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COMMISSION SENSITIVE
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ME MORANDUM FOR THE RE CORD
Event: Maj or David McNul ty, Chief of Intel l igence, 121
s t
Fighter Squadron, Air
National Guard, Andrews Air ForceBas e
Type: Interview
Date: March 11, 2004
Special Acces s Is s ues : Cl earances pas s ed
Team: 8
Prepared by: Lis a Sul l ivan
Location: Andrews Air ForceBas e Air National Guard Wing
Participants (non-Commis s ion): Heather LoBue, J AG
Participants (Commis s ion): Lis aSul l ivan, Mil es Kara, andKevin Shaeffer
Background
[FOUOJ Major McNul ty is anROTC graduate fromBos ton Univers ity. Hewent on
active duty in 1994andhas been acareer intel l igence officer ever s ince. His as s ignments
incl ude Shaw Air ForceBas e, 1994-1996; fighter weapons s chool ; Kuns on Air Force
Bas e, Korea, J ul y 1997-J ul y 1998; Davis -Montham Air Force Bas e, J ul y 1997-April
2001. At that point, hel eft active duty and as s umed anAGR with the 113
th
, s Wing with
is active guard res erve (ful l -time). Heis theful l -time intel l igence officer for the 121
s t
fighter s quadron. His duties currentl y areabout thes ame as they were on 9-11. The
chief at thetime was Lt Col Suzanne Karow, but s hewas not inthebuil ding that day. On
9-11, hewas the s enior intel l igence officer of the 113
th
Wing; Major Borukin was the
s enior intel l igence officer for the89
th
Air Lift Wing.
89
th
Air Lift Wing
[FOUOJ Theoutfit is aful l -time mis s ion to s upport dis tinguis hed vis itors to theBas e,
whereas the 113
th
Wing is atenant. The 89
th
Air Lift Wing provides himhigh-l evel
information (TS - Sens itive Compartmental ized Information which is received at the s s "
Air Lift Wing' s facil ity ands haredwith McNul ty); they al s o do s ometraining exchanges .
Intel l igence officer for the 121
s t
Fighter Squadron
[FOUOJ McNul ty' s intel l igence facil ity is as ecret-col l ateral facil ity. He andMajor
Borukin worked cl os el y interms of current intel l igence. McNul ty had aTS-SCI
cl earance; al though hedidnot havemuch need for it before 9-11.
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[FOUO] When he took the job of intel l igence officer for the l 13
th
Wing in the s pring of
2001, the pos ition had been vacant for about s ix months . Prior to that, Maj or Bil l y
Hutchins on had fil l ed the rol e as an additional duty.
[FOUO] Once he took over, he does not recal l any s pecific information rel ated to
domes tic threats the s ummer before 9-11; the picture of the threat was oriented on the
Middl e Eas t. He was accus tomed to that outl ook from his previous as s ignments as an
intel l igence officer at Davis -Montham. He had s ix tours " in the des ert" [SW As ia]prior
to joining the l 13
th
Wing. As an intel l igence officer he was primaril y concerned with
where his men were going to depl oy and what was the terroris t threat there; the Arabian
Penins ul a was the s ource of al ot of that chatter.
[FOUO] Avenues ofInformation avail abl e to him: Air Combat Command through
Langl ey AFB and 9
th
Air Force Command down at Shaw. Both of thes e channel s were
focus ed on overs eas information. He al s o had apers onal contact at the NSA and Agent
Bouchamp from the Secret Service (that was the extent of McNul ty' s contact with l aw
enforcement). McNul ty added that Bouchamp' s duty s tation was the 89
th
Wing - control
tower - where he tracked pres idential movements . Otherwis e, McNul ty did not have
regul ar or continuous contact with any other federal agencies on 9-11.
On 9-11:
[FOUO] At 8: 00AM McNul ty was in a s chedul ing meeting in the conference room at the
113
th
Wing. Al s o with him were pil ots Sas s evil l e, Caine, and Val entine. The meeting
was interrupted to tel l them about the firs t pl ane hitting the Worl d Trade Center. Their
firs t as s umption was that it was an accident. They continued the meeting until
commotion in the hal l way interrupted them and they l earned of the s econd pl ane that
went into Tower I of the Worl d Trade Center. He went to the operations area; McNul ty
s at at the operations des k (the SOF-Supervis or of Fl ying= des k) for about five minutes
and then wal ked down to the vaul t. He thought SIPRINET (Secret col l ateral network)
woul d have information on the event. He cal l ed the national agencies feel ing as though
" he was waking up the national agencies " as he contacted them. The ones he thought to
cal l incl ude the National SIGINT Operations Center at NSA- they were doing what he
was doing and they had nothing to report. He tried to cal l s omeone in the Watch at the
FBI. " It was a fruitl es s effort. "
[FOUO] McNul ty returned to the Operations Des k. At this point, Major Caine was on
the phone with Major Bouchamp. The initial convers ation was about how they were
going to get the Bul l y fighters home (a three-s hip training mis s ion to the Dare Range in
North Carol ina) becaus e FAA was s hutting down the air s pace. He overheard the
convers ation in which Major Hutchins on (Bul l y fl ight l ead) was al ready heading back to
Bas e and was tol d to " go ID that thing coming up the river. " It was at about that time the
White Hous e J oint Operations Center (J OC) Special Agent Garrambito cal l ed the Wing.
