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Process Safety: From Concept to Commissioning

Jennifer F. Mize
Principal Chemical Engineer
Eastman Chemical Company
P.O. Box 511, Building18
Kingsport, TN 37662
jfmize@eastman.com



Copyright 2013, Eastman Chemical Company
All Rights Reserved



Prepared for Presentation at
American Institute of Chemical Engineers
2013 Spring Meeting
9th Global Congress on Process Safety
San Antonio, Texas
April 28 May 1, 2013


UNPUBLISHED



AIChE shall not be responsible for statements or opinions contained
in papers or printed in its publications
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Process Safety: From Concept to Commissioning


Jennifer F. Mize
Principal Chemical Engineer
Eastman Chemical Company
P.O. Box 511, Building18
Kingsport, TN 37662
jfmize@eastman.com

Keywords: Process safety, inherently safer design, relief design, Safety Instrumented
Systems, hazard analysis

Abstract

Process safety is an essential component in all phases of project design, from initial
research and development to commercial process design and commissioning. Data
obtained in the laboratory and piloting efforts feed into the engineering design of the
commercial facility. Integration of process safety into the design process will ensure the
optimal utilization of inherently safer design, relief and effluent handling systems, and
Safety Instrumented Systems in the final design.

I. Introduction

Process safety is an essential component in all phases of project design, from initial
research and development to commercial process design. During research and
development efforts, a process safety review can help identify the hazards associated with
the planned chemistry and initiate the investigation of inherently safer chemistry. As the
project progresses into the piloting stage, experiments can be designed to identify
potential process upsets and generate data to facilitate the design of relief systems and
Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS). Experiments can also determine the vessel design
conditions that can eliminate or mitigate as many potential relief scenarios as possible in
the commercial facility. The information generated in the pilot plant will feed into the
process safety effort during the engineering design of the commercial facility allowing
critical design decisions to be made early in the project to ensure the optimal utilization
of inherently safer design, and effluent handling relief systems, and Safety Instrumented
Systems in the final design.

There are multiple roles within the process safety discipline that will need to be filled at
each design phase. A relief designer, Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA) practitioner,
SIS designer, and Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) study leader are needed in the
development of the process safety design. Consultation with chemists, process experts,
operators, equipment designers, control systems engineers, and industrial hygienists is
essential to a comprehensive evaluation of process hazards.

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II. Conceptual Design

2.1 Laboratory and pilot plant work

Process safety efforts start with laboratory and pilot plant work. Hazard identification
should be included as a routine part of the planning of laboratory experiments and
development of piloting efforts. Identifying the hazards will allow for the design,
construction, and operation of a safe laboratory unit as well as a safe scale-up to a pilot
unit and then to commercialization. Prior to any formal hazard identification process, a
thorough review of existing literature and standard chemical references should be
conducted to obtain basic information about the physical and chemical hazards of the
chemicals that will be used. Standard references such as Kirk-Othmer [1], Bretherick [2],
Sax [3], and others will provide additional understanding of the reactive potential of a
given system.

Prior to starting the hazard identification process, all available information on the
chemicals should be gathered. In some cases, due to the experimental nature of the
chemicals produced, Safety Datasheets (SDS) may not be available. Hazards may have
to be assessed based on chemical structure. Testing may be needed to identify chemical
properties so that they can be safely handled.

The hazard assessment should be documented at each stage so the information can be
used as the process is developed and scaled up. The method and level of detail for the
hazard assessment will vary at each stage of the process development. A checklist may
be sufficient to guide the discussion for the laboratory and pilot plant work, while the
more rigorous methods set forth by OSHA 1910.119 (e)[4] including Checklist, "What
if", Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP), and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
(FMEA) should be used during the Front-End Engineering and Detailed Design efforts.

