The Colder War Chapter 9

JWBT1405-c09 JWBT1405-Katusa Printer: Courier Westford October 1, 2014 9:34 Trim: 6in 9in
Chapter 9
The Putinization
of Uranium
O
n Friday, March 11, 2011, nature struck.
A monster, magnitude 9.0 earthquake grabbed the seabed 40
miles northeast of Honshu, in Japan. It tossed the entire island eight
feet eastward and shifted the earths axis by more than four inches. The
shock generated tsunami waves that reached elevations of 130 feet and
inundated areas six miles inland. Hundreds of thousands of people fed.
Nearly 16,000 bodies were recovered and another 2,500 still are missing.
Lying in the tsunamis path were generators that fed the Fukushima
Daiichi nuclear power plants cooling system. They were disabled, and
the cooling system stopped. Reactor core meltdowns followed. On the
International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale, it was a Level 7
disaster, matched only by Chernobyl.
In the aftermath of Fukushimawhose cleanup will take decades
the spot price of uranium yellowcake has dropped more than 60 percent,
to $28 per pound (see Figure 9.1), and the stock prices of uraniumminers
123
124 THE COL DE R WAR
$20
$30
$40
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Fukushima Disaster
Figure 9.1 Spot Uranium Price
SOURCE: S&P Capital IQ. Casey Research 2014.
have plunged between 60 and 85 percent. Japan shut down all 52 of its
other reactors for safety evaluations. South Korea followed suit for its 23
reactorsalthough most have now been returned to service.
Fukushima rousted antinuclear protestors out of bed around the
world. For them, the earthquake revealed nuclear power to the world for
the terrible idea it had been all along. Germany announced it would shut
down all 17 of its reactors, permanently, by 2022. It seemed that many
other countriesperhaps all of themwould be closing their nuclear
power plants as well.
Well, not so fast.
No one followed Germanys lead. Today, no fewer than 71 new
plants are under construction, in more than a dozen countries, with
another 163 planned and 329 proposed. (See Figure 9.2.) Many coun-
tries without nuclear power soon will build their frst reactor, including
Turkey, Kazakhstan, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and sev-
eral of the Gulf emirates.
While many countries with nuclear power plants declared a time-
out to reassess safety practices, almost all are staying with what they
have. Uranium is still the only fuel that can produce base-load electricity
F
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125
economically and without exhaling greenhouse gases and other unwel-
come hydrocarbons.
In the United States, which hasnt opened a nuclear power plant
since 1977, six new units are scheduled to come online by 2020, four
from license applications made since mid-2007. The country is the
worlds biggest producer of nuclear energy, accounting for more than
30 percent of the worldwide total. Its 65 nuclear plants (housing just
over 100 reactors) generate 20 percent of U.S. electricity.
France is the country most dependent on uranium; 75 percent of
its electricity comes from nuclear power. China, whose urban residents
are choking on pollution from coal-fred plants, is now on a nuclear-
construction fast track. It already has 17 reactors in operation, and 29
more are being built. The country wants a fourfold capacity increase by
2020. India has 20 plants and is adding seven more. Several countries
in Africa, where more than 90 percent of the population goes without
electricity, have begun to explore the possibility.
New facilities are going to be safer, too, especially after Fukushima
exposed the vulnerabilities of older designs. Though the containment
systems at Fukushima were far more robust than the buckets that held the
Chernobyl reactors, they were 40 years old, several generations behind
todays containment engineering and materials. Fukushima would soon
have been a candidate for decommissioning.
Long-Term Shortage
While Germany may be able to get by without nuclear power plants
(although its carbon footprint is spreading, and its already fudging by
importing nuclear-generated electricity from France), none of the other
countries using or readying for nuclear power can. Theres just no alter-
native. That means the demand for uranium will rise as both the worlds
economy and its discomfort over fossil fuels grow. And that means profts
and political leverage for any country that might dominate the uranium
industry.
The World Nuclear Association predicts demand growth of 33 per-
cent from 2010 to 2020 and similar growth in the 10 years that follow. In
2011, the world consumed 160 million pounds of yellowcake uranium.
The Putinization of Uranium 127
32%
19%
12%
12%
11%
7%
3%
2% 2%
Russia
Kazakhstan/Uzbekistan
Niger/Gabon
Australia
Canada
South Africa/Namibia
European Union
Other
United States
Figure 9.3 EU-27 Sources of Uranium, 2010
SOURCE: Energy Information Administration. Casey Research 2012.
