Book Reviews Logical Form in Natural Language

logical form and moves on to the problems of pragmat-

ics and their influence on the surface form of produced
utterances. Semantics and pragmatics contribute inde-
pendently to the process of forming utterances (Lycan
is looking at language generation only), with the latter
explaining such phenomena as proper lexicalization
("he is X and Y" versus "he is X but Y"), performative
prefaces ("I state X"), and indirect force. Chapter 5 is
interesting but the discussion grows increasingly arcane
and may prove irritating for a reader who is not an
insider (especially Chapter 6). Numerous references to
the author' s other works do not help, and neither do a
vast amount of notes placed at the end of the book.
Chapters 7 and 8 are among the best in the book.
Chapter 7 starts with an overview of research by
Gordon and Lakoff on conversational postulates regard-
ing illocutionary force of natural language sentences.
Lycan points out various weaknesses in this account
and proposes a generalization in which he classifies all
cases of indirect force into three types. Type 1 contains
those sentences that in some circumstances can be used
to convey indirect illocutionary meaning, and this prop-
erty is relative to context of use ("It ' s cold in here").
Sentences of type 2 are normally used metaphorically,
though in some situations may be taken as conveying
literal meaning ("Have you lost your mind?"). Eventu-
ally, type 3 contains sentences that can be used only to
communicate their conventional, indirect meaning
("Can you please be a little quieter?"). The reader will
find this chapter a source of valuable information, even
though there is no definite treatment proposed.
In Chapter 8, Lycan is back to his earlier discussion
of truth conditions and meaning. He proposes to build a
flow diagram of a computer program that would speak
English. Among the few "obst acl es" that remain to be
to solved before such a program could be written,
Lycan lists the problem of disambiguation in natural
language understanding, which he classifies as "a spe-
cial case of the vexing and vicious frame problem in
Artificial Intelligence . . . . and not an especially aggra-
vated instance of it". Well, perhaps things are just the
other way around. As a computer scientist involved in
natural language research, I find most of the author' s
claims of "computational" paradigms premature and
misplaced. In Chapter 11 Lycan presents a schematic
diagram (which he calls a flow diagram) of the human
generative speech center, which, by any standard, is
much too abstract to be considered a computational
model.
In Chapter 9, Lycan takes on what he considers the
most serious challenge to the truth-theoretic semantics,
i.e., Quine' s indeterminacy hypothesis (Quine 1960).
The topic is of interest to anybody who thinks of
automated natural language processing as a series of
(possibly concurrent) transformations (or translations)
from one representation to another in order to reach,
eventually, an ultimate "logical form". But if you look
for a theoretical foundation of a new "translation
t heory" you are heading for a disappointment. The
discussion is somewhat confusing and the arguments
lack proper force. Eventually you will feel totally at a
loss from which you may never recover before the end
of the book. It only remains to hope that all this stuff is
important and relevant for philosophy, because I just
cannot see the significance of the "t rut h versus V-truth
(or even Vc-truth)" argument for computational linguis-
tics or AI in general.
In summary, it is not clear what audience this book is
addressed to. I guess it may be of interest in philosophy
of language, psychology, and perhaps linguistics. To the
AI and CL community it will be of moderate interest:
Chapters 7 and 8 are especially worth noticing. The
book is also not a primer, so I would not recommend it
to somebody who has just entered the field. From this
perspective, I think that the book is ultimately mistitled:
"logical form" is a trendy catch-phrase that attracts
attention and raises expectations which may prove
difficult to fulfill.
Tomek St rzal kowski
School of Computing Science
Simon Fraser University
Burnaby, B.C. V5A 1S6
Canada
REFERENCES
Quine, w. v. 1960. Word and Object. The MIT Press, Cambridge,
Mass.
Strawson, P. F. 1950. On Referring. Mind 59: 320-344.
