Sponsoring Committee: Professor Janelle T.

Scott, Chairperson
Professor Gary L. Anderson
Professor Leslie Santee Siskin
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS AND THE SMALL SCHOOLS
MOVEMENT: A NEW FORM OF EDUCATION MANAGEMENT
Catherine Comstock DiMartino
Program in Educational Leadership
Department of Administration, Leadership and Technology
Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requi rement s for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in the
Steinhardt School of Culture, Education, and Human Development
New York University
2009
UMI Number: 3346262
Copyright 2009 by
DiMartino, Catherine Comstock
All rights reserved.
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Copyright 2009 Catherine Comstock DiMartino
I hereby guarantee that no part of the dissertation which I have submitted for
publication has been heretofore published and/or copyrighted in the United
States of America, except in the case of passages quoted from other
published sources; that I am the sole author and proprietor of said
dissertation; that the dissertation contains no matter which, if published, will
be libelous or otherwise injurious, or infringe in any way the copyright of
any other party; and that I will defend, indemnify and hold harmless New
York University against all suits and proceedings which may be brought and
against all claims which may be made against New York University by
reason of the publication of said dissertation.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I am grateful to all of the individuals-principals, teachers, parents,
members of intermediary organizations and district officials-who participated in
this study. They generously opened their schools and offices, and shared their
experiences with me.
At NYU, my dissertation advisor, committee members and informal
mentors provided me with critical guidance and support. I drew inspiration from
Janelle Scott whose commitment to educational equity and intellectual rigor
constantly pushed me to think in new ways and deeply influenced my evolution as
an educational researcher. I feel fortunate to have had her as a teacher, advisor
and mentor. A special thank you to Gary Anderson who has supported my
doctoral pursuits in many ways, from finding me space to work on my dissertation
to offering sage advice about my next professional steps. His commitment to
students' intellectual growth and development exemplifies good teaching and
reminds me, through his example, the great importance of sharing knowledge and
experience. I have also benefitted from the wisdom of Leslie Santee Siskin whose
interest in and support of my work shaped this dissertation and who in her
creation of the High School Group, created a community of scholars with whom I
could share ideas. A special thank you goes to Mary Driscoll, who was the first
professor I met at NYU. I am grateful for your good counsel and our
conversations that span topics ranging from aviaries to roses. Last, but not least,
iii
to Elaine Chugranismy fellow doctoral studentyour great sense of humor and
unending generosity in explaining the whole dissertation process helped pull me
through!
My studies at NYU would not have been possible without the support of
Dean Patricia Cary and the Office of Student Services. In addition to funding me
for three years as a graduate assistant, members of the office, especially Jeanne
Bannon, Doris Alcivar and Nancy Hall, provided me with excellent advice as well
as many laughs.
At RAND, a special thank you goes to Team NYC who modeled the
practice of policy research and whose members offered invaluable support and
advice about the dissertation process.
To mom and dad who taught me the value of education and who always
urged me go for the gold! Thank you. A special thank you to my mom who
always encouraged me to pursue work that I believe in and that serves a greater
good. Finally, to Daniel Blanco my partner, best friend, fellow adventurer and
editor extraordinaire. Thank you for your unconditional love, support and
encouragement throughout this entire process; your positive energy and calming
presence helped me to complete this journey.
IV
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iii
LIST OF TABLES ix
LIST OF FIGURES x
CHAPTER
I THE USE OF INTERMEDIARY ORGANIZATIONS TO
REFORM PUBLIC EDUCATION 1
Introduction 1
Purpose and Rationale 6
Research Questions 8
Political and Economic Context: A National Perspective 9
Political and Economic Context: A Local Perspective 13
Building an Educational Marketplace 14
Partnering with the Private Sector to Run "Not a Great
School System, but a System of Great Schools" 15
New Accountability Mechanisms 16
The Emergence of Intermediary Organizations 17
An Introduction to the Findings 19
Dissertation Overview 21
Conclusion 22
II FRAMING HYBRID SCHOOLS: CONCEPTUALIZING
THE INTERSECTION OF EDUCATIONAL VALUES
AND POWER 24
Introduction 24
The Politics of Hybrid Schools: Crossing Sector Boundaries,
Exchanging Values and Negotiating Power 25
The Politics of Power and Control 30
The Spectrum of Control 32
Conclusion 37
continued
v
Ill REVIEW OF LITERATURE
38
Introduction 38
Motivation and Contextual Factors that Impact
Cross-Sectoral Partnerships 39
Legal, Financial, Political, and Organizational
Incentives 39
Partnering Factors 45
The Distribution of Power and Its Impact on Governance
within Joint Ventures 52
Distribution of Power 52
How Success is Measured, Sustained and Replicated
within Inter-Organizational Relationships 59
Measuring Outcomes 60
Sustainability and Scaling Up 61
Conclusion and Implications 64
IV METHODOLOGY 66
Introduction 66
Research Questions 66
Research Design 67
Sample Selection 70
Intermediary Organizations 71
School Samples 73
Data Collection 75
Identifying and Recruiting Study Participants 76
Data Sources 78
Data Analysis 83
Coding 83
Role of Researcher 86
Conclusion 87
V THE CASE OF EXCELSIOR ACADEMY: A
UNIVERSITY EDGE SCHOOL 89
Overview of the Case 89
Part I: Contextual Factors that Impact
Public-Private Ventures 91
The Partnership Quest: Alignment and Association 91
An Introduction to the University Edge and its
School Design Model 94
continued
VI
School Acceptance, Placement and Regional Support 97
Teacher Motivations for Choosing Excelsior 98
Parent Motivations for Choosing Excelsior 102
Admissions Procedures and Student
Selection Processes 103
Part II: Decision Making Processes 110
The Partnership in Action: Personnel, Curricular,
and Professional Development Decisions 114
Part III: Sustainability and Scaling Up 126
Leaving Before Year Four: Teacher Attrition
at Excelsior 126
Parents' Dream Making and Breaking Experiences 128
University Edge: Scaling Up 129
Excelsior Academy: An Uncertain Future 131
Discussion and Conclusion 132
VI THE CASE OF METROPOLITAN UNITED
ENTREPRENEURSfflP AND CITIZENSHIP
ACADEMY 136
Overview of the Case 136
Part I: Contextual Factors that Impacted
The Partnership 137
The Partnership Quest: A Speedy Union 137
From Partner to Manager: An Introduction
to Metropolitan United 140
Teachers Motivations for Choosing ECA 147
Parent Motivations for Choosing ECA 150
Student Characteristics and Selectivity 151
Part II: Decision-Making Processes 154
Decision-Making Processes: Personnel and Budget 155
Decision-Making Processes: Teaching and Learning 158
Part III: The Dissolution of the Partnership 166
Poor Interactions 167
New York City Department of Education Response 170
The School and Community's Response to the Break 172
Post Break-Up: Settling Accounts and
Changi ng Names 172
Part IV: Sustainability and Scaling Up 175
The Post Break Experience: Metropolitan United 175
continued
vn
The Post Break Experience: Entrepreneurship and
Citizenship Academy 177
The Post Break Experience: Parents' Hopes and
Goals for Schooling 177
Discussion and Conclusion 178
VII CROSS CASE ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 180
Introduction and Overview of the Study 180
Micro-Politics of Partnerships 183
Parameters of Power: The Spectrum of
Control Revisited 183
Contextual Factors that Impact and Influence
the Partnership 188
The Competing Public and Private Goals Inherent
in Cross-Sectoral Collaborations 194
The Macro-Politics of Current School Reform 197
Implications for Research, and Policy Recommendations 200
Implications for Research 200
Policy Recommendations 203
Conclusion - 207
BIBLIOGRAPHY 210
APPENDICES 220
A INTERVIEW PROTOCOLS 220
B OBSERVATION PROTOCOL 228
C DOCUMENT REVIEW PROTOCOL 229
V1H
LIST OF TABLES
1 Descriptions of Intermediary Organizations 72
2 Descriptions of Case Study Schools (2006-2007) 74
3 Total Individuals Interviewed at Excelsior Academy: A University
Edge School and at University Edge 80
4 Total Individuals Interviewed at Entrepreneurship and Citizenship
Academy and at Metropolitan United 80
5 Total Individuals Interviewed at District 80
6 University Edge School Design Model 96
7 Teacher Demographics, Experience and Retention Data at Excelsior 101
8 Metropolitan United's Principles Pre-Management Contract 141
9 Teacher Demographics and Experience at Entrepreneurship and
Citizenship Academy 149
IX
LIST OF FIGURES
1 Flow of Resources between Foundation, Intermediary, Schools
and the New York City Department of Education 5
2 Spectrum of Control 34
3 Spectrum of Control 184
x
CHAPTER I
THE USE OF INTERMEDIARY ORGANIZATIONS TO
REFORM PUBLIC EDUCATION
Introduction
While reports of school vouchers and educational management
organizations (EMOs) hold the media's and public's attention, subtler, but no less
important, privatization initiatives have taken root in some of the largest urban
districts across the United States. This new privatization
1
, often coupled with
mayoral takeover of school systems, school choice initiatives, and increased
accountability, encourages unprecedented reliance on the private sector to provide
educational services at all levels. Within the Department of Education (DOE) in
New York City, for example, private consulting firms make policy
recommendations, while at the school level, private organizations are regularly
co-founding new small schools. This dissertation focuses on the emergence of
intermediary organizations as partners to new small schools in New York City.