By 2024, just 10 years from now, it will be chewing through 200 million
pounds annuallyif its available.
At the same time, a supply crunch is building. In 2012, the world
consumed 25 percent more uranium than came out of its mines, a short-
fall of 40 million pounds (at current long-term prices, about $1.8 billion
worth). The defcit is likely to rise to 55 million pounds by 2020. Ura-
nium mines are few and far between. Only 20 countries have even one,
and half of global production comes from just 10 mines in six countries.
(Sources for the European Union are shown in Figure 9.3.)
In the United States, 100 reactors are burning fuel from 43 million
pounds of uranium per year to produce electricity. Supply from U.S.
mines is about 4 million pounds, or only 9 percent of whats needed to
keep those plants running.
Heres another way of looking at it: The estimated needs of U.S.
nuclear power plants between now and 2021 come in at around 275 mil-
lion pounds of yellowcake. The countrys entire inventory amounts to only
120 million pounds.
In the long run, more mining is the only answer. But a new uranium
mine is more difcult to bring into production than any other kind of
resource. Given the engineering challenges, environmental and safety
requirements, and strict permitting, it takes 10 years, minimum, to get
from decision to production. New mines are not coming online quickly
enough to meet expected growth in consumption. And the world already
is using more than it digs out of the ground. In fact, it has been doing
so for the past 20 years.
If every uranium mine proposed in the past decade were approved,
built, and commissioned on schedule, supplies might be able to keep up.
But current uranium prices are too low to entice any company to build
those potential mines, and any risk taker that might decide to gamble on
rising prices would face the separate risk of regulatory delay. Getting the
permits to build a uranium mine is not like standing in line for an hour
at the Department of Motor Vehicles. You have to stand in many lines
for many years while you wait for decision makers to fnd the courage
to confront the radiation bogeyman.
A shortage is coming, and Putin is preparing to turn it into a cash
register and also into a tool of geopolitics. Controlling in-the-ground
resources is just part of Putins plan. Understanding the whole plan
requires a brief detour.
Science Lesson
The uranium fuel cycle starts with digging uranium-bearing ore out of
the ground and then subjecting it to a chemical process that extracts the
uranium oxides (chiefy U
3
O
8
). The dried product is a powder called
yellowcake. You can guess the color.
Of the uranium atoms in a pile of yellowcake, more than 99 per-
cent are U-238, a barely radioactive isotope that cannot sustain a chain
reaction for a power plant, bomb, or any other purpose. Virtually all the
rest of the uranium atoms, about 0.7 percent, are U-235 (the number
diference indicating three fewer neutrons), which is a somewhat more
radioactive isotope that in quantities of just a few pounds can sustain a
chain reaction. U-235 has that capability because when an atom of the
stuf splits, it fings out neutrons with just the right velocity for splitting
any other U-235 atoms they encounter. Its like one drunk starting a
fght that spreads through an entire barroom.
To turn the yellowcake into something useful, enough of the U-
238 must be separated out so that the concentration of U-235 in the
remaining material is:
r
3 to 10 percent for use in a commercial nuclear power plant
r
20 percent for use in certain types of research and medical reactors
r
20 to 90 percent for use in the compact power plants of submarines
r
90 percent for use in weapons
Moving from the 0.7 percent U-235 concentration provided by
nature to something higher begins with introducing fuorine to the ura-
niumoxides. That produces uraniumhexafuoride (UF
6
), which at room
temperature is a gas.
Next, the uranium hexafuoride gas is pumped through a system that
exploits the slight weight diference between an atom of U-235 and an
atom of U-238 (whose greater weight comes from its three additional
neutrons). There are half a dozen clever techniques for doing this, but
only two are in commercial use. One is to spin the gas through a series
of ultra-high-speed centrifuges. The other is to pump the gas through a
series of ultrafne flters.
With either technique, each step in the series yields two streams of
gas, one slightly higher in U-235 and one slightly lower in U-235 than
the gas that went into the step. After the gas has passed through many
centrifuges or through many flters, the process ends with two tanks
of uranium hexafuoride. One contains the desired concentration of
U-235, and one contains U-238 with traces of U-235 well below
natures 0.7 percent. The contents of that second tank are referred to
as tails. For easier long-term storage, the tail gas may be reconverted to
a uranium oxide.
