Sage Publications, LTD

Security Policies of European Countries outside the Soviet Sphere
Author(s): Herman Van Der Wusten, Jan Nijman and Rob Thijsse
Source: Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Dec., 1985), pp. 303-319
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ISSN 0022-3433 Journal of Peace
Research,
vol.
22,
no.
4,
1985
Security
Policies of
European
Countries
Outside the Soviet
Sphere
HERMAN VAN DER
WUSTEN,
JAN NIJMAN & ROB THIJSSE
Department
of Social
Geography, University
of Amsterdam
Security policies
of states have a
military
and a
diplomatic aspect.
For the
European
countries outside the Soviet
sphere
a basic characteristic of their
security policies
is the extent to which these are
aligned
to the American-
European security relationship.
A
typology
of
security policies
is set
up
based on
military
and
political alignment.
There are five
types: Faithfuls, Marginals, Neutrals, Partners,
Fortresses. For the last two
types,
scores differ con-
siderably.
For various reasons these
types
also have
higher
defense burdens than the
others,
which in their turn do
not differ
systematically
on this count.
Military alignment
does not
necessarily
coincide with
political alignment.
To the extent that
alignment
is one dimension of
security policy
at
all,
it is
apparently
a different one from defense
burden.
Although
the
types
are
quite
stable over
time,
some evolution occurs: variation in
military alignment
in-
creases, political alignment
with the US
generally decreases,
defense burdens diminish. Cross-unit and over-time
differences are related to
power position
and
geography,
but there also seems to be an element of routinization to
explain
the evolution of the
system.
It is
finally argued
that the trends towards
qualitative changes
in the
system
unfortunately
are not
necessarily
for the better.
1. Introduction
World War II and its immediate aftermath
brought
the US and the USSR to the fore as the
most
powerful
countries in the world.
During
the
early postwar period they
became
opposite
poles
in the network of international
security
relations. Some
major
bones of contention be-
tween the two
superpowers
were located in
Europe.
As a
consequence,
the US and the
USSR became of
prime importance
to the secu-
rity
of
European
countries. The fixed
bipolarity
of
Europe
was
epitomized by
the
partition
of
Germany.
This distribution of
power
and this
structure of
security
relations were novel. Their
distinctive
pattern
has not been transformed
yet.
As a
consequence,
in
studying
the
problems
of
European security
since the late
1940s,
we deal
with a situation that has maintained its basic
features,
which is not to
say
that there has been
no
change
at all.
In this
paper
we want to trace the evolution of
post-war security policies
of a number of Euro-
pean
countries in a
comparative way
and to
go
some
way
towards the
explanation
of the result-
ing trajectories.
Successive
positions
in time will
primarily
be assessed in terms of the countries'
alignment
with a
superpower.
This
may
be ex-
pressed
in
policy
lines
similar
or
complementary
to those of the
superpower.
The
alignment
with
a
superpower
is a basic feature of
security policy
in a
bipolar
framework. In fact it is a
defining
characteristic of
bipolarity.
Such a framework is
considered to be relevant to the
security
of a
country
in a
positive (supporters
of a deterrence
policy)
or in a
negative way (supporters
of an all-
European security system
based on
co-opera-
tion).
To the extent that various
evolutionary paths
and cross-national differences and similarities at
any
moment in time reflect
conformity
with or
withdrawal from the rules of the dominant
bipolar security arrangement,
we
hope
to
gain
an
insight
into the forces
stabilizing
this
arrange-
ment and the forces that undermine the current
system
and
push
in the direction of alternatives.
Some of these forces
may
be constant over time
but have different effects in different
countries,
resulting
in stable cross-national variation over
time. Others
may vary
over time but have similar
effects on all countries
resulting
in
general pe-
riodic shifts. If we can take some
steps
towards
a
proper
estimate of forces that have tended to
stabilize or
change
the
system
so
far,
and if we
can
get
some sense of the directions of
change
that have come with the
temporary
losses of sta-
bility
of the
bipolar system,
there is a better
chance to
grasp
the
potentialities
and the
prob-
abilities of
changing
the
present security
ar-
304 Herman van der Wusten, Jan
Nijman
& Rob
Thijsse
rangement
into an alternative one.
The
concept
of
security,
which is of central
importance
to this
study,
warrants some extra
attention. It is a
singularly
elastic term which
needs
circumscribing.
It is used for social actors
at different levels of
aggregation.
Private indi-
viduals
may
feel secure or insecure or
they may
be in a more or less secure situation
according
to
outside
observers,
and so are
groups
and states
and the world as a whole.
Security
refers to the
risk of
involuntary
diminution of values
pre-
sently
available
(e.g. health, loyalty, military
manpower,
credit and
money).
It means that a
social unit is not
-
or does not
perceive,
or is
not
expected
to be
-
threatened or coerced
by
mostly
external
(but see,
for
example, loyalty)
forces to allow
significant changes
to
happen
with
respect
to
important
values. These external
forces
may
be absent from the environment or
the social unit
may
be
protected adequately
against
them. The
problem
of
making
this
distinction
meaningful
is one of the
major
items
in the discussion on 'defensive defense'
(e.g.
this
journal's special issue,
no.
2, 1984).
The increased
range, precision,
and
explosive
(not
to
speak
of otherwise
damaging) power
of
military technology
and the salience of the
threat of
major weapon systems
to others has
directed the
security policy
of states
very
much
towards the
pacification
of the environment.
Threats from the environment can be dimin-
ished at their source
by political co-operation
with social actors in the
environment,
which will
hopefully
lead to the
distargeting
and dismant-
ling
of
threatening weapon systems
in due
course. For the time
being
it is the
management
of
antagonistic
relations in a
non-violent,
non-
threatening way
that is at stake.
However,
threats
from the environment have often been met with
counter-threats in order to
pacify
the environ-
ment. That is the current
policy
of deterrence. A
security policy aiming
at defense has at the level
of major weapon systems hardly been discussed
until recently.
Some partial steps
in that direc-
tion were of course taken by
the
deployment
of
ABM systems. Military
defense
against
attacks
at lower levels of violence has always
been fore-
seen. A basic problem
is to what extent these
three forms of security policy (co-operation,
deterrence,
and
defense)
do contaminate each
other if combined.
The
concept
of
security
is difficult to define
and even more difficult to
operationalize
for a
number of reasons. Actual
probabilities
in-
volved in risks
may
differ
widely
from
percep-
tions in the same field. At the individual level
this is well known with
respect
to crime. The
domain of
security,
i.e. the values at
stake, may
in their own
perception vary
from actor to actor.
Factors
causing insecurity may
be assumed in
wider or narrower zones and in a few or in
many
spheres
of life.
In this
paper
we will
only
be concerned with
security
as the absence of
involuntary
direct in-
terference with central features of states
(popu-
lation, territory, regime type)
from the outside
by military
force or the actual or
perceived
threat thereof. This is a rather narrow defini-
tion,
but it
expresses
in our view the core of the
concept
at state level.