The hazard assessment conducted during the conceptual design should include an
evaluation of the following:

Reactive Hazards
Fire and Explosive Hazards
Respiratory, Skin, and Eye Hazards
Materials Handling

Pilot plants are typically operated to achieve steady-state conditions and generate data
that will support scale-up to a commercial plant. Another important task in the piloting
efforts is the identification of potential safety concerns during upset conditions. A
working knowledge of the intended chemistry is not sufficient to ensure reactive hazards
are adequately addressed. The unintended chemistry, such as side reactions,
decompositions, and unidentified intermediates, can lead to unsafe conditions in the unit.
Increasing or decreasing the concentration of reactants can lead to reactive hazards that
may not have been identified in the development of the original intended chemistry. For
example, the accumulation of byproducts and impurities in a particular system due to
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closing of the recycle streams could lead to hazards in the pilot unit that were not
experienced at the laboratory scale. Furthermore, reaction kinetics may be sensitive to
changes in operating conditions such as temperature and pressure. Reactants and
products may be unstable or subject to thermal decomposition. Incompatibilities with
seal fluids, heating media, lubricants, or other materials could lead to additional safety
concerns. [5]

The process safety engineer can assist with designing experiments to identify hazards and
generate data for the process safety evaluations during the design of a manufacturing
facility. Material generated in the laboratory and/or pilot plant can be used for
Differential Scanning Calorimetry (DSC) and other screening tests to identify reactivity
concerns. Potential reactions, instabilities, or incompatibilities can be addressed by
substituting other solvents or reactants that do not exhibit unstable behavior or reactivity.

2.2 Conceptual Safety Review / Process Safety Design Philosophy

Once the conceptual design of a commercial facility starts, a safety review should be
conducted with process engineers, chemists, and pilot plant operators with knowledge of
the process chemistry and operation. The goal of this review is to document the main
hazards of the process and develop the general process safety design philosophy for the
facility. Data from the laboratory and pilot plant work are crucial to this effort.

The conceptual safety review and documentation of the process safety design philosophy
will allow the process safety engineer to communicate the hazards and mitigations to the
other disciplines (process design, equipment design, vessel design, etc.), to be included in
their design deliverables. The best opportunity to achieve inherently safer design occurs
at this point in the design process. When inherently safer alternatives are not available,
relief systems and SIS can then be implemented to address the hazards. The process
safety engineer can utilize each of these options to optimize the safety design.

2.2.1 Inherently safer design

An inherently safer design is one that eliminates or reduces hazards rather than mitigating
or controlling them. The process flowsheet should be reviewed to identify opportunities
to implement inherently safer design, which can be achieved, for example, by selecting a
vessel or system with a Maximum Allowable Working Pressure (MAWP) that is greater
than the maximum possible pressure that can be generated during upset conditions.
Alternatively, the supply pressure and/or temperature of the utilities can be selected to
eliminate them as potential sources of overpressure. As previously mentioned, potential
reactions, instabilities or incompatibilities can be addressed by substituting other solvents
or reactants that do not exhibit unstable behavior or reactivity.

The process safety engineer should consider the following issues when looking for
opportunities to eliminate or reduce the hazards present in the preliminary design. When
identified early in the conceptual design, these strategies can be integrated into the design
process and validated in the pilot plant to confirm their viability. If a given hazard cannot
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be eliminated, the implementation of inherently safer options can be used to minimize the
size of relief systems and/or reduce the required reliability of SIS to effectively mitigate
it.

Vapor pressure of components at maximum utility temperatures

In order to eliminate loss of cooling and abnormal heating as relief scenarios, the
vapor pressure of all components, including cleaning solvents, must be less than the
system rated pressure at the maximum temperature of the heating media. This can be
achieved by selecting a heating media with the lowest practical operating temperature
and designing the system to operate at this temperature. The system MAWP is then
selected based upon the maximum vapor pressure that can be experienced with the
selected heating media. The relief designer must consider all operating modes,
including maintenance and cleaning operations, when selecting the system MAWP.
The designer must consider the use of all cleaning agents, such as water or solvents,
which may generate sufficient vapor pressure to overpressure the system.