For fuel, the fnal step is fabrication. The enriched gas (with the
desired concentration of U-235) is chemically processed into uranium
dioxide powder. The powder is compressed into pellets, heated until it
coalesces into a ceramic, and then bundled into rod-shaped fuel assem-
blies tailored for a particular kind of reactor.
The current uranium enrichment capacities of several nations is
shown in Figure 9.4.
Short-Term Fixes
An adequate supply of uranium is available today to fuel the worlds
reactors only because a secondary supply is flling the gap between usage
and primary supply from mines. Most of that secondary supply involves
Russia.
40%
23%
20%
15%
2%
Russia
Germany/Netherlands/UK
France
China
United States
Figure 9.4 Current Uranium Enrichment Capacity
Casey Research 2014.
When the USSR collapsed, Russia inherited over 2 million pounds
of weapons-grade uranium and vast, underused facilities for han-
dling and fabricating the material. Starting in 1993, the two were
brought together under the Megatons to Megawatts agreement between
Russia and the United States. Over the 20 years that followed, 1.1 mil-
lion pounds of Russian warhead-grade uranium (90 percent U-235),
equivalent to 20,000 nuclear warheads, was blended down to 33 mil-
lion pounds of reactor-grade uranium (3 percent U-235) by diluting it
with tailsenrichment in reverse. The resulting product was sold to the
United States.
Megatons to Megawatts helped to fll the supply gap for two decades
but now is history. Its expiration in November 2013 marked the end to
24 million pounds of annual uranium supply, 55 percent of what the
United States had been using.
During the Megatons to Megawatts period, Russia operated a sepa-
rate streamof secondary production. It put its excess enrichment capacity
to work on other peoples tails. In the 1990s and early 2000s, Russia
accepted boatloads of ready-to-process tails from major players like
Areva (Canadian) and Urenco (a European consortium). Today that
sideline also is history.
The United States now contributes to secondary supply in a modest
way. During the Megatons era, the United States also was converting
unwanted warhead material to fuel. But only one American company,
7%
4%
42%
11%
Russia
United States
18%

France
Canada
18%
United Kingdom
China
Figure 9.5 Uranium Conversion Capacity
Casey Research 2014.
WesDyne International, has facilities for downblending weapons-grade
uranium to fuel grade, and its capacity is less than 18,000 pounds per
year. (Russias capacity is more than fve times that.) (See Figure 9.5.)
So while the United States has plenty of warhead uranium to feed
downblending plants, it doesnt have much plant capacity to feed it into.
To speed things up, it would have to send the material to Russia for
conversion to fuel. Imagine the screaming if any U.S. politician proposed
handing nuclear warhead material to Mr. Putin.
Today Russia is producing enriched uranium from its own stockpile
of tails, in addition to enriching the output from Russian mines. As a
producer of uranium ore, Russia is in sixth place; however, when the
former Soviet states combine their production, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan,
and Russia make up almost half the global uranium production. As a
producer of enriched uranium, Russia is number one. It supplies over
40 percent of the worlds enriched uranium, mostly to power plants.
Putins Uranium Superstore
Russia now ranks sixth in the world for mine production of uranium.
On top of that, Putin carries a lot of clout in neighboring Kazakhstan,
a member of the Common Economic Space (CES) customs union and
the worlds top primary uranium producer, with 38 percent of the total.
So Russia already has its hands on 47 percent of the worlds primary
production.
Control over so much capacity for mining and enrichment makes
Putin the go-to source for countries desperate to secure long-term sup-
plies of reactor fuel. In 2012, for example, Russia signed an agree-
ment with Japanwhich, despite Fukushima, cant aford to give up on
nuclear powerthat guarantees the availability of uranium enrichment
services for Japanese utilities.
Russia will continue supplying the United States as well, but this
time on Russian terms. The Megatons agreement didnt let Russia sell
directly to American utilitiesonly to the U.S. Enrichment Corpora-
tion (USEC), at a set, below-market price. And the only product eligible
was downblended warhead uraniumnothing from new mine produc-
tion. It was because of those and other restrictions that Russia made no
efort to extend Megatons past 2013.
In 2012, Tenex, Russias nuclear fuel exporter, reached six-year
deals to supply more than $1 billion worth of reactor fuel to four
American utilities. It has also contracted to provide enrichment services
to USEC for nine years. Annual deliveries under the USEC contract
should be about half of those under Megatons. There is no price ceiling,
and there are no conditions on where the uranium comes from.
