Arnault v. Nazareno, G.R. No.

L-3820, July 18, 1950

OZAETA, J .:

I. THE FACTS

The Senate investigated the purchase by the government of two
parcels of land, known as Buenavista and Tambobong estates. An intriguing
question that the Senate sought to resolve was the apparent irregularity of
the governments payment to one Ernest Burt, a non-resident American
citizen, of the total sum of Php1.5 million for his alleged interest in the two
estates that only amounted to Php20,000.00, which he seemed to have
forfeited anyway long before. The Senate sought to determine who were
responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at the expense of the
government.

Petitioner Jean Arnault, who acted as agent of Ernest Burt in the
subject transactions, was one of the witnesses summoned by the Senate to
its hearings. In the course of the investigation, the petitioner repeatedly
refused to divulge the name of the person to whom he gave the amount of
Php440,000.00, which he withdrew from the Php1.5 million proceeds
pertaining to Ernest Burt.

Arnault was therefore cited in contempt by the Senate and
was committed to the custody of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms for
imprisonment until he answers the questions. He thereafter filed a petition
for habeas corpus directly with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of
his detention.

II. THE ISSUE

1. Did the Senate have the power to punish the petitioner for contempt for
refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the
Php440,000.00?
2. Did the Senate have the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a term
beyond its period of legislative session?
3. May the petitioner rightfully invoke his right against self-incrimination?

III. THE RULING

[The Court DENIED the petition for habeas corpus filed by Arnault.]

1. Yes, the Senate had the power to punish the petitioner for
contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he
gave the Php440,000.00.

Although there is no provision in the [1935] Constitution expressly
investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and
exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions as to
be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry with process to enforce it
is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A
legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to
effect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the
requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse must be had
to others who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for
such information are often unavailing, and also that information which is
volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of
compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.

xxx xxx xxx

[W]e find that the question for the refusal to answer which the
petitioner was held in contempt by the Senate is pertinent to the matter under
inquiry. In fact, this is not and cannot be disputed. Senate Resolution No. 8,
the validity of which is not challenged by the petitioner, requires the Special
Committee, among other things, to determine the parties responsible for the
Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal, and it is obvious that the name of
the person to whom the witness gave the P440,000 involved in said deal is
pertinent to that determination it is in fact the very thing sought to be
determined. The contention is not that the question is impertinent to the
subject of the inquiry but that it has no relation or materiality to any proposed
legislation. We have already indicated that it is not necessary for the
legislative body to show that every question propounded to a witness is
material to any proposed or possible legislation; what is required is that is
that it be pertinent to the matter under inquiry.
xxx xxx xxx

If the subject of investigation before the committee is within the range
of legitimate legislative inquiry and the proposed testimony of the witness
called relates to that subject, obedience, to its process may be enforced by
the committee by imprisonment.

2. YES, the Senate had the authority to commit petitioner for
contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative session.

We find no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body to
punish for contempt to the end of every session and not to the end of the last
session terminating the existence of that body. The very reason for the
exercise of the power to punish for contempt is to enable the legislative body
to perform its constitutional function without impediment or obstruction.
Legislative functions may be and in practice are performed during recess by
duly constituted committees charged with the duty of performing
investigations or conducting hearing relative to any proposed legislation. To
deny to such committees the power of inquiry with process to enforce it
would be to defeat the very purpose for which that the power is recognized in
the legislative body as an essential and appropriate auxiliary to is legislative
function. It is but logical to say that the power of self-preservation is
coexistent with the life to be preserved.

But the resolution of commitment here in question was adopted by
the Senate, which is a continuing body and which does not cease exist upon
the periodical dissolution of the Congress . . . There is no limit as to time to
the Senates power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may
constitutionally be exerted as in the present case.

3. NO, the petitioner may NOT rightfully invoke his right
against self-incrimination.

Since according to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and
that he gave the [P440,000.00] to a representative of Burt in compliance with
the latters verbal instruction, we find no basis upon which to sustain his
claim that to reveal the name of that person might incriminate him. There is
no conflict of authorities on the applicable rule, to wit:

Generally, the question whether testimony is privileged is for the
determination of the Court. At least, it is not enough for the witness to say
that the answer will incriminate him as he is not the sole judge of his liability.
The danger of self-incrimination must appear reasonable and real to the
court, from all the circumstances, and from the whole case, as well as from
his general conception of the relations of the witness. Upon the facts thus
developed, it is the province of the court to determine whether a direct
answer to a question may criminate or not. . . The fact that the testimony of a
witness may tend to show that he has violated the law is not sufficient to
entitle him to claim the protection of the constitutional provision against self-
incrimination, unless he is at the same time liable to prosecution and
punishment for such violation. The witness cannot assert his privilege by
reason of some fanciful excuse, for protection against an imaginary danger,
or to secure immunity to a third person.

