ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION FRAMEWORK

IN ABKHAZIA, GEORGIA
TABLE OF CONTENTS



Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 3
Part I. Post-War Negotiations and Moscow Agreement ..................................................... 4
Initial Meetings and Agreements .................................................................................... 4
The 1994 Moscow Agreement ........................................................................................ 6
Part II. United Nations ........................................................................................................ 8
UNOMIG ........................................................................................................................ 8
Geneva Process ............................................................................................................. 10
Geneva process in 1997-2002 ................................................................................... 10
Geneva process in 2003-2008 ................................................................................... 12
Coordinating Council ................................................................................................ 14
Confidence-Building Meetings ................................................................................. 16
Part III. Commonwealth of Independent States ................................................................ 18
Part IV. CSCE/OSCE........................................................................................................ 21
Conclusions ....................................................................................................................... 23
Introduction

The war in Abkhazia that started in August 1992 resulted in the de facto loss of this
region for Georgia and the exodus of a large majority of its Georgian population in
September 1993. The end of armed hostilities set in motion various international
mechanisms of conflict resolution.

The Moscow Agreement on a Cease-Fire and Separation of Forces signed in 1994 formed
the basis for the conflict resolution framework and the subsequent negotiating process. It
is the only major agreement signed by the Georgian and the Abkhaz sides to date.

Three international organizations - the United Nations, the Commonwealth of
Independent States and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe - have
been involved in the Abkhazia settlement process since 1993 and have thus formed the
international framework for this process.

The United Nations played a leading role in the conflict resolution process from the very
outset. It established its presence on the ground as early as in October 1992 by sending its
observers to Georgia, while the Secretary-General appointed his Special Envoy for
Georgia in May 1993. The UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) has maintained
its presence in the conflict zone to date. The United Nations and representatives of the
countries known as the Group of Friends of the UN Secretary-General on Georgia later
set out to facilitate a comprehensive political settlement through a series of high-level
meetings usually referred to as the Geneva Process.

The CIS contributed to the conflict resolution framework by deploying a peacekeeping
mission in the conflict zone in 1994. A number of noteworthy decisions were also
adopted during CIS summits in different years.

The CSCE/OSCE has been part of the international efforts to resolve the conflict in
Abkhazia since the early years of the process. The Abkhazia conflict was discussed at
OSCE summits and repeatedly mentioned in the relevant declarations.

The paper examines the performance of these organizations (and some of the mechanisms
that these organizations have set up) according to the degree of their involvement in the
peace process, in order to determine how effective the general conflict resolution
framework and its components have been.
Part I. Post-War Negotiations and Moscow Agreement

Initial Meetings and Agreements

About two months after the end of the war, on 30 November and 1 December 1993, the
Georgian and the Abkhaz sides met in Geneva under the auspices of the United Nations
to discuss a comprehensive settlement of the conflict. The Russian Federation in its
capacity as facilitator and representative of the Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe (CSCE) participated in the meeting. The sides signed the Memorandum of
Understanding whereby they, inter alia:

committed to refrain from the use of force or the threat of force against each other
while the negotiations continued;
stressed that peace would be promoted by an increase in the number of international
observers and by the deployment of an international peacekeeping contingent;
decided to exchange prisoners of war on the basis of "all for all" principle and to
take "urgent measures" to find the people who went missing during the hostilities;
undertook to create conditions for the voluntary, safe and speedy return of the
refugees and displaced persons and to return all the lost property to the refugees
and displaced persons who would return;
decided to establish a group of experts
1
that would include representatives of the
parties to the conflict, the United Nations, Russia and the CSCE in order to prepare
recommendations on the political status of Abkhazia.

The sides also asked for international assistance in tackling economic and humanitarian
problems in the conflict area and for the establishment of an international commission to
promote economic recovery in the conflict zone.
2


The second round of negotiations was held in Geneva 11-13 January 1994. The sides
signed a Communiqu in which they, inter alia:

reaffirmed their commitment not to use force or the threat of force against each
other;
noted that the deployment of a full-scale peacekeeping operation in the conflict area
would be conducive to further progress towards a political settlement of the conflict
and appealed to the UN Security Council to extend the mandate of the UN
Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG);

1
The first meeting of the group of experts consisting of the representatives of the parties to the conflict, the
United Nations, the Russian Federation and a CSCE observer was held in Moscow on 15-16 December
1993.
2
Memorandum of Understanding between the Georgian and the Abkhaz sides at the negotiations in
Geneva, 1 December 1993. http://smr.gov.ge/uploads/file/annex/annex7.pdf (accessed on 16/12/2008)
pledged to continue working on a quadripartite agreement (involving the Georgian
and the Abkhaz sides, the Russian Federation and the United Nations) on the return
of refugees and displaced persons to Abkhazia and agreed to establish a special
commission on refugees. They also agreed to start on 10 February 1994 a phased
process of the return of refugees and displaced persons to Abkhazia;
agreed to continue discussing Abkhazia's political status within the framework of
expert meetings
3
in Moscow.

In the Communiqu, the sides noted that the provisions of the Memorandum they signed
on 1 December 1993 were "for the most part" being implemented.
4


A further round of talks took place in Geneva 22-25 February, in New York 7-9 March
and in Moscow 29-31 March 1994. As a result, two documents were signed on 4 April
1994: the Declaration on Measures for a Political Settlement of the Georgian-Abkhaz
conflict and the Quadripartite Agreement on Voluntary Return of Refugees and
Displaced Persons.

The Declaration on Measures for a Political Settlement of the Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict
drew on the documents signed at the two previous rounds of negotiations. By signing the
Declaration, the parties to the conflict committed themselves to a "strict formal cease-
fire" and reaffirmed their commitment to refrain from the use of force or threat of the use
of force. The parties also:

signed a quadripartite agreement on the repatriation of refugees and displaced
persons;
reaffirmed their request for the deployment of a peacekeeping operation which, in
addition to its direct task, would also facilitate a safe return of refugees and
displaced persons;
agreed that Abkhazia would have its own constitution and legislation and
appropriate state symbols;
agreed to intensify efforts to investigate war crimes, crimes against humanity and
other serious crimes as defined by international and national law.

