11-41 Advise and Assist Brigades NL

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iii
ADVISE AND ASSIST BRIGADES NEWSLETTER
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Advise and Assist Br igades Newsletter
Table of Contents
Introduction 1
Secur ity Force Assistance Background
The U.S. Ar my Approach to Secur ity Force Assistance
BG Edward P. Donnelly, Col. Mike Redmond, and MAJ Bill Torrey
3
Oper ation New Dawn: Building a Long-Ter m Str ategic Par tner ship
Through Stability Oper ations
GEN Raymond T. Odierno
9
Combat Advising in Ir aq Getting Your Advice Accepted
LTC Thomas A. Seagrist
13
Advise and Assist Br igade Ar ticles
Security Force Assistance Operations Defning the Advise and Assist
Br igade
COL Philip Battaglia and LTC Curtis Taylor
23
Sustainment in the Ar mys Fir st Advise and Assist Br igade
LTC David Wilson
31
Taking on the Advise and Assist Mission: The Closer s
Dennis Steele
37
Team Ninewa Models Successful Civilian-Militar y Unity of Effor t
Mark Schapiro and MAJ Stephen Petzold
41
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED
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Center for Ar my Lessons Lear ned Advise and Assist Br igade Obser vations and
Key Leader Inter views
Key Leader Inter views: Advise and Assist Br igades Strengths and
Weaknesses
Center for Army Lessons Learned
45
Lessons of the Day: Advise and Assist Br igades
Center for Army Lessons Learned
55
Advise and Assist Br igade Oper ations 4th Br igade, 3r d Infantr y Division,
Al Anbar Province, Ir aq
LTC John Hoefert
75
Center for Ar my Lessons Lear ned
Director COL Thomas H. Roe
Plans Chief Lar r y Hollar s
CALL Analyst Mike Star k, CALL Contr actor
Editor Michael G. Brooks
Gr aphic Ar tist Dan Neal, CALL Contr actor
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Introduction
The following collection of articles and lessons learned are primarily focused on security force
assistance and the employment of the advise and assist brigade (AAB) concept. As a result, the
predominant focus is on operations in Iraq, although some articles provide overarching guidance
on the combat-advising mission in general that could pertain to most theaters. The decision to
augment a brigade combat team with additional personnel to perform the security assistance
mission by forming externally resourced transition teams is a relatively new concept designed
to facilitate partnering with host-nation security forces and enhance unity of effort. Iraq presents
a unique challenge to U.S. Army forces in terms of geography, culture, economic, political, and
security dimensions. Training the host nation forces to provide protection and security for their
unique and diverse population is one of the most important aspects of our counterinsurgency
strategy. To accomplish this task, the profciency, integrity, and loyalty of the host-nation
security forces is essential to a countrys national survival. The goal of the AAB concept with its
augmented stability transition teams is to make sure this happens.
These articles cover a range of issues discussing combat advising and the AAB mission, with a
specifc goal of sharing best practices and lessons learned. The articles should not be considered
as all-inclusive. This is an effort to capture relevant articles published in recent professional
journals and from the Center of Army Lessons Learned (CALL) and other joint archives to
inform Soldiers on relevant observations, insights, and lessons and provide a historical document
for future reference.
In many instances, the ideas presented in these articles are personal opinion and, in some cases,
not approved Army doctrine. The recommendations in these articles should always be validated
with the latest approved Army and joint doctrine.
CALL acknowledges and thanks the professional journals and authors who permitted the
reprinting of these articles and, in some instances, helped in the fnal formatting. Minor
modifcations to format were made by CALL editors to support the CALL newsletter format. In
some instances, pictures not referenced in the narrative were deleted to save space. Additionally,
biographies were eliminated to avoid release of personal information.
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The U.S. Ar my Approach to Secur ity Force Assistance
BG Edwar d P. Donnelly, U.S. Ar my; Col. Mike Redmond, Br itish Ar my;
and MAJ Bill Tor rey, U.S. Ar my
Reprinted with permission from the NovemberDecember 2010 issue of Military Review.
As the U.S. military looks ahead to the frst half of the 21st century, several global trends
globalization, technology availability, population growth, urbanization, increased resource
demands, climate change, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are shaping the
international security environment. They place increasing stresses on governments to satisfy
their citizens legitimate expectations, including meeting their basic needs, receiving fair and
impartial justice, and attaining increased prosperity and opportunities for themselves and their
progeny. Governments unable to satisfy these aspirations risk losing their ability to govern. This
loss creates opportunities for extremist groups to export terror and violence on behalf of radical
ideologies. Ultimately, it becomes a setting for persistent confict.
Persistent Confict
Protracted confrontation among state, non-state, and individual actors increasingly willing to use
violence to achieve their political and ideological ends remains the likely strategic environment
through the frst half of the 21st century and possibly beyond. Anticipated strategies for an era of
this persistent confict suggest that U.S. forces will have four major tasks:
Prevail in the current confict.
Deter, and if necessary, defeat enemies in future conficts, including defense of the
homeland.
Support civil authorities at home and abroad.
Engage with partner nations to build the capacity of their security forces; in concert
with other elements of national power, build the capacity of their governments and gain
their cooperation in operations across the spectrum of confict.
While partner engagement has long been a part of national strategies, the United States has only
episodically relied on its military forces to play signifcant roles in this fourth task. Because
of the conventional military threats, the level of international stability ensured by competing
superpowers, and a low extremist group threat, the U.S. military did not put much effort
into persuading partner nations to build their security forces capacities. However, with the
heightened threat extremist groups pose to regional and global stability, the U.S. military must
accept this role. Because the threat is persistent, the response must be persistent.
Persistent engagement is a protracted effort, in concert with other elements of government, to
build the capacity of partner nations to secure their territory and govern their population, and
to gain their cooperation in operations across the spectrum of confict. Accomplished largely
through security cooperation efforts to build partner capacity and relationships, persistent
engagement is crucial to success in persistent confict. The military is the primary instrument to
build the capability of other nations military forces and institutions by providing security force
assistance (SFA). The military has supplementary roles assisting other agencies efforts to build
partner nations governance capacity. It also helps those agencies develop their own capacity to
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assist other nations. Security cooperation, including SFA, increases the cooperation of partner
nations in operations across the spectrum of confict.
Secur ity Force Assistance
Security force assistance is the combination of activities to build the capability of foreign
security forces and their sustaining institutions. SFA is a task military forces conduct in
coordination with, supported by, or in support of other agencies, as part of stability operations
across the spectrum of confict.
1
Security force assistance also frequently contributes to building
relationships, which, among other things, provides political support for military operations and
government or security force capacity-building efforts. The Army approach to SFA has fve
components:
Demand.
Supply.
Preparation.
Execution (including assessment).
Sustainment.
Demand. Geographic combatant commands establish and articulate demand. They set it forth
in their theater strategies to achieve end states of security and stability within their areas of
responsibility, in accordance with guidance from the secretary of defense in his guidance
for employment of forces. Department of Defense processes validate, prioritize, and direct
geographic combatant commands demands.
Army service component commands develop theater campaign plans to execute geographic
combatant commands assigned responsibilities and achieve operational effects.
2
Army service
component commands, security cooperation organizations, J oint Force commanders, theater
special operations commands, and Department of State country teams coordinate plans within the
area of responsibility.
3
They may also develop operational or institutional demands to include in
the Army service component commands plans. The country team, for example, is a likely source
of demand for military assistance to other agencies governance or economic capacity building
plans.
The Army service component commands plans set forth requests for assistance articulated in
the form of capabilities required to achieve effects. The Department of Defense validates and
prioritizes the requests and directs the military services to provide individuals, units, equipment,
capabilities, and programs to the Army service component commands to meet the requests. Upon
direction to provide assistance, the Army determines how to supply the requirement. The two
sources from which the Army can draw are the operating force and the generating force.
Supply. When using operating forces to fll a demand, Army special purpose forces will
frequently be the frst and best choice. Organized, trained, and equipped to conduct small-unit
operations, possessing regionally focused language and cultural skills and foreign internal
defense training, Army special purpose forces are ideally suited for employment in the most
common SFA tasks involving small, adaptive, and short-duration packages required for capacity
building at the individual and small organization levels. When unique or niche capabilities
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are also required, general purpose forces or small tailored organizations can be attached to the
special purpose forces unit for the duration of the mission. Army special purpose forces can
operate with a less visible footprint, making them ideally suited for many SFA missions, because
the nations most likely to need SFA assistance often do not want their populations to know they
asked for it.
When the demand for operating forces exceeds the supply of special purpose forces or when
special purpose forces are not best suited for the mission, the Army will most likely task a
general purpose forces brigade to provide the assistance. The Army has 302 modular general
purpose forces brigades, including 73 maneuver brigade combat teams (BCTs) and 98
multifunctional support brigades. The Army used maneuver BCTs in Operations Iraqi Freedom
and Enduring Freedom (and now Operation New Dawn) to build Iraqi and Afghan security force
capacity. Lessons from these deployments so far indicate that the brigade is a viable basis for
large-scale SFA to build capacity at the individual and unit levels. The planning, command and
control, and sustainment capabilities inherent in a general purpose forces brigade headquarters
enable the brigade to plan, execute, and sustain larger, more complex, more varied, and longer-
duration SFA missions.
The brigades modular design enables the Army to organize it for the SFA mission with
individuals, organizations, and capabilities from special purpose forces, other general purpose
forces, and even generating force organizations. The more the stated demand articulates
the desired effects of the SFA mission and the earlier it is received, the more likely it is that
the general purpose forces task organization will contain the best blend of capabilities for
the mission. The brigade can organize elements of the required size and skill sets for each
mission, and it can provide sustained assistance across multiple locations using its internal
staff capabilities. Host nation facilities or specifc logistic capabilities from across the parent
formation can support the deployed teams logistically, depending on the environment.
Specialized units can augment the formation, while organic units can adapt to meet unique
mission requirements. The brigade contains a broad range of experience. An average brigade
combat team, for example, has over 250 commissioned offcers and over 1,000 NCOs of sergeant
rank and above, providing a large base of trainers and advisors.
When generating forces fll a demand, the Army will normally task an Army command to
develop an appropriately sized capability package to deliver the desired effect, or organize
the package around Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) or direct reporting unit
staff elements. Other generating force elements can contribute individuals, organizations, or
capabilities. If threat conditions require protected transportation and security, or the task requires
a signifcant support structure, operating forces may contribute to the package, as well. If it is
necessary to equip foreign security forces, the Armys Materiel Enterprise should determine
the best way to supply the assistance. Options include the Foreign Military Sales program,
authorized high priority direct sales, declaration of excess defense articles, and temporary
loans. When a specifc program best meets the demand International Military Training and
Education, for example the generating force will supply the required assistance.
Prepar ation. Once a source of supply has been identifed for a demand, the individuals,
organizations, capabilities, equipment, or programs prepare for execution.
When the source is special purpose forces, Special Operations Command will task an
appropriate element and request augmentation, if required, from the general purpose
forces or the generating force. HQDA will task accordingly.
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When the source is general purpose forces, Forces Command will task the appropriate
organization in line with the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process and
request appropriate special purpose forces or generating force augmentation for HQDA
tasking.
The ARFORGEN process enables progressive preparation for any assigned mission by allocating
resources to organizations, which build readiness through three sequential phases Reset,
Train-Ready, and Available. Regardless of the organization sourcing the requirement, the
matching of supply to demand should occur as early as possible in the ARFORGEN process
ideally before the end of a units Reset phase. During the Train-Ready phase, units receive
individuals, organizations, capabilities, training, and any special equipment required for the
SFA mission. The 162d Training Brigade, collocated with the J oint Readiness Training Center
(J RTC) at Fort Polk, Louisiana, is the primary instrument to assist in these integration activities.
The brigade provides mobile training teams and on-site instruction to develop individual
and collective skills and facilitate the scheduling of relevant language, regional and cultural
awareness education. The integration of SFA training within J RTC and other combat training
centers (CTCs) using special role players and mission-specifc scenarios provides additional
opportunities for collective unit preparation. During this Train-Ready phase, units coordinate
with Army service component commands, country teams, offces of defense cooperation or
coordination, and regionally focused special purpose forces to enhance mission preparation and
regional orientation.
Region-specifc teams, including regionally focused foreign area offcers, will work with the
162d Brigade to help the deploying unit translate theory into specifc situational practices. The
teams may deploy with SFA units to improve language profcient, cultural awareness, and long-
term continuity. They also provide lessons from deployments to update and refne SFA training
syllabi and help develop scenarios and assessments for specifc geographic areas. Although the
generating forces tasked with SFA do not operate on an ARFORGEN cycle, they are able to take
advantage of the 162d Brigades clearinghouse and tailorable training support capabilities.
Execution. Properly prepared individuals, organizations, capabilities, equipment, and programs
are available to execute SFA during the ARFORGEN Available phase. Army service component
commands assess the effects of SFA during and after its delivery and adjust plans and future
requirements accordingly.
Special purpose forces-sourced SFA, coordinated with the country team, takes place under the
operational control of the theater special operations command and, if appropriate, the special
operations command-forward in the country.
Generating force-sourced SFA is under the operational control of the Army service component
commands and coordinated with the country team and, if appropriate, the local security
cooperation organizations. The Army service component commands may choose to delegate
control of smaller or less complex SFA missions to the security cooperation organizations or
even to the Defense or Army attach.
Generating force-sourced SFA delivered to foreign nonmilitary security forces and institutions
(e.g., national police, intelligence services, local police) is under the operational control of the
Army service component commands in direct support of another federal agency. The Army
service component commands would either be assisting with military-unique capabilities or
augmenting them with military capabilities adapted to a civil purpose for limited periods, usually
when surge conditions exceed the capabilities of the federal agencies.
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Equipment and associated training provided to foreign security forces is under the operational
control of the Army service component commands, although the commands normally delegate it
to the security cooperation organizations.
Recently added to each Army service component commands staff is a 20- to 23-person security
cooperation division, the focal point for all SFA-related planning, execution, and assessment.
The security cooperation division is the primary coordination point between the Army service
component commands and country teams, security cooperation organizations, geographic
combatant commands staffs, region-specifc Special Operations Command elements, and HQDA.
In addition to being the Army service component commands major developer of SFA demand
requirements, the security cooperation division assists units assigned SFA missions and assesses
their effectiveness in SFA activities.
Sustainment. The anticipated strategic environment of the 21st century requires SFA missions
of signifcantly greater frequency, duration, and scope than those in the latter half of the 20th
century. The Army must adapt its force management institutions to sustain SFA efforts and make
them as much a part of its core competencies as the ability to conduct major combat operations.
The Armys enterprise approach will help it achieve balance between sustaining existing
capabilities to prevail over conventional military adversaries and institutionalizing the changes
necessary to enable sustained SFA efforts. Enterprise approach leaders are empowered to take a
holistic view of Army objectives and resources and act cohesively to provide trained and ready
forces and capabilities effectively and effciently. The two core enterprises most important for
sustaining the Armys ability to conduct SFA are the Human Capital and the Materiel Enterprises.
The Armys Human Capital Enterprise trains, educates, and develops Soldiers and leaders
who understand the importance of SFA in the context of the national strategy. It makes Soldier
participation in SFA-related activities part of the Soldiers permanent record. Continuous
review of skill requirements enables the Army to adjust and maintain adequate inventories of
appropriately skilled individuals in both the active and reserve components. One example is the
plan to feld an additional 100 foreign area offcers (10 percent increase overall and 25 percent in
the critically affected specialties) by converting an equivalent number of generalist billets by FY
2012.
Army doctrine is another part of the Human Capital Enterprise. After the publication of FM 3-0,
Operations, both FM 3-07, Stability Operations, and FM 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance, were
refned for building partner capacity. Future revisions will refect continued evolution of thinking
as lessons are learned and concepts honed.
Army training systems have also kept pace with the increased need for SFA. The TRADOC
Culture Center at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, is one example of adapting to the need for greater
cultural awareness to support SFA. The establishment of a force modernization proponent for
SFA at the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is further evidence of the
Armys move to institutionalize its ability to deliver SFA.
In addition to supporting the Soldiers who undertake SFA, the Human Capital Enterprise builds
partner capacity. When an SFA effort focuses on a foreign security forces institutions, the
Human Capital Enterprises force management element meets the requirement. It also provides
the International Military Education and Training program through which partner nation service
members attend U.S. Army schools.
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The Armys Materiel Enterprise is the primary generating force element maintaining and
sustaining the equipment and materiel of a foreign security force. The Foreign Military Sales
program provides equipment to foreign security forces. Loans, donations of excess defense
articles, and encouragement of fedgling foreign nation production capabilities are also important
means to build capacity, as are sales or donations by partner nations conducting complementary
SFA activities. The Materiel Enterprise ensures equipment is available for foreign security forces
and that supporting institutions are able to maintain it.
Conclusion
The Armys approach to providing SFA nests within the security cooperation concept of
persistent engagement to minimize enemy opportunities within an era of persistent confict. The
Department of Defense validates, prioritizes, and directs combatant commander requirements
to ensure the Army makes the best use of its operating and generating forces for SFA. Both
special and general purpose forces prepare and employ individuals, organizations, equipment,
and programs to build the capability and capacity of foreign security forces and institutions.
Organized with tailored assistance from operating and generating forces, prepared, trained,
and regionally-aligned through the ARFORGEN cycle, and under the operational control of
Army service component commands, brigades are the key component of this concept and the
primary instruments for delivering SFA. The second key component is building foreign security
force capacity at the institutional level through the employment of individuals, organizations,
equipment, capabilities, and programs from the generating force.
This SFA concept is suffciently versatile and agile to meet fuctuations in demand. It also
allows the Army to maintain a balanced force capable of full spectrum operations to execute the
balanced strategy our Nation requires.
Endnotes
1. This defnition of security force assistance is adapted from Department of Defense Instruction 5000.68 on
SFA. It differs slightly from defnitions in Army Field Manuals (FMs) 3-07 and 3-07.1 and from defnitions in
J oint Publication (J P) 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense, previous draft DODI, and papers on SFA fundamentals.
These differences are not stark and represent the continuing evolution of thinking regarding SFA and its objects.
Capacity as used in this article is shorthand for capability (the qualitative ability to do something) and capacity
(the quantitative amount of that capability the force can do).
2. This article uses the term ASCC to refer only to the six geographic Army commands: U.S. Army Europe, U.S.
Army Central, U.S. Army Pacifc, U.S. Army Africa, U.S. Army South, and U.S. Army North.
3. A Security Cooperation Organization (SCO) is responsible for planning and in-country management of U.S.
security cooperation programs, including security assistance. These offces have a number of names, including
Offce of Defense Cooperation, Security Cooperation Offces, Offces of Defense Coordination, Military Assistance
Advisory Group, Military Group, Military Training Mission, etc. Combined Security Training Command-
Afghanistan (CSTC-A) is a Security Cooperation Organization, as was Multinational Security Training Command-
Iraq (MNSTC-I), which is now United States Forces-Iraq, Advising and Training (USF-I (A&T)).
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Operation New Dawn: Building a Long-Term Strategic
Partnership Through Stability Operations
GEN Raymond T. Odierno
Reprinted with permission from the October 2010 issue of ARMY.
The U.S. presence in Iraq, now into its eighth consecutive year, is undergoing a signifcant
transformation as emphasis shifts towards fostering a long-term strategic partnership between
the United States and Iraq. Rather than disengaging from Iraq, the United States is shifting focus
from a military-led to a civilian-led presence in order to transfer the skills and expertise that
will enable Iraqis to unleash their countrys great potential. Correspondingly, U.S. Forces-Iraq
(USF-I) has conducted a change of mission, ending Operation Iraqi Freedom and commencing
Operation New Dawn on September 1, 2010. As its name implies, Operation New Dawn marks
the beginning of a new chapter in the U.S. militarys endeavor in Iraq. Through the end of 2011,
USF-I will focus on conducting stability operations to achieve our national goal of a sovereign,
stable and self-reliant Iraq.
Stability operations encompass the military component of our national strategy to address
security threats spawned by the failure of nation-states to meet the basic needs and aspirations of
their people. The goal of stability operations is to provide the foundations for enduring peace by
securing the population, rebuilding government and economic institutions, providing essential
services and restoring a sense of normalcy. For USF-I, stability operations are defned by three
critical tasks: (1) advise, train, assist and equip the Iraqi security forces (ISF); (2) support
provincial reconstruction teams, the United Nations and other nongovernmental organizations
in their efforts to build civil capacity; and (3) conduct partnered counterterrorism operations
and provide command-and-control and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance combat
enablers to help the ISF maintain pressure on extremist networks. Guided by our bilateral
agreementsthe security agreement and the strategic framework agreementUSF-I is enabling
the Government of Iraq (GoI) to become a self-reliant strategic partner that contributes to peace
and security in the region.
Since the ISF assumed control of security within the cities on J une 30, 2009, overall security
incidents in Iraq have continued to decline, reaching the lowest levels since 2004. All forms
of violenceincluding improvised explosive devices (IEDs), indirect-fre attacks and civilian
casualtieshave decreased from 2009 levels. The signifcant improvement in the capabilities of
the ISF, coupled with their improved public perception, paid great dividends during the March
2010 national elections, when record numbers of Iraqis exercised their right to vote. Through the
period of uncertainty and vulnerability surrounding the elections, the ISF validated their role as
an apolitical arm of the government, loyal to the Iraqi Constitution and not to a single candidate
or political party. With the elections behind it, Iraq is now poised for a peaceful transfer of
power while the newly elected politicians work to build consensus on the nature of the new
government.
The continued progress of the ISF and improvements in the security environment allowed
USF-I to deliberately reduce our force structure to 50,000 servicemembers on September 1,
as outlined by the President. During the surge, the coalition force consisted of more than
170,000 personnel spread out over 600 bases. Since then, USF-I has withdrawn more than
120,000 servicemembers, returned more than 500 bases to the GoI, and retrograded more than
40,000 pieces of rolling stock wheeled vehicles and nearly 2 million pieces of non-rolling stock
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containerized equipment. Over the last two years, USF-I has quietly but deliberately conducted
the largest redeployment of personnel and equipment while simultaneously conducting
operations since the Vietnam War.