UNDERSTANDING COMPUTERS AND COGNITION: A
NEW FOUNDATION FOR DESIGN
Wi n o g r a d , T e r r y a n d F l o r e s , F e r n a n d o
Hardbound, Norwood, N J: Ablex Publishing
Corporation, 1986, xiv+207 pp,
ISBN 0-89391-050-3, $24.95
Paperback, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1987, 214
pp, ISBN 0-201-11297-3, $12.95
This is an important and exasperating book.
What do hermeneutics and Heidegger, autopoiesis
and artificial intelligence, commitment and computers
have in common? In their book, Winograd and Flores
try to explain their own private views of the connec-
tions. They are mainly addressing the systems analysis,
AI, and computational linguistics communities, warning
them against embracing too closely the ways of mathe-
maticians and the advocates of symbolic logic.
The authors perform a useful service by outlining the
limitations of the approach that they call "rationalistic"
and by calling attention to certain philosophical issues
that might prove helpful in the future to establish new
directions in computer design. From a mathematician' s
point of view, they are merely reviving and rerunning
the morality play that has already finished its run in
340 Comput at i onal Li ngui st i cs Vo l ume 13, Numbe r s 3- 4, J ul y - De c e mbe r 1987
Book Revi ews Understanding computers and cognition: A new foundati on for design
mat hemat i cs under the banners of formal i sm, logicism,
and intuitionism.
W&F are t oo emot i onal l y i nvol ved with their subj ect
mat t er to be mer e formal i st s; t hey want mor e meani ng
t han a formal i st woul d be happy with. They explicitly
rej ect the logicist line and urge us to listen to our
intuitions and our personal , ever yday, common experi -
ences. Thei r pat h to t he use of intuition and common
sense exper i ence is t hrough phenomenol ogy- - mor e
preci sel y, phenomenol ogy of the Hei deggeri an vari et y.
Al t hough, on the surface, a phenomenol ogi st comput er
sci ence seems to be a cont radi ct i on in t erms, the issues
raised by W&F are wort h careful consi derat i on because
the poi nt s t hey are maki ng will be hard to ignore in the
future.
OPPOSITION TO THE RATIONALISTIC VIEW
The aut hor s' new vision is hel ped by focusi ng on what
Mat ur ana and ot hers call autopoietic systems. These
syst ems are self-organizing; t hey are not organi zed from
the outside. Li vi ng organi sms are the best exampl es of
aut opoi et i c syst ems. Comput er s that have to be pro-
gr ammed by an out si de agent are not aut opoi et i c.
Furt her i nspi rat i on is provi ded by Mat ur ana' s wor k on
frogs, where a lot of what one woul d be t empt ed to
consi der "cogni t i ve" act i vi t y was found to be nothing
mor e t han bi ochemi st ry: peri pheral devi ces, such as the
eye of a frog, mechani st i cal l y performi ng their biologi-
cal function.
Because the book is unusual in nat ure, it would be
unfair not to let the aut hors state their mai n points in
their own words.
The key to much of what we [say] lies in recognizing the
fundamental importance of the shift from an individual-
centered conception of understanding to one that is socially
based. Knowledge and understanding (in both the cognitive
and linguistic senses) do not result from formal operations
on mental representations of an objectively existing world.
Rather, they arise from the individual's committed partic-
ipation in mutually oriented patterns of behavior that are
embedded in a socially shared background of concerns,
actions, and beliefs. This shift from an individual to a social
perspective - - from mental representation to patterned
interaction - - permits language and cognition to merge.
Because of what Heidegger calls our "thrownness", we
are largely forgetful of the social dimension of understand-
ing and the commitment it entails. It is only when a
breakdown occurs that we become aware of the fact that
"things" in our world exist not as the result of individual
a c t s of cognition but through our active participation in a
domain of discourse and mutual concern. (p. 78)
W&F' s basi c posi t i on cent ers on their opposi t i on to
what t hey call the "rat i onal i st i c appr oach" , i.e., the
vi ew t hat "knowl edge and underst andi ng . . . [result]
from formal operat i ons on ment al represent at i ons of an
obj ect i vel y existing wor l d". Thi s rationalistic vi ew was
ver y successful in effecting significant advances in com-
put er wor k, and in t he st udy of cogni t i on and language.