Maximum utility pressure

Utilities directly connected to the vessel, such as inert gas, water, or steam, can be a
source of overpressure if the supply pressure is greater than the system MAWP. In
order to eliminate tube rupture as a potential relief scenario, the supply pressure of the
heating and cooling media must be less than the system MAWP.

Reactivity concerns

Potential reactions, instabilities, or incompatibilities can be addressed by substituting
other solvents or reactants that do not exhibit unstable behavior or reactivity.
Evaluation of alternate solvents and reactants should be considered during laboratory
and pilot plant work. Utility supply temperature can be limited to ensure the system
operates significantly below the initiation temperature of identified exothermic
reactions or thermal decompositions. Heating and cooling media that are compatible
with the process materials can be selected to eliminate the potential for reactions due
to mixing of process and utility streams due to leaks or tube failures.

Liquid overpressure

In order to eliminate liquid overpressure as a potential relief scenario the maximum
supply pressure of all liquid feeds to the vessels should be less than the system
MAWP. This can be readily achieved with pressure vessels designed per ASME
Code, [6] which have pressure ratings above 15 psig. Alternatively, relief systems
with discharge to a properly designed effluent handling system can be used to address
liquid overpressure. Low pressure storage tanks designed to API 650 [7] cannot be
filled above the top weld line, so relief cannot be provided for liquid overpressure by
a device located on the top head. Relief for liquid overpressure can be provided by a
relief device located on the top head of API 620 [8] storage tanks, which can be rated
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for 2.5 psig to 15 psig. Designing an API 620 storage tank for 15 psig allows the use
of a relief valve to address liquid overpressure. Alternatively, a Safety Instrumented
System can be used to shut off liquid feeds into the tank on high level. If there are
multiple feed lines, it can be difficult to achieve the required reliability in the SIS.

Vacuum

All vessels that are not rated for full vacuum require vacuum protection. The
installation of a vacuum vent introduces a source of air inflow to the process that may
lead to the development of a flammable atmosphere inside the process vessel. There
may also be operational concerns associated with air entering the process vessel. For
this reason, a blanketing system is typically used in conjunction with a vacuum vent
to allow inert gas to enter the vessel to relieve vacuum prior to opening the vacuum
vent as a secondary source of vacuum protection. Required air and/or inert gas
flowrates to relieve vacuum due to pumping out a vessel are easily supplied with a
small vacuum vent and blanketing system. Low pressure storage tanks should be
requested with a Maximum Allowable Working Vacuum (MAWV) of at least 1 oz/in
to allow use of standard conservation vents to relieve vacuum.

Vacuum generated due to collapsing vapor in a distillation column or other system
with a high mass of vapor can require very large air and/or inert gas flowrates. This
may require the installation of a large vacuum vent and an accumulation system to
store inert gas so it can be introduced quickly to relieve vacuum. All pressure vessels
should be rated for full vacuum unless this requires significant additional expense to
achieve. If a full vacuum rating cannot be obtained, the vessel manufacturer should
be requested to calculate and rate the vessel for the highest possible vacuum rating
achievable with the requested MAWP.

External fire

External fire can be addressed by building layout and/or fire protection including fire
resistant insulation, vessel specific deluge, and/or foam fire systems. Locating
equipment greater than 30 feet above a surface that can sustain a pool fire,
segregating equipment and piping containing ignitable materials from equipment and
piping with no ignitable materials, and designing underground tanks can eliminate the
need to design relief systems for external fire impingement. Utilizing aboveground
buried tanks severely limits the potential fire exposure for storage systems. Providing
fire resistant insulation and/or vessel specific deluge will reduce the size of relief
systems when designing for external fire impingement. Refer to NFPA 30
Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code [9] and OSHA 1910.106 Flammable and
combustible liquids [10] for additional information.

