Startup Cities Institute

Startup
Cities
A NEW APPROACH
TO REFORM
Table of
Contents
The Challenge of Traditional Political Reform......................................................
The Startup Cities Approach: Low-Risk Pilot Projects for Reform........................
Benefits of the Startup Cities Approach...............................................................
From Startup Cities to National Reform...............................................................
How Feasible are Startup Cities?........................................................................
Cases.................................................................................................................
Startup Cities on the Rise.................................................................................... Startup Cities on the Rise....................................................................................
Profile of Startup Cities Institute..........................................................................
Further Reading..................................................................................................
Contact...............................................................................................................
1
4
7
8
10
11
16 16
17
20
23
The Challenge of Traditional Political Reform
After a victory in a heated election, reformers are full of new ideas from their campaign platform. Inspired
citizens are ready for change. The new administration has plenty of money and its staff have
committed to improvement.
Governments may have everything on their side yet many reforms still fail. In the early years of a new
government, the failure of a reform demoralizes officials. Failure can cost a government the
support of citizens. Few administrations recover from defeat.
Reformers Reformers themselves often misunderstand the failure of reform. Many think that a reform has failed only
when Congress struggles to pass a new law or when courts strike down an idea. With a strong coalition
in Congress and no concerns about legal challenge, reformers assume they have everything they need
to change the nation. When the benefits of a policy dont arrive, things take a turn for the worst. People
blame lack of political will, insufficient spending, or an inexperienced new president for the defeat.
Reformers and analysts alike underestimate the risk of failure. Like entrepreneurship, reform is a high
risk risk project where failure is the norm rather than the exception. Sometimes special interests capture a
reform, twisting it into something the reformers never intended. Special interests may control the govern-
ment agencies in charge of executing a reform. These agencies may even behave like interest groups
themselves, standing in the way of change. This phenomenon, known as regulatory capture, can also
corrupt a reform.
Even with few special interests in the way, its easy to misunderstand a political problem. Entrepreneurs
sometimes design a fancy new product that no one wants to buy.
Reformers sometimes design policies that just dont solve the problem. Worse, reformers may be so
mistaken about complex new policies that they end up doing bad while trying to do good.
Despite anyones best efforts, political reform is complex. Complexity plagues attempts to remake
education, to restructure the legal system, or to fix security problems. National reform is a risky and
difficult process.
1
Traditional approaches to political reform increase the risk and likelihood that
reforms will fail. Reformers often hire the best and brightest ministers and advisors
available. They design a reform from the safety of an office or ministry and impose
that reform onto the entire nation with the hope it will succeed.
Complex problems do not lend themselves to easy solutions, writes Yaneer Bar-
Yam of the New England Complex Systems Institute, any action may have hidden
effects that cause matters to become worse and the whole strategy we are
using may be moving things in the wrong direction.
1
No matter how smart the hired experts may be, the complexity of politics is still
greater. Immense complexity means that it's unlikely that any particular reform will
solve a problem. When governments design reform from the safety of their offices
it becomes even harder to cope with complexity.
Reforms Reforms get no feedback from the real world until theyre already in place. Even the
best reformers are likely to miss important aspects of a new policy. Complex
problems of law and governance often need several pieces in place all at once for
a reform to be effective. But its hard to know what those pieces will be until after the
reform begins.
Failure Failure to consider the complexity of reform can lead to disastrous results. During
the privatization of large industries, the late Soviet Union broke firms up into shares
and sold them on the market. But there was no strong legal structure in place for
high-level financial transactions. Reformers quickly discovered that the reform
would fail.
Sure Sure enough, corrupt trading by political insiders dominated the sale of these
industries.
2
Even as the government became aware of their failure, it was too late.
After seizing control of these firms, insiders then blocked future reform efforts.
These firms remain politicized and controlled by a tiny elite in Russia today.
Entrepreneurs often say a business plan rarely survives contact with the
customer.
3
For the same reasons of uncertainty and complexity, a reform rarely
survives contact with the citizen.
