Charles C. Holman, Jr. v. Gary J. Hilton, Superintendent, New Jersey State Prison, Trenton, Robert Hatrak, Superintendent, New Jersey State Prison, Rahway, Donald Tucker, Assistant to the Superintendent, New Jersey State Prison, Trenton, Joseph Call, Chairman of Institutional Classification Committee, Captain A. Richardson, Captain at New Jersey State Prison, Trenton, Captain R. Curran, Captain at New Jersey State Prison, Rahway, and Lieutenant Williams, Lt., at New Jersey State Prison, Trenton, Charles C. Holman v. Gary J. Hilton, Superintendent, New Jersey State Prison at Trenton Alan R. Hoffman, Former Superintendent, New Jersey State Prison at Trenton William Baum, Investigations Officer, New Jersey State Police Lawrence Ashton, Lieutenant, New Jersey State Prison James Williams, Lieutenant, New Jersey State Prison at Trenton, Individually, and in Their Official Capacities. Appeal of Gary J. Hilton, Alan R. Hoffman, William Baum, Lawrence Ashton and James Williams, 712 F.2d 854, 3r
CARMEN DEL PRADO, Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES ANTONIO L. CABALLERO and LEONARDA CABALLERO, Respondents. D E C I S I O N NACHURA, J .: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated September 26, 2000 and its resolution denying the motion for reconsideration thereof. The facts are as follows: In a judgment rendered on February 1, 1985 in Cadastral Case No. N-6 (LRC Rec. No. N-611), Judge Juan Y. Reyes of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 14, adjudicated in favor of Spouses Antonio L. Caballero and Leonarda B. Caballero several parcels of land situated in Guba, Cebu City, one of which was Cadastral Lot No. 11909, the subject of this controversy. 2 On May 21, 1987, Antonio Caballero moved for the issuance of the final decree of registration for their lots. 3 Consequently, on May 25, 1987, the same court, through then Presiding Judge Renato C. Dacudao, ordered the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration to issue the decree of registration and the corresponding titles of the lots in favor of the Caballeros. 4
On June 11, 1990, respondents sold to petitioner, Carmen del Prado, Lot No. 11909 on the basis of the tax declaration covering the property. The pertinent portion of the deed of sale reads as follows: That we, Spouses ANTONIO L. CABALLERO and LEONARDA B. CABALLERO, Filipinos, both of legal age and residents of Talamban, Cebu City, Philippines, for and in consideration of the sum of FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P40,000.00), Philippine Currency, paid by CARMEN DEL PRADO, Filipino, of legal age, single and a resident of Sikatuna St., Cebu City, Philippines, the receipt of which is full is hereby acknowledged, do by these presents SELL, CEDE, TRANSFER, ASSIGN & CONVEY unto the said CARMEN DEL PRADO, her heirs, assigns and/or successors-in-interest, one (1) unregistered parcel of land, situated at Guba, Cebu City, Philippines, and more particularly described and bounded, as follows: "A parcel of land known as Cad. Lot No. 11909, bounded as follows: North : Lot 11903 East : Lot 11908 West : Lot 11910 South : Lot 11858 & 11912 containing an area of 4,000 square meters, more or less, covered by Tax Dec. No. 00787 of the Cebu City Assessors Office, Cebu City." of which parcel of land we are the absolute and lawful owners. Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 1305, covering Lot No. 11909, was issued only on November 15, 1990, and entered in the "Registration Book" of the City of Cebu on December 19, 1990. 5 Therein, the technical description of Lot No. 11909 states that said lot measures about 14,457 square meters, more or less. 6
On March 20, 1991, petitioner filed in the same cadastral proceedings a "Petition for Registration of Document Under Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1529" 7 in order that a certificate of title be issued in her name, covering the whole Lot No. 11909. In the petition, petitioner alleged that the tenor of the instrument of sale indicated that the sale was for a lump sum or cuerpo cierto, in which case, the vendor was bound to deliver all that was included within said boundaries even when it exceeded the area specified in the contract. Respondents opposed, on the main ground that only 4,000 sq m of Lot No. 11909 was sold to petitioner. They claimed that the sale was not for a cuerpo cierto. They moved for the outright dismissal of the petition on grounds of prescription and lack of jurisdiction. After trial on the merits, the court found that petitioner had established a clear and positive right to Lot No. 11909. The intended sale between the parties was for a lump sum, since there was no evidence presented that the property was sold for a price per unit. It was apparent that the subject matter of the sale was the parcel of land, known as Cadastral Lot No. 11909, and not only a portion thereof. 8
Thus, on August 2, 1993, the court a quo rendered its decision with the following dispositive portion: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby granted and judgment is hereby rendered in favor of herein petitioner. The Register of Deeds of the City of Cebu is hereby ordered and directed to effect the registration in his office of the Deed of Absolute Sale between Spouses Antonio Caballero and Leonarda Caballero and Petitioner, Carmen del Prado dated June 11, 1990 covering Lot No. 11909 after payment of all fees prescribed by law. Additionally, the Register of Deeds of the City of Cebu is hereby ordered to cancel Original Certificate No. 1305 in the name of Antonio Caballero and Leonarda Caballero and the Transfer Certificate of Title be issued in the name of Petitioner Carmen del Prado covering the entire parcel of land known as Cadastral Lot No. 11909. 9
An appeal was duly filed. On September 26, 2000, the CA promulgated the assailed decision, reversing and setting aside the decision of the RTC. The CA no longer touched on the character of the sale, because it found that petitioner availed herself of an improper remedy. The "petition for registration of 2 document" is not one of the remedies provided under P.D. No. 1529, after the original registration has been effected. Thus, the CA ruled that the lower court committed an error when it assumed jurisdiction over the petition, which prayed for a remedy not sanctioned under the Property Registration Decree. Accordingly, the CA disposed, as follows: IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction. No pronouncement as to costs. 10
Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant petition, raising the following issues: I. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN MAKING FINDINGS OF FACT CONTRARY TO THAT OF THE TRIAL COURT[;] II. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN FAILING TO RULE THAT THE SALE OF THE LOT IS FOR A LUMP SUM OR CUERPO CIERTO[;] III. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE PETITION FOR REGISTRATION OF THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE DATED 11 JUNE 1990 EXECUTED BETWEEN HEREIN PETITIONER AND RESPONDENTS[.] 11
The core issue in this case is whether or not the sale of the land was for a lump sum or not. Petitioner asserts that the plain language of the Deed of Sale shows that it is a sale of a real estate for a lump sum, governed under Article 1542 of the Civil Code. 12 In the contract, it was stated that the land contains an area of 4,000 sq m more or less, bounded on the North by Lot No. 11903, on the East by Lot No. 11908, on the South by Lot Nos. 11858 & 11912, and on the West by Lot No. 11910. When the OCT was issued, the area of Lot No. 11909 was declared to be 14,475 sq m, with an excess of 10,475 sq m. In accordance with Article 1542, respondents are, therefore, duty-bound to deliver the whole area within the boundaries stated, without any corresponding increase in the price. Thus, petitioner concludes that she is entitled to have the certificate of title, covering the whole Lot No. 11909, which was originally issued in the names of respondents, transferred to her name. We do not agree. In Esguerra v. Trinidad, 13 the Court had occasion to discuss the matter of sales involving real estates. The Courts pronouncement is quite instructive: In sales involving real estate, the parties may choose between two types of pricing agreement: a unit price contract wherein the purchase price is determined by way of reference to a stated rate per unit area (e.g., P1,000 per square meter), or a lump sum contract which states a full purchase price for an immovable the area of which may be declared based on the estimate or where both the area and boundaries are stated (e.g., P1 million for 1,000 square meters, etc.). In Rudolf Lietz, Inc. v. Court of Appeals (478 SCRA 451), the Court discussed the distinction: "In a unit price contract, the statement of area of immovable is not conclusive and the price may be reduced or increased depending on the area actually delivered. If the vendor delivers less than the area agreed upon, the vendee may oblige the vendor to deliver all that may be stated in the contract or demand for the proportionate reduction of the purchase price if delivery is not possible. If the vendor delivers more than the area stated in the contract, the vendee has the option to accept only the amount agreed upon or to accept the whole area, provided he pays for the additional area at the contract rate. x x x x In the case where the area of an immovable is stated in the contract based on an estimate, the actual area delivered may not measure up exactly with the area stated in the contract. According to Article 1542 of the Civil Code, in the sale of real estate, made for a lump sum and not at the rate of a certain sum for a unit of measure or number, there shall be no increase or decrease of the price, although there be a greater or less areas or number than that stated in the contract. . . . x x x x Where both the area and the boundaries of the immovable are declared, the area covered within the boundaries of the immovable prevails over the stated area. In cases of conflict between areas and boundaries, it is the latter which should prevail. What really defines a piece of ground is not the area, calculated with more or less certainty, mentioned in its description, but the boundaries therein laid down, as enclosing the land and indicating its limits. In a contract of sale of land in a mass, it is well established that the specific boundaries stated in the contract must control over any statement with respect to the area contained within its boundaries. It is not of vital consequence that a deed or contract of sale of land should disclose the area with mathematical accuracy. It is sufficient if its extent is objectively indicated with sufficient precision to enable one to identify it. An error as to the superficial area is immaterial. Thus, the obligation of the vendor is to deliver everything within the boundaries, inasmuch as it is the entirety thereof that distinguishes the determinate object. 14
The Court, however, clarified that the rule laid down in Article 1542 is not hard and fast and admits of an exception. It held: A caveat is in order, however. The use of "more or less" or similar words in designating quantity covers only a reasonable excess or deficiency. A vendee of land sold in gross or with the description "more or less" with reference to its area does not thereby ipso facto take all risk of quantity in the land.. Numerical data are not of course the sole gauge of unreasonableness of the excess or deficiency in area. Courts must consider a host of other factors. In one case (see 3 Roble v. Arbasa, 414 Phil. 343 [2001]), the Court found substantial discrepancy in area due to contemporaneous circumstances. Citing change in the physical nature of the property, it was therein established that the excess area at the southern portion was a product of reclamation, which explained why the lands technical description in the deed of sale indicated the seashore as its southern boundary, hence, the inclusion of the reclaimed area was declared unreasonable. 15
In the instant case, the deed of sale is not one of a unit price contract. The parties agreed on the purchase price of P40,000.00 for a predetermined area of 4,000 sq m, more or less, bounded on the North by Lot No. 11903, on the East by Lot No. 11908, on the South by Lot Nos. 11858 & 11912, and on the West by Lot No. 11910. In a contract of sale of land in a mass, the specific boundaries stated in the contract must control over any other statement, with respect to the area contained within its boundaries. 16 1avvphi1 Blacks Law Dictionary 17 defines the phrase "more or less" to mean: About; substantially; or approximately; implying that both parties assume the risk of any ordinary discrepancy. The words are intended to cover slight or unimportant inaccuracies in quantity, Carter v. Finch, 186 Ark. 954, 57 S.W.2d 408; and are ordinarily to be interpreted as taking care of unsubstantial differences or differences of small importance compared to the whole number of items transferred. Clearly, the discrepancy of 10,475 sq m cannot be considered a slight difference in quantity. The difference in the area is obviously sizeable and too substantial to be overlooked. It is not a reasonable excess or deficiency that should be deemed included in the deed of sale. We take exception to the avowed rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. After an assiduous scrutiny of the records, we lend credence to respondents claim that they intended to sell only 4,000 sq m of the whole Lot No. 11909, contrary to the findings of the lower court. The records reveal that when the parties made an ocular inspection, petitioner specifically pointed to that portion of the lot, which she preferred to purchase, since there were mango trees planted and a deep well thereon. After the sale, respondents delivered and segregated the area of 4,000 sq m in favor of petitioner by fencing off the area of 10,475 sq m belonging to them. 18
Contracts are the law between the contracting parties. Sale, by its very nature, is a consensual contract, because it is perfected by mere consent. The essential elements of a contract of sale are the following: (a) consent or meeting of the minds, that is, consent to transfer ownership in exchange for the price; (b) determinate subject matter; and (c) price certain in money or its equivalent. All these elements are present in the instant case. 19
More importantly, we find no reversible error in the decision of the CA. Petitioners recourse, by filing the petition for registration in the same cadastral case, was improper. It is a fundamental principle in land registration that a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. Such indefeasibility commences after one year from the date of entry of the decree of registration. 20 Inasmuch as the petition for registration of document did not interrupt the running of the period to file the appropriate petition for review and considering that the prescribed one-year period had long since expired, the decree of registration, as well as the certificate of title issued in favor of respondents, had become incontrovertible. 21
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. SO ORDERED. G.R. Nos. L-21703-04 August 31, 1966 MATEO H. REYES and JUAN H. REYES, petitioners and appellants, vs. MATEO RAVAL REYES, respondent and appellee. Harold M. Hernando for petitioners and appellants. Rafael Ruiz for respondent and appellee. REYES, J.B.L., J .: Direct appeal on pure question of law from an order of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, in its Cadastral Cases Nos. 31, L. R. C. Rec. No. 1188, and 42, L. R. C. Rec. No. 1994, denying petitioners' motion to compel respondent to surrender their owners' duplicates of Original Certificates of Title Nos. 22161 and 8066, as well as from a subsequent order of the same court, refusing, upon petitioners' motion, to reconsider the first order of denial. The undisputed facts are: three brothers, Mateo H., Juan H., and Francisco H., all surnamed Reyes, are the registered owners of several parcels of land, to wit; Lots Nos. 15891, 15896, 15902 and 15912, of the Laoag (Ilocos Norte) Cadastre, embraced in and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 22161, and also Lots Nos. 20481 and 20484, of the same cadastral survey, embraced in and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 8066, both of the Registry of Deeds of Ilocos Norte. These titles were issued pursuant to a decree of registration, dated 31 May 1940. On 17 July 1962, petitioners Mateo H. Reyes and Juan H. Reyes filed, in the above stated cadastral cases, a motion for issuance of writs of possession over all the lots covered by both Certificates of Title above referred to. Respondent Mateo Raval Reyes opposed the motion, admitting that he is only in possession of the lots covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 22161, but denying that he possesses the lots covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 8066; however, he claimed that he has been in, and is entitled to, the possession thereof (i.e., Lots Nos. 20481 and 20484), having acquired by way of absolute sale (not recorded) from petitioners' brother, Francisco H. Reyes, the latter's undivided one-third (1/3) share, interest and participation to these disputed lots. 4 After due hearing of this appellant, the court a quo issued, on 20 December 1962, the writ of possession with respect to Lot Nos. 15891 and 15896, which writ was, upon petitioners' motion for reconsideration, amended, on 7 January 1963, to include all the other lots covered by both titles. Respondent did not appeal from this order amending the writ of possession. Subsequently, petitioners in the above cadastral cases, as plaintiffs, commenced, on 15 January 1963, before the same court of first instance, an ordinary civil action seeking to recover the products of the disputed lots, or their value, and moral damages against respondent Mateo Raval Reyes, as defendant. This case was docketed as its Civil Case No. 3659. Defendant therein (now respondent M. Raval Reyes) answered the complaint and pleaded a counterclaim for partition of all the disputed lots, alleging the same ground he had heretofore raised in his answer and/or opposition to the motion for issuance of writ of possession, i.e., he is their (plaintiffs') co-owner, he having bought from plaintiffs' brother, Francisco H. Reyes, the latter's undivided one-third (1/3) share, interest and participation to these disputed lots. Pending trial on this ordinary civil case (No. 3659), petitioners presented, on 25 February 1963, in the cadastral cases aforementioned, a motion to compel respondent Mateo Raval Reyes to surrender and deliver to them the owners' duplicates of Original Certificates of Title Nos. 22161 and 8066. Respondent opposed this motion. The court a quo denied petitioners' motion, on the ground that the parcels of land covered by both titles are subjects of litigation in Civil Case No. 3659 and the same has not yet been decided on the merits by it. Petitioners subjected the foregoing order to a motion for reconsideration, but without success; hence, the present appeal. Petitioners-appellants dispute the above ruling of the trial court contending that, since the subject matter of Civil Case No. 3659 are not the lots covered by the titles in question but their products or value, and moral damages, these lots are not in litigation in this ordinary civil case; and that since respondent had already raised the issue of ownership and possession of these lots in his opposition to the (petitioners') motion for issuance of writ of possession and, despite this opposition, the court a quo granted the writ, without any appeal being taken, respondent is barred and estopped from raising the same issue in the ordinary civil case, under the principle ofres judicata.1wph1.t On the other hand, respondent-appellee maintains that, having pleaded a counterclaim for partition of the lots in question in said Civil Case No. 3659, the trial court correctly held that these lots are subjects of litigation in this ordinary civil case. He also maintains that petitioners not having impleaded their brother, Francisco H. Reyes, or his heirs, as parties in their motion for issuance of writ of execution, and because these heirs have not intervened in this particular incident, the writ of possession issued by the trial court is, at most, valid only with respect to their (petitioners) undivided two-thirds (2/3) share and participation in these disputed lots; hence, he concludes that he is not barred and estopped from raising the issue of ownership and possession of the undivided one-third (1/3) share and participation of petitioners' brother, Francisco H. Reyes, which share respondent allegedly bought from the latter. In their reply brief, petitioners-appellants refute the latter argument of respondent- appellee by showing that they had previously obtained special authority from the heirs of their deceased brother to represent them in the proceedings had in the court below. The sole issue to be resolved in the instant appeal is: who between petitioners- appellants or respondent-appellee has a better right to the possession or custody of the disputed owners' duplicates of certificates of title. While we agree with the court a quo that the disputed lots are subjects of litigation in Civil Case No. 3659, it appearing that respondent, as defendant therein, had presented a counterclaim for partition of the lots covered by the titles, we see no valid and plausible reason to justify, on this ground, the withholding from the registered owners, such as the petitioners-appellants herein, the custody and possession of the owners' duplicates of certificates of title. In a decided case, this Court has already held that the owner of the land in whose favor and in whose name said land is registered and inscribed in the certificate of title has a more preferential right to the possession of the owners' duplicate than one whose name does not appear in the certificate and has yet to establish his right to the possession thereto. Thus, this Court said: Como acertadamente dijo el Juzgado, lo unico que se suscita es si Ana Umbao de Carpio tiene derecho a la possession del duplicado para el dueno del Certificado de Titulo Original No. 698, con preferencia a la opositora-apelante. A nuestro juicio, la solucion es clara e ineludible. Hallandose admitido que el decreto final que se dicto en el expediente catastral en 28 de mayo de 1936, en relacion con el lote No. 778, fue a favor de Ana Umbao y que el duplicado para el dueo del Certificado de Titulo Original No. 698 se expidio por el Registrador de Titulos a favor de la misma es obvious que quien tiene derecho a poseer el certificado de titulo es ella y no la apelante (art. 41 de la Ley No. 496, tal como ha sido reformado). Alega la apelante que ella tiene tanto derecho como la apelada a poseer el titulo porque el terreno a que se refiere es de la propiedad de las tres hermanas. La pretension no es meritoria Segun el articulo 41 de la Ley No. 496, conforme ha sido enmendado, el duplicado para el dueno debe expedirse por el Registrador a nombre de la persona a cuyo favor se ha decretado el terreno y dispone, ademas, que dicho duplicado debe entregarsele al dueo inscrito. Si la apelante cree que tiene derecho a participar en el lote No. 778, como coheredera, debe ejercitar una accion independiente, encaminada a obtener su participacion. (El Director de Terrenos contra Abacahin 72 Phil. 326). It being undisputed that respondent had already availed of an independent civil action to recover his alleged co-owner's share in the disputed lots by filing a counterclaim for partition in said Civil Case No. 3659, his rights appear to be amply protected; and considering that he may also avail of, to better protect his rights thereto, the provision on notice of lis pendens under Section 24, Rule 14, of the Revised Rules of Court, for the purpose of recording the fact that the lots covered by the titles in question are 5 litigated in said Civil Case No. 3659, we again see no justifiable reason for respondent to retain the custody of the owners' duplicates of certificates of titles. In view of the above considerations, we deem it unnecessary to pass on the merits of the second contention of petitioners-appellants. Wherefore, the orders appealed from should be, as they are hereby, reversed; and, in accordance with this opinion, respondent Mateo Raval Reyes is hereby ordered to deliver to petitioners the owners' duplicates of Original Certificates of Title No. 22161 and 8066. With costs against respondent-appellee, Mateo Raval Reyes. [G.R. No. L-7644. November 27, 1956.] HENRY LITAM, ETC., ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellants, vs. REMEDIOS R. ESPIRITU, as guardian of the incompetent MARCOSA RIVERA, and ARMINIO RIVERA, Defendants-Appellees. [G.R. No. L-7645. November 27, 1956] IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE OF THE DECEASED RAFAEL LITAM. GREGORIO DY TAM,Petitioner-Appellant, vs. REMEDIOS R. ESPIRITU, in her capacity as judicial guardian of the incompetent MARCOSA RIVERA, counter- Petitioner, ARMINIO RIVERA, administrator-Appellee.