No agreement on Abkhazia's political status was reached but the Declaration stated that
the sides discussed the issue of distribution of powers between Georgia's central
government and the authorities in Abkhazia. As the Abkhaz side would not sign any
document that endorsed Georgia's territorial integrity, the Declaration contained no
reference to it.
5



3
In accordance with the 13 January 1994 Communiqu, the second meeting of the group of experts took
place in Moscow on 8-10 February to address the issue of Abkhazia's political status. In his report dated 3
March 1994 (S/1994/253), the UN Secretary General stated that "the points of view of the two delegations
seemed to have drawn visibly closer".
4
Communiqu on the second round of negotiations between the Georgian and Abkhaz sides in Geneva, 11-
13 January 1994. http://smr.gov.ge/uploads/file/annex/annex8.pdf (accessed on 16/12/2008)
5
Declaration on Measures for a Political Settlement of the Georgian/Abkhaz conflict signed on 4 April
1994. http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/georgia-abkhazia/keytext1.php (accessed on 16/12/2008)
The Declaration, along with the 13 January Communiqu, eventually became a basis for
the Agreement on a Cease-Fire and Separation of Forces that was signed in Moscow on
14 May 1994.

By signing the second document - the Quadripartite Agreement on Voluntary Return of
Refugees and Displaced Persons - the parties, inter alia:

agreed to cooperate in their efforts to guarantee a "safe, secure and dignified" return
of refugees and displace persons to their homes;
undertook to respect the voluntary nature of repatriation and agreed that the
returnees would not face risk of arrest, detention, imprisonment or legal criminal
proceedings unless "serious" evidence indicating that they had committed war
crimes and crimes against humanity could be presented. The parties also agreed that
such immunity would not apply to those who participated in armed hostilities and
those serving in the armed formations, preparing to fight in Abkhazia;
agreed to ensure that the returnees would be protected from harassment, their
expired documents would be extended and they would regain ownership of the
property that they left behind and receive compensation where the return of
property was not feasible.
to establish a quadripartite commission that would address practical issues related
to the return process.
6


The 1994 Moscow Agreement

The parties to the conflict signed the Agreement on a Cease-Fire and Separation of
Forces in Moscow on 14 May 1994 in order to formalize their commitment to cease-fire
and non-use of force stipulated first in their 13 January 1994 Communiqu and then in
the 4 April 1994 Declaration. The Agreement, inter alia:

obliged the sides to "scrupulously" observe a cease-fire;
established a security zone - a 12-km area along each side of the Inguri river, and a
restricted weapons area which represented an extension of the security zone on
each side. The Agreement prohibited the presence of any armed forces or heavy
military equipment
7
within the security zone. As for the restricted weapons zone,
the agreement stipulated that no heavy military equipment would be allowed there.
Local civil authorities (the police) could operate within both zones and carry
"personal arms"
8
;
stipulated that the CIS peacekeeping force would be deployed in the security zone
to monitor the compliance with the Agreement;

6
Quadripartite Agreement on Voluntary Return of Refugees and Displaced Persons Signed on 4 April
1994. http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/georgia-abkhazia/keytext2.php (accessed on 16/12/2008)
7
The Agreement defined heavy military equipment as a) all artillery and mortars of caliber exceeding 18
mm; b) all tanks; c) all armored transport vehicles.
8
The term "personal arms" later caused difference of opinion as the Abkhaz "militia" was armed with
automatic weapons while the Georgian police carried pistols.
ruled that special areas be designated for the heavy military equipment withdrawn
from the security and the restricted-weapons zone (subject to monitoring by UN
observers);
obliged Georgia to withdraw its troops from the Kodori Valley.

The agreement also mentioned the role of the UN military observers on the ground and
contained a map defining the security and restricted-weapons zones.

One of the key tasks of the CIS peacekeeping force in addition to maintaining a cease-fire
as stipulated in the special Protocol of the Agreement on the CIS peacekeeping force was,
by its presence, to "promote the safe return of refugees and displaced persons, especially
to the Gali district".
9


Following the Georgian-Russian war in August 2008, Georgia withdrew from the
Moscow Agreement.

9
See S/1994/583, Annex I for the text of the Agreement on a Cease-Fire and Separation of Forces, signed
in Moscow on 14 May 1994.
Part II. United Nations

UNOMIG

The United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) was established by the UN
Security Council Resolution 858 of 24 August 1993. Initially, the Mission was to monitor
the observance of the Cease-Fire Agreement signed by the parties to the conflict on 27
July 1993, investigate reports of violations of the agreement and attempt resolving them
with the sides and report to the UN Secretary-General on such violations.
10


Following the signing of the 14 May 1994 Moscow Agreement which, among other
things, envisaged the deployment of the CIS peacekeeping force in the conflict zone, the
Security Council on 21 July 1994, adopted a resolution, expanding the mandate of
UNOMIG and increasing its presence on the ground. The Mission was mandated, inter
alia:

to monitor and verify the implementation of the Moscow Agreement;
to observe the operation of the CIS peacekeeping force within the framework of
the implementation of the Moscow Agreement;
to monitor the situation in the security and restricted weapons zone defined by
the agreement and, by its presence in the area, contribute to the creation of
conditions that would allow safe return of refugees and IDPs;
to regularly patrol the Kodori Valley.
11


UNOMIG has been led since 1997 by the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General who has been a leading figure in the conflict settlement process. The Special
Representative arranged and presided over meetings between parties to the conflict in
various formats. The Special Representative has also facilitated visits by Georgian
officials and envoys to Sukhumi as well as visits by Abkhaz leaders and representatives
to Tbilisi on multiple occasions.