But as expect at i ons about the per f or mance level of
comput er syst ems i ncrease, the rationalistic vi ew is
provi ng to be i ncreasi ngl y sterile. New appr oaches are
needed that do not necessari l y rej ect the rationalistic
position, but go beyond it.
W&F criticize the rationalistic appr oach and woul d
want to rej ect it al t oget her, r at her t han striving for a
synt hesi s whi ch i ncorporat es the useful feat ures, while
suppl ement i ng t hem with new insights. Per haps their
uncompr omi si ng posi t i on is necessar y in order to high-
light the limitations of the ol der paradi gm. But one can' t
help cont rast i ng their si ngl e-mi nded opposi t i on with
mor e moder at e, synt hesi s-ori ent ed appr oaches such as,
for exampl e, George Lakof f ' s experientialism or expe-
riential realism, as descri bed in his recent book Women,
Fire, and Dangerous Things.
In the aut hor s' words:
The rationalistic orientation can be depicted in a series of
steps:
1. Characterize the situation in terms of identifiable
objects with well-defined properties.
2. Find general rules that apply to situations in terms of
those objects and properties.
3. Apply the rules logically to the situation of concern,
drawing conclusions about what should be done.
There are obvious questions about how we set situations
into correspondence with systematic "representations" of
objects and properties, and with how we can come to know
general rules. In much of the rationalistic tradition, how-
ever, these are deferred in favor of emphasizing the formu-
lation of systematic rules that can be used to draw logical
conclusions. (p. 14-15)
What are the i mpl i cat i ons as far as comput at i onal
linguistics is concer ned?
The rationalistic tradition regards language as a system of
symbols that are composed into patterns that stand for
things in the world. Sentences can represent the world
truly or falsely, coherently or incoherently, but their ulti-
mate grounding is in their correspondence with the states
of affairs they represent. This concept of correspondence
can be summarized as:
1. Sentences say things about the world, and can be
either true or false.
2. What a sentence says about the world is a function of
the words it contains and the structures into which these
are combined.
3. The content words of a sentence (such as its nouns,
verbs, and adjectives) can be taken as denoting (in the
world) objects, properties, relationships, or sets of these.
(p. 17)
The aut hors rej ect this vi ew of l anguage in f avor of a
very different vi ew. Int erest i ngl y, the aut hor s' concept
of language is nowher e defined in the book. We don' t
even have a definition at t he casual , snap-sl ogan level
such as " a cultural cons t r uct ", " a biological conse-
quence", "abi l i t y to f or m ut t er ances", "t echnol ogy to
rearrange ment al model s " , " huma n act i vi t y defined by
a gr ammar " , or "concept ual aid for st ruct uri ng rea-
l i t y". One may specul at e whet her this omi ssi on was
i nadvert ent or del i berat e.
Co mp u t a t i o n a l Li n g u i s t i c s V o l u me 13, N u mb e r s 3 - 4 , J u l y . De c e mb e r 1987 341
Book Revi ews Underst andi ng comput ers and cogni ti on: A new f oundat i on f or desi gn
Be that as it may, what is interesting about this
omission is that it is rat her hard to notice. It does not
mat t er that language is not defined, because even in the
discussion of linguistic mat t ers, language assumes a
ver y subordi nat e position. For the aut hors, natural
language underst andi ng and meani ng are results of
"l i st eni ng" for " commi t ment " .
Language can work without any "objective" criteria of
meaning. We need not base our use of a particular word on
any externally determined truth conditions, and need not
even be in full agreement with our language partners on the
situations in which it would be appropriate. All that is
required is that there be a sufficient coupling so that
breakdowns are infrequent, and a standing commitment by
both speaker and listener to enter into dialog in the face of
a breakdown. (p. 63)
If t here is no " br eakdown" , words are unnecessary.
What " communi cat es " is not onl y what is specified, but
also what does not need to be specified because of a
shared background, and a grounding in physical and
social reality.