As we make the transition to stability operations, the most important change to the composition
of our forces is the shift to advise and assist brigades (AABs). USF-I is currently organized
into six AABs with an additional AAB headquarters element, which fall under three division
headquarters covering northern, central and southern Iraq. The AAB is an evolution of the
brigade combat team concept, specifcally tailored with additional personnel, equipment and
training for the express purpose of conducting stability operations. In line with the change of
mission, our AABs are primarily focused on partnering with their ISF counterparts and building
civil capacity, yet they retain the combat power necessary to defend themselves and their
interagency partners.
As we have reduced our force and changed our mission, our troops have also continued to evolve
their mind-set. In the current operating environment, our troops understand that their success is
no longer dependent on how much they accomplish, but on how much they enable their Iraqi
counterparts to accomplish. Rather than focus on offensive and defensive operations, USF-I
servicemembers now concentrate their efforts on further professionalizing the ISF and helping
U.S. Embassy-Baghdad (USEMB-B) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) build civil
capacity.
As the ISF have taken the lead in day-to-day security, our forces have focused on improving
the capability and capacity of the ISF. Throughout Iraq, our AABs are working shoulder to
shoulder with members of the Iraqi army and federal police to build advanced capabilities such
as precision targeting, intelligence fusion and counter-IED operations. USF-I servicemembers
remain integrated in ISF units and regional operations centers in order to observe and advise
their planning methods and improve upon command and control. USF-I special operations
forces continue to conduct partnered counterterrorist operations in order to secure the population
and disrupt violent extremist networks. Our AABs are using the expertise of their embedded
law enforcement professionals to improve Iraqi police investigative techniques, including the
collection and analysis of forensic evidence. In the northern region of Iraq, U.S. forces conduct
combined checkpoints and operations as a part of our trilateral security agreement with the
GoI and the Kurdistan Regional Government in an effort to ease tensions and build trust and
confdence. USF-I senior leaders also interface with the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of
Defense in order to develop their administrative and budgetary capabilities. With the emergence
of a noncommissioned offcer corps and an institutional acknowledgement of the importance of
logistics and sustainment, the ISF are clearly developing into a modern force.
Under Operation New Dawn, USF-I is supporting provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), the
United Nations and NGOs in their efforts to build civil capacity. Currently, USF-I is executing
more than 60 medical engagement programs within population centers across Iraq. These
engagements feature the refurbishment and reopening of clinics, the supply of medical aid, and
the provision of emergency medical technician training. In addition, our AABs are partnering
with PRTs to invest in vital infrastructure using Commanders Emergency Response Program
funds. By utilizing the expertise of PRT specialists in conjunction with various ministries of
the GoI, USF-I personnel are supporting many important civil-capacity initiatives such as
the construction of plastic greenhouses and irrigation systems that extend the growing season
and allow Iraqi farmers to grow crops where they normally could not. Furthermore, USF-I
is continuing to use targeted microgrants to spur sustainable economic growth and provide
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employment opportunities for aspiring entrepreneurs. Our humanitarian and capacity-building
engagements are coordinated and conducted through the ISF, which improves their relationship
with the Iraqi people. As a result of the goodwill garnered through these activities, the Iraqi
populace has provided valuable atmospherics and intelligence, information that several years ago
would have required considerable effort and risk to obtain. These examples of USF-I stability
operations demonstrate how our AABs are remaining engaged with the Iraq population and
setting the conditions for a long-term, strategic partnership with Iraq.
The Way Ahead
Future improvements in Iraqs security environment are dependent on the Iraqi governments
ability to provide security, uphold the rule of law and deliver basic services. The ISF have come
a long way but still rely on USF-I for combat enabler support. USF-I and senior Iraqi leaders
have worked closely to determine the minimum capabilities required to sustain and establish
foundational capacity for internal and external security. Through the end of 2011, USF-I must
continue to advise, train, assist and equip the Iraqi security forces to ensure they meet these
goals. In addition, USF-I will assist the ISF in establishing goals and plans to begin the transition
to police primacy, which will entail the Ministry of Interior and Iraqi police assuming full
responsibility for internal security. This will allow the Ministry of Defense and the Iraqi army to
focus on training to deter or defeat external threats.
As we approach the expiration of the security agreement at the end of 2011, USF-I must
manage the strategic transition of responsibility for enduring programs, projects and activities
necessary for the long-term stability of Iraq. USF-I and the USEMB-Bs charter is to set
conditions conducive to establishing an enduring strategic relationship with the GoI as outlined
in the strategic framework agreement. The U.S. governments plan to make the transition from
a military-led to a civilian-led presence in Iraq is outlined in the J oint Campaign Plan. As we
carry out the transition to a civilian-led effort, USF-I must continually assess our effectiveness
at the macro and micro levels. Our goal is to ensure that enduring programs are transferred
in time to allow USF-I elements to monitor, assess and support those organizations assuming
responsibility. The strategic transition plan is not simply the passing of responsibility from
USF-I to the GoI, USEMB-B and U.S. Central Command, but a whole-of-government approach
that sets the conditions for a long-term strategic partnership between the United States and the
GoI. As we move forward, the American presence must pursue a strategic partnership through
close cooperation across the spectrum of government functions to help Iraq succeed and play a
constructive role in regional stability.
With the end of the military mission in sight, USF-I must remain vigilantour actions through
the end of 2011 will set the tone for our long-term strategic partnership. USF-Is presence
through 2011 provides the physical and psychological support necessary for the GoI to continue
along its current trajectory as the United States makes the transition to a civilian-led presence.
USF-I now faces an opportunity to solidify the progress that has been made over the past seven-
and-a-half years. We must fnish with honor and success to pay tribute to all the Soldiers, Sailors,
Airmen, Marines and members of the Coast Guard who have served and sacrifced to bring
peace and security to Iraq. They are the best that our country has to offer, and it is thanks to their
adaptability, ingenuity and dedication that we have come this far.
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Combat Advising in Ir aq
Getting Your Advice Accepted
LTC Thomas A. Seagr ist
Reprinted with the permission from the MayJ une 2010 issue of Military Review.
In the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, small teams of advisors (e.g., military transition
teams, national police transition teams, police transition teams, border transition teams, and
embedded training teams) advise, coach, teach, and mentor host nation security forces. They
also provide situational awareness for host nation units, helping to shape the operational
environment through their counterparts. As coalition combat forces begin to draw down in Iraq,
advisory assistance brigades are replacing them. Our Nations future conficts will require adept
professionals for this crucial advisory mission. Therefore, the U.S. military needs to examine
the scope of the advisory mission and determine the methods of effective advising required for
mission success.
The nascent democracies in Iraq and Afghanistan need strong, professional militaries and self-
policing and self-learning internal security forces. At the national policy level, these forces must
support the host nation constitution and the duly elected members of the national, provincial,
and local governments. Said another way, they need military leaders who will not instigate a
coup at the frst sign of trouble. At the unit level, these nations need soldiers who can defeat their
enemies, while learning from setbacks and successes. This article strives to defne the advisory
mission, show a snapshot of advisor reality, set forth some tenets of combat advising, and
identify measures of effectiveness to shape the training of future advisors and the expectations of
coalition force commanders.
Prerequisites: Having the Right Stuff
From 2006 through 2009, these advisor teams trained at Camp Funston at Fort Riley, Kansas,
and deployed to the theaters of war as needed. Soldiers, from the rank of staff sergeant to colonel
and from a wide variety of military occupational specialties, served as combat advisors, for
approximately 15 months, including their training. However, the training at Camp Funston,
seemingly excellent at training advisor survival skills, misses the mark on teaching the fne art of
actual combat advising. As one advisor put it, Camp Funston taught us to survive. The Madain
(a rural district in Baghdad Province) taught us to advise.
1
Training at Camp Funston is a mix of Soldier common tasks, collective combat skills training,
counterinsurgency (COIN) theory, language and culture training, and team building. The school
house hones combat lifesaver, individual and crew-served weapon, communications equipment,
and operator HMMWV maintenance skills. Counterinsurgency is taught as a combination of
lectures and readings from counterinsurgency classics such as David Galulas Counterinsurgency
Warfare: Theory and Practice, J ohn A. Nagls Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, and U.S.
Army Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency.
2
Language and cultural training involve classroom
instruction, presented through a variety of media and concentrating on the specifc language and
area where the team will be employed. Leader Meets training exercises are staged scenarios
with role players from the targeted language and culture-simulating situations that U.S. military
advisors may encounter on the battlefeld. The course ensures that all deploying advisory team
members have the requisite skills to survive in Iraq and Afghanistan.
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Oddly, though, teaching future advisors the art of how to advise takes up very little training time,
lending credence to the idea of learning to advise while on the job. Many advisors literally learn
the craft through trial and error while doing it. As the reader can imagine, this leads to a wide
variety of results. Many advisors have returned from deployment completely frustrated by the
experience and demoralized about the missions overall chance of success. Yet, others return
with a tremendous sense of accomplishment. What, we might ask, causes some advisors to return
fulflled, and others disenchanted?
Partner Units
In Iraq, advisor teams advise host nation security forces in order to help build a sustainable,
professional military or policing capability that can provide security for the Iraqi people, defeat
the insurgency, and secure the nascent democracy. Coalition force combat units are partnered
with Iraqi units towards the same ends. All three are engaged in the day-to-day struggle of
counterinsurgency. Depending on the location in Iraq, this can mean:
Operating static checkpoints.
Conducting cordon and searches.
Governing humanitarian aid missions.
Performing command and control.
Sustaining units.
When time allows, initial and sustainment training of all military occupational specialties
and the vital staff functions for these combat units is necessary. In this environment with the
perceived overlapping tasks of advising and partnering, who is responsible for the maturation
and professionalization of the host nation forces? Who does what to whom, and how and when?
Without question, coalition advisors and partner coalition-force units are involved with the
continued professionalization of the Iraqi Security Forces. Understanding the difference between
advising and partnering is critical to the success of both missions: despite how we use the terms
advise and partner with, the two are not the same.
Advising versus Partnering
For most of us, the most common partnership experience is marriage. Two people involved
in a marriage have, or should have, the same or combined goals, whether the goal is putting
food on the table, putting a roof over their heads, or raising a family. In a perfect world, this is
a partnership of equals, who share the burdens and rewards, examine and discuss challenges,
and reach decisions together. In the context of unit-to-unit partnerships in Iraq, partnership
translates into combined planning, combined training, and combined decision making,
followed by combined execution. Although the coalition force partner unit shares in the goal of
professionalizing the host nation security force unit, its frst mission is to defeat the insurgent and
secure the Iraqi people.
Just like in a marriage, success or failure in counterinsurgency often hinges on the quality and
quantity of communication. An advisor, however, is not a partner in a marriage. An advisor
provides advice, often requested, sometimes not. In this sense, he is more like a sibling, close
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friend, or even a marriage counselor. Siblings and friends want to see the success of their loved
ones, but they often do so as onlookers, without the shared goals and associated burdens and
rewards of partners. They may provide advice along the way, but ultimately the success of the
relationship is the responsibility of the two parties involved. In advising, what separates the
advisors role from that of the partnered coalition force unit is his relationship to the host nation
unit. The advisor is not an owner of ground. He does not fght counterinsurgency in an
assigned sector. He is concerned with his host nation units performance in the counterinsurgency
fght and he is concerned about the health of the partnership, but the advisors primary mission is
the professionalization of the host nation unit.
The Tenets of Combat Advising
Advice for Advisors: Suggestions and Observations from Lawrence to the Present, is a book
given to prospective advisors headed for Iraq and Afghanistan that provides insight into the
challenges of combat advising.
3
Two consistent truths about combat advising jump off the books
pages time and patience.
Being there all the time. Time is so critical to advising that without the proper investment of it,
the mission is surely to fail. A resolute investment of time is necessary to:
Assess the unit and its personnel.
Build trust and a personal relationship producing opportunities for honest and open
discussion. Understand problems faced in the partnership or host nation unit and by key
leaders and soldiers.
Ask many questions, and patiently and attentively listen to the answers.
An advisor must maximize the amount of time he spends with his counterpart. The best way to
do this is through constant physical proximity. My personal experiences demonstrate the power
of this method.
Upon arrival in Iraq, our team was assigned to advise the 35th Mechanized Brigade, part of the
9th Mechanized Division. The brigade headquarters was in an abandoned hotel in Salman Pak,
Iraq. Our predecessors lived at Combat Outpost Cahill on the other side of town and commuted
to work. Our team also took up residence at Cahill. Despite recognizing the need to live with
the 35th Brigade in its headquarters, and invitations to do so by the brigade commander, for a
variety of good and bad reasons, the team was never able to move into the hotel. The immensity
of this mistake became clear fve months later when the team was reassigned to advise the 9th
Division at its headquarters on Al Rasheed. In this case, the team did live on the Iraqi base, and
the benefts of doing so were immediately apparent. To be certain, there are many other factors
involved, but without question, physical proximity with the host nation unit and its leaders and
especially shared living quarters make a huge difference in mission success or failure.
The advisor must share a joint domicile with the host nation unit he is advising. By physically
being present there, the advisor is:
Able to learn the daily patterns of his counterpart and recognize anomalies.
Exposed to the good, the bad, and the ugly of the host nation unit.
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On call when his counterpart asks for him.
Able to ft in as a member of the team and adopt the battle rhythm of the host nation
unit instead of attempting to force battle rhythm change for the sake of convenience.
A phone call just will not do. Effective advising requires the individuals to look each other in the
eye, observe body language, share light moments as well as business moments, and in so doing,
establish trust. An advisor must share the risks in combat by accompanying his counterpart at
every opportunity. An advisor who is not willing to share dangers in combat with his host nation
unit may as well go home. Without getting to know the individual in this environment, the
advisor will never be able to recognize those rare and elusive opportunities when real advising
can take place.
The advisor must measure and mitigate risks as he lives with his counterpart. One such risk is
the challenge of physical security for the advisory team. Other risks range from sanitation to the
potential that a host nation soldier may turn his weapon upon the advisors. Advisors can mitigate
these risks through due diligence, establishing an advisor compound within the host nation base,
a solid base-defense and internal-communications plan, basic buddy team rules, and, perhaps
most important, making friends and building trust at all levels. Our team adopted the philosophy
of force protection with a smile. Making friends and establishing sound, military working
relationships with your counterpart, his subordinates, and the common soldiers of the host nation
unit goes a long way toward advisory team security. Your friends are far less likely to kill you
than your enemies, and very likely to warn you in advance of trouble that is brewing. Although
it seems paradoxical, risk actually decreases the longer the advisor team lives among the host
nation unit.
Another risk is that of advisory team members going native. This does not refer to the often-
heard complaint about advisors allegedly lowering standards. Wearing your counterparts
unit patch, adopting his daily work and rest cycle, and growing a mustache (or a beard in
Afghanistan) are all useful steps to build relationships, so there is no easy way to guard against
going native. Be aware of its possibility and watch for warning signals.
A sure sign that an advisor has gone native is when his counterparts success begins to matter
more to him than the success of his own mission, professionalizing the host nation unit. The best
way to guard against going native is for the advisor to let the host nation unit fail, provided it is
not catastrophic failure. (The host nation unit leaders can learn a great deal from some setbacks.)
Despite the numerous risks associated with the advisor mission, the real risk to mission success
is in failing to invest the resources required to allow the advisor to maximize his time by living
with his counterpart. Time is the main ingredient in the establishment of any relationship; it
takes ample, quality time for the advisor to build the trust with his counterpart that permits
accomplished advising to occur. Thus, time is a tenet of combat advising. Patience is another.
Patience: Getting to the Point
Patience is hard to have when the situation appears dire. Yet patience is one quality the advisor
needs in abundance. Imagine the advisor has a crucial need to reinforce checkpoint security near
a polling site just prior to an important election. Every leader in his chain of command is telling
him to make it happen. The advisor can demand or manipulate his counterpart into reinforcing
the checkpoint. Everything from bribery through gifts of various classes of supply to threats
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of cutting off supplies already provided, can force compliance with coalition-force desires. If
the advisor has already invested the time to develop rapport and trust, he can make such demands
at crucial times without upsetting the relationship, but if he has not, then making demands will
almost certainly damage the relationship, often beyond repair. Coalition force commanders
must keep this in mind as they ask advisory teams to force compliance. The coalition force
commander may get what he wants in the short term, but it may come at the cost of permanently
damaging the advisory mission. It is far better to exercise patience and fnd a way for host nation
unit leaders to understand the why and the how of a mission in order to have a lasting and
meaningful impact.
Patience also means not pointing out every single weakness the host nation unit has all at once.
After all, military offcers of all nations have pride. An overly critical advisor may so damage the
relationship he has with his counterpart that the counterpart comes to loathe having the advisor
present. The advisor that passes quick judgment is very likely to set conditions for his own long-
term failure.
A recent study of combat advising noted that most advisors and their Iraqi counterparts felt that
it took one to three months to build an effective working relationship.
4
Even after trust and
rapport are established, the exercise of patience, to wait for opportunities, is still a critical aspect
of advising. One thing that helps is to fnd commonality of interest between the advisor and his
counterpart. Whether it is history or ping-pong, the advisor can fnd something that he has in
common with his counterpart that can start conversations. Several hours of small talk may
eventually lead to 20 minutes of Army talk. When opportunity strikes, the good advisor makes
that 20 minutes the most productive 20 minutes of the day. Patience is indeed a tenet of combat
advising.
Advising Methods: Making It Their Idea
Combat advising is as varied as the individuals and units involved. Attacking the problem of
getting a host nation military leader to do what you require, while making him think that it is his
idea, is far easier to say than to do. Some advisors try to convince their counterpart in a debate
of ideas. This is often a losing proposition because the counterpart has more actual or perceived
experience and usually outranks the advisor by one or two grades. Most military professionals,
regardless of the country they serve, are type A personalities. They do not rise to the position
of command without being that way. So how does an advisor get that type of person to do
something and make him think it was his idea to do it?
Asking Questions: Providing Advice without Giving It
One of the best ways to shape the advising environment is to ask many questions. Asking
questions about the unit is natural in the assessment phase. The advisor must ask questions to
fll in his gaps of knowledge about the host nation unit and its leaders. Questions also aid the
combat advisor in discovering how his counterpart thinks, processes information, and turns
discovery into action. Asking questions is also a means to allow the host nation counterpart to
learn on his own. Shaping a conversation using planned and artful questions can set the stage for
opportunities to provide advice. For example, if munitions smuggling is a problem in the host
nation units operational environment but the host nation commander has not taken steps to deter
or prevent it, it may be because he does not know that it is occurring or he feels powerless to stop
it. He will likely not admit that he is powerless to prevent it, which would be admitting failure.
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The advisor may already have some suggestions, but advice given directly may cause the host
nation commander to lose face or crush his confdence. Even worse, he may take the advice just
to placate his advisor but without learning the why of the situation. The advisor may get what
he wants but without the long-term beneft of increased professionalism. Better to ask a series of
questions that allow the counterpart to internalize the situation. Asking How are the insurgents
getting munitions into this area? can be followed up with a question such as What do you think
can be done about that? Asking the right series of questions can aid in the learning process,
shaping the conversation so the host nation commander teaches himself, and subsequently takes
ownership of the problem and the solution.
Asking questions also helps the advisor avoid one of the worst things a combat advisor can do,
make a comparison between his Army and the one he is advising. There are many differences
between the U.S. Army and those we advise. Our technology is greater, weapons are better,
soldier education is far more advanced, and the supply chain has a much greater capacity.
Pointing these out, however, will not endear the advisor to his counterpart.
Asking questions also helps avoid assigning blame. The strengths and weaknesses of offcers
in any Army stand out, particularly the longer one is around them. Making off-hand remarks
about a given offcer or noncommissioned offcer in the host nation unit is not going to solve the
problem. For starters, the advisor may not realize the true strengths and weaknesses of a leader.
He may also be unaware of long-standing personal relationships between host nation offcers or
with tribal or familial relations. Making disparaging remarks may erode the relationship that the
advisor is establishing.
Ultimately, asking questions, many questions, can lead the advisor and his counterpart to work
in tandem toward lasting solutions to tactical and organizational challenges. Asking questions,
whether to avoid pitfalls or to shape a conversation, often leads to individual learning, host
nation leader ownership of their problems, creative and lasting solutions, and a professional host
nation unit.
The Approach: Direct, Indirect, and Mixed
The direct approach and the indirect approach are two methods of combat advising. As the
titles imply, one is straight to the target and the other is by varied paths. Both are effective, and
perhaps most effective when applied together. However, deciding which approach to use depends
on the relationship between advisor and counterpart, the maturity of the individual host nation
leaders, and the maturity of the unit.
The direct approach. The advisor, using questions to shape the conversation, is advising his
counterpart man-to-man. If the counterpart is new to the job and has yet to establish trust in
his subordinates or his staff, this may be the best and only approach available to the advisor.
However, the advisor should not anticipate immediate results, for if the counterpart is indeed new
to his command, his relationship with his advisor is also likely immature.
The indirect approach. In this approach, the advisor plants seeds in the mind of his counterpart
by means of the advice of the counterparts subordinates or staff offcers. This presupposes
that the advisor or advisory team has established functional, trusting relationships with the
subordinates. It also presupposes that the commander is willing to listen to them. It helps if the
advisor knows which subordinates his counterpart trusts and with whom he has an existing solid
professional relationship.
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Direct and indirect approaches. The best approach to combat advising is a blend of both the
direct and indirect approaches. For example, assuming the advisory team has the rapport it
needs to plant ideas within the host nation staff, the advisors can, over time and with experience,
begin to predict when the staff will present those ideas to the host nation unit commander. The
senior advisor can then make sure he is in the room when the subordinate presents the idea, so
he can reinforce concepts, provide color commentary if required, and ensure that the ideas are
presented to the commander. He must remember the tenets of time and patience. The advisor
must make the time to be there and he must exercise patience to allow the host nation staff the
time to present their ideas.
The advisory team must exercise patience in letting the seeds germinate. Our team discovered
that two weeks is often required for a seed of an idea planted with the staff to reach the
commander, and another two weeks for the commander to act upon that idea. That may appear
terribly ineffcient and too slow for combat operations, and in many cases, it is. However, the
patient application of a mixture of direct and indirect approaches will likely yield lasting results
that empower the host nation unit. The more often this approach is used, the more likely the lag
time will shrink from planting to sprouting to sustained growth.
Advising through Obser vation
In a language-hindered environment, host nation soldiers and leaders observe their coalition
force partners closely. Observation is an often overlooked method of advising and a powerful
tool to promote learning.