Using two case studies of new small schools co-founded by an intermediary
organization and the New York City Department of Education (NYC DOE), this
study exami nes decision-makinga key area around which partners and school s
In this dissertation, privatization is defined as "the act of reducing the role of government, or
increasing the role of the private sector, in an activity or in the ownership of assets" (Savas, 1987,
P-3).
1
negotiate power
2
. In particular, this study explores how partners and school-
based stakeholders make decisions over personnel, budgets, curricula,
professional development and admissions processes.
The use of public-private partnerships is not new; private sector
contracting has a long history in public education. However, the founding and
running of schools by private sector organizations is a more recent phenomenon
(Colby, Smith & Shelton, 2005; Gold, Christman & Herold, 2007; Miron &
Nelson, 2002; Richards, Shore & Sawicky, 1996). Fueled by neoliberal ideology
which argues that markets and consumer choice create more effective and better
quality public schools (Chubb and Moe, 1990; Friedman, 1962), the influence of
these perspectives on policymakers, in concert with the decreased role of federal
and local governments in social services, has led to the reconceptualization of
how educational services are delivered. This vision involves replacing publicly
funded and run educational services with public-private partnerships or entirely
private organizations (Chubb & Moe, 1990; Handler, 1996; Minow, 2002).
Similarly, small schools are not new to public education; they have often
functioned on the periphery of the school system, residing in rural areas and in
alternative superintendencies where, with exceptions, they educate "at-risk" or
second chance students (Lief, 2001; Raywid & Schmerler, 2003). In New York
City, progressive and equity minded educators have often been key leaders in the
2
In this dissertation, the term power refers to the ability of an individual or group, as defined by
Max Weber, "to realize their own will in a communal action even against the resistance of others
who are participating in the action" (Gerth & Mills, 1946. p. 180).
2
small schools reform movement (Meier, 1995). The current iteration of the small
schools movement
3
; however, seeks to pull schools from the periphery to the
norm. These new small schools are being created by a colorful mix of school
transformers, including progressive educators, standardized test developers,
Hispanic rights organizers and former real estate developers. Spurred by
foundational and federal funding, new small schools have been created in city
systems across the nation. In the current privatization and small schools
4
movements, schools are co-founded by local departments of education and private
sector organizations, called intermediaries (AIR, 2003, Heubner, 2005, NYC
DOE, 2007). Proponents of privatization posit that these organizations will use
their outsider status and experience to access personal and professional networks
that will spark innovation in the public school system. This use of intermediary
organizations to co-found and run new small schools reflects both the current
neoliberal ideology as well as the diversity of educational values driving school
founders (Kafka, 2008).
In addition to championing the expansion of private sectors players in
public education, neoliberals have pushed for increased use of choice and markets
to improve educational outcomes. Particular to the new small schools movement,
This study will focus on small school creation in New York City. Other large cities, such as
Chicago and Boston, also received significant funds from the Annenberg Challenge and currently
the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation to implement small school reform.
4
While many of these schools are high schools (9-12), some include both middle and high school
age students (6-12). On the NYC DOE website, it defines small as schools enrolling 500 or fewer
students.
3
policymakers seek to provide consumer choice to parents and students, and to
infuse market competition within urban districts, whose large comprehensive high
schools have come under criticism for fostering poor learning environments, low
daily attendance and abysmal graduation rates (Angus & Mirel, 1999; Huebner,
2005). In contrast, detractors of privatization caution that the addition of private
sector actors will alter the relationship between government and citizens,
potentially reallocating power away from citizens and toward an amalgam of
interest groups and stakeholders (Ball, 2007; Handler, 1996; Scott and DiMartino,
2009a).
Intermediary Organizations and New York City
Since 2003, over 260 small schools have opened in New York City (NYC
DOE, 2008). The majority of these schools have been founded by the Department
of Education in partnership with an intermediary organization such as New
Visions for Public Schools, Replications, Inc., The Urban Assembly, and The
College Board (NYC DOE, 2007). Intermediaries receive funding to co-found
and support new small public secondary schools from foundations, who also
sometimes donate directly to districts. For example, in 2005, the Bill and Melinda
Gates Foundation gave $11,850,000 to the intermediary College Board (Bill and
Mel i nda Gat es Foundat i on, n. d). In exchange, foundations expect intermediaries
to assist in launching new small schools, but also to refine their models or core
principles so that they can be replicated. Intermediaries, for their part, leverage
4
this funding to provide start-up support during the first four years of a school's
existence. The amount depends on the intermediary, ranging from $400,000 to
$575,000 dollars, or about 10% of what the district provides to each school.
Refer to figure 1 for a graphic representation of the foundation-intermediary-
school-New York City Department of Education relationship.
Figure 1. Flow of Resources between Foundation, Intermediary Schools and the
New York City Department of Education.
As figure 1 illustrates, foundations allocate significant funding directly to
intermediaries. Intermediaries, for their part, "sell" their solutions to the call for
educational reform in order to attract foundational funding. The intermediary
then provides its own funding contribution to schools in the form of a partnership,
with the implicit assertion that this association will lead to better outcomes in how
the school is run. Given the current policy context, and in ideological agreement
with this new privatization led-reform, the NYC DOE has also made decisions to
decentralize decision making by shifting more funding to the school level. The
5
idea is to give principals greater authority over day-to-day decision making, while
holding them to greater accountability via an array of new measurement
mechanisms. The theory is that principals will be empowered to better serve the
needs of their local communities, just as parents will be empowered to choose
among a marketplace of options for schools that best meet the needs of their
children.
Purpose and Rationale
This study examines the politics of cross-sectoral partnerships in the
current iteration of the small schools movement in New York City. It explores
how various actors' values, beliefs and goals for schooling influence school
decision-making processes in terms of teaching, learning, and leadership. Case
study methodology reveals how this new approach to school governance affects
the experiences of principals and teachers working in schools, students who attend
them, and the members of intermediary organizations with whom the schools are
partnered. Handler (1996) suggests that answering questions of governance
requires indicators such as "attendance, participation, control of agenda, how the
decisions are made (for example, voting, consensus), who prevails, how often, for
what kinds of issues and the substantive decisions that are actually made" (p.
222).
The findings from this dissertation will help policymakers and
practitioners understand the complexities of public-private partnerships and to
6
avoid pitfalls that arise from this new paradigm. In addition, this work places
intermediary organizations within the larger field of private sector organizations
that support and manage public schools. This is particularly important because
earlier studies of intermediaries (Honig, 2004) strictly defined them as
"organizations that occupy the space in between at least two other parties.
Intermediary organizations primarily function to mediate or to manage change in
both parties" (p. 67). While the intermediary organizations studied for this
dissertation occupied space "in between" two parties, they were not designed to
"mediate' or "manage" change in both parties. This distinction is significant as
the theory behind this reform was for the Bill and Melinda Gates funded
intermediaries to catalyze change on the school side, not on the foundation side.
Therefore, these intermediaries more closely resemble New American Schools'
design teams, charter school management companies (CMOs) or EMOs (Berends,
Bodilly & Kirby, 2002; Bulkley, 2005; Horn & Miron, 2000; Miron & Nelson,
2002; Scott, 2002; Scott and DiMartino, 2009b).
Rather than looking at the intermediary construct from a mutually
mediating perspective, this dissertation focuses on how the addition of a private
sector actor impacts power sharing and decision-making among local school
stakeholders-with special focus on principals and teachers. Building on the work
of Col by, Smi t h and Shelton (2005), and Scott and Di Mart i no (2009b), this st udy
seeks to understand the role of intermediary organizations within the current push
7
for private sector involvement in public education. Having defined the goals of
this study, the research questions follow.
Research Questions
The crossing of boundaries between private and public sector
organizations raises important questions about the politics of cross-sectoral
partnerships in the new small schools movement. The following questions
5
guide
this study:
1) What motivates public school principals and intermediary organizations to
partner to create and run a school?
2) What are the values, beliefs and goals for schooling that drive members of
public small school communities-including principals, teachers, parents
and members of intermediary organizations?
3) What are the central issues around which public small school communities
experience conflict, cooperation and the process of negotiation?
Having introduced the purpose and rational for this dissertation as well as
the guiding research questions, the next section contextualizes the research by
locating these small school partnerships within larger political, economi c and
historical contexts both nationally and in New York City.
Concepts and questions have been influenced by Scott, J. (2002). Privatization, charter school
reform, and the search for educational empowerment.
8
Political and Economic Context: A National Perspective
Throughout the history of schooling, policymakers and practitioners have
made various policies in their quest for improved learning outcomes in high
schools. While some of these recommendations have focused on school size,
others have focused on curriculum and standards. Still others have examined
subject departments, the primary organization unit of high schools (Angus &
Mirel, 1999; Conant, 1959; Lee & Smith, 1997; Marsh & Codding, 1999; Siskin
& Warren, 1995). Recognizing this long history of working to improve high
schools, this section addresses why the use of public-private partnerships arose
during this particular political and economic climate.