Bouchamp may have facil itated the connection between the WH J OC and the Wing' s
operations des k. McNul ty was not pos itive who cal l ed who firs t. McNul ty thinks the
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cal l probabl y took pl ace around 9: 15 AM. Several phone cal l s took pl ace; he thought
Major Caine, the SOF, tal ked to the WH J OC jus t after 10AM. Meanwhil e, As s is tant
Senior Airman Garcia was cal l ing l ocal l aw enforcement agencies . McNul ty was hims el f
running between Caine and Garcia and his vaul t trading information as it became known.
[FOUO] After the North tower col l aps ed, McNul ty l eft the facil ity to drive acros s Bas e to
~here the 89
th
Air Lift Wing had its SCl F. There was no information on the events
pos ted on the TS-SCI channel s avail abl e to him there, either (SIPRl NET, J WICS, etc).
He recal l ed a s ingl e critic mes s age that came out of the NSA. [Note: NSA provided that
critic and it s houl d be in the fil es at K Street. It is not particul arl y res pons ive. ]
I
[FOUO] The initial threat picture McNul ty got was from Agent Garambito and it was
" cl oudy at bes t" becaus e it incl uded information s uch as abomb at the State Department.
This cal l was at 10: 30-10: 45 AM. He pinned that time to when CAPS 01 (Sas s evil l e)
firs t l aunched which was approximatel y 10: 45 AM. They s toppedfor a s econd to figure
out what was going on. They eras ed the white board on which they were noting
information and turned off the TV becaus e, according to him, " at that point they [news
media and Secret Service] were reporting crap, " s uch as the State Department had been
bl own up, etc.
[FOUO] They never memoral ized what was written on the white board bas ed on Agent
Garambito' s input. Bas ical l y, it was " how many aircraft do we have hijacked?" and they
s tarted to keep al is t of pl anes that were s us pect. He recal l s there were 8airl ines
unaccounted for. Garambito gave them the fl ight numbers : AAL 11, UAL 175, UAL 93,
" a Del ta 1989 was apoint of cons ternation, " and acoupl e of fl ights from overs eas . Next,
they wanted to verify from two s ources (if pos s ibl e) the s tatus of the fl ights . At this point
there s ounded l ike there was another wave of airpl anes coming at us ; the Guard had s ent
afighter up (Bul l y 1- Major Hutchins on) to check out what was coming down the river,
and it was n' t until l ater that they real ized the pl ane in ques tion might be UAL 93 which
had cras hed in Penns yl vania. [Note: according to FAA tapes and trans cripts the " pl ane"
was actual l y an Army National Guard hel icopter bas ed out of Davis on Fiel d, Fort
Bel voir, Virginia, which had become is ol ated in Maryl and as events unfol ded and which
wanted to return to its home fiel d. ]
Situational Awareness and Unit Status
[FOUO] What s ituational awarenes s did Major Hutchins on have when he went back up
to ID the pl ane coming down the river? McNul ty tol d the Commis s ion that to his
knowl edge, Hutchins on had got s ome information from the tanker he refuel ed from in
North Carol ina to the effect that s omething had happened in New York. He was fairl y
l ow on fuel when he l anded. Lt Col Phil Thomps on had rel ieved Major Caine as SOF and
directed Hutchins on to immediatel y take off, des pite l ow fuel . Hutchins on received no
s pecific ROE except to identify the aircraft coming up the river.
[FOUO] That week, the unit had come back from aRed Fl ag exercis e at Nel l is in
Nevada, an intens ive training event. Monday was adown day; Tues day was al ight
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fl ying day which was why they l aunched athree-s hip (Bul l y fl ight) that morning rather
than an eight s hip that they normal l y woul d have fl own. There were few pil ots and pl anes
avail abl e that morning. Pl anes were configured for travel (two gas pods , travel pods and
Captive Aim-One Twenty rounds that they carry for tonnage " dummy rounds " ). This
configuration s hortened the time needed to bring the pl anes back up; and the dummy
rounds appeared from the ground to be armed. Seven pil ots were avail abl e, three of them
were fl ying in North Carol ina.
Bul l y fl ight: Hutchins on, Campbel l , Hagis .
Sas s evil l e, Caine, Ras mus s en, Drifter Val entine, Heather Penny were the
other pil ots in the buil ding.
(FOVO) Concerning Hutchins on' s immediate takeoff; he was tol d to ID s omething
coming down the river. As far as McNul ty recal l ed, Hutchins on was not given s pecific
ROE. It is McNul ty' s unders tanding the information about the pl ane coming down the
river came from the White Hous e J oint Operations Center. McNul ty, meanwhil e, was
trying to figure out what pl ane it was that Hutchins on was l ooking for. VAL 93 and AAL
77 were s til l unaccounted for at this point and they hada good idea which of the pl anes
went into the Worl d Trade Centers (AAL 11 and VAL 175). He s pecified that he us ed a
two-s ource rul e to val idate information and that accounted for his s tatus on the four
hij acked aircraft at that point in time.