Security policies
aim at
preventing
and
resisting
interference and threats
on a
purely
national basis or
collectively by
al-
liance formation
(for
a
general discussion,
see
Buzan
1983).
Security policy
in this narrow sense is the field
of
diplomats
and the
military.
But it does not
cover the whole area of non-violent
foreign
policy
and the external use of armed force. In-
ternational commerce and
aggressive
warfare
waged
for
purposes
of economic
exploitation,
for
instance, only
touch
security policy
at the
fringes.
It
is, however, extremely
difficult to
make this sort of distinction with the data at
hand.
Inevitably
we will have to use data from
the
general
field of
foreign
relations
(military
and
non-military)
and
interpret
them with a
view to their
significance
for
security policy
proper.
For reasons of convenience we have limited
this
report
to the set of
present-day European
states outside the
sphere
dominated
by
the
USSR. We have discarded the cases of
Iceland,
Luxembourg,
and Albania from consideration.
We have included Finland and
Yugoslavia
in the
analysis, although particularly
the exclusion of
Finland from the Soviet sphere
as regards secu-
rity policy proper may be debated.
How can one
explain temporal changes
and
Security
Policies
of European
Countries 305
cross-country
variations in
security policies
of
European
countries outside the Soviet
sphere,
primarily
assessed in terms of
alignment
with
the US?
Two
types
of
argument
have often been used
to
explain
an assumed decrease of
European
alignment (e.g.
in Mendl
984, p.
84
f.;
see also:
Hanrieder & Auton
1980, p. 284; Laqueur 1979,
p. 181;
Kaldor
1978).
First of all relations are
thought
to have
changed
as a
consequence
of
the evolution in
superpower
armaments diffe-
rentials. In the first
instance,
when the nuclear
forces of the US were able to reach the core of
the USSR and the Soviet Union lacked the
means to
respond
in
kind,
the US
confidently
guaranteed European security by threatening
the use of these forces in case of an attack
against European territory.
As the USSR ac-
quired strategic capacity against
the US
itself,
the US
guarantee
of
European security
wea-
kened. The
advantages
of
alignment
with the
US for
Europeans
diminished and alternative
policies began
to
gain
in
prominence.
On
balance,
actual
alignment
should have decreased.
Secondly
a
change
is
thought
to have oc-
curred in the
American-European power
diffe-
rential. As
European
economies recovered and
the
integration
of the EC members' economies
in
particular spilled
over into other
policy areas,
individual countries
acquired
a more extended
power
base and some collective actor
capability
developed
to resist American dominance. Al-
though security policy certainly
was not an area
where this
happened
to
any great
extent
(see e.g.
the
shadowy
existence of the
organs
of the West-
European Union)
and the extent to which this
occurred
generally
is a matter of
contention,
it
has been
argued
that room for deviation from
total
alignment gradually
increased. This also
may
have resulted in a
gradually widening gap
between US
security policy
and that of Euro-
pean
states. To the extent that EC
membership
has been of
special significance
in this
respect,
differential
dynamics
of
de-alignment
for two
classes of
European
countries would have to be
expected. We will further discuss this argument
at the end of this section.
To allow for the cross-country variation in
alignment,
two factors at least should be taken
into account:
geography
and
power position.
Although they may
be
differentiated, they par-
tially overlap. Geographical categories
like size
enter into assessments of
power position
as
power
base elements
(Goldmann
&
Sj6stedt
1979,
ch.
1).
Geography basically
has two
aspects:
an in-
ternal one
(the
site
quality)
and an external one
(the
situational
quality;
a
country's position
in
relation to other
countries).
Terrain
analysis
of
different countries demonstrates
important
dif-
ferences in
vulnerability
to conventional outside
attack
(compare e.g.
Switzerland and the Ne-
therlands in this
respect).
This results in diffe-
rent
probabilities
for various
security policy op-
tions.
Furthermore,
countries are
variously
sit-
uated with
regard
to basic axes of
transportation
and
potential
fronts. This
presumably
affects
their considerations in the field of
security
policy
even if
they
know
weapon systems
of uni-
versal destruction to be in the hands of a few
countries. Various scenarios of
aggravated
con-
flict at different levels of destructive violence are
probably
taken into account in
making
deci-
sions on
security policy (a
recent overview of this
field is O'Sullivan & Miller
1983).
Power differentials
changing
over time were
thought
to be
responsible
for eventual
changes
in
alignment
of
European security policies
with
US
policy
in this area. It is now also
hypothes-
ized that
cross-country
variation in
power posi-
tion is relevant to the differences in
security po-
licy
between
European
countries. In this con-
nection it should be remarked that cross-coun-
try differences,
at least in terms of available
power bases,
are almost
certainly greater
than
changes
over time.
Consequently cross-country
variation in
alignment
could also be
expected
to
be
greater
than
temporal
variation.
The
way
in which
power position
affects secu-
rity policy
in the narrow sense in which we de-
fined
it,
is difficult to
predict,
as
contrary argu-
ments
may
be made from the
perspective
of the
other countries and from the
perspective
of the
country
itself. A more
powerful country
has
more means to ensure a
large say
in alliance poli-
tics and also to follow a more comprehensive
security policy
in
general.
A
larger pool of
means tends to be used for a wider set of
306 Herman van der
Wusten,
Jan
Nijman
& Rob
Thijsse
options.
From the
perspective
of other coun-
tries
things
look different. The more
powerful
a
country becomes,
the more sensitive for others
its
point
of view as
regards security
matters.
Consequently
more efforts will be made to
affect its
policy.
In the context of the
alignment
of
European
security policies
with the
US,
this means
very
generally
that there are more chances for de-
alignment
of more
powerful
countries seen from
the
perspective
of their own means and of
weaker countries seen from the
perspective
of
relevance to the
superpower.
In fact those who
argue general dealignment
of
European
coun-
tries over time based on a
shifting European-US
power differential,
as we mentioned
above,
im-
plicitly
take it for
granted
that the first
argument
is the more solid one. This
may
in fact be true for
part
of the
range
of
power differences, e.g.
where
they
are rather small.
Power often widens the
range
and domain of
external interests countries
pursue generally.
Consequently,
the institutions of non-violent
foreign
relations and of warfare that states
pre-
serve tend to be extended and there is
possibly
also more room for
security policies
in the nar-
row sense. As external interests are more
widely
defined, they
are also more often affected and
there is a
paradoxical tendency
for more
power-
ful countries to
perceive
their
security
more
frequently
as
jeopardized (Deutsch 1978, p.
101).
There is considerable room for terminolo-
gical disputes
on the demarcation of
security
interests
proper,
as we said before.
Fig.
1.
US-European (De) Alignment Hypotheses
over
time:
increase in
US strategic
vulnerability
dealignment
decrease in
US-European
power
differential
across countries:
geography (position
and
situation, e.g.
with
regard
to
vulnerability)
variations
in
alignment
power position
In
Fig. 1,
we show some
hypothetical
rela-
tions
concerning US-European (de)alignment
of
security policies.