The publication of A Nation at Risk in 1983 and other policy studies in the
1980s heavily critiqued the state of public education. Spurred by the fear that,
"the educational foundations of our society are presently being eroded by a rising
tide of mediocrity and threatening our very future as a nation" (A Nation at Risk,
1983, p. 1) citizens, the government, educators, the business community, and
foundations turned their focus to school reform. Tyack and Cuban (1995)
comment, "A Nation at Risk was only one of many elite policy commissions of
the 1980s that declared that faulty schooling was eroding the economy and that
the remedy for both educational and economic decline was improving academic
achievement" (p. 34). This critique of the American public education system in
the 1980s coincided with changing conceptions of the role of government in
society. In contrast to the welfare state which supported programs such as
9
Lyndon Johnson's Great Society plan, the post-welfare state, in which neoliberal,
neoconservative and conservative ideology dominate, champions the reduction of
government and an increased reliance on privatization, markets, and consumer
choice (Friedman, 1962, Chubb and Moe, 1990). Gewirtz (2002) describes this
change: "in the post-welfarist era the formal commitments to Keynesian
economics and distributive justice were dropped and replaced by formal
commitments to market 'democracy' and competitive individualism" (p. 2).
Within this political and economic context, ideas expressed by market
reformers, notably Milton Friedman (1962) in Capitalism and Freedom, and
Chubb and Moe (1990) in Politics, Markets and America's Schools, became
influential with educational policymakers as a means to improve public schools,
most notably through charter schools and voucher systems. Friedman argued that
the role of government should be severely limited and that "the role of
government just considered is to do something that the market cannot do for itself,
namely, to determine, arbitrate and enforce the rules of the game" (p. 27). In his
view, limiting the role of government by means of privatizing former government
entities opens up a marketplace of options for people. In this environment,
individual freedom of choice would be maximized. In addition, competition,
induced by the newly created marketplace, would compel schools to be run more
efficiently and effectively (p. 32). Fri edman champi oned government removi ng
itself from running schools and instead promoted "private enterprises operated by
for-profit, or by non-profit institutions" delivering educational services (p. 89).
10
To this end, government would require "certain minimal standards," involving
content and attendance requirements, but otherwise a variety of self-governing
independent schools would exist.
Chubb and Moe (1990) use Friedman's ideas and apply them directly to
schooling in a post A Nation at Risk policy environment. They argue that public
schools are ineffective bureaucracies and must be replaced with privately
managed institutions, which would then compete with each other for students.
Chubb and Moe advocate removing the governance of public education from the
public to the private sphere. They explain:
Markets offer an institutional alternative to direct democratic
control. They are not built around the exercise of public authority,
but rather around school competition and parent-student choice
which.. .tend through their natural operation to discourage
bureaucratic forms of organization and to promote the
development of autonomy, professionalism, and other traits
associated with effective schooling (p. 167).
Chubb and Moe call for removing the creation and running of schools from the
public "democratic" sphere to the private. They posit this would create an
improved model that would be more responsive to the demands of the consumer.
At the same time as policymakers and practitioners were pushing for
decentralization, deregulation, and increased privatization, systemic reform was
also becoming an increasingly popular approach to improving educational
out comes. Syst emi c reform pushed for an end to incremental changes to the
school system and called for fundamental-system wide-reform from the bottom
up. These changes would, in turn, impact governance structures, teaching and
11
learning and school-community relations. Implementation of systemic reform
rested on the standards movement and enabled site-based decision-making. As
the standards movement took hold, states moved to set up state standards and
assessments. While these standards and assessments would become integral to
the implementation of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, and specifically to
holding schools accountable to making annual yearly progress, they also
succeeded in changing how schools were evaluated. As inputs-regulation by
districts and states-carried less weight than outcomes-usually measured by test
scores-new players were able to enter the education reform arena (Wells, 2002).
Systemic reform, market ideology, the growth of the small schools
movement, and the neoliberal desire to privatize government services created an
extremely amenable environment for the growth of private or cross-sector school
originators such as EMOs, CMOs and intermediary organizations. Arising in this
policy environment were for-profit EMOs, like Edison Schools and Mosaica, and
non-profit organizations, such as Knowledge Is Power Program (KIPP).
In parallel, the small schools movement moved from functioning on the
fringe to gaining widespread support as a way to address policymakers and the
public's growing dissatisfaction with failing comprehensive high schools (Powell,
Farrar & Cohen 1985; Sizer, 1984). As large sums of foundational and federal
moni es were directed t oward creating new small schools, private sector pl ayer s
reflecting the current neoliberal and neoconservative policy environment-were
invited to be part of the reform. Requiring a proving ground to demonstrate their
12
ability to produce more efficient and effective schools, private sector
organizations, such as intermediary organizations, seized on this means of
entering the public education sector.
Simultaneously, the current iteration of the small schools movement also
attracted progressive educators who desired to create new types of schooling
options within the public school system to address the needs of students not being
met by traditional public schools. Social justice themed schools, Afro-centric
schools, schools fostering women's leadership potential and schools focused on
the needs of English language learners were a few examples that emerged from
this political and economic climate.
Having examined the national policy context that gave rise to this new
approach to school reform, the next section focuses on how this context has
played out on a local level in New York City, as the city has moved to privatize
and marketize aspects of public schooling, with an increased emphasis on high
stakes testing and accountability.
Political and Economic Context: A Local Perspective
Michael Bloomberg, the CEO and founder of Bloomberg, LP, campaigned
on, among other policy positions, gaining mayoral control of the New York City
school system. After he took office as Mayor in January 2002, the New York
State legislature granted Bloomberg that control. Shortly after the school system
became a mayoral agency, Bloomberg hired Joel Klein, the former Chairman and
13
CEO of Bertelsmann, Inc. to be Chancellor of the New York City Public Schools.
In the winter of 2002, Chancellor Klein began a series of reforms. First, he
launched the Children First Reform Initiative, which called for the comprehensive
reform of the New York City Department of Education. This first restructuring
eliminated the city wide Board of Education and community school boards and the
32 independent community school districts were organized into 10 regions. These
regions became the focus of the new governance structure, with regional
superintendents reporting directly to the Chancellor (Fruchter, 2006). Five years
later, in the spring of 2007, Chancellor Klein announced a second restructuring
which further decentralized that school system and continued efforts to build an
educational marketplace with the participation of private sector partners.
Building an Educational Marketplace
Two main ideas drove the 2007 restructuring: school-based decision-
making and market competition. With this current reform, the Mayor and
Chancellor aim to empower principals by giving them more decision-making
power over their individual schools, including influence over curriculum
selection, human resources and the budget. At a Manhattan Town Hall Meeting,
Chancellor Klein commented, "decisions are best for kids when they're
happeni ng close to kids at the school level. Starting in 2007- 2008, rather than
being told what to do by distant bureaucrats, principals and school communities
will have decision-making power and they'll be responsible for results" (Town
14
Hall Meeting, February 6, 2007). In the previous system, the region selected
curricular and intervention materials and ran programs such as summer school;
this new system gives principals the authority to make these decisions, and to
choose a "support organization" that best serves the needs of their school. To this
end, the governance structure of 10 regions has been replaced by three distinct
sets of school support organizations. Two of these, the empowerment support
organization [ESO] and learning support organizations [LSO], remain internal to
the Department of Education, and had already existed to some extent within it.
However, the third, partnership support organizations [PSOs], represents a new
model for New York City and hails from the private sector (NYC DOE, 2007).
Differences exist surrounding the level of support offered by and the cost of the
three school support organizations.
Partnering with the Private Sector to Run "Not a Great School System,
but a System of Great Schools"
With these governance changes the NYC DOE aimed to create a
"Portfolio of New School Options" from which students and their families can
choose. As Chancellor Klein stated, the NYC DOE seeks to create "not a great
school system, but a system of great schools" (NYC DOE, 2008). Thus, the
importance of the small schools movement comes into play; increasing the
number of schools part nered with intermediary organizations and charter schools
is an essential component of creating a diverse, choice-enabling educational
marketplace. Since 2003, over 260 new small schools and over 60 charter schools
15
have been created with an additional 19 charter schools slated to open for the
2008-2009 school year (NYC DOE News, 2008). The creation of over 300
schools in partnership with private sector organizations exemplifies the
Department of Education's commitment to private sector involvement and market
ideology.
New Accountability Mechanisms
6
As a result of the 2007 reorganization, principals now have increased
authority over school-level decision making and budget processes. To hold
principals accountable, the Department of Education has produced new methods
to monitor and measure school effectiveness: progress reports and quality
reviews. With progress reports, each school receives a letter grade (A-F).
Standardized test scores, attendance reports and the results of surveys determine a
school's grade. In contrast to the outcome oriented progress reports, quality
reviews provide a more descriptive overview of the school (NYC DOE, 2007b).
For new small schools, which do not have graduations rates or local reputations to
attract new students, these new accountability measures carry significant weight
and, as the cases will illustrate, impact not only school-level personnel but also
the intermediaries with which they are partnered.
Concepts and information from this section were originally written for Scott and DiMartino
(2009a).