1 Making Things Work:
Solving Complex Problems in
a Complex World by Yaneer
Bar-Yam, p. 14.

22 See Solomons Knot: How
Law Can End the Poverty of
Nations by Robert Cooter and
HansBernd Schfer for this
and several other stories
about legal reform.
3 For this and other
entrepreneurial maxims, entrepreneurial maxims,
consult Steve Blanks
The Startup Owners Manual
textbook series.
2
Traditional
approaches
to political reform to political reform
increase the risk
and likelihood
that reforms will
fail. Startup Cities
help reformers
cope with
complexity. complexity.
Traditional Approaches to Reform
are Expensive and Gamble the
Nations Future
Governments gamble the fate of the entire
nation with a reform designed in this
traditional way. If the reform is not well
designed, the entire nation suffers.
Citizens have no choice but to comply,
whether reform helps or harms them.
Ineffective Ineffective and unpopular reforms may be
met with protests or even violence. This is
risky for the nation as well as for a reformer
government. A single high-profile failure
can destroy the political support enjoyed
by reformers. Political realities often give
reformers only one chance to get it right.
Reform Reform designed at the national level also
leads to expensive mistakes. The launch of
the medical exchange website for the
Affordable Affordable Care Act in the United States,
Healthcare.gov, was a high-profile failure.
At launch, security holes and broken code
riddled the website. The price tag: between
$677 million and $1 billion.
The The failed launch of Healthcare.gov spread
through the internet. The government
faced a public relations nightmare. Even
with good intentions, a big budget, and
popular support, complexity overwhelmed
the reformers. In large nations with high
populations, any new program or change
introduced everywhere at once
comes at a high cost particularly if it
fails.
Startup Cities: A New Tool for
Reformers
A growing movement called Startup
Cities offers governments a new tool
to reform with less risk and a higher
chance of success.
Startup Cities take their name from
the organizational methods of
technology technology companies. Startups
work on the risky, complex frontiers
of innovation. Both reformers and
innovative entrepreneurs share simi innovative entrepreneurs share simi-
lar problems: too much complexity,
too little feedback, and huge risks for
making small errors. Business has
adapted well to these harsh realities.
Reformers, who you might call
political entrepreneurs, have only
begun to realize the power of the
Startup Cities approach.
The Startup Cities Approach:
Low-Risk Pilot Projects for
Reform
Startup Cities are small, highly
autonomous municipalities created
by host nations that want to reform.
Governments designate new or
existing municipalities as special
jurisdictions jurisdictions with significant autonomy
over tax and regulatory policy,
security, education, and other areas
of public policy.
Startup Cities are politically neutral.
Within the constraints of the nations
constitution, constitution, a city can test any new
bundle of public policies, technolo-
gies, or other reforms. Startup Cities
may be broad and enjoy a great deal
of autonomy in administration, with
independent courts, and a separate
municipal police force. Or Startup
Cities Cities may focus on a specific area
like education or attracting invest-
ment for a port.
4
Startup Cities bring the dynamic of agile, competitive entrepreneurship that works well in technology but
is absent from politics. The autonomy of Startup Cities jurisdictions create competition between zones.
Citizens are able to vote with their feet. People can move between cities much more easily and safely
than they can cross into another nation.
Competition Competition between zones creates tighter feedback for governments to know if their reform is working.
This competition between zones also creates strong incentives for innovation. Competing cities all need
to attract capital, citizens, and ideas to their municipality. So cities must be responsible and work to satisfy
citizens needs if they are to compete. Startup Cities create incentives for constant improvement in public
policy.
Competitive Competitive zones in the same nation have strong precedents. Douglas Zeng, an economist at the World
Bank, writes about Chinas Special Economic Zones, the hundreds of SEZs are highly competitive
among themselves. Each SEZ strives to distinguish itself in service, quality of infrastructure, and appear-
ance to attract new enterprises and reach the targeted development goals. Such competition helps make
them more efficient and competitive.
4
Competition also seeds innovation. Innovations pioneered by one zone can be easily copied by rival cities.