D E C I S I O N CONCEPCION, J .: This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in the above entitled case, which were jointly tried. On May 21, 1952, Gregorio Dy Tam instituted Special Proceeding No. 1537 of said court, entitled In the matter of the Intestate Estate of the Deceased Rafael Litam. The petition therein filed, dated April 24, 1952, states that Petitioner is the son of Rafael Litam, who died in Manila on January 10, 1951; chan roblesvirtualawlibr ar ythat the deceased was survived by:chanr obl esvirt uall awlibrar y Li Hong Hap 40 years Li Ho 37 years Gregorio Dy Tam 33 years Henry Litam alias Dy Bun Pho 29 years Beatriz Lee Tam alias Lee Giak Ian 27 years Elisa Lee Tam alias Lee Giok Bee 25 years William Litam alias Li Bun Hua 23 years Luis Litam alias Li Bun Lin 22 years that the foregoing children of the decedent by a marriage celebrated in China in 1911 with Sia Khin, now deceased; chan robl esvirtual awlibrar ythat after the death of Rafael Litam, Petitioner and his co-heirs came to know that the decedent had, during the subsistence of said marriage with Sia Khin, contracted in 1922 in the Philippines cralaw another marriage with Marcosa Rivera, Filipino citizen;chan roblesvirtualawli brar ythat the decedent left as his property among others, his one-half (1/2) share valued at P65,000 in the purported conjugal properties between him and Marcosa Rivera, which cralawpartnership consisted of the following real property acquired during the marriage between him and Marcosa Rivera, to wit:chanr obl esvirt uall awlibrar y (1) Three (3) parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1228 of the Registry of Deeds of the province of Pampanga:chanroblesvirtuallawli brar y (2) One (1) parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 26011 of the Registry of Deeds of the province of Bulacan. and that the decedent had left neither a will nor debt. Petitioner prayed, therefore, that, after appropriate proceedings, letters of administration be issued to Marcosa Rivera, the surviving spouse of the decedent. Soon thereafter, Marcosa Rivera filed a counter- petition:chanrobl esvirtuallawli brar y (1) substantially denying the alleged marriage of the decedent to Sia Khin, as well as the alleged filiation of the persons named in the petition; chan r obl esvirt ual awlibr ary(2) asserting that the properties described herein are her paraphernal properties, and that the decedent had left unpaid debts, and certain properties in Bulan and Casiguran, Sorsogon, and in Virac, Catanduanes, apart from shares of stock in a private corporation known by the name of Litam Co., Inc.; chan r obl esvirt ual awlibrar yand (3) praying that her nephew, Arminio Rivera, be appointed administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased. In due course, the court granted this petition and letters of administration were issued to Arminio Rivera, who assumed his duties as such, and, later, submitted an inventory of the alleged estate of Rafael Litam. Inasmuch as said inventory did not include the properties mentioned in the petition, dated April 24, 1952, of Gregorio Dy Tam, the latter filed, on November 29, 1952, a motion for the removal of Rivera as administrator of the aforementioned estate. This led to a number of incidents hinging on the question whether said properties belong in common to the decedent and Marcosa Rivera or to the latter exclusively. Meanwhile, Remedios R. Espiritu was appointed, in Special Proceeding No. 1709 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, guardian of Marcosa Rivera, who had been declared incompetent. Thereafter, or on April 20, 1953, Gregorio Dy Tam and his alleged brothers and sisters aforementioned, filed the complaint in Civil Case No. 2071 of the same court, against Remedios R. Espiritu, as guardian of Marcosa Rivera, and Arminio Rivera. In said complaint,Plaintiffs therein reproduced substantially the allegations made in the aforementioned petition of Gregorio Dy Tam dated April 24. 1952, except that the properties acquired during the existence of marriage between Rafael Litam and Marcosa Rivera and/or with their joint efforts during the time that they lived as husband and wife were said to be more than those specified in said petition, namely:chanroblesvirtuallawli brar y (1) 3 parcels of land situated in the Municipality of Macabebe, Province of Pampanga, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1228 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Pampanga, issued on July 29, 1947; (2) 2 Parcels of land, together with all buildings and improvements thereon except those expressly noted in the title as belonging to other persons, situated in the Municipality of Navotas, Province of Rizal, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 35836 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Rizal, issued on October 4, 1938; 6 (3) 1 parcel of land situated in the Municipality of Malabon, Province of Rizal, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 23248 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Rizal, issued on June 12, 1933; (4) 1 parcel of land situated in Barrio of Kay-Badia, Municipality of Obando, Province of Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 21809 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Bulacan, issued on May 25, 1939; (5) 1 parcel of land (plan psu-93067, swo-16049) situated in Barrio of Quibadia, Municipality of Obando, Province of Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 26011 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Bulacan, issued on April 9, 1943; Other properties are located in Bataan province. All properties total an assessed value of approximately P150,000.00. In said complaint, Plaintiffs prayed that the judgment be rendered:chanrobl esvirtuallawli brar y (1) declaring the aforesaid properties as belonging to the conjugal partnership or tenancy in common which existed between the deceased Rafael Litam and the incompetent Marcosa Rivera; (2) ordering the Defendants to deliver the aforesaid properties to the administration of the estate of the deceased Rafael Litam (Rule 75, section 2, Rules of Court); (3) ordering the said Defendants further to render an accounting of the fruits they collected from the aforesaid properties and to deliver the same to the administration of the estate of the deceased Rafael Litam; (4) ordering the said Defendants to pay the administration of the estate of the deceased Rafael Litam damages in double the value of the fruits mentioned in the preceding paragraph which they embezzled; chan roblesvirtualawli brar yand (5) ordering the Defendants to pay the costs. The Plaintiffs further pray for such other remedy as the Court may deem just and equitable in the premises. In her answer to the complaint, Marcosa Rivera reiterated, in effect, the allegations in her counter-petition, dated July 12, 1952, in Special Proceeding No. 1537, and set up some affirmative and special defenses, as well as a counter-claim for attorneys fees and damages in the aggregate sum of P110,000.00. Owning to the identity of the issue raised in said Civil Case No. 2071 and in the aforementioned incidents in Special Proceeding No. 1537, both were jointly heard. Later on, the court rendered a decision. (1) Dismissing Civil Case No. 2071, with costs against the Plaintiffs; (2) Sentencing the Plaintiff in Civil Case No. 2071, under the Defendants counterclaim, to pay jointly and severally each of the Defendants the sum of P5,000.00 as actual damages and P25,000.00 as moral damages; (3) Declaring that the properties in question, namely:chanroblesvirt uallawlibr ar y the fishponds, consisting of three parcels, situated in Macabebe, Pampanga, with Transfer certificate of Title No. 1228 of the land records of Pampanga, one-half undivided portion of the fishponds, consisting of two parcels, situated in Navotas, Rizal, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 35836, the parcel of land with the improvements thereon situated in Malabon, Rizal, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 23248, both of the land records of Rizal, and the fishponds, consisting of two parcels, situated in Obando, Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 21809 and 26011, both of the land records of Bulacan, are the exclusive, separate and paraphernal properties of Marcosa Rivera; chan r obl esvirt ual awlibr ar yand (4) Declaring that the Plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2071 (who are the same persons alleged to be children of Rafael Litam in the petition, dated April 24, 1952, filed by the Petitioner in Sp. Proc. No. 1537) are not the children of the deceased Rafael Litam, and that his only heir is his surviving wife, Marcosa Rivera. The two (2) Cases are now before us on appeal taken by the Petitioner in Special Proceeding No. 1537 and the Plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2071. The issues for determination are:chanroblesvirtuallawli brar y (1) AreAppellants the legitimate children of Rafael Litam? (2) Is Marcosa Rivera the exclusive owner of the properties in question, or do the same constitute a common property of her and the decedent? The first issue hinges on whether Rafael Litam and Sia Khin were married in 1911, and whether Rafael Litam is the father of Appellants herein. In this connection, the lower court had the following to say:chanr obl esvirt uall awlibrar y cralaw the evidence weikhs very heavily in favor of the theory of the Defendants in Civil Case No. 2071 to the effect that the said deceased Rafael Litam was not married to Sia Khin and thatPlaintiffs, are not the children of the said decedent. The Plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2071 and thePetitioner in Sp. Proc. No. 1537 have utterly failed to prove their alleged status as children of Rafael Litam by a marriage with Sia Khin. It appears from the evidence presented by the Defendants in civil Case No. 2071 and the administrator and the counter-Petitioner in Sp. Proc. No. 1537 that there was no such marriage between the deceased Rafael Litam and Sia Khin and that the Plaintiffs named in Civil Case No. 2071 are not children of said deceased. The various official and public documents executed by Rafael Litam himself convincingly show that he had not contracted any marriage with any person other than Marcosa Rivera, and that he had no child. In the marriage certificate, (Exhibit 55) it was clearly stated that he was single when he married Marcosa Rivera on June 10, 1922. In the sworn application for alien certificate of registration dated July 7, 1950 (Exhibit 1), Rafael Litam unequivocably declared under oath that he had no child. In the several other documents executed by him and presented in evidence, (Exhibits 19, 21, 22, 23, 46 and 46-A) Rafael Litam had consistently referred to Marcosa Rivera alone as his wife; chan r obl esvirt ual awlibr aryhe had never mentioned of Sia Khin as his wife, or of his alleged children. The witnesses presented by the Defendants in Civil Case No. 2071 and the administrator and counter Petitioner in Sp. Proc. No. 1537 positively testified to the effect that they know that Rafael Litam did not have any child, nor was he married with Sia Khin. An impartial and disinterested witness, Felipe Cruz, likewise testified that he has known Rafael Litam even before his marriage with Marcosa Rivera and that said Rafael Litam did not have any child. On the other hand, the Plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2071 and the Petitioner in Sp. Proc. No. 1537 presented in support of their theory the testimony of their lone witness, Luis Litam, and certain documentary evidence. It is noteworthy that the said Plaintiffs and said Petitioner did not present in evidence the marriage certificate of Rafael Litam and Sia Khin, which in the opinion of the Court, is the competent and best evidence of the alleged marriage between them. No explanation has been given for the non-presentation of said marriage certificate, nor has there been any showing 7 of its loss. Neither have said Plaintiffs and said Petitionerpresented any competent secondary evidence of the supposed marriage. The testimony of the lone witness, Luis Litam, cannot be given any credence and value at all. His testimony is mostly hearsay, as according to him, he was merely informed by Rafael Litam of the latters supposed marriage with Sia Khin. His testimony is uncorroborated. The court noticed that the said witness was only 22 years old when he testified, and it appears in the petition filed by the Petitioner in Sp. Proc. No. 1537 that said witness is the youngest of all the alleged eight children of Rafael Litam. The Court is at a loss to understand why one or some of the older alleged children of Rafael Litam were not presented as witnesses in view of the unreliable testimony of Luis Litam, and considering that older persons are better qualified to testify on the matters sought to be proved which allegedly happened a long time ago. The birth certificate presented by the Plaintiff in Civil Case No. 2071 and Petitioner in Sp. Proc. No. 1537 cannot be given even little consideration, because the name of the father of the children appearing therein is not Rafael Litam, but different persons. It is very significant to note that the names of the father of the persons appearing in said birth certificates are Dy Tham, Li Tam, Lee Tham, Rafael Dy Tam, and that said persons were born in different places, some in Amoy, China, another Fukien, China, and the other in Limtao, China. It also appears in said birth certificates that the childrens mothers named therein are different, some being Sia Khim, others Sia Quien, the other Sia Khun, and still another Sia Kian. These documents do not establish the identity of the deceased Rafael Litam and the persons named therein as father. Besides, it does not appear in the said certificates of birth that Rafael Litam had in any manner intervened in the preparation and filing thereof. The other documentary evidence presented by the said Plaintiffs and Petitioner are entirely immaterial and highly insufficient to prove the alleged marriage between the deceased Rafael Litam and Sia Khin and the alleged statue of the Plaintiffs as children of said decedent. It is, therefore, the finding of this Court that the Plaintiffs named in Civil Case No. 2071 are not heirs of the said decedent, his only heir being his surviving wife, Marcosa Rivera. (Emphasis ours.) The findings of fact thus made in the decision appealed from are borne out by the records and the conclusion drawn from said facts is, to our mind, substantially correct. Appellants evidence on this point consists of the testimony of Appellant Li Bun Lin, who said that he is, also known as Luis Litam; chan robl esvirtual awlibrar ythat his co-Appellants are his brothers and sisters; chan roblesvirtualawli brar ythat their parents are the decedent and Sia Khin, who were married in China in 1911; chan r obl esvirt ual awlibr ar yand that Sia Khin died in Manila during the Japanese occupation. He likewise, identified several pictures, marked Exhibits I to S, which were claimed to be family portraits, but the lower court rejected their admission in evidence. Although we agree with herein Appellants that this was an error, it is clear to us that said pictures and the testimony of Luis Litam, as well as the other evidence adverted to in the above-quoted portion of the decision appealed from, are far from sufficient to outweigh, or even offset, the evidence in favor of the Appellees. It should be noted that the decedent had admittedly married Marcosa Rivera in 1922. In the very petition of Appellant Gregorio Dy Tam, in Special Proceeding No. 1537, dated April 24, 1952, he alleged that Marcosa Rivera is the surviving spouse of the decedent. In their complaint in Civil Case No. 2071, Appellants specifically admitted and averred the existence of the marriage between said Rafael Litam and Marcosa Rivera which would have been void ab initio, and, hence, inexistent legally, if Appellants pretense were true or they believed it to be so and that they had lived as husband and wife. Again, although Gregorio Dy Tam, asserted, in his aforementioned petition, that he and his co-heirs came to know about the marriage of the decedent and Marcosa Rivera after the death of Rafael Litam, the very testimony of Li Bun Lin, as witness for the Appellants, show, beyond doubt, that said Appellants knew, during the lifetime of Rafael Litam that he and Marcosa Rivera were living in Malabon, Rizal, openly and publicly, as husband and wife, and regarded her as his lawful wife. Indeed, in the course of his testimony, said Li Bun Lin alluded to her as his mother. In other words, aside from the circumstance that the wedding and marital life of Marcosa Rivera and Rafael Litam is undisputed, it is, also, an established fact that they had the general reputation of being legally married and were so regarded by the community and by Appellants herein, during the lifetime of Rafael Litam. Upon the other hand, Appellants maintain, in effect, that Rafael Litam was guilty of the crime of bigamy; chan r obl esvirt ual awlibr arythat he had, likewise, willfully and maliciously falsified public and official documents; chan roblesvirtualawli brar yand that, although Appellants and Sia Khin were living in Manila and Marcosa Rivera whom Appellants knew resided only a few kilometers away, in Malabon, Rizal where Rafael Litam returned daily, after attending to his business in Manila, the decedent had succeeded, for about thirty (30) years, in keeping each party in complete ignorance of the nature of his alleged relations with the other. Apart from the highly improbable nature of the last part of Appellants pretense, it is obvious that the same cannot be sustained unless the evidence in support thereof is of the strongest possible kind, not only because it entails the commission by Rafael Litam of grave criminal offenses which are derogatory to his honor, but, also, because death has sealed his lips, thus depriving him of the most effective means of defense. The proof for Appellants herein does not satisfy such requirement. As regards the title to the properties in dispute, the evidence thereon was analyzed by the lower court in the following language:chanr obl esvirt uall awlibr ar y It has been established by the evidence that the properties in question were bought by Marcosa Rivera with her separate and exclusive money. The fishponds situated in Obando, Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 21809 and 26011, the one-half (1/2) undivided portion of the fishponds situated in Navotas, Rizal with Transfer Certificate of Title No. 35836, and the property situated in Hulong-Duhat, Malabon, Rizal, with Transfer Certificate of Title No. 23248 were all purchased by Marcosa Rivera with the money she earned and accumulated while she was still single; chan roblesvirt ualawlibr ar ywhile the fishponds situated in Macabebe, Pampanga with Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1228 were purchased by her with the money she inherited from her late sister, Rafaela Rivera and with the money she received from the proceeds of the sale of the pieces of jewelry she inherited from her father Eduardo Rivera and her sister Rafaela Rivera. The properties in question, having been bought by Marcosa Rivera, although during her marriage with Rafael Litam, with her exclusive and separate money, said properties are undeniably her paraphernal properties. (Art. 1396, Spanish Civil Code, which is the same as Art. 148 of the Civil Code of the Phil.) Great importance should be given to the documentary evidence, vis:chanr obl esvirt uall awlibr ary Exhibits 21, 22, 23, 19, 46 and 46-A, presented by the Defendants, in Civil Case No. 2071 and the administrator and counter- Petitioner in Sp. Proc. No. 1537, which prove beyond 8 peradventure of any doubt that the properties in question are the paraphernal properties of Marcosa Rivera. In Exhibit 21, Rafael Litam unequivocably declared under his oath that the money paid by Marcosa Rivera for the fishponds in Obando, Bulacan was her exclusive and separate money which was earned by her while she was still single. In Exhibits 22 and 23, both dated June 16, 1947, same Rafael Litam, also under oath, acknowledge the fact that the sums of P13,000.00 and P10,000.00 loaned by Marcosa Rivera to the spouses Catalino Pascual and Juliana Pascual, and to Juliana Pascual, respectively, are the separate and exclusive money of Marcosa Rivera, in which money Rafael Litam had no interest whatsoever. In Exhibit 19, same Rafael Litam acknowledged the fact that he had obtained, before the outbreak of the second world war, from Marcosa Rivera the sum of P135,000.00 which belongs exclusively to the latter, and that after the liberation, or more specifically, on January 4, 1946, he stole from Marcosa Rivera the further sum of P62,000.00, also belonging exclusively to the latter, which amounts, totalling P197,000.00, exclusive of interests, have not, according to the evidence, been paid to her up to the present. In Exhibits 46 and 46-A, it was acknowledged by Rafael Litam that he had not given any money to his wife, Marcosa Rivera, and that they have actually adopted a system of separation of property, each of them not having any interest or participation whatsoever in the property of the other. These declarations and admission of fact made by Rafael Litam against his interest are binding upon him, his heirs and successors in interests and third persons as well. (Secs. 7 & 29, Rule 123, Rules of Court). The finding of this Court that the properties in question are paraphernal properties of Marcosa Rivera, having been bought by her with her separate and exclusive money, is further