16
This combination of a political and economic environment which
championed privatization, mayoral control, high stakes accountability systems,
the proliferation of small schools, and large scale investments by foundations with
a focus on failing high schools across New York City created a fertile
environment for the emergence of public-private partnerships targeted to improve
public education. Having introduced this study and placed it within a larger
political, historical and economic context, the next section takes a closer look at
intermediary organizations themselves.
The Emergence of Intermediary Organizations
Similar in concept to the school design teams
7
of the New American
Schools (NAS), the school reform models of the Comprehensive School Reform
Design (CSRD), and the external partners of the Chicago Annenberg Challenge,
intermediary organizations' outsider status is meant to give them the ability to
"cross organizational boundaries in order to inspire vision, to focus change, to
lend support to change efforts, and to apply pressure to change" (McDonald,
McLaughlin, & Corcoran, 2000, p. 6). Terms such as school design teams,
external partner, reform support organization and school development
organization are often used to describe the intermediary construct. These
organizations may provide funding, technical assistance, professional
The design teams of the NAS were a precursor to the comprehensive school reform models of
the CSRD program. As a result, many of NAS design teams became models in the CSRD
program, including Accelerated Schools and Success for All.
17
development for teachers and administrators, curricular materials and programs,
and advocacy on behalf of schools. All of these functions are expected to build
the capacity of schools to nurture and sustain whole-school reform.
In their study of the external partners used in the Chicago Annenberg
Challenge, McDonald, McLaughlin and Corcoran (2000) found that:
'Regular' organizations such as schools, districts, states, and
universities, in this case, cannot reliably change themselves.
Being caught up in the dynamics of the status quo, they cannot
easily act as catalysts for redefining it, or for refocusing
policies and reform agendas that include their own (p. 6).
To this end, an outside entity, such as an intermediary organization, brings its own
understandings and expertise to the organization in need of reform and can act as
an outside lever for change. For example, proponents hope that an Expeditionary
Learning Outward Bound school will look different from its neighboring public
schools not only because of its small size, but also because of an infusion of ideas
from the intermediary. In this way, the presence of intermediary organizations
opens up the education system and brings new "human and intellectual resources"
into the world of educational reform (Smylie and Corcoran, 2006, p. 14). Unlike
some reforms which focus on teaching and learning practices or school
leadership, the use of intermediary organizations aims to change the governance
structure of schools, which in turn affects teaching and learning, and leadership.
Foundations such as the Annenberg Foundation, the Bill and Melinda
Gates Foundation, and the Ford Foundation have championed intermediary
organizations as vehicles for school reform. Their support reflects concerns about
18
policy implementation, as many "interventions are never implemented as
proposed so as to have the desired effects" (Bodilly, 1996, p. 10). This challenge
of implementation cultivates a general distrust of public education's ability to
reform itself. In the Journal of the Annenberg Challenge (2002), Rothman
explains:
Private funders were reluctant to contribute to the New York City
Schools [for example] because they were concerned that the funds
might not be used the way they were intended. But by enabling the
funders to contribute to a private organization, which provided a
means of tracking funds and evaluating their effectiveness, the
Center [an intermediary organization] provided a 'comfort level'
for donors (p. 5).
Foundations' unease with giving directly to schools or districts belies not only
their past difficulties implementing reforms (Bodilly, 1996), but also current
neoliberal and neoconservative ideology which believes that the private sector is
more efficient and effective than public organizations (Chubb and Moe, 1990).
Given the political, economic and historical background, the purpose of
this study is to examine public-private partnerships in practice. Through two case
studies of schools and their intermediary partners, the findings from this study
will reveal the complexities of this approach to school reform.
An Introduction to the Findings
Findings from this study will ultimately show that the actual
implementation of these partnerships proved to be much more complex than
theorized and had much more mixed outcomes than expected. While
19
relationships existed between intermediaries and school-based stakeholders,
calling these associations "partnerships
8
" may be misleading. Rather than equal
partners in the relationship, the intermediary organizations, who tended to possess
more money, more power and greater access to high status networks, assumed
managerial roles in the relationship. This assertion of authority created tension at
the school level as some principals, teachers and parents struggled to understand
the parameters of the school-intermediary relationship, and were frustrated by
how the addition of the "partner" restricted their ability to control the environment
in which they worked or sent their children to school.
This study will also uncover the importance of contextual factors, such as
policies that encourages partnerships to form quickly, the experience or lack
thereof of principals and intermediaries, pressures to perform on accountability
measures, and race and poverty. In addition, findings will reveal the sometimes
competing private and public goals that surface as a result of public-private
partnerships, and the nuanced and often complicated parameters of power and
control which stakeholders within these hybrid relationships must negotiate. The
following section provides an overview of the dissertation.
Though the term partnership is problematic, it is the term that policymakers and practitioners use
to describe the intermediary-school construct. It will be the term that this dissertation uses often to
refer to this approach to school reform.
20
Dissertation Overview
This dissertation unfolds over seven chapters. Chapter 1 introduced the
study, its purpose and rationale, its overarching research questions and its
underlying political, economic and historical context. Chapter 2 lays out the
conceptual framework which weaves together the theories of political scientists,
legal scholars and educational theorists to capture the complexities of inter-
organizational partnerships, raising questions about alignment of educational
values and goals for schooling, as well as the allocation of decision-making
power. To further operationalize this theorizing on power, Chapter 2 introduces a
spectrum of control which situates intermediary organizations within the larger
field of private sector partners and managers. Chapter 3 draws on the existing
literature on small schools, New American Schools, intermediary organizations,
reform support organizations, charter schools, EMOs and CMOs, to support and
challenge findings as well as reveal gaps in the research that this study fills.
Chapter 4 describes the data collection and analysis strategies used in this
dissertation. It defines each case as well as provides background information
about the intermediaries and the schools with which they were partnered.
Chapters 5 and 6 are case studies of public-private partnerships.
Chapter 5 introduces the case of Excelsior Academy: A University Edge
School (Excelsior)
9
which was co-founded in 2005 by the Department of
Education and University Edge, an intermediary organization. This case
9
Both Metropolitan United
9
and University Edge are pseudonyms.
21
chronicles the challenges and successes of a public-private partnership. Findings
from the case reveal points of deep mission and goal alignment as well as areas of
profound discord amongst key stakeholders. Additionally, it highlights the
importance of stakeholder buy-in, leadership capacity, and ownership and
proprietary rights.
Chapter 6 chronicles the Metropolitan United Entrepreneurship and
Citizenship Academy's (ECA) experiences with a public-private partnership. The
school began as a quickly formed partnership agreement between the principal of
ECA and Metropolitan United, and the case follows the partnership's rancorous
dissolution. This break-up story surfaces the importance of mission alignment,
leadership capacity and control in inter-sector partnerships.
The dissertation ends with Chapter 7, which provides both a cross-case
analysis comparing and contrasting the findings from Excelsior Academy and
ECA, and a conclusion. It begins with an overview of the study and then presents
the major findings. A discussion updating the spectrum of control follows which,
considering the fluid nature of intermediary organizations, situates them on the
spectrum as well as raises questions about their futures. Implications of this study
for research, policy and practice will be discussed in Chapter 7.
Conclusion
This study concludes that the use of intermediary organizations to reform
public education requires a healthy public debate in which the overall
22
effectiveness of this approach to school reform must be weighed. If, as many
indicators suggest, using public-private partnership to improve public education
remains a key approach to strengthening public schools, then policymakers and
practitioners must: 1) improve transparency to clearly outline the identities, roles
and responsibility of each actor in the relationship; 2) increase regulations to
ensure that schools do not use admissions processes to discriminate against
students and that schools accurately portray themselves in marketing materials to
be shared with students and parents; and 3) slow the pace of the reform to avoid
scaling up so quickly that a critical mass of experienced teachers, leaders and
intermediaries cannot keep pace. Additionally, policymakers and practitioners
must be mindful of students and families attending these hybrid schools and
appreciate that they are participants in this educational experiment. While some
degree of upheaval is to be expected when implementing a new reform, the three
or four years it takes for some schools to become fully functioning represents
most students' entire high school experience.
23
CHAPTER II
FRAMING HYBRID SCHOOLS: CONCEPTUALIZING THE
INTERSECTIONOF EDUCATIONAL VALUES AND POWER
Introduction
The emergence of intermediary organizations as a driving force in
reforming secondary school education requires a very specific climate; truly, the
stars must align. In New York City, the "stars" include the mayor, business
leaders, parents, teachers, school administrators, community groups, social-
agency staff and foundation officers, all of whom must be motivated to align
around a specific policy issue. Stone, Henig, Jones and Pierannunzi (2001) refer
to this phenomenon as "civic capacity" (p. 4). For this study, the specific policy
issue is the use of public-private partnerships to reform public education.
According to Stone et al, the activation of civic capacity calls for reforms that
change existing relationships to ensure the institutionalization of new reforms.
This means that the new institutional relationship created by public-private
partnerships must not only look, but act, differently, as a newly constructed type
of governing relationship between the stakeholders (p. 8). Building new
rel at i onshi ps requires sector boundari es to be crossed, values to be exchanged,
and, ultimately, power to be negotiated among partners.