UNOMIG has operated in close cooperation with the CIS peacekeeping force on the
ground, participating in joint patrolling of the security and restricted weapons zones and
the Kodori valley, exchanging information. Most of the time, their cooperation was
described as "satisfactory" by the UN Secretary-General though occasional difficulties
did apparently occur.
12
The most serious incident of this sort occurred in April 2002
when a contingent of the CIS peacekeepers was deployed in the Georgian-controlled
upper Kodori Valley without a prior coordination with UNOMIG. It is noteworthy that

10
United Nations Security Council Resolution 858, 24 August 1993 (S/RES/858)
11
United Nations Security Council Resolution 937, 21 July 1994 (S/RES/937)
12
See, for example, Report of the UN Secretary-General concerning the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia of 8
November 1995 (S/1995/937) and Report of the UN Secretary-General concerning the situation in
Abkhazia, Georgia of 29 October 1998 (S/1998/1012)
the United Nations has linked the extension of UNOMIG's mandate to the presence of the
CIS peacekeepers on the ground due to security reasons.

UNOMIG's senior representatives regularly attended the weekly quadripartite meetings at
the main bridge over Inguri. Attended by heads of Zugdidi and Gali administrations and
chaired by the Commander or the Chief of Staff of the CIS peacekeeping force, these
meetings were used to discuss practical matters on the ground. Subsequently, the
meetings were expanded to include the police and security representatives from both
sides. The meetings were suspended and resumed depending on the situation until the
autumn of 2006 when the last such meeting took place.

The UNOMING Chief Military Observer chaired the Joint Fact-Finding Group that was
established in January 2000 to investigate alleged violations of the Moscow Agreement.
The group brought together representatives of the Georgian and the Abkhaz sides and the
CIS peacekeeping force and continued to operate until the events of August 2008.

While UNOMIG was able to conduct patrolling in the Gali and Zugdidi sectors on a
regular basis from the moment of its establishment until the August 2008 events, the
mission's patrols in the Kodori Valley (both the Georgian-controlled and the Abkhaz-
controlled parts) were suspended on numerous occasions over security concerns.

In 2003, the UN Security Council endorsed the Secretary-General's recommendation to
add a civilian police component of 20 officers to UNOMIG to contribute to the creation
of conditions for a safe and dignified return of refugees and internally displaced
persons.
13
However, it subsequently proved impossible to extend the operation of the
civilian police component to Gali District due to the continued objection by the Abkhaz
side. The plans to open a branch of the mission's Human Rights Office in Gali also never
materialized for the same reason.

Given that, as mentioned above, the extension of UNOMIG's mandate was repeatedly
linked by the United Nations to the presence of the CIS peacekeepers on the ground, the
August 2008 war and Georgia's subsequent decision to withdraw from the
commonwealth and terminate the peacekeeping operation has raised questions over the
future of the mission. However, in his October 2008 report to the Security Council, the
Secretary-General recommended extension of the UNOMIG mandate "on a technical
basis" for a period of four months. The Secretary-General noted that, while it was too
early to define the future role of UNOMIG, he had received a formal indication from both
the Georgian and the Abkhaz sides that they supported the continuation of the mission.
The report also noted that the Secretary-General would hold consultations with the two
sides and with the relevant international actors over the possible adjustment of the
mission's role and report to the Security Council on the outcome of those consultations
before the end of the technical extension.
14
The Security Council subsequently voted to
extend the mandate of UNOMIG until 15 February 2009.
15


13
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1494, 30 July 2003 (S/RES/1494)
14
Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia of 3 October 2008 (S/2008/631)
15
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1839, 9 October 2008 (S/RES/1839)

Geneva Process

The UN Secretary-General informed the Security Council in his April 1997 report on the
situation in Abkhazia that he intended to convene a meeting involving both parties to the
conflict in order to map out the areas where concrete political progress could be made.
16

The decision was made to strengthen the UN role in conflict resolution and revitalize the
peace process after a prolonged stalemate and continued disagreement of the sides on two
key issues: Abkhazia's political status and the return of refugees and internally displaced
persons to their original places of residence.
17
This can be considered the beginning of
the process that is usually referred to as the Geneva process and has served as the main
format for the international efforts towards a comprehensive political settlement.

The United Nations, the Russian Federation, the CSCE/OSCE and the Group of Friends
18

have since been involved in the Geneva process along with the Georgian and the Abkhaz
sides.
Geneva process in 1997-2002

On 23-25 July 1997, a high-level meeting involving both parties to the conflict was held
in Geneva. At the meeting, the parties reaffirmed their commitment to non-use of force or
threat of use of force. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General said that the
parties welcomed the reinvigoration of the UN role in the conflict resolution efforts.
19

The high-level Geneva meeting was resumed on 17 November 1997 when the
participants adopted the Concluding Statement, approving a program of action
concerning the resolution of the conflict and setting up a mechanism for the

16
Report of the UN Secretary-General concerning the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia, 25 April 1997
(S/1997/340)
17
UN-led negotiations between the sides continued after the signing of the Moscow Agreement in May
1994. A number of meetings were held in Geneva in 1994-1995. During those meetings, the parties
discussed a draft paper on Abkhazia's possible status within a "union state" prepared jointly by the United
Nations, the OSCE and Russia. No agreement was reached and the negotiations came to a standstill
following the hostilities in Gali District in the spring 1995.
18
Although the status of the Group of Friends of the UN Secretary-General on Georgia was officially
defined by the Concluding Statement of the 17 November 1997 high-level meeting in Geneva,
representatives of the states that comprise the group - Germany, France, Britain, the United States and the
Russian Federation - have been actively involved in conflict resolution efforts since very early stages of the
peace process. Initially referred to simply as Friends of Georgia, the ambassadors of these countries
frequently met with the Georgian and Abkhaz separatist leadership whether to discuss pressing problems,
convey concerns over the lack of progress towards political settlement of the conflict or call for the
resumption of dialogue between the parties when it was absent. Representatives of the Group of Friends
supported UN-led efforts and its decision to convene the aforementioned high-level meeting in Geneva and
became active participants in the Geneva Process that started with that meeting. In addition to participating
in the Geneva Process and the sessions of the Coordinating Council (established by the Concluding
Statement of the 17 November 1997 Geneva meeting), the Group of Friends has continued maintaining
contacts with the two sides outside this framework.
19
Report of the UN Secretary-General concerning the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia, Addendum, 29 July
1997 (S/1997/558/Add.1)
implementation of this program - the Coordinating Council (see separate section). The
Statement also defined the status of the Group of Friends of the Secretary-General on
Georgia in the peace process: representatives of the Group were authorized to participate
in meetings and make statements and proposals without being a party to the
negotiations.
20