strengthened by the fact that, as it is clearly disclosed by the evidence when Marcosa Rivera married Rafael Litam in 1922, she was already rich, she having already earned and saved money as consignataria while she was still single. It also appears that she was born of a rich family, her father, Eduardo Rivera, being the owner of fishponds, commercial and residential lands and buildings, (Exhibits 5 to 18, inclusive), with an assessed value of around P150,000.00 (Exhibits 25 and 42, inclusive), now worth approximately a million pesos, and most of which properties as may be seen from the certificates of title were acquired by him way back in the years 1916 and 1919. When Eduardo Rivera died on February 5, 1942, his cash and jewelry were inherited by his eldest daughter, Rafaela Rivera, and when the latter died single on July 2, 1943, Marcosa Rivera inherited her cash amounting to P150,000.00, Philippine currency, and and her pieces of jewelry. It is with this amount and with the proceeds of the sale of some of said pieces of jewelry that Marcosa Rivera purchased the fishponds in question, situated in Macabebe, Pampanga. On the other hand, it appears from the evidence that when Rafael Litam was on June 10, 1922, married to Marcosa Rivera, he was poor. He had to borrow from Marcosa Rivera, the sum of P135,000.00 belonging exclusively to her before the outbreak of the war, and to steal from her further sum of P62,000.00 after the liberation (Exhibit 10). The said amounts totalling P197,000.00, exclusive of the stipulated interests, according to the evidence, have not been paid to Marcosa Rivera up to the present. Rafael Litam did not contribute any amount of money or labor to the properties in question, as he and Marcosa Rivera maintained an absolute separation of property (Exhibits 46 and 46-A). Besides, during his lifetime he used to go his office in Manila everyday. Another circumstance which clearly proves that the properties in question belong exclusively to Marcosa Rivera is the established fact that before she became incompetent sometime in the early part of the year, 1953, she had been administering said properties, to the exclusion of Rafael Litam. In fact, as may be seen from the very documentary evidence (Exhibit EE, same as Nxh. 50) presented by the Plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2071 themselves and Petitioner in Sp. Proc. No. 1537, she alone leased the properties in question, situated in Macabebe, Pampanga, and the corresponding lease contract, dated July 13, 1948 was signed by her as lessor and by Rafael Suarez, Jr. as lessees. Furthermore, the properties in question have been declared in the name of Marcosa Rivera alone, and she alone pays the real estate taxes due thereon. (Exhibits 43, 44 & 45.) Further strong proofs that the properties in question are the paraphernal properties of Marcosa Rivera, are the very Torrens Titles covering said properties. All the said properties are registered in the name of Marcosa Rivera, married to Rafael Litam. This circumstance indicates that the properties in question belong to the registered owner, Marcosa Rivera, as her paraphernal properties, for if they were conjugal, the titles covering the same should have been issued in the names of Rafael Litam and Marcosa Rivera. The words married to Rafael Litam written after the name of Marcosa Rivera, in each of the above mentioned titles are merely descriptive of the civil status of Marcosa Rivera, the registered owner of the properties covered by said titles. On the other hand, the evidence presented by the Plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2071 andPetitioner in Sp. Proc. No. 1537 in support of their contention that the properties in question are conjugal is, in the mind of the Court, very weak, unreliable, and mostly incompetent, and cannot overcome the clear, convincing and almost conclusive proofs presented by the opposite party. Scant or no consideration at all could be given by the Court to the immaterial, incompetent and unbelievable testimonies of the witnesses presented by the said Plaintiffsand Petitioners. The disputable presumption of law that the properties acquired during the marriage are conjugal properties, upon which legal presumption said Plaintiffs and Petitionermainly rely has been decisively overcome by the overwhelming preponderance of evidence adduced in these cases that the properties in question are the paraphernal properties of Marcosa Rivera. (Emphasis ours.) Appellants counsel assail the decision appealed from upon the ground that the lower court had been partial to the Appellees and had not accorded to the Appellants a fair and just hearing. As above pointed out, His Honor the trial Judge could have been, and should have been, more liberal in the reception of evidence. Appellants witnesses (Li Bun Lin, Dominador Gadi, Benigno Musni and Rafael B. Suarez) should have been allowed to testify on the alleged title of Rafael Litam to certain properties and on his alleged reasons for the language used in the public and official documents relied upon by the Appellees. However, it is apparent to us that said evidence cannot affect the decision in these cases. The evidenciary value of the testimony of said witnesses would have depended mainly upon their individual appraisal of certain facts, upon their respective inferences therefrom and their biases or view points, and upon a number of other factors affecting their credibility. At best, said testimony could not possibly prevail over the repeated admissions made by the decedent against his own interest in Exhibits 19, 21, 22, 23, 46 and 46-A (adverted to in the abovequoted portion of the decision appealed from), which admissions are corroborated by the fact that the deceased father of Marcosa Rivera was well to do; chan robl esvirtual awlibrar ythat aside from her share in his estate, she had, likewise, inherited from a sister who died single and without issue; chan roblesvirtualawli brar ythat 9 the lands in dispute were registered, and some were, also, leased, in her name, instead of hers and that of the decedent; chan roblesvir tualawli brar yand that the latter lived in her house in Malabon, Rizal. Appellants contend that the transactions covered by said Exhibits 19, 21 to 23 and 46 and 46-A, as well as by the other deeds referred to in the decision appealed from, were caused to be made in the name of Marcosa Rivera, to the exclusion of her husband, in order to evade the constitutional provision disqualifying foreigners from the acquisition of private agricultural lands, except by succession. Apart from being based, solely, upon a surmise, without any evidentiary support, this pretense is refuted by the fact that said residential property in Hulong-Duhat, Malabon, Rizal, was acquired on April 12, 1933, or prior to the adoption of our Constitution (see Exhibits Z and AA). Her transactions subsequently thereto, merely followed, therefore, the pattern of her activities before the drafting of said fundamental law. This notwithstanding, we do not believe that Appellants should be sentenced to pay damages. The petition of Gregorio Dy Tam in Special Proceeding No. 1537 and the complaint in Civil Case No. 2071 contain nothing derogatory to the good name or reputation of the herein Appellees. On the contrary, it may be surmised from said pleadings that Marcosa Rivera had no knowledge of the alleged previous marriage of the decedent to Sia Khin. Moreover, the records do not show that Appellants have acted in bad faith. Likewise, we are of the opinion that the lower court should not have declared, in the decision appealed from, that Marcosa Rivera is the only heir of the decedent, for such declaration is improper in Civil Case No. 2071, it being within the exclusive competence of the court in Special Proceeding No. 1537, in which it is not as yet, in issue, and, will not be, ordinarily, in issue until the presentation of the project of partition. Wherefore, with the elimination of the award for damages in favor of the herein Appellees, and of said declaration of heirship, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed in all other respects, with costs against the Appellants. It is SO ORDERED. G.R. No. L-57757 August 31, 1987 PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PRAGMACIO VITUG AND MAXIMO VITUG, respondents. GANCAYCO, J .: Does the presumption of conjugality of properties acquired by the spouses during coverture provided for in Article 160 of the Civil Code apply to property covered by a Torrens certificate of title in the name of the widow? This is the issue posed in this petition to review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 60903 which is an action for reconveyance and damages. * On November 28, 1952, Donata Montemayor, through her son, Salvador M. Vitug, mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) several parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 2289 Pampanga to guarantee the loan granted by the PNB to Salvador Jaramilla and Pedro Bacani in the amount of P40,900.00 which was duly registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Pampanga. 1 On December 1, 1963, Donata Montemayor also mortgaged in favor of PNB certain properties covered by TCT Nos. 2887 and 2888-Pampanga to guarantee the payment of the loan account of her son Salvador Vitug in the amount of P35,200.00, which mortgage was duly registered in the Register of Deeds of Pampanga. 2
The above-mentioned Transfer Certificates of Titles covering said properties were all in the name of Donata Montemayor, of legal age, Filipino, widow and a resident of Lubao, Pampanga at the time they were mortgaged to PNB 3 and were free from all hens and encumbrances. 4
Salvador Vitug failed to pay his account so the bank foreclosed the mortgaged properties covered by TCT Nos. 2887 and 2888. They were sold at public auction on May 20, 1968 in which the PNB was the highest bidder. The titles thereto were thereafter consolidated in the name of PNB. Likewise, Salvador Jaramilla and Pedro Bacani failed to settle their accounts with the PNB so the latter foreclosed the properties covered by TCT No. 2889 which were sold at public auction and likewise PNB was the buyer thereof. On August 30, 1968, a certificate of sale was issued by the Register of Deeds covering said properties in favor of the PNB. When the title of the PNB was consolidated a new title was issued in its name. 5
On September 2, 1969, the PNB sold the properties covered by TCT Nos. 2887 and 2888 Pampanga to Jesus M. Vitug, Anunciacion V. de Guzman, Prudencia V. Fajardo, Salvador Vitug and Aurora V. Gutierrez in those names the corresponding titles were issued. 6
During the lifetime of Clodualdo Vitug he married two times. His first wife was Gervacia Flores with whom he had 3 children, namely, Victor, Lucina and Julio all surnamed Vitug. Victor now dead is survived by his 5 children: Leonardo, Juan, Candida Francisco and Donaciano, an surnamed Vitug. Juan Vitug is also dead and is survived by his only daughter Florencia Vitug. The second wife of Clodualdo Vitug was Donata Montemayor with whom he had 8 children, namely, Pragmacio, Maximo, Jesus, Salvador, Prudencio and Anunciacion, all surnamed Vitug, the late Enrique Vitug represented by his wife Natalia Laquian, and the late Francisco Vitug who is survived by 11 children, namely, Antonio, Francisco, Aurora, Pedro, Honorio, Corazon, Anselmo, Benigno, Eligio Jesus and Luz. 10 Clodualdo Vitug died intestate on May 20, 1929 so his estate was settled and distributed in Special Proceeding No. 422 in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga wherein Donata Montemayor was the Administratrix. 7
Meanwhile, on May 12,1958, Donata Montemayor executed a contract of lease of Lot No. 24, which is covered by TCT No. 2887-R in favor of her children Pragmacio and Maximo both surnamed Vitug. This lease was extended on August 31, 1963. By virtue of a general power of attorney executed by Donata Montemayor on Sept. 19, 1966 in favor of Pragmacio Vitug, the latter executed a contract of lease on Sept. 19, 1967 of the said lot in favor of Maximo Vitug. 8
On March 21, 1970 Pragmacio Vitug and Maximo Vitug filed an action for partition and reconveyance with damages in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga against Marcelo Mendiola, special administrator of the intestate estate of Donata Montemayor who died earlier, Jesus Vitug, Sr., Salvador, Natalia, Prudencia, Anunciacion, all surnamed Vitug, Antonio, Francisco, Aurora, Pedro, Honorio, Corazon, Anselmo, Benigno, Eligio Jesus and Luz, all surnamed Fajardo and the PNB. The subject of the action is 30 parcels of land which they claim to be the conjugal property of the spouses Donata Montemayor and Clodualdo Vitug of which they claim a share of 2/11 of 1/2 thereof. They assailed the mortgage to the PNB and the public auction of the properties as null and void. They invoked the case of Vitug vs. Montemayor, L-5297 decided by this Court on Oct. 20, 1953 which is an action for partition and liquidation of the said 30 parcels of land wherein the properties were found to be conjugal in nature. In a decision of Sept. 15, 1975, the lower court dismissed the complaint with costs against the plaintiffs and ordered them to pay attorney's fees of P5,000.00 to the defendant's counsel. Plaintiffs then interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, wherein in due course a decision was rendered on May 20, 1981, the dispositive part of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and set aside, and another one entered in accordance with the tenor of the prayer of appellant's complaint with the modification that the sale at public auction of the 22 parcels be considered valid with respect to the 1/2 thereof. No costs. Hence the herein petition for certiorari filed by the PNB raising the following assignments of error: I THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING TO THE CASE AT BAR THE RULING OF THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT IN FLORENCIA VITUG VS. DONATA MONTEMAYOR, ET AL., 91 PHIL. 286 (1953) BECAUSE: A. BETWEEN A PROVISION OF A SPECIAL LAW AND THE JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION AND/OR APPLICATION OF A PROVISION OF A GENERAL LAW, THE FORMER PREVAILS. B. THE DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS IS NOT A MECHANICAL FORMULA OF ADHERENCE. C. PNB WAS NOT A PARTY, AND HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE ABOVECITED CASE. D. SIMILARLY, PRAGMACIO VITUG AND MAXIMO VITUG WERE NOT PARTIES IN SAID CASE. II THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RECOGNIZING THE CONCLUSIVENESS OF THE CERTIFICATE, OF TITLE, AS PROVIDED IN ACT 496, AS AMENDED (THE LAND REGISTRATION). III THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN IGNORING THE CONCLUSIVENESS OF OWNERSHIP OF DONATA MONTEMAYOR OVER THE PROPERTIES WHICH WERE REGISTERED EXCLUSIVELY IN HER NAME WHEN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS (PRAGMACIO VITUG AND MAXIMO VITUG), AS LESSEES, ENTERED INTO A CONTRACT OF LEASE WITH DONATA MONTEMAYOR AS THE OWNER-LESSOR. IV THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT PNB WAS A MORTGAGEE IN BAD FAITH. The petition is impressed with merit. When the subject properties were mortgaged to the PNB they were registered in the name of Donata Montemayor, widow. Relying on the torrens certificate of title covering said properties the mortgage loan applications of Donata were granted by the PNB and the mortgages were duly constituted and registered in the office of the Register of Deeds. In processing the loan applications of Donata Montemayor, the PNB had the right to rely on what appears in the certificates of title and no more. On its face the properties 11 are owned by Donata Montemayor, a widow. The PNB had no reason to doubt nor question the status of said registered owner and her ownership thereof. Indeed, there are no liens and encumbrances covering the same. The well-known rule in this jurisdiction is that a person dealing with a registered land has a right to rely upon the face of the torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further, except when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man make such inquiry. 9
A torrens title concludes all controversy over ownership of the land covered by a final degree of registration. 10Once the title is registered the owner may rest assured without the necessity of stepping into the portals of the court or sitting in the mirador de su casa to avoid the possibility of losing his land. 11 Article 160 of the Civil Code provides as follows: Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. The presumption applies to property acquired during the lifetime of the husband and wife. In this case, it appears on the face of the title that the properties were acquired by Donata Montemayor when she was already a widow. When the property is registered in the name of a spouse only and there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by said spouse, this is an indication that the property belongs exclusively to said spouse. 12 And this presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code cannot prevail when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involved. 13 The PNB had a reason to rely on what appears on the certificates of title of the properties mortgaged. For all legal purposes, the PNB is a mortgagee in goodfaith for at the time the mortgages covering said properties were constituted the PNB was not aware to any flaw of the title of the mortgagor. 14 True it is that in the earlier cases decided by this Court, namely Vitug VS. Montemayor decided on May 15, 1952, which is an action for recovery of possession of a share in said parcels of land, 15 and in the subsequent action for partition between the same parties decided on Oct. 20, 1953, 16 this court found the 30 parcels of land in question to be conjugal in nature and awarded the corresponding share to the property of Florencia Vitug, an heir of the late Clodualdo Vitug from the first marriage. In said cases this Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. In the dispositive part of the decision of the trial court it made the observation that "but from the conduct of Clodualdo Vitug and Donata Montemayor during the existence of their marital life, the inference is clear that Clodualdo had the unequivocal intention of transmitting the full ownership of the 30 parcels of land to his wife Donata Montemayor, thus considering the 1/2 of the funds of the conjugal property so advanced for the purchase of said parcels of land as reimbursible to the estate of Clodualdo Vitug on his death. 17 That must be the reason why the property was registered in the name of Donata Montemayor as widow after the death of Clodualdo Vitug. 18 At any rate, although actions for recovery of real property and for partition are real actions, however, they are actions in personam that bind only the particular individuals who are parties thereto. 19 The PNB not being a party in said cases is not bound by the said decisions. Nor does it appear that the PNB was aware of the said decisions when it extended the above describe mortgage loans. Indeed, if the PNB knew of the conjugal nature of said properties it would not have approved the mortgage applications covering said properties of Donata Montemayor without requiring the consent of all the other heirs or co-owners thereof. Moreover, when said properties were sold at public auction, the PNB was a purchaser for value in good faith. So its right thereto is beyond question. 20
Pragmacio and Maximo Vitug are now estopped from questioning the title of Donata Montemayor to the said properties. They never raised the conjugal nature of the property nor took issue as to the ownership of their mother, Donata Montemayor, over the same. Indeed private respondents were among the defendants in said two cases wherein in their answers to the complaint they asserted that the properties in question are paraphernal properties belonging exclusively to Donata Montemayor and are not conjugal in nature. 21 Thus they leased the properties from their mother Donata Montemayor for many years knowing her to be the owner. They were in possession of the property for a long time and they knew that the same were mortgaged by their mother to the PNB and thereafter were sold at public auction, but they did not do anything. 22 It is only after 17 years that they remembered to assert their rights. Certainly, they are guilty of laches. 23
Moreover, as correctly held by the lower court. Pragmacio and Maximo Vitug as occupants and lessees of the property in question cannot now dispute the ownership of their mother over the same who was their lessor. 24
WHEREFORE, the subject decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and set aside and another decision is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint and ordering private respondents to pay attomey's fees and expenses of litigation to petitioner PNB in the amount of P20,000.00 and the costs of the suit. SO ORDERED. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 185091 REPRESENTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION DIVISION OF LIPA CITY (FOR PANINSINGIN PRIMARY SCHOOL), Petitioner, Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson, - versus - ABAD, VILLARAMA, JR., *
PEREZ, ** and MENDOZA, JJ. PRIMO MENDOZA and MARIA LUCERO, Promulgated: Respondents. August 8, 2010
x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
12 DECISION
ABAD, J .:
This case is about the propriety of filing an ejectment suit against the Government for its failure to acquire ownership of a privately owned property that it had long used as a school site and to pay just compensation for it.