2.2.2 Relief and Effluent Handling Systems

The relief designer should determine which vessels need individual relief devices and
which vessels will be relieved as a system, such as distillation units. The need for normal
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venting devices should also be determined. The appropriate type of relief device (relief
valve, rupture disk, and/or conservation vent) should be selected for each installation.
Evaluation of the relief design philosophy at this point in the design will allow
representation of the correct relief system/device and discharge location on the Piping
and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs) as they are developed.

The safe discharge location must be identified for each individual relief device. In order
to determine what constitutes a safe discharge location the toxicity, flammability and
volatility of the material(s) involved must be considered. Both OSHA 1910.106 and
NFPA 30 refer to discharging to a "safe location". OSHA 1910.106 is essentially the
1971 version of NFPA 30. Since the regulations do not provide prescriptive information
on discharging to a safe location, documents such as API 521 [11] and books such as
Guidelines for Pressure Relief and Effluent Handling [12], published by the Center for
Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers,
provide good engineering practice for the design of relief systems. OSHA 1910.119
Appendix C, Section 3, (part of the OSHA PSM Standard) provides additional sources
for good engineering practices.

Secondary containment, such as blowdown tanks, vent stacks, scrubbers, and flares,
should be designed to handle credible simultaneous relief flow from connected
equipment. Higher relief flowrates will result in larger secondary containment systems.
The overall process safety design philosophy will optimize the use of relief, Safety
Instrumented Systems, inherently safer design, and other mitigations to "right-size" the
relief and effluent handling systems.

2.2.3 Safety Instrumented Systems

The process safety engineer should determine where Safety Instrumented Systems will be
used to address hazards identified in the conceptual safety review. General design
considerations can include the use of SIS for liquid overpressure/overfill protection,
abnormal heating, tube failure in shell and tube heat exchangers, and pump and
compressor deadhead and isolation protection. These can be represented on the P&IDs
using a standard template for the each interlock. Non-SIL rated interlocks and interlocks
implemented in the basic process control system (BPCS) may also provide mitigation.
Layer of Protection Analysis should be utilized to determine the required reliability for
the SIL interlocks and evaluate the effectiveness of other interlocks for each scenario.


2.2.4 Difficult to resolve issues

There are some hazards that can prove to be difficult to address with either relief systems
and/or Safety Instrumented Systems. Addressing these hazards may require a
combination of relief systems or Safety Instrumented Systems with inherently safer
design (selection of vessel MAWPs) and/or specific equipment design.


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High pressure to low pressure

High pressure to low pressure is characterized by the ratio of the operating pressures.
Typically, a ratio of high operating pressure to low pressure MAWP of greater than
2.5 is considered to be of significant concern. This ratio is used as an estimate of the
transition point from elastic to plastic deformation in typical pressure vessel design.
Maintaining the ratio below 2.5 will prevent catastrophic failure of the vessel but may
result in vessel damage due to overpressure above the test pressure. A risk
assessment should be conducted to ensure sufficient layers of protection are in place
to address overpressure.

Generally, the transition from a section of the process that operates at high pressure to
a section that operates at low pressure is accomplished by the use of a pressure
reducing device like a control valve. If this valve fails to achieve the designed
pressure reduction due to human error (manual bypass or commanding the valve to
open), mechanical failure, or failure of the basic process control system, the high
pressure equipment can de-inventory quickly into the low pressure vessels with
potential for catastrophic failure of the low pressure vessels. Due to the high pressure
ratio, the flowrate across a failed open valve may require large relief devices to
protect the low pressure vessels. For very high flowrates, multiple relief devices may
be required.

If emergency pressure relief cannot be provided for this case, a SIS may be used to
shut off the flow from the high pressure equipment to the low pressure equipment.
However, without mitigation credit from an adequately designed emergency relief
system, the required reliability of the SIS may be difficult to achieve and maintain.

This hazard can be addressed by selecting the vessel MAWPs to achieve a high
operating pressure to low pressure MAWP ratio of less than 2.5 and/or designing the
pressure reducing device to limit the maximum flowrate in a failed state. Limiting
the maximum flowrate can allow design of a reasonably sized relief and effluent
handling system to provide adequate protection.

