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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
Event: Interview of General Richard Myers
Typeof Event: Interview
Date: February 17,2004
Prepared by: Dana Hyde
Classification: Secret
DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2012-047, document no. 4
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: September 29,2014
TeamNumber: 8
Location: Pentagon
Participants - Non-Commission: General Richard Myers, Major General Maples
Participants -Commission: PhilipZelikow,Bonnie J enkins, J ohn Farmer,
SteveDunne and Michael Hurley
Tenur easCI NCNORAD
Myers assumed thepost of CINCNORAD inAugust of 1998. At that time thenumberof
NORAD alert sites was 7, down from22at theheight of the Cold War. Myers
summarized NORAD's day-to-day mission as (1) guarding against thethreat of aballistic
missile attack, and (2) providing air defense for theNorth American continent.
Myers vaguely recalled the 1997QDR recommendation to further cut NORAD's alert
sites- from7to 4. Hedidnot specifically address why that recommendation was not
carried out by 2001; hedescribed theoverall issue as whether NORAD's air defense
mission was still relevant, givenNORAD's outward focus and orientation.
Myers recalled that prior to 9111NORAD was concerned about theFAA's plans to'
change its radar systems. NORAD sharedtheinterior radar picture with the FAA -
through theJ oint Surveillance System- andthe issue of who maintained this systemwas
important to NORAD.
NORAD's radar coverage inthenorth was better than its radar coverage inthesouth,
which Myers described as"somewhat spotty." NORAD was not ableto "correlate" over
50%of theunknown tracks itpicked up- either because NORAD could not get
interceptor involvement intime or because it could not track themappropriately. A
number of the unknown tracks werepilots flying off flight plans, helicopters servicing oil .
platforms, or other targets that wouldjust disappear beforeNORAD could correlate them
with theFAA: Thesituation was well understood "up here," but tolerated because the
only external threat at thetimewas Russia.
Interms ofNORAD's mission in 1998,Myers stated that "every country has aninherent
right of air sovereignty" andthat NORAD hadplans ontheshelf -- should thethreat to
thenation change =: to expand itsfleet. "We could goupto 3,000fighters dedicated to
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thedefense of theNorth American continent - that was theplan." Headded that we
didn't seethethreat, but wanted tobeready. The mission was air sovereignty.
Myers could not confirmthat hetold the Chairman, upon taking command ofNORAD,
that hecould provide air sovereignty inname only. Herecalled making sure that the
people inthePentagon knew that NORAD could not correlate well over 50%of the
unknown tracks it picked up. "1do remember making surepeople inthis building were
aware -- don't think we're providing 100%air sovereignty here... we're looking outward,
and anumber of thosetracks arenever correlated."
NORAD had adrug interdiction mission when called upon to "flight follow." NORAD
would behanded off anaircraft, follow it, andreport where it landed.
Myers did not recall thework of the"Role andMission" team, nor its briefing with UBL
onthecover. Hestated that inconnection with the internal radar issue, "1saw aletter 1
put out talking about apotential terrorist issue... that's why youwould want these radars
up.. .it's kind of afuture issue." (NB: Hard to catch complete quote; no follow up onthis
subject).
Myers was asked ifduring his tenure asCINCNORAD anyone inNORAD ever
postulated anair breathing terrorist threat of any kind. Heresponded "no, not to my
knowledge, never." Myers was also not aware of any exercises during his tenure that
postulated the.useof suicide aircraft. That would haveraised theROE issue, hesaid,
which only came upin connection with thePayne Stewart aircraft. "1don't recall ever
doing anything vis avieterrorists or any of that business - it would have raised this
.whole ROE - 1might bemistaken andI just don't remember, or maybe it was happening
and I didn't know about it - but I doubt it."
In.thecase of Payne Steward, NORAD requested authorization fromWashington - from'
thePresident - to shoot down theaircraft before it flewinto amajor city. Myers recalled
that such authority was granted,but theissuebecame moot when the aircraft went down
inafield.
Myers could not recall any involvementin air space controls associated with National
.Security Special Events (e.g., Atlanta Olympics, NATO 50
th
Anniversary, Genoa G-8).
Myers was asked about the 1998PDB that explicitly referenced anaircraft ladenwith
explosives crashing into acity. Myers stated, "it doesn't ring abell- not at all." Healso
reaffirmed no recollection of any postulated threat scenario involving aterrorist using an
aircraft as abomb. Myers hadno explanation for why other agencies - such asthe Secret
Service- werethinking of thepossibility of anair threat tothe White House whilethe
entity charged with air defense of thenation was not thinking ofa threat to theNational
Capitol Region.