For example, coalition force soldiers in Iraq wear kneepads to protect their knees from the
sustained impact of taking a knee on patrol or the sudden whacks experienced inside tactical
vehicles. In non-tactical situations, soldiers often slide the kneepads down around their ankles for
comfort. Therefore, while on patrol with an Iraqi unit we observed an Iraqi soldier wearing three
kneepads. One kneepad was applied correctly to the knee that he was using to take a knee during
temporary halts. The other two were worn around his ankles. There is no way he could have
learned this through communication. He learned it through observation. He had seen so many
coalition force soldiers wear their kneepads in this fashion that he assumed it was what right
looked like.
This lesson applied to combat advising often leads to excellent results, but requires coalition
force partner involvement. One such example is the quarterly training brief. Our team felt
that its counterpart commander could beneft from a similar tool. Opportunity knocked when
the coalition force partner unit was conducting its normal quarterly briefng. Arranging an
impromptu visit to that unit provided a chance opportunity for observation learning. The
host nation unit commander sat alongside his coalition force partner commander while he was
receiving a quarterly training briefng. During the course of the briefng, discussion ensued
between the commanders regarding why the event was important to the readiness and health
of the organization. The host nation commander participated by asking questions. The advisors
never said a word. Within a few weeks, the advisors walked in on an Iraqi quarterly training brief
in progress. This eventually became a regular practice in the unit. The host nation commander
had his subordinate battalion commanders present status briefs so that he could better
understand the health and challenges of his subordinate units. Observation is a powerful tool
for the advisor to wield. The advisory team and the coalition force partner unit should always
make sure that they present the appearance and behavior of professional military offcers and
noncommissioned offcers.
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Measures of Effectiveness
How does an advisory team or coalition force partner unit know when and if it is being effective
in professionalizing a host nation unit? Metrics are useful, of course; items that can be measured
provide the most useful data. However, they do not tell the whole story and can be misleading.
The metrics most often used by professional militaries worldwide are status reports on personnel,
vehicle and equipment availability and readiness, maintenance days required for repairs,
and personnel trained and qualifed for certain skills. This data is a snapshot of health in an
organization. What these metrics do not tell the advisor is cause.
Discovering causes for increases or decreases in effciency is the art that goes with the science.
For the combat advisor this is often made harder by the fudging of host nation unit reporting
systems, outright lying, perceived or real corruption, and errors in language translation. There are
also some areas of professional growth and maturity in a host nation unit that simply cannot be
measured.
Early on, our team set a goal of professionalizing the noncommissioned offcers in our host
nation unit. After many months of assessing the problem, we determined that the problem
was a matter of empowerment and confdence. The senior noncommissioned offcers of this
organization knew what they personally needed to be successful as individuals and as a group.
Many of the junior noncommissioned offcers, however, did not know what right looked like. The
senior noncommissioned offcers were routinely frustrated in any attempts to fx this problem
independently. The most-often stated reason for this was that their commissioned offcers did not
let them tackle the challenge. However, when we asked the commissioned offcers why they did
not utilize the noncommissioned men more effectively, the answer was often that they lacked
confdence in them.
A problem of this magnitude, and with so many entry points, required the entire advisory teams
participation. Slowly, over a period of months, little signs became apparent that the message
was soaking in. Then, one day at a command and staff meeting, the advisory team noticed
the host nation unit command sergeant major sitting at the table with his boss. He did not
have a speaking role, but the visual signal was enough, and it sent a powerful message to the
subordinate commanders and staff at the table. The boss was signaling his confdence; he had
empowered his senior noncommissioned offcer with a seat at the table. Immediately following
this event, other signs of success started to emerge. The unit established a noncommissioned
offcer-led leaders course to impart knowledge from senior noncommissioned offcers to junior
noncommissioned offcers. Noncommissioned offcer development programs in subordinate units
started to appear. Noncommissioned offcers began leading training. The tipping point was the
seat at the table.
Metric evidence provides concrete measures of readiness. However, these metrics can be
dangerous as the sole measure for success or failure. Advisory teams and coalition force partner
units must invest time, exercise patience, use the power of questioning and observation, identify
and use the appropriate approaches, and look for signals that indicate whether the advisory effort
is working.
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Emer ging Specialties
The U.S. Army devotes considerable time and resources to the development of combat advisors.
As advisory assistance brigades take the lead in Iraq, training U.S. Soldiers how to be successful
advisors becomes even more critical. The current effort, although preparing advisors to survive,
falls short at developing competent and confdent combat advisors. Similarly, commanders of
coalition units receive little to no introduction to combat advising and therefore possess poorly
conceived expectations of what advisors can do for them in the context of partnership.
On-the-job training costs valuable time. Expanding combat advisor education to include
interpersonal skills training, the art of asking questions, and observation and listening skills
will aid in their development. Learning how to master patient behavior through education and
practical exercise must be part of the curriculum. By synchronizing effort and using a targeting
cycle, with the host nation unit as the target, the coalition force unit commanders expectations
will be better managed. Enabling advisors to live with their host nation unit will maximize the
time advisors have to put these skills into practice.
Combat advising and partnering are related specialties emerging in our military profession.
Specialties are characterized by a foundation in doctrine, continuing education from a certifed
practitioner, and an investment of time and resources. J ust as we educate teachers, counselors,
and consultants, we can educate advisors and partner unit leaders in the skills required to execute
this mission successfully.
Endnotes
1. J eremy Dobos, S2/G2 advisor, 35th Brigade, 9th Iraqi Army Division Military Transition Team, 2008-2009.
2. David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Praeger Security International, Westport, CT,
2006). J ohn A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam
(University of Chicago Press, IL, 2005). U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (University
of Chicago Press, IL, 2007).
3. Robert D. Ramsey, III, ed., Advice for Advisors: Suggestions and Observations from Lawrence to the Present,
Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 19, Combat Studies Institute Press, Fort Leavenworth, KS.
4. Christopher E. Phelps, Michelle Zbyut, and J ason Brunner, Selecting and Training U.S. Advisors: Interpersonal
Skills and the Advisor-Counterpart Relationship, unpublished.
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Secur ity Force Assistance Oper ations:
Defning the Advise and Assist Brigade
COL Philip Battaglia and LTC Cur tis Taylor
Reprinted with permission from the J ulyAugust 2010 issue of Military Review.
Over the past six years, the U.S. Army has shown an extraordinary ability to adapt to
the evolving environment in Iraq. As the fght shifted from combat operations, to a brief
peacekeeping operation, to classic counterinsurgency, the Army has had to profoundly adapt
its tactics, structure, and most importantly, its mind-set for each phase of the operation. Our
shortcoming has often been our inability to adapt fast enough to the changing operating
environment. The implementation of the security agreement in J anuary 2009 and the ensuing
agreement to move out of major cities have heightened Iraqi nationalism and the desire to assert
their sovereignty. Once again, the Army is in a period where rapid and widespread adaptation to
U.S. force mind-set is imperative to safeguard recent gains. Understanding the nature of this new
environment and then anticipating the changes to doctrine, tactics, and mind-set required is the
preeminent challenge facing our deployed and deploying forces. Defning this change in mind-
set, Secretary Gates stated in a 2007 address to Army leaders that Arguably, the most important
military component in the War on Terror is not the fghting we do ourselves, but how well we
enable and empower our partners to defend and govern their own countries. The standing up and
mentoring of indigenous armies and police once the province of Special Forces is now a
key mission for the military as a whole.
1
As U.S. forces gradually hand over security responsibilities to the host nation, success becomes
less about what we can achieve than what we can encourage and promote our host nation
partners to achieve. The doctrinal framework for this type of approach is Security Force
Assistance Operations. Field Manual 3-07.1 defnes security force assistance as the unifed
action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host nation, or regional security forces in support
of a legitimate authority. This article offers some insights and lessons learned from one brigades
experience while conducting a security force assistance-type mission in southern Iraq between
2008 and 2009.
In J une 2008, the 4th Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 1st Cavalry Division, arrived at Contingency
Operating Base Adder in southern Iraq and assumed responsibility for a temporary operating area
that encompassed three provinces previously controlled by British forces: Muthana, Dhi Qar,
and Maysan. All three were under provincial Iraqi control and, because of the British focus
on Basra, had seen very little coalition force presence in the past two to three years. Maysan in
particular was rife with violence and lawlessness. Due to the unique political and geographic
limitations of operating across three provinces about the size of South Carolina, our brigades
main effort from the outset was to improve the effectiveness of the Iraqi Security Forces already
present in the region. The lack of any tangible sectarian strife in Southern Iraq also helped to
make this effort possible. In essence, 4th Brigade Combat Team started its 12-month campaign
as a security force assistance force and maintained that focus for the duration of the deployment.
Performing the mission of a prototype advise and assist brigade (AAB), 4th BCT developed
operational partnerships with the 10th Iraqi Army Division and its four maneuver brigades, three
provincial police forces, and the 11th Brigade of the Directorate of Border Enforcement. Over
time, 14 externally sourced transition teams augmented 4th BCT, dramatically enhancing our
ability to partner with the Iraqi Security Forces.
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Team leaders quickly discovered that security force assistance requires a different mind-set and
focus from the traditional counterinsurgency mission of previous tours. We could no longer
defne our success by the number of insurgents we detained or the local populations sense of
security. Rather, the quality of the host nation security forces we left behind ultimately defned
the success of our campaign. The brigade learned many hard lessons conducting these operations
in southern Iraq.
One important caveat to remember is that this is one BCTs experience in one corner of Iraq
for a brief and evolving period of history. Because of the lack of sectarian violence in southern
Iraq, we could rely on the Iraqi Security Forces to secure the population in ways that may not
be applicable to Baghdad, Mosul, or Kandahar. With that in mind, we list 16 principles, gleaned
over a year of operations that we offer to help defne the new environment for units training for
this unique mission.
1. The AAB is a mission, not a Modifed Table of Organization and Equipment
(MTOE).
2
The modular BCT design is six years old and has demonstrated its success in two wars
and virtually all forms of combat operations. The brigade combat team is an agile, fexible
organization that provides a diverse toolbox of complementary skills, weapons, and organizations
that a commander can use and adapt to specifc missions. Our experience in southern Iraq
has shown that the modular BCT is the right organization to form the core of security force
assistance operations in Iraq. When properly augmented with senior level advisory capability,
this organization can simultaneously train and mentor large host nation formations while
protecting and sustaining itself in a hostile territory. The inherent fexibility of the BCT allows
it to shift from security operations to counterinsurgency to major combat as the environment
evolves during the deployment. We believe that discussions to develop a custom-designed
advisory force structure to replace the BCTs are moving in the wrong direction. With the proper
training focus and enabler augmentation, the BCT structure has the built-in fexibility to perform
any mission assigned. There is no need for wholesale force structure redesign.
2. Security force assistance requires full spectrum tactical profciency.
In April 2009, 2-7 Cavalry executed a combined arms live-fre exercise with partnered elements
of the 38th Iraqi Army Division. This exercise employed Iraqi helicopters, artillery, and mounted
and dismounted forces with Air Force and Army aviation synchronized in a live-fre offensive
scenario. The purpose of the exercise was to demonstrate the Iraqi Armys growing deterrence
capacity and increase the interest in full spectrum training. Planning, training, and executing this
complex live-fre exercise required every bit of tactical and technical expertise that 2-7 Cavalry
could draw upon. Master gunners laid out surface danger zone diagrams and battalion staff
offcers worked their execution checklists just like they would preparing for the live-fre breach
through Drinkwater Valley at the National Training Center. This exercise fully tested battalion
and BCT profciency at basic major combat operations Mission Essential Task List activities. The
lesson learned was that we must maintain our ability to conduct full spectrum operations. In the
security environment, you cant teach what you dont know. As Iraqi forces grow in maturity,
they increasingly perform both population security and traditional deterrence operations. The
U.S. forces that train these forces must be profcient in full spectrum operations to perform their
security mission effectively and to be prepared to shift to major combat operations should the
operational environment unexpectedly change.
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3. Under standing the Ir aqi secur ity bureaucr acy is essential.
The decisive mission during security force assistance operations is developing the host nations
security infrastructure. This infrastructure forms the conceptual terrain upon which the U.S.
forces conduct their operations. A detailed understanding of the host nation security bureaucracy
is as important to mission success as knowing the terrain in traditional combat operations. The
Iraqi security bureaucracy has expanded rapidly over the last six years, and the Army has not
kept pace with the changes. The Phoenix Academy and recent Center for Army Lessons Learned
publications on the Iraqi and Afghan force structures are good frst efforts but we need more
detailed and current information. We struggled to learn the complex relationships among entities
such as the Iraqi Provincial Police, National Police, Border Forces, Port of Entry Directorate,
National Intelligence, and the like. Within the Iraqi Army partnerships, our logisticians tasked
with teaching effective sustainment operations had to sort out how the Iraqi system worked
as they went along. Teaching a U.S.-centric process does not help host nation forces. Units in
training to conduct these missions should learn as much as possible about host nation systems
and processes prior to deployment. Embedded transition teams can assist in this effort by
providing the most current information.
4. Key leader relationships are the tactical center of gr avity in secur ity force
assistance oper ations.
In May 2009, an unfortunate Iraqi fatality during U.S. combat operations in a neighboring
province received wide media coverage and generated considerable hostility against coalition
forces. Partners we had worked closely with for months immediately declined to support any
future combined training or operations. Fortunately, relations improved after a relatively short
period, and we realized the importance of a positive relationship with Iraqi Security Forces
leaders. Without that strong relationship, we would have been unable to complete our mission.
Those relationships were our tactical center of gravity. In post-deployment interviews we were
often asked, How much of your time was taken up in relationship building? The question
implies that relationship building is a distraction or, at best, a critical housekeeping duty. In
security force assistance operations, relationship building is the mission. A commanders most
valuable contribution to his unit is a productive and mutually trusting relationship with his host
nation counterpart, because it is the foundation for the units partnership.
5. Tr ansition teams and par tnered units have complementar y and mutually
suppor ting roles.
As we transitioned to security force assistance operations, we were often asked the question, If
all your leaders in the brigade are doing advisory duty, what are the other 4,000 Soldiers doing?
The answer is that an advisor and the partnered unit perform complementary and reinforcing
roles (Figure 4-1). As we integrated our transition teams into our formations, the importance of
these separate and reinforcing roles became apparent to us. Soldiers perform advisory duties at
all levels. An advisor spends time embedded in the host nation unit, observing their processes
and decision making and offering assistance or expertise where appropriate. However, the
advisor does not have access to combat enablers and lacks the staff to organize large training
events or demonstrate what right looks like. This is the role of the partnered unit. On any given
day, our brigade had hundreds of Soldiers training or mentoring security force partners across
every BCT functional area. Figure 4-1 depicts some of these training events and the daily force
protection and sustainment duties of a brigade operating across three forward operating bases
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and eight joint security stations. This work was more than suffcient to fully employ the brigades
Soldiers each day.
Company Commanders Course
Combat Lifesaver Train the Trainer Course
Rife Markmanship Training
Bomb Disposal Training
Mortar Training
Route Clearance Academy
Vertical Construction Academy
HUMINT Operator Course
Border Fort of Excellence Training
Vehicle Checkpoint Training
Police Investigator Training
Forensic Evidence Training Course
Maintenance Training
Warehouse Operations Training
Figure 4-1. Some of the tr aining events executed by 4BCT as par t of
secur ity forces assistance oper ations.
6. For advisor s, talent is par amount, access is second, and r ank is thir d.
Most of us appreciate the value of talented and capable advisors to the security force assistance
mission. However, we often overlook the importance of access. To maintain credibility and
infuence, an advisor must demonstrate his ability to produce resources. Even the best advisor
will not retain his infuence for long if he depends solely on the value of his own sage advice.
Host nation security force leaders are astute observers and quickly recognize that both resources
and power fow through the ground maneuver chain of command. To retain his credibility
and relevance, the advisor must demonstrate he has a close and reliable relationship with the
maneuver commander. For this reason, we attached our Iraqi brigade military transition teams
directly to the maneuver battalions responsible for those brigades. Not only did this give the
maneuver battalion commander direct control over his own main effort, but it also eliminated a
redundant chain of command. As expected, battalion commanders took great care of the teams
they owned and integrated them into their security force assistance mission. This relationship
also worked well because brigade-level advisors were majors who ft neatly inside an existing
battalion structure.
7. The frst step of every battle drill is to call the local host nation security forces.
On 20 January 2009, insurgents fred a rocket at Contingency Operating Base Adder. A Q36
radar detected a point of origin inside dense urban terrain. We dispatched a patrol immediately,
and it was on site within 23 minutes. Within two hours, we had captured both rocket rails and
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a suspect from our top ten enemy list. This would have been a successful mission by most
traditional standards. What was truly amazing about the incident was that no U.S. forces entered
the city. Upon impact, brigade tactical operations center personnel passed the Q36 acquisition
to a combined command post at the Provincial J oint Coordination Center, which forwarded it
to the local police for action. The Iraqi forces in the city were well-led and motivated to prevent
the insurgents from using their neighborhoods as launching pads for attacks. We could rely on
them to be the action arm for our operations. They appreciated this trust, and we discovered we
could achieve great synergy by combining our technical intelligence capabilities (in this case,
counterfre radar) with their responsiveness and cultural intuition. Building on this success, the
brigade combat team eventually established three combined command posts within the Iraqi
Security Forces headquarters. These command posts enabled us to rapidly fuse intelligence and
maintain Iraqi and U.S situational awareness.
8. Effective tar geting star ts with intelligence shar ing between host nation and U.S.
forces.
Our frst step toward effective intelligence sharing was to overcome the institutional dogma that
classifed all high-value target lists as SECRET US Only. If our partner host nation security
forces are ultimately responsible for security in an area of operations, then we have an obligation
to share with them all releasable information about criminals operating in their area. We had
to educate ourselves and our leaders rapidly on the limits and constraints of foreign disclosure
operations. We discovered that under the security agreement, we had to share intelligence if we
expected to remain effective and relevant. Background checks and polygraphs for selected key
leaders within the Iraqi Security Forces enabled us to both disclose and release some classifed
material to these leaders. We had to move from a targeting model that brought U.S. and host
nation forces together only during the operational phase (combined operations) to a model that
embedded us in the Iraqi Security Forces targeting process from initial intelligence development
through capture, exploitation, and prosecution (combined targeting).
9. U.S. forces are often the glue that binds the host nation and inter agency together.
As Iraqi elections approached in J anuary 2009, it was essential that the Iraqi people saw their
own security forces establishing security for the elections. Our frst attempts to inspect security
preparations at polling stations misfred badly. It became clear to us that U.S. high mobility
multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) and body armor were counterproductive near
polling booths or ballot warehouses. However, we could make a tremendous contribution as
the honest broker bringing together Iraqi government agencies and provincial reconstruction
teams. Instead of inspecting polling stations, we hosted a bi-weekly meeting with all involved
agencies from the Iraqi Army to the police to the local representatives of the Iraqi High Electoral
Commission and provincial reconstruction team rule-of-law and governance experts. We created
the venue for the collaboration and then allowed the process to unfold as the Iraqis desired.
In this way, we discovered our unique position as the glue in the host nations interagency
process. We did not impose U.S. solutions on this process. Instead, we created the conditions for
interagency collaboration and problem solving.
10. The secur ity agreement represents the Ir aqi desire for dignity and sovereignty.
It is critical for every leader to understand the legal authorities and prohibitions in the security
agreement, but this alone is not enough. Leaders must understand and appreciate what the
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agreement means to the local population. The security agreement restores dignity to the Iraqi
people. It establishes limits to what a foreign army can do to Iraqis on their own soil. It has a
tremendously important psychological effect. So long as we fully comply with the agreement, the
Iraqi people perceive us as a protecting and stabilizing force rather than a threat to their honor
and dignity. This is why unilateral, time-sensitive raids, while often enormously successful in the
short term, so often generate long-term setbacks. Technical compliance is often not enough. The
local people must see and hear us deferring to the authority and the spirit of this agreement.
As an example of this, leaders in the brigade discovered that a midgrade Iraqi police offcer had
a Central Criminal Court of Iraq warrant issued against him for the murder of British soldiers
in 2003. Under the security agreement, we were well within our authority to arrest the offcer
and transport him to Baghdad to stand trial. When we presented the warrant to the local police
chief, he suggested that he provide an escort to travel with our forces and the offcer to Baghdad
to hand him over to the Iraqi court. In this way, no U.S. force ever had exclusive custody of the
suspect. This process allowed the police chief to show his commitment to the rule of law without
suffering the indignity of a foreign army arresting his offcer.
11. The host nation judicial process is the centr al component of tar geting.
Over the last six years, we have built a truly phenomenal intelligence architecture in Iraq.
From company support teams to fusion cells at divisions and corps, we created a process for
intelligence sharing that was light years ahead of where we were in 2003. However, the security
agreement and the emergence of an independent Iraqi legal system forced a fundamental
redesign of this system. While good intelligence is essential to anticipate and preempt
enemy action, it is often insuffcient to remove a hostile actor from the battlefeld. In todays
environment, we need more than good intelligence. We need evidence. Classifed source reports
are not enough to secure a warrant. The source must now present himself to an Iraqi judge and
provide a sworn statement admissible in an Iraqi court. Intelligence and targeting offcers now
need to become familiar with the articles of the Iraqi antiterrorism laws. Leaders must understand
the difference between the inquisitorial Eastern judicial system and the adversarial system
common to most Western nations. To help manage this transition, we made extensive use of law
enforcement personnel detailed to the BCT. With over 100 years of combined law enforcement
and prosecutorial experience, these seasoned offcers were tremendous assets to the S2s who
were trying to assemble district attorney-quality cases on suspects while also trying to predict
tomorrows rocket attack, all with a paltry fve-person staff.
12. No nation wants to see foreigners detain its citizens.
The security agreement provides a procedure for U.S. forces to detain Iraqi citizens under certain
circumstances. Our experience, however, uncovered a huge difference between what was legally
permissible and what was tactically and culturally appropriate. Regardless of the legal authority
we retained, most Iraqis understood the security agreement to mean that foreigners would no
longer arrest them. Unilateral arrest of an Iraqi citizen was seen as an affront. We found that it
was usually possible to recruit the assistance of a local host nation security unit to perform the
arrest and then deliver the detainee to an Iraqi detention facility where we had an established
relationship and a degree of access and oversight. The host nation jails then became our key
terrain. This was often where we did much of our intelligence collection.