24
To examine the politics of public-private partnerships, the conceptual
framework for this dissertation weaves together theories and research on public-
private partnerships from political scientists, legal scholars, and educational
historians. These scholars highlight the pivotal role that educational values and
goals for schooling play in individual organizations. Further, they discuss how
the act of partnering necessitates the negotiation of these values and goals;
ultimately, it is the more powerful actor whose agenda of educational values and
goals is most likely to get implemented. Thus, understanding the parameters of
power becomes essential for comprehending decision-making within private-
public partnerships. To illuminate levels of control within inter-sector
partnerships, this chapter presents a spectrum, which posits three distinct types of
private-public relationships along a continuum.
The Politics of Hybrid Schools: Crossing Sector Boundaries,
Exchanging Values and Negotiating Power
Paying close attention to an organization's values and goals for schooling
can reveal organizational missions that are not necessarily explicitly articulated.
Frederick Wirt and Michael Kirst's (2001) analysis of the complex set of values
involved in educational policymaking highlights the intricacies of public-private
partnerships. Investigating these intricacies, Martha Minow (2002) raises
important questions about the value differences inherent in organizations hailing
from the public and private sectors. David Labaree (1997) pushes the idea of
values even further by suggesting three distinct goals of schooling: democratic
25
equality, social efficiency, and social mobility; goals which affirm Minow's
discussion of democratic values, but also highlight the role of consumer choice.
Joel Handler (1996) both acknowledges the complexities surrounding the politics
of schooling and raises questions about who is empowered by these new
governance structures. Specifically, Handler encourages studying decision-
making processes at the school level to see which stakeholders' values for
schooling dominate within these cross-sectoral partnerships.
Wirt and Kirst (2001) highlight the critical role that individual and group
values play in the politics of public education. They argue that it is these values,
particularly the values of quality, efficiency, equity and choice, (p. 66) that drive
individual and group decisions about education. Stakeholders, including parents,
school administrators, teachers, intermediary organization staff, foundation
officers, public office holders, community groups and business leaders, have
formed their own sets of values regarding education based on the cultural and
historical context in which they operate. Wirt and Kirst explain: "education
policy touches on a mosaic of American values -religious, ethnic, professional,
social, economic- that often clash in politics" (p. 75). Conflicts often emerge
among these various constituencies over two fundamental questions: "What
should be taught in school? Who should do it?" (p. 12).
As Wi rt and Kirst further assert, "t ensi on arises among t hem because
different policy actors back different values" (p. 67). These stresses become
highlighted because educational resources are limited, allowing for the
26
advancement of only certain groups' policies and underlying values. The
championing of certain policies reveals who holds the policy-making power in the
United States; "whose values currently dominate the political system" (p. 58). In
terms of this study, examining who champions which values and,
correspondingly, whose values are implemented at the school level, will reveal
how power is negotiated within public-private partnerships.
When school governance involves multiple stakeholders, value conflicts
tend to emerge and negotiations must occur in order for these hybrid schools to
function. Stone et al (2001) highlight the importance of value alignment among
multiple stakeholders:
School reform, in important respects, can be seen as a window into
a larger and enduring set of questions relating to collective
problem solving. In particular, this case sheds some light on the
special dynamics that characterize what we have labeled "high
reverberation" subsystems: policy subsystems characterized by
frequent reshuffling of mobilized stakeholders, multiple and deeply
held competing value and belief systems, and ambiguous
boundaries, making the prospects for establishing a new
equilibrium more problematic than is usually the case (p. 152).
The concept of "deeply held competing value and belief systems and ambiguous
boundaries" resonates with this study, as the focus lies on the institutional
relationships that emerge as a result of public and private entities negotiating the
creation of new public schools. At the macro level, education policy is
complicated, yet t he introduction of the private sector, whose val ues and mi ssi ons
sometimes clash with those of the public sector, adds an additional layer of
mission-setting complexity at the micro and macro levels of school reform.
27
Minow (2002) deconstructs why conflict emerges when public and private
entities collaborate. Referencing the Constitution and a series of other legal
precedents, Minow (2002) explains that public sector entities have:
commitments to equality, freedom, fairness, and democracy.
Translated in our legal system as antidiscrimination, freedoms of
association and religious exercise, due process, and voting, these
public commitments traditionally helped to undergird the public-
private distinctions itself, ensuring private freedoms by restricting
public incursions (p. 31).
Minow posits that while private sector organizations may support similar
values, they are not held accountable for them to the extent that public sector
organizations are. By choosing to merge with a public sector organization,
therefore, the mission of the private sector organization is at risk of being
compromised. Minow suggests "conflicting mission and loss of accountability
surface immediately as central problems when public and private, profit and non-
profit, and secular and religious sectors converge" (p. 28). This vision of the
differences in public and private sectors implies that when sector boundaries blur,
stakeholders must examine how and when their values and missions do or do not
align, and work to negotiate a new vision for partnership.
Expanding on this discussion of organizational values and missions,
Labaree (1997) argues that throughout history the goals of schooling have been
debated and contested. Are students being prepared to be citizens, (democratic
equality), contributors to the larger economic marketplace (social efficiency), or
to gain the best jobs (social mobility) (Labaree, 1997, pp. 43-46)? Labaree
elaborates on these terms when he explains, "from the perspective of democratic
28
equality, schools should make republicans; from the perspective of social
efficiency, they should make workers; but from the perspective of social mobility,
they should make winners" (p. 66).
While these goals often overlap for people, one may trump the rest. For
example, some scholars, progressive educators and citizens view public schools as
a means of reproducing democratic society. In contrast, other stakeholders, such
as members of the Business Roundtable and Bill Gates, often emphasize goals of
social efficiency when they express concern that high schools do not prepare
workers for the knowledge-based economy. Finally, there are people who,
adhering to the Horatio Alger myth of individualism and hard work, prize the
personal prestige, status and financial attainment associated with credentials from
an elite education; social mobility trumps all else.
This discussion of values and goals provide a useful lens through which to
explore the relationships that evolve when public and private organizations
partner to co-found a new small school. However, knowledge of diverse and
sometimes conflicting values is not, by itself, a sufficient framework for studying
these complicated partnerships. Thus, integrating Handler's work, as this study
will do in the next section, pushes the study above and beyond values, to unravel
the complexities of empowerment embedded within the lived experiences of
peopl e worki ng in and at t endi ng these partnership-led schools.
29
The Politics of Power and Control
Many current policymakers argue that privatization shifts authority away
from the centralized government to an array of stakeholders. This raises
questions about the distribution of power among stakeholders, especially the
question of who is gaining or losing influence in these new institutional
relationships. For example, new small schools partner with intermediary
organizations to "break the 'government monopoly' over public education and
instead infuse public schools with market forces of choice and competition"
(Scott, 2002b). The hybrid governance structures created by partnerships,
proponents argue, empower site level personnel and community members, while
also creating more accountable, effective and equitable schools. Recognizing that
privatization involves "reallocation of power and resources between various
interest groups and stakeholders," (p. 5) Handler (1996) raises questions about
who is actually empowered by these new governance structures. Handler asks:
"What are the consequences of these moves for citizen empowerment? Will
ordinary citizens -clients, patients, teachers, students, parents, tenants, and
neighbors- have more or fewer opportunities to exercise control over decisions
that affect their lives?" (p. 5). Empowerment, "the ability to control one's
environment" (p. 115), is meant to give school level stakeholders greater
decision-making power over issues that directly impact their daily lived
experiences in schools.
30
The introduction of the private sector brings new players into the politics
of decision-making at the school level, players with significant clout. Given the
potential for an imbalance in power, Handler (1996) expresses concern about who
governs these private sector organizations and their relationships with the
communities that the hybrid schools serve. Located in low-income communities
of color, these new hybrid schools serve diverse students bodies. In contrast, non-
profit and for-profit organization boards of directors tend to be dominated by
"predominately white, male, Protestants, in their fifties and sixties, wealthy, in
business or law" (p. 100), who have been selected precisely because this
constituency tends to bring political and economic capital to an organization.
Noting the lack of women and minorities on boards leads Handler to question the
"democratic character" of the organizations (p. 100).
As powerful outsiders enter school reform, Handler (1996) stresses the
importance of all stakeholders having a voice in school decision making, but
expresses concern that those with access to greater financial and political
resources may be more empowered than the people living in the communities
served by or working in the school. In this situation, rather than empowering all
stakeholders, Handler argues that reforms that focus on privatization simply
replace "one hierarchical regime for another" (p. 220). To this end, studying
these hybrid partnerships requires not only looking closely at who participates in
decision-making processes, but also at who sets the agenda and has the greatest
access to financial and political resources.
31
To understand who holds power over decision-making it is essential to
capture how power-manifested through control-is shared among different types
of partnerships, and to question whether the organizational relationships formed
between intermediaries and small schools are, in fact, partnerships, or instead
another more complex form of management and associations. The following
section operationalizes power by placing various types of private sector partners
on a spectrum of control.
The Spectrum of Control
By taking organizational goals and local context into consideration, this
spectrum captures three types of private sector relationships and places them on a
spectrum of control - from affiliation, which represents the least control, to
comprehensive management, which represents the most. This spectrum is
important; where a private sector partner lands on the continuum reflects the
amount of control that it will be able to leverage within a school, and in turn, how
likely its educational values and goals for schooling are to take precedence, even
if they clash with those of school level stakeholders.