Putin has also captured long-term customers for Russian uranium
in countries where Rosatom, Russias state nuclear utility, is building
reactors.
Rosatom is a giant in the global nuclear sector. The company builds
more nuclear power plants worldwide than anyone else, with construc-
tion currently under way in China, Vietnam, India, and Turkey. The
21 projects now on Rosatoms order book are worth $50 billion. Iran
plans to buy at least eight new nuclear reactors, and the Russians are
ready to build and operate the projects and supply the fuel. While the
United States dithers over Ukraine, Putin is cementing more long-term
contracts into place.
Moreover, many of those new facilities come with a life-of-plant
fuel supply contract, such as the one Rosatom recently signed with
Bangladesh for its frst nuclear power plant. Putin understands the mean-
ing of full-service provider.
Rosatom also handles $3 billion per year of Russian uranium exports
to other customers. One-ffth of the material goes to the Asia-Pacifc
region, a market growing so quickly that Rosatom is building a new
uranium products transportation hub at Vladivostok, Russias largest
Pacifc port.
The Ultimate Source
Putin has been locking up mine production outside of Russia. In mid-
2010, AtomRedMetZoloto (ARMZ, an arm of state-owned Rosatom)
boosted its stake in Uranium One, one of the largest publicly traded
uranium producers in the world, from 17 percent to 51 percent. At the
time, ARMZ wanted to use Uranium One as a public vehicle to attract
investors for its expansion plans.
That notion evaporated when Fukushima killed investor interest
in uranium. Thus, in 2013, it acquired all of the remaining shares in
Uranium One for $1.3 billion and took the company private at over
100 percent premium to the market price of the shares at the time. The
timing was right.
Uranium One is a major producer, with 16 million pounds per
year. Through the acquisition, Russia picked up mining operations in
Australia, Canada, Kazakhstan, South Africa, Tanzania, and even the
United States, where it will now produce more uranium each year than
all American mining companies combined.
Russia has signed uranium exploration and development agreements
with Japan, France, India, South Korea, and Canada. ARMZ is already
involved in joint production projects with Kazakhstans state-owned
Kazatomprom, the worlds largest producer of uranium.
Russia has also been courting Namibia, which possesses 5 percent
of the worlds known uranium reserves. It is already a big producer and
is expected to become the number two yellowcake exporter by 2018,
after Kazakhstan.
Egypt has a place in Putins plan as well. After a 2013 meeting
with then-President Mohamed Morsi, it was announced that the two
countries would resume cooperation in peaceful nuclear projects,
including construction of nuclear power plants. Cairo wants 4 gigawatts
of nuclear generating capacity by 2025, enough to power about 3 million
homes. Egypt also invited Moscow to cooperate in the joint develop-
ment of uranium mines. Given the benefts to Egypt, the agreements are
likely to survive Morsis overthrow.
Going to School in Mongolia
Russia is willing to go pretty far to get what it wants. Though Putin shies
away from waging war over resourcespreferring to let other countries
do the dirty work, then step in for a share of the spoils, as in Iraqhes
not shy about economic warfare. Consider events in Mongolia, one of
those bordering nations, like Ukraine, that Russia proprietarily considers
part of its near-beyond.
Russia was the frst developer of Mongolias 7,500-acre Dornod
deposit. The Soviets and then the Russians mined it from 1988 to 1995,
with a workforce that peaked near 10,000. Russia spent $150 million on
developing the site but then abandoned it in 1995, during the turbulent
time when the money supply from Moscow had all but dried up.
Despite leaving, Russia never lost its sense of entitlement for
Dornod.
The project sat idle until 2003. Then the Mongolian government
opened it to Western mining interests. It was snapped up by a small
Canadian company, Khan Resources, which took a majority stake and
also took on the Mongolian government as a partner.
Then Khan got clipped by Putin.
In January 2009, Russia and Mongolia announced a joint venture for
uranium extraction. Next, in January 2010, the Mongolian parliament
bestowed upon the Mongolian government a 51 percent share in every
project in which the Mongolian government had an investment. That
included Dornod. Thus Khan lost control of the project through a no-
compensation expropriation; that is, they were robbed.
The matter is now entombed in international litigation. Whatever
Khan recovers in the legal fght, if anything, will go to the lawyers
another dead client for dinner.

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