The competency and availability of Iraqi investigative judges varies widely from location to
location, but most investigating judges were much more willing to order long sentences for Iraqi
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criminals when their detention and prosecution appeared to be an Iraqi-led process instead of an
American-led one. While we provided substantial support to host nation investigators as they
assembled their cases, it was important that the host nation led the affair and that the detainee
remained under host nation control throughout the process. Too many U.S. fngerprints on the
case often undermined the credibility of the process and led to a reduced sentence.
13. Rapidly exploit the infor mation component of enemy and fr iendly actions.
Westerners underestimate the power of the spoken word to shape the minds of host nation
populations. Rumors travel hundreds of miles in hours by word of mouth and cell phone. Bizarre
and implausible conspiracy theories can crop up on the most unlikely pretense and spread
across a province in an afternoon. Our forces must constantly and rapidly tell our story through
every available venue, including through host nation forces and their media. Anything likely
to generate buzz in the local community, from a school opening to an air strike to an enemy
rocket attack, requires an immediate information campaign to explain what just happened and
why. The best counterfre is often a timely press release. We must engage the host nation
media, local websites, public affairs offcers in local security forces, and any other prominent
opinion makers. They must be on our short list to call during a crisis.
14. Killing an insur gent, while sometimes necessar y, is usually counter productive.
The killing of enemy combatants is often a necessary component of warfghting and peacemaking
when local security forces are incapable of maintaining order. As the local forces become more
capable, however, the tactical value of an enemy kill drops precipitously. In a security force
assistance environment, the role of the advisory force is to enable the host nation forces to
secure their population and defeat the insurgents. Every time U.S. forces kill a local insurgent,
regardless of the circumstances, we aggravate a deep wound that often leads to revenge and
ultimately more violence. Killing insurgents was a necessary reality when sectarian violence
and lawlessness threatened to tear Iraq apart. As security conditions improve and the host nation
forces demonstrate growing capability, we should expect increased hostility and resentment
to U.S. unilateral operations. While tactical conditions may sometimes warrant violent action
against a hostile force, these actions usually prove counterproductive to long-term success and
can undermine security force assistance campaign objectives.
15. A cowar d is a better enemy than a mar tyr.
An insurgent who has fed his operational area to seek sanctuary elsewhere makes a mockery
of his cause and increases the freedom of maneuver for the counterinsurgent. When he hides in
his sanctuary, the insurgent no longer competes for the support of the population and becomes
irrelevant to the struggle. A dead or detained insurgent, on the other hand, often achieves the
status of a martyr and this encourages increased violence in support of the cause, particularly if
his fate came at the hands of an outside force.
Our goal should not be to capture or kill the enemy, but to render the enemy irrelevant by
whatever means available. Billboards, wanted posters, and targeted information operations all
help to create the image of the insurgent as a fugitive on the run instead of a leader of a noble
cause. Most important, effectively portraying the insurgent as a fugitive of the local security
forces can make him the enemy of his own people.
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16. Empathy is a combat multiplier.
Perhaps the best predeployment training is to sit for an afternoon with a thoughtful citizen of
a different culture. Our own Western narrative has so insulated us that we often fail to see how
other cultures perceive events. Not only do they see events differently, but our host nation
partners often pursue goals, strategies, and approaches that can baffe even the most culturally
attuned advisor.
We in the U.S. Army are fortunate to live in a relative meritocracy where we can reasonably
expect that the success of our unit or our mission will lead to our personal and professional
success. This is not the case in many other cultures particularly in the Middle East. Personal
loyalty and nepotism are enormous factors in these societies, and they shape the behavior of
leaders just as much as the mission-frst mind-set in our military drives our behavior. In order
to understand and infuence the behavior of these leaders, we must frst understand how they
perceive events and how they calculate their own prospects for success. Without this insight, we
often struggle to understand their behavior and grow frustrated with what we cannot understand.
Empathy, the ability to see and understand the world through the eyes of another, is perhaps the
greatest skill a leader can cultivate in the security force assistance environment.
Conclusion
The 16 insights we have listed above offer a perspective on the unique characteristics of security
force assistance operations as experienced by one brigade combat team, in one corner of Iraq,
for one short year. As we discovered, security force assistance is a fundamentally different
mission from traditional counterinsurgency operations and requires a shift in mind-set, focus, and
approach. Traditional counterinsurgency places the security of the population as the preeminent
goal. Security force assistance seeks the same end state but focuses instead on enabling host
nation security forces to achieve that security. In cases where the local forces lack the capacity
or motivation to provide basic security, then a more traditional counterinsurgency approach is
appropriate.
The challenge for todays leaders is to understand the human terrain in their assigned area well
enough to perceive which approach is appropriate. If conditions support a focus on security force
assistance operations, then the key metric of success is no longer criminals captured or networks
disrupted. In Security Force Assistance operations, the only real way to measure your success is
by the quality and capacity of the host nation security forces that you leave behind.
Endnotes
1. Taken from a speech by Secretary Gates to the 2007 AUSA convention on 10 October 2007. As quoted by Fred
Kaplan, Secretary Gates Declares War on the Army Brass, Slate Magazine, 12 October 2007, 2.
2. This principle is a direct quote from LTG Charles H. J acoby, J r., commanding general of I Corps and MNC-I
during an Operations and Intelligence update brief given by the authors at Forward Operations Base Garry Owen,
Maysan Province, in April 2009.
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Sustainment in the Ar mys Fir st Advise and Assist Br igade
LTC David Wilson
Reprinted with permission from the MayJ une 2010 issue of Army Sustainment.
The 4th Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 1st Armored Division, embarked upon its mission
readiness exercise (MRX) at the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California, in
J anuary 2009 fully prepared to execute counterinsurgency operations. But while at NTC, the
brigade received word that it would instead be deploying as the proof of principle for the advise
and assist brigade (AAB) mission.
The AAB Mission
The AAB is a natural evolution of the role of the BCT in a stability operations environment.
U.S. Soldiers now advise and assist Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), which include the Iraqi Army
(IA), Iraqi National Police, and Department of Border Enforcement. In addition to the AAB
mission, the 4th BCT would also be enabling civil capacity efforts of the U.S. Department of
State provincial reconstruction teams in the southern Iraqi provinces of Dhi Qar, Maysan, and
Muthana.
This bold shift in mission drew all leaders to look to this unifed action with a keen eye while
ensuring that it was nested across all operations. Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, defnes
unifed action as the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of
governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort.
Figure 5-1. Through their logistics tr aining and advisor y teams, br igade suppor t battalions
are responsible for assisting their Ir aqi par tner units. Militar y tr ansition teams are
responsible for advising those Ir aqi units.
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To facilitate the new mission, the brigade received additional personnel who were then embedded
with the ISF on Iraqi bases. Military transition teams (MiTTs), border enforcement transition
teams, port of entry teams, police training teams, and stability training teams rounded out the
brigade personnel, and the brigade aligned with supported Iraqi units to accomplish the advise
and assist mission.
Tr aining at NTC
The 4th BCT saw the change in mission as an opportunity to execute a nontraditional training
regimen that would set the conditions for success as it assumed the advise and assist mission.
The commander saw the implications of the mission and knew that all entities had to work
together effectively to achieve the campaign end state.
While at NTC, the brigade staff was given clear guidance by its commander, Colonel Peter
Newell, to work through two lines of effort: frst, to build civil capacity across the lines of
governance, essential services, economic development, and rule of law security; and second, to
advise, assist, and enable the ISF.
The 4th BCTs brigade support battalion (BSB), the 121st BSB, received this new focus for
the BCTs mission and saw sustainment crossing all lines of effort. This allowed the BSB
to stick with the fundamentals of requirements determination for operations and capabilities
reviews for the sustainment mission. As stated in FM 4-0, Sustainment, Successful sustainment
enables freedom of action by increasing the number and quality of options available to the
commander. The unfamiliar element of the battalions MRX was the partnership with the ISF.
As the staff worked through the concept, it sought assistance from NTCs Goldminer observer-
controller team. The Goldminer team was able to provide the BSB with instant feedback from
the Phoenix Academy at Camp Taji, Iraq. The battalion learned that Multi-National Security
Transition Command-Iraq was creating logistics maintenance advisory teams (LMATs) to work
in conjunction with the MiTTs to build the ISFs logistics capacity through training. This new
information prompted the BSB to analyze how it could become an enabler of this vital mission of
the sustainment warfghting function.
A critical step in the process was determining what the training requirements would be and if the
ISF had any process resembling a mission-essential task list. There were several unknowns, such
as the types of logistics units the ISF had, the status of their on-hand equipment, their on-hand
personnel status, and the organization of their logistics units. Without answers to these questions
initially during the MRX, the BSB focused its training on partnership, negotiation, and bilateral
engagements. This allowed the BSB staff to prepare the commander for key-leader engagements
and to work through the BATNA [best alternative to a negotiated agreement] and ZOPA [zone of
possible agreement] to be achieved by the engagements.
The role players at NTC who assisted in the training were from the Multi-National Division-
South region of Iraq. They served the BSB well by pressing for training of their forces, which did
not have adequate equipment, funding, and resources. One of the BSBs many lessons learned
was that U.S. units must let the ISF drive the training priorities and must coach them through
building capacity across all sustainment and combat health support functions.
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Deploying as an AAB
Following the NTC rotation, the 4th BCT attended the predeployment site survey (PDSS) and
gained further knowledge of the LMAT requirements that were being developed as well as the
Multi-National Corps-Iraq requirement for unit partnership in theater. This requirement stated
that BSBs were to partner with Iraqi motorized transportation regiments (MTRs) and forward
support companies were to partner with headquarters and supply companies of Iraqi Army
brigades.
After the PDSS, the BCT studied the information received during its visit with the 4th BCT, 1st
Cavalry Division, which transferred authority to the 4th BCT, 1st Armored Division, and took
time to develop its strategy for training and partnership. The strategy followed a crawl-walk-run
model, and the brigade looked at developing the training and partnership along three lines: train
the jundees (IA privates), train the trainer, and focus on joint operations.
Through fact fnding and the PDSS, the 121st BSB realized that U.S. military logistics is not the
same as ISF logistics. This allowed the battalion to focus on improving the ISF logistics posture
by getting ISF sustainment units to work effciently using their current system and not the U.S.
system. The ISFs lack of confdence in their system was immediately obvious. The BSB decided
to approach ISF training with the commanders model for support of the AAB, the TAPE [train,
advise, partner, and enable] model (see Figure 5-2).
Figure 5-2. Enabling Ir aqi par tner units consists of three
tasks: tr aining, advising, and par tner ing.
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The 121st BSBs logisticians had to break new ground in determining how to deliver instruction
that would build logistics capacity for the ISF. This effort started with an assessment of what the
previous partner unit had established. The 27th BSB, 4th BCT, 1st Cavalry Division, had made
great strides in embracing the embedded logistics MiTT as part of their team and had developed
a training plan that would set guidelines for the MiTT to follow in their engagement with the
MTR.
Much of what was being delivered focused on the individual training of Iraqi soldiers. This
served as a good foundation and laid the groundwork for the 121st BSB to train, advise, partner,
and enable.
The BSBs approach was to build on the actions already in place as it transitioned and moved
from training individual Iraqi jundees to the train-the-trainer mode. The train-the-trainer mode
gave the Iraqi partners the capability to deliver the instruction themselves, with coalition
forces providing advice on the delivery of the instruction or adjustments necessary to move the
instruction to a higher level.
The MTR commander used the BSBs feedback to develop his training priorities for subsequent
engagements. In essence, this allowed the ISF to pick the training that they were most interested
in receiving, based on the priorities of the MTR commander.
A big part in moving to the train-the-trainer mode was the establishment of the 121st BSB
logistics training and advisory team (LTAT). The LTAT was made up of senior noncommissioned
offcers (former drill sergeants, instructors, and linguists) and a unit commander providing
oversight to focus the training efforts and identify any future key-leader engagements between
the ISF and BSB commanders.
After a month of training with the ISF, the BSB could tell that the MiTT was the enhancer and
the BSB (through the LTAT) was the enabler. The MiTT relied on the BSBs training capabilities
to assist the MTR commander in achieving his training goals while the train-the-trainer efforts
and the push for partnership started to gain ground.
Joint Logistics Convoys
Success in this partnership was evident when the MTR commander provided ISF soldiers and
assets to partner with the BSBs sustainment replenishment operations. The MTR commander
saw the partnership as an opportunity to improve his own convoy operations.
Through good faith that developed from the relationship, the MTR began running joint logistics
convoys with the BSB. This effort was executed incrementally and started with the training of
ground and convoy commanders for moving commodities within the coalition force and ISF
logistics formation.
The commanders received instructions on troop-leading procedures, tactical convoy operations
(based on the 121st BSBs Convoy Leaders Guide), escalation of force, and sharing the road
(a method that prevents sustainment movements from impeding the highways that belong to
the Iraqi people). This training culminated with convoy leader certifcation for the ground and
convoy commanders and moved to the stage-setter phase of executing a logistics convoy.
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The joint logistics convoy process for the ISF and coalition forces was based on a 96-hour
timeline developed by the 121st BSB. The concept of operations developed at the brigade
logistics command post by the support operations section (future operations) and the mission
support order developed by the BSB S-3 section (current operations) set the conditions for the
ISF to receive the information needed to coordinate the joint operation.
The concept of operations also allowed the MiTT to track the IA headquarters planning once
they received the mission. The ground and convoy commanders attended the sustainment
synchronization meeting at the brigade logistics command post and ensured that the commodities
to be moved were on track as they began pre-combat checks and inspections for the mission set,
which often included KBR logistics assets within the convoy. This allowed the ISF to see the
critical synchronization and coordination that occurs before any 121st BSB convoy.
The time leading up to the joint IA and coalition force logistics convoy was coined the two
minute drill or the NASCAR pit drill by the BSB commander because of the intensity of the
operations. At this time, the BSB would quickly check the vehicles for maintenance needs or
have a quality control team inspect vehicles in the BSB motor pool. Critical staff sections, such
as the S-1, would verify manifests for the tactical convoy system, and the electronic warfare
offcer would ensure that all counter remote-controlled improvised explosive device electronic
warfare systems were in working order prior to departure.
Also during this time, the coalition force and IA convoy members would share a meal and
attend the BSB S-2s joint threat brief that centered on route-focused intelligence preparation
of the battlefeld and the convoy commanders convoy mission brief. Following all briefngs
and the fnal precombat checks and inspections, the coalition force, ISF, and KBR convoy
members would conduct a joint ground rehearsal to practice actions during movement, actions on
contact, actions at destination, and preparations for return. The rehearsals were completed with
BSB interpreters embedded in the ISF and coalition force formations (as they would be when
mounted) so that the BSB could ensure that the IA fully understood the mission to be conducted
as well as the tactics, techniques, and procedures for convoy operations.
After-action reviews from all stages of the partnership were provided to the MTR commander
and the IA division MiTT so that the ISF could set the priorities for future training. The reviews
also provided the MiTT with a good assessment of where the ISF partner was on the scale for
the operational readiness assessment a unit status report provided to the Iraqi Ministry of
Defense every month.
This sustainment mission in support of the AAB allowed 121st BSB logisticians to work with
Iraqi partners to build their capabilities for sustainment while supporting the 4th BCT in a
battlespace the size of South Carolina. Building the concept of support through sustainment
targeting meetings synchronized sustainment across the BCT and allowed the BSB to incorporate
contractors, ISF logisticians, and the BSBs organic sustainment platforms into its replenishment
operations.
Synchronizing sustainment while partnering with the ISF allowed coalition forces to model the
exact behavior the ISF wants to emulate. Those capabilities will endure long after the BSBs
mission is complete. Logistics is the muscle that enables the fst to strike!
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Taking on the Advise and Assist Mission: The Closer s
Dennis Steele
Reprinted with permission from the April 2010 issue of ARMY.
Like most missions, it started in the motor park and started early. J ust after dawn, a platoon
of military police (MPs) the missions security team milled around their mine resistant
ambush protected (MRAP) vehicles at Camp Marez outside Mosul, Iraq, waiting for the liaison
team to arrive and the patrols start time to tick down. Beefy engines idled throaty and low.
The brake system of a massive six-wheeled MRAP heaved like a steam locomotive as the air
compressor built up pressure and periodically purged the lines. The vehicle column created a
symphonic rumble diesel purr, hydraulic hiss.
This patrol was the frst time out for two advise and assist brigade (AAB) feld-grade offcer
augmentees who had just arrived in Iraq as members of the 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT),
3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized), augmented for the AAB mission the frst such augmented
BCT to be stationed in the U.S. Division-North (USD-N) area of operations. Maintaining a
combat structure like any other BCT that has been deployed in case direct assistance to the Iraqis
is needed, the brigade also is modeled to conduct the overall mission planned as the last phase of
Operation Iraqi Freedom: the wholesale shift to support, training and mentoring of Iraqi security
forces in preparation for steep reductions of U.S. forces this year and the United States full
redeployment at the end of 2011 the endgame.
LTC Dave Sanders commander of Task Force Shield, the security transition teams (STTs)
focusing on Iraqi police (IP) units (including regular IPs, the federal police and border security
forces) in the brigades area of operations and COL Eric von Tersch, the IP provincial team
chief, climbed aboard MRAPs and headed downtown for their initial meetings with Iraqi
commanders, a day-long series of introductions and talks to start understanding the situation
from the Iraqi point of view, learning the political undertones and working to gain the confdence
of their Iraqi counterparts.
Army and police STTs, directly assigned to the BCT and led by senior Army offcers under the
AAB model, take over liaison responsibility from military transition team (MiTT) and police
transition team (PiTT) units that have been deployed to Iraq for the past several years and
which were organizationally separated from the BCT command structure, providing their own
administration and support.
The STT structure fully integrates teams with the brigade, providing senior U.S. offcers as
fully dedicated lead advisors who receive from the BCT security assets and support along with
training teams or other enablers tailored to the needs of the Iraqi unit being assisted.
LTC Bryan Luke, deputy commander of the 2nd BCT, explained that the brigade was augmented
with 36 additional feld-grade offcers for the advise and assist mission, creating 18 STTs.
The brigade also has the mission to support the provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) in its
area. The PRTs are the second wing of overall U.S. support, providing assistance to the Iraqi
civil government structure under the U.S. Department of State while the STTs work with the
uniformed security forces.
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LTC Luke added that the brigades focus is the advise and assist mission, but the 2nd BCT
organization set is not completely structured as an advise and assist organization because of the
remaining possibility that Iraqi forces will need direct military assistance.
Were a hybrid because of the security situation [in northern Iraq], he said. Our goal,
however, is that when we leave, we can [conduct a relief in place] with Iraqi forces. We want to
work ourselves out of a job.
For U.S. units in Iraq, working themselves out of a job follows a strict force-reduction time line
and continuing mission shifts this year and next to meet goals set by President Barack Obama
and the provisions of U.S.-Iraqi security agreements. The job of advising and assisting Iraqi units
will shift from being a main effort to being the only effort.
To emphasize the changing role for U.S. forces in Iraq, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates
recently announced that Operation Iraqi Freedom will be renamed Operation New Dawn on
September 1, when current U.S. troop numbers are scheduled to be cut by half to between 50,000
and 55,000, tracking toward a complete withdrawal by the end of 2011.
For the AAB brigades and STTs, the mission is to set the conditions for the political end of the
U.S. presence in Iraq by putting maximum effort into ensuring that Iraqi security forces have the
ability to defend the country from internal and external threats.
The U.S. commitment to a successful conclusion in Iraq remains high. The Army continues to
deploy frst-line units to Iraq. The 3rd Infantry Division headquarters, for example, currently has
responsibility as the USD-N headquarters through the force-reduction period, with three of its
maneuver brigades deployed in northern Iraq. It is the fourth Iraq deployment for the 3rd Infantry
Division, which led the western wing during the invasion phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom in
2003, and it is ftting that the 3rd Infantry Division, having been the frst into Iraq, is one of the
units that will conclude the mission.
Along with the deployment of top combat units structured as advise and assist formations to see
the Iraq mission through, the Army is sending some of its best offcers to lead the STTs during
the fnal phases.
LTC Sanders described the STTs as liaison on steroids, composed of experienced senior
offcers. The Army has assigned command selectees to the job, putting the assignment on par
with battalion or brigade command and indicating the Armys commitment to and emphasis on
the advise and assist mission.
The frst BCTs to be beefed up for the advise and assist mission were rapidly augmented in the
months leading up to their deployment. STT members were selected from throughout the Army
and funneled into deploying brigades during the fnal training phases before deployment.
We had guys coming from Alaska, Korea, Germany and all over the States, said LTC Brian
Bricker, who commands the 2nd BCTs Task Force Sword, the STTs working with the Iraqi
army. Some had 60-day notice; some less.
Five of the 2nd BCTs teams were established within the brigade in time for its mission rehearsal
exercise at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, Calif.
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LTC Bricker said that integration of STTs and the advise and assist mission fully within BCTs
reduces frictions that were perceived in the MiTT and PiTT organizational structure, making
those teams largely autonomous from the brigade structure.
The STT seeks to integrate the objectives that the U.S. brigade commander wants to achieve with
the support that Iraqi commanders want to receive. Success pivots on furthering American goals
under Iraqi terms, however, because the Iraqis are in the lead, requiring STT offcers to see things
from the Iraqi point of view and temper assistance to ft their goals.
LTC Bricker said that U.S. support must avoid trying to impress American systems and methods
onto the Iraqi ways of doing things.
We have great systems, he explained. But we have to understand that they have systems, too,
and assistance doesnt mean making them in our image.
In addition to understanding the American and Iraqi security goals and environment, offcers
serving with STTs also must grasp the greater political environment in Iraq.
We have to understand the whole picture the politics at play within the Iraqi government and
how decisions made by the government of Iraq will affect this province to effectively assist
progress of the Iraqi security forces. We have to understand the drivers of instability to reduce
the causes and effects, LTC Sanders noted.
Its important and vital to have a strategic partnership with Iraq well into the future, he added.
And the relationship and partnership we start at this level will last well into the future. The goal
is to build enduring capacity in the Iraqi security forces.