Not onl y synt ax, but even semant i cs fades into the
background. The focus is on pragmat i cs alone. Nat ural
language does not "bri ng about " underst andi ng. The
underst andi ng is t here as a background phenomenon.
Nat ural language is called f or - - and becomes useful and
r el evant - - when this background underst andi ng breaks
down. Use of language signals the lack of underst and-
ing. It is al most like a warning light whi ch comes on
when a mal funct i on is not i ced. This is the exact oppo-
site of the traditional vi ew t hat we use natural language
to creat e underst andi ng. No. At best we re-establish
underst andi ng; at worst we merel y signal that a break-
down in underst andi ng has occurred. Hence under-
standing is not an act to perform, but a state to be in. If
we have to talk, that means that this happy state of
affairs has been disturbed.
IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPUTER DESIGN
How woul d W&F' s insights about language be used to
design and build a comput er - based natural language
underst andi ng syst em? The aut hors do not say. They
criticize the est abl i shed approach whi ch const rues
meaning as being in the message, rat her than being
around the message - - in the t ext , and not in the cont ext
- - but t hey do not quite get around to formul at i ng new
archi t ect ures. They are on the right t rack, but do not go
far enough. The subtitle of the book promi ses " a new
foundat i on for desi gn". The appropri at eness of the
pr oposed new foundat i on cannot be eval uat ed wi t hout
seeing at least a bit more of the design.
While on some subjects t hey do not go far enough, on
one topic t hey do go somewhat overboard. Thei r dislike
of the t erm representation is strong. What t hey mean by
represent at i on is oft en not ver y clear. They ment i on the
dangers of assuming that the represent at i on accurat el y
reflects what is " out t her e" in a nai ve realist sense, and
raise doubt s about the vi ew that cognition rests on the
manipulation of symbol i c represent at i ons. But t hen
t hey go on to say that the represent at i on is in the eye of
the behol der (p. 86). This is a most val uabl e insight
which coul d have been devel oped furt her. In general,
we can express this t ype of insight in st at ement s of the
form " X is the represent at i on of Y in the eyes of the
behol der Z" . This does not seem probl emat i c even in
the philosophical f r amewor k of the aut hors. One may
guess that the t erm representation was condemned on
the basis of guilt-by-association. Symbol i c represent a-
tions have been closely associ at ed with the rationalistic
tradition that the aut hors oppose. This is unfort unat e,
but some aspect s of the symbol i c represent at i on con-
cept are wort h saving. For exampl e, cognitive sci ence is
based on the mental model s hypot hesi s, i. e. , that peopl e
underst and the worl d by formi ng ment al model s. This is
a fairly recent view; we j ust got it and it woul d be a
shame to abandon it so soon. What are we to repl ace it
with? Are Wi nograd and Fl ores advocat i ng a new
school of neo-behavi ori sm, in whi ch everyt hi ng is em-
bodi ed in hardware (wet ware?), and t here are no pro-
grams and no symbol i c represent at i on of worl d knowl-
edge? How woul d we design and build such
neo-behavi ori st i c comput er s?
The aut hors' rej ect i on of represent at i on is not so
much wrong-headed as unnecessary. Talking about
represent at i on as modeling of the worl d by a cogniting
agent is quite harmless. The enemy is not represent a-
tion; that is onl y a sympt om. The enemy is nai ve realism
or objectivism, whi ch blithely assumes, on the basis of
one view, one versi on, one descri pt i on, one glimpse
from one perspect i ve that the essence of an "obj ec-
tively existing wor l d" (p. 78) has been grasped, and that
one knows exact l y how this uni que worl d is " r eal l y"
const ruct ed. In ot her words, on the basis of the exist-
ence of X, it assumes that Y also exists, as in the
sent ence " X is the represent at i on of Y in the eyes of the
behol der Z" . Represent at i ons are fine, as long as t hey
are const rued to be no more t han ment al model s of a
publicly exami nabl e kind. But model s of what ? The
eyes of Z domi nat e the answer to that quest i on. X
exists, but Y may not, even if Z does not realize it. In
fact, in spite of Z' s limited vision, he might find X to be
a most useful i mpl ement . He may be mi st aken in the
global sense, but still get the j ob done using X.