In the next two sections we set out to describe
the
security policies
of
European
countries out-
side the
sphere
dominated
by
the USSR as re-
gards
their
alignment
with US
policies
and then
to assess the
relationships
with the factors we
brought
forward.
2.
Alignment
and
dealignment of security
policies
2.1
Military alignment
We
try
to assess
military alignment
of countries
by considering
treaties and
legal agreements,
the
stationing
of
forces,
the
presence
of American
nuclear
weapons,
the contribution to
NATO's
armed forces and the
development
of
military
integration.
American-European
relations in the field of
military security
are based on a number of trea-
ties and
agreements.
Those countries that are
parties
to the six treaties and
agreements
consid-
ered to be the most
important by observers,
have
been mentioned in Table I. As far as we are
aware,
no
equally important
texts have been
negotiated
after 1959. The
legal
base of the
American-European security relationship
has
been
quite
stable for a
generation, apart
from
the
juridical
concomitants of
France's
with-
drawal from the
integrated military
command
and SHAPE's removal from French soil in the
sixties.
Recently
the issue of a new
legal
base for
the
deployment
of middle
range
nuclear missiles
has arisen.1
The UK and France are
signatories
of all
texts. Nonetheless
they
have different
positions
compared
to the other countries. The UK
signed
texts
deviating
from the'standard formulas in
such
ways
that more
equal partnership
between
the
co-signatories (the
US and the
UK)
was
sug-
gested. France, although
not
withdrawing
from
the North Atlantic
Treaty,
loosened the
resulting
ties in 1966.
After
Yugoslavia
had withdrawn from all the
agreements it had signed in 1959, none of the
six, generally considered or in their own view,
'neutral' countries were a
party
to more than
two of these agreements and
they were more
Security
Policies
of European
Countries 307
Table I. Co-signatories
to Treaties and
Agreements
Countries
AUS BEI DEN FIN FRA FRG GRE IRE ITA NET NOR POR SPA SWE SWI TUR UK YUG'
ECA x x x x '49 x x x x x x '53 x x x x
NAT2 x x x '54 '51 x x x x '51 '
MDAA3 x x '55 '47 x x x '51 '53 '47 ' '51
MSA x x x x x x x x x x '53 x x '51
SOFA '53 '55 '52 '59 '54 '56 '54 '53 '55 '53 '54 '54
ADA x x x x '60 x x x
2 6 5 0 6 6 6 1 6 6 5 5 4 1 0 6 6 3
x =
original signatories
'49 = other
signatories
with date of
entry
European Cooperation Agreement (1948);
North Atlantic
Treaty (1949);
Mutual Defense Assistance
Agreement (1950);
Mutual
Security Agreement (1952);
Status of Forces
Agreement (1951-1959);
Atomic Defense
Agreement (1959).
note 1:
Yugoslavia
withdrew from all the
agreements
it had
signed
in 1959.
note 2: France withdrew from the NATO
integrated military
command in
1966;
Greece did the same in the
period
1974-1978.
note 3: Greece and
Turkey
concluded an earlier
agreement, comparable
to the MDAA
('Agreement
to
provide
assistance to
Greece/Turkey').
Sources:
Treaty Series,
United
Nations,
New York.
likely
to have
signed
one or nil.
The US
military presence
is
extremely
con-
centrated in the German Federal
Republic.
About 80% of US
military manpower
in
Europe
is stationed here. About the same
pro-
portion
of nuclear devices in
Europe
is
kept
in
that
country,
the
overwhelming majority
of
these
being
American. About half of the new
middle
range
missiles
exclusively
American
controlled, will, according
to current
plans,
be
stationed in the FRG. There is no
question
that
West
Germany
is of the utmost
importance
in
terms of the Western Defense
apparatus.
This is
also evident from the
adoption
of the
strategic
principle
of forward defense
by NATO, imply-
ing
full scale
military
action at the German
border as soon as it is crossed
by enemy
forces.
The most
important commanding
officer in
NATO is the
invariably
American
SACEUR,
whereas the
political top
function has
always
been in
European
hands
(and,
what is
more,
occupied by British, Belgian,
Dutch and Italian
politicians only).
SACEUR's
peace
time
job
is to
organize,
train and
equip military
forces alloca-
ted to him to ensure that
they
are knit
together
into one unified force. The transition from
peace
to war
can, according
to the
treaty, only
be
made after consultations in the Defence Plan-
ning
Committee and the
Military
Committee. In
time of
war,
maximal
integration
of the various
forces of
NATO countries
may
occur. SACEUR
would then controll all
land,
sea and air
opera-
tions in the area of Allied Command
Europe.
'Internal defence and defence of coastal waters
remain the
responsibility
of the national auth-
orities
concerned,
but the SACEUR would have
full
authority
to
carry
out such
operations
as he
deemed
necessary
for the defence of
any part
of
the area under his command'
(Facts
and
Figures
1981, p. 106).
There
is, however,
no absolute
guarantee
that consultations will lead to consen-
sus and maximal
integration
of the forces of all
member countries. As one author
put
it suc-
cinctly:
'... in an
emergency,
SACEUR will com-
mand,
but there is no
guarantee
that the mem-
ber countries will follow'
(Calleo 1970, p. 112).
On the other
hand,
it should be stressed that
the
agreed authority
of the allied command is
unique
under
peacetime
circumstances and
apparently
far wider and
stronger
than that of
similar bodies
during
World Wars I and
II
in
wartime.
Honick
(1982, pp. 6-7),
the historian
working
at
SHAPE,
states the various formulas
under which national commanders in the allied
Nijman
& Rob
Thijsse
commands could
appeal
to their own
govern-
ments on these earlier
occasions, bypassing
the
commander-in-chief. The
guidelines
under which
SACEUR
operates
in wartime do not seem to
leave such
opportunities.
Commitment of
army
units to NATO can be
under two
headings:
earmarked or
assigned.
Assignment implies
the transfer of
operational
control to NATO commanders even in
peace-
time,
while earmarked forces will be at the
disposal
of NATO commanders in the event of
war
only.
Air forces are
assigned,
and the radar
warning system
and its concomitant
weapon
systems deployed
in a semi-circle
along
the East-
West border all over
Europe
are
integrated
to a
very high degree.
The central commands
(SHAPE
and its subsidiaries for
AFNORTH,
AFCENT and AFSOUTH as well as those for
the Atlantic and the
Channel,
SACLANT and
CINCHAN)
have an international staff.
It is clear from the evidence that the
large,
more
powerful
countries
generally keep
a sub-
stantial
part
of their armies outside the alliance.
This
applies
in
particular
to the
US,
Great Bri-
tain and France. These countries allocated not
more than a third of their armies to the alliance.
We should remember that these are the three
countries which have their own nuclear
forces,
in the last resort
only
to be activated for use
by
their
respective
heads of
government,
if
proce-
dures work
correctly.
For the
FRG,
no
army
units outside NATO
nor nuclear
weapons
are
possible
on account of
treaty obligations.