Following a low point in the peace process that was caused by the resumption of armed
hostilities in May 1998 and the Special Representative's efforts to put the Geneva Process
back on track, the second high-level meeting between the Georgian and the Abkhaz sides
was held in Geneva on 23-25 July 1998. The participants, inter alia, reiterated their
support for greater UN involvement in the conflict resolution process, stressed the need
for a full activation of the mechanisms established at the previous Geneva meeting (the
Coordinating Council), underscored the importance of direct dialogue between the parties
to the conflict at various levels and reaffirmed their commitment to a peaceful settlement.
The return of refugees was discussed in detail but no concrete agreement was reached.
21

The Concluding Statement was accompanied by a statement on behalf of the Group of
Friends of the Secretary-General. The Group lamented the lack of progress with regard to
a political settlement, called on the parties to search for one using the mechanism
established in November 1997 and stressed the importance of providing for a safe return
of refugees and displaced persons.
22


In 1999, the work commenced on a draft document that was to serve as the basis for the
eventual resolution of the conflict. In Resolution 1255 adopted on 30 July 1999, the UN
Security Council stated its support for the "intention of the Secretary-General and his
Special Representative, in close cooperation with the Russian Federation, in its capacity
as facilitator, the OSCE and the Group of Friends of the Secretary-General, to continue to
submit proposals for the consideration of the parties on the distribution of constitutional
competences between Tbilisi and Sukhumi as part of a comprehensive settlement".
23


In a related development, later in the same year, Abkhazia held a referendum on its
constitution and declared independence. The decision had a profound and lasting impact
on the Geneva process as the Abkhaz side repeatedly refused to discuss the question of its
possible status within the single Georgian state in the years that followed.

The first draft of the Basic Principles for the Distribution of Constitutional Competencies
between Tbilisi and Sukhumi was presented to Russia, the OSCE and the Group of
Friends in late 1999. Revised versions of the draft were produced in March and May
2000 following the Special Representative's consultations with the Group of Friends
though the Secretary-General noted in his July 2000 report to the Security Council that

20
Concluding statement on the outcome of the resumed meeting between the Georgian and Abkhaz parties
held in Geneva from 17 to 19 November 1997, http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/georgia-
abkhazia/keytext7.php (accessed on 16/12/2008)
21
Report of the UN Secretary-General concerning the situation on Abkhazia, Georgia, Addendum, 28 July
1998 (S/1998/647/Add.1, Annex)
22
Report of the UN Secretary-General concerning the situation on Abkhazia, Georgia, Addendum, 28 July
1998 (S/1998/647/Add.1, Appendix)
23
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1255, 30 July 1999 (S/RES/1255)
differences of views had arisen among the Friends themselves concerning both content
and strategy.
24
The Secretary-General continued to voice his concern in the subsequent
reports as the Group of Friends was unable to reach a consensus due to disagreements
between Russia and the rest of the Group.
25


In December 2001, more than two years after the adoption of Resolution 1255, the
Special Representative was finally able to produce a text of the paper that had the full
support of all members of the Group of Friends.
26
The document offered the following
basic principles for the future settlement:

Abkhazia was to become a sovereign entity within the sovereign state of Georgia
Distribution of competencies between Tbilisi and Sukhumi was to be based on a
federal agreement which was not to be amended without mutual consent
The constitutions of Georgia and Abkhazia were to be amended in accordance
with the federal agreement
The constitutions of Georgia and Abkhazia would endorse the rights of national
minorities and the right of displaced persons to return to their homes
Georgia and Abkhazia were to agree on the composition of the Constitutional
Court whose work was to be guided by the Georgian and the Abkhaz
constitutions and the federal agreement.
27


Despite the Secretary-General's assurance that the paper on the distribution of
competences was "simply a means to open the door to substantive negotiations in which
the parties themselves will work out a settlement"
28
, the Abkhaz leadership refused to
receive the paper for consideration and emphasized that the status of Abkhazia had
already been determined through its declaration of independence. The Abkhaz leadership
also refused to meet the Group of Friends in 1999-2002.
Geneva process in 2003-2008

During this period of time, the United Nations tried to advance the negotiating process
through a series of high-level meetings of the Group of Friends held under the
chairmanship of the Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations. As the
Abkhaz side continued to refuse to engage in any discussions involving the question of
status, the UN efforts focused on facilitating agreements on non-resumption of hostilities
and return of refugees and displaced persons.

24
Report of the UN Secretary-General concerning the situation on Abkhazia, Georgia, 17 July 2000
(S/2000/697)
25
See, for example, Report of the UN Secretary-General concerning the situation on Abkhazia, Georgia, 24
October 2001 (S/2001/1008) which mentions that the Group of Friends disagreed with Russia's proposal to
include security guarantees in the draft.
26
The plan is often referred to as the Boden document after the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General, Dieter Boden.
27
Office of the Georgian Minister of State for Reintegration,
http://smr.gov.ge/en/abkhazia/documents/bodens_document (accessed on 15/12/2008)
28
Report of the UN Secretary-General concerning the situation on Abkhazia, Georgia, 18 January 2002
(S/2002/88)

In February 2003, senior representatives of the Group of Friends held a brainstorming
session in Geneva in order to overcome the deadlock in the negotiating process. They
identified three sets of issues as key to achieving progress in the negotiations: (a)
economic affairs, (b) the return of refugees and displaced persons and (c) political and
security matters. In order to facilitate work on these issues, they proposed the
establishment of three task forces that would operate under UN chairmanship and
comprise representatives of the two parties, the Group of Friends and external experts.
29

Georgian and Abkhaz delegations attended parts of a follow-up meeting held in July and
held separate discussions with the Group of Friends. The Georgian side emphasized the
need to promote the return of refugees and displaced persons to Gali District, while the
Abkhaz delegation focused primarily on mechanisms for ensuring non-resumption of
hostilities.
30


