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Assertion
First published Mon Jan 22, 2!
An assertion is a speech act in which something is claimed to hold, e.g. that
there are infinitely "any pri"e nu"bers, or, with respect to some time t, that
there is a traffic con#estion on $roo%lyn $rid#e at t, or, of some person & with
respect to some time t,that & has a tooth ache at t. The concept of assertion has
often occupied a central place in the philosophy of language, since it is often
thought that making assertions is the use of language most crucial to linguistic
meaning, and since assertions are the natural expressions of cognitive attitudes,
and hence of importance for theories of knowledge and belief.
The nature of assertion and its relation to other categories and phenomena have
been subject to much controversy. Various accounts of assertion are presented
in the sections below. For instance, the %no'led#e account is presented in
section . !There is no section dedicated to assertion accounts generally." The
accounts presented include #talnaker$s rules of assertion !section %.&,
supplement on pragmatics"' principles directly relating truth and assertion
!section (.%"' norms of truth)accounts centering on the aim of truth !section
(.*"' the principle of correctness !section (.("' norms of belief or sincerity
!section "' norms of knowledge !section .%"' +ricean or ,eo-+ricean
accounts !section ."' #earle$s account !section ."' and assertibility of
conditionals !section /".
The article is also organi0ed into a main part for the basic material and
supplementary parts for more speciali0ed or advanced material. The main part
constitutes a self-contained presentation and is sufficient for readers with a
general interest in assertion. There are links to supplementary material at the
ends of sections and subsections.
&. #peech acts
%. 1ragmatics
o %.& 1resupposition
o %.% 2mplicature
o %.3 2ndirect speech acts
3. 4onvention
*. 4ontent
(. Truth
o (.& The truth predicate
o (.% Assertion as truth-claim
o (.3 Truth as aim5 fact-stating
o (.* Truth as aim5 norms of speakers$ intentions
o (.( Truth and correctness
. 6elief and knowledge
o .& 6elief
o .% 7nowledge
.. #ocial character
/. 8ogic
6ibliography
9ther 2nternet :esources
:elated ;ntries
1. Speech acts
As indicated with the initial examples, in an assertion it is asserted that so-and-
so. +rammatically, the verb <assert= takes that-clause complements, i.e.
expressions of the form that s, where s is replaced by a declarative sentence.
#omething that can be asserted can also be believed, known, doubted, hoped,
and vice versa. 2 can doubt that >ars will be coloni0ed, and 2 can
also assert that >ars will be coloni0ed. 2n other words, 'hat we assert
are propositions.
?&@
The so-called propositional attitudes, like believing,
knowing and hoping, are said to relate a thinker to a proposition, or at least to
be instantiated by mental states that have propositional content. #imilarly,
assertion is a propositional act in that it relates the speaker to a proposition, or
is an act with propositional content.
9n the other hand, an assertion is made by "eans of an utterance. 2 utter the
sentence
!&" The cat is on the mat
and by means of the utterance of that sentence, 2 have !for some time, cat and
mat" asserted that the cat is on the mat.
?%@
Typically, we make an assertion by
means of uttering a declarative sentence, but not any utterance of a declarative
sentence is an assertion. For instance, 2 can well utter <The curfew tolls the
knell of parting day= merely for the sake of its poetic Auality.
#omething is added to an utterance that makes it into a means for asserting
something. +ottlob Frege !&B&/, %%" characteri0ed the assertoric Auality of an
utterance as an assertoric force !<6ehauptende 7raft=" of the utterance. That is,
the speaker makes an utterance in an assertoric !or assertive" mode or with an
assertoric force, and that is the difference between just uttering and also
asserting. This idea was later taken over by C. 8. Austin !&B.(, BBD&EE", the
founding father of the general theory of speech acts. Austin distinguished
between several levels of speech act, including these5 the locutionary act, the
illocutionary act and the perlocutionary act. The locutionary act is the act of
<Fsaying somethingG in the full normal sense= !&B.(, B*", which is the utterance
of certain words with certain meanings in a certain grammatical construction,
such as uttering <2 like ice= as a sentence of ;nglish.
The notion of an illocutionary act was introduced by Austin by means of
examples !&B.(, B/D&E%", and that is the normal procedure. 2llocutionary acts
are such acts as asserting, asking a Auestion, warning, threatening, announcing
a verdict or intention, making an appointment, giving an order, expressing a
wish, making a reAuest. An utterance of a sentence, i.e. a locutionary act, by
means of which a Auestion is asked is thus an utterance with interro#ative
force, and when an assertion is made the utterance has assertoric force. ;ach
type of illocutionary act is a type of act with the corresponding illocutionary
force.
The perlocutionary act is made by means of an illocutionary act, and depends
entirely on the hearer$s reaction. For instance, by means of arguing the speaker
may convince the hearer, and by means of warning the speaker may frighten the
hearer. 2n these examples, convincing and frightening are perlocutionary acts.
The illocutionary act does not depend on the hearer$s reaction to what has been
said. #till, according to Austin !&B.(, &&D&.", it does depend on the hearer$s
being aware of the utterance and understanding it in a certain way. For instance,
2 haven$t warned someone unless he heard and understood what 2 said. 2n this
sense the performance of an illocutionary act depends on the <securing of
uptake= !&B.(, &&.". However, although Austin$s view is intuitively plausible
for speech acts verbs with speaker-hearer argument structure
!like & congratulates y" or speaker-hearer-content argument structure !& reAuests
of y that p", it is not obviously as plausible when the structure is speaker-
content !&declares that p". <Assert= is of the latter kind, as opposed to e.g. <tell=.
2t may be said that 2 failed to tell him that the station was closed, since he had
already left the room when 2 said so, but that 2 still asserted that it was closed,
since 2 believed he was still there. As we shall see, several theories of assertion
focus on hearer-directed beliefs and intentions of the speaker, without reAuiring
that those beliefs are true or the intentions fulfilled.
1art of the tasks of general theory of speech acts is to provide a systematic
taxonomy of speech acts. Austin had earlier !&B(" initiated the development of
speech act taxonomy by means of the distinction
between constative and perfor"ative utterances. The purpose then was more
polemical than systematic, since Austin thought that the philosophy of language
at the time had neglected to note other uses of language than the assertoric.
:oughly, whereas in a constative utterance you report an already obtaining state
of affairs)you say something)in a performative utterance you create
something new5 you dosomething !Austin &B(, %3(". 1aradigm examples of
performatives were utterances by means of which actions such as bapti0ing,
congratulating and greeting are performed. Assertion, by contrast, is the
paradigm of a constative utterance.
However, when developing his general theory of speech acts, Austin abandoned
the constativeIperformative distinction, the reason being that it is not so clear in
what sense something is done e.g. by means of an optative utterance,
expressing a wish, whereas nothing is done by means of an assertoric one.
Austin noted e.g. that assertions are subject to infelicities, just like
performatives !Austin &B.(, &3D". For instance, an assertion isinsincere in
case of lying as a promise is insincere when the appropriate intention is lacking
!Austin &B.(, *E". This is an infelicity of the abuse kind. Also, an assertion is,
according to Austin, void in case of referential presupposition, such as in
:ussell$s
!%" The present 7ing of France is bald
!Austin &B.(, %E". This is then an infelicity of the same kind)fla'(type
"ise&ecutions)as the use of the wrong formula in a legal procedure !Austin
&B.(, 3", or of the same kind)"isinvocations)as when the reAuirements of
a naming procedure aren$t met !Austin &B.(, (&", or when 2 try to sell you
something that isn$t mine !Austin &B.(, &3.".