Enduring capacity as it relates to the long-term goals of American military assistance goes
beyond hardware, weapons and operational competence. It addresses embracing organizational
values such as serving under elected-civilian political control.
We have a responsibility to mentor the armed services of Iraq to serve under rule of law, to be
the armed force that is obedient to civilian authority and defends a body of ideals as we do, said
MG Anthony (Tony) Cucolo, commanding general of USD-N/3rd Infantry Division.
As we are partnering, the general continued, we want to build their capacity to do things
themselves, and gradually wean them from us. Some of the key things we have to work on are
the niche capabilities that the U.S. has been doing like route clearance, [counter improvised ex-
plosive device measures, intelligence operations fusion], and assembling and executing a quick-
response force, which is moderately new to them. Thats agile command and control. Thats
empowerment of subordinates, and theyre just learning that now.
MG Cucolo said U.S. forces will continue to provide some enablers such as intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance assets, which will help buy some more time for the Iraqis to get
their legs under them.
Concerning the overall goals for the 3rd Infantry Divisions year-long deployment, MG Cucolo
said, Im shooting for an Iraqi population in northern Iraq that is confdent in their security
forces. Im shooting for a near-incident-free departure of U.S. forces and leaving and transferring
an absolutely solid relationship between the U.S. military and the Iraqi military and police a
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solid relationship that will grow into the kind of relationships we have with other nations with
Iraqi offcers going to the War College, going to the Command and General Staff College and
the like relationships that also lead to friendships that break down cultural barriers and myths
and misperceptions. I hope that we can contribute to the United States and Iraq being strategic
partners in this region.
Concerning the 3rd Infantry Divisions current deployment, MG Cucolo said, The fact that
were back a fourth time is a point of extreme pride, [and] I think what makes it most meaningful
is the mission we have: Were the closers for northern Iraq. Combat operations end with us. For
the soldiers in 3rd ID who kicked in the door and took down Saddams regime in 2003 to come
back and be the closers makes it much more meaningful, and we feel a responsibility to fnish it
with honor and success.
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Team Ninewa Models Successful Civilian-Military Unity of Effort
Mark Schapiro and MAJ Stephen Petzold
Reprinted with permission from Small Wars Journal online journal article,
21 October 2010: <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/team-ninewa-models-successful
-civilian-military-unity-of-effort>.
Over the past year within the restless province of Ninewa Iraq, the Team Ninewa concept
was born. This concept is a highly successful model of U.S. civilian-military cooperation that
resulted in an unprecedented unity of effort among the State Department and U.S. military
goals/objectives in the region. This unity of effort led to tens of millions of dollars in savings
on redundant projects and a highly effective use of Defense and State Department funding
streams targeted at very specifc local communities. Key to this strategy was thinking small
deprioritizing large infrastructure projects in favor of income-generating activities for neglected
economic actors among Ninewas myriad ethnic groups and business associations. Team Ninewa,
which consisted of TF Spartan (2nd Advise and Assist Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division), the State
Department-led Ninewa Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), and the Ninewa Reconstruction
Cell (NRC), all gathered around a table once per week to discuss, assess and de-confict all U.S.
government assistance and program spending in the province. For these meetings, the PRT was
the lead in articulating specifc U.S. policy and development goals for the province. TF Spartan
would communicate any specifc security related goals of the brigade and express any concerns
with the potential impact of PRT initiatives on security in the region. These de-conficted
objectives would then be communicated to the TF Spartan units for execution throughout the
province.
Our unifed goals were always based on a clear vision for the province: the vision of Team
Ninewa was to work in partnership with the Ninewa Provincial Government and local
associations to build economic and governance capacity at the provincial and local levels with
an end state of a legitimate, transparent, and representative government capable of delivering
essential services, fostering sustainable economic growth, respecting and bolstering rule of
law, and providing security for its people. The key Team Ninewa objectives to support this
vision were: 1) to coordinate and synchronize capacity-building efforts in association with the
Ninewa PRT Provincial Development Strategy and Maturity Model which were consistent
with established Iraqi provincial and local government goals and priorities; and 2) combine
civilian expertise and military reach into communities to thoroughly assess progress and review
programs to ensure that every effort remained consistent with U.S. policy and development goals
as expressed by the PRT.
The challenges in Ninewa to achieve this vision and objectives were, and continue to be,
tremendous. Ninewa Province is the most diverse and unstable province in Iraq. The Arab-
Kurd fault line that runs through it traps numerous vulnerable communities in an unresolved
political situation driven by decision-makers outside the province. For the purposes of economic
development and reconstruction planning, the Arab-Kurd line also represents a resource divide.
South of this line, mostly poor Sunni Arabs have endured four years of a crushing drought with
some modest relief from 20092010 rains, and have little agricultural, mineral or other resources
to draw from. North of the Arab-Kurd fault line, there is signifcantly more water, numerous
oil felds with ongoing exploration, suffcient winter supplies of kerosene due to imports from
the autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), and higher crop yield in winter
20092010. It is within this context that Team Ninewa continued to prepare for a responsible
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drawdown of United States military forces in 2010 and 2011 and lay the groundwork for long-
term U.S. civilian diplomatic engagement, slowly changing the face of the bilateral U.S.-Iraq
relationship and educating Iraqis about the peaceful civil affairs value that the military and PRT
can bring to the area of operation.
True sustainable economic development, however, cannot occur without political stability at
the local, provincial and national levels. Team Ninewas strategy was to develop programs
to build local Iraqi capacity and bridge resource gaps to create the conditions for a political
accommodation to occur. Economic and development programs alone though, cannot create
peace and reconciliation; they can, however, take some issues of contention off the table
and allow the Iraqi government to focus on the larger political solution. Without political
accommodation, many of our security and developmental efforts are simply an exercise in
building sandcastles at low tide. The alternating waves of security and insecurity in Ninewa
over the past six years are the best evidence of this. In this environment, what seems like a good
quick win idea may actually prove wasteful or harmful to longer-term U.S. interests if that
idea is not maintained, developed or expanded upon by local Iraqis. For example, paving a road
will help a community today but two or three years later when the road is in disrepair, locals will
point to it as an example of a negative U.S. legacy.
Given the political situation in Ninewa, it was critical that we focus creatively on local and
provincial Iraqi capacity to plan, manage and maintain projects as well as developing this
capacity at the local level. Programs consisted of Iraqi ideas and goals combined with U.S.
solutions and expertise, driven by the Department of State-led PRT with full support from TF
Spartan and TF Marne. Due to ineffective communication and a weak relationship between rural
Ninewa and Mosul and between Mosul and Baghdad, local Iraqis needed U.S. support to get
their own system to approve projects and assistance. This lent a governance component to every
economic, agriculture and security program in the province, reinforcing the need for the close
partnership, communication and unity of effort brought by the Team Ninewa civilian-military
model. This support came from USF or PRT key leader engagements (KLEs) at the local
level, in Mosul, and in Baghdad. Above all, if a program did not have signifcant interest and a
motivated Iraqi buy-in in the form of vision, fnancing, labor or supplies, the U.S. interagency
funding mechanism decided against supporting it through Commanders Emergency Relief
Program (CERP), Quick Response Funds (QRF) or other USG funding sources.
Included in Task Force Spartans mission statement was the directive provide support to the
PRT. Due to the effective working and personal relationships between the PRT and TF Spartan,
whatever Ninewa PRT needed, TF Spartan provided. In fact, an entire feld artillery battalion
was tasked by the brigade to provide direct support to the PRT. This support from the 1-9 Field
Artillery (FA) Battalion included dedicated movement teams, logistical support, communications
support, and staff augmentation for the PRT. As needed, 1-9 FA provided support to enable PRT
special requests, such as augmenting the PRT Elections Operations Center during the critical
March 2010 Iraq parliamentary elections with a fully operational tactical communications suite
which included multiple radios, Blue Force Tracker, and personnel to help keep track of election
observers and ballots. As required, TF Spartan also provides helicopter lift support, Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle (UAV) surveillance, intelligence updates, CERP funds, and CERP project packet
development. To insure that the Iraqi government and citizens saw all U.S. government actors
speaking as one, the brigade leadership participated in joint engagements with provincial leaders
through and with the Ninewa PRT. The days of the military meeting with the Mosul Mayor,
provincial councilmen, or governor without the PRT present were over. Most important to the
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U.S. UNCLASSIFIED
successful relationship between TF Spartan and the Ninewa PRT was the participation in each
others re-occurring meetings each others battle rhythms. This insured a level of transparency
which allowed for de-confiction of projects and programs between all the U.S. government
players in Ninewa, greatly enhancing unity of effort.
One of the frst events held between the PRT and TF Spartan was a series of meetings to refne
the PRTs Ninewa Provincial Development Strategy. The Provincial Development Strategy
(PDS) proposed a new function for military feld units. If capacity building and economic
empowerment were the new centerpieces of U.S. policy and development goals for Ninewa, then
military units should begin to de-emphasize traditional infrastructure assessments such as the
SWEAT (sewer, water, electric and telecommunications) assessments every Soldier is familiar
with and instead engage in human mapping to fnd and evaluate all local partners who
could develop and ultimately manage economic and governance programs. This broadened the
Team Ninewa contact base beyond the same small group of leaders we had been relying on for
years. This reliance over the years empowered some at the expense of others, creating economic
imbalance and growing resentment of the U.S. within certain areas of the population. Thus,
the frst task of any feld commander or civilian in Team Ninewa was to conduct a full human
inventory with names and contact information of local NGOs (non-governmental organizations),
womens organizations, economic and agricultural associations, media outlets and local business
leaders. The brigade supported the PRT in this effort by surging its attached human terrain team
(HTT) personnel to the various focus areas throughout Ninewa province.
A cornerstone of the PDS was to think small and rural; building capacity, bridging resource gaps,
avoiding perceptions of favoritism, and creating long-term employment projects/programs at
the local level with signifcant Iraqi buy-in in the form of vision, fnancing, and labor. Several of
these small and rural projects were focused in areas vulnerable to violent extremists infuence,
smuggling, or other activities that supported terrorist fnancing. For example, in the village of
Tawajena, inexpensive drip irrigation systems offered a highly lucrative economic alternative
to local farmers, leading to greater reliance on cash crops such as eggplant, melon, tomatoes,
and squash. Unlike the government-subsidized and politically sensitive grain sector, cash crops
offered the farmer direct control over the price and market demand for their harvest. Six months
after the introduction of this drip irrigation program, the insurgent line had shifted away from the
village due to the economic alternatives now present.
Programs that create lasting jobs for unemployed males were also a priority. These programs
aimed heavily at Ninewas moribund agricultural sector. Paving a road creates jobs for a few
weeks, meets U.S. forces immediate logistical and counterinsurgency needs, but does not meet
Team Ninewa criteria for sustainability and Iraqi management capacity. Instead, using Team
Ninewa used its funding to purchase and install greenhouses for Farmers Associations and
Cooperatives which created long-term local jobs and built local confdence and administrative
capacity. We no longer agreed to provide 100 percent of the work or investment on a project.
We met local Iraqis half way we provided materials but not labor, and/or we provide training
expertise, but not organization or fnancing. We would provide the greenhouses, but the Ninewa
Directorate General (DG) of Agriculture provided the training. Establishing this buy-in
was our only way to be certain that our efforts were absorbed and sustained by local cultures
and communities. Team Ninewa insisted on seeing the Iraqis contribution frst. If the input
was not there or the government was not willing to provide fnancing, labor or maintenance,
this suggested that it was not a true priority but rather just another money-maker for a local
contractor or leader.
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Team Ninewa recognized that the engine of true and sustainable economic growth is small and
medium enterprise. Agricultural associations continue to be an excellent partner; in most cases,
we provided 1-2 greenhouses to an association while the Ninewa DG of Agriculture provided
them with training. The association would then lease a greenhouse to a member and purchase a
new one once enough income was received from the frst. This model combined traditional Iraqi
collective culture with an element of proft and market-driven incentive. In the Ninewa Womens
Initiative program, we used State Department Quick Response Funds (QRF) to provide business
plan training to the leaders of womens groups, who then developed small business plans for
catering, laundry, sewing, and internet businesses, all ranging in value from $7,000 to $10,000.
Once the women developed market studies and budgets, we used Department of Defense CERP
funds to establish these businesses. These programs were nested with the brigades security plan
and often targeted specifc vulnerable communities across ethnic and religious lines.
As a result of multiple, reinforcing efforts coordinated and de-conficted across the province,
Team Ninewa was highly successful in strengthening Iraqi civil capacity at the provincial
and local levels, supporting Iraqi governance goals, fostering sustainable economic growth,
respecting and bolstering rule of law, and assisting the government in providing security for
its people. Team Ninewa has been blessed with many skilled members from both the State
Department and the U.S. military, but we do not possess all the competencies necessary to
provide solutions to every problem. However, by applying the tenets of a targeted effort,
consultation with partners, and a shared vision of a responsive Ninewa Government and
vibrant economy, we were able to signifcantly raise the level of civil capacity and economic
development in Ninewa Province.
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Key Leader Inter views:
Advise and Assist Br igades Strengths and Weaknesses
The following are extracts from Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) key leader interviews
of stability transition team (STT) offcers in Iraq operating under the advise and assist brigade
(AAB) concept. The complete interviews are available on the CALL website. The question asked
is the following: In your opinion, what are the AABs greatest strengths and weaknesses?
MAJ Br ian Bettis, 4th Infantr y Br igade Combat Team (IBCT), 1st Infantr y
Division, STT Leader, Januar y 2009
Greatest strength: The concept of being solely supported by a brigade combat team (BCT) is
great. When conducting a relief in place (RIP) with the military transition team (MiTT), their
logistical needs were to beg, borrow, and sacrifce from surrounding units, but this concept
allows me to tap into the brigade resources and easily obtain the necessary training and supplies
I need to execute the mission. Also, the brigade has tracking systems already in place, where as a
MiTT, the chief would have to establish his own (staff functions).
Greatest weakness: Personnel strength. You are entirely dependent on what the BCT can give
you to support the transition team package. If the brigade is short personnel, the priority lies with
the battalions. Prior to deployment, it is critical that the STT is full up and the team is identifed
before boots-on-the-ground.
MAJ Rob Boone, 3r d Heavy Br igade Combat Team (HBCT), 3r d Infantr y Division
(3ID), STT Deputy, December 2009
The Army has never sat down and asked, What is an STT and what can they do? What is their
function and what is their capability? If I were to take a crack at a possible defnition, it would
be: An STT is a uniquely trained two-man team. It is responsible for advising and assisting senior
level host-nation security forces offcials while working by, with, and through their counterpart
to legitimize the government and their security forces. The purpose is to build capacity leading to
an enduring strategic relationship.
The AAB concepts greatest strength is we are part of the brigade, so we are part of the actual
operation. We do not conduct any unilateral operations whatsoever. The brigade commander has
fostered a unity of effort down to the company level.
I see several weaknesses:
STTs need to be a little larger than the two-person team. I believe to be effective, the
STT should be a seven-person team. An 0-5, 0-4, and offcers in the S-1 (personnel),
S-2 (intelligence), and S-4 (logistics) staff offcer positions. Also, a couple of
maintenance and supply noncommissioned offcers (NCOs) who are E-7s or E-8s. I
think we are short-changing ourselves the way it is now. The extra team members could
surge in certain areas. Right now it is just too much work for a lieutenant colonel or
major to be functional for the Department of Border Enforcement (DBE). This is my
opinion.
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Units outside of the AAB do not really know what the STTs are, or what their
capabilities are. It goes back to my previous question on whether or not the division
and corps understand the STT concept.
The intent is for the squadron to partner with us, but our province is so large it is hard
for them to meet all of the demand.
STTs need to show up the same time as the brigade does for deployment training. We
need to get integrated with the training plan and train with the battalions we will be
working with. I feel the training model outlined in The Modular Brigade Augmented
for Security Force Assistance Handbook, on page 1-6, is a great model and should be
replicated as close as possible. I did not meet my battalion commander until I got in
country.
STTs should be assigned and not attached. There should be senior NCOs on a team.
It would have been benefcial if some of the STTs had attended the predeployment site
survey.
The AAB needs to establish an Iraqi Security Force (ISF) coordination cell at the
brigade level before deployment, or allow the ISF cell to train with the STTs. There
has been a lot of disconnect going on with the brigade ISF cell. Perhaps the best course
of action is to have an STT act as the ISF cell. They could represent us better at Multi-
National DivisionSouth and let them know our limitations and capabilities.
LTC Adam Edwar ds, 3r d HBCT, 3ID, STT Leader, 8th Ir aqi Ar my, December 2009
The greatest potential strength is the fact we are part of the brigade. The brigade commander
has made it clear the STTs are part of the brigade, and all of the brigade resources we need are
available to us.
The greatest weakness is we still have not fully realized that the STTs are part of the brigade.
Maybe if we had joined the brigade earlier in the training cycle we could have developed a
better relationship with the battalions. I think now that as we have arrived in country, a lot of the
brigade still does not realize the STT potential and how to leverage us. The potential is defnitely
there, and after a month in country I see us getting better every day.
Within our own forces I believe the STTs need to be a three-person team rather than a two-person
team. The third person should be an E-8 or E-9. One of the most important things we want is to
build a strong Iraqi Army (IA) NCO corps. I cannot think of an army where that is not one of the
most critical pieces of the organization. I can tell the IA about being an NCO, but what they need
is to see and talk to one as part of the STT.
COL Roy Nar worol, 3r d HBCT, 3ID, Senior STT Leader, 5th Region DBE,
December 2009
The greatest strength is the United States presence and Army values culture. Army values are
our salt and light gifts to the Iraqi people. The greatest gift we can offer these people is our
American values, which are refected in Army values. The AAB concept has no weaknesses.
I think the smaller teams going from an 11-man MiTT to a two-man STT are part of the U.S.
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forces (USFs) greatest strength. It is a signal to the Iraqis we are adapting because the mission
is changing. We are no longer going to come out and do the kinds of kinetic things we used to.
We are sending high-powered colonels, lieutenant colonels, and majors out to pick up the next
phase of the mission (see 2010 J oint Capabilities Board Stage 2). The next phase is building
partnerships and building Iraqi capacity. I believe every Iraqi general and Iraqi colonel looks to
us to provide them what right looks like in leadership, coaching, mentoring, and training. This
goes far in building our enduring partnership and partner capacity.
COL Joseph A. Southcott, 3r d HBCT, 3ID, 8th Ir aqi Ar my Division STT Leader,
December 2009
Greatest strength: We are part of the brigade. Going back to the doctrinal process, we are
assigned to the brigade. The strength for the STTs is to be assigned to the brigade and not
attached. This makes them part of the organization.
If you look at the old legacy MiTT and BCT relationship, there were several points of confict
that would not allow for a unity of effort or a smooth transition operation with the IA because
they were both not in synchronization (synch). Let me give you an example:
Figure 8-1
From the above timeline showing an average rotation, you will see there are several periods
of contention with the BCT and the MiTT where they are out of synch with their stability
transition efforts. The MiTT comes in while the BCT is already here. The MiTT is learning new
BCT reporting requirements and has limited awareness of the IA leaders and what had been of
importance to them and the BCT, because they are new. A few months after they arrive, the BCT
does a RIP/transfer of authority (TOA) with another BCT, again causing a period of being out
of synch. The cycle continues, and every six months there is confict or someone out of synch
with the effort. Now in the AAB model, for a whole year we arrive together, train together, RIP/
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TOA together, and leave together. There is one mission, one fght, one unity of effort, and one
commanders guidance. This is the great strength of the AAB. The AAB goes from cradle to
grave together and in synch.
Greatest weakness: The STT is only two individuals. The Army will tell you that is why you
have a partner team. I acknowledge that. But, I go back to the fact that, in my case, the rank and
experience structure doesnt work. The 8th IA division commander and all of his staff are in
this area of operation (AO). My partnering unit was a company. So in my case, if there was an
issue with supply for example, I would partner with an E-5 supply sergeant with an Iraqi general
offcer. To get the same level of expertise that we had at the MiTT team, I would have to go to
the battalion or the brigade and get a major or E-8. So there is a delta there in the new concept of
the AAB. Partnering should be done by someone commensurate with the rank structure we had
in the legacy MiTT.
The brigade commander has identifed this error and has initiated a staff exchange between his
brigade staff and the IA division staff (e.g. S-1 to G1, S-2 to G-2) to correct this weakness. I am
not saying the brigade staff will engage every day, but through a group effort they will be able to
see them a few times a week. Now we need to fnd a partner for them at the IA brigade level.
LTC Anthony Lowrey, 3r d HBCT, 3ID, STT Chief, Ir aqi Police, Diwaniyah and
Najaf Provinces, December 2009
I believe the greatest strength is we are geared to advise and assist. An AAB is an entire brigade
ultimately devoted to the success of the Government of Iraq (GoI) as we assist in strengthening
their country.
The greatest weaknesses I have seen are that we have many Soldiers here who are on their third
and fourth deployments. It is very hard for them to come back this time and understand this is a
nonkinetic fght. For some it is hard to bring themselves to the new mindset. There have been no
incidents, but you can feel it in the attitudes about a nonkinetic mission.
COL Paul L. English, 3r d HBCT, 3ID, Senior STT Chief, 3r d Region DBE,
December 2009
The greatest strength is we are assigned to the brigade. We have one commander, with one
vision, and receive the same guidance for the same fght. It makes the AAB a powerful tool in
stability operations.
I am absolutely convinced the AAB concept is valid and true, provided the Iraqi unit we are
falling in on can use an STT. For example, we have been helping the IA for several years, so
the STT can come in and advise and assist with a very thin veneer. In that case, the AAB is
valid. The Iraqi Police (IP) may or may not be ready for an STT, depending on the Iraqi Police
Station. An STT for the DBE may be even harder. I believe what needs to be considered during
the analysis of flling the STT assignments is to ask the question, Can the ISF partnering units
continue to progress if you unilaterally apply the AAB concept across all three (IA, IP, and DBE)
at the same time?
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The greatest challenge I have encountered is sharing intelligence with our coalition partners. It
becomes very diffcult to get things released through foreign disclosure channels. Unfortunately,
our efforts to create an effective fusion cell have been hindered by this issue.
Another weakness is, I believe, the STTs have a different focus than our partnering battalions.