Building models is nothing obj ect i onabl e, except that
one should not attribute more verisimilitude to the
model than is requi red by the model er. A represent at i on
is a represent at i on, and a model is a model , preci sel y
because the observer, behol der, or model er sees it as
such. It is the at t empt s to escape from this perspect i vi st
f r amewor k that creat e difficulties.
When we consi der the following or der ed list of
statements:
1. " X is the represent at i on of Y."
2. " X is the represent at i on of Y ' out t her e' . "
3. " Z consi ders X to be the represent at i on of Y ' out
t her e' . "
3 4 2 Co mp u t a t i o n a l Li ng ui s t i c s V o l u me 13, Nu mb e r s 3 - 4 , J u l y - De c e mb e r 1987
Book Revi ews Understanding computers and cognition: A new foundati on for design
4. " Z considers X to be a representation of Z' s
mental model Y' of Y ' out t her e' . "
we might notice that the last sentence, although longer
than is usually considered convenient for casual use,
reflects a humble, modest, experientialist, and basically
honest approach.
COMPUTERS AS AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEMS
If computers are not to be programmed using represen-
tations of a "real world out t here" how exactly are they
supposed to function? W&F use Maturana' s concept of
autopoietic systems. Autopoietic computer systems
somehow "self-organize", as opposed to having their
programs inflicted upon them in an authoritarian man-
ner by programmers. Certainly, an anthill is "autopoie-
t i c", and so is a free market economy. Can we object to
programming because it is authoritarian and elitist, in
the sense that it is an outsider who inflicts the program
on the machine in a non-egalitarian way? What exactly
is wrong with this approach?
It assumes that the programmer (or "knowledge engi-
neer") can articulate an explicit account of the system's
coupling with the world--what it is intended to do, and
what the consequences of its activities will be. This can be
done for idealized "t oy" systems and for those with clearly
circumscribed formal purposes (for example, programs
that calculate mathematical formulas). But the enterprise
breaks down when we turn to something like a word
processor, a time-sharing system, or for that matter any
system with which people interact directly. No simple set
of goals and operators can delimit what can and will be
done.
The person selects among basic mechanisms that the
machine provides, to get the work done. If the mechanisms
don't do what is needed, others may have to be added.
They will often be used in ways that were not anticipated in
their design. (p. 53)
Do Winograd and Flores have a genuinely novel
approach to systems analysis? Yes. Their idea is to go
beyond the verbal level in order to look at people' s
interactions with each other and to look for the com-
mitment that underlies these interactions. Rather than
going from the verbal level to Newell' s "knowledge
l evel ", they try to go from the verbal level to an
action/intention/commitment level. They claim that
what matters is not what people say, but what they do,
or intend to do, and the kind of commitment that they
are ready to make. It should be repeated that this view
of the task of the systems analyst is based upon consid-
ering the use of language as the performing of speech
acts. This view agrees with the authors' notion of the
natural language understanding process as a listening
for commitment.
Would such an approach to systems analysis work in
practice? That depends on the client. Some clients
would feel that with such an approach the analyst is
overstepping his mandate by appropriating to himself
management functions. He transgresses the limits of his
job category by investigating matters which are not
within the bounds of his job description.
The limitations of the book are grounded in the
experiential limitations of the authors. They are blind to
the industrial and commercial domains of discourse,
e.g. that computers are built to make money for the
vendor, that it takes money to build computer systems,
and whoever funds the work will expect in one form or
another a return on his investment. Although they
emphasize the importance of autopoietic systems being
closely coupled to their environments, neither author
seems to realize how messy the real world really is. Had
they done so, this realization might have driven them
back to the neat, well-ordered world of the rationalistic
tradition that they criticize.