Further, Austin noted that when it comes to appraisals, there is not a sharp
difference between acts that are simply true and false, and acts that are assessed
in other respects !Austin &B.(, &*ED*.". 9n the one hand, a warning can be
objectively proper or improper, depending on the facts. 9n the other hand,
assertions !statements" can be assessed as suitable in some contexts and not in
others, and are not simply true or false. An example is
!3" France is hexagonal
?3@
As an alternative to the performativeDconstative dichotomy, Austin suggested
five classes of illocutionary types !or illocutionary verbs"5 verdictives,
exercitives, commissives, behabitives and expositives !Austin &B.(, &(&D*".
Jou exemplify a verdictive e.g. when as a judge you pronounce a verdict' an
exercitive by appointing, voting or advising' a commissive by promising,
undertaking or declaring that you will do something' a behabitive by
apologi0ing, critici0ing, cursing or congratulating' an expositive by acts
appropriately prefixed by phrases like <2 reply=, <2 argue=, <2 concede= etc., of a
general expository nature.
2n this classification, assertion would best be placed under expositives, since
the prefix <2 assert= is or may be of an expository nature. However, an assertion
need not in itself be expository. As a classification of illocutionary types
Austin$s taxonomy is thus not completely adeAuate.
9ther taxonomies have been proposed, e.g. by #tephen #chiffer !&B.%", Cohn
#earle !&B.(b", 7ent 6ach and :obert >. Harnich !&B.B", and FranKois
:ecanati !&B/.". 9ne leading idea, for instance in #earle$s taxonomy, is to
distinguish between speech acts according to direction of fit. An assertion has
word-world direction of fit, since an assertion is correct if what is said agrees
with what the world is like. 6y contrast, a command has a world-word direction
of fit, since a command is satisfied if the addressee of the command
subseAuently performs what is ordered.
For some further points on taxonomy and the special status of assertion, see the
supplementary text on speech acts.
2. Pragmatics
Assertion is generally thought of being open, explicit and direct, as opposed
e.g. to conveying something indirectly, without explicitly saying it. 2n this
respect assertion is contrasted with presupposition and i"plicature. The
contrast is, however, not altogether sharp, partly because of the idea of indirect
speech acts, including indirect assertions.
2.1 Presupposition
A sentence such as
!*" 7epler died in misery
is not true unless the singular term <7epler= has reference. #till, Frege argued
that a speaker asserting that 7epler died in misery, by means of !*" does not
also assert that <7epler= has reference !&/B%, (.*". That <7epler= has reference
is not part of the sense of the sentence. Frege$s reason was that if it had been,
the sense of its negation,
!(" 7epler did not die in misery
would have been that )epler did not die in "isery or *)epler+ does not
havereference, which is absurd. According to Frege, that <7epler= has reference
is ratherpresupposed, both in an assertion of !*" and in an assertion of its
negation.
The modern treatment of presupposition has followed Frege in treating survival
under negation as the most important test for presupposition. That is, if it is
implied that p, both in an assertion of a sentence s and in an assertion of the
negation of s, then it is presupposed that p in those assertions. 9ther typical
examples of presupposition !cf. 8evinson &B/3, &./D/&" include
!" Cohn managed ?didn$t manage@ to stop in time
implying that Cohn tried to stop in time, and
!." >artha regrets ?doesn$t regret@ drinking Cohn$s home brew
implying that >artha drank Cohn$s home brew.
2n the case of !*", the presupposition is clearly of a semantic nature, since the
sentence <#omeone is identical with 7epler=, which is true just if <7epler= has
reference, is a logical conseAuence both of !*" and of !(". 6y contrast, in the
negated forms of !" and !." the presupposition can be canceled by context, e.g.
as in
!/" Cohn didn$t manage to stop in time. He didn$t even try.
This indicates that in this case the presupposition is a pragmatic phenomenon.
2t is the speaker or speech act rather than the sentence or the proposition
expressed that presupposes something. The presupposing should still be kept
distinct from asserting. 9ne further reason is that the presupposition occurs in
other illocutionary types as well. For instance, in asking
!B" Lid Cohn ?didn$t Cohn@ manage to stop in timeM
the speaker normally assumes that Cohn tried and is only asking about the
success.
For further connections between assertion and presupposition, see the
supplementary text on pragmatics.
2.2 Implicature
Frege noted !&/.B, %E" that there is no difference in truth evaluable content,
between sentences such as
!&E" a. Cohn works with real estate and likes fishing
b. Cohn works with real estate but likes fishing
<And= and <but= contribute the same way to truth and falsity. However, when
using !&Ea", but not when using !&Eb" the speaker indicates that there is a
contrast of some kind between working with real estate and liking fishing. The
speaker is not assertin# that there is a contrast. For instance, forming a
conditional with !&Eb" in the antecedent preserves the contrast rather than make
it hypothetical5
!&&" 2f Cohn works with real estate but likes fishing, 2 think we can bring him
along
2n an utterance of a conditional like !&&" the content of the antecedent is not
asserted. The speaker may sincerely assert the conditional while denying or
being agnostic about the antecedent. #ince the contrast indicated by <but=
survives in the antecedent context, it is natural to say that the contrast is not
part of the asserted content in !&Eb" either, and therefore not part of what ceases
to be asserted.
2t is usually said that the speaker in cases like !&Eb" and !&&", i"plies that there
is a contrast. These are then examples of implicature. H. 1aul +rice !&B.(,
&B/B" developed a general theory of implicature. +rice called implicatures of
the kind exemplifiedconventional, since it is a standing feature of the word
<but= to give rise to them. >ost of +rice$s theory is concerned with the
complementing kind, the conversational implicatures. These rely on general
conversational maxims, not on features of expressions. These maxims are
thought to be in force in ordinary conversation. For instance, the maxim $e
orderly, reAuires of the speaker to recount events in the order they took place.
This is meant to account for the intuitive difference in content between
!&%" a. Cohn took off his shoes and sat down
b. Cohn sat down and took off his shoes
According to +rice$s account, the speaker doesn$t assert, only implicates that
the events took place in the order recounted. Nhat is asserted is just that both
events did take place.
:eal or apparent violations of the maxims generate implicatures, on the
assumption that the participants obey the over-arching 4o-operative 1rinciple.
For instance, in the following conversation
!&3" -5 Nhere does Cohn spend the summerM
$5 #omewhere in 4anada.
$ implies that he doesn$t know where in 4anada Cohn spends the summer. The
reasoning is as follows. $ violates the Ouantity principle to be as informative as
reAuired. #ince $ is assumed to be co-operative, one can infer that he cannot
satisfy the Ouantity principle without violating the Ouality principle not to say
anything for which one lacks sufficient evidence. Hence, one can infer that he
doesn$t know. Again, $ has not asserted that he doesn$t know, but still managed
to convey it in an indirect manner.
2.3 Indirect speech acts
This clear distinction between assertion and implicature is to some extent
undermined by acknowledging indirect assertion as a kind of assertion proper.
A standard example of an indirect speech act is given by
!&*" 4an you pass the saltM
6y means of uttering an interrogative sentence the speaker reAuests the
addressee to pass the salt. The reAuest is indirect. The Auestion, concerning the
addressee$s ability, is direct. As defined by #earle !&B.(a, (BDE", and also
6ach and Harnich !&B.B, .E", an indirect illocutionary act is subordinate to
another, more primary act and depends on the success of the first. An
alternative definition given by #adock !&B.*, .3" is that an act is indirect just if
it has a different illocutionary force from the one standardly correlated with the
sentence-type used.
;xamples of indirect assertions by means of Auestions and commands or
reAuests are given by
!&(" >ay 2 tell you that, obviously, the sAuare root of a Auarter is a half.
!&" 8et me tell you that, obviously, the sAuare root of a Auarter is a half.
!8evinson &B/3, %". :hetorical Auestions also have the force of assertions5
!&." 2s not #wit0erland a peace-loving nationM
Another candidate type is irony5
!&/" #wit0erland is known for its aggressive foreign policy.
assuming the speaker does mean the negation of what is literally said.