The Facts and the Case
Paninsingin Primary School (PPS) is a public school operated by petitioner Republic of the Philippines (the Republic) through the Department of Education. PPS has been using 1,149 square meters of land in Lipa City, Batangas since 1957 for its school. But the property, a portion of Lots 1923 and 1925, were registered in the name of respondents Primo and Maria Mendoza (the Mendozas) under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) T-11410. [1]
On March 27, 1962 the Mendozas caused Lots 1923 and 1925 to be consolidated and subdivided into four lots, as follows:
Lot 1 292 square meters in favor of Claudia Dimayuga Lot 2 292 square meters in favor of the Mendozas Lot 3 543 square meters in favor of Gervacio Ronquillo; and Lot 4 1,149 square meters in favor of the City Government of Lipa [2]
As a result of subdivision, the Register of Deeds partially cancelled TCT T- 11410 and issued new titles for Lots 1 and 3 in favor of Dimayuga and Ronquillo, respectively. Lot 2 remained in the name of the Mendozas but no new title was issued in the name of the City Government of Lipa for Lot 4. [3] Meantime, PPS remained in possession of the property.
The Republic claimed that, while no title was issued in the name of the City Government of Lipa, the Mendozas had relinquished to it their right over the school lot as evidenced by the consolidation and subdivision plan. Further, the property had long been tax-declared in the name of the City Government and PPS built significant, permanent improvements on the same. These improvements had also been tax- declared. [4]
The Mendozas claim, on the other hand, that although PPS sought permission from them to use the property as a school site, they never relinquished their right to it. They allowed PPS to occupy the property since they had no need for it at that time. Thus, it has remained registered in their name under the original title, TCT T- 11410, which had only been partially cancelled.
On November 6, 1998 the Mendozas wrote PPS, demanding that it vacate the disputed property. [5] When PPS declined to do so, on January 12, 1999 the Mendozas filed a complaint with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Lipa City in Civil Case 0002-99 against PPS for unlawful detainer with application for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction. [6]
On July 13, 1999 the MTCC rendered a decision, dismissing the complaint on ground of the Republics immunity from suit. [7] The Mendozas appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lipa City which ruled that the Republics consent was not necessary since the action before the MTCC was not against it. [8]
In light of the RTCs decision, the Mendozas filed with the MTCC a motion to render judgment in the case before it. [9] The MTCC denied the motion, however, saying that jurisdiction over the case had passed to the RTC upon appeal. [10] Later, the RTC remanded the case back to the MTCC, [11] which then dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence. [12] Consequently, the Mendozas once again appealed to the RTC in Civil Case 2001-0236.
On June 27, 2006 the RTC found in favor of the Mendozas and ordered PPS to vacate the property. It held that the Mendozas had the better right of possession since they were its registered owners. PPS, on the other hand, could not produce any document to prove the transfer of ownership of the land in its favor. [13] PPS moved for reconsideration, but the RTC denied it.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 96604 on the grounds that: (1) the Mendozas were barred by laches from recovering possession of the school lot; (2) sufficient evidence showed that the Mendozas relinquished ownership of the subject lot to the City Government of Lipa City for use as school; and (3) Lot 4, Pcs-5019 has long been declared in the name of the City Government since 1957 for taxation purposes. [14]
In a decision dated February 26, 2008, the CA affirmed the RTC decision. [15] Upholding the Torrens system, it emphasized the indefeasibility of theMendozas registered title and the imprescriptible nature of their right to eject any person occupying the property. The CA held that, this being the case, the Republics possession of the property through PPS should be deemed merely a tolerated one that could not ripen into ownership.
The CA also rejected the Republics claim of ownership since it presented no documentary evidence to prove the transfer of the property in favor of the government. Moreover, even assuming that the Mendozas relinquished their right to the property in 1957 in the governments favor, the latter never took steps to have the title to the property issued in its name or have its right as owner annotated on the Mendozas title. The CA held that, by its omissions, the Republic may be held in estoppel to claim that the Mendozas were barred by laches from bringing its action.
With the denial of its motion for reconsideration, the Republic has taken recourse to this Court via petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
The Issue Presented
The issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in holding that the Mendozas were entitled to evict the Republic from the subject property that it had used for a public school. 13
The Courts Ruling
A decree of registration is conclusive upon all persons, including the Government of the Republic and all its branches, whether or not mentioned by name in the application for registration or its notice. [16] Indeed, title to the land, once registered, is imprescriptible. [17] No one may acquire it from the registered owner by adverse, open, and notorious possession. [18] Thus, to a registered owner under the Torrens system, the right to recover possession of the registered property is equally imprescriptible since possession is a mere consequence of ownership.
Here, the existence and genuineness of the Mendozas title over the property has not been disputed. While the consolidation and subdivision plan of Lots 1923 and 1925 shows that a 1,149 square meter lot had been designated to the City Government, the Republic itself admits that no new title was issued to it or to any of its subdivisions for the portion that PPS had been occupying since 1957. [19]
That the City Government of Lipa tax-declared the property and its improvements in its name cannot defeat the Mendozas title. This Court has allowed tax declarations to stand as proof of ownership only in the absence of a certificate of title. [20] Otherwise, they have little evidentiary weight as proof of ownership. [21]
The CA erred, however, in ordering the eviction of PPS from the property that it had held as government school site for more than 50 years. The evidence on record shows that the Mendozas intended to cede the property to the City Government of Lipa permanently. In fact, they allowed the city to declare the property in its name for tax purposes. And when they sought in 1962 to have the bigger lot subdivided into four, the Mendozas earmarked Lot 4, containing 1,149 square meters, for the City Government of Lipa. Under the circumstances, it may be assumed that the Mendozas agreed to transfer ownership of the land to the government, whether to the City Government of Lipa or to the Republic, way back but never got around to do so and the Republic itself altogether forgot about it. Consequently, the Republic should be deemed entitled to possession pending the Mendozas formal transfer of ownership to it upon payment of just compensation.
The Court holds that, where the owner agrees voluntarily to the taking of his property by the government for public use, he thereby waives his right to the institution of a formal expropriation proceeding covering such property. Further, as the Court also held in Eusebio v. Luis, [22] the failure for a long time of the owner to question the lack of expropriation proceedings covering a property that the government had taken constitutes a waiver of his right to gain back possession. TheMendozas remedy is an action for the payment of just compensation, not ejectment.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, [23] the Court affirmed the RTCs power to award just compensation even in the absence of a proper expropriation proceeding. It held that the RTC can determine just compensation based on the evidence presented before it in an ordinary civil action for recovery of possession of property or its value and damages. As to the time when just compensation should be fixed, it is settled that where property was taken without the benefit of expropriation proceedings and its owner filed an action for recovery of possession before the commencement of expropriation proceedings, it is the value of the property at the time of taking that is controlling. [24]
Since the MTCC did not have jurisdiction either to evict the Republic from the land it had taken for public use or to hear and adjudicate the Mendozas right to just compensation for it, the CA should have ordered the complaint for unlawful detainer dismissed without prejudice to their filing a proper action for recovery of such compensation.
WHEREFORE, the Court partially GRANTS the petition, REVERSES the February 26, 2008 decision and the October 20, 2008 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. 96604, and ORDERS the dismissal of respondents Primo and Maria Mendozas action for eviction before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Lipa City in Civil Case 0002-99 without prejudice to their filing an action for payment of just compensation against the Republic of the Philippines or, when appropriate, against the City of Lipa.
SO ORDERED. D.B.T. MAR-BAY CONSTRUCTION, INCORPORATED, Petitioner,
- versus -
RICAREDO PANES, ANGELITO PANES, SALVADOR CEA, ABOGADO MAUTIN, DONARDO PACLIBAR, ZOSIMO PERALTA and HILARION MANONGDO, Respondents. G.R. No. 167232
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, and PERALTA, JJ.
Promulgated:
July 31, 2009 x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J .:
Before this Court is a Petition [1] for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision [2] dated October 25, 2004 which reversed and set aside the Order [3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 216,
dated November 8, 2001.
The Facts
Subject of this controversy is a parcel of land identified as Lot Plan Psu- 123169, [4] containing an area of Two Hundred Forty Thousand, One Hundred Forty- Six (240,146) square meters, and situated at Barangay (Brgy.) Pasong Putik, Novaliches, Quezon City (subject property). The property is included in Transfer 14 Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 200519, [5] entered on July 19, 1974 and issued in favor of B.C. Regalado & Co. (B.C. Regalado). It was conveyed by B.C. Regalado to petitioner D.B.T. Mar-Bay Construction, Inc. (DBT) through a dacion en pago [6] for services rendered by the latter to the former.
On June 24, 1992, respondents Ricaredo P. Panes (Ricaredo), his son Angelito P. Panes (Angelito), Salvador Cea, Abogado Mautin, Donardo Paclibar, Zosimo P. Peralta, and Hilarion Manongdo (herein collectively referred to as respondents) filed a Complaint [7] for Quieting of Title with Cancellation of TCT No. 200519 and all Titles derived thereat (sic), Damages, with Petition for the Issuance of Injunction with Prayer for the Issuance of Restraining Order Ex-Parte, Etc. against B.C. Regalado, Mar-Bay Realty, Inc., Spouses Gereno Brioso and Criselda M. Brioso, Spouses Ciriaco and Nellie Mariano, Avelino C. Perdido and Florentina Allado, Eufrocina A. Maborang and Fe Maborang, Spouses Jaime and Rosario Tabangcura, Spouses Oscar Ikalina and the Register of Deeds (RD) of Quezon City. Subsequently, respondents filed an Amended Complaint [8] and a Second Amended Complaint [9] particularly impleading DBT as one of the defendants.
In the Complaints, Ricaredo alleged that he is the lawful owner and claimant of the subject property which he had declared for taxation purposes in his name, and assessed in the amount of P2,602,190.00 by the City Assessor of Quezon City as of the year 1985. Respondents alleged that per Certification [10] of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) National Capital Region (NCR) dated May 7, 1992, Lot Plan Psu-123169 was verified to be correct and on file in said office, and approved on July 23, 1948.
Respondents also claimed that Ricaredo, his immediate family members, and the other respondents had been, and still are, in actual possession of the portions of the subject property, and their possession preceded the Second World War. To perfect his title in accordance with Act No. 496 (The Land Registration Act) as amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 (The Property Registration Decree), Ricaredo filed with the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 82 a case docketed as LRC Case No. Q-91-011, with LRC Rec. No. N-62563. [11]
Respondents averred that in the process of complying with the publication requirements for the Notice of Initial Hearing with the Land Registration Authority (LRA), it was discovered by the Mapping Services of the LRA that there existed an overlapping of portions of the land subject of Ricaredos application, with the subdivision plan of B.C. Regalado. The said portion had, by then, already been conveyed by B.C. Regalado to DBT.
Ricaredo asseverated that upon verification with the LRA, he found that the subdivision plan of B.C. Regalado was deliberately drawn to cover portions of the subject property. Respondents claimed that the title used by B.C. Regalado in the preparation of the subdivision plan did not actually cover the subject property. They asserted that from the records of B.C. Regalado, they gathered that TCT Nos. 211081, [12] 211095 [13] and 211132, [14] which allegedly included portions of the subject property, were derived from TCT No. 200519. However, TCT No. 200519 only covered Lot 503 of the Tala Estate with an area of Twenty-Two Thousand Six Hundred Fifteen (22,615) square meters, and was different from those mentioned in TCT Nos. 211081, 211095 and 211132. According to respondents, an examination of TCT No. 200519 would show that it was derived from TCT Nos. 14814, [15] 14827, [16] 14815 [17] and T-28.
In essence, respondents alleged that B.C. Regalado and DBT used the derivative titles which covered properties located far from Pasong Putik, Novaliches,Quezon City where the subject property is located, and B.C. Regalado and DBT then offered the same for sale to the public. Respondents thus submitted that B.C Regalado and DBT through their deliberate scheme, in collusion with others, used (LRC) Pcs-18345 as shown in the consolidation-subdivision plan to include the subject property covered by Lot Plan Psu-123169.