Myers reiterated that, inconnection withtheissue of maintaining FAA internal radars,
there was talk about thefuturepotential of aterrorist threat as arationale for "trying to
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get people to address theFANAF radar funding issue inamorerobust way." Aside
fromthat NORAD took its cue.fromintelligence, and Myers has norecollection of any
intelligence during theperiod regarding terrorist air threats. Usually the PDB issues are
recycled back through stuff -- you seeif somewhere -- andthat didn't happen in 1998.
"It would have really stood out" if thePDB information would have come to his
attention.
Myers confirmed that fromatechnical radar standpoint, NORAD had pretty good coastal
range, and that the activity on 9111was within the radar areathat was accessible to
NORAD. Yet Myers stated that NORAD was looking outward, and anything that
happened intheinterior of thecountry was amatter for FAA or law enforcement.
Interms of the lashup between FAA andNORAD radar capability, Myers stated that
there were aseries of exercises each year involving coordination between thetwo
systems. He didnot recall any problems coming to his attention. NORAD's main
concern with theFAA was that it was coming to the conclusion that it did not need "skin
paint" capability, andthat was inadequate toNORAD's task.
Myers didrecall problems with NORAD's command andcontrol software. The system
was very old andwas contracted to bereplaced, but thecontractor did not perform. The
issue was how many tracks thesystemcouldhandle at once; NORAD kept modifying the
equipment to allowmore inputs but it needed anew system. Myers was personally
involved intrying to get NORAD better equipment
Inahijacking situation, theFAA would call upon NORAD to (1) follow thetarget (2)
describe the.actions thetarget was taking (3) and beinproximity ifthe target crashed.
An example would beNORAD's involvement inthe Payne Stewart incident. Myers
stated that NORAD controllers would vector the fighter, but acknowledged that froma
communications standpoint it would require agreat deal of coordination with theFAA.
Myers acknowledged that prior to 9111NORAD exercised hijack scenarios with the
FAA, including the capability to vector afighter to atarget and communicate with the
fighter. Myers was not awareof any problems with communications between the fighters
andthesector/region, nor was he awareof any problems inthe"lash up" with theFAA.
Theonly problemherecalled prior to 9/11was thecommand and control issue regarding
the controllers' equipment, which could only handle afinitenumber of tracks.
Myers was asked whether hefelt hehadenough alert sites when heassumed command of
NORAD. He stated that he made surepeople were awareNORAD could not correlate
all unknown tracks. However, givenNORAD's external focus, given theplans to ramp
up to several thousand aircraft if the threat changed, given thetraining andreadiness
standards, and giventhe threat NORAD knew about, Myers was comfortable that ''we
were OK." Inother words, giventhemission assigned toNORAD by the Unified ,
Command Plan, andgiven thehijack agreement with theFAA, hehad enough resources
to do hisjob. Inhindsight this proved not tobetrue, but at thetime hethought they were .
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okay. Pressed further, Myers statedthat "I thought wewere at theminimum of what was
required to fulfill our mission."
Myers was asked about General Arnold's statement that hehad a"big problem" with the
FAA's claimthat it didn't have anational security mission. Myers' reaction was that the
issue was aresource one; theFAA sawapath where it didn't needthese (internal radars)
anymore, andNORAD saw apath where it did. This got to beahuge bureaucratic issue .:
of who would pay for theradars -- DaD or DOT?
.Myers had no recollection of any call for aspecial air defense plan for theNational
Capitol Region during his tenure. NORAD was not "hooked into" any of the White
House defenses - they werethefunction of the Secret Service - andNORAD was not
tied into the Service's notification or command and control. It isnow.
"Day or' 9/11
.Onthe morning of 9111Myers was onCapitol Hill. He left Capitol Hill after learning
that thePentagon had been hit, andrecalls seeing smoke pouring fromthe building ashe
made his way back. Myers estimated his arrival time at theNMCC to bearound 1000or
1010.
General Eberhart phoned Myers ashewas coming out of the Senator Cleland's office.
Myers believes hetook thecall fromSenator Cleland's outer office, andthat it was after
thesecond tower hadbeen hit (sometime between 0903 and0930). It was ashort
conversation.: Eberhart updated himonthesituation (i.e., two towers hit, several hijack
codes inthe system), and informed Myers that NORAD would bescrambling fighters.