However, although in a sense the act is indirect, since the speaker asserts
something different from what she would do on a normal direct use of the
sentence, and relies on the hearer to reali0e this, it is not an indirect assertion by
either definition. 2t isn$t on the first, since the primary act !the literal assertion"
isn$t even made, and it isn$t on the second, since there is no discrepancy
between force and sentence type.
2rony does, however, Aualify as indirect assertion on the definition given by
:ecanati !&B/., &%(". According to :ecanati, an indirect speech act is a special
kind of conversational implicature, where the speaker not only implicates some
proposition p, but also that she intends to convey that p. 2n the case of !&/",
there is an apparent flagrant violation of the Ouality principle to say only what
is true. 9n the assumption that the speaker is co-operative, together with
background knowledge of her political awareness, the hearer can infer that she
does not mean what she literally says, but rather the opposite, i.e. that what
she 'ants to communicate is the negation of what she says. For :ecanati, the
communicative intention is what brings this act under the category of assertion
proper !see section .".
Although #earle$s definition of indirect speech acts is different, #earle too
thinks that they work by means of an inferential mechanism, including that of
conventional implicature. The hearer is supposed to understand that the speaker
cannot merely be performing the primary act, since that would violate
conversational principles, and then again conclude by conversational reasoning
what other act has been performed.
#o, if indirect assertions are assertions proper as well as conversational
implicatures, the idea that assertions in general are explicit and direct has to be
given up. An alternative is to simply deny that indirect assertions are assertion
proper, and to distinguish between implicatures according to whether they are
assertoric, imperative, or interrogative, or perhaps Auasi-assertoric, Auasi-
imperative etc.
The very idea of indirect speech acts is, however, controversial. 2t is not
universally agreed that an ordinary utterance of !&*" is indirect, since it has
been denied e.g. by 8evinson !&B/3, %.3D." that a Auestion has really been
asked, over and above the reAuest. #imilarly, 8evinson have Auestioned the idea
of a standard correlation between force and sentence type, by which a reAuest
would count as indirect on #adock$s criterion. This brings us to the topic of
conventionality.
3. Convention
Austin held that illocutionary acts as opposed to perlocutionary acts
are conventional, in the sense that they can be made explicit by the so-called
performative formula !Austin &B.(, &E3". According to Austin one can say <2
argue that= or <2 warn you that= but not <2 convince you that= or <2 alarm you
that=. 1resumably, the idea was that a speech act type is conventional just if
there exists a convention by which an utterance of a sentence of a certain kind
ensures !if uptake is secured" that a speech act of that type is performed. Austin
probably thought that in virtue of the performative formulas this condition is
met by illocutionary but not by perlocutionary act types.
The more general claim that illocutionary force is correlated by convention
with sentence type has been advocated by >ichael Lummett !&B/&, 3E%, 3&&".
9n this view, it is a convention that declarative sentences are used for assertion,
interrogative for Auestions and imperative for commands and reAuests. #imilar
views have been put forward by #earle !&BB" and 1etr 7otatko !&BB/".
According to #earle !&BB, 3/, *E", illocutionary acts are conventional, and the
conventions in Auestion govern the use of so-called force-indicating devices
!#earle &BB, *" specific to each language. #earle does not claim that the
standard sentence types are force indicating devices !but speculates that a
representation of illocutionary type would be part of the syntactic deep
structure".
However, the view that illocutionary acts types are conventional in this sense
has met with much opposition. 1eter #trawson !&B*, &(3D(*" objected early
on that ordinary illocutionary acts can be performed without relying on any
convention to identify the force, e.g. when using a declarative sentence like
<The ice over there is very thin= for a warning. This kind of criticism, now
directed against Lummett, has later been reinforced by :obert C. #tainton
!&BB.", stressing that in appropriate contexts sub-sentential phrases like <Cohn$s
father= !pointing at a man" or <very fast= !looking at a car" can be used to make
assertions, and gives linguistic arguments why not all such uses can be treated
as cases of ellipsis, i.e. as cases of leaving out parts of a well-formed sentence
that speaker and hearer tacitly aware of. 2f #trawson and #tainton are right,
convention isn$t necessary for making assertions.
>oreover, Lonald Lavidson !Lavidson &B.B, Lavidson &B/*b" stressed that no
conventional sign could work as a force indicator in this sense, since any
conventional sign could be used !and would be used" in insincere utterances,
where the corresponding force was missing, including cases of deception,
jokes, impersonation and other theatrical performances. 6asically the same
point is made by 6ach and Harnich !&B.B, &%%D%.". 2f Lavidson, and 6ach and
Harnich are right, then conventions are also not sufficient.
For more on the conventionality of illocutionary types, see the supplementary
text onconvention.
4. Content
Ne said above that what is asserted is a proposition. Although this sounds fairly
uncontroversial !unless you object to use of the term <proposition=", it has in
fact been challenged in several respects. To see the issue, we must look at the
relation between thelin#uistic "eanin# of the sentence or other linguistic
expression uttered and the content of the assertion.
The most immediate idea is that the meaning of the sentence used is identical
with the content of the assertion. This seems natural when considering
sentences like
!&B" +oldbach$s conjecture is true
which, if true, is necessarily true, and true at all times. 6ut when considering a
typically indexical sentence like
!%E" 2t is raining
it seems clear that when normally uttered, the speaker is saying something
about the weather at a certain time and at a certain !limited" location. 4learly,
the meaning of !%E" does not contain reference to any particular time or
location.
#o we must distinguish between sentence meaning and assertion content. 2t is
often assumed that the assertoric content nevertheless systematically depends
on the meaning of the sentence. Typically, the meaning of the sentence is
described so as to provide a proposition as determined by the context of
utterance of the sentence. Nithin his truth-theoretic program in semantics !cf.
Lavidson &B/*a, 8arson and #egal &BB(", Lavidson proposed the following so-
called T-sentence for characteri0ing the meaning of !%E"
!%&" <2t is raining= is true as uttered by a speaker S at a time t if, and only if, it is
raining near S at t.
!&B.3, &3(". 6y Lavidson$s T-sentence, the speaker asserts that it is raining
near her at the time !provided the following holds5 if her utterance is true iff p,
then what she asserts is that p". 2n his different framework Lavid 7aplan !&B/B"
calls the meaning of a context dependent sentence like !%E" its character. The
character is a function from contexts of utterance to content, and the content of
an assertoric utterance in a context is a proposition. The effect is that what a
speaker asserts with a sentence s in a context c is the value of the character
of s for the argument c.
2t seems plausible, then, to revise the original eAuation of assertoric content
with sentence meaning, and instead eAuate assertoric content with the kaplanian
content of the sentence in the context, or again with the davidsonian truth
conditions of the utterance in that context. That such an eAuation holds has
been affirmed by e.g. by Cohn >cLowell !&B/E, &%E" and by Cason #tanley
!%EEE, 3B(".
6ut even this revised eAuation is problematic. 2n the pragmatics literature of
recent decades it has been pointed out that the content of what is asserted
usually !at least" goes beyond the proposition expressed by the sentence in the
context. 9ne of the standard examples is due to +eoffrey ,unberg !&B.B". The
sentence
!%%" The ham sandwich left without paying
can be used, e.g. when uttered by one waiter to another at a restaurant, to assert
that
!%3" .he #uest that had ordered the ham sandwich left the restaurant without
paying.
This does not seem to be an indirect speech act or implicature. 2t is the primary
act, but has a content different from anything that would be specified by a
meaning theory, truth theoretic or other.