In the case of Chinas many special economic zones, competing jurisdiction quickly adopted successful
innovations like a new stock market.
5
Think of Startup Cities as prototypes for reform. They're a way for a government to immediately start to
change the nation without the risks and expense of traditional, national reform.
Although Although they share some elements, Startup Cities are not traditional Special Economic Zones. SEZs
have a mixed history. Some generate many jobs and growth and others fail entirely. SEZs focus on tax
and regulatory policies. Some subsidize favored industries.
Startup Cities are not just tools of fiscal and regulatory policy. Yes, governments can use municipal au-
tonomy to offer streamlined regulations and attractive tax rates. These are important parts of a healthy
business environment. Broader autonomy gives Startup Cities better options to attract business and also
empower citizens. Nations already compete to offer low tax rates. Startup Cities give nations even more
options to compete: comprehensive legal reforms, anticorruption measures, security reform, education
and social services, and new projects in infrastructure and urban design.
4 How Do Special Economic
Zones and Industrial Clusters
Drive Chinas Rapid Develop-
ment by D.Z. Zeng (2010),
p. 22.
5 See Laboratories for
Capitalism: Testing the Limits
of the Special Economic
Zones of Mainland China by
Payton Alexander. Published
by SCI.
5
Startup Cities
bring
to politics
the agile,
competitive
dynamic
that drives
progress in progress in
technology.
Benefits of the Startup Cities Approach
Many benefits for a host nation arise from the Startup Cities approach.
Startup Cities:
1) Lower the risks of reform and allow governments to cope with the complexity of their projects
2) Significantly lower the cost of pursuing reform
3) Increase the chance of discovering effective reforms for the national level
4) Help overcome special interest opposition to reform
Lower Risk, Localized Failure
With Startup Cities any failures or oversights by reformers are confined to the city. While still unfortunate,
failures do not affect the entire nation. Startup Cities localize risk and error.
Working first at the municipal level allows the government to see their reforms in action with real citizens
before they commit to new policies on the national level. Citizens and reformers can get real-world
feedback feedback in a safe, controlled environment. Cities are smaller and more agile. A safe environment is even
more important with sweeping or radical reforms. Its easier to switch directions in a small startup than in
a large corporation. For reformers, its easier to switch directions in a city than in a nation.
In Startup Cities governments can refine policies until theyre ready to deploy on the national level.
Lower Cost of Reform
Reforms are cheaper to execute at the city level than the national level. New agencies and staff gain
experience at the city level before managing a massive national project. The size of the zone contains
costly errors and budget overruns. Costs dont spread across the entire nation. Startup Cities allow reform-
ers to test and check the effectiveness of reforms before the government commits millions or billions of
dollars at the national level.
Nations often subsidize reform projects. Instead, Startup Cities can raise money for the central
government. Startup Cities may pledge a part of their revenue to the central government in exchange for
autonomy and as payment for national services like defense. This revenue can go straight into a general
fund. Or, governments can commit revenue to a sovereign wealth fund or national trust. These trusts can
pay for education, security, womens empowerment, or any other important cause.
7
From Startup Cities to National Reform
Startup Cities are ideal incubators for national reform. Although reforms start at the
level of the municipality, they dont need to stay there.
Existing zones with less autonomy than Startup Cities have already proven to be
pioneers:
Shenzhen, a special economic zone in China, was the first to introduce a free
labour market and opened Chinas first stock exchange; Zhuhai implemented
the first system of local legislation; Shantou was the first to legalize individual
self-funded enterprises; and Hainan radically streamlined the process of self-funded enterprises; and Hainan radically streamlined the process of
registering companies. All of these reforms were pioneered by one of the
zones, then seen to be successful and adopted by the other zones, and finally
gained sufficient confidence from the national government to be implemented
nationwide.
6
Startup Startup Cities create safe environments to test and develop reforms. Governments
can then bring these reforms to the national level. One scholar calls the highly au-
tonomous Special Economic Zones on the coast of China an assembly line for
national reform.