In his Answer [18] dated July 24, 1992, the RD of Quezon City interposed the defense that at the time of registration, he found all documents to be in order. Subsequently, on December 5, 1994, in his Motion [19] for Leave to Admit Amended Answer, with the Amended Answer attached, he admitted that he committed a grave mistake when he earlier said that TCT No. 200519 covered only one lot, i.e. Lot 503. He averred that upon careful examination, he discovered that TCT No. 200519 is composed of 17 pages, and actually covered 54 lots, namely: Lots 503, 506, 507, 508, 509, 582, 586, 655, 659, 686, 434, 495, 497, 299, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 493, 692, 776, 496, 785, 777, 786, 780, 783, 505, 654, 660, 661, 663, 664, 665, 668, 693, 694, 713, 716, 781, 779, 784, 782, 787, 893, 1115, 1114, 778, 669 and 788, all of the Tala Estate. Other lots included therein are Lot 890-B of Psd 36854, Lot 2 of (LRC) Pcs 12892 and Lot 3 of (LRC) Pcs 12892. Thus, respondents' allegation that Lots 661, 664, 665, 693 and 694 of the Tala Estate were not included in TCT No. 200519 was not true.
On December 28, 1993, then defendants Spouses Jaime and Rosario Tabangcura (Spouses Tabangcura) filed their Answer [20] with Counterclaim, claiming that they were buyers in good faith and for value when they bought a house and lot covered by TCT No. 211095 from B.C. Regalado, the latter being a subdivision developer and registered owner thereof, on June 30, 1986. When respondent Abogado Mautin entered and occupied the property, Spouses Tabangcura filed a case for Recovery of Property before the RTC, Quezon City, Branch 97 which rendered a decision [21] in their favor.
On its part, DBT, traversing the complaint, alleged that it is the legitimate owner and occupant of the subject property pursuant to a dacion en pago executed by B.C. Regalado in the formers favor; that respondents were not real parties-in-interests because Ricaredo was a mere claimant whose rights over the property had yet to be determined by the RTC where he filed his application for registration; that the other respondents did not allege matters or invoke rights which would entitle them to the relief
prayed for in their complaint; that the complaint was premature; and that the action inflicted a chilling effect on the lot buyers of DBT. [22]
The RTC's Rulings
On June 15, 2000, the RTC through Judge Marciano I. Bacalla (Judge Bacalla), rendered a Decision [23] in favor of the respondents. The RTC held that the testimony of Ricaredo that he occupied the subject property since 1936 when he was only 16 years old had not been rebutted; that Ricaredo's occupation and cultivation of the 15 subject property for more than thirty (30) years in the concept of an owner vested in him equitable ownership over the same by virtue of an approved plan, Psu 123169; that the subject property was declared under the name of Ricaredo for taxation purposes; [24] and that the subject property per survey should not have been included in TCT No. 200519, registered in the name of B.C. Regalado and ceded to DBT. The RTC further held that Spouses Tabangcura failed to present satisfactory evidence to prove their claim. Thus, the RTC disposed of the case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Certificate of Title No. 200519 and all titles derived thereat as null and void insofar as the same embrace the land covered by Plan PSU-123169 with an area of 240,146 square meters in the name of Ricaredo Panes; ordering defendant DBT Marbay Realty, Inc. to pay plaintiff Ricaredo Panes the sum of TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000) pesos as attorneys fees plus costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
On September 12, 2000, DBT filed a Motion [25] for Reconsideration, based on the grounds of prescription and laches. DBT also disputed Ricaredos claim of open, adverse, and continuous possession of the subject property for more than thirty (30) years, and asserted that the subject property could not be acquired by prescription or adverse possession because it is covered by TCT No. 200519.
While the said Motion for Reconsideration was pending, Judge Bacalla passed away.
Meanwhile, on January 2, 2001, a Motion [26] for Intervention and a Complaint in Intervention were filed by Atty. Andres B. Pulumbarit (Atty. Pulumbarit), representing the Don Pedro/Don Jose de Ocampo Estate. The intervenor alleged that the subject property formed part of the vast tract of land with an area of 117,000 hectares, covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 779 issued by the Honorable Norberto Romualdez on March 14, 1913 under Decree No. 10139, which belongs to the Estate of Don Pedro/Don Jose de Ocampo. Thus, the Complaint [27] in Intervention prayed that the RTCs Decision be reconsidered; that the legitimacy and superiority of OCT 779 be upheld; and that the subject property be declared as belonging to the Estate of Don Pedro/Don Jose de Ocampo.
In its Order [28] dated March 13, 2001, the RTC, through Acting Judge Modesto C. Juanson (Judge Juanson), denied Atty. Pulumbarits Motion for Intervention because a judgment had already been rendered pursuant to Section 2, [29] Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
On April 10, 2001, the RTC issued an Order [30] stating that there appeared to be a need for a clarificatory hearing before it could act on DBT's Motion for Reconsideration. Thus, a hearing was held on May 17, 2001. Thereafter, supplemental memoranda were required of the parties. [31] Both parties complied. [32] However, having found that the original copy of TCT No. 200519 was not submitted to it for comparison with the photocopy thereof on file, the RTC directed DBT to present the original or certified true copy of the TCT on August 21, 2001. [33] Respondents moved to reconsider the said directive [34] but the same was denied. [35] DBT, on the other hand, manifested that a copy of TCT No. 200519, consisting of 17 pages, had already been admitted in evidence; and that because of the fire in the Office of the RD in Quezon City sometime in 1988, DBT, despite diligent effort, could not secure an original or certified true copy of said TCT. Instead, DBT submitted a certified true copy of Consolidated Subdivision Plan Pcs 18345. [36]
On November 8, 2001, the RTC, through Judge Juanson, issued an Order [37] reversing the earlier RTC Decision and dismissing the Complaint for lack of merit. The RTC held that prescription does not run against registered land; hence, a title once registered cannot be defeated even by adverse, open or notorious possession. Moreover, the RTC opined that even if the subject property could be acquired by prescription, respondents' action was already barred by prescription and/or laches because they never asserted their rights when B.C. Regalado registered the subject property in 1974; and later developed, subdivided and sold the same to individual lot buyers.
On December 18, 2001, respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration [38] which the RTC denied in its Order [39] dated June 17, 2002. Aggrieved, respondents appealed to the CA. [40]
The CA's Ruling
On October 25, 2004, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC Orders dated November 8, 2001 and June 17, 2002 and reinstated the RTC Decision dated June 15, 2000. The CA held that the properties described and included in TCT No. 200519 are located in San Francisco del Monte, San Juan del Monte, Rizal and Cubao,Quezon City while the subject property is located in Brgy. Pasong Putik, Novaliches, Quezon City. Furthermore, the CA held that Engr. Vertudazo's testimony that there is a gap of around 1,250 meters between Lot 503 and Psu 123169 was not disproved or refuted. The CA found that Judge Juanson committed a procedural infraction when he entertained issues and admitted evidence presented by DBT in its Motion for Reconsideration which were never raised in the pleadings and proceedings prior to the rendition of the RTC Decision. The CA opined that DBT's claims of laches and prescription clearly appeared to be an afterthought. Lastly, the CA held that DBT's Motion for Reconsideration was not based on grounds enumerated in the Rules of Procedure. [41]
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, [42] which was, however, denied by the CA in its Resolution [43] dated February 22, 2005.
Hence, this Petition.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following as grounds for this Petition: I.
PETITIONER'S FAILURE TO ALLEGE PRESCRIPTION IN ITS ANSWER IS NOT A WAIVER OF SUCH DEFENSE.
II. 16
IT IS NOT ERRONEOUS TO REQUIRE THE PRODUCTION OF A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY OF TCT NO. 200519 AFTER THE DECISION ON THE MERITS HAS BEEN RENDERED BUT BEFORE IT BECAME FINAL.
III.
A REGISTERED LAND CAN NOT BE ACQUIRED BY ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION.
IV.
THE TESTIMONY OF ENGR. VERTUDAZO ON THE BASIS OF THE TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION OF LOT 503 IN AN INCOMPLETE DOCUMENT IS UNRELIABLE.
V.
MR. PANES HAS NEVER BEEN IN OPEN, ADVERSE AND CONTINUOUS POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY FOR MORE THAN THIRTY (30) YEARS. [44]
Distilled from the petition and the responsive pleadings, and culled from the arguments of the parties, the issues may be reduced to two questions, namely:
1) Did the RTC err in upholding DBT's defenses of prescription and laches as raised in the latter's Motion for Reconsideration? 2) Which between DBT and the respondents have a better right over the subject property?
Our Ruling
We answer the first question in the affirmative.
It is true that in Dino v. Court of Appeals [45] we ruled:
(T)rial courts have authority and discretion to dismiss an action on the ground of prescription when the parties' pleadings or other facts on record show it to be indeed time-barred; (Francisco v. Robles, Feb. 15, 1954; Sison v. McQuaid, 50 O.G. 97; Bambao v. Lednicky, Jan. 28, 1961; Cordova v. Cordova, Jan. 14, 1958; Convets, Inc. v. NDC, Feb. 28, 1958; 32 SCRA 529; Sinaon v. Sorongan, 136 SCRA 408); and it may do so on the basis of a motion to dismiss (Sec. 1, [f] Rule 16, Rules of Court), or an answer which sets up such ground as an affirmative defense (Sec. 5, Rule 16), or even if the ground is alleged after judgment on the merits, as in a motion for reconsideration (Ferrer v. Ericta, 84 SCRA 705); or even if the defense has not been asserted at all, as where no statement thereof is found in the pleadings (Garcia v. Mathis, 100 SCRA 250; PNB v. Pacific Commission House, 27 SCRA 766; Chua Lamco v. Dioso, et al., 97 Phil. 821); or where a defendant has been declared in default (PNB v. Perez; 16 SCRA 270). What is essential only, to repeat, is that the facts demonstrating the lapse of the prescriptive period be otherwise sufficiently and satisfactorily apparent on the record; either in the averments of the plaintiff's complaint, or otherwise established by the evidence. (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, one of the inherent powers of courts is to amend and control its processes so as to make them conformable to law and justice. This includes the right to reverse itself, especially when in its opinion it has committed an error or mistake in judgment, and adherence to its decision would cause injustice. [46] Thus, the RTC in its Order dated November 8, 2001 could validly entertain the defenses of prescription and laches in DBT's motion for reconsideration.
However, the conclusion reached by the RTC in its assailed Order was erroneous. The RTC failed to consider that the action filed before it was not simply for reconveyance but an action for quieting of title which is imprescriptible.
Verily, an action for reconveyance can be barred by prescription. When an action for reconveyance is based on fraud, it must be filed within four (4) years from discovery of the fraud, and such discovery is deemed to have taken place from the issuance of the original certificate of title. On the other hand, an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years from the date of the issuance of the original certificate of title or transfer certificate of title. The rule is that the registration of an instrument in the Office of the RD constitutes constructive notice to the whole world and therefore the discovery of the fraud is deemed to have taken place at the time of registration. [47]
However, the prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property. If the plaintiff, as the real owner of the property also remains in possession of the property, the prescriptive period to recover title and possession of the property does not run against him. In such a case, an action for reconveyance, if nonetheless filed, would be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible. [48] Thus, in Vda. de Gualberto v. Go, [49] this Court held:
[A]n action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years, the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the property, but this rule applies only when the plaintiff or the person enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property, since if a person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the property, as the defendants are in the instant case, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not prescribe. The reason for this is that one who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason for the rule being, that his undisturbed possession gives him a 17 continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession.
Insofar as Ricaredo and his son, Angelito, are concerned, they established in their testimonies that, for some time, they possessed the subject property and that Angelito bought a house within the subject property in 1987. [50] Thus, the respondents are proper parties to bring an action for quieting of title because persons having legal, as well as equitable, title to or interest in a real property may bring such action, and title here does not necessarily denote a certificate of title issued in favor of the person filing the suit. [51]
Although prescription and laches are distinct concepts, we have held, nonetheless, that in some instances, the doctrine of laches is inapplicable where the action was filed within the prescriptive period provided by law. Therefore, laches will not apply to this case, because respondents' possession of the subject property has rendered their right to bring an action for quieting of title imprescriptible and, hence, not barred by laches. Moreover, since laches is a creation of equity, acts or conduct alleged to constitute the same must be intentional and unequivocal so as to avoid injustice. Laches will operate not really to penalize neglect or sleeping on one's rights, but rather to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly inequitable situation. [52]
Albeit the conclusion of the RTC in its Order dated November 8, 2001, which dismissed respondents' complaint on grounds of prescription and laches, may have been erroneous, we, nevertheless, resolve the second question in favor of DBT.
It is a well-entrenched rule in this jurisdiction that no title to registered land in derogation of the rights of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. [53]
Article 1126 [54] of the Civil Code in connection with Section 46 [55] of Act No. 496 (The Land Registration Act), as amended by Section 47 [56] of P.D. No. 1529 (The Property Registration Decree), clearly supports this rule. Prescription is unavailing not only against the registered owner but also against his hereditary successors. Possession is a mere consequence of ownership where land has been registered under the Torrens system, the efficacy and integrity of which must be protected. Prescription is rightly regarded as a statute of repose whose objective is to suppress fraudulent and stale claims from springing up at great distances of time and surprising the parties or their representatives when the facts have become obscure from the lapse of time or the defective memory or death or removal of witnesses. [57]
Thus, respondents' claim of acquisitive prescription over the subject property is baseless. Under Article 1126 of the Civil Code, acquisitive prescription of ownership of lands registered under the Land Registration Act shall be governed by special laws. Correlatively, Act No. 496, as amended by PD No. 1529, provides that no title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be acquired by adverse possession. Consequently, in the instant case, proof of possession by the respondents is immaterial and inconsequential. [58]
Moreover, it may be stressed that there was no ample proof that DBT participated in the alleged fraud. While factual issues are admittedly not within the province of this Court, as it is not a trier of facts and is not required to re-examine or contrast the oral and documentary evidence anew, we have the authority to review and, in proper cases, reverse the factual findings of lower courts when the findings of fact of the trial court are in conflict with those of the appellate court. [59] In this regard, we reviewed the records of this case and found no clear evidence that DBT participated in the fraudulent scheme. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, [60] this Court gave due importance to the fact that the private respondent therein did not participate in the fraud averred. We accord the same benefit to DBT in this case. To add, DBT is an innocent purchaser for value and good faith which, through a dacion en pago duly entered into with B.C. Regalado, acquired ownership over the subject property, and whose rights must be protected under Section 32 [61] of P.D. No. 1529. Dacion en pago is the delivery and transmission of ownership of a thing by the debtor to the creditor as an accepted equivalent of the performance of the obligation. It is a special mode of payment where the debtor offers another thing to the creditor, who accepts it as an equivalent of the payment of an outstanding debt. In its modern concept, what actually takes place in dacion en pago is an objective novation of the obligation where the thing offered as an accepted equivalent of the performance of an obligation is considered as the object of the contract of sale, while the debt is considered as the purchase price. [62]
It must also be noted that portions of the subject property had already been sold to third persons who, like DBT, are innocent purchasers in good faith and for value, relying on the certificates of title shown to them, and who had no knowledge of any defect in the title of the vendor, or of facts sufficient to induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the subject property. [63] To disregard these circumstances simply on the basis of alleged continuous and adverse possession of respondents would not only be inimical to the rights of the aforementioned titleholders, but would ultimately wreak havoc on the stability of the Torrens system of registration.
A final note.
While the Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring title, but merely a system of registration of titles to lands, justice and equity demand that the titleholder should not be made to bear the unfavorable effect of the mistake or negligence of the State's agents, in the absence of proof of his complicity in a fraud or of manifest damage to third persons. The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land and put a stop forever to any question as to the legality of the title, except claims that were noted in the certificate at the time of the registration or that may arise subsequent thereto. Otherwise, the integrity of the Torrens system would forever be sullied by the ineptitude and inefficiency of land registration officials, who are ordinarily presumed to have regularly performed their duties. [64] Thus, where innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of the certificate of title thus issued, acquire rights over the property, the court cannot disregard those rights and order the cancellation of the certificate. The effect of such outright cancellation will be to impair public confidence in the certificate of title. The sanctity of the Torrens system must be preserved; otherwise, everyone dealing with the property registered under the system will have to inquire in every instance on whether the title had been regularly or irregularly issued, contrary to the evident purpose of the law. Every person dealing with the 18 registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor, and the law will in no way oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine the condition of the property. [65]
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Court of Appeals Decision dated October 25, 2004 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby entered DISMISSING the Complaint filed by the respondents for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. DIONISIO CARAAN, represented by HEIDI CARAAN and ERLINDA CARAAN, G.R. No. 140752 Petitioners, Present:
PUNO, Chairman, *
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, - versus - CALLEJO, SR., TINGA, and CHICO-NAZARIO, ** J J .
COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES SALCEDO R. COSME and NORA LINDA S. COSME,
This resolves the petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated October 29, 1999 affirming with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104 (RTC), thereby ordering herein petitioners to vacate the property located at No. 65 Commodore St., Veterans Subdivision, Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon City and surrender possession thereof to herein private respondents.
The antecedent facts are as follows.
On September 16, 1992, private respondents-spouses Salcedo R. Cosme and Nora Linda S. Cosme filed a complaint (accion reivindicatoria) with damages against Dionisio Caraan in the RTC. Therein, it was alleged that: herein private respondents are the registered owners of the real property located at No. 65 Commodore St., Veterans Subdivision, Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon City under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 214949; they had been paying realty taxes on the property from 1969 to 1993; sometime in March 1991, they discovered that the land was being occupied by petitioner who had built his residential house thereon; such occupancy by petitioner was effected through fraud, strategy and stealth without private respondents knowledge and consent; demands to vacate, both oral and written, were made upon petitioner, the last written demand having been received by petitioner on August 7, 1992, but said demands went unheeded; thus, private respondents prayed that judgment be rendered ordering petitioner and all persons holding title under him to vacate the subject premises and deliver possession thereof to private respondents; pay private respondents the amount of P54,000.00 by way of reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of the premises, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P50,000.00 as attorneys fees.