ROE
181General Wherl ey was on the phone with the White Hous e J OC; s omeone in the Secret
Service and was s aying get me s omeone in the mil itary. There was no official ROE for
the pil ots to s ign acknowl edgement for at that time. CAPS 01 and 02 went out the door
with apicture of the threat in their head, but no s pecific guidance. At 11 a. m. Lt Col
Thomps on, the SOF, rel ayed over the radio to the fighters : " l ook to turn anything away
before you do anything el s e. " This was the cl os es t thing to an official ROE that McNul ty
remembers any pil ot receiving that day. .
General Wherley and Sasseville/Penny conversations:
~ Wherl ey s aid that targets were headed toward downtown and he knew that they
needed to keep al l pl anes away from the Was hington D. C. area. McNul ty did not
remember the term " weapons free" being us ed by General . Wherl ey.
[FOVOJ There was zero information about Langl ey fighters al ready in CAP over
Was hington D. C. He didn' t know what NEADS [Northeas t Air Defens e Sector] was ;
Huntres s [NEADS cal l s ign] was s omething they were famil iar with iri training; " we were
s tupid when it came to Air Defens e of the VS that day, " he s tated.
[FOVOJ Sas s evil l e and Penny went up with l ead/concrete rounds , 110rounds apiece.
The maintenance crews did agreat job getting the pl anes l oaded and ready to go.
Caine and Ras mus s en (Wil d 01 and 02) were waiting for their weapons to be l oaded.
Wil d 01 and 02 got offthe ground at 11: 09 AM. At that time, McNul ty was working on
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thewhiteboard which was agonizingl y s l ow. Around 11: 30-is hit s eemed l ike another
wave of hijacks were coming fromovers eas becaus e awhol e other s eries of pl anes
s quawking emergency. Later it was determined theemergency s quawk was becaus e they .
were al l diverted to Canada.
Threats to AFI
[FOUO] Senior Airman Garcia andhims el f weretal king al l day to theJ OC - anopen
s ecure l ine. McNul ty never heard of any threat to API ontheopen l ineto theJ OC, nor
didhehear threat information directed at AP1fromany other s ourceuntil much l ater in
theafternoon when Sas s evil l e andPenny picked upAPI to es cort it home.
Mission Reports (MISREPS)
[FOUO] Air Traffic Control hadl os t contact with afew aircraft ontheeas t coas t; he
debriefed Major Hutchins on; hefiredoff amis s ion report to 9
th
Air Force, Air Combat
Command, and about everybody except NEADS (theentity hewas unaware had air
defens e res pons ibil ity).
J . Sr At 11: 35AM Rais in' (Caine' s cal l s ign- heis airborne by now) wanted athreat
picture becaus e hewas frus trated andMcNul ty, who was al s o frus trated, had nothing new
to tel l him. There were s til l pl anes unaccounted for; information was s tarting to trickl e in
that apl anehad cras hed inPenns yl vania. By noon everything ontheir l is t is cros s ed off.
Therewere emergency fl ights abroad. Hewent over the 89
th
wing andat about 1: 45he .
got acopy of thes ecure fax with theJ CS-a roved ROE. Onthat da he concl uded
they were s u ortin the 89
th
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(a) I
DEFCON 3
J 81Heheard about it after it was es tabl is hed at 11: 09AM. About noon, he l earned of it
hims el f onas huttl erun to the 89
th
. " Weapons Free" was not mentioned to the firs t 4
pil ots . [Note: 5incl uding Hutchins on] Later fl ights were as kedto s ignthe faxed ROE-
that was s ometime after 2PM that afternoon.
Hutchinson's first flight recapitulated
[FOUO] McNul ty s aidthat Hutchins on was s ent upthePotomac, did as pin by
Georgetown, s awthes moke out of thePentagon, andreported there were aton of
hel icopters inthearea. Heknew it was n' t a s mal l airpl ane that hit thePentagon.
At s omepoint l ater intheday s omeone s aidwel come to theworl d of theNorth Eas t Air
Defens e.
10:05 AM ATIS message
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[FOUO] Andrews Tower s tartedbroadcas ting over theATIS (Air Traffic Information
Sys tem) at about 10: 05AM warning pl anes that if they entered Cl as s B airs pace they
woul d bes hot down. McNul ty s aidit was pretty horrifying tohear that. Hedid not hear
themes s age until Bul l y 01was back onthedeck. Hes pun thetapeto get atake off time
- that mes s age was heard prior toBul l y two (Hutchins on' s wingman) l anding fromNorth
Carol ina. After Hutchins on l andedwes tarted s aving tapes but then weran out of tapes
s owehadto s tart reus ing them.
(FOUO) McNul ty acknowl edged that theWil d cockpit tapetheCommis s ion was
provided was probabl y fromafl ight l ater intheday with thes ame cal l s ign becaus e they
werereus ing tapes . Therefore, Caine' s Wil d cockpit tape l ikel y does not exis t.
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