6 Laboratories for Capitalism:
Testing the Limits of the Spe-
cial Economic Zones of Main-
land China by Payton Alexan-
der, p. 50. Published by SCI.
8
Overcoming Special Interests
Large coalitions of special interests often block reform. National reform commits
the entire populace to new policies. Any change at the national level encourages
special interests to join together against reform.
Startup Cities do not commit the entire nation to reform at least not at first.
Piloting Piloting reforms in a small area does not threaten the entire national network of
special interests. If new policies are first tried at the local level its harder for special
interests to form large coalitions to oppose them. Some special interests may actu-
ally stand to gain from better governance in a small area. This pits one group of
special interests against the other in favor of reform. While still a challenge, reform-
ers may find it easier to organize coalitions in favor of reform at the city level. Size
changes the structure of reform.
Startup Cities
are safe,
politically
neutral
environments
to test and
develop
reforms. reforms.
The visible, real-world experience of
citizens citizens in Startup Cities generates its own
spontaneous support. Its hard to argue
with results. Some skeptics or those previ-
ously uninterested in reform will join coali-
tions to support it. These are the seeds of a
national reform movement. What begins in
a small area can grow into a national pro
gram.
As Startup Cities succeed under new
reforms, opposition becomes more difficult
for groups who stand in the way. Political
conversations are often caught in the
abstract. Neither side is able to test their
views. Startup Cities help cut through the
rhetoric. Its hard to argue with more jobs,
safer streets, or successful new schools.
How Feasible are Startup Cities?
Every year, nations incorporate new
municipalities to accommodate
population population growth. These new cities are
usually just administrative units, without
much control over their future. The first
step to Startup Cities reform is simple.
Governments only need to grant new and
existing municipalities wider autonomy.
Many Many precedents already exist for highly
autonomous, small, competitive political
units. Small nations have already
proven their ability to compete on the
international stage. Liechtenstein and
Switzerland have used powerful and
effective effective local governance to become
some of the wealthiest and safest
places on earth.
7
Singapore and
Hong Kong grew from poor backwa-
ters to economic powerhouses. Na-
tions like Estonia and Georgia have
proven that smaller political units can
be more agile and reform faster than
large nations.
Nations with a tradition of federalism
through states or provinces, like the
United States and Canada, also apply
these principles. The laboratory of
the states enjoys a long tradition in
American politics. Cities bring even
more vigorous competition than large
states or provinces create.
Occasionally, developing nations
experiment with free trade zones, or
import-export import-export processing zones.
These may seem superficially like
Startup Cities. But they do not enjoy
the autonomy necessary to be
complete complete tools for reform. Their lack
of autonomy has given them a mixed
history, where some succeed and
many others fail completely.
Startup Cities bring all these tools
together. together. While "free trade zones"
focus just on business or tax policy,
the greater autonomy of Startup
Cities allows reformers to address all
public policy problems
comprehensively. comprehensively. Startup Cities dont
need radical changes. No one needs
to refound a nation on the model of
Switzerland. Startup Cities just need
competition between highly
autonomous municipalities.
Countries Countries have already begun to take
steps towards Startup Cities.
7 See The State in the Third
Millennium by Prince
Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein
10
In 2002, Dubai designated a small 110-acre patch of desert as the Dubai Interna-
tional Financial Center.
Two years later, the DIFC opened its doors. Besides offering traditional
incentives incentives like lower taxes, the DIFC also enjoyed an independent legal system.
Built on English Common Law, this legal system attracted over 750 firms by 2008.
The DIFC began to competitively market its services to firms around the world.
They even issued press releases that advertise the credibility and transparency of
their institutions. None of this would have been possible in a traditional Special
Economic Zone focused only on taxes.
Greater Greater autonomy gave the DIFC the agility it needed to behave like a startup com-
pany. The results were clear. By 2008 the zone attracted more than $18 billion in
infrastructure investment from the private sector more than all Sub-Saharan
Africa, excluding South Africa, combined.