Tube rupture, especially high pressure gas/vapor into low pressure liquid (high
pressure ratio)

A tube leak or rupture in a shell and tube exchanger can allow high pressure material
to enter the low pressure side. For pressure ratios above 2.5, a rupture disk (non-
reclosing relief device) must be used to provide relief. A relief valve (reclosing
device) will not operate quickly enough to prevent failure of the low pressure side of
the exchanger.

All tube failures (except high pressure vapor into liquid) resulting from a tube leak or
a tube leak that has propagated into a full tube break can be addressed with a Safety
Instrumented System. For high pressure vapor into liquid an engineering analysis
should be conducted to verify if a SIS has sufficient time to operate. All tube failures
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resulting from a full, instantaneous tube break need to be addressed with a relief
device; a SIS cannot operate quickly enough to prevent vessel failure.

Rupture disks may be undesirable to protect liquid-filled exchangers because of the
potential for disk failure due to water hammer. Proper effluent handling must be
provided based on the hazards of the relieving fluid, which is not the normal contents
of the side of the exchanger that requires protection. Reaction due to mixing of
incompatible materials in the exchanger must also be evaluated in the relief design.
Designing the exchanger to limit the operating ratio below 2.5 should be strongly
considered.

Introduction of Volatiles

Potential hazards exist when materials of significantly different volatilities are present
in the process. Leakage of a low boiling liquid into a hot vessel can result in a high
vapor generation rate as the low boiler flashes. Low boiling liquids can enter a hot
vessel due to a tube rupture or process error allowing reverse flow or flow through the
wrong path. Relief device sizing for this scenario can result in very large relief
devices. This concern can be addressed by selecting a system MAWP above the
vapor pressure of the low boilers at maximum process and utility temperatures or by
the use of SIS to prevent low boilers from entering hot vessels.

External fire

For many vessels, external fire is the governing relief scenario because the
unmitigated heat input due to a pool fire can require large relief devices to provide
emergency pressure relief. External pool fire can be mitigated by the use of fire
resistant insulation and/or vessel specific deluge to reduce the required size of the
relief devices. Due to the high temperatures that can be experienced during a pool
fire, vessels containing high boilers (boiling point above the vessel rated temperature)
and gas-filled vessels can fail due to overheating of the vessel walls before reaching
the set pressure of the relief devices. A depressurization system can be designed to
de-inventory these vessels prior to failure. Safety Instrumented Systems cannot be
used to mitigate external fire because the components can be damaged or destroyed
by the fire.

Development of the process safety design philosophy and documentation of process
hazards during the conceptual design will ensure that this information is available to the
equipment designers and control system engineers as they start their efforts during Front-
End Engineering. This will ensure that equipment specifications will include the
requested MAWP as well as nozzles for the installation of relief systems and the
instrumentation needed for the SIS. Safety Instrumented Systems can be addressed in the
development of the interlock narratives and any non-SIL rated or BPCS interlocks used
for hazard mitigation can be included in control systems design.


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III. Front-End Engineering

Information from the conceptual safety review and general safety design philosophy will
feed into the development of the Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs). Since
the relief and Safety Instrumented System design efforts may be conducted in parallel
with the Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PrHA), it is critical that the preliminary safety
interlocks and relief systems are represented on the P&IDs that will be used during the
PrHA. This will allow the team to assess the adequacy of the proposed mitigations and
controls and will minimize recommendations that simply identify the need for mitigation
that will have to be designed after the conclusion of the study. It is more effective and
efficient for the team to assess the adequacy of the proposed mitigations and controls
during the study. Representation of the preliminary safety interlocks and relief systems
on the P&IDs will also allow the interlock and relief system designers to start their design
efforts prior to the conclusion of the PrHA.