The spectrum contains three categories that private sector organizations
working with public schools can fall into and between: affiliation, thin
management and comprehensive management. By combining organizational
characteristics (such as whether or not an organization has a set design model)
with contextual characteristics (such as whether or not teachers are unionized)
32
these categories represent varying levels of influence that an organization might
be expected to hold over a school.
Affiliation organizations hold the least amount of control, and often are
not actively seeking greater power; they are partners in the basic sense of the
word. Affiliations manifest their partnerships in ongoing ways such as school
mentoring, or in specific functions such as fundraising, but seldom bring a strong
philosophical educational agenda to the relationship. In contrast, thin managers
possess a greater degree of control, and often carry a clear design model that they
would like to see implemented by the partner school. However, thin managers
face the challenge of having to use soft "influencing" skills as best they can to
advocate for their ideas to be adopted, given that they do not hold ultimate
authority over key questions such as personnel and budget. Examples of thin
managers include many intermediary organizations as well as the design teams of
New American Schools. Finally, comprehensive managers directly and
effectively manage the schools they are partnered with, and therefore have the
most influence over all aspects of decision-making. Of the three levels of control,
organizations that fall along the comprehensive management part of the spectrum
have the greatest latitude in implementing their vision for school reform. Of
course, depending on organizational goals and local context, a given private
sector organi zat i on can also move up and down the spectrum, falling into and i n
between the various categories. Refer to figure 2 to see the full spectrum of
control.
33
Manager
a
T
R
O
Partner
Affilia tion
"Aiif.ts' '
' j . ,'1 ''iiw,n model
Di st ri ct cont rol s budgeti ng
and personnel decisions
No contracts
Teachersare unionized
Partnerswith local networks
of schools
May be for or non-for-profit
E*: Partners, Intermediaries
Tl' in tf i r a gmcnt.
^ "Inftiicpces'
1
tf
i * J i *
and per sonnel deci si ons
f or mat or i nf or mal cont ract
>.vith school or di stri ct
TeacnersusuaOy unionized
Affiliates with national and
local networks of schools
May be for or non-for-profit
Ex: New AmericanSchools
DesignTeams. EMOs. CMOs.
Intermediaries
Comprehensive
_^. Ma ni gvmcnt .
m - Cont r ol ^
-* i . * k i i i ' * !
. . . -i * .i i. .
' . - ' n ; * : , * nf l ^i
-1 1 l | V I I
1
1 1
i
uni oni zed
Manages national net works
school s
May be f or or non-f or-prof i t
Ex: EMOs. CMOs
Figure 2. Spectrum of Control
10
To construct the spectrum of control, findings from this study were
integrated with theoretical and research based articles produced by educational
researchers (Gold, Christman & Herold, 2007; Scott and DiMartino, 2008b) and
think tanks (Colby, Smith and Shelton, 2005). Findings from this study revealed
that the work of intermediaries varies over time and circumstance, a situation
which is exacerbated by their finite funding streams. This means an intermediary
may start out as an affiliate of a school, but over time transfer into the role of thin
management as political or economic circumstances change. Thus, the fluid
nature of intermediaries lends itself to the use of a spectrum. In fact, the findings
Ideas from Colby, Smith and Shelton's (2005) spectrum of loose to tight management
responsibility, support and control influenced the creation of this spectrum of control.
34
from this cases analyzed in this document showed intermediary organizations,
over time, acting less and less like affiliates and more and more like
comprehensive managers, putting into question the "partnership" aspect of this
approach to school reform.
The works of Scott and DiMartino (2009b) and Colby, Smith and Shelton
(2005) map out the institutional landscape of private sector management in public
education. Scott and DiMartino's (2009b) research focuses on capturing the
breadth of private sector managers and on defining new players in the field of
education management, such as CMOs and intermediary organizations. Colby,
Smith and Shelton (2005), for their part, focus on differentiating managerial
responsibility, support and control among private sector organizations working
with public schools. By creating their own spectrum of loose to tight
management responsibility, support and control, Colby, Smith and Shelton show
how "organizational capabilities and culture, and the scale and complexity of their
operations" impact whether school-organizational relationships look like
"voluntary associations" or "true ownership" (p. 5). The authors' use of a loose to
tight spectrum offers a helpful means to conceptualize the school-partner
relationship, but suffers from not being rooted in local political and economic
contexts; absent from their work, for example, is a conversation about the role of
district contracts or memor andum of underst andi ngs (MOUs), and t he i mpact of
teachers' unions. To this end, Gold, Christman and Herold's (2007) research in
35
Philadelphia on the implementation of a diverse provider model becomes
particularly useful.
Gold, Christman and Herold (2007) introduce the term "thin management"
to describe the implementation of the diverse provider model
11
in Philadelphia.
Under "thin management," private sector providers, such as Edison Schools and
Temple University, were given limited authority over the schools that they
managed and were working to improve. Gold, Christman and Herold explain:
"under thin management, schools were not turned over lock, stock and barrel to
providers. Instead, the district retained responsibility over such key areas as
staffing, school grade configurations, facilities management, school safety, food
services, the overall school calendar, and the code of conduct for teachers and
students" (p. 198). In Philadelphia, thin management resulted in providers having
limited control over their schools, which challenged their ability to implement
their educational goals for schooling.
The spectrum of control is crucial to this study; where an intermediary
organization falls along the spectrum indicates how much power they possess,
and, in turn, how much their educational values and goals for schooling will
dominate school decision-making processes. It also reveals that intermediary
organizations with definite views on improving public education have an
i ncent i ve to move from bei ng partners to managers on the spectrum. Recall that
A diverse provider model of school governance refers to the outsourcing of school management
to private sector groups, including for-profit companies, non-for-profit organizations and
universities to improve historically low-performing public schools (Gold, Christman & Herold,
2007; Hill, Pierce & Guthrie, 1997).
36
the theory behind using intermediary organizations as change agents calls for
them to be able to scale up and replicate their work, following a specific model or
core principles; the intermediary needs willing school partners to act as its
laboratory for testing and validating these reforms. Lack of control can stymie
those reforms. Further, the spectrum reveals that even if an organization's
characteristics remain static, local factors, such as whether or not schools are
unionized, have the potential to expand or limit its power, thus making large-scale
implementation of a set school design more challenging. This scalability question
is another central challenge in a public-private partnership, which will be further
explored later in the study.
Conclusion
The role of personal and group values in the politics of education, the
challenges implicit in cross-sectoral collaboration, the multiple goals of
schooling, and the importance of studying school-decision making processes all
help to uncover the distribution of power among stakeholders within public-
private partnerships. The integration of these diverse yet overlapping
perspectives provides a lens through which to examine the educational values and
goals for schooling that motivate stakeholders to enter partnerships, the
organizational and local characteristics that foster varying degrees of control, and,
ultimately, the negotiation of power among key stakeholders in the partnership.
37
CHAPTER III
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Introduction
Multiple strands of literature were surveyed to find out what is known and
what remains to be explored about the relationship between public schools and
private sector actors, since no comprehensive literature exists that delineates the
intermediary- school association. Rather than examining organizations that might
provide one or two services to schools, this review focuses on those entities that
provide a comprehensive array of services, for example a school design model
that includes both curriculum and teacher professional development. This review
of literature relies on findings from studies on New American Schools, the
Comprehensive School Reform Demonstration program (CSRD), charters
schools, EMOs, CMOs and reform support organizations. Findings from the
literature are organized around three broad themes: 1) the motivations and
contextual factors that affect cross-sectoral collaboration; 2) the distribution of
power and its impact on governance within joint ventures; and 3) the ways in
which success is measured, sustained and replicated within inter-organizational
38
relationships. Findings from this review of literature clarify some aspects of the
intermediary-school community relationship, but also highlight gaps in the
research that this and future studies will address.
Motivations and Contextual Factors that Impact Cross-Sectoral Partnerships
This section examines the diverse motivations for cross-organizational
collaboration, from clearly designed state and local policies to more nuanced
financial, political and organizational incentives. It continues with a review of
different contextual factors that potentially impact the partner-school relationship,
such as the non-profit or for-profit status of the partner and the geographic
proximity of the partner to its schools. Findings from the literature on these
topics illustrate the important role that motivation and context play in building
effective and successful collaborations. Findings also raise important questions
about inequitable access to financial resources and political networks, lack of
transparency, and the potential for organizational isomorphism as foundational
funding ends.
Legal, Financial, Political and Organizational Incentives
In the political context of the privatization-led reform movement described
in Chapt er 1, government legislation and foundational requirements often
explicitly require private sector collaboration. For example, within charter school
reform, some state charter school laws require the inclusion of some type of
39
private sector partnership or alliance in order for a charter to be granted
(Wohlstetter, Malloy, Smith & Hentschke, 2004, p. 336; Miron & Nelson, 2002).