8
8 See The Legal Autonomy of
the Dubai International
Financial Center by Michael
Strong and Robert Himber
Cases
With the Startup Cities approach now outlined, we can look at some possible uses
for Startup Cities reform. These examples reflect real problems and proposals,
though not all are real-world projects.
Case 1: Education
A nation with low-performing schools wants to reform their school system.
Reformers are at a dead end. They study successful nations but find the same
problems everywhere. Even wealthy countries like the United States constantly
tinker with their national education systems. Yet they rarely achieve their goals.
National National education reform seems impossible. Teachers groups can be powerful
special interests that meet every new change or reform with hostility. Bureaucracy
and financial commitments seem to stop all change. Education workers are
unwilling or unable to retrain or change their habits.
The new government designates multiple jurisdictions as Startup Cities focused on
education. Within the cities, neighborhood boards administer schools. This allows
the government to run many experiments in education at once.
Reformers within the cities tailor the existing network of schools to the local Reformers within the cities tailor the existing network of schools to the local
conditions. Some give students practical skills to join the workforce.
11
Nations
committed to
reform have
already begun to
take steps toward
Startup Cities.
Others build high-achieving training centers for innovation and technology.
It was easy to allow for new models of schooling operated by private entities, too.
Independent courts and a common law legal system attracted investment in education.
Labor law reform at the municipal level loosened the hold of special interests.
Autonomy and the smaller scale of the reform gave the government a cheaper and less
complex job when they worked to retrain, restaff, and reform. After 5 years of
experience in these zones, one approach outshined all the others. The national experience in these zones, one approach outshined all the others. The national
government decided to adopt that approach throughout the country.
Case 2: Security
Violence and crime haunt the streets of a large developing city. A new government
takes power on a platform to restore law and order. Without enough resources, the
government is unable to control large portions of the countryside. In the fight against
organized crime, the government looks to municipalities for security reform.
After a popular referendum passes, the government designates several
populated areas as Startup Cities. They also choose several sparsely inhabited
regions regions near their coast as Startup Cities, hoping to attract investment and build a
major port.
Reformed labor and contract law allows the municipality to restructure the police force
from the ground up. First, they train a small, elite new force. Rigorous
background checks ban any officers with a history of corruption or criminality from the
force. This elite security team deploys into the most dangerous parts of the cities. All
officers wear cameras at all times. The city advertises this policy as part of their
commitment commitment to transparency and anti-corruption. To outfit this small team of officers
was cheap and simple for the reformers.
As it turned out, police cameras lowered both police abuse and violence against the
officers.
9
New methods of policing borrowed from private security agencies helped cut
violent crime even more. As this new municipal force proved its effectiveness, the city
phased out their old force and replaced it with police known for integrity and effective-
ness. The government eventually brought new techniques
9 See In California, A
Champion for Police
Cameras in New York
Times for the success of
cameras on police in
Rialto, California.
August 21, 2013.
13
tested by these cities to the national police.
The municipal government paired security reform with new software to make
finances more transparent. After its successful use by several zones, the national
government adopted the same software.
With With security improved, people returned to the streets at night. New businesses
opened, no longer fearing extortion. New business and investment meant greater
jobs, which helped get young men prone to violence off the street. Tourists even
started coming to the citys historic districts. Already, the nation was on its way to a
virtuous cycle of peace and economic development.
10
Case 3: Jobs
After decades of sluggish economic growth, a reformer government took power with
one goal: create jobs. Government officials consulted with several business leaders
about their biggest obstacles to growth. Then they designated several jurisdictions
as Startup Cities focused on economic development.
These zones did not rely on the aging and corrupt bureaucracy inherited from
past past administrations. Each zone offered a simple, one-stop shop to incorporate a
business or notarize contracts. Small business owners could complete all these
processes in days, rather than months or years. Borrowing a system from
Singapore, citizens began to pay taxes online in minutes through a secure, stream-
lined website.