In his Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner alleged that he had acquired the land in question through extra-ordinary prescription of thirty years of continuous, public, open and uninterrupted possession; private respondents title was one of the numerous titles derived from TCT No. 3548 in the name of Eustacio Morales and Vicente Villar doing business under the style of Vilma Malolos Subdivision, which was in turn derived from TCT No. 33531 which came from TCT No. 26285 and derived from (OCT) No. 614; and OCT No. 614 had been declared null and void by the RTC, Quezon City (Branch 83). [2]
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision dated August 9, 1995, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs [herein private respondents], whereby defendant [herein petitioner] is ordered to:
(a) Vacate the premises concerned and to deliver and surrender the possession of the same to the plaintiff;
(b) To pay plaintiffs the sum of P54,000.00 as reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of the premises subject matter of the above-entitled case;
(c) Pay the plaintiffs the sum P30,000.00 as moral damages;
(d) Pay the plaintiffs the sum of P20,000.00 as attorneys fees and to pay the cost of the suit. [3]
Herein petitioner Dionisio Caraan then appealed the RTC judgment to the CA. On October 29, 1999, the CA promulgated its Decision ruling thus:
Absent any countervailing factum probandum adduced by the defendant-appellant [herein petitioner], the indefeasibility of the Torrens title under their [herein private respondents] names buttresses the presumption ad homini that they have a better right of ownership over the land.
The defendant-appellant [herein petitioner] cannot seek refuge on his contention that he is a holder of a residential permit allegedly issued by the Bureau of Forest Development. Within the aegis of Section 3 (ff) of Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code, a [p]ermit is a short-term privilege or authority granted by the State to a person to utilize any limited forest resources or undertake a limited activity within any forest land without any right to occupation and possession therein.
19
Neither is the defendant-appellant a possessor in the concept of an owner, which fact is a conditio sine qua non in order to be entitled to ownership through acquisitive prescription.
mere possession with a juridical title, e.g., as a usufructuary, a trustee, a lessee, an agent or a pledgee, not being in the concept of owner, cannot ripen into ownership by acquisitive prescription, unless the juridical relation is first expressly repudiated and such repudiation has been communicated to the other party. [4]
The appellate court then affirmed the RTC judgment ordering petitioner Dionisio Caraan to vacate subject premises and to deliver and surrender possession thereof to herein private respondents. The CA, however, deleted the sums for compensatory and moral damages and attorneys fees awarded by the RTC in favor of private respondents. No motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision was filed.
In the meantime, petitioner Dionisio Caraan died and his surviving heirs filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari with motion that said heirs be substituted as petitioners in this case.
Petitioners insist that private respondents TCT No. 214949 is a derivative of OCT No. 614 and TCT No. 3548 which had been declared spurious and null and void; Dionisio Caraan has a better right of possession because he had been in open, public, adverse, continuous, and uninterrupted possession in the concept of owner of subject land for more than thirty years; and the subject land is part of a large tract of public land not yet classified for alienation to private ownership.
On the other hand, private respondents argue that a certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked, thus, TCT No. 214949 is valid and existing and conclusive evidence of ownership unless it becomes subject of a direct attack through a proceeding for cancellation of title.
The Court finds the present petition bereft of merit.
In Eduarte vs. Court of Appeals, [5] the Court reiterated the hornbook principle that a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. [6] Private respondents having presented TCT No. RT-71061, which is the reconstituted title of TCT No. 214949, they have thus proven their allegation of ownership over the subject property. The burden of proof then shifted to petitioners who must establish by preponderance of evidence their allegation that they have a better right over the subject property.
Petitioners attack the validity of private respondents certificate of title, alleging that TCT No. 214949 is spurious as it was derived from OCT No. 614 which had allegedly been declared null and void pursuant to the Partial Decision on Defaulted Private Respondents dated March 21, 1988 issued in Civil Case No. Q-35672, entitled Teofilo M. Gariando, et al. vs. Gregorio Dizon, et al. Petitioners further point out that the subject land could not have been titled in favor of private respondents as said land is within the unclassified public forest land of Quezon City and not subject to disposition under the Public Land Law, per Certification dated April 16, 1985 issued by the Bureau of Forest Development. Petitioners further argue that they have a better right to subject property, as they had been in possession thereof in open, public, adverse, continuous, and uninterrupted possession in the concept of owner of subject land for more than thirty years.
It should be borne in mind, however, that Section 48, Presidential Decree No. 1529 (P.D. No. 1529), provides that a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. Petitioners defense takes the form of a collateral attack on private respondents certificate of title. In Mallilin, Jr. vs. Castillo, [7] the Court defined a collateral attack on the title in this wise:
When is an action an attack on a title? It is when the object of the action or proceeding is to nullify the title, and thus challenge the judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attack is direct when the object of an action or proceeding is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof. [8]
In the present case, the attack on the title is definitely merely collateral as the relief being sought by private respondents in their action was recovery of possession. The attack on the validity of private respondents certificate of title was merely raised as a defense in petitioners Answer filed with the trial court. In Ybaez vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, [9] the Court categorically ruled that:
It was erroneous for petitioners to question the Torrens Original Certificate of Title issued to private respondent over Lot No. 986 in Civil Case No. 671, an ordinary civil action for recovery of possession filed by the registered owner of the said lot, by invoking as affirmative defense in their answer the Order of the Bureau of Lands, dated July 19, 1978, issued pursuant to the investigatory power of the Director of Lands under Section 91 of Public Land Law (C.A. 141 as amended). Such a defense partakes of the nature of a collateral attack against a certificate of title brought under the operation of the Torrens system of registration pursuant to Section 122 of the Land Registration Act, now Section 103 of P.D. 1259. The case law on the matter does not allow collateral attack on the Torrens certificate of title on the ground of actual fraud. The rule now finds expression in section 48 of P.D. 1529 otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. [10] (Emphasis supplied)
The Court cannot, therefore, resolve the issue of the alleged invalidity of private respondents certificate of title in the present action for recovery of possession. Even petitioners claim that subject property could not have been titled in favor of private respondents because the same has not yet been classified for alienation for private ownership, cannot be given consideration because, as clearly stated in Apostol vs. Court of Appeals, [t]he issue of the validity of the title of respondents can only be assailed in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. [11]
Petitioners asseveration that TCT No. RT-71061 (214949) should not have been admitted into evidence because private respondents merely presented the photocopy thereof is also unmeritorious. Private respondents presented the original 20 of TCT No. RT-71061 (214949) in open court during the hearing held on April 13, 1994. The pertinent portions of the transcript of stenographic notes of said hearing are reproduced hereunder:
Atty. Mazo:
Your Honor, we are presenting in evidence this Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-71061 (214949) as Exhibit A. The purpose of which, Your Honor, is to show that the property subject matter of this case is registered in the name of the herein plaintiff spouses Salcedo R. Cosme and Nora Linda S. Cosme. And in that regard, Your Honor, may we invite Counsel to stipulate that this is a Xerox copy and that we request to be marked as Exhibit A is a faithful reproduction of the original.
If Counsel will stipulate, this will be the one to be submitted in evidence.
Atty. Moya:
This is a faithful reproduction, Your Honor. (Emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, no objection was raised by counsel for petitioners in their written opposition/comment to private respondents offer of evidence [12] regarding the fact that what was marked and submitted to the court was the photocopy. In Blas vs. Angeles-Hutalla, [13] the Court held thus:
The established doctrine is that when a party failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they were offered in evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived. In Tison v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court set out the applicable principle in the following terms: [F]or while the documentary evidence submitted by petitioners do not strictly conform to the rules on their admissibility, we are, however, of the considered opinion that the same may be admitted by reason of private respondents failure to interpose any timely objection thereto at the time they were being offered in evidence. It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible document is offered in evidence, otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived, since the right to object is merely a privilege which the party may waive. As explained in Abrenica vs. Gonda, et al., it has been repeatedly laid down as a rule of evidence that a protest or objection against the admission of any evidence must be made at the proper time, otherwise, it will be deemed to have been waived. The proper time is when from the question addressed to the witness, or from the answer thereto, or from the presentation of the proof, the inadmissibility of the evidence is, or may be inferred. Thus, a failure to except to the evidence because it does not conform with the statute is a waiver of the provisions of the law. [14]
Hence, considering the fact that counsel for petitioners admitted that the photocopy of TCT No. RT-71061 (214949) is a faithful reproduction of the original thereof, stipulated with private respondents counsel that what will be marked and submitted to the trial court as Exhibit A is the photocopy, and the lack of objection on such ground which is then deemed a waiver thereof, the admission into evidence of the photocopy of TCT No. RT-71061 was absolutely correct.
Moreover, although the reconstituted title of TCT No. 214949 does show on its face that it was derived from OCT No. 614, [15] both the trial and appellate courts are correct in saying that petitioners assertion that OCT No. 614 had been declared null and void is misleading. The RTC of Quezon City, Branch 83 issued a Partial Decision on Defaulted Private Respondents [16] dated March 21, 1988 in Civil Case No. Q-35672 which declared OCT No. 614 and subsequent TCTs issued therefrom, with the exception of those titles belonging to the non-defaulted respondents, [17] null and void. However, the defaulted private respondents in Civil Case No. Q-35672 filed a case for annulment of said partial judgment. The CA granted the petition for annulment of partial judgment in Civil Case No. Q-35672. The case was elevated via a petition for review on certiorari assailing the CA decision and on January 19, 2001, this Court promulgated a Decision in Pinlac vs. Court of Appeals, [18] docketed as G.R. No. 91486, affirming the CA Decision setting aside and annulling said partial decision on the ground of the trial courts lack of jurisdiction over the persons of respondents in said case. Petitioners have not been able to present any proof that, indeed, OCT No. 614 had been declared null and void by final judgment. Hence, petitioners claim that private respondents certificate of title is spurious deserves no consideration whatsoever. Private respondents certificate of title must be deemed valid and existing, as it cannot be assailed through a collateral attack in the present action.
Consequently, petitioners defense that they have a better right over the subject land because they had been in open, public, adverse, continuous, and uninterrupted possession in the concept of owner for more than 30 years must be struck down. Section 47 of P.D. No. 1529 provides that [n]o title to registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. The ruling in Ragudo vs. Fabella Estate Tenants Association, Inc., [19] is exactly in point, to wit:
In a long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that lands covered by a title cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. So it is that in Natalia Realty Corporation vs. Vallez, et al., we held that a claim of acquisitive prescription is baseless when the land involved is a registered land because of Article 1126 of the Civil Code in relation to Act 496 (now, Section 47 of Presidential Decree No. 1529):
Appellants claim of acquisitive prescription is likewise baseless. Under Article 1126 of the Civil Code, prescription of ownership of lands registered under the Land Registration Act shall be governed by special laws. Correlatively, Act No. 496 provides that no title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be acquired by adverse possession. Consequently, proof of possession by the 21 defendants is both immaterial and inconsequential. (Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, as emphasized in the above quoted ruling, petitioners allegations of uninterrupted possession for 30 years cannot prevail over private respondents certificate of title, which is the best proof of ownership. As the Court stated in Apostol vs. Court of Appeals, et al., [20] the registered owners are entitled to the possession of the property covered by the said title from the time such title was issued in their favor. Preponderance of evidence being in favor of private respondents, there can be no other conclusion but that private respondents, being the registered owners of subject property, should be placed in possession thereof.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 29, 1999 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. [G.R. No. 156357. February 18, 2005] ENGR. GABRIEL V. LEYSON, DR. JOSEFINA L. POBLETE, FE LEYSON QUA, CARIDAD V. LEYSON and ESPERANZA V. LEYSON, petitioners, vs. NACIANSINO BONTUYAN and MAURECIA B. BONTUYAN, respondents. D E C I S I O N CALLEJO, SR., J .: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), as well as its Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 64471 denying the motion for reconsideration of the said decision.
The Antecedents Calixto Gabud was the owner of a parcel of land located in Barangay Adlawon, Mabolo, Cebu City, which was declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration (T.D.) No. 03276-R in 1945 [2] with the following boundaries: North Calixto Gabud East Marcelo Cosido South Pedro Bontuyan West Asuncion Adulfo. [3]
Because of the construction of a provincial road, the property was divided into two parcels of land covered by T.D. No. 03276-R and T.D. No. 01979-R. On February 14, 1948, Gabud executed a Deed of Absolute Sale [4] over the property covered by T.D. No. 03276-R, as well as the other lot covered by T.D. No. 01979-R, in favor of Protacio Tabal, married to Leodegaria Bontuyan. On the basis of the said deed, T.D. No. 03276-R was cancelled by T.D. No. 13615-R in the name of Protacio Tabal effective 1949. [5] On January 5, 1959, Tabal executed a Deed of Sale [6] over the property covered by T.D. No. 13615-R in favor of Simeon Noval, married to Vivencia Bontuyan, daughter of Gregorio Bontuyan, forP800.00. T.D. No. 13615-R was cancelled by T.D. No. 100356 in the names of the spouses Noval. [7] Gregorio Bontuyan received a copy of the said tax declaration in behalf of the spouses Noval. [8] The latter tax declaration was then cancelled by T.D. No. 008876 under the same names effective 1967. [9]
Subsequently, the property was surveyed by Cadastral Land Surveyor Mauro U. Gabriel on January 22, 1964. The plan survey was approved on September 30, 1966. [10] The property covered by T.D. No. 008876 was identified as Lot No. 17150 of Cebu Cadastre No. 12, while the property covered by T.D. No. 01979-R was identified as Lot No. 13272. On May 22, 1968, the spouses Noval executed a Deed of Absolute Sale [11] over the two lots covered by T.D. No. 008876 in favor of Lourdes V. Leyson for P4,000.00. Lourdes Leyson took possession of the property and had it fenced. Despite the said sale, T.D. No. 008876 was cancelled by T.D. No. 21267 effective 1974. [12] Thereafter, T.D. No. 21267 was cancelled by T.D. No. 23821 [13] which, in turn, was cancelled by T.D. No. 01-17455 effective 1980. [14] In 1989, the latter was cancelled by a new tax declaration, T.D. No. 01-001-00646. All these tax declarations were in the names of the spouses Noval. [15]
Meanwhile, Lourdes Leyson paid for the realty taxes over the property. However, the tax declaration issued thereon continued to be under the names of the spouses Noval. [16]
Despite his knowledge that the property had been purchased by his son-in-law and daughter, the spouses Noval, Gregorio Bontuyan, who was then 91 years old, filed an application with the Bureau of Lands for a free patent over Lot No. 17150 on December 4, 1968. He alleged therein that the property was public land and was neither claimed nor occupied by any person, [17] and that he first entered upon and began cultivating the same in 1918. Thus, on November 19, 1971, Free Patent No. 510463 was issued over Lot No. 17150 in his favor, on the basis of which Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-1619 was issued to and under his name on March 21, 1974. [18] Another parcel of land, Lot No. 13272, was also registered under the name of Gregorio Bontuyan under OCT No. 0-1618. He then declared Lot No. 17150 for taxation purposes under T.D. No. 13596 effective 1974. [19] On February 20, 1976, Gregorio Bontuyan executed a Deed of Absolute Sale [20] over Lot No. 17150 in favor of his son, Naciansino Bontuyan. On April 28, 1980, Gregorio Bontuyan, then 103 years old, executed another Deed of Absolute Sale [21] over Lot Nos. 13272 and 17150, covered by OCT No. 0- 1618 and OCT No. 0-1619, respectively, in favor of Naciansino Bontuyan for P3,000.00. On the basis of the said deed, OCT No. 0-1619 was cancelled by TCT No. 1392 in the name of Naciansino Bontuyan on December 2, 1980. [22] Gregorio Bontuyan died intestate on April 12, 1981. [23]
On March 30, 1981, the spouses Bontuyan executed a Real Estate Mortgage over Lot No. 17150 covered by OCT No. 0-1619 in favor of the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) as security for a loan of P11,200.00. [24] Naciansino Bontuyan had earlier executed an affidavit that the property was not tenanted. Shortly thereafter, the spouses Bontuyan left the Philippines and resided in the United States. Meanwhile, Lourdes Leyson died intestate. The spouses Bontuyan returned to the Philippines in 1988 to redeem the property from DBP only to discover that there were tenants living on the property installed by Engineer Gabriel Leyson, one of the late Lourdes Leysons children. Despite being informed that the said spouses owned the property, the tenants refused to vacate the same. The tenants also refused to deliver to the spouses the produce 22 from the property. The spouses Bontuyan redeemed the property from DBP on September 22, 1989. On February 12, 1993, Jose Bontuyan, Nieves Atilano, Pacifico Bontuyan, Vivencia Noval and Naciansino Bontuyan, the surviving heirs of Gregorio Bontuyan, executed an Extrajudicial Settlement [25] of the latters estate and adjudicated Lot No. 13272 in favor of Naciansino. Based on the said deed, T.D. No. 01-001-00877 was issued to and under the name of Naciansino over the said property starting 1994. On June 24, 1993, Naciansino Bontuyan, through counsel, wrote Engr. Gabriel Leyson, demanding that he be furnished with all the documents evidencing his ownership over the two lots, Lots Nos. 17150 and 13272. [26] Engr. Leyson ignored the letter. The spouses Bontuyan, thereafter, filed a complaint against Engr. Leyson in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City for quieting of title and damages. They alleged that they were the lawful owners of the two lots and when they discovered, upon their return from the United States, that the property was occupied and cultivated by the tenants of Engr. Leyson, they demanded the production of documents evidencing the latters ownership of the property, which was ignored. The spouses Bontuyan prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in their favor, thus: WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court to render judgment against the defendant and in favor of the plaintiffs, to wit: (a) Confirming the ownership of the plaintiffs on the lots in question; (b) Ordering defendant to pay the plaintiffs the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) as the share of the plaintiffs of the produce of the lots in question; (c) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiffs the sum of P50,000.00 as reimbursement of attorneys fees and the further sum of P500.00 as appearance fee every time the case is called for trial; (d) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiffs the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages and exemplary damages may be fixed by the court; (e) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as actual expenses for the preparation and filing of the complaint; (f) Ordering defendant to pay the costs; and (g) Granting to plaintiffs such other reliefs and remedies just and equitable in the premises. [27]