How does one draw the line between linguistic meaning in context and content
that is added because of further factors of various sortsM This is currently a
topic of much dispute. 9ne view in particular has conseAuences for the general
theory of speech acts. 4appelen and 8epore !%EE(" have argued that the
boundary of semantics must be drawn very narrowly5 if we freely follow
intuitions about what is said by means of some sentence in different scenarios,
we are on a slippery slope and cannot in the end draw any line at all. However,
4appelen and 8epore still claim that the semantic content is asserted, since this
is what connects speech act content with sentence meaning. This holds even in
cases where the speaker intuitively wants to communicate something different.
2n the case of !%E", the correct semantic description according to 4appelen and
8epore !%EE(, &D3" is not !%&" but rather
!%*" <2t is raining= express the proposition that it is rainin# and is true iff it$s
raining
!when disregarding the time indexicality". Here, no location is mentioned. The
speaker of !%E" therefore asserts that it is raining !simpliciter" at t, for some
contextually salient time t. However, over and above this, the speaker
typically also asserts that it is raining at l at t, for some contextually salient
location l and some contextually salient time t. That the speaker performs both
assertions by means of the same utterance is part of 4appelen$s and 8epore$s
doctrine of #peech Act 1luralism !%EE(, *". According to this doctrine, by
means of a single utterance a speaker performs indefinitely many assertions, in
fact every assertion that can reasonably be attributed to her on the basis of the
utterance.
This doctrine is very controversial. A similar but less radical thesis is advanced
by #cott #oames !%EE%". #oames also wants to combine an austere semantic
theory !in this case the thesis that proper names are rigid designators" with
intuitions that the contents of assertions are richer than can be accounted for by
the semantics.
For more on pragmatic enrichment and discourse content, see the
supplementary text oncontent.
5. Truth
2t has often been noted that there is a close relation between the concepts of
assertion and truth. 4onnections between assertion and truth have sometimes
been appealed to for defining the concept of assertion, and sometimes for
defining the concept of truth. Four different connections with assertion have
been especially emphasi0ed5 with the use of the truth predicate, with truth as
the aim or norm of assertion, with the role of truth in meaning theory, and with
truth as related to correctness of assertions.
5.1 The truth predicate
As often noted in discussion of the truth predicate, there is a close connection
between using a sentence like
!%(" 7afka wrote many letters to >ilena
for making an assertion, and saying of it that it is true, e.g. by means of
!%" <7afka wrote many letters to >ilena= is true
or by means of
!%." That$s true
with reference to !%(", or to an utterance of !%(". #trawson !&B*B' &B(E, %E("
claimed that using !%." is not to make a ne' assertion, but to endorse a
previous one. #imilarly, N. V. Ouine !&B.E, &%" said that to call the sentence
<snow is white= true is to call snow white. 2n #trawson$s case in particular, the
idea was that this use of <true= for signaling agreement is basic, and the key to
understanding the truth predicate. This has been called the reassertion theory of
truth !1rice &B/., %E.".
2n Ouine$s case it is less clear that the endorsement signaling function is basic.
:ather, Ouine emphasi0ed that the truth predicate is a disAuotational device
!Ouine &B.E, &%". That is, applying the truth predicate to the Auotation of a
sentence, as in !%", has the same effect as removing the Auotes. That is, in
general an expression occurring within Auotes is mentioned, not used, but when
the truth predicate is applied to a Auoted sentence, what is within Auotes is
effectively brought from mention to use.
For more on assertion and the truth predicate, see the supplementary text
on truth.
5.2 Assertion as truth-claim
The simple connection between truth and assertion that #trawson and Ouine
pointed to for characteri0ing truth, can also be used for characteri0ing assertion.
According to 4rispin Nright !&BB%, %3D%*", the principle
!TA" Asserting a proposition is claiming that it is true.
is a platitude and its correctness is <partly constitutive= of the concepts of
assertion and truth. #o, according to Nright, !TA" serves both to partly
characteri0e truth in terms of assertion, and assertion in terms of truth.
2t is natural to understand <claim that= as pretty much synonymous with <assert
that=. #o understood, !TA" seems to say that to assert that p is the same as to
assert that p is true. However, if they are the same, then it seems that what is
asserted must be the same5 that is, the proposition that p and the
proposition that p is true are one and the same. #uch a view belongs in the
family of deflationary views about truth, and it was Frege$s view !Frege &/B%,
%E3". 2f it is correct, however, !TA" does not say anything more
about assertionthan that asserting that p is the same as asserting that p, and that
does not really characteri0e assertion.
2t is better, then, to understand <claim that= in some other way. Nright uses one
formulation !Nright &BB%, 3*" that is fairly common5
!1T" To assert is to present as true.
This natural-sounding phrase presumably suggests the idea be that in uttering a
sentence one presents a proposition, and in uttering it with assertoric force one
present it as having some particular property, that of being true. Analogously,
when a speaker utters a sentence with imperative force, she presents a
proposition as having the property that the addressee is to make it true. 6ut
already when it comes to the interrogative force, it is not clear what property 2
present the proposition as having. 2t cannot really be the property that its truth
value is desired by the speaker to be known, for that would fail to make a
distinction between !%/a" and !%/b" or !%/c"5
!%/" a. 2s ;lsa at homeM
b. 2 would like to know whether ;lsa is at home.
c. 2nform me whether ;lsa is at homeP
#o it is not so easy to see in general that the illocutionary force corresponds to
some property ascribed to the proposition expressed. This makes it less clear
what the locution <present as= amounts to. !1T" is then not as illuminating as it
might at first seem.
Frege had a more specific idea about /ud#"ent5 to judge is to advance
from sense !#inn" to reference !6edeutung" !Frege &/B%". According to Frege,
judging cannot be the same as ascribing to a proposition !a Thought, in Frege$s
sense" the property of being true, since moving from the proposition that p to
the proposition that p is true is just moving from a proposition to a proposition5
adding judgmental force must be something else !Frege &/B%, %E3' this can be
construed as a regress argument". 2n Frege$s view, the truth value of a !sentence
expressing a" proposition is its referent. 2n a judgment the thinker
acknowledges the truth of the proposition considered, and thereby advances
from the proposition to the acknowledgment that the referent is the truth value
The True. #o Frege$s idea is that in judging the thinker in a distinct way relates
a proposition to a particular object, The True. 9n this point Frege has not been
followed by many.
#ince judging that p or asserting that p clearly is different from just thinking
the thoughtthat p is true, we must characteri0e the relation between assertion,
or judgment, and truth in other terms than ascribing truth as a property, just as
Frege observed. 6ut it is difficult do to this in clear and convincing way. 9ne
might therefore suspect that the relation between truth and assertion simply
derives from the eAuivalence schema
!;#" 2t is true that p iff p
!according to Nright, this is entailed by !TA""5 asserting that p is by !;#"
eAuivalent to asserting that p is true. 6ut that eAuivalence derives from the
eAuivalence of the contents, and need not say much about assertion as such.
A more complex version of this connection between truth and assertion is
suggested by >ichael Lummett !&B(B, /". According to this suggestion, the
truth of an assertion is like the winning of a game5 this is not just a
classification of an outcome, but something the speaker or the player ai"s at.
2n this sense, an assertion !a statement" is false if one of the state of affairs that
the speaker meant to e&clude with the assertion obtains. 2f no such state of
affairs obtains, the statement is true. This introduces the theme of truth as an
aim, here as means of characteri0ing truth in terms of assertion.
5.3 Truth as aim !act-stating
2t is a commonly held idea, mainly used for characteri0ing assertion in terms of
truth, that assertion ai"s at truth. This is stated e.g. both by 6ernard Nilliams
!&B" and by >ichael Lummett !&B/&". 2t can be understood in two rather
different ways, the one intended by Nilliams and the other by Lummett !for
some ways of understanding what it could be for belief to aim at truth, see
;ngel %EE*".