This reviewer would suggest that the authors should
have been looking not at computers as single entities,
but rather at the owner-computer complex as a struc-
tural unit. Looking at computers in isolation from
ownership does not make sense. But this is a symptom
of a larger deficiency. In general, it seems that the
authors have no industrial experience. Maturana' s frogs
may be autopoeitic systems, but computers are not.
From the industrial perspective, it' s hard not to notice
that no computer system is ever built unless someone
pays for it. Computers, unlike frogs, have owners. It is
the owner-computer complex that may be an autopoie-
tic system. We should also note that programmers and
analysts do not usually own the computers; they work
for people or institutions who do.
The authors want to alter our vision. But they
recommend corrective lenses, whereas radical eye sur-
gery, and even some bionic aids, may be required. They
are squeamish about money. They do not mention that
computers are owned by owners, and that someone
must pay for the construction of a computer system,
and the person or institution who pays the designer has
a lot to say about what kind of design is acceptable.
They acknowledge that computers are structurally cou-
pled to their environment, and that both this environ-
mental context and the structural coupling are social in
nature. They forget to mention the economics of the
structural coupling. The seemingly dirty words of
money and ownership are not prominently featured in
the book.
THE MISSING PARTS
Although W&F seem to be uncompromisingly bold and
thorough in their analysis, and in their unflinching
criticism of the shortcomings of the rationalistic posi-
tion, it is curious that there are areas where they
hesitate to go further. One of these areas has to do with
discourse, and the domain of discourse, such as ex-
plored by Michel Foucault; the other area is conceptual
analysis and Jacques Derrida' s grammatology and de-
construction. Both of these omissions are puzzling,
especially because Habermas and Gadamer are dis-
cussed. Roland Barthes is not mentioned.
Computational Linguistics Volume 13, Numbers 3-4, July-December 1987 343
Book Reviews Understanding computers and cognition: A new foundation for design
Her meneut i cs, or at least one t ype of the her meneu-
tical appr oach, does recei ve st rong support , but pheno-
menol ogi st social psychol ogy and the soci ol ogy of
knowl edge as, for exampl e, di scussed by Aber cr omby,
does not. I t ' s an i nt erest i ng guessi ng game to go t hrough
the book noting what the aut hors do, or do not, include,
and t ry to guess the r eason why.
Over the mont hs, peopl e have asked me if I like the
book. I woul d answer that "l i ki ng" has not hi ng to do
with the mat t er; t here is somet hi ng much mor e i mpor-
tant at st ake. The i ssues rai sed by the book are of
fundament al i mpor t ance, and should be kept in the
forefront of public debat e. Concept ual l y, the comput er
field is on the bri nk of radical changes. Syst ems anal y-
sis, appl i cat i on syst ems design, and knowl edge acquisi-
tion are assumi ng new pr omi nence. It woul d be desir-
able to have the changes aligned with larger, humani st i c
val ues, as opposed to nar r ow t echni cal consi derat i ons.
In t hat respect , Wi nograd and Fl ores light a candl e
while still cursi ng the darkness.
St ephen Reg oczei
Comput er St udi es
Tr ent Uni ver si t y
Pet er bor ough, Ont ari o
Canada, K9J 7B8
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I am grateful to Graeme Hirst for his comments on an earlier draft.
REFERENCE
Lakoff, George. 1987 Women, fire, and dangerous things: What
categories reveal about the mind. Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press.
SEMANTICS AND SYNTAX: PARALLELS AND
CONNECTIONS
J a me s Mi l l e r
[ Dept Li ngui st i cs, Uni ver si t y of Edi nburgh]
(Cambri dge studies in linguistics 41)
Cambr i dge Uni ver si t y Press, 1985, viii+262 pp.
I SBN 0-521-26265-8; $47.50
[ Edi t or' s note: This book is rev i ewed twice: by Bruce
Nev i n and by Barbara Brunson and Geof f rey
Laker. ]
Miller originally set out in this book to rehabi l i t at e a
t heory of semant i cs known as Local i sm: the idea that
everyt hi ng we talk about ei t her is an obj ect l ocat ed in
space, or is spoken of met aphori cal l y as t hough it were
such an obj ect , si t uat ed with respect to ot her such
obj ect s by means of fami l i ar spatial relations.