In his answer to the complaint, Engr. Leyson averred, by way of affirmative defenses, that the two lots were but portions of a parcel of land owned by Calixto Gabud, covered by T.D. No. 03276-R, and was subdivided into two parcels of land because of the construction of a provincial road on the property; Gabud later sold the two lots to Protacio Tabal, who sold the same to Simeon Noval, married to Vivencia Bontuyan, one of the children of Gregorio Bontuyan; Simeon Noval later sold the property to Lourdes Leyson on May 22, 1968 who, forthwith, took possession thereof as owner; and Gregorio Bontuyan was issued a free patent over the property through fraud. Engr. Leyson concluded that the said patent, as well as OCT No. 0-1619 and TCT No. 1392, were null and void and that the plaintiffs acquired no title over the property. Engr. Leyson interposed a counterclaim against the spouses Bontuyan and repleaded as an integral part thereof all the material allegations in his affirmative defense. He prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in his favor, thus: a) Dismissing Plaintiffs complaint for failure to include indispensable parties; b) Declaring the Defendant and his four (4) sisters, namely, Dr. Josefina L. Poblete, Mrs. Fe L. Qua, Esperanza Leyson and Caridad Leyson as the true and legal owners and possessors of the parcels of land in issue; c) Declaring OCT No. 0-1619 in the name of Gregorio Bontuyan and TCT No. 1392 in the name of Naciansino Bontuyan null and void and to order the Register of Deeds to cancel the same and issue new ones in favor of the Defendant Gabriel V. Leyson and his four (4) sisters, namely: Dr. Josefina L. Poblete, Mrs. Fe L. Qua, Esperanza V. Leyson and Caridad V. Leyson; d) And on the Counterclaim, to order Plaintiffs to pay the Defendant the following sums: d-1) P50,000.00 as attorneys fees and appearance fee of P1,000.00 per hearing; d-2) P500,000.00 as moral damages; d-3) P20,000.00 as exemplary damages; d-4) P10,000.00 as expenses of litigation. Defendant further prays for such other reliefs just and equitable in the premises. [28]
In due course, the other children of Lourdes Leyson, namely, Dr. Josefina L. Poblete, Fe Leyson Qua, Caridad V. Leyson and Esperanza V. Leyson, were allowed to intervene as defendants. They filed their answer-in-intervention wherein they adopted, in their counterclaim, paragraphs 7 to 26 of the answer of their brother, Engr. Leyson, the original defendant. They prayed that, after due hearing, judgment be rendered in their favor as follows: Wherefore, this Honorable Court is prayed to render judgment in favor of the Defendant and the Defendants-in-Intervention and against the Plaintiffs as follows: a) Promissory Plaintiffs complaint for failure to include indispensable parties and for lack of cause of action; 23 b) Declaring the Defendant and his four (4) sisters, namely: Dr. Josefina L. Poblete; Mrs. Fe L. Qua, Esperanza Leyson and Caridad Leyson as the true and legal owners and possessors of the parcels of land in issue; c) Declaring OCT No. 0-1619 in the name of Gregorio Bontuyan and TCT No. 1392 in the name of Naciansino Bontuyan null and void and to order the Register of Deeds to cancel the same and issue new ones in favor of the Defendant Gabriel V. Leyson and his four (4) sisters, namely: Dr. Josefina L. Poblete, Mrs. Fe L. Qua, Esperanza V. Leyson and Caridad V. Leyson; d) On the Counterclaim, Plaintiffs should pay the Defendants the following sums: d-1) P50,000.00 as attorneys fees and appearance fee of P1,000.00 per hearing; d-2) P500,000.00 as moral damages to each Intervenor; d-3) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; d-4) P15,000.00 as expenses of litigation. Defendant further prays for such other reliefs just and equitable in the premises. [29]
In their reply, the spouses Bontuyan averred that the counterclaim of the defendants for the nullity of TCT No. 1392 and the reconveyance of the property was barred by laches and prescription. On January 21, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the Leyson heirs and against the spouses Bontuyan. The fallo of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, foregoing considered judgment is hereby rendered dismissing plaintiffs complaint for dearth of evidence declaring the defendant and the intervenors as the true and legal owners and possessors of the subject parcels of land; declaring OCT No. 0-1619 in the name of Gregorio Bontuyan and TCT No. 1392 in the name of Naciansino Bontuyan null and void; ordering the Register of Deeds to cancel OCT No. 0-1619 and TCT No. 1392 and issue new ones in favor of defendant Gabriel Leyson and intervenors Josefina Poblete, Fe Qua, Esperanza Leyson and Caridad Leyson; ordering plaintiff to pay defendant and intervenors the following: a) P50,000.00 attorneys fees; b) 1,000.00 per appearance; c) 100,000.00 moral damages for defendant and intervenors; d) 10,000.00 exemplary damages; and e) 10,000.00 litigation expenses. SO ORDERED. [30]
The trial court held that Simeon Noval had sold the lots to Lourdes Leyson on May 22, 1968, who thus acquired title over the property. The spouses Bontuyan appealed the decision to the CA which affirmed, with modification, the decision of the RTC. The appellate court held that the Leyson heirs were the owners of Lot No. 13273, while the spouses Bontuyan were the owners of Lot No. 17150. The CA ruled that the answer of the Leyson heirs to the complaint constituted a collateral attack of OCT No. 0-1619 which was proscribed by law. The Leyson heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision insofar as Lot No. 17150 was concerned, contending that their counterclaim for the nullification of OCT No. 0-1619 contained in their answer constituted a direct attack on the said title. The CA denied the motion. The Leyson heirs then filed a petition for review with this Court and made the following assignments of error: First Assignment of Error THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT THE NULLITY OR THE VALIDITY OF OCT NO. 0-1619 CANNOT BE RULED UPON IN THESE PROCEEDINGS BROUGHT BY THE RESPONDENTS FOR THE QUIETING OF THEIR TITLE. Second Assignment of Error THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONERS ANSWER WITH COUNTERCLAIM, PRAYING FOR THE CANCELLATION OF PLAINTIFFS TORRENS CERTIFICATE IS A MERE COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE TITLE. [31]
Third Assignment of Error THE APPELLATE COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT MODIFIED THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DATED JANUARY 21, 1999 BY RULING THAT PETITIONERS ARE DECLARED THE OWNERS OF LOT 13273 BUT RESPONDENTS ARE DECLARED THE OWNERS OF LOT 17150 UNDER OCT NO. 0-1619 AND PRESENTLY COVERED BY TCT NO. 1392 IN THE NAME OF NACIANSINO BONTUYAN, DESPITE THE APPELLATE COURTS AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT FRAUD WAS COMMITTED BY GREGORIO BONTUYAN (RESPONDENTS PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST) IN ACQUIRING TITLE OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES. [32]
Fourth Assignment of Error THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT RECONVEYANCE OF TITLE OF LOT 17150 COVERED BY OCT NO. 0-1619 AND PRESENTLY COVERED BY TCT NO. 1392, IN FAVOR OF PETITIONERS HAD PRESCRIBED. [33]
Fifth Assignment of Error THE APPELLATE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GRANTING ATTORNEYS FEES AND APPEARANCE FEES DESPITE RESPONDENTS FRAUD IN ACQUIRING TITLE OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES. [34]
24 On the first two assignments of errors, the petitioners aver that the counterclaim in their answer to the complaint constituted a direct attack of the validity of OCT No. 0-1619. They maintain that the appellate courts reliance on the ruling of this Court in Cimafrancia v. Intermediate Appellate Court [35] was misplaced. They assert that what is controlling is the ruling in Pro Line Sports Center, Inc. v. Court of Appeals [36] wherein this Court held that the counterclaim of the petitioners therein constituted a direct attack on a certificate of title. The petitioners, likewise, cited Section 55 of Act No. 496, as amended, to buttress their stance. They plead that their answer to the complaint should be liberally construed so as to afford them substantial justice. On the other hand, the respondents assert that the decision of the CA is correct. They claim that Lot No. 17150 was still public land when Lourdes Leyson purchased the same from Simeon Noval, and that the property became private land only when Free Patent No. 510463 was issued to and under the name of Gregorio Bontuyan. We agree with the contention of the petitioners that the CA erred in not nullifying OCT No. 0-1619 and TCT No. 1392 and ordering the respondents to reconvey the property covered by the said title to the petitioners. The respondents, as plaintiffs in the court a quo, were burdened to prove their claim in their complaint that Gregorio Bontuyan was the owner of Lot No. 17150 and that they acquired the property in good faith and for valuable consideration from him. [37] However, the respondents failed to discharge this burden. The evidence on record shows that Calixto Gabud sold the property to Protacio Tabal on February 14, 1948, [38] and that the latter sold the property to Simeon Noval on January 5, 1959. [39] Simeon Noval then sold the property to Lourdes Leyson on May 22, 1968. [40] The respondents failed to adduce any evidence to prove that Lourdes Leyson, or even Simeon Noval, sold the property to Gregorio Bontuyan, or to any of the respondents for that matter. Since Gregorio Bontuyan was not the owner of the property, he could not have sold the same to his son Naciansino Bontuyan and the latters wife, the respondents herein. As the Latin adage goes: NEMO DAT QUOD NON HABET. Gregorio Bontuyan could not feign ignorance of Simeon Novals ownership of the property, considering that the latter was his son-in-law, and that he (Gregorio Bontuyan) was the one who received the owners copy of T.D. No. 100356 covering the property under the name of Simeon Noval. [41] At the dorsal portion of the said tax declaration, there was even an annotation that the property was transferred to Simeon Noval as shown by the deed of sale executed before Notary Public Gregorio A. Uriarte who notarized the deed of sale over the property executed by Protacio Tabal in favor of Simeon Noval on January 5, 1959. [42] We note that the respondents failed to adduce in evidence any receipts of real property tax payments made on the property under their names, which would have fortified their claim that they were the owners of the property. We agree with the findings of the CA, thus: This case involves two parcels of land Lot 17150 and Lot 13273. Lot 17150 is registered under the Torrens System under the names of plaintiffs-appellants, while Lot 13273 remained to be unregistered. In this case, records show that defendant-appellee and intervenors-appellees are the true owners of the subject lots. They have in their favor tax receipts covering the subject lots issued since 1945. While, indeed, tax receipts and declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, such, however, if accompanied with open, adverse, continuous possession in the concept of an owner, as in this case, constitute evidence of great weight that person under whose name the real taxes were declared has a claim of right over the land. Further, defendant-appellee and intervenors-appellees presented before the trial court the Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 14, 1948, executed by Calixto Gabud, conveying the subject lots in favor of Protacio Tabal. The deed is a notarial document. Likewise presented is the Deed of Absolute Sale of the subject lots dated January 5, 1959, executed by Protacio Tabal in favor of spouses Simeon Noval and Vivencia Bontuyan. The document is, likewise, a notarial document. Defendant-appellee and intervenors-appellees also presented the Deed of Absolute Sale of the subject lots dated May 22, 1968, executed by spouses Simeon Noval and Vivencia Bontuyan in favor of Lourdes Leyson. The deed is a notarial document. A notarial document is evidence of the facts in clear, unequivocal manner therein expressed. It has in its favor the presumption of regularity. It is admissible in evidence without necessity of preliminary proof as to its authenticity and due execution. There exist (sic) no trace of irregularity in the transfers of ownership from the original owner, Calixto Gabud, to defendant-appellee and intervenors-appellees. Plaintiffs-appellants, on the other hand, offered no convincing evidence as to how their predecessor-in-interest, Gregorio Bontuyan, acquired the subject lots. Plaintiffs-appellants presented only the Free Patent and OCT No. 0-1619, covering Lot No. 17150, issued in the name of Gregorio Bontuyan. As to Lot No. 13273, We find no sufficient reason why defendant-appellee and intervenors- appellees should be disturbed in their ownership and possession of the same. [43]
As copiously shown by the record, Gregorio Bontuyan filed his application for a free patent with the Bureau of Lands on December 4, 1968 in gross bad faith, thereby defrauding Lourdes Leyson of the said property through deceit. Gregorio Bontuyan falsely declared in the said application: (a) that he entered upon and cultivated the property since 1918 and that the property was not claimed or occupied by any person; and (b) that Lot No. 17150 was located in Sirao, Cebu City, when, in fact, the property was located in Adlawon, Cebu City. Lourdes Leyson was not notified of the said application and failed to file any opposition thereto. Gregorio Bontuyan was then able to secure Free Patent No. 510463 on November 19, 1971 and OCT No. 0-1619 on March 21, 1974. It appears in the said title that the propertys location was indicated as Sirao, Cebu City. [44] Indeed, the CA declared that Gregorio Bontuyan had acquired title to the property through fraud: However, as to Lot No. 17150, We find that despite the fraud committed by Gregorio Bontuyan (plaintiffs-appellants predecessor-in-interest) in acquiring his title over the said lot, ownership over the said lot should be adjudged in favor of plaintiffs-appellants. 25 Records, indeed, show that, at the time when Gregorio Bontuyan applied for Free Patent, Gregorio Bontuyan was living with his daughter, Vivencia Bontuyan (defendant-appellees predecessor-in-interest). Thus, Gregorio Bontuyan must have known that at the time when he applied for free patent on December 1968, the subject lots were already sold on May 1968 by his daughter Vivencia Bontuyan in favor of Lourdes Leyson, predecessor-in-interest of defendants-appellees. Moreover, records further show that Gregorio Bontuyan sold twice Lot [No.] 17150 to plaintiffs-appellants. The first was in 1976 and the other was in 1980. Plaintiffs-appellants offered no reasonable explanation why Gregorio Bontuyan have (sic) to sell twice Lot No. 17150 in favor of plaintiffs-appellants. As found by the trial court, these are badges of bad faith which affect the validity of the title of Gregorio Bontuyan over the subject lots. We are aware that the torrens system does not create or vest title. It only confirms and records title already existing and vested. It does not protect a usurper from the true owner. It cannot be a shield for the commission of fraud. It does not permit one to enrich himself at the expense of another. Where one does not have any rightful claim over a real property, the torrens system of registration can confirm or record nothing. [45]
The findings of the CA affirmed the findings of the trial court in its decision, thus: After having thoroughly analyzed the records and the evidences adduced during the trial of this case, this Court is convinced and sincerely believes that the lots in question were originally owned by Calixto Gabud as evidenced by T.D. [No.] 03276R marked as Exh. 1. In 1945, this consisted of only one lot in Adlawon, Cebu City, as there was no provincial road yet. However in 1948, the said parcel of land was divided into two because a provincial road was constructed passing through it. Hence, T.D. [No.] 03276R and T.D. [No.] 01979-R were issued to Calixto Gabud. On February 16, 1948, Calixto Gabud sold the said parcels of land to spouses Protacio Tabal and Ludegaria (sic) Bontuyan as evidenced by an Absolute Deed of Sale, Exh. 2. On January 5, 1959, spouses Protacio Tabal and Ludegaria (sic) Bontuyan, in turn, sold the same parcels of land to spouses Simeon Noval and Vivencia Bontuyan as evidenced by a Deed of Sale, Exh. 4. It is noteworthy to mention at this point in time that Vivencia Bontuyan is one of the daughters of Gregorio Bontuyan, the father of herein plaintiff Naciansino Bontuyan. In May 1968, spouses Simeon Noval and Vivencia Bontuyan sold the subject parcels of land to Lourdes vs. (sic) Leyson, the mother of herein defendant as evidenced by a Deed of Sale marked as Exh. 6. It is quite perplexing for the court to imagine that Gregorio Bontuyan, father of herein plaintiff, who was then residing with spouses Simeon Noval and Vivencia Bontuyan at 179 C San Jose dela Montaa, Mabolo, Cebu City, as reflected in his application for Free Patent (Exhs. 8 & 26) dated December 4, 1968 was unaware of the sale of the subject parcels of land made by his daughter Vivencia Bontuyan and spouse Simeon Noval to Lourdes Leyson. It is evident that, after the sale from spouses Noval to Lourdes Leyson in May 1968, Gregorio Bontuyan applied for Free Patent for the same parcels of land in December 1968 claiming to have cultivated the land since 1918, stating therein the location as Sirao and not Adlawon which is the true and correct location. Sirao and Adlawon are two different barangays which are not even adjacent to each other. In fact, as borne out by Exh. 25, it is separated by Barangay Guba. In 1974, Free Patent No. 510463 and OCT# 0-1619 was issued to Gregorio Bontuyan covering subject property, the location of which is in Barangay Sirao in consonance to his application. Gregorio Bontuyans application for Free Patent over subject parcels of land had raised in the mind of this Court reasonable badges of bad faith on his part as the subject parcels of land were already sold by his daughter Vivencia Bontuyan and spouse Simeon Noval to Lourdes Leyson. Another badge of bad faith is raised in the mind of this Court when he (Gregorio) sold the subject parcels of land twice to his son Naciansino Bontuyan in 1976 and 1980, respectively, wherein both Deeds of Sale were notarized by different Notary Publics, (Exhs. 10 & 16). [46]
Considering that Lourdes Leyson was in actual possession of the property, the respondents cannot, likewise, claim that they were in good faith when Gregorio Bontuyan allegedly sold the property to them on April 28, 1980. Anent the third and fourth assignments of error, we do not agree with the ruling of the CA that the petitioners failed to directly attack the validity of OCT No. 0-1619. The CA failed to consider the fact that, in their respective answers to the complaint, the petitioners inserted therein a counterclaim wherein they repleaded all the material allegations in their affirmative defenses, that Gregorio Bontuyan secured OCT No. 0- 1619 through fraud and deceit and prayed for the nullification thereof. While Section 47 of Act No. 496 provides that a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack, the rule is that an action is an attack on a title if its object is to nullify the same, and thus challenge the proceeding pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attack is considered direct when the object of an action is to annul or set aside such proceeding, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, an attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the proceeding is nevertheless made as an incident thereof. [47] Such action to attack a certificate of title may be an original action or a counterclaim in which a certificate of title is assailed as void. A counterclaim is considered a new suit in which the defendant is the plaintiff and the plaintiff in the complaint becomes the defendant. It stands on the same footing and is to be tested by the same rules as if it were an independent action. [48] Furthermore, since all the essential facts of the case for the determination of the titles validity are now before the Court, to require the party to institute cancellation proceedings would be pointlessly circuitous and against the best interest of justice. [49]