From my perception, the battalions and brigade staffs are focused on the lethal fght with the
recent attacks in the brigade AO. I can appreciate how they must feel. I am more focused on the
partnership with my counterpart and the mission to assist the DBE.
The next weakness is the DBE is neither army nor police. It is fairly new to the GoI. Most of
the Iraqi offcers assigned to the DBE were offcers in the IA. Often, I notice they still believe
they are in the army. I am not sure we need U.S. Army offcers on the STTs. Maybe not initially,
but in the near future we need civilians from the United States Border Patrol to join the teams.
One of the problems I have noticed is the DBE is looking in at the border and not looking out. I
hope to develop a clear focus between the DBE and the IA. A relationship that understands their
individual roles of securing the border, like at home in the United States with the Border Patrol
and the National Guard.
The fourth weakness is with the National DBE. We at the brigade level have adapted to the two-
man STT concept, but the National DBE struggles with the fact that the STTs are not stove piped
to them. Since we are assigned to the brigade, our command structure requires that we report to
our brigade. I do not think they have internalized the new structure of the STT. They keep asking
for operational readiness assessments (ORAs). I do not have the ability to continue an ORA
assignment. It has been very frustrating to meet very short turn-a-rounds on in-depth assessments
and then skip the chain of command in reporting. Under the same time constraints, I just do not
have the organizational depth to keep up with all the requirements that 60 people did previously.
Finally, I am sure the people who fll these STT assignments use some analytical approach
as they put the right person in the right spot. Let me give you an example of what I am
talking about. All of my STTs have requested two things: more intelligence training and more
maintenance training. That tells me our STTs needed more of this background on the team. I
think these two functions will always be a big demand for a DBE. For the IA STT, they will need
a different mix of skills.
LTC James F. Car lisle, 3r d HBCT, 3ID, STT Leader, December 2009
The strength of the AAB is having an entire brigade focused on enabling and assisting the ISF
inside your operational environment (OE). We are one brigade, with one commander, and the
same mission.
We have established a relationship with the provincial reconstruction team in An Najaf. The
beauty of the AAB by design is that all of the STTs already have a relationship with all of the
other STTs. The MiTTs did not enjoy this close relationship. Because this brigade relationship
exists, I can know where all of the IA, IP, and DBE forces are and what they are doing. If I have
any questions, I just have to contact the STT that covers that area. This relationship is a big plus
in the AAB concept.
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Another one of the beauties of the AAB is I have all of the enablers found in a brigade. If I need
a human collection team (HCT) or a Raven, all I have to do is ask and I will usually get it rather
quickly.
The greatest weakness is the size of the team. Let me explain. The strength of the MiTTs is that
they had a guy to partner with every section: S-1, S-2, S-3, and S-4. With the AAB concept, the
two-man STTs are augmented by the company to make it look like a MiTT. The company I am
supported by has an E-5 they have given me to partner with in giving advice to a full colonel
with combat experience on how to be a HCT. It just does not work. This partnering looks good
on paper and in some geographical locations. The problem here is that our battalion covers two
provinces.
With the number of STTs in our brigade, it can suck up the resources of a brigade very quickly.
I think if the STTs each had an operations/intelligence offcer, logistics offcer, maintenance
offcer, and a commanding offcer, the STTs would be far more functional.
MAJ Er ic N. Weyenber g, STT Leader, 17th Br igade, 4th Ir aqi Ar my Division,
Januar y 2010
I still think of our AAB as an IBCT. Its an IBCT that is hopefully conditioned to deal with
governance, economics, and security. Its an IBCT with 16 additional offcers. Its an AAB
because we have replaced MiTTs and, in some cases, tightened up on reporting channels between
MiTTs and partnered battalions, as now we are directly tied in with the battalions. Strength is
in direct reporting channels between advisers of ISF units and battalions. No confusion in OE
activities between ISF and U.S. forces.
Weakness is that the capability of a MiTT no longer exists. Weakness is that ORAs no longer are
useful to do, unless you have a partnered company do that, and they wont put the time or effort
into it, as they have way too many other, higher-rated priorities.
COL Char les Eckvall Jr., 4th IBCT, 1ID, STT Chief, 4th Ir aqi Ar my Division,
Januar y 2010
The greatest strength of the AAB concept is the consolidation of all aspects of the mission under
one commander. The previous occupation of his OE by MiTTs, police transition teams, etc.
ensured animosity and failed to focus all activities on one set of goals.
The greatest weakness of the AAB concept is the lateness of the team building and understanding
of AAB operations. The AAB absolutely must train with the assigned STTs before deployment.
Having the SST train only with the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command dooms the AAB
to suffer with a half-coordinated, half-understood team during operations and causes the STT to
learn AAB operations during execution of the mission.
The lack of predeployment team building and joint development of the OE has haunted the
relationship between the AAB staff and the STT team members. This is the single-most
important criticism of the accelerated plan to organize AABs. Future AABs must not suffer this
problem; the Army must ensure that it does not.
The STT doesnt have a staff. The STT has advisers who pull double-duty as staff. It is
inadequate, specifcally limiting our ability to conduct analysis, and creating problems whenever
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the STT has required nonadvising duties such as award writing, property accountability, and
supply requisitioning.
LTC Louis Pooer, 3r d HBCT, 3ID, STT Leader, Ir aqi Police Distr icts in Babil and
Kar bala Provinces, Januar y 2010
Greatest strengths: Being part of the same brigade, with the same mission, and the same
guidance under one commander is the greatest strength. I like being able to take issues to the
battalion commander and using the infuence of his unit to coordinate and execute the needed
requirements. In this environment we are able to tap into all of the enablers within the brigade.
Greatest weaknesses:
When you compare MiTTs to STTs, I believe all we did was change the name. We did
not change the mindset of why we are here. This is still early in the lessons learned
process, but I think in 12 to 24 months you might see more success. Right now we are
some of the frst guys in. We have changed the name, but we have not changed the way
we make decisions and think things through.
One of the things we have seen is we have not looked at this as when we have an attack
against a USF Soldier, that the attack should be handled no differently than if the attack
was handled in the United States. Because of warrant-based targeting as an end state,
we have not adjusted our methodologies and our tactics, techniques, and procedures
(TTP) on the ground to say that when an improvised explosive device goes off, we treat
it as a crime scene.
I still see legacy USF mindsets in operation, as it was before 30 J une 2009, and how
intelligence is more important. The problem is U.S. forces really do not care about
evidence. They go into a signifcant activity mode. We just want to grab that cell phone,
document, weapon, or the fragmentation because we think it can be exploited for
intelligence, which will drive another operation, which will drive to more intelligence,
which drives to another operation. In a time of a crisis, we go back to our old ways
very quickly. We have seen it frsthand here, and we are trying to shape operations from
our level.
Let me give you an example of what I am talking about. When we send U.S. forces to
assist with an indirect fre point of origin, as we arrive, we just need to slow down and
treat it as a crime scene, so we will be able to gather enough adequate evidence to get a
warrant issued and a strong enough case for the Iraqis to prosecute in their courts by an
Iraqi judge. The end state is successful prosecution. I think that now our mindsets let us
have two different types of end states. The one being to kill and capture and the other
being to prosecute in Iraqi courts.
The authority for a kill or capture mission has been pulled higher and higher from the
brigade commander, so it has got to force us to evidence collection processing and
getting it before an Iraqi judge, who can say that it is good police work and issue a
warrant. The Iraqi police execute the warrant with maybe the USF in support.
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What slows us from this type of success is we are still making mistakes at the tactical
level. That is why I think we have changed our names, but we have not really changed
our TTP.
LTC Br adley D. Nadig, 3r d HBCT, 3ID, STT Leader, 33r d Ir aqi Br igade, Januar y
2010
Greatest strength is the amount of enablers and expertise readily available to the STT. Either we
can provide something right away, or we just need to coordinate and we can provide the enabler.
Greatest weakness is the STT manning: two personnel. There should be at least four of us. One
needs to be a senior NCO.
The STT should consist of four personnel, not just two. Recommend one lieutenant colonel, two
majors, and one E-9. This allows the STT itself to at least create a relationship with the four key
decision makers and the senior NCO in the IA brigade. One lieutenant colonel can pair up with
the brigade commander. One major will be the deputy team chief responsible for maintaining the
reports for the STT and can pair up with the G-7. The other major can pair up with the G-2/G-3,
and the E-9 can pair up with the command sergeant major (CSM) in the IA brigade. This way, it
frees up the troop-level leadership to totally focus on the battalions partnered units.
LTC Michael D. Bush, 3r d HBCT, 3ID, STT Leader 7th Br igade, 3r d Region
Depar tment of Bor der Enforcement Waist Province, Januar y 2010
The AABs greatest strength is the unity of effort, while the greatest weakness is the newness
of the AAB concept and the diffculty with transitioning from offensive operations to security
operations, especially for leaders that have two or more tours in Iraq.
LTC William Smith, 3r d HBCT, 3ID, STT Leader 3r d Region DBE Waist Province,
June 2010
Greatest strengths: The unity of effort is by far the greatest strength. Both the STT and the
maneuver commanders hear the same guidance from the same commander. When we showed
up on the ground here, there were four legacy MiTTs. They had been stymied by a lack of
overarching vision and subsequently there was little unity of effort between them. Each MiTT
was mostly worried about their Iraqi unit and did not seem to possess a higher vision for what the
ISF was supposed to do.
Greatest weaknesses:
The command and control structure of a brigade gets confused when you add 35 feld
grade offcers operating in two- to four-man teams. Our experience here at Contingency
Operating Base Shocker is probably different than the other STTs in the brigade for two
reasons: we are geographically separate from our supporting battalion headquarters,
and we have a large concentration of STT offcers (10) in one place. It took about
a month for us and the squadron to fgure out our relationship to one another, and
fortunately we all work very well together.
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This weakness can be mitigated by earlier embedding of the STTs into the brigade.
Because the AAB concept was new when we arrived at the brigade (I think we were
the second AAB in the Army), we arrived much later than is ideal. As a result, we
missed virtually all of the brigade training events, including the mission rehearsal
exercise (MRX) at the National Training Center. I believe that many of the command
and control issues we dealt with when we frst arrived in Iraq would have already been
solved had we been able to participate in the brigade train up.
COL Steven Scioneaux, 3r d HBCT, 4th Infantr y Division (4ID), DBE/Por t of Entr y
STT Chief, 4th Region DBE, November 2010
As we continue into the drawdown and have fewer Soldiers trying to cover the same number
of Iraqi forces and area, manning is another challenge. Each of my two-man teams are now
covering down on what an 11-man team covered before. Because we are a lot smaller, some of
my two-man teams are covering down on what 22 or 33 people were covering before. In some
cases, this is not as obvious at higher echelons. It is always good to get the guys from Baghdad
to come down and see the challenge. They then realize how few guys we have covering so
much. The challenge is to get higher to understand what our capabilities are based on our current
numbers. They still have expectations as when the larger border transition teams were here; we
no longer have that capability. That is the other challenge. Getting our own folks to realize with
reduced manpower, our capability is reduced. They have to take an appetite suppressant as well.
Case in point, we had the national DBE STT team come down and spend four days with us.
They had no idea of the challenges we went through to get information that we provide to them.
They had no idea my guys kit up fve to six days a week and travel out to the various locations
to interface with the DBE. My guys and 4th Squadron, 10th Cavalry are working joint and
combined operations with the DBEs. It is not as simple as going into a key leader engagement,
jotting down some notes, and sending in some information. There is actually a lot that goes into
getting the level of fdelity that we provide, and it was a huge eye opener for them. Hopefully,
as they send down requests for information or other requests to us, they now understand what it
takes for us to get that information.
COL Rober t Forester, 3r d HBCT, 4ID, STT Leader, 14th Ir aqi Ar my Division,
Febr uar y 2011
You have to understand that we were one of the frst STTs under the new AAB model. When you
are plowing new ground or breaking ice, you are surprised by a lot of things. We changed from a
legacy MiTT structure to suddenly foisting 48 feld-grade offcers onto a brigade staff. Especially
when each one of the 48 feld grades is a unique story. We had lots of examples of unique
personal situations. I am not sure we appreciated going in all of the additional administrative
and personnel actions associated with supporting this kind of a population. We worked through
most of them at Fort Carson prior to deployment, and we are working through them for the
redeployment piece, but it is just tough. The individual Soldier support for the major-through-
colonel level is something that I am not sure anyone was able to think through. You add a
signifcant additional workload to brigade and battalion staffs.
Additional challenges included issues with orders and fnances that we have worked through
over the year. Hopefully, we have gotten some of these lessons back to the Army so the next
guys do not have the same sort of issues. In terms of the mission itself, we had some interesting
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discussions about this when we were at Fort Polk. The Army gave 48 feld-grade offcers to a
brigade commander but did not give him anything to support us with. We came to the brigade
with no weapons, and the Army response was it was the brigade commanders problem. That is
okay, but you have now given him a requirement without an authorization. If the STT model is
going to be enduring, and that is the frst question the Army has to grapple with, is it enduring?
If it is going to be enduring there has to be something like a mobilization table of distribution
and allowances document that goes with the team that creates the equipment listing of weapons,
night vision goggles and simple individual Soldier gearkit. They have to address the vehicles
the STT team will use for mobility.
If the STT is going to be an enduring mission set, somebody has to think through all the domains
of doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, facilities in a
new equipment training assessment and understand the implications of adding this additional
capability to a BCT. The simple approach is to think of us an attachment, but that is not fully
true. When you get an attachment, that is a table of organization and equipment (TO&E) unit that
attaches to another TO&E unit. They come with all of their stuff. With the STT model, a team is
being created from nothing, and that is exactly what they bring with themnothing. All those
requirements fall on the brigade commander, and that is not fair to him. The Army owes the BCT
commander a solution, and I do not think we have done that yet. So again, if it is an enduring
mission set, the Army needs to fgure the support package that goes with the STT. If it is not an
enduring mission set, then we just continue the pickup game we have been playing with the STT
model.
Summar y
In summary, the AAB concept is working. From these interviews, it is clear the greatest
strength of the AAB concept is the assignment of the STTs to a BCT, integrating all enablers
under one commander to enhance unity of effort. The most successful teams were collocated
with their Iraqi counterparts and worked with them on a near-full-time basis. Probably the
greatest weakness at this point is the concern over the size and composition of the STT. Most
interviewees would like to see a three- to four-person team with at least one NCO (brigade and
below). Another weakness at the time of these interviews and echoed by nearly every interviewee
was the desire to be assigned to the BCT prior to the MRX. One recommendation indicated
that STTs should join the BCT 45 days prior to the MRX. Although this is not necessarily an
AAB weakness, it is a reasonable observation that is consistent with Army collective training
experiences associated with combat training center rotations that existed well before the Iraq and
Afghanistan wars. The modular BCT concept alleviated much of the task organization challenges
associated with combined arms training. However, any time a BCT receives augmentees,
especially if it involves reserve component forces, it requires a dedicated effort to assign
personnel with suffcient leadtimes to fully integrate them into theater-specifc unit training plans
and exercises prior to deployment. Finally, understanding the operational environment, emersion
in cultural and language training, and attempting to tailor the STT training to the job and echelon
they will encounter in theater are good future goals to achieve as the AAB concept matures.
Leaders and Soldiers must understand that a two-man team is not replacing a 12-man team
a 12-man team is being replaced with a two-man team supported by a brigades organizational
strength.
3rd HBCT, 3ID
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Lessons of the Day: Advise and Assist Br igades
Topic: Leveraging the Public Affairs and Information Operations Offcers in an
Advise and Assist Br igade (AAB)
Theater: Iraq
Date: 19 J une 2009
Observation: 4th Brigade Combat Team (BCT) (AAB), 1st Armored Division (4/1AD) has fully
integrated their public affairs offcer (PAO) and information offcer (IO) into their campaign
plans and operations.
Discussion:
Planning and conducting an IO campaign and utilizing the PAO to get the commands
message out to key Iraqi leaders, the Iraqi public, and keeping families informed starts
with the commander.
4/1AD commander understood the importance of leveraging his nonlethal assets and
provided IO and PAO his planning guidance and intent and fully integrated them into
his operations.
Both the IO and PAO attend the commanders daily synchronization meeting with the
command group. Discussions would include the commanders schedule, key leader
engagements, distinguished visitors, current and future operations, and signifcant
events. The IO would discuss themes and messages that division and corps are putting
out. He also monitors and reports on what local Iraqi media (television, newspapers,
radio, and mosques) are reporting about local events, attacks, the security agreement,
and anything on coalition and Iraqi security forces. IOs and PAOs often work together
in getting common themes and messages out.
The PAO discusses and plans current and future stories that get the commanders
message out and counters negative storylines that are communicated by local media.
PAOs and IOs are critical assets for an AAB conducting stability operations.
The PAO is the offcial spokesperson for the brigade. He is responsible for preparing
and communicating information relative to unit participation in military operations,
events, and key leader engagements through news releases, special activities,
photographs, radio and television, and other informational material.
The IO utilizes many of the brigades intelligence assets in addition to monitoring
Iraqi media to get a common operating picture on what the populations concerns and
feelings are in the brigades operational environment. In a non-lethal environment (post
30 J une 09), the IO works closely with the PAO in getting division and corps themes
and messages out to the public.
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The IO also manages the psychological operations (PSYOP) (editor note: PSYOP is
now known as military information support operations [MISO]) effort through the
assigned detachment. Post 30 J une 09, the IO has integrated U.S. PSYOP resources
with the Iraqi security forces (ISF) media operations. Products are often designed and
developed through the Iraqi media cell and supported through the tactical PSYOP
detachment resources. Despite being able to conduct PSYOP unilaterally after 30 J une,
the commanders guidance to the IO was to conduct operations by, with, and through
the Iraqis.
Good interpreters are critical to the PAOs and IOs campaign. There are around 330
interpreters in the brigade, both local nationals and U.S. hires. About 290 interpreters
are category I, local nationals that do not require a secret clearance. Category IIs are
U.S. citizens with a secret clearance. Category IIIs are U.S. citizens with a top-secret
clearance. Interpreters who work for the PAO/IO are usually category IIs. Not all
interpreters are created equal. They speak, listen, write, and interpret at different levels.
Some are computer literate, others are not. Its critical to your PAOs/IOs campaign
that you have highly competent interpreters who are able to speak, listen, write, use a
computer, and interpret precisely what is being communicated, both verbally and in
writing.
Best practices by 4/1AD PAO:
Advise and assist media (outreach) kits at transfer of authority and press events
that are written in both English and Arabic. The kit included the advise and
assist mission, what an AAB does, the units history, brigade commanders
biography, and PAO contact information.
Iraqi reporter ride along program. Allowing vetted Iraqi reporters to ride with
our formations (both ground and air) and report what they experience.
Proactive responses to stories in Arabic news such as the H1N1 virus concern,
claims processing, out-of-the-cities policy, and the security agreement.
Push for combined press conferences when important information and
statements are made by Iraqi and American military and civilian offcials.
Push photos to Iraqi media to help them tell the story.
Provide local media access to the brigade commander and Soldiers.
Include command messages in all press releases.
Establish a social media program. Unit established a Facebook page with over
2,000 fans and 700+Twitter followers. It has produced an interactive social
media environment with photos, videos, and open comments. Additionally, Fort
Bliss rear detachment and families have access and current information on the
units events and activities.
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Lessons/Insight:
Have a PAO/IO plan, prior to arriving in country, on communicating the units advise
and assist mission with the Iraqi media, key leaders, and the provincial reconstruction
teams (PRTs).
Include Iraqi reporters in as many events as possible. Find a few Iraqi reporters who
are able to get good story placement in their papers and give them exclusive access
to events and interviews.
Develop an e-mail list of Iraqi reporters and send them routine updates on what the unit
is doing in support of their security forces and civil capacity efforts by the PRTs.
Work with Iraqi security forces public affairs (media) counterparts to reinforce
partnerships, openness, trust, and media access to their events.
Request copies of printed articles and links to online articles from reporters. This
allows the unit to know what is being printed and its accuracy.
Selection of interpreters is critical for the PAO. Select an interpreter who knows how to
use a computer, speaks well, spells well, is diplomatic, and interprets directly what you
want. Their words are read by hundreds of thousands of people.
Recommendation: For an advise and assist mission, the PAOs/IOs should be carefully selected.
They can literally change public perceptions and feelings (positive or negative) about your unit,
operations, and relationships.
Topic: Civilian Tr aining Teams and the Advise and Assist Mission
Theater: Iraq
Date: 07 J une 2010
Observation: Civilian training teams play a vital role in the conduct of the advise and assist
mission.
Stability transition teams (STTs) often do not have members who are experts in law
and border enforcement.
Civilian police and border patrol agents fll this gap through the conduct of vital
training essential to the success of the advise and assist mission.
Discussion: Transition teams are critical elements within the AAB formation. Tasked with
training the ISF, the transition teams are the main effort of the AAB mission. Some transition
teams do not have experienced law and border enforcement offcers to train the Iraqi police (IP)
and the Iraqi Department of Border Enforcement (DBE). In the 3rd BCT (AAB), 4th Infantry
Division (3/4ID) AO, trained civilians are utilized to overcome this obstacle.
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At Camp Dhi Qar, a part of the 3rd Battalion, 29th Field Artillery AO, the civilian
police assistance training team (CPATT) is comprised of civilian law enforcement
offcers who have, on average, 10 years of law enforcement experience. Because the
Dhi Qar/Muthana STT does not have an experienced law enforcement offcer within
its ranks, the 3/4ID uses the CPATT to reinforce the STT. The CPATT, in coordination
with the STT, conducts training on weapons qualifcation, special weapons and tactics,
rule of law, crime scene investigation, and a variety of other tasks essential to good
law enforcement. Because, like the IP, the CPATT is a civilian entity, the IP are more
receptive to the training techniques.
In the 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry and the 1st Battalion, 68th Armor battalions AOs,
the battalions use CPATT personnel and U.S. border patrol agents to buttress the STTs.
Border patrol agents are critical to the units because the eastern boundary is Iran. The
smuggling of weapons and Iranian personnel into Iraq is one of the top concerns of the
battalions and the 3/4ID. Currently, the military does not have a military occupational
specialty that equates to a civilian border patrol agent. Thus, it is critical for the brigade
to have qualifed civilian agents to assist the battalion in training the Iraqi DBE.
Unfortunately, the number of border patrol agents is very small compared to the size of
the AO.