Denmark and
Norway (and
Canada
also)
have
only
forces earmarked to
NATO.
The other countries are more
fully
com-
mitted to the alliance in this
respect.
In
summary,
we have a variation of
military
commitment to the
American-European
secu-
rity relationship:
1. FRG:
co-signatory
to all treaties
plus
We-
stern
European
Union member, by
far the
largest American
presence
and central to the
concept of forward defense, military forces
assigned.
2.
Belgium, Netherlands, Italy: co-signatories
to all treaties and agreements plus WEU
members, military forces assigned.
3.
Greece, Turkey: co-signatories
to all treaties
and
agreements, military
forces
assigned.
4.
Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Spain:
did not
sign
all treaties and
agreements,
in
particular
not on nuclear
weapons;
when forces are
allocated, they
are
only
earmarked. Canada
also
belongs
to this
type.
5. Great
Britain,
France: have
kept
some di-
stance to
American-European security
rela-
tionship by signing
different texts and with-
drawing
from some
obligations respectively.
Both of them
are, however,
WEU
members,
military
forces
only partially
committed to
NATO.
Autonomy
with
regard
to nuclear
arsenal.
6.
Finland, Sweden, Ireland, Switzerland,
Austria, Yugoslavia: very
few treaties and
agreements signed,
to American
military
presence whatsoever,
no known
military
commitments to NATO.
A further reduction
brings
us to the
following
trichotomy: types 1, 2,
3:
strong military
com-
mitments to the
relationship; type 4,
5 more hesitant in this
respect
or
partially aligned
on various
grounds;
type
6
strongly
committed to a neutral
position
which
clearly implies
a distance to
any military
alignments
with the US.
Most of these
arrangements
were made in the
forties and fifties. As a matter of
fact,
we
pre-
sume that the commitment of national
military
forces to
NATO
has
qualitatively
increased over
time on account of technical
developments
like
the radar
warning equipment,
the common
pipeline
networks for the
transport
of
fuel,
the
shared communication
system
that is now under
construction,
the efforts to standardize
weapon
systems
and to
design
and
produce
these for a
number of national forces at a time. In
strictly
military
terms much
progress
has been made to-
wards the
knitting together
of one unified force.
Finally
it should be asked to what extent these
military
commitments are
part
of the field of
security policy proper. There can
hardly be any
doubt that European governments at the time
perceived a
grave security risk that they were
anxious to solve. To what extent this was the fear
of new German aggression
in the longer run or
Security Policies of European
Countries 309
of immediate Soviet
pressure probably
varies
from
country
to
country,
from
year
to
year,
and
from
party
to
party.
In some countries an internal red scare
may
also have contributed. As far as these commit-
ments were intended to solve these
problems
they qualify
as
security policies
under our defi-
nition,
even if in the end these fears turn out to
be
unjustified.
Far more difficult to answer is
the
question
to what extent American and/or
European
ideas about an eventual roll-back of
the Soviet influence in Central
Europe
were in-
strumental in the
engagements
the different
governments
entered. In whatever
ways
these
could be
proposed they
would not
qualify
as
security policies
in our terms.
The reasons
given
for these
military
commit-
ments have not
changed
much since
they
were
first
agreed.
As a
consequence
we can continue
to look at them as
part
of the
security policies
of
these countries. A
very
different
way
of
ap-
proaching
this
question
would have been to ask
to what extent these
policies,
whatever we call
them,
have affected the field of
security.
For the
classification of
policies
we have to use inten-
tions rather than
consequences
as the
ordering
principle.
2.2 Political
alignment
Voting patterns
in the United Nations
represent
the
political alignment
of
European
states with
the US in this
study.
It is evident that
foreign
policy considerations,
which are wider than con-
cerns over
security issues,
determine the
way
in
which a
country
uses its influence there. For
example, security problems
of
European
coun-
tries in the sense of this
paper
would be called
East-West issues in the UN
context, although
certainly
not all East-West issues that turn
up
in
different
analyses
would
qualify
as such. East-
West issues cover
only
a
part
of UN business.
Besides,
the United Nations is a
specific political
arena with its own distribution of
spotlighted
areas and darker corners. As a
consequence,
points
of view
may
be
expressed differently
from
the way they are expressed
in other arenas or
even other
points
or view may be taken. Alter-
native sources do not fit our needs in this in-
stance either. For example, the COPDAB file,
vulnerable as it
is,
has
only
small numbers of
events in relevant
pairs,
and data
categories
again
do not allow a
sharp
focus on
security
issues
proper.
The collection of UN roll calls is a
precious
data source as it enables
analysts
to follow the
foreign policy
orientations of member countries
over a
long period. Although
the context seems
to be
constant,
this is not the case. The
changing
membership
has caused definite
changes
of cli-
mate. This is an extra
handicap
in the
following
analysis.
Because it turned out to be far from
easy
to select resolutions on the basis of summa-
ry descriptions
as to their relevance for Euro-
pean security,
we used roll call votes taken on all
resolutions
during
all sessions for the
period
1946-1982. We calculated a mean distance of US
votes to all
European
countries in the
analysis by
cumulating
the differences
(yes/no
= 2;
yes/abstain
or blank =
1;
no/abstain or blank
=
1; equal
votes =
0)
between the US and a
European country
on each vote taken divided
by
the number of votes.
Resulting figures vary
between 2
(maximum
difference of
opinion)
and 0
(maximal alignment).
Then we
regrouped
the sessions into seven
presumably
relevant
periods
of
roughly equal
duration and
calculated the mean of means for each
pair per
period.
Table 2
gives
the results for countries
that were
founding members,
for countries that
entered in the
mid-fifties,
for the FRG which has
only
been a member since the
early seventies,
and for the whole set of
European
countries that
we consider.
Overall there is a distinct trend towards in-
creasing
distances between the US
position
and
the stand the
European
countries have been
taking
in the UN.
Taking
a more careful look at
the subsets with similar dates of
entrance,
some
further refinements can be made.
First of all the oldest members as a whole
took a
surprisingly de-aligned
stand in the UN
in the
early
fifties. This
presumably
reflects the
position
of Cold War issues on the
agenda
of the
world
organization
in those
years (Russett 1967,
p. 67).
After a short reversal in the direction of
alignment
in the
years
around 1955, there was a
trend towards de-alignment
followed by another
small reversal around 1972. Then the de-align-
310 Herman van der
Wusten,
Jan
Nijman
& Rob
Thijsse
Table II. Mean Distances Roll Call Votes in U.N. General
Assembly
for Pair
U.S.-country
X
per period
A. All countries
<
.25
.26-.40 .41-.55 .56-.70 .71-.85
.86-1.00
1
>1.01
SWE/NET/UK FRA/TUR YUG/SU
1946-1948 NOR/DEN/
BEL/GRE
TUR/NET SWE/UK/NOR YUG SU
1949-1955 DEN/BEL/FRA
GRE
NET/UK/ITA BEL/SPA/AUS IRE/SWE/POR FIN YUG/SU
1956-1962 TUR GRE/DEN/
NOR/FRA
NET/UK/BEL ITA/IRE/AUS SWE/FRA/ SPA/POR YUG/SU
1963-1967 NOR DEN/GRE/
FIN/TUR
BEL UK/NET/ITA DEN/NOR/ FIN/GRE/SPA TUR YUG/SU
1968-1972 AUS/IRE/
FRA/SWE/
POR
UK/FRG/BEL ITA/NET/DEN NOR/AUS/ POR/FIN/SPA YUG/SU
1973-1977 FRA IRE SWE TUR/GRE
UK/FRG/FRA BEL/NET/ITA DEN/POR/ AUS/SWE/FII\ TUR YUG/SU
1978-1982 NOR/IRE SPA/GRE
I
B.