9n Nilliams$s view, the property of aiming at truth is what characteri0es fact(
statin#discourse, as opposed to e.g. evaluative or directive discourse. 2t is
natural to think of
!%B" The moon is about 3/*,EEE km from the ;arth
as stating a fact, and of
!3E" 6ardot is good
as expressing an evaluation, not corresponding to any fact of the matter. 9n
Nilliams$s view, to regard a sincere utterance of
!3&" 2t is wrong to steal
as a moral assertion, is to take a realistic attitude to moral discourse5 there are
moral facts, making moral statements objectively true or false. This view again
comes in two versions. 9n the first alternative, the existence of moral facts
renders the discourse fact-stating, whether the speaker thinks so or not, and the
non-existence renders it evaluative, again whether the speaker thinks so or not.
9n the second alternative, !3&" is an assertion if the speaker has a realistic
attitude towards moral discourse and otherwise not.
9n these views, it is assumed that truth is a substantial property !Nilliams
&B, %E%", not a concept that can be characteri0ed in some deflationary way.
As a conseAuence, the sentence
!3%" <6ardot is good= is true
is to be regarded as false, since !3E" is objectively neither true nor false' there is
no fact of the matter.
For more on assertion and fact-stating, see the supplementary text on truth.
5.4 Truth as aim norms o! spea"ers# intentions
The other idea of truth as an aim for assertion is that this is what the speaker
aims at in making an assertion. The speaker tries to say something true.
#tatistically, it is no doubt the case that speakers usually believe what they
assert to be true, and usually this belief is no doubt part of the reason for
making the assertion. However, we cannot go from there to take a speaker$s
having this aim as necessary for her utterance to be assertoric, for lies are
assertions as much as honest utterances. The relation between assertion and the
aim of truth has then to be indirect.
There are basically two ways of effecting such an indirect connection. 9ne is to
complicate speaker intentions. For instance, instead of aiming to say something
true, we could say that
!A&" The speaker of an assertion aims at making the hearer believe that she
aims at saying something true.
Ne might then want to say that if the speaker does not have this primary, hearer
oriented intention, she is not really making an assertion, and if she does have it,
it is an assertion whether she is honest or not.
The other way is to appeal to the notions of rule, norm or convention. For
instance, we might try
!A%" 2t is a norm for making an assertion that the speaker aims at saying
something true.
9n this alternative, an utterance is assertoric just in case it is governed by this
norm, whatever the speaker in fact aims at in the particular case.
These two ideas have complementary problems. The problem with !A&" is that
utterances are made, even if infreAuently, that are intuitively assertoric, but
where the speaker does not have the reAuired intention. The speaker may be
fully aware that she will be taken as a liar, whether she aims at the truth or not,
and whether or not she tries to make the addressee believe she does aim at the
truth. 6eing convinced that this hearer oriented aim is unreachable, she will not
even have it, but is nonetheless making an assertion !for a testimony of
conversations of this kind, see 8evi &B(/, chapter /". 9ne may try to overcome
this by complicating the speaker intentions even further, but it hard to see that
any necessary condition of this kind could be immune to counterexamples.
The problem with !A%" is that it needs a supplementary criterion for when the
assertion norm is in force. 2f we don$t know how to tell whether the norm
applies to an utterance, we cannot tell whether it was an assertion or not.
Lummett has combined the two strategies. He has suggested the following
definition !Lummett &B/&, 3EE"5
!>L" A man makes an assertion if he says something in such a manner as
deliberately to convey the impression of saying it with the overriding intention
of saying something true.
Lummett$s proposal is presumably intended to give necessary as well as
sufficient conditions. There are problems of sufficiency with this proposal of
the kind that will be discussed in section .. There are also problems of
necessity of exactly the same kind as afflicts !A&" above. However, Lummett
can overcome these necessity problems by his appeal to convention. That is, it
can be a convention that when uttering a declarative sentence, unless there are
explicit indications to the contrary !such as a theater setting", the
speaker counts as conveying that he has the overriding intention of speaking
truly. Then it is no longer reAuired that the speaker tries to convey it, as long as
the circumstances make her count as doing so.
This proposal has the problems that afflict convention theories in general !see
section 3". 6ut there is a further point. 9nce the burden of determining
assertionhood is shifted to a convention about means and ways of expressing
oneself !setting aside the problems with this idea", we need to check whether
assertion is adeAuately characteri0ed in the convention. 2n Lummett$s case, it is
not, because of a problem with the very idea of appealing to the aim of truth.
For it is not only in assertions that we normally aim at saying something true.
Ne have that aim also in guesses, presumptions, conjectures and and the like,
all normally aimed at saying something true, but all somehow falling short of
being assertions. #imilarly, if 2 believe in the truth of, say, +oldbach$s
conjecture, 2 will deliberately convey the impression of pronouncing it with the
intention of saying something true, but because of my low degree of certitude, 2
don$t want to outright assert it. Assertoric force can be said to differ in %indfrom
interrogative and imperative force, but only in de#ree or intensity from e.g.
conjectural force. 4onventions of the aiming kind don$t discriminate between
assertion and weaker forms of propounding.
Ne would therefore need a more demanding norm5
!T" #ay only what is trueP
The idea is again that an utterance is an assertion just if it is governed by this
norm. +uesses aren$t, for guesses are, in some sense !in need of
clarification", allo'ed to be wrong. A speaker trying to comply with !T" will
not only avoid asserting what she believes to be false, but she will also try
to "a%e sure that what she says isn$t false unbeknownst to her. 6ecause of this
she will assert only that for which she has adeAuate evidence. #he can even be
blamed for asserting something which was in fact true, if she didn$t have good
enough reasons for believing it was. This is in accordance with +rice$s
supermaxim of Ouality5 .ry to "a%e your contribution one that is true !+rice
&B/B, %.".
From this standpoint of the norm of !T", assertion is characteri0ed by the way
assertions are evaluated. There are several ideas of how to assess assertions
as correct orincorrect. This theme will be pursued in the present section and the
next.
5.5 Truth and correctness
There is a family of Auestions about the conditions for an assertion to
be correct. As has often been noted, an assertion can be correct in different
respects. ;.g., a speaker can say something true but be impolite in saying it,
thereby making an assertion that is incorrect with respect to etiAuette. Also,
even if we disregard such social aspects on a speech act, an assertion may have
e.g. an i"plicature that is incorrect, even though the primary act is correct.
8et$s for now concentrate on the semanticIepistemic correctness of the primary
act. For that respect, the principle
!;4" An assertion that p is correct if, and only if, the speaker has good evidence
that it is true that p
is almost universally accepted !for problems concerning conditionals, see
section /". 2n the case of mathematics, for instance, an assertion it thought of as
correct if the speaker knows a proof of what is asserted !see 1rawit0 &BB/a, *(,
and many other places". There is room for doubt that there is anything like
reasonably sharp and stable standards of assertoric correctness in ordinary
linguistic practice, and in fact speakers pretty rarely engage in evaluating
utterances in these terms, beyond assessing them for truth or falsity, or blaming
the speaker for breach of confidence and the like. There is therefore not much
evidence from actual practice that the intended notions of correctness play any
important role. They can nevertheless belong in the linguistic or philosophical
enterprises of reflecting over that practice.
A second preliminary issue concerns the status of the notion of correctness
involved. 2s it an inherently nor"ative notion, or is it just descriptiveM
According to e.g. !an earlier view of" 1aul 6oghossian !&B/B, (&3" the mere
fact that we can evaluate assertions as correct or incorrect show that words are
governed by norms of use. According to 7athrin +lQer !%EE&, ED(' cf.
Nikforss %EE&, and 6oghossian %EE3", on the other hand, there is no reason to
see in the notions of correctness and incorrectness anything more than a
descriptive classification, which may then be coupled with certain a preference
for correct assertions over incorrect ones, both in making and in taking. Those
preferences may then be explained e.g. by appeal to social psychology, or the
desire for knowledge.