Lesson/Insight: The AAB mission is new for many of the BCTs; transition teams, particularly
those working with the police and border enforcement units, are not necessarily staffed with
personnel trained in the tasks their Iraqi counterparts are required to conduct. AABs must use the
civilian enablers that are at their disposal to overcome this challenge.
Recommendation: Increase the number of civilian enablers into the AAB task organization
to complement transition teams and strengthen their professional experience. The number of
civilian border patrol agents deserves particular attention due to the length of the border with Iran
in the 3/4ID AO.
Topic: Infor mation Dissemination Oper ations (IDO) Tr aining Quick Look
Observation: 4th BCT (AAB), 3rd Infantry Division (4/3ID) provides STTs throughout Anbar
Province. This Quick Look provides some simple yet not-so-obvious tactic, technique, and
procedure (TTP) for anyone assigned to, or assisting, an STT in the area of media relations and
information dissemination operations (generally defned as IDO).
Discussion: 4/3ID advises, trains, and assists IA and IP forces throughout Anbar province in
IAW the tenets set forth in Field Manual (FM) 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance (SFA), May
2009. The 4/3ID Anbar Police Directorate (APD) STT media adviser and the brigade IO staff
offcer developed and provided a training plan aimed at enhancing the APD media offcers
understanding of IDO and media engagements with the understanding that he would, in turn,
instruct his subordinate representatives on the concepts. The program experienced initial success
and is one small step on the path to increasing IP professionalism.
Lessons/Insight:
Recognize the impact of a military solution on a civilian agency. Advisers must
understand the differences between the IA and IP and realize that military solutions
cannot necessarily be applied to civilian agencies. FM 3-13, Information Operations:
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Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, November 2003, defnes IO as the
employment of the core capabilitiesin concert with specifed supporting and related
capabilities, to affect or defend information and information systems, and to infuence
decision making. While concepts like IO, PSYOPs, and public affairs (PA) work great
in a military environment and serve well-defned purposes, they might not ft well with
an agency simply focused on media and community relations. However, it cannot be
overlooked that the situation in Iraq most likely lends itself to an aggressive IP media
campaign and that getting the message out quickly and accurately goes a long way
with the public. Identify the workable pieces of each capability based on the operating
environment and advise your counterpart how to best implement each one.
Train-the-trainer and encourage participation at all levels. Use this as an opportunity
to put an Iraqi face on the problem and enable Iraqis to develop their own training
program. Take the time to do an honest assessment of your counterparts capabilities,
requirements, and expectations and emphasize development of more than just a speak
to the media class. Assist in creating an enduring plan of action that identifes their
wants and needs and leads to institutionalization of the concept that timely and accurate
messaging portrays the organization and its leadership as competent and professional.
Iraqi media engagements are generally conducted by senior individuals, so its
important that any program of instruction empowers junior personnel to effectively
train senior leaders. J unior personnel will be the actual media spokespersons for
the organization and will advise senior leaders on planned media engagements and
recommended activities.
Adviser presence is required. FM 3-07.1 states that advise and assist is a security
force assistance (SFA) task in which U.S. personnel work with friendly security forces
(FSF) to improve their capability and capacity and that advising is the primary type
of SFA. Advisers must gain the trust and confdence of their FSF counterpart in order
to infuence actions and be effective. By embedding, advisers are able to build the
relationships required to infuence FSF to conduct independent decision making and
operations. Establish a schedule and be persistent. This may mean meeting twice a
day initially and shadowing your counterpart as he conducts business. Ensure follow-
through and understand that concept buy-in will take time. As ideas start to stick,
results will be obvious for you and your counterpart.
Get counterparts to develop their own messages, themes, and products. We can develop
and push products to the Iraqis all day long. But, at the end of the day, all theyll have
is a product that we created and zero knowledge on how to do it themselves. Pull
products from Arab media sources and explain where they came from and who the
target audience is for each one. Encourage counterparts to produce their own products
based on their cultural knowledge and expertise. Understand that the end product and
process will likely be different than the adviser may envision. The important fact is
that it will be an FSF product and process. Develop their understanding and teach that
communicating via the media serves a purpose other than simply passing information
and, if done correctly, can be a very powerful tool.
Assess and refne. Getting your counterpart to plan for and teach the class is simply
the frst step in the process. Developing measures of performance and measures of
effectiveness are critical to continued development. Become familiar with readiness
assessment requirements and associated IO, PSYOP, and PA mission essential task
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list (METL) tasks. Realize, however, that you may have to take a page out of FM 7-0,
Training for Full Spectrum Operations, December 2008 and defne success where
standards have not been established.
Topic: AAB AO Boundar ies
Theater: Iraq
Date: 05 November 2009
Observation: AO boundaries for AABs, IP forces, and IA forces in the Iraqi theater of operations
do not always align.
Discussion: In Iraq, AABs operate within, and are responsible for a given AO. The ISF also have
their own AOs in which they operate. Sometimes these ISF AOs lie entirely within a U.S. units
AO. Sometimes however, the ISFs AO may lie partially in one U.S. units AO and partially
within another. Often times these AOs do not align.
The result in the latter case is that some of the ISF units within a U.S. AO will report to a
different higher headquarters than the rest of the ISF units in the U.S. AO. Conversely, in some
cases ISF units outside of the U.S. AO will report to the higher headquarters in which a given
U.S. unit is responsible. This fact makes coordination of operations more diffcult. It also results
in the U.S. forces sometimes being unaware of ISF operations that are being conducted in their
AO and vice versa.
For example, a given U.S. battalion can have ISF outside their unit boundary
conducting operations. Sometimes, these ISF units may cross into the U.S. battalions
AO (even though the ISF unit is staying within their own boundary). This ISF unit may
have advised their higher headquarters of the operation, but because the ISFs higher
headquarters falls under the responsibility of a different U.S. battalion or brigade, the
U.S. battalion may not have the beneft of prior knowledge or coordination with the ISF
unit.
In addition, the same U.S. battalion may want or need to conduct operations with the
given ISF unit that operates both within and outside of their AO. However, because the
ISF unit boundary extends beyond the U.S. forces boundary, this requires additional
coordination, with adjacent U.S. and ISF units. This also results in U.S. forces
operating in unfamiliar areas or operating with ISF forces with whom they do not have
a habitual working relationship.
Lesson/Insight: Better coordination, communication, and effciency would occur if AAB AO
boundaries corresponded with current ISF AO boundaries. This improved communication and
coordination would increase both U.S. and Iraqi situational awareness; and reduce confusion and
chances of fratricide.
Recommendation: When U.S. AOs boundaries are created, instead of being arbitrary, they
should, to the greatest extent possible, correspond to the ISF unit boundaries that they support.
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Topic: Functional Alignment Modifcation of the AAB
Theater: Iraq
Date: 13 November 2009
Observation: The civilian and military enablers that are the spearhead of the AAB mission in
Iraq are not new assets to the battlefeld commander. At least since 2005, there has been a strong
presence of civil affairs (CA), PSYOPs, human intelligence teams, military transition teams
(MiTT), police transition teams, and various State Department teams on the ground in Iraq. What
is different is how the AABs have task-organized the brigade to more effectively utilize these
assets to accomplish the AAB mission.
Discussion:
The battalions of the 4th BCT (AAB), 4/1AD have functionally aligned their battalions and
companies to allow the military and civilian enablers to maximize their efforts on their primary
tasks.
When the 4/1AD arrived in Iraq in April 2009, it was understood that their mission was going to
be different from their predecessors. The phrase of the day was by, with, and through. Missions
were going to be conducted by, with, and through the ISF.
In the past, it was common for individual companies to have border patrol agents, police, and
MiTTs in their AO. They also were responsible for CA projects, which included construction
projects, and infrastructure projects. This placed a huge burden on the company and battalion
commanders because they needed to be competent in the management of the civilian and military
enablers tasks. The transition teams were often responsible for their own security and life
support. This took a tremendous amount of time for the teams that could be better spent training
the ISF. The 4/1AD developed a task organization that allowed the civilian and military enablers
to focus, almost exclusively, on their missions.
The frst action taken was to dedicate a specifc battalion to manage all the civilian and military
enablers. The PRTs, CA, PSYOPs, human collection teams, and human terrain teams belonged
to the battalion commander. The commander was responsible for coordinating and providing
security for the enabler missions. This battalion was designated as the brigades main effort.
The next change, which occurred at the tactical level, occurred when the maneuver battalion
commanders functionally aligned their companies with the mission of the transition teams in
their AOs. With this change, the transition teams were no longer isolated assets that spent most
of their time on life-support issues. The companies dedicated platoons to provide security and
additional trainers for the military, police, and border transition teams. Within the company,
a platoon was tasked with supporting a specifc transition team. This enabled the platoon to
specialize in the needs of the supported transition teams. The platoons live and work with the
transition teams. They are no longer fending for themselves in a remote area of the battlefeld.
Lesson/Insight: The functional alignment of the 4/1AD in Multinational Division-South
(MND-S) has allowed the civilian and military enablers to focus on their missions. Security and
life-support issues are handled by dedicated units from the brigade.
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Recommendation: Prior to the predeployment train-up, brigades should consider task organizing
their battalions, companies, and platoons along the model established by 4/1AD.
Topic: Task Force Personnel Integration into AAB Units
Theater: Iraq
Date: 19 October 2009
Observation: In the Iraq theater of operation, task force members assigned to an AAB, to include
attached Soldiers, Airmen, Sailors, and civilians, are not being fully integrated into the AABs
until both the attached personnel and the AABs arrive in theater.
Discussion: Due to the various personnel assigned to support a deployed AAB, it is not unusual
for example for a battalion of approximately 500 personnel to grow to a task force of nearly
1,000 personnel when all the additional Soldiers, Airmen, Sailors, and civilians and other
assigned subject matter experts are taken into account. These additional personnel do not train
side by side or fully integrate into the unit they will support until both they and the unit arrive in
theater.
Lesson/Insight:
Identifying the members from other units, other services, and the civilian personnel
who will deploy with AAB formations as early as possible and integrating them into
the predeployment training would accomplish much.
Getting all AAB task force personnel on the same training glide slope would help
every task force member see and evolve in their understanding of the mission, the unit,
its personnel, and the units SOPs together during training.
Additional cross training could take place between the attached members and the
parent unit for each to gain a greater appreciation of each others capabilities and skills
so that those skills can be fully leveraged during deployment.
The camaraderie that would be built during predeployment training would add to the
cohesiveness and ultimately the effectiveness of the deploying task force.
Granted, the attached specialty personnel would need to conduct specifc training based
around and supporting their area of expertise; however, core training that is common to
all should be done together.
Recommendation: Army leadership, to the greatest extent possible and as early as possible,
should identify all military and civilian personnel who will support the deploying AAB task
force. These personnel should be integrated into the deploying unit and their predeployment
training at home station and be on the same deployment cycle.
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Topic: AAB S-9
Theater: Iraq
Date: 3 September 2009
Observation: The AABs in Iraq have experienced success by collocating their S-9 (civil affairs
offcer) with PRTs during stability operations.
Discussion: The S-9 has the primary responsibility for the planning and integration of CA
operations and civil-military operations at the operational level. In most operations, the S-9 CA
offcer can be found located with the battalion or brigade staff.
PRTs in Iraq are under Department of State (DOS) control and led by a senior foreign
service offcer. The purpose of the PRTs is to achieve the political ends of the U.S.
government by extending the reach of the Government of Iraq and providing strategies
to improve security and governance in the region. In some cases, PRTs are embedded
within military brigades or regiments. Other times, however, the PRT will not be
collocated with the actual BCT that supports their operations.
When the PRT and the supporting BCT are not collocated, AABs in Iraq have placed
their S-9 offcer with the PRT. When this is done, AAB staff members state that it
demonstrates the AABs intent to truly partner with the PRT. Attendance, they say,
at regularly scheduled and unscheduled events keeps the AAB outfront and in the
mind of the PRT. It also allows the AAB to have input immediately before decisions
are made or misinformed courses of action are undertaken. Impromptu meetings that
often occur are easier for the S-9 offcer to attend. If the S-9 offcer was located at the
AAB in another area of the combined operating base, he may have not even known the
meeting occurred. AAB staff offcers say that attendance at non-work-related events
at the PRT helps in team building. Information fow is much improved because of the
daily personal interaction between members of the brigade staff and members of the
PRT. AAB staff member situational awareness is enhanced similar to a liaison offcer at
higher headquarters.
Leaders and staffs in both the PRT and the AAB have also noted an increase in the
quality and clarity of operational communications. These leaders and staffs state they
are in a better position to project their commanders guidance as well. In a recent
visit to an AAB where this practice had been adopted, the Multinational Corps-Iraq
(MNC-I) commander noted that this was a benefcial practice and advised other AAB
units in Iraq to look at adopting it.
Lesson/Insight: In situations where the AAB and the PRT are not collocated, improved
communication and working relationships have been noted by collocating the AAB S-9 staff
offcer at the PRTs location.
Recommendation: When State Department PRTs and AABs are not collocated, unit commanders
should consider the possibility and the potential advantages of collocating their S-9 staff offcer
with the PRT they support.
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Topic: Key Decisions for AAB Tr aining
Theater: Iraq
Date: 24 March 2010
Observation: As the frst AAB in Iraq, COL Peter Newell, the brigade commander of 4/1AD,
made key decisions that led to the overwhelming mission success.
Discussion: 4/1ADs innovative approach led to outstanding results in the United States Forces
Iraq (USFI) partnership with the ISF. The uniqueness of the mission led the brigade staff to
think outside the box in training preparation and in the execution of their mission in Iraq. The
key decisions in preparation for deployment follow:
Training was tailored to meet the demands of an AAB mission. It was critical that
brigade leadership and Soldiers understood their role of developing the ISF. Emphasis
was also on facilitating the PRTs to accomplish their mission of stabilizing the Iraqi
political and economic infrastructure. Although it was assumed that the Soldiers would
be engaged in combat during their tour, it was stressed that this would not be their
primary mission.
CA training for the Soldiers enabled them to see the big picture of the PRT
mission and their role in that mission.
Partnering with the El Paso city managers offce enabled the leadership to
see how a modern city handled the distribution of resources, including the
emergency response units.
Predeployment training with the DOS and PRTs enabled brigade staff to
understand the role of the PRT in an AAB. It also established an excellent
working relationship between the brigade commander and the PRTs.
The brigade dedicated an entire battalion, the 2nd Battalion, 29th Field Artillery (2/29
FA BN), to provide security and support to the PRTs.
The 2/29 FA BN was responsible for processing 100 percent of all
Commanders Emergency Response Program funds.
The 2/29 FA BN supervised all civilian and military enablers for the brigade
(minus the transition teams).
As the deputy director for civil capacity, the 2/29 FA BN commander was the
liaison between the brigade and the PRTs.
Battalion boundaries were based on the boundaries of the IA units the brigade was
supporting.
Two battalions covered Maysan province, the hotspot in the brigades
operational environment.
The alignment provided each IA brigade with one USF AAB battalion.
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The 10th IA Division was partnered with the 4/1AD brigade headquarters.
The 30 J une 2009 Restructuring of Forces Agreement was successfully executed by the
4/1AD through the following steps:
All USF were moved from the urban areas to rural USF forward operating
bases or rural ISF bases.
100 percent of lethal operations were executed solely by the ISF or with the ISF
in the lead.
USF present on lethal operations were in an advisory capacity only.
Charlie, 38th Long Range Surveillance (C/38 LRS) Troop was tasked to advise and
assist the DBE in Maysan province.
The LRS unit provided expertise in reconnaissance and surveillance that the
border transition teams did not possess.
The LRS unit was a force multiplier for the AAB.
Its success opens the possibility for using special operations forces for the AAB
mission, particularly the transition teams.
The battalions dedicated one company to provide security and life-support to
the transition teams; this enabled the teams to focus on their mission.
Soldiers were exposed to the difference between conducting an AAB mission
and conducting lethal operations.
Lesson/Insight: The AAB is a unique mission that requires commanders to think outside
the box. They must develop training that is unique to advising and assisting. Commanders
must also recognize that the AAB mission is two-pronged: it has both a civilian and a military
mission. Commanders must develop cohesive relationships with their civilian counterparts. This
bonding must begin in the predeployment training phase and must be cultivated throughout the
deployment. It is also imperative that commanders stress to their leadership and their Soldiers the
intent and purpose of an AAB mission. This understanding must be accomplished in the training
phase and reiterated throughout the deployment.
Recommendation: The brigade commander provided an excellent framework for the training
that an AAB must conduct prior to deployment. The focus on CA was critical and should be
required for all Soldiers who are expected to conduct an advise and assist mission. The brigades
partnership with PRTs throughout all phases of the deployment demonstrated its commitment to
succeeding in the mission. Establishing a battalion to support the PRTs was critical to the success
of both the PRTs and the brigade. This support structure should be replicated by future AABs.
The brigade task-organized its military assets in an exemplary manner; the most interesting
decision was to partner C/38 LRS Troop with the DBE. This may prove to be a springboard in
bringing other specialized units (special forces) into the AAB mission.
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Topic: Tr ain, Advise, Assist Mission Prepar ation
Observation: The current professional military education system and predeployment training
established for combat advisers requires signifcant changes and resources to properly prepare
Soldiers, Airmen, Sailors, and Marines for combat adviser assignments.
Discussion:
SFA is the unifed action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host-nation or regional security
forces in support of a legitimate authority (FM 3-07, Stability Operations). Developing host-
nation security forces is a complex and challenging mission. The United States and multinational
partners can only succeed if they approach the mission with the same deliberate planning
and preparation, energetic execution, and appropriate resourcing as the combat aspects of the
counterinsurgency (COIN) operation.
Arguably, the most important military component in the War on Terror is not the fghting we
do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern their
own countries. How the Army should be organized and prepared for this advisory role remains
an open question, and will require innovative and forward thinking.
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, 10 October 2007
Training foreign forces is now a core competency of regular and reserve units of all services;
however, the Army has yet to develop a comprehensive program of instruction within its
professional military education system or predeployment preparation to produce Soldiers trained
with the combat adviser skills for an era of persistent confict. To meet the challenge of training
host-nation security forces, the Army has transitioned eight BCTs into AABs to deploy under
the stability operations concept. Advising and assisting other nations military forces requires
unique personal- and unit-level attributes that are not always the same as required by a BCT.
It is important to identify and focus predeployment training on these shortfalls. Although still
evolving, the Armys current training and certifcation of AABs and other train-and-advise forces
are not providing the teaching and cultural competencies necessary to effectively train foreign
security forces and expedite the transition back to the host nation.
U.S. forces that train and advise foreign forces must be profcient in full spectrum operations to
perform security missions effectively. Converting from the kill people, break stuff mentality
to the train, advise, and assist mentality requires extensive education and training as well as
profciency in building relationships and problem solving. To gain their counterparts trust and
confdence, combat advisers must be competent in their core profciencies and experts in every
facet of combat critical tasks as well as possess the ability to effectively transfer that knowledge
to their foreign counterparts through effective coaching, teaching, and mentoring. They must be
relentless and forceful, yet patient, persuasive, and diplomatic.
What happened:
The overwhelming consensus of all the Soldiers interviewed at company level and
below was that they wanted more SFA-focused training. Soldiers wanted more
language skill training. Many stated they only received cards for language training,
and they wanted to be able to use easy phrases and know how they should sound.
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They believed there needed to be more foreign language-speaking role players at
J oint Readiness Training Center, since the role players they had at their level were all
English-speaking U.S. Soldiers. Although any unit going into a combat operational
environment needs to ensure all Soldiers are trained in the warrior tasks and battle
drills and can perform the required lethal-style operations, performing the SFA mission
requires a different focus and much more in depth on working with the host-nation
forces. (Initial Impressions Report, Operation Enduring Freedom Security Force
Assistance, May 2010)
The current training for STTs is inadequate to fully prepare them for the cultural
environments they actually encounter while training ISF. STTs in Iraq have reported
that the training they received prior to deployment did not adequately prepare them for
what they actually encountered when training ISF. An example where STT leaders say
they were not adequately prepared in their training was in the area of the Iraqi culture
itself. These leaders state that in the Iraqi culture, knowledge is power. Because of
this fact, what happens in many cases is that Iraqi commanders will be aware of an
operation or mission and not tell the USF or even their own subordinate commanders
or staff. Iraqi leaders are able to retain wasta or clout if they are the only ones
who know certain information. (Lesson of the Day Predeployment Training of
Stabilization Transition Teams, 30 December 2009)
Training and preparing leaders and Soldiers with the necessary skills required to
conduct advise and assist missions is a must! We need to expand upon and continue
language and culture training. The Iraqis will always have their own values and
character traits that we do not always understand. This can be diffcult to assess. We
cannot assess and compare every situation to U.S. military standards. The AABs should
have not only the tools and resources but also the discipline and team concept for
these type missions. These leaders should also have training in the areas of garrison
operations and force protection operations. These are areas that enable our Iraqi
counterparts during training. I believe we still have lots of work to do in this area. (Key
Leader Interview, LTC Leon E. Luck III, Base Defense Operations Cell, Camp Victory,
Iraq, 25 J une 2010)
I think the most important thing is to train the teams as early as possible with the
organizations they are coming into theater with now. The Army Force Generation
(ARFORGEN) cycle does not support getting the teams there in time. Because of
the ARFORGEN cycle, brigade commanders do not have a chance to go through
an exercise with all of their STTs, or their partnering teams, in a mission readiness
exercise. In terms of specialized training, it depends on where they are going. If STTs
are going to an area with a border, they need to understand how border operations
work and functions of sovereignty. They should be familiar with the U.S. Department
of Homeland Security border operations. The training with the interagency aspect of
border operations is important. Understanding what each STT member brings to the
organization, how they are organized, and what their strengths and weaknesses are
essential. Understanding what our strengths and weaknesses are enables commanders
to better position resources and interact with other organizations. (Key Leader
Interview COL Charles T. Hensley, G-3, USD-S, June 2010)
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The over-arching theme was that all units need to focus on basics: shoot, move, and
communicate skills. Other critical skills include troop leading procedures and the
ability to conduct good precombat inspections/precombat checks and mission briefs,
battle and crew drills, move as a member of a fre team, conduct dismounted patrols in
urban terrain, and immediate action drills (dismounted movement techniques, react to
improvised explosive device strike, ambush, roll over). These are tasks the unit will be
expected to show the Afghan National Police (ANP) as well. Other must-know skills
are operational network for Common Remotely Operated Weapon Station, checkpoint
operations, searching vehicles and individuals, use of the Biometric Automated Toolset
System and Handheld Interagency Identity Detection System, cultural awareness
training, escalation-of-force practical exercises, nine-line medical evacuation, close
air support, use of Blue Force Tracker, funds training on the use of Title 10 Afghan
Security Forces Funds, ANP overview, the Ministry of Interior logistical process, and
how to effectively use nongovernmental organizations such as CIVPOL or DYNCORP.