Several meetings of the Group of Friends were held in 2004-2006 to review progress on
the three sets of issues identified earlier. The Georgian and Abkhaz delegations continued
to attend the meetings and present their views on the key issues. The Secretary-General
noted in his April 2005 report to the Security Council that the latest meeting had
highlighted the "differing priorities" of the sides and the importance of building trust as a
precondition for progress on political issues.
31


In order to implement the recommendations of the February 2003 Geneva brainstorming
session, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General also arranged, together with
the Group of Friends ambassadors, a number of meetings between the Georgian and the
Abkhaz sides on security guarantees in 2003-2005. A draft text on non-resumption of
hostilities and return of refugees and internally displaced persons, in the first instance to
Gali District, was discussed at the last such meeting which took place in Tbilisi in August
2005.
32


The negotiating process stalled following the Georgian police operation in the upper
Kodori Valley in July 2006 and Tbilisi's subsequent decision to relocate the exiled
Abkhaz government to the area. The Abkhaz side refused to engage in a political
dialogue with Tbilisi so long as Georgian armed personnel and the exiled government
remained in Kodori.

Two meetings of the Group of Friends were held in 2007 (in February and in June) and
the Georgian and Abkhaz delegations were again invited to participate. The Abkhaz side
reiterated that the withdrawal of Georgian forces from Kodori was a precondition to the

29
Report of the UN Secretary-General concerning the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia, 9 April 2003
(S/2003/412)
30
Report of the UN Secretary-General concerning the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia, 21 July 2003
(S/2003/751)
31
Report of the UN Secretary-General concerning the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia, 25 April 2005
(S/2005/269)
32
Statement of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the UN for Georgia, Ms Heidi
Tagliavini, 4 August 2005. http://www.unomig.org/data/file/693/security_forth_eng.pdf (accessed on
16/12/2008)
resumption of dialogue. In response to the Georgian proposal to hold a meeting at the
highest level to discuss security, the Abkhaz delegation stated that such a meeting could
take place so long as it would result in the signing of a non-use of force agreement or the
lifting of economic sanctions. The political dialogue remained suspended as the sides
continued to differ on the question of the Kodori Valley.
33


The attempts to revive the negotiating process continued in 2008. At the February
meeting of the Group of Friends in Geneva, the Georgian side stated its readiness to
develop economic links and to lift economic sanctions provided an agreement was
reached on a number of issues including a safe and dignified return of refugees and
internally displaced persons. Meanwhile, the Abkhaz side called on the Group of Friends
to revise its approach to the conflict settlement process in the light of the developments
concerning Kosovo. The members of the group urged the sides to resume the meetings on
security guarantees and to finalize the documents on non-resumption of hostilities and
return of refugees.
34


In July 2008, German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier presented a conflict
settlement plan that envisaged a three-phase process: 1) agreements on security measures
(non-use of force) and return of refugees; 2) economic rehabilitation and confidence-
building measures; 3) discussion of political status.
35
The German government also
proposed to hold a meeting in Berlin to discuss the plan. The Abkhaz side once again
stated that Georgia's commitment to non-use of force and the withdrawal of armed
personnel from Kodori were prerequisites to any talks. The Abkhaz leadership also
requested postponement of the Berlin meeting from July to August. The meeting was
eventually cancelled due to the outbreak of hostilities in South Ossetia.

Following the August war in 2008, the Russian Federation, a member of the Group of
Friends, unilaterally recognized the independence of Abkhazia.
Coordinating Council

The Coordinating Council was established through the Concluding Statement adopted by
the participants of the high-level meeting between the Georgian and the Abkhaz sides
that was held in Geneva on 17 November 1997.
36
The Council was set up as a mechanism
for the implementation of the program of action for the settlement of the conflict
approved at the Geneva meeting. Within the framework of the Coordinating Council,
three working groups were set up to address the following issues: 1) lasting non-

33
Report of the UN Secretary-General concerning the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia, 3 April 2007
(S/2007/182); Report of the UN Secretary-General concerning the situation in Abkhazia, 18 July 2007
(S/2007/439)
34
Report of the UN Secretary-General concerning the situation on Abkhazia, Georgia, 23 July 2008
(S/2008/480)
35
Report of the UN Secretary-General concerning the situation on Abkhazia, Georgia, 3 October 2008
(S/2008/631)
36
Concluding statement on the outcome of the resumed meeting between the Georgian and Abkhaz parties
held in Geneva from 17 to 19 November 1997. http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/georgia-
abkhazia/keytext7.php
resumption of hostilities and security problems; 2) refugees and internally displaced
persons; and 3) economic and social problems.

The first session of the Coordinating Council took place in Sukhumi on 18 December
1997 under the chairmanship of UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for
Georgia. Representatives of the Russian Federation, the OSCE and the Group of Friends
participated in the session along with the Georgian and the Abkhaz delegations.
Separatist leader Vladislav Ardzinba addressed the opening session. Participants of the
first meeting adopted the Statute of the Coordinating Council which stated that the aim of
the Council was to implement the stipulations of the Concluding Statement adopted in
Geneva. According to the statute, the Council was to meet at least once every two months
and its decisions were to be considered binding on the parties. Each of the parties was
entitled to call an extraordinary session.
37
The three working groups of the Council held
separate meetings where they approved their respective programs of action.
38


The Coordinating Council met regularly between December 1997 and April 1999 when
eight sessions (out of the total of 13 sessions held to date) took place. During this period
of time, two extraordinary sessions of the council were convened in order to address the
tense situation in the conflict zone. Another four sessions were held between January
2000 and January 2001.