3.1 Preliminary Hazard Analysis

The PrHA should be conducted early enough in the design phase of the project to allow
the hazards to be effectively addressed as part of the process design efforts. Early
identification of hazards and the required controls also lowers cost by preventing scope
changes late in the project. Waiting for the PrHA team to identify the need for all
interlocks and relief systems forces the process safety design to take place later in the
project schedule increasing the likelihood of delays and scope changes and may eliminate
the capability to efficiently implement inherently safer options.

In order for the PrHA to be effective, preliminary Process Safety Information (PSI),
including P&IDs, Heat and Material Balances (HMBs), and relief system and Safety
Instrumented Systems design must be available for review. At least two review cycles
should have been completed on the P&IDs by the project team and operations
representatives. This will allow sufficient time for a thorough review of the P&IDs (first
cycle) followed by incorporation of the markups from the review into the P&IDs used for
the PrHA (second cycle). Plant layouts and site plans should be available for review,
along with the preliminary control system design and the process safety design
philosophy.

Since the PrHA is being conducted in the design phase of the project, maintenance,
operability, and other design issues will be identified during the study. The study leader
should ensure that any design discussions do not interfere with the hazard analysis. If it
is determined that the design is still in development such that the PrHA is not effective, it
should be stopped and resumed once the design is better developed.

A team report should be generated at the conclusion of the PrHA to provide
documentation of hazards and proposed controls for use by the project team.
Recommendations made during the study should be incorporated and addressed during
the remainder of the design phase.

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3.2 Relief Design

The relief scope should be developed and documented during the design effort. The
scope should include preliminary sizing, proposed set pressures, and discharge location
for each device. Materials of construction should be identified for the relief devices due
to the potential for long-lead times on specialty alloys. The relief designer should review
the P&IDs to evaluate the need for relief devices on utility supplies, piping systems,
pumps, and downstream of control valves or pressure reducing systems. Proposed relief
systems with discharge location should be represented on the P&IDs used for the PrHA.

Once the PrHA has been completed, the relief designer should review the team report to
ensure that all scenarios requiring relief are included in the sizing basis. The relief scope
should include specific guidance for completing relief calculations for the project,
including codes, standards, regulations, and good engineering practices that must be
incorporated. A plan should be developed for review and approval of all relief
calculations generated for the project.

3.3 Safety Instrumented Systems

The SIS scope should be developed and documented during the design effort. The scope
should include identification of the initiating event, proposed initiator and actions, and
required reliability. LOPA or other risk assessments should be used to determine the
required reliability for proposed interlocks. This will allow the required instrumentation,
field elements, logic solver, and other components for the SIS to be included in the
overall control system design. The interlock designer should review the P&IDs to
evaluate the need for SIS on pumps or other rotating equipment. Proposed SIS should be
represented on the P&IDs used in the PrHA. Once the PrHA has been completed, the
interlock designer should review the team report to ensure that all scenarios requiring
mitigation are included in the SIS design.

The SIS scope should include specific guidance for completing the interlock design for
the project, including codes, standards, regulations, and good engineering practices that
must be incorporated. A plan should be developed for review and approval of all LOPAs
and Safety Integrity Level (SIL) verification calculations generated for the project.

IV. Detailed Design

Information developed in the Front-End Engineering effort will feed into the detailed
design efforts for equipment design, instrumentation and control systems, piping systems,
relief systems, and Safety Instrumented Systems.

4.1 Initial Process Hazard Analysis

The intent of the initial PHA is to provide a comprehensive safety review of the near-
complete design package. In order for the study to be accurate, complete, and
representative of the process as-built, it should take place near the end of detailed design
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prior to construction of the facility. Ideally, the design package should be at least 80%
complete when the PHA is performed. The study may focus primarily on the process
changes that take place between the completion of the PrHA and the initiation of the
PHA. A change log must be maintained for significant changes that occur during detailed
design to allow revalidation of the PrHA as the basis for the formal PHA. If this change
log does not adequately document the changes, the study leader may choose to review the
design in total at the time of the PHA. Special emphasis should be given to reviewing
process design details, operating procedures, emergency response plans, and
startup/shutdown procedures that were not available for review during the PrHA.
Additionally, recommendations made in the PrHA which could not be resolved until
detailed design should be reviewed during the PHA for satisfactory resolution. Any
recommendations made in the initial PHA must be resolved before the process can be
commissioned.