(Initial Impressions Report, Operation Enduring Freedom Security Force Assistance,
May 2010)
Equally important was the need to educate the leaders and Soldiers as to what SFA
would mean at the squad, platoon, and company levels. In close cooperation with
the outgoing unit, 4/1AD held a series of sessions with leaders and Soldiers to start
changing the average mindset prior to deployment. In some cases, there existed
mid-level leaders with an Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) deployment or two under
their belt who needed to know that this would not be like their former rotations. In
addition, new Soldiers had to understand that this is not the combat tour they have read
about where U.S. forces are focused on targeting and killing the enemy. The brigade
commander established clear guidance during the National Training Center rotation for
leaders at all echelons to restructure their thinking thusly: For every Iraqi problem that
we encounter, we ought to be able to fnd an Iraqi solution to that problem. (CALL
Newsletter 10-17, Security Force Assistance, December 2009)
Lesson/Insight: The BCTs were designed to provide built-in fexibility to perform any mission
assigned; however, receiving proper training prior to deployment is critical for successful SFA
missions. Most reports indicate that the six-week predeployment training offered to the military
transition teams does an excellent job of teaching basic combat skills, but is very limited in
providing scenario-based exercises, cultural training, rapport building, negotiations, and small-
group team building. Advise, assist, and train will always be a key part of any stability operations
environment; therefore, it is incumbent on the military to provide the resources and training
opportunities to properly prepare forces for these missions.
Recommendations:
The predeployment training for deploying combat advisers should be examined to
determine if suffcient training time is dedicated to teaching and coaching techniques,
cultural training, practical exercises, and other skills needed to foster relationships and
transfer knowledge to the host-nation security forces.
Produce a common set of COIN-related METL tasks for the operational force, such
as conducting SFA, interagency integration, civil-military operations, and political-
military integration,
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SFA force commanders must determine the appropriate balance between training
warrior tasks/battle drills and SFA tasks in the limited time they have for
predeployment training.
Correctly align U.S. and host-nation security forces military sets to enhance training
and facilitate success.
Extend the advisors contact time with the host-nation security forces to the maximum
extent possible to develop and maintain the trust required.
Topic: AAB Strengths and Weaknesses
Author: MAJ Michael Mullins, 6th IA Division Military Transition Team Executive Offcer
Theater: Iraq
Dates: August 2009 to August 2010
Observation
J ust recently as August 2010, the 4th BCT, 3rd Infantry Division (4-3 AAB) moved into our
division MiTT AO. I was previously working as the division MiTT executive offcer and
combat adviser to the 6th IA Division and several of its staff, such as the 6th IA Division G-3,
G-5, G-7, headquarters and service company, and the personal security detachment for the IA
commanding general. It sounds like a lot, but our team had considerable help from the STT
members who were on-site much earlier than their own organic U.S. brigade, 4-3 AAB. Initially,
the STT members were augmented to our division MiTT as early as J anuary 2010, eight months
before the AAB would assume responsibility. This gave eight months of great insight as to the
mechanics, task organization, and training of the STT assigned to 4-3 AAB.
We worked together and used our limited resources under one entity until the AAB and its
headquarters could assume responsibility for our AO. Immediately, we realized the STT
members came to us with very little organizational equipment. The STT had personal weapons
and accessories such as optics, and that was about it. We issued ammunition, computers, desks,
nontactical vehicles (NTVs), and high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) (just
to mention Class V and Class VII items) to the STT members.
In addition, we immediately noticed a quickly depleting Class I fund that was assigned to
our MiTT to help supplement any critical items that were not immediately provided from our
higher headquarters. As far as task organization, command and control (C2), modifed table of
organization and equipment (MTOE) strength, and training were concerned, there were several
major differences between the MiTT and the STT.
One major difference the two teams quickly noticed was in predeployment training. The STT
received 10 days compared to the three months that our MiTT just completed. We knew these
differences could negatively impact our mission if we did not pull together and align our internal
team training plan to match as closely as possible to the team training our MiTT received at Fort
Riley.
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The AAB concept as we understood it was to assist the ISF, providing them logistics if necessary,
as well as assisting with governmental and private initiatives through mentorship and funding.
The AABs point men were now the STTs. To us, this meant that the AABs were going to assist
the STTs immensely with organizational equipment, assume direct C2 of the STTs to allow the
STTs to have myriad resources at their fngertips, and have a brigade commander who owns the
operational environment (OE) and understands the STTs role better than what was observed
under the previous autonomous MiTTs. This was one of the major reasons the AAB was formed
and why the divisional separate MiTTs were going away. Although our MiTT was not under
the C2 of a BCT early in the deployment and reported only to the U.S. division and USF-I, we
quickly moved under the command of the 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) from 2nd
Infantry Division as early as December 2009, approximately 60 days after we established our
footprint in the 6th IA Division as their combat advisers.
After the task organizational change, we noticed immediate effects. We now had to report
directly to the U.S. brigade and its staff. Initially, the transition was rough, and we could not
see the brigade staffs role in assisting the MiTT. We soon realized that our small team could
not accomplish its mission more effectively or more effciently without help from the 4th SBCT
and its staff members. Once we succumbed to the idea that the U.S. brigade had dedicated
resources at our fngertips, we inculcated ourselves within the brigade. I mention this because
it is a good example of what is envisioned in the Armys new AAB concept: a U.S. brigade
having a direct relationship with the advisers on the ground and their STT advisers having all
the AAB resources at their fngertips. Almost all members agreed that one OE owner and one
command relationship with direct access helped exponentially in comparison to the previous task
organization with autonomous MiTTs.
Now, the concept to channel all energies in one direction and one goal can be realized. This was
the concept, but we began to witness gaps between the AABs and the STTs. Although in concept
it sounded great and the division MiTT and 4th SBCT that I worked with lived that concept
to the fullest, it appeared that the goals of the AAB and STT were not always in-line with one
another due to the lack of education, training, MTOE shortages, and various other reasons.
Discussion:
As the division MiTT transitioned out of theater and the STTs AAB moved in to control the
OE in which we were working (northwest Baghdad), we immediately understood the STT
frustration. Our MiTT turned in all of the equipment, and the STT we left behind had to ask their
brigade for replacement equipment. The STTs needed computers, radios, NTVs, HMMWVs,
and much more. It was very discerning to see the STTs dependency rely heavily on the MiTTs
equipment, to include feld ordering offcer (FOO) funds and contracting. Our division MiTT
attended several meetings with 4-3 AAB and witnessed the level of commitment the brigade
had with their STT. It seemed as if the brigade had one agenda, while the STT had a completely
different agenda. Although great advantages were realized with our own MiTT under the U.S.
brigade, it started with us being accepted as the subject matter experts as combat advisers for our
Iraqi counterparts. Living through and experiencing the Armys transformation from BCTs and
MiTTs to AABs and STTs, both adviser teams noted several advantages and disadvantages under
the BCT concept compared to the AAB concept:
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Advantages:
The advantage of the STTs was its direct organizational and command
relationship. The STT had only one entity to report to as opposed to the MiTT,
which had USF-I and a division staff. The relationship, with the AAB was
already established. The direct C2 relationship kept the STTs goals nested with
that of the AAB commander.
STTs from the AABs did not need to ask for augmented security personnel
when they conducted mounted combat patrols with the IA counterparts. The
AAB already had mechanized infantry units at their location and were ready to
support the STTs tactical movements without the need for formal requests.
In theory, the AABs understood the roles and responsibilities of the STT much
better than the previous, autonomous MiTTs. The BCT commander and MiTTs
teams often worked under separate agendas, which often conficted and strained
the relationship between the MiTTs and BCTs.
The advantage of the MiTTs was their organizational strength. They were
task-organized with a minimum of 10 personnel compared to the STT with 3
to 4 personnel. The MiTTs personnel strength ensured that we could conduct
both life-support/internal duties as well as advise without being distracted or
overwhelmed with one or the other responsibility. As a division MiTT, we
advised many more key leaders than the STT could possibly cover. The MiTTs
also had their own FOO accounts and did not have to rely on external funding
to subsidize anything that was necessary in theater.
Disadvantages:
The disadvantage of the MiTT was its lack of direct organizational and
command relationship with the brigade that owned the OE. The MiTT teams
had to request resources from all locations possible. Fortunately, we were
attached to the 4th SBCT, which had myriad resources and often helped our
MiTT accomplish its mission, but those resources depended strictly on the built
relationships between the MiTT chief and the BCT commander. These included
but were defnitely not limited to brigade engineers, brigade military police, and
even brigade staff assisting us with key leader engagements.
The disadvantage of the STT members was their lack of predeployment training
with the AAB. The command group from the AAB often had a different
perspective than that of the STT. The AABs staff and other leadership had very
little, if any, cultural awareness and language training. Therefore, the unity of
effort in priorities, objectives, and short-term goals was often different, thus,
straining the relationships between the STT members and the AAB command
group.
The STTs were also so small they were often conducting internal team and life-
support duties more than advising. The STTs continued to conduct their internal
duties as a battalion staff and relied heavily on the support of the AABs staff.
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Many of the key leaders who were being advised by the MiTT were no longer
being covered by the STT. If the AABs staff was not supportive in covering
down or had limited manpower, the STTs success would be stifed.
The STTs organic equipment was narrowed down to personally owned
weapons with accessories. The STTs were forced to ask/beg their AAB for all
classes of supply to include night-vision goggles, crew-served weapons, NTVs,
HMMWVs, and more.
When MiTTs transitioned to STTs, FOO accounts and other individual funding
for STTs were closed. STTs were at the mercy of the AABs decision to allocate
any additional funding or not.
Recommendations:
Recommend that the STT and AAB command group conduct predeployment training
together. The training for the STTs and the AAB leadership should be the same. This
would minimize the different perspectives that we witnessed in theater. This would also
ensure that a better working relationship is established before deployment, reducing the
amount of strain and stress between the two organizations.
Recommend that the STTs MTOE strength be increased to cover those critical key
leadership positions and to allow for any internal duties to be accomplished without
distracting or impairing the advising portion of the mission. This would ensure the
STTs were physically capable of advising the majority of the key leaders that were
targeted.
Keep the task organization the same with direct C2, but allow the STT to have its
own organizational equipment and not rely on the AAB striping resources from other
internal sections in order to make the mission work. Success should not rely on the
AABs ability to provide equipment or personnel but provide a framework that will
build the STTs capability.
Develop an AAB allocation or fund account that is completely separate and hold the
STTs accountable, allowing the STT to be more fexible and have a better margin of
success.
Topic: OIF VII and Oper ation New Dawn (OND) 3r d HBCT, 3ID AAB Obser vations
Theater: Iraq
Observation: Defning the C2 relationship between the maneuver unit and the STT early enables
unity of command and ease of operations.
Discussion: Initially, the C2 relationships of the STTs were not formally defned across the BCT.
Most of the time this was quickly worked out between a professional conversation with the
STTs and the battalion-level commander, but on several occasions it was necessary for the BCT
commander to further defne this relationship. This is critical when it deals with command-select
STT members and the relationship with the STT members who are colonels.
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Recommendation: As with C2 relationships within maneuver and support units, defne the C2
relationships of STT members and the battalions/squadron within the BCT (attached, operational
control, supported, supporting, etc.).
Observation: Task-organizing a company-level organization to execute either a STT support
mission or PRT-support mission enabled positive development of key relationships.
Discussion: Several company-level organizations were task-organized with the primary mission
of either supporting a PRT or STT directly. This enabled the two organizations to quickly form
a professional relationship and move forward toward the same goal/end state. Additionally,
it ensured that both supported elements were as mobile as possible throughout the AO and
maximized their interaction with their Iraqi counterparts.
Recommendation: When possible, assign a company-level organization the permanent job of
supporting a PRT and STT, ensuring this relationship remains throughout the deployment.
Observation: Use the size and diversity of experiences within the modular BCT staff to reinforce
the efforts of the PRT and STT.
Discussion: Modular BCT staffs have the ability to dedicate additional manpower to reinforce
the efforts of the PRT and STT within different portions of the AO. Civil-military offcers
(formally or informally trained) were used to help fll shortages on PRTs. Lawyers were used
to help both the PRT and STT develop the rule of law and improve the capabilities of the IP.
Intelligence offcers reinforced the efforts of STT training and also executed intelligence mobile
training teams to provide additional resources for the ISF.
Recommendation: AABs should continue this TTP to increase the success of the PRT and STT
(the main efforts) elements in order to achieve the desired end state for the commanders intent.
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Advise and Assist Br igade Oper ations
4th Br igade, 3r d Infantr y Division, Al Anbar Province, Ir aq
LTC John Hoefert, Center for Army Lessons Learned Liaison Offcer
4th Br igade, 3r d Infantr y Division Advise and Assist Br igade
Obser vation
Security force assistance is no longer an additional duty. It is now a core competency of our
Army.
Field Manual 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance, May 2009
Discussion
4th Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division (4/3ID) assumed responsibility of Al Anbar Province from
1st Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division (1/82) on 2 August 2010. Both units are among the frst
to be designated as advise and assist brigades (AABs) in the Armys efforts to conduct security
force assistance in accordance with FM 3-07.1. The following information is certainly not all-
encompassing, nor is it an attempt to provide the perfect solution for AAB operations. Rather,
it provides an overview of how 4/3ID AAB organized to best advise, train, assist, and equip
Iraqi security forces (ISF) in Al Anbar Province. ISF collectively refers to the Iraqi Army (IA)
and Iraqi police (IP). What follows is the result of 4/3IDs mission analysis and shows how they
organized their battalions, stability transition teams (STTs), and police training teams (PTTs) to
best partner with the many different ISF entities and work toward establishing police primacy
throughout Al Anbar province through the use of conditions-based lines of effort and district
team partnerships.
Organization
The brigade is augmented with 43 additional feld-grade offcers (three colonels, 20 lieutenant
colonels, and 20 majors) who make up fve STTs and an ISF coordination cell. A military
police company provides personnel to staff nine PTTs, who, in turn, support STT efforts with
law enforcement training and security during key leader engagements as well as transportation
throughout the area. Human terrain teams (HTTs), civilian police advisers (CPAs), and law
enforcement professionals (LEPs) also provide expertise. Two organic maneuver battalions
coordinate with and provide STTs with additional partnering, transportation, and security
capability. The brigade support battalion (BSB) and brigade special troops battalion (BSTB)
provide traditional/doctrinal sustainment to 4/3ID and advise and assist IA and IP forces in
the enabler support arena. 1st Armored Division, headquartered in Baghdad and serving as
U.S. Division Center (USD-C), advises and assists Iraqi provincial senior leadership through a
forward-deployed brigadier general (Deputy Commanding General, USD-C West). The brigade
also supports a provincial reconstruction team (PRT). The task organization is depicted in Figure
10-1.
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Legend:
AOC Anbar Operations Command
APD Anbar Police Directorate
ASOS Air support operations squadron
BDOC Base defense operations center
BN Battalion
CAPT Civil affairs planning team
CGS Common ground station
CI Counter intelligence
COLT Combat observation and lasing team
DBE Department of Border Enforcement
EOD Explosive ordinance detachment
FA Field artillery
FLE Forward logistics element
FSC Forward support company
HCT Human intelligence collection team
HQ Headquarters
IN Infantry
MET Meteorological
MI Military intelligence
MP Military police
MWD Military working dog
SWET Sewage, water, electricity, and trash
UAS Unmanned aerial system
Figure 10-1. Brigade task organization
77
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Advise and Assist Relationships
4/3ID advises and assists the following entities:
Two IA divisions (six subordinate brigades).
Eight district chiefs of police.
Three training centers.
One detention facility.
The Anbar Operations Command (AOC). The AOC coordinates and monitors all ISF
activities throughout Anbar Province. The relationship is coordinated by USD-C West.
The Anbar Police Directorate (APD). The APD coordinates and monitors IP activities
within Anbar province and is led by a provincial chief of police (PCoP).
The Department of Border Enforcement (DBE). The DBE provides security along
Iraqs borders with Syria, J ordan, and Saudi Arabia.
Lines of Effor t
Police primacy is an essential element of 4/3IDs plan given the specifed task of enabling a
self-suffcient provincial government capable of providing sustained security for its citizens.
Figure 10-2 depicts three integrated and mutually supporting lines of effort (LOEs) that focus
on ISF professionalization (decisive operations), civil capacity (shaping operations), and
responsible drawdown of forces (RDoF) (sustaining operations). Note that IP professionalization
is considered a critical sub-LOE of ISF professionalization. Ten linked operations (concept
of operations [CONOPS]) further govern efforts along the LOEs. Each CONOP is aimed at
integrating, aligning, and effectively communicating commanders intent, effort, and progress
toward the desired conditions of each LOE.
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Figure 10-2. Lines of effor t
Distr ict-Team Par tner ships
Integrating the many activities among and between different ISF entities is diffcult. Challenges
exist in coordinating the targeting, detention, warrant, and prosecution efforts between the
IA and IP. The IA is a relatively self-suffcient organization due to several years of training
and partnering with military transition teams and has accepted much of the law enforcement
responsibility throughout the province. The IP is developing its law enforcement capacity
through various recruiting and training initiatives and is focused on relieving the IA of policing
functions and clearing the way for police primacy to take hold. Advising and assisting at the
district-team level intends to help this process.
District-team partnering creates linkages that facilitate communication and integration between
the IA and IP. 4/3ID divided its area of operations (AO) into two geographic sub-AOs. Each
sub-AO is managed by a maneuver battalion and sourced with an STT, numerous PTTs, and
associated CPAs, LEPs, and HTT personnel. Each entity engages in coordinated and appropriate
rank and skill-based partnering with the IA and IP. The keys to success are the seamless and
transparent links between the STTs, PTTs, and the maneuver battalions that reduce the number
of touch points the IA and IP have to go to for support. The goal is to improve unity of effort and
situational awareness through simultaneous information fow between the IA and the AOC and
the IP and the APD. The logical follow-on is an increased movement of horizontal information
between the AOC and APD. Figure 10-3 depicts how each battalion creates linkages with STTs
and PTTs to facilitate APD/AOC and IA/IP integration and communication.
79
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Legend
C2 Command and control
HPDF Hurricane Point Detention Center
HTC Habbaniyah Training Center
J OC J oint operations center
PSF Provisional security force
RTC Ramadi Training Center
USF United States Forces
Figure 10-3. Distr ict-team par tner ship
Realizing that the district-team concept requires actionable items at the senior leadership level,
the 4/3ID brigade commander offered the following tangibles to the PCoP as an initial way
ahead:
Assistance in establishing a working group of investigative judges and district law
enforcement personnel to improve knowledge of and share information on targeting,
warranting, and prosecution efforts.
Assistance in coordinating evidence-collection efforts between the IA and IP.
Use of a train-the-trainer concept to wean the IP off of U.S. individual/tactical level
training and empower IP to conduct training themselves.
Monthly update and assessment (subjective and objective) of progress using U.S.
ForcesIraq (USFI)-directed measurement tools.
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The second (and perhaps most important) part of the way ahead requested the following from
the PCoP:
Conduct a review of required tasks by Iraqi agency and identify stakeholders.
Review processes and determine how Iraqi stakeholders can improve the processes at
each step along the way.
Provide information on how to best assist in fxing issues at one of the provincial
training centers plagued with low attendance and graduation rates.
These due-outs effectively placed ownership of and responsibility for the plan in the
Iraqis hands with 4/3IDs support and assistance.
Enabler Suppor t
While 4/3IDs maneuver battalions and STTs organized geographically, the sustainment
elements organized functionally. The BSB advises and assists the IA with improving oversight
of materiel, maintenance, medical, supply, and services processes. The BSTB advises, trains,
and assists both the IA and IP on how to improve their capabilities in intelligence collection,
surveillance and reconnaissance, signal, engineering and route clearance, explosive ordnance
disposal, and weapons exploitation. The challenge here is not getting the IA and IP to understand
the importance of services, support, and sustainment; rather, its getting them to understand
their internal systems and how to communicate accurate and relevant status throughout the
organization. This task involves building the logistics partnership from the ground up and
becomes more diffcult as RDoF efforts increase and the BSB and BSTB divide their attention
among supporting the brigade, continued advising/assisting with the IA and IP, and working base
closure and consolidation issues. Figure 10-4 depicts the concept of enabler support.
Lessons Lear ned:
Commanders and planners must understand that all the elements present in the
operational environment drive task organization of an AAB. What works for one
brigade combat team in transition will not necessarily work for the next, nor will the
augmentation be the same.
Organizing STTs, PTTs, CPAs, and LEPs under maneuver battalions focuses functional
efforts on a geographic basis. Direct partnering of BSB and BSTB (pure functional
alignment) with Iraqi units works well.
Understanding relationships between equal-ranking commanders and STT leads is
important for unity of effort.
Use of the USFI smart book How the Iraqi Army Operates early on, rather than once
deployed, is absolutely essential.
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Legend:
AMW Al Asaad Medium Workshop
FER Field engineer regiment
FFW Field Factory Workshop
HMW Habbaniyah Medium Workshop
MED Medical company
OP Ordnance park
SIG Signal company/regiment
TPC Transportation Provisioning Command
Figure 10-4. Concept of enabler suppor t
The philosophy of Iraqi solutions to Iraqi problems does not mean dont help. It
means be creative and get them better at using their own systems.
Defning the end state is critical, but realize that the calendar and the Iraqis now have a
vote in what it looks like.
The modular brigade enables a fat structure and, therefore, yields rapid
communication of vast amounts of information up, down, and sideways. Its important
for staffers to understand this concept.
Conducting foreign security assistance requires great skill in building relationships and
leading from behind. We must all increase our understanding of this important mission.
GEN Martin E. Dempsey, Foreword to FM 3-07.1, May 2009
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