The 12th session held in January 2001 was followed by a lengthy break in the Council's
activities as the next scheduled meeting was postponed on several occasions due to the
deterioration of the situation on the ground (notably the developments in the Kodori
Valley in the autumn 2001). The Secretary-General noted in his October 2001 report to
the UN Security Council that the meeting had to be postponed due to "insufficient
political will on either side to engage in serious dialogue within the available peace
process mechanisms".
39


The Coordinating Council did not meet again until May 2006 when the first session of
the resumed Coordinating Council was convened in Tbilisi. The parties drew up a
schedule of meetings of the three working groups and also agreed to hold the next session
in July as part of the Council's original bimonthly schedule. However, the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General was unable to convene a meeting of the Council
due to the developments on the ground, including the Georgian police operation in the
upper Kodori Valley. The Council has not assembled since 2006.

The Coordinating Council was thus unable to meet on a regular basis between 1997 and
2008 or to achieve tangible progress in any of the three areas of its work.

37
Record of the first session of the Coordination Council of the Georgian and Abkhaz Parties, held in
Sukhumi on 18 December 1997. http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/georgia-abkhazia/keytext8.php
(accessed on 13/12/2008)
38
Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations concerning the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia, 19
January 1998 (S/1998/51)
39
Report of the Secretary-General concerning the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia, 24 October 2001
(S/2001/1008)

Confidence-Building Meetings

The confidence-building meetings (conferences) between the Georgian and the Abkhaz
sides were held as part of the Geneva process under the chairmanship of the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General. The Georgian and the Abkhaz sides were
represented by the minister of state and the de facto prime minister respectively.

The first meeting was held in Athens 16-18 October 1998 and was subsequently
described by the Secretary-General in his report to the Security Council as "the largest
and most representative meeting between the parties since the end of the war of 1993".
40

Along with government officials and MPs, the delegations included representatives of
academic circles, members of NGOs and journalists. Representatives of the Russian
Federation, the OSCE and the Group of Friends also attended the meeting. The parties
reaffirmed their previous commitment regarding the right of refugees and displaced
person to return to their places of permanent residence and agreed to speed up the work
on the relevant documents. They also proposed a number of confidence-building
measures including the creation of a joint mechanism for the investigation of alleged
violations of the 1994 Moscow Agreement and the relevant complaints and the
establishment of an operative link between the military structures of the sides for rapid
response to situations and actions that could aggravate the situation in the conflict zone. It
was decided that confidence-building measures were to be implemented within the
framework of the Coordinating Council and bilateral meetings.
41


The second meeting was held in Istanbul 7-9 June 1999. The Georgian and the Abkhaz
delegations included, among others, military commanders who had participated in the
armed conflict. The parties agreed to revive the activities of the three working groups set
up within the Coordinating Council, to organize meetings between political and public
figures from both sides, to study possibilities for specific types of cooperation in various
areas (in particular, the economic area), to develop and establish mechanisms for regular
exchange of information. They also decided that the law-enforcement bodies would
exchange information on illegal activities and would consult with each other on the
measures to be taken jointly to prevent such activities.
42


The third meeting on confidence-building measures was originally expected to take place
later in 1999 but was only held in March 2001. At the meeting, the parties requested the
Special Representative to appeal to the United Nations, the Group of Friends, the OSCE
and the CIS to "become guarantors for the non-resumption of hostilities, the steady and
safe return of refugees and displaced persons, in the first phase to the Gali district within

40
Report of the Secretary-General concerning the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia, 20 January 1999, p 1.
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/013/68/IMG/N9901368.pdf?OpenElement (accessed on
12/12/2008)
41
Athens Meeting of the Georgian and Abkhaz Sides on Confidence-Building Measures, 16-18 Oct 1998.
http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/georgia-abkhazia/keytext10.php (accessed on 12/12/2008)

42
Istanbul Statement of the Georgian and Abkhaz Sides on Confidence-Building Measures, 79 June 1999.
http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/georgia-abkhazia/keytext11.php (accessed on 12/12/2008)
the old borders, and to elaborate, with the participation of the Sides, the mechanism to
implement these guarantees."
43
The parties also agreed on a list of 15 confidence-building
measures.
44


The possibility of holding a fourth meeting on confidence-building measures was
discussed during the February 2003 gathering of the Group of Friends where it was
suggested that the meeting would address all aspects of the peace process.
45
Also, the UN
Security Council resolutions adopted in 2003-2006 repeatedly called on the parties to the
conflict to consider holding a fourth meeting (conference) on security-building measures.
However, the meeting was not convened.

43
Yalta Declaration of the Georgian and Abkhaz Sides, 15-16 March 2001.
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/293/95/PDF/N0129395.pdf?OpenElement (accessed on
12/12/2008)
44
Annex to the Programme of Action on Confidence-building between the Georgian and Abkhaz Sides.
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/293/95/PDF/N0129395.pdf?OpenElement (accessed on
12/12/2008)
45
Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia, 9 April 2003,
http://www.unomig.org/data/file/105/030409.pdf (accessed on 12/12/2008).
Part III. Commonwealth of Independent States

The involvement of the CIS in the conflict settlement process in Abkhazia dates back to
April 1994 when the Council of Heads of State adopted a statement expressing the
readiness of the members of the commonwealth to launch a peacekeeping operation in
the conflict zone. The Moscow Agreement signed in May 1994 provided for the
deployment of a CIS peacekeeping force and the mandate of the peacekeepers was
approved by the CIS heads of state in October 1994. The operation was to start on 15
November 1994 and to last until 15 May 1995 unless the mandate was extended by the
Council of Heads of State.

The mandate was subsequently extended repeatedly though the extension was delayed on
several occasions as Georgia sought its modification while the Abkhaz side objected to
any such changes. During their March 2003 meeting in Sochi, Georgian President Eduard
Shevardnadze and Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed that the CIS peacekeepers
would stay in the conflict zone until consent was withdrawn by one of the parties.

Along with sending a peacekeeping force to Abkhazia in 1994, the CIS Council of Heads
of State adopted a number of noteworthy acts on the conflict settlement process in
subsequent years.