With low taxes, independent courts, and easy access to private arbitration,
businesses from abroad were eager to set up shop in these cities. Autonomy gave
zones the flexibility to negotiate with international trading partners and attract
investment.
At first, only large businesses flocked to the zones to incorporate. Soon, small and
medium-sized enterprises from the host nation began moving as well. After 7 years,
these zones became some of the fastest growing jurisdictions in the world with
10 See Georgias
Rose Revolution by
Larisa Burakova and Robert
E. Lawson. Published by
Antigua Forum.
14
Startup Cities
allow
governments
to emulate the
bottom-up, trial
and error process
of startup
entrepreneurship. entrepreneurship.
annual GDP growth of 10% or more.
11

Citizens flocked to the city, eager to open
small formal businesses rather than selling
their wares in the street. Unemployment
started to fall for the first time in decades.
11 The DIFC reported growth
rates of 14% for 2013
(http://www.difc.ae/overview-
13).
16
Case 4: Public-Private Partnerships
Streets filled with potholes slowed the
arrival of government ambulances and fire
trucks on their way to accidents. Even on
better streets, these unreliable services
sometimes still did not show up at all.
Fed Fed up with corruption and waste in public
services, a reformer government creates
several Startup Cities. The autonomy
enjoyed by these municipal governments
allowed them to create sweeping reform of
city services.
The administration put out clear,
competitive competitive contracts for everything from
road building to the issuance of building
permits. One year later, a foreign logistics
firm with an international reputation beat
out all other applicants on price and
quality.
City City services were completely restructured
from the inside. The firm handled nearly
everything. The municipality was able to
drastically cut back their workforce.
Citizens were thrilled as quality
improved. Reformers were happy to
see that these competitive contracts
allowed them to pay only one third of
what they used to.
With With roads and other services taken
care of, municipalities were able to
focus themselves on security. Cities
were able to take their savings from
competitive contracting to better fight
crime in the streets.
Learn Learn more about this model as it was
used in Sandy Springs, Georgia in
our publication The Contract City by
municipal reformer Oliver Porter.
Startup Cities on the Rise
The world is urbanizing quickly. The
U.N. estimates that by 2050 the
overwhelming overwhelming majority of the worlds
population will live in cities: 6.3 billion
people. Human beings will soon
become an urban species. Cities can
become ungovernable hot beds for
unrest and crime. Or they can be
powerful, effective tools to improve
governance in the 21st century. governance in the 21st century.
Startup Cities signal to the populace
that a government is serious about
change. Cities need municipal
autonomy autonomy to become tools for reform.
Governments can show their commit-
ment to the nation in a credible,
public, and swift way with Startup
Cities.
Startup Cities also allow governments
to show their commitment to
prudence. Autonomous municipalities
to pilot reform is a bold vision that can
inspire citizens. By mitigating risk,
Startup Cities allow governments to
avoid charges of being reckless or
pursuing utopian policies that ignore
the needs of citizens.
Startup Cities give reformers the chance to cut through complexity, to learn which
reforms will stick at the national level, and to avoid massive national failures if
something goes wrong.
The rise of small reformer nations like Georgia and Estonia, the growth of special
zones like the Dubai International Financial Center and Hong Kong, and the
growing economic importance of cities all point to a common future.
The tools and precedents for Startup Cities are available. They only need bold and
visionary reformers to bring them to life. visionary reformers to bring them to life.
Profile of Startup Cities Institute
Startup Cities Institute (SCI) is a nonprofit research organization that studies the
use of startup communities for legal and political reform. These special governance
zones, called Startup Cities, are small and highly autonomous jurisdictions
established within pre-existing nations. Governments use Startup Cities to create
inclusive economic growth, combat corruption and insecurity, and to test public
policy innovations in public services, transparency, and environmental stewardship.
SCI SCI has grown to be the worlds leading resource for this approach to reform. Were
working to find answers to the hard questions that reformers face. Most of these
tough questions arise as governments execute Startup Cities reform. For
infrastructure and design, how can you build a minimum viable community that
attracts citizens but doesnt waste investment? What kinds of laws are the most ef-
fective to create adaptable city governments? How can you build an accountable
police force from the ground up?