It is the province of the trial judge to determine from all the facts and
circumstances of the case whether the witness is justified in refusing to
answer. A witness is not relieved from answering merely on his own
declaration that an answer might incriminate him, but rather it is for the trial
judge to decide that question.


Bengzon v Senate Blue Ribbon Committee

G.R. No. 89914 November 20, 1991
Padilla, J.:

Facts:
1. Petitioner was one of the defendants in a civil case filed by the
government with the Sandiganbayan for the alleged anomalous sale of
Kokoy Romoaldez of several government corporations to the group of
Lopa, a brother-in-law of Pres. Aquino.

2. By virtue of a privilege speech made by Sen. Enrile urging the Senate to
look into the transactions, an investigation was conducted by the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed
by the Committee to appear before it and testify on "what they know"
regarding the "sale of thirty-six (36) corporations belonging to Benjamin
"Kokoy" Romualdez."

3. At the hearing, Lopa declined to testify on the ground that his testimony
may "unduly prejudice" the defendants in civil case before the
Sandiganbayan.

4. Petitioner filed for a TRO and/or injunctive relief claiming that the inquiry
was beyond the jurisdiction of the Senate. He contended that the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee acted in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative
purpose. One of the defendants in the case before the Sandiganbayan,
Sandejas, filed with the Court of motion for intervention. The Court
granted it and required the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to
comment on the petition in intervention.

ISSUE: W/N the Blue Ribbon inquiry was in aid of legislation

NO.
1. There appears to be no intended legislation involved. The purpose of the
inquiry to be conducted is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of
Congress, it was conducted to find out whether or not the relatives of
President Aquino, particularly Mr. Lopa had violated RA 3019 in
connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to
Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group.

2. The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation is not absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the
Constitution. As provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and
that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall
be respected." It follows then that the rights of persons under the Bill of
Rights must be respected, including the right to due process and the right
not to be compelled to testify against one's self.

3. The civil case was already filed in the Sandiganbayan and for the
Committee to probe and inquire into the same justiciable controversy
would be an encroachment into the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction
that had already earlier set in. The issue sought to be investigated has
already been pre-empted by the Sandiganbayan. To allow the inquiry to
continue would not only pose the possibility of conflicting judgments
between the legislative committee and a judicial tribunal.

4. Finally, a congressional committees right to inquire is subject to all
relevant limitations placed by the Constitution on governmental action
including the relevant limitations of the Bill of Rights. One of these rights is
the right of an individual to against self-incrimination. The right to remain
silent is extended to respondents in administrative investigations but only if
it partakes of the nature of a criminal proceeding or analogous to a criminal
proceeding. Hence, the petitioners may not be compelled by respondent
Committee to appear, testify and produce evidence before it only because
the inquiry is not in aid of legislation and if pursued would be violative of
the principle of separation of powers between the legislative and the
judicial departments of the government as ordained by the Constitution.

Gudani vs. Senga G.R. No. 170165, Aug. 15, 2006
The ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying
before Congress does not turn on executiveprivilege, but on the
Chief Executives power as commander-in-chief to control the actions
and speech of members of the armed forces. The Presidents
prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same
limitations as in executive privilege.
FACTS:

On Sept. 22, 2005, Sen. Biazon invited several senior officers of the AFP,
including Gen. Gudani, to appear at a public hearing before the
Senate Committee on National Defense and Security concerning the conduct
of the 2004 elections wherein allegations of massive cheating and the Hello
Garci tapes emerged. AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga issued a
Memorandum, prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan and company from
appearing before the Senate Committee without Presidential approval.
Nevertheless, Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan testified before said Committee,
prompting Gen. Senga to order them subjected to General Court
Martial proceedings for willfully violating an order of a superior officer.In the
meantime, President Arroyo issued EO 464, which was subsequently
declared unconstitutional.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the President can prevent military officers from
testifying at a legislative inquiry
RULING:

We hold that the President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of
her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military
officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. At the same
time, we also hold that any chamber of Congress which seeks the
appearance before it of a military officer against the consent of the
President has adequate remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any
military official whom Congress summons to testify before it may be
compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the
President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of
the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land
which the President has the duty to faithfully execute.