In its 19 January 1996 decision, the Council condemned the "destructive stance" of the
Abkhaz side which, in the Council's opinion, was an obstacle to the settlement of the
conflict and the return of refugees and displaced persons. The Council imposed a number
of sanctions on the breakaway region, noting that the member-states:

would refrain from delivering all types of armaments, ammunition and military
hardware to Abkhazia;
would prevent their citizens from joining the armed groups operating in Abkhazia
and ensure return of their citizens who served in such groups at the time;
would not engage in trade, economic, finance and transport communications with
the Abkhaz authorities or in contacts with Abkhaz officials without the Georgian
government's consent;
would not allow the operation of Abkhaz diplomatic missions on their territory.
46


In March 1997, the Council passed a decision which criticized the Abkhaz side for
obstructing the settlement of the conflict and the return of refugees and displaced persons
and reaffirmed the sanctions introduced the previous year.
47
The Council also supported
the proposed expansion of the security zone and redeployment of the peacekeepers in

46
-
, , 19 1996 .
http://www.apsny.ge/notes/1128822468.php (accessed on 16/12/2008)
47
-
, , 28 1997 .
http://www.apsny.ge/notes/1128994710.php (accessed on 16/12/2008)
order to provide conditions for a safe return of refugees and displaced persons to Gali
District.
48
In April 1998, the Council expressed concern over the fact that its decision on
the expansion of the security zone had not been implemented due to the Abkhaz side's
objection and called for the completion of the process of return of refugees and displaced
persons to Gali District before the end of the year. The Council also recommended
establishment of an interim administration involving UN and OSCE representatives in
Gali.
49


During the April 1999 meeting in Moscow, the Council adopted a decision on further
steps towards the resolution of the conflict, reiterating its support for the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Georgia and urging the member-states to consider the possibility of
contributing to the CIS peacekeeping operations in Abkhazia through the deployment of
military contingents or observers. The Council called on the parties to the conflict to
finalize a draft agreement on peace and guarantees for the prevention of armed
confrontation and a draft protocol on the return of refugees to Gali District and measures
for economic rehabilitation. The Council emphasized that measures towards the
economic revival of the region were to be linked to the process of continuous and
organized return of refugees.
50


In a March 2003 decision, the Council of Heads of State reaffirmed its support for the
territorial integrity of Georgia and emphasized the need for a safe and dignified return of
refugees. The Council also voiced its support for the document on the Basic Principles
for the Distribution of Competencies between Tbilisi and Sukhumi.
51
In a statement
adopted later in the same year, the Council once again expressed the support for the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia and called for the implementation of the
measures outlined in its decision of 19 January 1996.
52


Georgia's overall discontent with the activities of the CIS peacekeeping force was
reflected in a number of resolutions adopted by the country's parliament in different
years. In May 1997, parliament adopted a resolution requesting the president of Georgia
to take a number of steps to ensure the withdrawal of the CIS peacekeepers unless
considerable progress was made towards a peaceful settlement of the conflict by 31 July
1997. The resolution noted that the peacekeepers effectively served as Abkhaz border

48
-
, , 28 1997 .
http://www.apsny.ge/notes/1128994687.php (accessed on 16/12/2008)
49
-
, , 28 1998 .
50
6 1999
(S/1999/392)
51

, , 22
2003 . http://pravo.kulichki.com/megd2007/bz01/dcm01102.htm (accessed on 16/12/2008)
52
. , 19 2003
. http://www.bankzakonov.com/inter/razdel114/time1/lavz0058.htm (accessed on 16/12/2008)
troops and supported and strengthened the separatist regime.
53
In October 2001,
parliament proposed that the president implemented procedures for an "immediate and
unconditional" pullout of the CIS peacekeepers and raised the question of deployment of
an international peacekeeping force with the United Nations, the OSCE and the Group of
Friends.
54
In October 2005, parliament passed another resolution that referred to a
possible withdrawal of the Russian peacekeepers from Abkhazia and South Ossetia the
following year.
55
Finally, in a July 2006 resolution, parliament called on the government
to start procedures for immediate suspension of the peacekeeping operations and
immediate withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from the country and to work towards the
deployment of an international police force in Georgia's conflict zones.
56
The Georgian
government did not follow parliament's advice on any of these occasions though it
repeatedly called for internationalization of the peacekeeping operation, particularly after
President Saakashvili's accession to power.

In October 2007, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili declared the commander of the
CIS peacekeeping force persona non grata following an incident in which the CIS
peacekeepers confronted the Georgian Interior Ministry personnel near the Ganmukhuri
Patriotic Youth Camp.

In the spring of 2008, after Russia unilaterally withdrew from the 1996 CIS decision on
economic sanctions against Abkhazia and President Putin instructed his government to
establish direct contacts with the separatist Abkhaz and South Ossetian governments in a
number of areas, Georgia warned that it was prepared to formally request withdrawal of
the CIS peacekeepers unless a significant change of the peacekeeping format was
implemented.

Following the August 2008 war between Georgia and Russia, Georgia withdrew from
CIS and from several key agreements and informed the CIS Executive Council of its
decision to terminate the CIS peacekeeping operation in Abkhazia.

53


, 30 1997 . , 69-70, 3 1997 .
54
The Georgian Parliament's Statement on the Situation on the Territory of Abkhazia, 11 October 2001 (in
Georgian), http://www.parliament.ge/index.php?lang_id=GEO&sec_id=98&info_id=5092 (accessed on
15/12/2008)
55
The Georgian Parliament Resolution on the Situation in the Country's Conflict Zones and the Conduct of
Peacekeeping Operations, 11 October 2005 (in Georgian),
http://www.parliament.ge/index.php?lang_id=GEO&sec_id=98&info_id=6606 (accessed on 15/12/2008)
56
The Georgian Parliament Resolution on the Peacekeeping Forces Stationed on Georgian Territory, 18
July 2006 (in Georgian), http://www.parliament.ge/index.php?lang_id=GEO&sec_id=63&info_id=12710
(accessed on 13/12/2008)
Part IV. CSCE/OSCE

Although the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and
subsequently the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
57
has
always been part of the international efforts to resolve the conflict in Abkhazia, its role
can be safely described as auxiliary to that of the United Nations.