Specific to the current iteration of the small schools movement, a few cities, such
as New York City, strongly suggest that individuals who want to start a new
school form a partnership with a private sector organization, whether an
intermediary, EMO or CMO. In fact, not choosing a partner could put a founder-
principal's school design in peril of not being accepted by the City. It is not
surprising, then, that the majority of New York City's new small schools that
opened in 2008 were founded in collaboration with a partner organization (NYC
DOE School Choice, 2008). Foundations, for their part, have often made funding
contingent on having private sector partners. For example, cities that want to be
recipients of small school start-up grants from the Bill and Melinda Gates'
Foundation's National School District and Network Grants must incorporate
intermediary or partner organizations into their small schools initiative, as this
program gives funds to intermediary organizations rather than directly to public
school districts (Huebner, 2005; AIR, 2003). As such, there are clearly strong
incentives from both public and private sources that encourage collaboration
between public schools and private partners. Having reviewed these legal and
structural incentives, the study will now examine financial, political and
organizational i ncent i ves that exert a similar push t owards partnership.
40
Financial Incentives
Financial incentives for partnership stem from the need for seed money to
support school growth and development, a problem particularly acute in newly
formed schools. The literature on charter schools reveals that they tend to start
with too few students, among other constraints, to cover operating costs (Scott &
Home, 2002; Smith & Wohlstetter, 2006, Slayton, 2002, Miron & Nelson, 2002).
Scott and Holme (2002) address these funding complexities when they describe
charter school reform as "unique in that it leaves partially 'public funded' schools
starved for resources to pay for fundamental things, such as facilities and school
equipment" (p. 126). Specifically, "charter schools exist within a framework that
leaves them no choice but to struggle for private resources" (p. 126). Similar to
charter schools, a recent WestED evaluation of Gates' funded new small schools
found that in addition to district support, new schools rely, "heavily on private
money to advance this effort, particularly for planning, professional development,
and any special program-related costs at an individual school, such as extra lab
equipment at a science-themed school" (Huebner, 2005, p. 4).
Just as relationships with the private sector benefit new schools, they also
reward the partnering organizations. For organizations that support a specific
type of curriculum or whole school design, such as Expeditionary Learning-
Outward Bound or the College Board, these partnerships provide a venue to
showcase, experiment with and implement their ideas, as well as an opportunity to
41
collect revenue from districts or foundations for their products (Smith and
Wohlstetter, 2006, p. 257; Molnar, 2002).
Political Incentives
As new entities functioning within a larger system of more traditional
schools, small schools, similar to charter schools, often need allies to advocate on
their behalf. Wohlstetter et al (2004) explain: "to enhance their legitimacy and
boost political clout, some charter schools were motivated to partner with well-
established and respected non-profits such as the Boys and Girls Club of America
or the Urban League" (pp. 348-9). Aligning with these organizations lends new
schools credibility, which in turn can help them to garner greater financial support
from funders and political support from community members. Whether aligning
with respected non-profits, EMOs, businesses, law firms or influential
individuals, these partnerships with powerful and influential individuals or
organizations link schools with networks beyond themselves and their districts.
Scott and Holme (2002) explain, "high-status networks-personal and professional
connections to people with money and political power-are even more critical to
private-resource accumulation than the particular strategies used to acquire
resources" (p. 103).
Just as partnerships hel p schools politically, they also benefit the
partnering organization. Involvement in starting a charter or small school enables
non-profits, especially Community-Based Organizations [CBOs], to have a
42
greater role in public education. In fact, in a recent study of charter schools,
partners reported choosing to enter partnerships because they facilitated more
direct interaction with students, as well as access to public schools, which they
considered to be often blocked by "bureaucratic measures" (Wohlstetter et al,
2004, p. 349). Forming a direct relationship with public schools allows a
partner's vision and services to be integrated into the school day, whether that
vision be, in the case of the corporate sector, to develop the future workforce, or
whether the goal may be to "improve an organization's image in the community"
or to show, in the case of some universities, that they are "cutting edge" (p. 350).
Organizational Incentives
Cross-sector partnerships often bring resources and expertise into the
school in pursuit of the school's mission. Some partners function as consultants,
providing technical assistance such as data analysis or management training.
Others add expertise in curriculum or professional development (Smith
&Wohlstetter, 2006, p. 257). In terms of technical expertise, some schools
choose to partner with an EMO because of the "management expertise and
infrastructure to accomplish back office tasks" that they provide (Wohlstetter et
al, 2004, p. 350). By divvying up responsibilities between the EMO and the
school, principals gain more freedom to oversee curricular issues, whi l e t he EMO
manages the financial and operational aspects of running a school. Other
organizations may bring a specific educational philosophy or model to the school
43
with which it partners. For example, in the case of small school creation, schools
started in partnership with the Coalition of Essential Schools are given a set of
principles to use as guidelines (Raywid & Schmerler, 2003). These relationships
provide a venue for new research and design ideas to be tested in terms of
management and curriculum, and, provide a way for services, especially in the
case of CBOs, to reach a large number of students (Wohlstetter et al, 2004).
Implications for New Small Schools
Increased funding, political clout, and access to curricular and
programmatic resources highlight a few of the positive outcomes of forming
partnerships. However, the value-added of these inputs may not be universally
distributed. Scott and Home's (2002) research has found that there are "vast
disturbing inequities emerging within and across charter school reform-inequities
that mirror the wealth and poverty of the communities that house these schools"
(p. 103). These findings emphasize the role of context, in this case, communities,
in creating equitable school development. While their research focuses on
elementary schools, which tend to be more community specific in their school
enrollment, their findings remain relevant. Even if intermediaries receive the
same baseline funding from foundations, the amount of total resources from
which a school will benefit depends upon its partner. An i nt ermedi ary' s access to
financial and in kind resources, as well as political networks, rests on its
reputation and the influence of its leaders and board members. In addition,
44
because intermediaries hail from the private sector, they are not required to give a
public accounting of how they allocate their resources. This variation among
intermediaries regarding their access to and use of financial and political capital
warrants further research.
Partnering Factors
Organization type and geographic location influence cross-sector
collaborations. With respect to organization type, the influence of sector
orientation, particularly whether an entity is non-profit, for-profit or public, will
be explored.
Organization Type
In the current neoliberal and neoconservative policy environment which
condemns "big government," private sector organizations, both for-profit and
non-profit, have become key players in educational reform. In fact, as for-profits
and non-profits both function within the same educational marketplaces, it
becomes necessary to discuss general similarities and differences between these
two types of private sector organizations, since, over time, it has become
increasingly difficult to distinguish between the two types.
Understanding the non-profit arena requires consideration of one, the legal
characteristics that make non-profits unique, two, the current demand for these
organizations, three, the diversity among types of nonprofits, and four, the
45
tensions with which these organizations must grapple within the current political
and economic policy context. Non-profits, as opposed to for-profits, receive
special exemptions from taxes and other legislative measures because of the
public services they provide. As many non-profit EMOs, CMOs, intermediaries
and community-based organizations have received millions in foundational funds,
these exemptions are clearly very important to them. In fact, as more foundations
prefer to give funds to non-profits rather than directly to public school systems,
the demand for non-profits involved in school reform has actually grown over
time. Smylie and Corcoran (2006) found that, "the number of non-profits
working with schools appears to be growing due to the expansion of charter
schools, the general pressure on school systems to improve performance, the trend
in school districts contracting out key services, and the increased interest in
having external organizations manage schools" (p. 21). Speaking to these
findings, Scott and DiMartino (2009b) chronicle the rise of private sector for-
profit and non-profit management organizations in public education from the
1970s to the present and note the current increase in CMOs .
Within the non-profit sector common types of organizations involved in
school reform include: community-based organizations (CBOs), cultural
institutions, educational institutions, faith-based institutions, CMOs, private
foundations, race/ethnic based organizations and social service organizations
12
Similar to EMOs, CMOs manage charter schools with the key distinction being that CMOs tend
to be non-profit organizations and most EMOs are for-profit (Molnar, Garcia, Miron, & Berry,
2007; Scott & DiMartino, 2009b).
46
(National Center School Research Project (NCSRP), 2007; Wohlstetter, Molloy,
Hentschke & Smith, 2004b). As this diversity illustrates, tremendous variation
exists amongst non-profits; in their purposes and objectives, size, agenda, sources
of revenue and funding, and governance structures. Hall (1995) describes:
[Nonprofits] vary enormously in scope and scale, ranging from
community and neighborhood organizations with no assets and no
employees through multi-billion dollar foundations, universities,
and health care complexes with thousands of employees. They
vary enormously in what they do, from offering traditional
charitable assistance to the needs to carrying out manufacturing
and advanced research... .Their sources of revenue follow no clear
pattern....Their modes of governance range from the autocracy of
sole trustees selected from among the descendants of a charitable
donor through broadly representative boards composed of ex
officio elected officials or elected by members of organizations
(pp. 3-4).
The non-profit sector contains an array of organizations with diverse
purposes and organizational structures. As the number of non-profits involved in
school reform grows, competition will increase as they compete for funding from
foundations and corporations, and for partnerships with districts and principals.
Some fear that this increased competition over funding will create isomorphism
within the non-profit sector. As non-profit educational reform organizations
respond to foundational and corporate requirements in requests for proposals
(RFP), they may be pressured to "emulate the characteristics and behaviors of
other organizations around them and to reflect larger social values" (Smylie &
Corcoran, 2006, p. 21). As more and more for-profits enter the educational
marketplace, non-profits may be obligated to adapt the "market and business-
oriented practices of commercial organizations" (pp. 28-29) in order to compete.