#etting these Auestions aside, we can note that the !;4" biconditional has been
used in two different ways5 as a way of characteri0ing assertoric correctness in
terms of truth and evidence, or as a way of characteri0ing truth in terms of
correctness and evidence. 2t is the second alternative that has been most
important. Ne shall return to the first alternative in the next section.
Nhen using !;4" to account for truth it is crucial how <good evidence= is
understood. Typically, it is the best possible evidence, i.e. the best evidence
that can be had or could be had !as opposed to something that only could have
been had but cannot anymore", that is relevant. There is also a Auestion of how
to understand <has=, as we shall see.
Cohn Lewey !&B3/" seems to have been the first to characteri0e truth in terms
of assertoric correctness, with his notion of 'arranted assertibility, even
though this idea had a clear affinity with the verifiability principle of >orit0
#chlick !&B3". Lewey was later followed by, notably, >ichael Lummett
!&B." and Hilary 1utnam !&B/&". 4ommon to them is the position that there
cannot be anything more to truth than being supported by the best available
evidence. Lewey, following 4. #. 1eirce, regarded truth as the ideal limit of
scientific inAuiry !Lewey &B3/, 3*(", and a proposition warrantedly asserted
when known in virtue of such an inAuiry. Narranted assertibility is the property
of a proposition for which such knowledge potentially exists !&B3/, B".
1utnam !&B/&, (*D(" operated with an idea of assertibility under ideal
epistemic conditions. Rnder normal conditions, a speaker can be justified in
making an assertion even though what she asserts is false. The evidence is
enough for truth under normal circumstances, but because of abnormal
interference the evidence falls short. For instance, improbable changes, say
because of a fire, may have taken place after the speaker$s observation.
However, in ideal epistemic conditions evidence that is sufficient for justifying
an assertion also is conclusive. #pelling out what the ideal epistemic conditions
are, in a non-circular fashion, has of course been a main problem for this view.
Lummett$s views are more complex, but in general focus on actual evidence
rather than ideali0ed conditions.
For more on assertion, truth and correctness, see the supplementary text
on truth.
$. %elie! and "no&ledge
Two common ideas about assertion are that the speaker says what she believes
and that she says what she knows. +iven that assertions often are made that
don$t fit these descriptions, the Auestion is how those ideas can be worked out.
$.1 %elie!
According to Frege !&B&/, %%", an assertion is an outward sign of
a /ud#"ent !Rrteil". The term <judgment= has been used in several ways !cf.
section (.%". 2f it is used to mean either belief, or act by 'hich a belief is
for"ed or reinforced, then Frege$s view is pretty much eAuivalent with the view
that assertion is the expression of belief.
How should one understand the idea of expressing hereM 2t is natural to think of
a belief state, i.e. a mental state of the speaker, as causally co-responsible for
the making of the assertion. For instance, a speaker has a belief and wants to
communicate it. This motivates an assertoric utterance. The having of the
belief, i.e. the belief state, together with the desire to communicate, motivate
the action, and jointly cause it !if reasons are causes' cf Lavidson &B3". The
assertion therefore gives evidence that the speaker has a belief suitably related
to the meaning of the sentence uttered. 9n this conception, an assertion is the
expression of belief like a running nose is the expression of a virus infection, or
groaning is the expression of pain.
However, assertion is intentional and groaning can be. 2 can intentionally groan
to make my pain known to others, and my belief that there are black swans can
motivate my intention to assertorically utter
!33" There are black swans
!4f. 9wens %EE." 9n the other hand, 2 can also pretend to be in pain by
groaning, and pretend to believe that there are black swans by means of an
assertoric utterance of !33". 2n this case the utterance isn$t caused or motivated
by the corresponding belief, but since it is an assertion nonetheless, not all
assertions are expressions of belief in the sense suggested.
The utterance may still be evidence for the existence the belief state. ,o doubt,
a speaker will not try mislead the addressee about the facts, by means of an
assertion, unless she assumes !tacitly, for the most part" that her assertion does
count as evidence for the addressee that the she does have the belief in
Auestion. This idea, of intendin# the addressee to take the utterance as evidence
for belief of is a key idea in 6ach$s and Harnich$s understanding of what
expressing is. They say
!;" For S to e&press an attitude is for S to R-intend the hearer to take S$s
utterance as reason to think S has that attitude
!6ach and Harnich &B.B, &(' italics in the original." <:-intend= is short for
<reflexively intend=, a notion we will return to in the next section. 9n this view,
expressing is wholly a matter of hearer-directed intentions. 4f. section ..
However, a speaker can clearly make an assertion even if the addressee has a
prior conviction that the speaker is dishonest and will not treat the assertion as
evidence for belief, and intuitively she can also make an assertion even if she
is convinced that that is so. 2t can happen e.g. in interrogation situations, where
the speaker officially insists on an account of what has happened, knowing full
well she will be taken as a liar. #he will not then intend the interrogators to take
her utterance as evidence for belief. 2nsisting can be a conversational strategy,
whether she is lying or not.
2ntuitions are surely debatable here, but the possibility of such situations makes
it problematic to treat the existence of such hearer-directed intentions as a
necessary condition for an utterance to be an assertion.
A more neutral way of trying to capture the relation between assertion and
believing was suggested both by >ax 6lack !&B(%" and by Lavidson !&B/*b,
%/"5 in asserting that pthe speaker represents herself as believing that p. This
suggestion appears to avoid the difficulties with the appeal to hearer-directed
intentions, because representation belongs more to semantics than to personal
psychology. However, it is not so clear what representing oneself amounts to. 2t
must be a sense different from that in which one represents the 'orld as having
black swans by means of a normal assertoric utterance of !33". The speaker
does claim that there are black swans but does not also claim that she believes
that there are black swans. 2t must apparently be some weaker sense of
<represent=, since it is not just a matter of being, as opposed to not being, fully
explicit. 6y means of answering the Auestion what 2 believe with an utterance
of !33" 2 do represent myself as believing that there are black swans,
eAuivalently with asserting it. Nhat 2 assert then is wrong if 2 don$t have the
belief, despite the existence of black swans.
9n the other hand, it must also be stronger than the sense of <represent= by
which an actor can be said to represent himself as believing something on
stage. The actor says
!3*" 2$m in the biology department
thereby representing himself as asserting that he is in the biology department,
since he represents himself as being a man who honestly asserts that he is in the
biology department. 6y means of that he in one sense represents himself as
believing that he is in the biology department. 6ut the hearer is no way invited
to believe that the speaker, i.e. the actor, has that belief.
Apparently, the relevant sense of <represent= is not easy to specify. An
alternative is again to go normative, with the rule
!6" Assert only what you believeP
This accords with but is stronger than +rice$s first submaxim of Ouality5 0o
not say 'hat you believe to be false !+rice &B/B, %.". An immediate objection
to this is that !6" is a moral rule rather than a rule that accounts for assertion as
such. #peakers may be subject to this rule, but as moral agents more than as
speakers. 6ut this objection can be met. 2t can be agreed that being honest, or
sincere, indeed is something reAuired by a moral rule. However, you can be
insincere in many different ways. Nhat !6" specifies is what %ind of insincerity,
and thereby sincerity, is specific to assertion. That is, you can regard the appeal
to !6" as eAuivalent with a statement about what counts as being sincere5
!#6" An act of type 1 is sincere if, and only if, the speaker believes what she
says
Then you can go on to claim that assertion is a value of 1, or even the uniAue
value of 1, that makes !#6" come out true. This idea is part of #earle$s account,
as we shall in the next section.
For more on assertion, belief and >oore$s paradox, see the supplementary text
on belief and assertion.