The CA, likewise, erred in holding that the action of the petitioners to assail OCT No. 0-1619 and TCT No. 1392 and for the reconveyance of the property covered by the said title had already prescribed when they filed their answer to the complaint. Case law has it that an action for reconveyance prescribes in ten years, the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed or the date of issuance of the certificate of title over the property. In an action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is highly regarded as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of the property or its title, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another persons name, to its rightful or legal owner, or to one who has a better right. [50]
However, in a series of cases, this Court declared that an action for reconveyance based on fraud is imprescriptible where the plaintiff is in possession of the property subject of the acts. In Vda. de Cabrera v. Court of Appeals, [51] the Court held: ... [A]n action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years, the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed or the 26 date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the property, but this rule applies only when the plaintiff or the person enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property, since if a person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the property, as the defendants are in the instant case, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not prescribe. The reason for this is that one who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason for the rule being, that his undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession. Similarly, in the case of David v. Malay, [52] the same pronouncement was reiterated by the Court: ... There is settled jurisprudence that one who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason for the rule being, that his undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of the court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession. No better situation can be conceived at the moment for Us to apply this rule on equity than that of herein petitioners whose ... possession of the litigated property for no less than 30 years and was suddenly confronted with a claim that the land she had been occupying and cultivating all these years, was titled in the name of a third person. We hold that in such a situation the right to quiet title to the property, to seek its reconveyance and annul any certificate of title covering it, accrued only from the time the one in possession was made aware of a claim adverse to his own, and it is only then that the statutory period of prescription commences to run against such possessor. The paramount reason for this exception is based on the theory that registration proceedings could not be used as a shield for fraud. [53] Moreover, to hold otherwise would be to put premium on land-grabbing and transgressing the broader principle in human relations that no person shall unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another. [54]
In the present case, Lourdes Leyson and, after her death, the petitioners, had been in actual possession of the property. The petitioners were still in possession of the property when they filed their answers to the complaint which contained their counterclaims for the nullification of OCT No. 0-1619 and TCT No. 1392, and for the consequent reconveyance of the property to them. The reconveyance is just and proper in order to put a stop to the unendurable anomaly that the patentees should have a Torrens title for the land which they and their predecessors never possessed and which has been possessed by another in the concept of an owner. [55]
On the fifth assignment of error, we rule for the petitioners. The award of attorneys and appearance fees is better left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and if such discretion is well exercised, as in this case, it will not be disturbed on appeal. [56] With the trial and the appellate courts findings that the respondents were in bad faith, there is sufficient basis to award attorneys and appearance fees to the petitioners. Had it not been for the filing of a baseless suit by the respondents against the petitioners, the latter would not have sought the services of counsel to defend their interests and represent them in this case. IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals declaring the respondents the owners of Lot No. 17150 covered by OCT No. 0-1619 and TCT No. 1392; and setting aside the award of attorneys fees in favor of the petitioners by the Regional Trial Court are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Court hereby AFFIRMS the ownership of the petitioners of Lot No. 17150. OCT No. 0-1619 and TCT No. 1392 covering the said lot are hereby nullified. The Register of Deeds is ORDERED to cancel TCT No. 1392 and to issue another title over the property in favor of the petitioners as co-owners thereof. The trial courts award of P50,000.00 for attorneys fees to the petitioners is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. TEOFISTO OO, PRECY O. NAMBATAC,VICTORIA O. MANUGAS and POLOR O. CONSOLACION, Petitioners,
Promulgated: March 9, 2010 x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x D E C I S I O N
BERSAMIN, J .:
The subject of controversy is Lot No. 943 of the Balamban Cadastre in Cebu City, covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO-9969-(O-20449), over which the contending parties in this action for quieting of title, initiated by respondent Vicente N. Lim (Lim) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City, assert exclusive ownership, to the exclusion of the other. In its decision dated July 30, 1996, [1] the RTC favored Lim, and ordered the cancellation of OCT No. RO-9969-(O-20449) and the issuance of a new certificate of title in the name of Luisa Narvios-Lim (Luisa), Lims deceased mother and predecessor-in-interest. On appeal (CA-GR CV No. 57823), the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC on January 28, 2002. [2] It later denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration through the resolution dated June 17, 2002. [3]
Hence, this appeal via petition for review on certiorari.
Antecedents
27 On October 23, 1992, Lim filed in the RTC in Cebu City a petition for the reconstitution of the owners duplicate copy of OCT No. RO-9969-(O-20449), alleging that said OCT had been lost during World War II by his mother, Luisa; [4] that Lot No. 943 of the Balamban Cadastre in Cebu City covered by said OCT had been sold in 1937 to Luisa by Spouses Diego Oo and Estefania Apas (Spouses Oo), the lots registered owners; and that although the deed evidencing the sale had been lost without being registered, Antonio Oo (Antonio), the only legitimate heir of Spouses Oo, had executed on April 23, 1961 in favor of Luisa a notarized document denominated as confirmation of sale, [5] which was duly filed in the Provincial Assessors Office of Cebu.
Zosimo Oo and petitioner Teofisto Oo (Oos) opposed Lims petition, contending that they had the certificate of title in their possession as the successors- in-interest of Spouses Oo.
On account of the Oos opposition, and upon order of the RTC, Lim converted the petition for reconstitution into a complaint for quieting of title, [6] averring additionally that he and his predecessor-in-interest had been in actual possession of the property since 1937, cultivating and developing it, enjoying its fruits, and paying the taxes corresponding to it. He prayed, inter alia, that the Oos be ordered to surrender the reconstituted owners duplicate copy of OCT No. RO-9969-(O-20449), and that said OCT be cancelled and a new certificate of title be issued in the name of Luisa in lieu of said OCT.
In their answer, [7] the Oos claimed that their predecessors-in- interest, Spouses Oo, never sold Lot No. 943 to Luisa; and that the confirmation of salepurportedly executed by Antonio was fabricated, his signature thereon not being authentic.
RTC Ruling
On July 30, 1996, after trial, the RTC rendered its decision, [8] viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered quieting plaintiff's title to Lot No. 943 of the Balamban (Cebu) Cadastre, and directing the Register of Deeds of Cebu
(1) To register the aforestated April 23, 1961 Confirmation of Sale of Lot No. 943 of the Balamban, Cebu Cadastre by Antonio Oo in favor of Luisa Narvios-Lim;
(2) To cancel the original certificate of title covering the said Lot No. 943 of the Balamban, Cebu Cadastre; and,
(3) To issue in the name of Luisa Narvios-Lim, a new duplicate certificate of title No. RO-9969 (O-20449) of the Register of Deeds of Cebu, which shall contain a memorandum of the fact that it is issued in place of the lost duplicate certificate of title, and shall in all respects be entitled to like faith and credit as the original certificate, and shall be regarded as such for all purposes of this decree, pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 109, Presidential Decree No. 1529.
Without special pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. [9]
The RTC found that the Lims had been in peaceful possession of the land since 1937; that their possession had never been disturbed by the Oos, except on two occasions in 1993 when the Oos seized the harvested copra from the Lims caretaker; that the Lims had since declared the lot in their name for taxation purposes, and had paid the taxes corresponding to the lot; that the signature of Antonio on the confirmation of sale was genuine, thereby giving more weight to the testimony of the notary public who had notarized the document and affirmatively testified that Antonio and Luisa had both appeared before him to acknowledge the instrument as true than to the testimony of the expert witness who attested that Antonios signature was a forgery.
CA Ruling
On appeal, the Oos maintained that the confirmation of sale was spurious; that the property, being a titled one, could not be acquired by the Lims through prescription; that their (the Oos) action to claim the property could not be barred by laches; and that the action instituted by the Lims constituted a collateral attack against their registered title.
The CA affirmed the RTC, however, and found that Spouses Oo had sold Lot No. 943 to Luisa; and that such sale had been confirmed by their son Antonio. The CA ruled that the action for quieting of title was not a collateral, but a direct attack on the title; and that the Lims undisturbed possession had given them a continuing right to seek the aid of the courts to determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on their own title.
Nonetheless, the CA corrected the RTC, by ordering that the Office of the Register of Deeds of Cebu City issue a new duplicate certificate of title in the name of Luisa, considering that the owners duplicate was still intact in the possession of the Oos.
The decree of the CA decision was as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. However, the dispositive portion of the decision appealed from is CORRECTED as follows:
(1) Within five (5) days from finality of the decision, defendants-appellants are directed to present the owner's duplicate copy of OCT No. RO-9969 (O-20449) to the Register of Deeds who shall thereupon register the Confirmation of Sale of Lot No. 943, Balamban Cadastre, Cebu, executed on April 23, 1961 by Antonio Oo in favor of Luisa Narvios-Lim, and issue a new transfer certificate of title to and in the name of the latter upon cancellation of the outstanding original and owner's duplicate certificate of title. 28
(2) In the event defendants-appellants neglect or refuse to present the owner's copy of the title to the Register of Deeds as herein directed, the said title, by force of this decision, shall be deemed annulled, and the Register of Deeds shall make a memorandum of such fact in the record and in the new transfer certificate of title to be issued to Luisa Narvios-Lim.
(3) Defendants-appellants shall pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. [10]
The CA denied the Oos motion for reconsideration [11] on June 17, 2002. [12]
Hence, this appeal.
Issues
The petitioners raise the following issues:
1. Whether or not the validity of the OCT could be collaterally attacked through an ordinary civil action to quiet title;
2. Whether or not the ownership over registered land could be lost by prescription, laches, or adverse possession;
3. Whether or not there was a deed of sale executed by Spouses Oo in favor of Luisa and whether or not said deed was lost during World War II;
4. Whether or not the confirmation of sale executed by Antonio in favor of Luisa existed; and
5. Whether or not the signature purportedly of Antonio in that confirmation of sale was genuine.
Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
A. Action for cancellation of title is not an attack on the title The petitioners contend that this action for quieting of title should be disallowed because it constituted a collateral attack on OCT No. RO-9969-(O-20449), citing Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, viz:
Section 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
The petitioners contention is not well taken. An action or proceeding is deemed an attack on a title when its objective is to nullify the title, thereby challenging the judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. [13] The attack is direct when the objective is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof. [14]
Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud, doubt, or uncertainty affecting title to real property. [15] Whenever there is a cloud on titleto real property or any interest in real property by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding that is apparently valid or effective, but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title. [16] In such action, the competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and the other claimants, not only to place things in their proper places, and to make the claimant, who has no rights to said immovable, respect and not disturb the one so entitled, but also for the benefit of both, so that whoever has the right will see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he can thereafter fearlessly introduce the improvements he may desire, as well as use, and even abuse the property as he deems fit. [17]
Lims complaint pertinently alleged:
18. If indeed, the genuine original of the Owner's Duplicate of the Reconstituted Original Certificate of Title No. RO-9699 (O- 20449) for Lot 943, Balamban Cadastre xxx is in Defendant's (Oos) possession, then VNL submits the following PROPOSITIONS: xxx 18.2. Therefore, the Original of Owners Duplicate Certificate (which Respondents [Defendants Oos] claim in their Opposition is in their possession) must be surrendered to VNL upon order of this Court, after the Court shall have determined VNL's mother's acquisition of the attributes of ownership over said Lot 943, in this action, in accordance with Section 107, P.D. 1529, Property Registration Decree xxx xxx [t]hat OCT 20449 be cancelled and new title for Lot 943 be issued directly in favor of LUISA NARVIOS, to complete her title to said Lot; [18]
The averments readily show that the action was neither a direct nor a collateral attack on OCT No. RO-9969-(O-20449), for Lim was asserting only that the existing title registered in the name of the petitioners predecessors had become inoperative due to the conveyance in favor of Lims mother, and resultantly should be 29 cancelled. Lim did not thereby assail the validity of OCT No. RO-9969-(O-20449), or challenge the judgment by which the title of the lot involved had been decreed. In other words, the action sought the removal of a cloud from Lims title, and the confirmation of Lims ownership over the disputed property as the successor-in- interest of Luisa.
B. Prescription was not relevant
The petitioners assert that the lot, being titled in the name of their predecessors-in-interest, could not be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
The assertion is unwarranted.
Prescription, in general, is a mode of acquiring or losing ownership and other real rights through the lapse of time in the manner and under the conditions laid down by law. [19] However, prescription was not relevant to the determination of the dispute herein, considering that Lim did not base his right of ownership on an adverse possession over a certain period. He insisted herein, instead, that title to the land had been voluntarily transferred by the registered owners themselves to Luisa, his predecessor-in-interest.
Lim showed that his mother had derived a just title to the property by virtue of sale; that from the time Luisa had acquired the property in 1937, she had taken over its possession in the concept of an owner, and had performed her obligation by paying real property taxes on the property, as evidenced by tax declarations issued in her name; [20] and that in view of the delivery of the property, coupled with Luisas actual occupation of it, all that remained to be done was the issuance of a new transfer certificate of title in her name.
C. Forgery, being a question of fact, could not be dealt with now
The petitioners submit that Lims evidence did not preponderantly show that the ownership of the lot had been transferred to Luisa; and that both the trial and the appellate courts disregarded their showing that Antonios signature on the confirmation of sale was a forgery.
Clearly, the petitioners hereby seek a review of the evaluation and appreciation of the evidence presented by the parties.
The Court cannot anymore review the evaluation and appreciation of the evidence, because the Court is not a trier of facts. [21] Although this rule admits of certain exceptions, viz: (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjecture; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case, and the findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and, (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record, [22] it does not appear now that any of the exceptions is present herein. We thus apply the rule without hesitation, and reject the appeal for that reason.
It is emphasized, too, that the CA upheld the conclusion arrived at by the RTC that the signature of Antonio had not been simulated or forged. The CA ruled that the testimony of the notary public who had notarized the confirmation of sale to the effect that Antonio and Luisa had appeared before him prevailed over that of the petitioners expert witness. The concurrence of their conclusion on the genuineness of Antonios signature now binds the Court. [23]
In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side, and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term greater weight of the evidence or greater weight of the credible evidence. Preponderance of evidence is a phrase that means, in the last analysis, probability of the truth. [24] It is evidence that is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.
Lim successfully discharged his burden of proof as the plaintiff. He established by preponderant evidence that he had a superior right and title to the property. In contrast, the petitioners did not present any proof of their better title other than their copy of the reconstituted certificate of title. Such proof was not enough, because the registration of a piece of land under the Torrens system did not create or vest title, such registration not being a mode of acquiring ownership. The petitioners need to be reminded that a certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property described therein. Its issuance in favor of a particular person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be co-owned with persons not named in the certificate, or that it may be held in trust for another person by the registered owner. [25]
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is denied, and the decision dated January 28, 2002 is affirmed.
The petitioners are ordered to pay the costs of suit.
Charles C. Holman, Jr. v. Gary J. Hilton, Superintendent, New Jersey State Prison, Trenton, Robert Hatrak, Superintendent, New Jersey State Prison, Rahway, Donald Tucker, Assistant to the Superintendent, New Jersey State Prison, Trenton, Joseph Call, Chairman of Institutional Classification Committee, Captain A. Richardson, Captain at New Jersey State Prison, Trenton, Captain R. Curran, Captain at New Jersey State Prison, Rahway, and Lieutenant Williams, Lt., at New Jersey State Prison, Trenton, Charles C. Holman v. Gary J. Hilton, Superintendent, New Jersey State Prison at Trenton Alan R. Hoffman, Former Superintendent, New Jersey State Prison at Trenton William Baum, Investigations Officer, New Jersey State Police Lawrence Ashton, Lieutenant, New Jersey State Prison James Williams, Lieutenant, New Jersey State Prison at Trenton, Individually, and in Their Official Capacities. Appeal of Gary J. Hilton, Alan R. Hoffman, William Baum, Lawrence Ashton and James Williams, 712 F.2d 854, 3r