From the very start of the conflict settlement process, representatives of the CSCE/OSCE
participated in the negotiations that were held under the auspices of the United Nations
and maintained close cooperation with UNOMIG. The organization's involvement on the
ground, however, has been limited: when the United Nations (with the help from the
OSCE in negotiations with the Abkhaz authorities to this end) opened its Human Rights
Office in Sukhumi in December 1996, the OSCE deployed a human rights officer there.

In 1997, the OSCE lent its strong support to the UN-initiated effort to revitalize the
stalled peace process and the subsequent establishment of the Geneva process. Its
representatives also participated in the sessions of the Coordinating Council.

In the final documents of the OSCE summits held in Budapest (1994), Lisbon (1996) and
Istanbul (1999), the organization expressed its strong support for the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Georgia within its internationally recognized borders, called for a
safe and dignified return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes and
condemned "ethnic cleansing" which had resulted in "mass destruction and forcible
expulsion of predominantly Georgian population in Abkhazia" and the death of a "large
number of innocent civilians".
58


In addition, the Budapest Document (1994) expressed "concern" over the adoption by the
separatist authorities on 26 November 1994 of a constitution that referred to Abkhazia as
a sovereign state. The participating states regarded this decision as undermining both the
UN and CSCE efforts to promote peaceful resolution of the conflict. The Lisbon
Document (1996) strongly criticized the Abkhaz separatist authorities for obstructing the
return of refugees and displaced persons as well as their decision to hold elections in
Abkhazia, noting that those actions undermined the peace process. The Istanbul
Document (1999) reiterated the statements made at the previous two summits, describing
the referendum and the election held in Abkhazia the same year as illegitimate and once
again condemning the "ethnic cleansing" perpetrated in the conflict area. Further, the
participating states recommended dispatching a joint UN-OSCE fact-finding mission to

57
To give a "new political impetus" to the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), it
was transformed into the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) at the 1994
Budapest summit (see the CSCE Budapest Document 1994 at
http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1994/12/4048_en.pdf, accessed on 15 Dec 2008)
58
The Budapest Document 1994 (http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1994/12/4048_en.pdf, accessed on
15 Dec 2008); the Lisbon Document 1996 (http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1996/12/4049_en.pdf,
accessed on 15 Dec 2008); the Istanbul Document 1999
(http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1999/11/4050_en.pdf, accessed on 15 Dec 2008)
investigate reports on continued ethnic cleansing in the region.
59
The participant states
also underscored the importance of finding the way out of the stalemate that had emerged
at the time and, to this end, expressed readiness to elaborate, together with the United
Nations, a draft document on the distribution of competencies between Georgia's central
authorities and authorities of Abkhazia.

The conflict in Abkhazia has also been repeatedly discussed at the meetings of the OSCE
Ministerial Council.

59
The Istanbul Document 1999
Conclusions

The framework for the settlement of the Abkhazia conflict was established by the 1994
Moscow Agreement on a Cease-Fire and Separation of Forces and a number of UN
Security Council resolutions, as well as decisions by the CIS Council of Heads of State.

The UN-led Geneva process failed to bring the parties closer to reconciliation despite the
continuous efforts by the United Nations and the Group of Friends. The draft document
on the distribution of competencies between Tbilisi and Sukhumi that was finalized in
2001 did not become a basis for negotiations on a comprehensive settlement as the
Abkhaz side refused to even accept the document for consideration, let alone engaging in
a discussion. Subsequently, the Geneva process was focused on issues that were
considered less sensitive though little progress was made in those areas too.

The mechanisms set up within the framework of the United Nations/Geneva process in
order to facilitate the negotiating process seemed to operate with a certain degree of
success at the initial stage but were eventually paralyzed as a result of the failure of the
parties to reach agreement on key issues and/or because of the deterioration of the
situation on the ground. The Coordinating Council met on a regular basis in 1997-1999
and between January 2000 and January 2001 but has effectively ceased operation
afterwards. The meetings (conferences) on confidence-building measures also failed to
become a meaningful tool for enhancing mutual trust: three meetings were held in 1999-
2001 but a fourth conference never took place despite the numerous calls by the Security
Council and the Group of Friends.

The CIS did not prove to be an effective framework for conflict settlement efforts either.
While the summits of CIS leaders repeatedly voiced their support for the territorial
integrity of Georgia and the right of refugees and displaced persons to return to
Abkhazia, the CIS peacekeeping force failed to create conditions for their safe return.
Georgia continued to call into question the credibility of the Russian-led peacekeeping
force and sought internationalization of the operation.

The OSCE only played a limited role in the conflict settlement process in 1993-2008.

Ultimately, while the parties to the conflict never came close to drawing up a mutually-
acceptable agreement on Abkhazia's status, they did not make considerable progress on
other important issues either. As a result, matters like security guarantees, non-
resumption of hostilities and return of refugees and displaced persons were on the agenda
in 2008 as much as they were in 1993.

Moreover, the August 2008 war between Georgia and Russia led to a collapse of some of
the conflict settlement mechanisms while rendering the future of others uncertain.

The abrogation of the 1994 Moscow Agreement by Georgia was the most significant
post-war development, as far as the impact on the conflict settlement process in Abkhazia
is concerned, since a large part of the conflict settlement framework was based on the
ceasefire agreement.

The CIS was effectively excluded from any future conflict settlement efforts following
Georgia's decision to withdraw from the commonwealth and to terminate the CIS
peacekeeping operation in Abkhazia.

Russia's unilateral recognition of the independence of Abkhazia, followed by Georgia's
decision to sever diplomatic ties with Moscow, raises serious doubts as to whether the
Group of Friends can continue to operate in its old format since Russia was an integral
part of the Group.

The mandate of UNOMIG was extended by the UN Security Council on a technical basis
until 15 February though the Secretary-General noted in his latest report to the Council
that it is presently too early to define the role that the UNOMIG could play in the future
as the Moscow Agreement which formed the basis for the mission's mandate was
declared null and void by Georgia.

It is therefore safe to say that the framework for the resolution of the Abkhazia conflict
that was established between 1993 and 2008 failed to bring the parties closer to a
settlement and was largely rendered obsolete by the August 2008 war.