The issue of ROE was not discussed. Myers mainly listened andresponded that he
needed to get back totheNMCC because hecould not communicate fromacell phone.
Myers didnot recall making any decisions or taking any actions between thetime the
second tower was hit andthetimethePentagon was struck. Hereceived word that the
Pentagon was hit as hewas getting into his car on Capitol Hill. People were evacuating
ashearrived at thePentagon. Heinstructed thedriver to goto theRiver entrance and
asked where the command center was operating; hewas told theNMCC was up and
running and went there. Myers stopped briefly outside thePentagon and spoke to Deputy
Secretary Wolfowitz, who saidhewas relocating for continuity reasons.
Upon arriving at theNMCC Myers first tried to obtain situational awareness. There had
been two attacks onthe World Trade Center and one onthePentagon. His first thought
was "what's next"? By this timetheNMCC had initiated theAir Threat Conference Call
(ATCC). "The first thing weheard about was anairplane inbound to Washington -- over
Pennsylvania or up inthat way somewhere-- andthat therewere fighters going to
intercept it." Myers was thinking "what don't weknow about" andinquired if theFAA
hadgrounded all aircraft. Myers was also focused onthelocation of the Secretary. He
stated hehad only been intheNMCC for ashort period of time whenthe Secretary
arrived (sometime between 1015and 1030).
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Myers' staff evacuated the building andrelocated to analternate site; only his executive
assistant stayed with Myers intheNMCe.
Myers' source of information was the ATCe. Myers was informed that the FAA was not
ontheATCC until 1015,andthat there was no evidence NORAD was effectively
tracking aircraft inbound to Washington at that time. Hereplied, "I was not aware of
that...I have inmy mind that infact wecould pair fighters against theinbound fromthe
north, northwest. ..whether theFAA was there or not I don't know; they were there later."
At approximately 1015theDDO stated ontheATCC that theVice Chairman wanted to
know who was controlling thefighters over Washington. TheFAA answered
Washington Center, and Myers was asked about this exchange. Hestated ''there was
probably abreak down interms." Myers wanted to knowwhether the fighter aircraft
wereunder NORAD sector control. "My assumption was- maybe wrong - that NORAD
would have been at that point, given all thehijack codes that wereup.... NORAD was
doing that."
Myers acknowledged that it was not thejob of Washington Center to control fighters-
only air space. The FAA's answer was not abad response, however, because
Washington Center could "ector fighters to suspect aircraft. "I just wanted to makesure
there were fighters up, and if therewas another aircraft inbound to Washington that we
had achance to intercept it- theanswer I recall was yes."
Myers was asked to focus onthefirst hour that hewas intheNMCC - because those
would have been the "life or death minutes" - and asked what
actions/decisions/confirmations weremade regarding (1) NORAD's affirmative control
'over its fighters, and (2) the authorities NORAD was conveying to its pilots. Myers
could not recall. He stated that hespoketo Eberhart many times that morning, but could
not remember exact times. Hebelieves at onepoint hehad anopen linewith Eberhart.
Myers also could not recall if hewas monitoring the ATCC when thePEOC relayed the
guidance that theVice President had authorized the shoot down (approximately 1013and
1019). Hewas asked whether this guidance fromthePEOC was sufficient for himfrom
achain of command perspective. He stated yes, at thetime it was good enough. "You
make several assumptions; that he's incontact with thepeople heneeds to beincontact
with." '.
Myers was asked whether, after learning of this guidance fromthePEOC, he
communicated with NORAD to (1) informthemof theVicePresident's authorization,
and (2) ensure that they understood their instructions. "To thebest I can recall, I'm not
sureI didn't have that conversation withEberhart onthis, probably.. .I don't
remember ... that being asimpleissueweworked our way through it."
Myers was informed ofthe Commission's findings that theLangley pilots werenot
vectored toward the inbound aircraft, andhadnot received any guidance regarding shoot
down. Hewas asked whether this was surprising to-him. "It depends when inthetime
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sequence it would be, because it was avery confusing morning; there were all sorts of
reports... fromthe geometry I understood onthe phone, I thought they could get there in
time."
Myers stated that "in this initial period" hedidnot do anything toensure that effective
rules of engagement were communicated to pilots. Headded that afax was sent out later
intheday, but not inthe initial period.
Regarding the falsereports of inbound aircraft, Myers described NORAD as "very
helpful - best as I recall - insaying nothat's not correct. ..my best recollection isthey
had abetter sense of ground truth than someof these other inputs wegot.. .otherwise I
would have been diving under thetable."