Co-founding
members U.N.
<.25
.26-.40 .41-.55 .56-.70 .71-.85 .86-.1.00
>1.01
1946-48 7 2 2
1949-55 2 7 1 1
1956-62 3 5 1 2
1963-67 3 1 5 2
1968-72 1 2 4 1 1 2
1973-77 3 2 2 2 2
1978-82 2 2 2 2 1 2
C. Members since 1955
<.25
.26-.40 .41-.55 .56-.70 .71-.85 .86-1.00
>1.01
1956-62 1 2 2 1
1963-67 3 1 2
1968-72 1 3 2
1973-77 2 1 3
1978-82 1 2 3
D. Members since 1972
? .25 .26-.40 .41-.55 .56-.70 .71-.85 .86-1.00
>1.01
1973-77 1
1978-82 1
Sources: U.N. roll calls 1946-1974
(Ch. Wrigley invest.)
issued as a file
by ICPSR,
Ann Arbor
Michigan through
Steinmetz
Archives Amsterdam. For the
plenary meetings
of the General
Assembly
after 1974 use has been made of 'Index to
proceedings of
the General
Assembly 1975-1982',
United
Nations,
New York.
Security
Policies
of European
Countries 311
ment trend continued
again.
Members
entering
the UN in 1955 were
already
less
aligned
when
they joined
and have drifted further
away
from
the US ever since.
The FRG
finally
entered as a faithful
ally
and
has not
changed
course.
The most
spectacular
rank order
changes
of
individual countries occurred in the
early part
of the
period.
From the sixties onward the rank
order of more and less
politically aligned
coun-
tries
only changed marginally.
In the
early part
of the
period
Sweden
changed
from a
relatively
very aligned position
to a
distinctively
de-
aligned position. Turkey, initially being
the most
de-aligned
member of this set of
countries,
be-
came
strongly aligned
as the Cold War started in
earnest in the late forties
only
to veer back to its
former
position
later on. The latter
part
of this
trajectory
was also made
by Spain,
a
country
that entered the UN
only
later.
France,
on the
other
hand,
moved from a
de-aligned position
to a
position relatively
near the
US, paradoxi-
cally starting
this
change
at the time of the
Gaullist
regime.
This
again
warns us
against
the
interpretation
of these
patterns
as direct reflec-
tions of
positions
in
security policy proper only.
It is an indication on how much the
agenda
on
the UN
mattered,
as France also at this
juncture
solved its last
important
colonial
problems.
The
same
type
of
change
also occurred to some
extent with
Portugal's position
in the late seven-
ties, apparently
for similar reasons.
We are inclined to think that even if the main
factor
responsible
for the overall
pattern,
the
changes
in distances to the US
voting record,
and their rank
order,
was the UN context
itself,
at the
very
least there would have been
repercus-
sions in the
foreign policy aspect
of
security
policies.
Even in this extreme case the results
would at least to some extent have to reflect the
situation in this issue area as well. It could then
be that we overrate the increase of the Ameri-
can-European
distance in the field of
security
policies
or that in this field the start of the
pro-
cess was later. But we deem it
probable
that for
a considerable period
there has been a secular
trend towards increasing American-European
political de-alignment
also affecting the
diplo-
matic part
of security relations.
The mean score of all sessions from 1955
onwards
(all
countries
except
FRG had become
members
by then)
shows the UK to have been
the dearest friend the US has had in the United
Nations over these decades.
Belgium, Italy,
the
Netherlands and FRG follow suit
(the figure
for
this last
country
is somewhat biased because of
late
entry),
France at some more distance. The
other countries are even more distant from the
US,
there
being
no consistent difference between
neutral countries and the countries
militarily
committed to the
relation. In fact
Yugoslavia
is a distinct outlier
rather near the
position
of the
SU.
This
does,
however,
not
necessarily
mean that it has
kept
this distance
by consistently voting
with the
SU.
2.3
7Typology
of security policies
The
diplomatic
and
military part
of
security
policies
measured in terms of
alignment
are two
dimensions that
may
or
may
not
go together.
Table III is a cross-classification of these two
dimensions with all five
existing categories
la-
belled. In the cases of the
Faithful,
the
Margi-
nals,
and the
Neutrals,
the two dimensions more
or less
go together.
More consensus with the US
on the
diplomatic
front means more
military
alignment, although
at the lower tail end of the
diplomatic
consensus the
systematic
relation
with
military alignment
breaks down. The
Fortresses and the Partners
represent
the reverse
combination:
high military alignment
and low
diplomatic
consensus and vice versa.
These differences are
pretty
consistent over
time.
They
are
apparently
the result of
long-
standing cross-country
variations.
Military
alignment,
where it
occurs,
is
definitely
not
diminishing. Military integration
of NATO
countries and
particularly
of those
closely
tied
to the
military organization
of NATO has
pro-
bably
been on the increase. At the same time in
the
diplomatic sphere
the
gap
with the US has
generally
widened. It follows in
general
terms
that
along
the
military
dimension most
aligned
countries have become more
closely
tied to the
US and intertype
differences within Europe
have as a consequence
become more outspro-
ken. Along the political dimension countries
have as a
general
rule moved further away from
Nijman
& Rob
Thijsse
Table III. Military
and Political
Alignment
of
European
Countries to the
American-European Security
Relation
Military alignment
strong
weak absent
strong
FAITHFUL PARTNERS
(NET
FRG BEL
ITA) (UK FRA)
Political
alignment
weak FORTRESSES MARGINALS NEUTRALS
(GRE TUR) (DEN
SPA NOR
POR) (SWE
SWI YUG FIN
IRE
AUS)
the US while
intercountry
differences within
Europe
have remained rather stable. Overall
agreement
as
regards European security
is
bound to be a vexed
problem.
The defense burden of countries
(defense
expenditure
as a
%
of
GNP)
does not
vary
with
the
general
dimension of
alignment.
The Faith-
ful,
the
Marginals,
and the Neutrals do not
systematically
differ on this. The Partners and
the
Fortresses, however, consistently
show
high
levels. The
Partners,
as we
saw,
have a distinctive
military policy
over and above their commit-
ments to a common
security safeguarded by
NATO. The
Fortresses,
while
being aligned
in a
military
sense to a
very high degree,
have at the
same time been
arming against
each other. In
other words it seems
hardly
worthwhile to
explain
the
deviating positions
of these two
types
with direct reference to their
diverging
scores on the two dimensions of
alignment.