$.2 'no&ledge
The belief rule !6" relates the appropriateness of an assertion to the sincerity of
the speaker. However, if we compare this idea with traditional notions of the
correctness of assertion, it may seem that sincerity is not enough. According to
the traditional ideas, an assertion is correct only if the speaker has good
evidence for what she asserts !cf. section (.(". This fits well with the intuition
that the speaker who makes an assertion typically wants to come across not
only as sincere, but also as being ri#ht, and as having some authority on the
particular topic.
This suggests that the belief rule should be replaced by something stronger,
a %no'led#erule5
!7" Assert only what you knowP
2n a slightly different format !<one must5 assert p only if one knows p=" this rule
has in fact been proposed by Timothy Nilliamson !%EEE, %*3' cf. >artin-8Sf
&BB/, Le:ose %EE%, Hawthorne %EE*". The idea of a knowledge rule is one
among several related ideas of connecting asserting with the speaker$s
knowledge of what she asserts !for a version concerned with transfer of
knowledge to the audience, see +arcia-4arpintero %EE*". The general idea has
come to be called <the knowledge account of assertion=. The idea that assertion
is governed by the rule !7" can be strengthened into the claim that assertion
isuni2uely governed by such a rule. That is, we would have
!7R" Assertion is the uniAue value of 1 for which the schema <1 only what you
knowP= gives a valid rule.
The general idea of the knowledge account was suggested, or at least
anticipated by +. ;. >oore himself !&B&%" with the claim that the
speaker i"plies that she knows that p!>oore &B, 3". >any years later, 1eter
Rnger !&B.(, %(3D.E", and >ichael #lote !&B.B, &/(" made the stronger claim
that in asserting that p the speaker represents herself as %no'in# that p.
9ne argument for this view comes from conversational patterns. As a response
to an assertion you can ask <How do you know thatM=, or critici0e it by means
of <Jou don$t know that=. #uch responses, it is argued, would not be appropriate
if the speaker did not automatically represent herself as knowing what she
asserts. 9ne problem with this argument is that it is not so clear that in such
reactions to an assertion the speaker is really taken to have claimed to know, in
some implicit way. For instance, the Auestion <How do you know thatM= might
simply be a way of inAuiring about the grounds for the assertion.
Nith respect to the Auestion of the correctness of assertions !section (.(", the
position of the knowledge account is that an assertion is incorrect if the speaker
doesn$t know that the proposition asserted is true.
For more on knowledge and assertion, see the supplementary text on belief and
knowledge.
(. Social character
The social character of a speech act can be of two kinds. 9n the one hand, there
can be an institutional change of relation between speaker and addressee
occurring because of a characteristic property of the act. For instance, by means
of a sincere utterance of
!3(" 2 promise to call the repair shop
the speaker has committed herself, in relation to the addressee, to do
something. 6oth speaker and hearer will regard the speaker as having incurred
an obligation to the addressee. The first to view assertion from this angle was
probably 4. #. 1eirce, who said that <to assert a proposition is to make oneself
responsible for its truth= !&B3*, 3/*".
9n the other hand, there can be hearer-directed intentions which the speaker
has in performing a speech act. The speaker may intend the hearer to come to
believe something or other about the speaker, or about something else, or
intend the hearer to come to desire or intend to do something. #uch intentions
can concern institutional changes, but need not. 2ntentions that are immediately
concerned with communication itself, as opposed to ulterior goals, are
called co""unicative intentions.
The distinction between these two kinds of social character does not coincide
with the distinction between conventional and non-conventional. For instance,
you can hold that there is a form-force convention in ;nglish without accepting
any institutional theory about illocutionary types.
>ost social accounts have tended to focus either on the
conventionalIinstitutional or on the intentional features !#earle, as we shall see,
combines them". An example of the former is 6random !&BB*". According to
6random !&BB*, &.3D.(", the nature of assertion consists in the fact that in
assserting the speaker achieves two different normativeIinstitutional results at
the same time5 on the one hand she authori0es the hearer to claim anything that
follows from what is asserted and on the other she undertakes the responsibility
of justifying it. 6random has recently been followed by Cohn >acFarlane
!%EE3, %EE(" in the context of semantic relativism. 9ther examples include
7otatko !&BB/, %3D3B", who like #earle stresses the importance of social
conventions about what counts as making a commitment or undertaking, and
+ary Natson !%EE*". Also, +reen !&BBB, %EEE" has worked out the idea of
assertoric commitment in the setting of conversational score.
The idea of communicative intentions derives from +rice$s &B(. article
<>eaning=, where +rice defined what it is for a speaker to non(naturally
"ean something. +rice$s idea can be set out as follows5
!,," S non-naturally means something by an utterance u if, and only if, there is
a hearer 3 such that
!i" S intends u to bring about a response R in 3
!ii" S intends 3 to recogni0e that !i"
!iii" S intends 3$s reason for R to be that !i".
!Here <that !i"= is short for <that S intends u to bring about a response R in 3=."
That is, the speaker intends the hearer to react in a certain way because of
recogni0ing that the speaker wants him to react in that way. 9ften, and in
+rice$s original examples, the intended reaction is one of coming to believe
something, and that is a reaction that typically fits the speaker$s intention or at
least desire when making an assertion. Although +rice did not explicitly
attempt to define assertion, the idea can be straightforwardly applied to provide
one5
!1+" S asserts that p by the utterance u iff there is a hearer 3 such that
!i" S intends u to produce in 3 the belief that p
!ii" S intends 3 to recogni0e that !i"
!iii" S intends 3 to believe that p for the reason that !i"
2n the early to mid &BEs Austin$s speech act theory and +rice$s account of
communicative intentions began to merge. The connection is discussed in
#trawson &B*. #trawson inAuired whether illocutionary force could be made
overt by means of communicative intentions. He concluded that when it comes
to highly conventionali0ed utterances communicative intentions are largely
irrelevant, but that on the other hand convention does not play much role for
ordinary illocutionary types. #trawson also pointed out a dfficulty with +rice$s
analysis5 it may be the case that all three conditions are fulfilled, but that the
speaker intends the hearer to believe that they aren$t, e.g. by intending the
hearer to believe that the speaker wants him to believe that p for an entirely
different reason.
#uch intentions to mislead came to be called snea%y intentions !+rice &BB",
and they constituted a problem for speech act analyses based on communicative
intentions. The idea was that genuine communication is essentially open5 the
speaker$s communicative intentions are meant to be fully accessible to the
hearer. #neaky intentions violate this reAuirement of openness, and therefore
apparently they must be ruled out one way or another. #trawson$s own solution
was to add a fourth clause about the speaker$s intention that the hearer
recogni0e the third intention. However, that solution only invited a sneaky
intention one level up !cf #chiffer &B.%, &.D*%".
Another solution was to make the intention refle&ive. This was proposed by
#earle !&BB", in the first full-blown analysis of illocutionary types made by
appeal to communicative intentions. #earle combined this with an appeal to
institutional relations as created by rules. #uch rules are the so-
called constitutive rules, as opposed tore#ulative rules !the terminology is taken
from 7ant". :oughly, whereas regulative rules regulate a pre-existing activity,
such as traffic regulations regulate traffic, constitutive rules in a sense create a
new activity. 1aradigm examples are rules of games as defining games, and
thus making it possible to play them. The distinction was introduced by :awls
!&B((", and also suggested by 4. +. C. >idgley !&B(B" in the same terms and
format as later by #earle !&BB, 33D*%' cf. +lQer and 1agin &BBB".
#earle suggests five rules for the use of force indicating devices. 2n the case of
assertion, they are as follows. S is the speaker and 3 the hearer5
!C#&" !&" The propositional content rule5 what is to be expressed is any proposition p.
!%" First preparatory rule5 S has evidence !reasons etc." for the truth of p.