Myers was not aware of the Secret Service's radar system. Healso didnot recall any
involvement inthedecision to scramble aircraft fromAndrews. He wanted to have eyes
intheair that morning, and would havethought it agoodidea to scramble Andrews if
someone would have brought it tohim.
Myers described himself that morning as focused on what elsecould behappening inthe
world inconjunction with this attack. Hewas not focused onthese "little incidents"; he
knew there was anaircraft inbound to D.C., but thought NORAD could handle it. He
tried to look beyond it, directing others to call commands overseas, to check on ships at
Norfolk, to try anddetermine how widespread thethreat could be.
Myers was asked his opinion of whether Flight 93would havehit its intended target in
DC had it not been forced down over Pennsylvania. "I think theanswer is it would have
been intercepted andforced down somehow." He sourced this opinion to adiscussion
with General Eberhart. .
Myers has seen after-action type"analysis" byNORAD, but hewould not call it an after-
action report. Thematerials hesawincluded information about notifications fromthe
FAA, which Myers noted weredelayed on9/11. Myers was askedto look into whether
NORAD had done anafter-action review, andif so toprovide it totheCommission.
Myers inquired if Eberhart had been interviewed, and stated that heshould have avery
different perspective ontheday. He stated, "I'm not just worried about air defense, I'm
worried about defense with abigD."
Turning back to the shoot down order, Myers was asked whether the Secretary of
Defense, when hearrived at theNMCC, was already aware of that order. Myers replied
no, his impression was that the Secretary was theperson who worked that issue when he
arrived at theNMCC.
This response created confusion givenMyers earlier statement that thePEOC guidance to
the ATIC was sufficient for purposes of thechain of command. Hewas asked, "either
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enough or it wasn't. Myers stated, "I think it was... my recollection is that before wegot
theVice President's authorization, the Secretary and I hadthis conversation. And I made
himaware of theauthorization wewere going to need if wehad anaircraft coming in."
Myers backed away fromthis statement, saying "maybe my recollection was wrong,"
after learning that thePEOC guidance cameat approximately 1013,when the Secretary
of Defense was not (likely) intheNMCC.
Myers offered that if the authorization was announced ontheATCC, NORAD could have
relayed it to thepilots through Washington Center "and that's all that would berequired."
Heacknowledged this was merely speculation, andthat hehadno knowledge this infact
happened. Myers repeated that somehow "I have inmy mind" that NORAD could have
dealt with the inbound aircraft, but that this was more "general recollection" andnot
specifics.
Myers was asked to respond totheobservation that the 9/I 1Commission should not have
to answer these questions about whether Flight 93 would have reached its target - the Air
Force andNORAD ought tohavetheanswers. Myers stated that after 9111they started
working the forward piece "really hard" - howto improve thelash upwith theFAA -
because this threat had not goneaway. "We were looking forward, not so much
backward, andthat's probably our fault." Therewas alsotheissueof asecond war.
"Given this wasn't aNORAD mission to begin with, youcould saythey did thebest they
could.. .it wasn't adequate, but that wasn't themission they were given, it was anFAA
mission."
Myers committed tocalling General Eberhart and obtaining whatever analytic work had
been doneonthesubject.
Regarding the decision to gotoDefCon 3,Myers stated hedidnot recall if that issuewas
runby thePresident before thedecision was made to goto Level 3. He stated that they
"got out thebook" andreviewed thevarious levels, andthe Secretary spoketo theVice
President about theissue. Hedid not recall anything after that.
Myers was asked to rateour air defense posture today against suicide aircraft inwhatever
formthey may take (e.g., general aviation, cargo, etc). He answered "very good," with
the exception of acomplicit air crew; inthat casethere isnot much you can do. If a
terrorist air crew gets off theground, with anexplosive ladenplane, follows all
instructions andon short final to someairport pulls thegear up andturns it into
something, the military does not havemuch capability to stopthem.
With respect to theNational Capitol Region (NCR), there is "limited capability," but not
much. Myers stated that inanideal world you would want to expand the ADIZ or "keep-
out" zone around theNCR, yet it involves abalancing ofrisks. Hestated that herecently
talked toEberhart about this subject, andthought you could make agood casefor
expanding the "keep-out zone" inlight of recent threats. If you wanted to beabsolutely
safeyouwould haveto ground all general aviation aircraft. Myers stated they have
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raised this issue anumber of times with theSecretary andothers, citing exercises inthe
NCR which point out theneed for "alittlemore stand off time" around theNCR.
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