The
defense burden
apparently
is a
separate
dimen-
sion of
security policy
while also a
subject
of
other
policy areas,
economic
policy
in
particu-
lar. The rank order of countries is
extremely
stable,
but the
percentages change considerably
over
time,
the
general
trend
being
downward.
In
catchwords, then,
the
general
trend of se-
curity policies
in
Europe
outside the Soviet
sphere
is more internal variation in
military
alignment,
a
general
decrease of
political align-
ment with the US and
decreasing
defense bur-
dens.
3.
Explanations
and
implications
States
apparently
have their distinctive
security
policy profiles
over
long periods
of time. While
the whole set of states rolls
slowly
forward and
backward in some
respects,
towards more hete-
rogeneity
on this factor and more
homogeneity
on another
one,
the
pattern
of
positions
of all
countries remains
essentially
similar over time.
Some
explanatory
factors that
may
account for
this
slowly evolving pattern,
for its stable featu-
res and for its directions of
change,
were
sug-
gested
in the first section.
Geographical
situa-
tion
plus
terrain condition and
power position
were
thought
to be relevant for the
cross-country
differences in
security.
We first consider these
factors. Then we take account of
power
shifts
thought
to be
responsible
for the
temporal
chan-
ges
of
security policies.
3.1
Cross-country differences
The
map (Fig. 2)
shows the five
types
of
security
policies
we described in section 2.3. The
pattern
is more or less
regular
and to a considerable
extent to be
explained by
the frontline at the end
of World War
II.
The
strong
links of FRG to the
relation are deter-
mined
by
its core
position
at this front line
marking
the maximal extension of the influence
of the two
post-war superpowers,
the traditional
importance
of
Germany,
the role of
Germany
as
the main contender on the
losing
side in the war
and the central
position
of the area in connec-
tion with the rest of
Europe.
The
position
of
Belgium
and the Netherlands
on the one hand and of most of the Northern
and Southern countries on the other hand
may
be
interpreted by
differences of
maneuvering
space
of small states in connection with armed
conflict
along
this German border. In her com-
parative study
on the efforts of five small states
to
stay
out of World War
II,
Fox
(1959, p. 184)
Countries 313
Fig.
2.
Typology
of
Security
Policies
IV............
I Faithful
.. ..............
aj Partners
..................
I
Fortresses
. .
.................

Marginals
.ii
I
N
eutrals
. .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. .

i
~ti~iiiiii!fiifiiiiii!! i
. . . . . . . o
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
iii: 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 : 1 2 1 1
"
.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
i.
. . . .
.:
i.
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
.....
ii!itiiiiiliiiiili!iii~iil ii ir
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sc~rk'l: i. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . ..~::
Scale 1:29.000.000
Scale 1: 30.000.000
Scale 1: 31.000.000
Scale 1: 32.000.000
Scale 1: 33.000.000
Scale 1:34.000.000
Scale 1: 35.000.000
Scale 1 : 36.000.000
Scale 1:37.000.000
Scale 1:38.000.000
Scale 1:39.000.000
Scale 1:40.000.000
314 Herman van der Wusten,
Jan
Nijman
& Rob
Thijsse
concluded that its chances became smaller the
nearer a
country
was situated to the routes con-
necting
the
warring parties.
Most of the trans-
portation
axes
connecting
the US and crucial
Germany pass Belgium
and the Netherlands.
Total air lifts were not feasible when the relevant
agreements
were made. Even now
port
facilities
are
thought
to be
indispensable. Although
Fox's
rule is concerned with the connection between
warring parties,
we
suggest
that the routes to the
obvious front are in this case essential as well.
As a
consequence
the Faithful are on or near
the
transportation axes,
the
Marginals
are more
distant. It is difficult to
say
to what extent this
difference can be
explained by
the various coun-
tries'
perception
of their eventual
position
in an
armed conflict or of US
pressure
to facilitate
military operation.
However this
may be,
the
changing
scale of warfare
(explosives,
missiles
and the worldwide
operation
of navies increa-
singly emphasizing
the
importance
of the
flanks)
has
apparently
not altered the
original
decisions.
Inside NATO some countries shun the lure of
geography.
For France and Great
Britain,
their
central
position
on the
transportation
axes has
not been a sufficient reason for
becoming
a
faithful
ally,
while the countries on the Eastern
Mediterranean have not become
Marginals
despite
their
peripheral position.
It
may
be that
France and Great Britain are too
large
states to
have their
security policies
dictated
by geo-
graphy. They
strove to become Partners. On the
other hand the US was
exceptionally deeply
in-
volved in conflicts within the Eastern Mediter-
ranean countries in the
early post-war period
even before the East-West
bipolar structure,
cen-
tered around the German
problem,
had formed.
These countries became Fortresses.
Italy's posi-
tion as a Faithful is also anomalous from this
perspective.
Another
geographical regularity
on the
map
is a zone of minimal commitment to the Ameri-
can-European security relation and of minimal
diplomatic consensus with the US close to the
East-West partition
line. This is the zone of the
Neutrals from Finland to Yugoslavia, only inter-
rupted by Germany. Ireland clearly defies this
pattern. But Irish neutrality does not result from
the East-West conflict. This also
applies
to the
other two neutrals most to the West: Switzer-
land and Sweden. The final
agreement
over a
more or less neutral zone at the
edge
of
Russia's
consolidated
sphere may
to some extent have
been affected
by
the existence of
already
neutral
countries in
Europe
and
particularly
of
nearby
Sweden and Switzerland: 'The
larger
the num-
ber of neutrals
(the larger)
the would-be neu-
tral's chance of
successfully resisting
the bel-
ligerents',
Fox
(1959, p. 184) suggested. Why
should this not also
apply
in a cold war?
Internal
physical
characteristics also
play
a
role in
security policies. Norway's extremely
long
coast line which is difficult to defend seems
to have been material to her choice of
NATO (de
Raeymaeker 1974, p. 394).
Swiss
neutrality
has
been more tenable as a result of its mountainous
territory. Yugoslavia's capacity
for self-defense
has been facilitated
by
the same
type
of
physical
environment. On the other
hand, Yugoslavia
also has a considerable coastline and it made a
choice
very
different from
Norway
in the field of
security policy. Physical
environment has an
impact although
not a determinant one.
In
conclusion,
countries on the
principal
axis
of
transportation
towards the main front tend to
be
Faithfuls,
countries at the flanks tend to be
Marginals,
countries near the East-West border
at some distance from the main front tend to be
Neutrals. For the other
types deviating
from a
general alignment dimension,
other
explanatory
factors are needed.
Fig.
3.
presents power rankings
for
1955,
1965,
and 1975 based on
GNP, military expen-
diture, population,
and size. Such indexes
may
be criticized for their choice of
indicators, ways
of transformation and for the
concept
of
power
they
are meant to
reptesent,
but
anyhow they
give
some
general impression
of ranks and
orders of differences between countries.