Ability of President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress
is based on Commander-in-chief powers

As earlier noted, we ruled in Senate that the President may not issue a
blanket requirement of prior consent onexecutive officials summoned by the
legislature to attend a congressional hearing. In doing so, the Court
recognized the considerable limitations on executive privilege, and affirmed
that the privilege must be formally invoked on specified grounds. However,
the ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before
Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executives
power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of members
of the armed forces. The Presidents prerogatives as commander-in-chief are
not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege.

RATIONALE: Our ruling that the President could, as a general rule,
require military officers to seek presidential approval before appearing before
Congress is based foremost on the notion that a contrary rule unduly
diminishes the prerogatives of the President as commander-in-chief.
Congress holds significant control over the armed forces in matters such as
budget appropriations and the approval of higher-rank promotions, yet it is
on the President that the Constitution vests the title as commander-in-chief
and all the prerogatives and functions appertaining to the position. Again, the
exigencies of military discipline and the chain of command mandate that the
Presidents ability to control the individual members of the armed forces be
accorded the utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn between
obeying the President and obeying the Senate, the Court will without
hesitation affirm that the officer has to choose the President. After all, the
Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and not the Senate, who is the
commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

Remedy is judicial relief

At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the
military to appear before Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The
Constitution itself recognizes as one of the legislatures functions is the
conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for
Congress to interfere with the Presidents power as commander-in-chief, it is
similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congresss
right to conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in this
petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential prohibition.
Yet the Court is aware that with its pronouncement today that the
President has the right to require prior consent from members of the armed
forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize.

We believe and hold that our constitutional and legal order sanctions a
modality by which members of the military may be compelled to attend
legislative inquiries even if the President desires otherwise, a modality which
does not offend the Chief Executives prerogatives as commander-in-chief.
The remedy lies with the courts.

The fact that the executive branch is an equal, coordinate branch of
government to the legislative creates a wrinkle to any basic rule that persons
summoned to testify before Congress must do so. There is considerable
interplay between the legislative and executive branches, informed by due
deference and respect as to their various constitutional functions. Reciprocal
courtesy idealizes this relationship; hence, it is only as a last resort that one
branch seeks to compel the other to a particular mode of behavior. The
judiciary, the third coordinate branch of government, does not enjoy a similar
dynamic with either the legislative or executive branches. Whatever
weakness inheres on judicial power due to its inability to originate national
policies and legislation, such is balanced by the fact that it is the branch
empowered by the Constitution to compel obeisance to its rulings by the
other branches of government.








President has absolute authority over the armed forces

The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify
allegations of massive cheating in the 2004 elections and the surfacing
of the Hello Garci controversy. President Arroyo issued E.O 164
enjoining officials of the executive department including the military
establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her
approval. However, the two concluded their testimonies before the
Senate in spite the fact that a directive has been given to them. As a
result, both of them were relieved of their assignments for allegedly
violating the Articles of War and the time honored principle of the
Chain of Command. May the President prevent a member of the
armed forces from testifying before a legislative inquiry?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes. Soldiers are constitutionally obliged to obey the President they may
dislike or distrust. The ability of the President to prevent military officials
from testifying before Congress DOES NOT TURN ON EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
BUT ON THE CHIEF EXECUTIVES POWER AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF to
control the actions and speech of the armed forces. Under the Commander
in Chief Clause (Art. XVl, section 5), the President has absolute authority
over the persons and actions of the members of the armed forces. Such
authority includes the ability of the President to restrict travel,
movement and speech of military officers, activities which may otherwise
be sanctioned under civilian law. (Gudani vs. Senga, GR No. 170165,
August 15, 2006)

The President can prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying
before a legislative inquiry. Is this rule absolute?

ANSWER: No. The rule is not absolute. In as much as it is ill advised for
Congress to interfere with the Presidents power as Commander-in-Chief,
it is similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with
Congress right to conduct legislative inquiries. xxx Courts are empowered,
under the principle of JUDICIAL REVIEW, to arbitrate disputes between the
executive and legislative branches of the government on the proper
parameters of power. By this, if the court so rule, the duty falls on the
shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the
appearance of the military officers before Congress. Even if the President
has earlier disregarded with notion of officers appearing before the
legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply
with the final orders of the court. (Gudani vs. Senga, GR No. 170165,
August 15, 2006)