Startup Cities Institute was created in 2013. SCI began to promote the idea that law
and governance is a technology just like a cell phone or a computer. Startup Cities
are a tool to bring the experimental, entrepreneurial methods of startup culture to
political reform. The Startup Cities approach allows host nations to pilot new forms
of governance in a low-risk environment of competing zones, similar to competing
technology startups. SCI is based in Guatemala City at Universidad Francisco Mar-
roqun, one of Latin Americas leading universities.
17
Startup Cities
Institute focuses
on the
nuts-and-bolts nuts-and-bolts
challenges faced
by nations as
they pursue
Startup Cities.
Startup Cities Institute is not a traditional think tank. Its structure reflects its
commitment to startup thinking. SCI maintains a small team in Guatemala that
remotely manages projects from an international network of collaborators. This
distributed think tank allows people from all over the world to stay involved.
SCI draws on all the resources of Universidad Francisco Marroqun. It merges
project-based project-based learning at the university with research on Startup Cities. Student and
faculty teams research and generate business or design prototypes for concrete
solutions to public policy problems. Projects range from areas like healthcare to law
to public transit.
Speakers Speakers from SCI are sought after by media outlets and events around the world.
SCI has worked with mayors, reformers, ministers, entrepreneurs, activists, and
technologists from the United States, Africa, Europe, and throughout Central and
South America. SCI has been profiled by Virgin.coms Entrepreneur magazine and
interviewed by numerous international media outlets, including Foreign Policy.
Events by SCI all run a unique format of open collaboration no weekends spent
listening listening to lectures. Participants self-organize into teams. These teams build proto-
types over the course of a few intense days to compete for a prize.
SCI also publishes work relevant to the entrepreneurial approach to community
building. SCIs books include a reprint of Spencer MacCallums The Art of
Community and a new work by American municipal reformer Oliver Porter, The
Contract City.
SCIs SCIs other projects include Locality, a library of laws and legislation that show how
nations create local autonomy around the world; Ulex, an open-source legal system;
and Lean City Lab, a partnership with Nobel Laureate Vernon Smiths Center for
Experimental Economics to guide reforming nations with randomized controlled
trials and economic experiments.
We are growing and always searching for new ways to improve the Startup Cities
approach to reform.
19
Further
Reading
Alexander, Payton. "Laboratories for Capitalism: Testing the Limits of the Special Economic Zones
of Mainland China." Thesis. Startup Cities Institute, 2014. Web.
Arthur, W. Brian. The Nature of Technology: What It Is and How It Evolves. New York: Free, 2009.
Bar-Yam, Yaneer, Chitra Ramalingam, Laurie Burlingame, and Cherry Ogata. Making Things Work:
Solving Complex Problems in a Complex World. Cambridge, MA: NECSI, Knowledge, 2004. Print.
Beinhocker, Eric D. The Origin of Wealth: Evolution, Complexity, and the Radical Remaking of Eco-
nomics. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School, 2006. Print.
Blank, Steven G., and Bob Dorf. The Startup Owner's Manual. the Step-by-step Guide for Building a
Great Company. Pescadero, CA: K&S Ranch, 2012. Print.
Burakova, Larisa, and Robert E. Lawson. Georgia s Rose Revolution: How One Country Beat the
Odds, Transformed Its Economy, and Provided a Model for Reformers Everywhere. Guatemala City:
Antigua Forum, 2014. Web.
Chiu, Stephen WingKai, KongChong Ho, and Dale L. City-states in the Global Economy: Industrial
Restructuring in Hong Kong and Singapore. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997. Print. 20
Colander, David C., and Roland Kupers. Complexity and the Art of Public Policy: Solving Soci-
ety's Problems from the Bottom up. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2014. Print.
Cooter, Robert, and HansBernd Schfer. Solomon's Knot: How Law Can End the Poverty of Na-
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Contact
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Startup Cities Institute
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