Some exampl es give the flavor. Over t went y st udent s
expr esses by its preposi t i on the same spatial rel at i on as
over the wall, and " t he sent ence The bl acksmi t h beat
out the horseshoe with a h ammer can be i nt erpret ed as
present i ng t he bl acksmi t h in t he same l ocat i on as the
hammer , and John went to the part y with Mary can be
seen as present i ng John as in the same l ocat i on as Mar y,
albeit a changing l ocat i on, as t hey t ravel f r om one
l ocat i on to anot her on their way to t he par t y" (p. 123).
The mechani c got the car f i x ed is deri ved f r om some-
thing like The mechani c mov ed the car into a st at e of
repair (p. 174).
Echoes of this hoar y not i on r ever ber at e f r om t he
Gr eek gr ammar i ans down to t he t er mi nol ogy of tradi-
tional gr ammar , wher e for exampl e a t ransi t i ve rel at i on
' car r i es' the ' act i on of the ver b' f r om the subj ect to t he
obj ect . Ther e are obvi ous affinities to not i ons of case.
Tradi t i onal l y, case cover s bot h synt act i c rel at i ons, such
as subj ect and obj ect , and semant i c not i ons t hat are
cl earl y Local i st , such as are expr essed by t he dat i ve,
abl at i ve, and l ocat i ve cases, with a rat her foggy regi on
of met aphor i c ext ensi on bet ween for things like the
abl at i ve absol ut e const ruct i on, in whi ch one ' move s '
from one act i on ( expr essed by a part i ci pl e in the abla-
tive case) to anot her. Miller woul d di spel t he fog by
ext endi ng this sort of met aphor bol dl y over t he whol e
field of semant i cs, claiming (p. 119)
that all constructions can be interpreted in terms of spatial
expressions, that spatial expressions are the rock upon
which the entire edifice of semantics is built.
It may be that he mer el y ext ends the fog.
In f avor of Local i sm, we may l ook fondl y on the
relative t ract abi l i t y of physi cal rel at i ons and nai ve phys-
ics as compar ed with ot her di mensi ons of cogni t i ve
' space' ; poi nt eagerl y to t he obvi ous i mpor t ance of
anal ogy and met aphor for cogni t i on in general and
language use in part i cul ar, feeling an under st andabl e
desi re to get at some root of all anal ogi zi ng; and cite
numer ous studies in the psychol ogy and phi l osophy of
cogni t i ve devel opment t hat advance or suggest some
f or m of l ocal i sm - - for i nst ance, Her skovi t s (1986)
seems to cover some of the same concept ual ground. l
Ther e are pr obl ems, of course. Miller conf esses (p.
86) that while
it would be convenient if there was a one-to-one correspon-
dence between each [semantic entity] and a [word in the
language] . . . language being as it is, a certain amount of
vacillation is to be expected.
He illustrates a bit of this "vaci l l at i on" with a bri ef
descri pt i on of some difficulties getting t he concept s
t Miller could make his case more effectively if he showed more
familiarity with other work. His lexicalist treatment of morphology
and syntax would benefit from 'unification techniques, but he is no
computational linguist, and evinces no knowledge of recent CFL
(context-free language) work, nor of the problems of knowledge
representation (to which his work might well contribute). Even within
linguistics, he makes no mention of Langacker's Space Grammar,
recently renamed Cognitive Grammar. He opines (and I agree) that
generativists would have avoided much needless ramification of
theoretical blind alleys if they had followed the work of Zellig Harris
more closely. It is a great pity that he himself apparently knows
nothing of that work past 1957! Familiarity with Harris's more recent
writings might have steered him clear of some unfortunate misinter-
pretations of the earlier work.
344 Comput at i onal Li ngui st i cs Vol ume 13, Numbers 3- 4, Jul y- December 1987