The enormous preponderance of the US is
clearly shown and it is only slightly affected over
time. As a
consequence
to be Partners in secu-
rity can only be an
aspired status for the
larger
European states individually. The FRG is a lar-
ger state in
European terms from the
beginning
and it
strengthens its position over time. France
also becomes stronger but at a slower rate. Great
Security
Policies
of European
Countries 315
Fig.
3. Power
Rankings 1955, 1965, 1975
1955 1965 1975
+
19
+ 19
US
US
US
+3 +3
FRG
+2
+2
FRA
UK FRG
CAN UK
CAN UK
CAN
+ 1 FRA
FRA
-
1
FRG
ITA
.
ITA ITA
0
O
SPA
SPA
SPA.
-1 TUR
TUR
-
TUR
--
YUG
NET
BEL NET
SWE
YUG NET SE
YUG
NET
DEN FIN GRE AUS POR SWI NOR
FIN GRE AUS POR SWI .
E
IRE
DEN jQR:
-E2
rE
DEN FIN GRE NOR POR
2
IRE
-3 -3
The selection of
power
indicators has been based on a review article
(Guy Tegenbos, 'De macht der staten: een inventarisatie
van de alternatieven tot
kwantificering'
Res Publica
16, 1974, pp. 133-159).
Each of the four variables
GNP, military expendi-
ture, population
and size
(Thylor
& Jodice
1983)
has been transformed into z-scores
(values expressed
as the distance from the
mean in standard deviation units with the mean as
0).
Based on considerations of assumed relevance variables have
finally
been
weighted differently.
The index is
(2GNP
+ MILEX + POP +
0,5 SIZE).
Nijman
& Rob
Thijsse
Britain's
position
is
apparently
stable but it loses
in
power compared
to the other two.
Italy's posi-
tion is the sort of
halfway
house
position
be-
tween
large
and small which it has
always
had in
the modern
history
of
Europe.
Other differences
and
changes
are
extremely
small scale. There
seems to be some trend towards more
power
dif-
ferentiation
among
small
European
states.
With
regard
to the dimensions of the
security
policies presented
in section
2,
there is an overall
relation with defense burdens in
particular.
As
defense burdens are
expressed
in relative terms
there is no mathematical relation between the
two.
Larger states,
also when we extend this con-
cept
to other dimensions of
power, spend
relati-
vely
more on defense. Olson & Zeckhauser
(1966)
have
provided
an
explanation
in terms of
alliance
dynamics.
But the relation seems to
hold for the neutral states as well.
Moreover,
we
have
already
mentioned that some
states, parti-
cularly larger ones, keep
a considerable
part
of
their armed forces outside the
military
alliance.
It
may
in this connection also be relevant to con-
sider
Yugoslavia's
and Sweden's
power positions
compared
to the other neutrals and their efforts
to secure
regional arrangements
in this field. In
other words we surmise a connection between
power position,
defense burden and
scope
of
military policies
which a state
may
want to have
the
capacity
to follow.
Against
this
background
the
position
of the FRG is an
anomaly
and it is
to be
expected
that strains
put
on that
country
will
increasingly
be resented. On the other hand
a
loosening
of
existing
ties will
immediately
reawaken old fears in the
region.
But then
again
some
part
of the
logic
of
geography
also attracts
the
country
to
get
inserted in the zone of
Neutrals.
There is also a
fairly strong
relation of the
diplomatic
consensus dimension in the
typology
(2.3)
and
power position
and a
slight
connection
with
military alignment.
In
general
terms the
more
powerful states of
Europe
view world af-
fairs, and
probably
the
diplomatic
line in secu-
rity matters also, from a
perspective
similar to
that of the US compared
to the other Europeans,
but
they are not
willing
to
align
their countries
mliitarily
to the US to the same extent.2
We argued at the outset that alignment might
be related to
power position
in two
differing
ways depending
on the
perspective
one takes. As
we find
power position
to be
positively
related to
the
political part
of
security policy
in
particular,
this would
according
to that
argument
have to
be the result of extra attention from the US for
more
powerful
countries.
3.2
Change
over time
Following
recent
literature, American-European
de-alignment
was
expected
to occur for two rea-
sons: the
development
of US-SU
parity
in stra-
tegy capacity,
and the
narrowing gap
in US-
European power potential.
The first
question,
of
course,
is if
de-alignment
has in fact occur-
red.
According
to our results it
has,
but in the
political
dimension of
security policy only.
Can
this be accounted for
by
the two
processes
we
mentioned?
The
consequences
of
strategic parity
would
probably
first of all be felt in the
military
dimen-
sion of
security policy,
because the fear of
Europe decoupling
would
primarily
affect
available
military options
and thus
military
security policy. Generally, however,
this has not
been the case. On the
contrary,
countries once
aligned militarily
tend to
strengthen
their bonds
via
continuing
institutional
growth (partial
exceptions
are France and
Greece).
This could
contrary
to the initial
hypothesis
be
interpreted
as an extra effort
by
the
European
countries to hold on to their now traditional
military security policy
of
alignment against
these odds. There
could,
on the other
hand,
be
a
tendency
for these
European countries,
con-
scious of the
increasing vulnerability
of their
doctrine of
military protection,
to look for a
political way
to
pacify
the
environment, through
cooperation.
This could entail
political
de-
alignment
from the US. In this
way, strategic
parity
between the
superpowers
could have re-
sulted in
opposite policy changes
in the two di-
mensions of security policy.
What this
kind
of
argument cannot explain
is the more or less con-
tinuous change
in security policy starting before
the moment in time that parity
was more or less
reached and was
perceived
in the sixties.
De-alignment
could also result from the les-
sening
of American-European power
differen-
Security
Policies
of European
Countries 317
ces,
we stated. In actual
fact, however,
it is far
from certain that
any significant change
has
happened
in this
regard.
Our
Fig.
3 shows a
change
in this
direction,
but the differences in
power
of the US and the
European
countries
remain
simply
enormous. The FRG made the
largest leap
ahead followed
by
France. As we
have seen these
are, however,
not the countries
that
particularly
showed
de-alignment
over
time.
In addition the
presumed
increased actor
capability
of some
European
countries on ac-
count of the EC and other forms of
cooperation
could be taken into account.
However, precisely
in the field of
security policy proper
there are
hardly any signs
that
European integration
has
proceeded during
the
period
we covered. In con-
clusion we doubt whether the
process
of
politi-
cal
de-alignment
we encountered can be ex-
plained by changing American-European power
differentials,
not to
speak
of the evolution of
military security policies.
If the factors we indicated are unsuitable or in
any
case not
sufficiently persuasive
to account
for the evolution of
security policies,
what are
other
possible explanations?
In our view the
course of time itself has to
play
a
large
role in
this. It is now little less than
forty years
since the
bipolar system
of international
security
rela-
tions was introduced in
Europe.