!3" #econd preparatory rule5 2t is not obvious to both S and 3 that 3 knows !does
not need to be reminded of, etc." p.
!*" #incerity rule5 S believes p.
!(" 4onstitutive rule5 4ounts as an undertaking to the effect that p represents an
actual state of affairs.
The fifth rule is constitutive. That is, according to #earle, without this rule the
practice of assertion would not exist. The existence of the undertaking is an
institutional fact created by the utterance. According to #earle !&BB, (", the
speaker e&presses the state reAuired by the sincerity rule, i.e. in the case of
assertion, expresses belief. Also, the speaker i"plies that the preparatory
conditions are met.
The making of an assertion also involves the speaker$s communicative
intentions. #earle critci0ed +rice for reAuiring the speaker to intend
perlocutionary effects, such as what the speaker shall come to do or believe,
pointing out that such intentions aren$t essential !&BB, *D*.". 2nstead,
according to #earle, the speaker intends to be understood, and also intends to
achieve this by means of the hearer$s recognition of this intention. >oreover, if
the intention is recogni0ed, it is also fulfilled5 <we achieve what we try to do by
getting our audience to recogni0e what we try to do= !#earle &BB, *.".
For more about assertion and social analysis of assertion, see the supplementary
text onsocial character.
). *ogic
Frege introduced the turnstile, <=, as a so-called assertion si#n. 2t first
appeared in the$e#riffsschrift !Frege &/.B". According to Frege, it serves
to e&press a /ud#"ent!&/.B, &&". The sign was meant to be composed from the
hori0ontal part, the so-calledcontent stro%e, and the vertical part, the so-
called /ud#"ent stro%e. The content stroke would mark that what follows it is a
judgeable content.
Frege demanded that what follows the the content stroke must have a content
that can become a judgment, which is to say a propositional content. Nith the
content stroke attached, but not the judgment stroke, we have an expression of
the kind <the circumstance that T=, or <the proposition that T= !&/.B, &&". He
also characteri0ed <= as a common predicate for all judgments, like the
predicate <is a fact= as occurring in sentences such as
!3" The violent death of Archimedes at the capture of #yracuse is a fact.
Here the argument is a noun phrase denoting an event rather than a state of
affairs. This difference in syntactic format between that-clauses and event terms
is of less significance than the basic idea that there really is just one kind of
judgment. There are not e.g. any hypothetical or disjunctive /ud#"ents, only
conditional or disjunctive contents. The contents vary, the nature of the
judgment remains the same !Frege &/.B, &3".
This view was retained in the 4rund#eset5e der -rith"eti% !Frege &/B3". The
assertion sign is here still composed of the vertical part, the /ud#"ent stro%e,
and the hori0ontal, now called the hori5ontal !der 6a#erechte". Nhile the
judgment stroke is more or less the same, Frege$s conception of the hori0ontal
has changed. The hori0ontal is now part of the expression of content. 2t denotes
a function from objects to truth values !&/B3, B"5 it maps the True on the True
and any other object on the False. 2t can occur in the interior of formulas.
:emember that on Frege$s view at the time, truth values are among the objects
of the universe.
#ince the judgment stroke is always followed by a hori0ontal, this construction
has the effect that what is judged always denotes a truth value, at least if what
follows the hori0ontal is a meaningful closed expression !not containing gaps
or free variables". 9n the view that Frege had developed since
the $e#riffsschrift, and which he argued for in <Uber #inn und 6edeutung=,
judging is passing from the level of sense !#inn" to the level of reference
!6edeutung". Cudging that p is passing from the mere thought that p, to
acceptance of the truth of the thought that p. Thus, in judging you advance from
a sense to a truth value. 4onversely, advancing from a sense to a truth value
constitutes judging. Therefore, we have a well-formed judgment, correct or
incorrect, if what follows the judgment stroke denotes a truth value. Nith the
new conception of the hori0ontal, the judgment is guaranteed to be well-
formed.
Frege$s conception of his assertion sign fits well in with his own system of
deduction. ;very sentence occurring in a deduction in the $e#riffschrift or
the 4rund#eset5e is either asserted or a proper constituent of a sentence that is
asserted. ;ach sentence asserted is either an axiom or is derived from axioms
by means of accepted rules of deduction. There is no such thing as an
unasserted assumption occurring as a premise of a deduction step, and a
fortiori no conclusion of a deduction step that depends on an assumption.
4orrespondingly, the judgment stroke itself only occurs initially in each
expression of judgment. There is no such thing as a complex judgment with
other judgments as proper parts. 2n particular, there are no hypothetical
judgments, in the sense of a judgment that is the conseAuent of a conditional.
#everal interesting connections between logical issues and the notion of
assertion have arisen because of transcendence of these Fregean limitations.
The first was crossed by +erhard +ent0en in the mid-&B3Es, and, depending on
interpretation, maybe the second, too. Nith +ent0en$s ,atural Leduction
system !&B3*D3(", a system of deduction was formulated with the possibility of
making assumptions, making inferences from these assumptions, and also
of dischar#in# assumptions in certain deduction steps !e.g. -2ntroduction".
Nith +ent0en$s work, and the later developments by Lag 1rawit0 !&B(",
,atural Leduction has become a well-established and almost standard system
of deduction. However, there is still a Auestion of how to understand the act of
inferring from an assumption, since it seems itself to be neither an assumption,
nor an assertion proper.
2t might be natural to think of such an act as a kind of conditional assertion.
2deas about conditional assertion have been proposed, but then chiefly in
connection with natural language indicative conditionals, i.e. sentences of the
form
!3." 2f p, then 2
!in ;nglish". 1roblems with interpreting such sentences as material
conditionals,
!3/" p 2
led to the suggestion, first in Ouine &B(%, that an assertoric utterance of an
indicative conditional really is a conditional assertion, in the following sense5 2f
the antecedent is true, then the speaker has asserted the proposition expressed
by the conseAuent, and if the antecedent is false, no assertion has been made.
This idea has been rather controversial.
Finally, generali0ing the idea that there are forms of judgment with assertions
as proper parts, there has been a development of so-called logics of assertion,
and even more generally, illocutionary logic, with complex speech act types,
having themselves speech act types as proper parts. 2n the assertion logic case,
there is special logical constant !<A=" denoting assertion, and the system is the
logic of that constant. 2n the case of ,icholas :escher !&B/", the basic form of
sentence studied is that of
!3B" & asserts that p
which is abbreviated as
!3BV" A&p
A similar system as is developed by 2ngemund +ullvWg !&B./". 2n illocutionary
logic, as e.g. in #earle and Vanderveken &B/(, the study concerns in general
logical relations between speech acts. 2n this case the idea is that each speech
act has a particular array of characteristics, and two speech acts may then be so
related that the characteristics of the one are implied by, or inconsistent with,
the characteristics of the other. 4f. the entry on #peech Acts.
For more on assumptions, conditionals and assertion logic, see the
supplementary text onlogic and assertion.
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-ther Internet .esources
?1lease contact the author with suggestions.@
.elated /ntries
Austin, Cohn 8angshaw \ convention \ Lavidson, Lonald \ defaults in semantics
and pragmatics \ Frege, +ottlob \ +rice, 1aul \ 1eirce, 4harles
#anders \ pragmatics \ Ouine, Nillard van 9rman \ speech acts \ #trawson, 1eter
Frederick
Ac"no&ledgments
2 have been greatly helped by comments on the first version from an
anonymous referee. 2 am also grateful for comments from Herman 4appelen,
and from participants in a seminar on the first version in #tockholm, especially
to 7athrin +lQer, 1er >artin-8Sf, Lag 1rawit0 and [sa Nikforss.
Copyright 2007 by
Peter Pagin <peter.pagin@philosophy.su.se>