The document discusses the legal concept of splitting a cause of action. It provides two cases as examples where the petitioners were found to have split their cause of action. Splitting a cause of action involves dividing a single claim into multiple suits, and is prohibited to avoid harassment of defendants and prevent multiplicity of suits. The document also discusses the related legal concept of res judicata, where a final judgment on the merits of a case prevents the same parties from relitigating the same issue.
The document discusses the legal concept of splitting a cause of action. It provides two cases as examples where the petitioners were found to have split their cause of action. Splitting a cause of action involves dividing a single claim into multiple suits, and is prohibited to avoid harassment of defendants and prevent multiplicity of suits. The document also discusses the related legal concept of res judicata, where a final judgment on the merits of a case prevents the same parties from relitigating the same issue.
The document discusses the legal concept of splitting a cause of action. It provides two cases as examples where the petitioners were found to have split their cause of action. Splitting a cause of action involves dividing a single claim into multiple suits, and is prohibited to avoid harassment of defendants and prevent multiplicity of suits. The document also discusses the related legal concept of res judicata, where a final judgment on the merits of a case prevents the same parties from relitigating the same issue.
Splitting a cause of action is the act of dividing a single cause of action, cla im or demand into two or more parts, and bringing suit for one of such parts onl y, intending to reserve the rest for another separate action. The purpose of th e rule is to avoid harassment and vexation to the defendant and avoid multiplici ty of suits. CATALINA B. CHU vs. SPOUSES CUNANAN (G.R. No. 156185, September 12, 2011) Splitting a cause of action is the act of dividing a single cause of action, cla im or demand into two or more parts, and bringing suit for one of such parts onl y, intending to reserve the rest for another separate action. The purpose of th e rule is to avoid harassment and vexation to the defendant and avoid multiplici ty of suits. Apparently, the petitioners were guilty of splitting their single cause of actio n to enforce or rescind the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage. Splitting a single cause of action is the act of dividing a single or indivisible cause of action into several parts or claims and instituting two or more actions upon th em.[26] A single cause of action or entire claim or demand cannot be split up or divided in order to be made the subject of two or more different actions.[27] T hus, Section 4, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court expressly prohibits splitting of a single cause of action, viz:
Section 4. Splitting a single cause of action; effect of. If two or more suits a re instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a j udgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others. (4a)
The petitioners were not at liberty to split their demand to enforce or rescind the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage and to prosecute piecem eal or present only a portion of the grounds upon which a special relief was sou ght under the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage, and then to leave the re st to be presented in another suit; otherwise, there would be no end to litigati on.[28] Their splitting violated the policy against multiplicity of suits, whose primary objective was to avoid unduly burdening the dockets of the courts. Thei r contravention of the policy merited the dismissal of Civil Case No. 12251 on t he ground of bar by res judicata.
Res judicata means a matter adjudged, a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment.[29] The doctrine of res judicata is an ol d axiom of law, dictated by wisdom and sanctified by age, and founded on the bro ad principle that it is to the interest of the public that there should be an en d to litigation by the same parties over a subject once fully and fairly adjudic ated. It has been appropriately said that the doctrine is a rule pervading every well-regulated system of jurisprudence, and is put upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of the common law: the one, public policy and necessity, which m akes it to the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation in terest reipublicae ut sit finis litium; the other, the hardship on the individua l that he should be vexed twice for one and the same cause nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa. A contrary doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and prefer the gratification of th e litigious disposition on the part of suitors to the preservation of the public tranquillity and happiness.[30]
Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment or decree on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits and on all points and matter s determined in the previous suit.[31] The foundation principle upon which the d octrine rests is that the parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once; that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and d etermined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed , should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate.[32]
TEGIMENTA CHEMICAL PHILS. vs. ROLAN E. BUENSALIDA (G.R. No. 176466, June 17, 200 8) We are not unaware of the provision in Section 1 (b), Rule 3 of the NLRC Rules o f Procedure which states that a party having more than one cause of action agains t the other party arising out of the same relationship shall include all of them in one complaint or petition. As stated earlier, however, the inclusion of resp ondents cause of action for constructive illegal dismissal in the Davao case coul d not have been possible since the same arose only after the latter case was fil ed. At the time of the filing of the Davao case, respondent could not have yet claimed that petitioner committed acts that would amount to constructive illegal dismissal. Thus, the aforementioned rule has no application in this case.