In the first in-
stance countries were
aligned
to the US to a
maximal extent
(remember Turkey's political
trajectory
in this
period).
But even
then,
some
countries succeeded in
steering
clear of the two
poles.
The
early postwar history
of all six Neu-
trals
except
Switzerland is full of incidents where
the
pull
of one or both
superpowers
was more or
less
clearly,
sometimes
dramatically,
felt.
As
long
as the
system
was under construc-
tion,
maximal
clarity
had to be obtained in
order
to
prevent
alternative
arrangements.
After
the orientation of the two Germanies towards
the two
respective poles
had been
settled,
although
not without some unresolved
contrary
views
remaining (international position
of
GDR, status of
Berlin),
the bipolar system star-
ted to wear itself out. Tensions were reduced
(Goldmann 1974),
even if
through routinization
only (Galtung 1966, pp.
157
f.). Superpowers
continued their
struggle
for
regional hegemony
elsewhere. The
proportion
and absolute number
of cases where
superpowers'
armed forces were
used short of war decreased in
Europe (calcula-
ted from the
appendices
in Blechman &
Kaplan
1978 and
Kaplan 1981).
As the
bipolar system
in
Europe
became more
taken for
granted
and drew less
attention,
other
security
elements became more
salient,
most of
them
feeding
on old controversies
(tension
be-
tween Greece and
Turkey, regionalist
move-
ments). Europe
outside the Soviet orbit
began
to
develop
some
independent political
orientation
as room for this was
provided by
altered
political
orientations of both
superpowers
and won
by
a
change
in
perspective
of
European
countries
themselves.
Along
the
military
dimension
things
developed differently
because
alignment
had
been instituted in NATO in this domain. This
institution
gathered
and
kept
its own momen-
tum as time
progressed.
Recent illustrative evi-
dence of the different
ways
in which the
political
and
military
dimension of
security policy
develop
is
provided by Spain joining
NATO:
wholehearted
participation
in the
military orga-
nization,
but
political
hesitations
(Garcia 1985,
p. 16).
Tension reduction showed
up
in
faltering
defense burdens. This does not
necessarily
mean
that defense in absolute
figures diminished,
let
alone that the
quality
of the armed forces de-
creased. But it does indicate a lower national
priority
for the armed forces. Tension reduction
did not undermine
NATO
as a
military
institu-
tion because the link between the two could be
argued
both
ways (in spite
of/thanks
to).
Even when tension returned and favorable
conditions for a
restructuring
towards stricter
bipolarity
seemed to obtain around
1980,
this
apparently
has not
happened.
Political
de-align-
ment was
according
to our
figures uninterrupted.
Military alignment
within
NATO
was
again
emphasized through
the execution of the double
track decision. The chances that
wavering
small
Faithfuls will in the end not
permit deployment
of middle
range
missiles are remote at the time of
writing. Defense burdens hardly grew. The
agree-
ment to a
3%o
increase of defense budgets in
NATO
was hardly more than a
stabilizing
operation
and has overall failed (Golden 1983).
318 Herman van der Wusten,
Jan
Nijman
& Rob
Thijsse
3.3
Implications
In the
early
seventies
Schilling
et al.
(1973)
drew
several
paths Europe
could take
They
ended
up
with various futures called
Big
Finland Western
Europe, Big
Sweden Western
Europe,
WEU
Western
Europe,
Reconstituted
Europe,
Libera-
ted Eastern
Europe.
In the
end, however,
it was
concluded that so
many
barriers could be surmi-
sed as the
paths
unfolded that a future
equal
to
the
present situation,
Two
Spheres Europe,
at
the moment seemed the more
probable.
The futures
Schilling
et al. foresaw were
pri-
marily
determined
by superpower policies
to-
wards the
area;
at the same time
they
treated
Europe
outside the Russian
sphere
as
essentially
one unit. At the
beginning
of the
1970's,
bila-
teral
superpower stewardship hang
in the air and
European unity
still seemed
very
much on the
increase.
During
the
past
decade Two
Spheres
Europe
has
clearly
been the dominant course of
history.
In that sense their
predictions
have been
correct for the time
being.
In this
paper
we
have, however,
also indicated
some
long
term
development
that
may
in the
course of time
sufficiently
undermine the basis
of Two
Spheres Europe
in the western
part
of the
continent so as to cause serious frictions. Pro-
bably
even more
important
than differences in
defense burdens is the breakdown of the Ame-
rican-European political
consensus. If we read
the
figures correctly (and
there is room for
question
marks at this
point)
the whole of
Europe
outside the Russian
sphere
is
systemati-
cally following
a
political
course different from
the American one. It
may
still be that in the
longer
run
Europe
will follow one of
Schilling
et
al's alternative
paths.
Like
Schilling
et
al.,
we have stressed internal
European diversity
and the evolution of an
extremely high
level of
military integration
involving parts
of
Europe
and the US.
Taking
these elements
together,
an
important part
of
Europe could be heading towards stable internal
political diversity, increasing political differen-
ces with the US leading
to its
possible
with-
drawal from Europe, and an ever more
highly
developed system of military integration
that
would not necessarily collapse, certainly not if it
had a European commander, as was recently
suggested (Kissinger 1984).
It is a
scary
scenario
leading
to a
political
form that is unknown but
that would have some features of
Europe
at the
time of the Crusaders.
There is no
suggestion
here that
anyone
is
planning
for this to
happen.
The
only sugges-
tion is that this future is
implied by
a combina-
tion of some current
developments.
It is clear
that the actual
security system
has been stable
over a
long period
of time. Its evolution has not
led to
qualitative changes yet.
The drifts of
history may
in due course undermine the stabi-
lizers that have
kept
it
going.
If this
happened
the chances are that the
security
situation would
deteriorate.
For the
present
situation to
improve,
a
carefully
concerted
long
term
policy
of detente
diplomacy
and disarmament would be neces-
sary
with
European governments developing
and
asserting
their own
viewpoints.
This seems
hardly
on the cards at the moment.
Countries 319
NOTES
1.
During
1983 the Dutch
government
in a rather unusual
move
sought
the advice of the Council of State on the
problem
whether a two-third
majority
would be neces-
sary
for the
treaty
with the US on the
stationing
of Cruise
Missiles. The advice
(two-third majority
not
necessary)
and its
juridical
base has been
extensively
commented on
in Nederlands
Juristenblad, April
1984.
Afterwards,
concerned citizens have
massively supported
a move to
start a
legal procedure against
the state in order to
get
a
prohibition
on the
stationing.
The summons has been
published
as
Dagvaarding
1985.
2. The three relations can be
quickly
summarized as fol-
lows:
defense
burden
high
low
high
7 2
power
ranking
1965
low 2 7
gamma=
.85
political
alignment
high
low
high
5 4
power
ranking
1965
low 1 8
gamma
= .82
military
alignment
high
middle low
high
4 3 2
power
ranking
1965
low 2 3 4
gamma=
.43
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Security Policies of European Countries outside the Soviet Sphere

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