Once the initial PHA has been completed, a formal Management of Change (MOC)
process must be implemented. MOCs that are generated after the completion of the
initial PHA will be reviewed during the normal revalidation of the process PHA.

4.2 Relief Design

The relief designer will be responsible for generating and/ or reviewing relief calculations
and evaluating piping layouts. Relief device datasheets will be generated for purchase.

4.3 Safety Instrumented Systems

The safety interlock designer will be responsible for generating and/ or reviewing SIL
verification calculations. Instrument datasheets will be generated for purchase.

V. Commissioning

Integration of process safety from concept to detailed design will facilitate safe
commissioning and start-up. Thorough safety reviews provide the opportunity for
comprehensive reviews of the P&IDs, equipment design, and control systems design that
can minimize the difficulties associated with starting up a new facility.

A Pre-Startup Safety Review (PSSR) should be conducted prior to the introduction of
process chemicals. This review should verify:

All interim and final field inspections are complete with all findings documented and
tracked to completion
Safety, operating, maintenance, and emergency procedures are in place
Initial Process Hazard Analysis is complete, with all recommendations resolved or
implemented
Appropriate training has been completed

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All Process Safety Information generated during the project design efforts should be
archived and managed according to site procedures and practices. This documentation
will be needed for the PHA revalidations that must be conducted every five years for
OSHA PSM covered processes.

VI. Conclusion

Process safety is an essential component of process design. Integration of process safety
at all stages of project design, from laboratory and piloting efforts to detailed design,
allows for early identification of process hazards and more efficient mitigation of those
hazards as the design progresses. The use of inherently safer design, relief and effluent
handling systems, and Safety Instrumented Systems will result in an optimized process
safety plan to achieve a safe and effective final design.

VII. References

[1] Kirk-Othmer, Kirk-Othmer Encyclopedia of Chemical Technology, 5
th
Edition
(Wiley, 2007)
[2] Urben, Peter, Bretherick's Handbook of Reactive Chemical Hazards, 7th Edition
(Academic Press, 2006)
[3] Lewis, Richard J., Sr., Sax's Dangerous Properties of Industrial Materials, 11th
Edition (Wiley-Interscience, 2004)
[4] Occupational Safety & Health Administration, U.S. Department of Labor,
Occupational Safety and Health Standards: 1910.119, Process safety
management of highly hazardous chemicals
[5] Browning, Christine E. and Jennifer F. Mize, " Identification of Process Hazards
in Laboratories and Pilot Plants", Proceedings of the 8th Global Congress on
Process Safety, April 1-4, 2012
[6] American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code
(BPVC), Section VIII, Division
[7] American Petroleum Institute, API Standard 650: Welded Tanks for Oil Storage
[8] American Petroleum Institute, API Standard 620: Design and Construction of
Large Welded Low Pressure Storage Tanks
[9] National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 30: Flammable and Combustible
Liquids Code
[10] Occupational Safety & Health Administration, U.S. Department of Labor,
Occupational Safety and Health Standards: 1910.106, Flammable and
combustible liquids
[11] ANSI/API Standard 521, Pressure Relieving and Depressuring Systems / ISO
23251, Petroleum, petrochemical, and natural gas industries Pressure-relieving
and Depressuring Systems
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[12] Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS), Guidelines for Pressure Relief and
Effluent Handling Systems (CCPS, 1998)

Additional references not cited:

[13] Mize, Jennifer F., "Relief Design for Laboratories and Pilot Plants", Proceedings
of the 8th Global Congress on Process Safety, April 1-4, 2012