47
One example of a non-profit that often functions like a for-profit
organization is the College Board, which over the past three years has been
aggressively expanding its role in public education. A 2006 New York Times
article described its current financial state:
Under Mr. Caperton (head of board of trustees) the Board's
revenues have doubled to about $530 million, and the new
products are likely to bring millions more. Mr. Caperton has more
than doubled the board's staff and increased its assets. His
compensation has jumped, too, to $639,000 last year with a
$110,000 expense account, from $358,000 and a $46,000 expense
account when he began (Arenson, 2006).
To make their organizations more financially successful and products more
competitive, non-profits, such as the College Board and the Educational Testing
Service (ETS), have veered away from choosing leaders from academia or other
non-profits, and have recruited from the corporate sector instead. For example,
the current head of ETS is the former CEO of Dupont and leader of the Business
Roundtable. Smylie and Corcoran (2006) expressed concern that "by becoming
less 'charitable' and more 'market-oriented' and 'businesslike,' they [non-profits]
may appear to be compromising their public service missions, altering the ways in
which they function, and these changes may raise questions about their legal
'protections," and incur even more financial risk" (p. 33).
In addition to raising questions about compromising "public service
mi ssi ons, " increased compet i t i on among non-profits, within this isomorphic
environment, could stifle risk taking and innovation due to fears of failure and
loss of funding (Smylie & Corcoran, 2006). While the current group of non-profit
48
educational reformers possesses distinctive goals, from women's rights to social
services, the question of how organizations will adapt when foundational seed
money ends will reveal whether they abandon their original missions to follow
funding streams.
Location
The location of the partnering organization plays a significant role in the
type of relationship it has with the district or school with which it collaborates.
Honig (2004) in her research on intermediary organizations describes:
Some intermediaries such as the Annenberg-funded Bay Area
School Reform Collaborative and the New American Schools
school reform design teams tend to be housed physically outside of
the districts within which they work. I call these organizations
'external intermediaries.' Other intermediary organizations such
as many collaboratives are based within geographic areas in which
they work and accordingly I call them internal intermediary
organizations (p. 68).
Highly community oriented, internal intermediaries are very specific to the
context in which they are based. As a result, they usually do not have a
formalized model or defined framework with which they approach school reform.
Instead, the approach of these internal organizations is more responsive (p. 36).
In addition, they tend to be "significant and respected organizations in their
communi t i es, " which already have the trust of t he communi t i es in whi ch they
work (Kronley & Handley, 2003, p. 1). In New York City, Good Shepherd
Services is an example of an internal intermediary organization.
49
External intermediaries, on the other hand, have some type of model or
"belief system" (Kronley & Handley, 2003, p. 38) for reform, which they spread
nationally to the different districts and schools with whom they work. EMOs,
CMOs, The New American School (NAS) design teams and the comprehensive
school reform models of the CSRD program are all examples of external
organizations. Current trends suggest a growth in external organization
involvement in public education as illustrated in the growth of EMOs and CMOs
managing numerous charter schools (Bennett, 2008; Bulkley, 2005; Molnar,
Garcia, Miron, & Berry, 2007; NCSRP, 2007; Scott, 2002 ), and of intermediaries
managing networks of twenty or more schools in New York City. In this climate,
these private sector organizations operate like a franchise, similar to a restaurant
chain, while an internal intermediary could be likened to a locally run, small
business. In fact, research shows that larger EMOs, which run 10 or more
schools, tend to have centralized headquarters from which they manage their
schools (Bennett, 2008; Molnar, 2006).
While external organizations carry with them a national reputation, they
face three key challenges. The first is that they need to gain deep understanding
of the historical, political, cultural and economic contexts in which they will
partner. Second, they need to achieve the trust of the community, which they will
serve, and third, they must devel op communi t y buy-in to ensure the effective
implementation and sustainability of the reforms (Billett, Ovens, Clemens &
Seddon, 2007; Berends, 2004; Kronley & Handley, 2003). These challenges can
50
hinder effective implementation of reform models. However, as mentioned
earlier, the national reputation and clear outsider status of external intermediaries
balances some of these challenges.
Some of the intermediary organizations involved in the current New York
City new small schools movement straddle the internal/external divide. They
could be defined as quasi-internal intermediaries on the path to functioning on a
national, external level. The term "quasi-internal" is used because in terms of
geography, these intermediary organizations are located within the district of the
schools with which they are partnered; however, in many other ways they
function like an external intermediary. For example, they may lack strong
community involvement and buy-in, as well as, in some cases, choose to
champion prescriptive reform models. However, they are not truly external
intermediaries because they do not function on a national level.
This section revealed that while much is understood about the motivations
for forming cross-sectoral collaborations, more research is needed to understand
how funding impacts the organizational missions of the partner as well as how the
geographic location of the partner organization impacts the effectiveness of the
relationship. Having discussed incentives for partnership and partnering factors,
the next section looks at how power is distributed within these cross-sectoral
associations.
51
The Distribution of Power and Its Impact on Governance within Joint Ventures
This section examines the different factors that affect how power is
distributed within cross-sectoral collaborations and continues by highlighting the
areas around which key points of tension emerge among stakeholders. It is at this
nexus-often involving decisions over personnel and ownership-that negotiation
occurs among stakeholders. Findings from the literature on this topic highlight
the importance of contracts between organizations: that they need to clearly
delineate all parameters of a relationship. At the same time, the issues revealed in
contracts raise complicated questions about ownership and identity when the
partnership ends.
Distribution of Power
Cross-sector collaborations require power to be shared across
organizations. Private sector involvement in public school governance defines
both the charter schools movement (Bulkley, 2002; Scott, 2003) and the new
small school movement. Bulkley (2005) suggests that studying the charter
school-EMO relationship, and it could be argued the small school-intermediary
relationship, "can shed light on how private companies in general might work
with public schools or operate public schools if moves toward broader
privatization were to take hold" (p. 206). Understanding how power is distributed
among these hybrid organizations requires studying mission coherence, partnering
agreements, and questions of ownership.
52
Mission and Agenda Setting
How individuals organizations choose to manage schools depends upon
the vision that drives them. When cross-sectoral collaborations form, mission
alignment needs to take place to ensure that the organizations are moving in the
same direction. To achieve mission coherence it is essential that each partner
holds an "awareness of organizational dynamics...The idea that organizations
have 'cultures'-shared values and norms of behavior that persist over time"
(Richards et al, 1996, p. 44). For two organizations to work effectively together,
they must communicate and negotiate their "values and norms," to form a unified
vision of their school. As might be expected, the process of forming and
maintaining mission coherence can challenge partners and create tension between
organizations. Horn and Miron (2002) describe:
A surprisingly large number of conflicts were evident between
charter school founder-leaders and school boards, between teachers
and school administrators, or between parents and the school
personnel. Most often, the conflicts resulted from differences in
educational philosophies, goals, leadership/administrative styles, or
differences in understanding about areas of responsibility. In some
cases, the conflicts were due to individuals or groups vying for
control and power. Oftentimes, these situations result in broad-
based turnover of school members, school staff, and students (p. 2).
Private partners and public school communities can have conflicting
educational goals and managerial styles. If they are unable to resolve these
differences, as Horn and Miron's research explains, this can lead to negative
outcomes such as "broad-based turnover" of administrators and teachers. Such
53
turmoil creates unstable learning environments and inhibits an ambiance that
fosters innovation in teaching and learning. These challenges of collaboration
raise questions about how formal agreements or memos of understand (MOUs)
could be used to clarify stakeholders' goals for schooling and the division of role
and responsibilities among actors, to head off misunderstanding and discord prior
to forming the formal relationship.
Agreements
Formal and informal agreements outline the division of roles and
responsibilities among stakeholders. Remarkably, many partnerships operate
under informal agreements, with no formal contract between partners. Smith &
Wohlstetter highlight some challenges to this type of partnership: "without
formalized structures, partnerships at times struggled to collaborate and make
progress toward their goals. As more stakeholders became involved and more
tasks came into play, it was often difficult to clearly define decision-making
responsibilities and governance procedures" (Smith & Wohlstetter, 2006, p. 261).
In contrast, other partnerships operate under more formal agreements, such as
contracts, the aforementioned MOUs, or leases. These types of formal
agreements often occur when some type of financial transaction accompanies a
partnership, such as when a school must pay a fee for a specific type of school
design package (p. 261). To create these written documents, organizations must
invest time and financial resources, such as lawyer fees, to outline how the
54
partnership will evolve. Potential issues addressed in these documents include:
length of partnership; performance requirements; ownership of facilities and
materials, including curricula; exiting stipulations; and decisions about who will
conduct an evaluation of the school and its personnel (Richards et al, 1996, p.
189). As the literature reveals, clarifying these different aspect of the union could
prevent future tension, by designating who has the authority to make key
decisions, from those involving human resources, to questions of ownership, to
when and how the partnership might dissolve.
The Control of Human Resources
Research on charter schools exposes tension concerning the level of
control EMOs and CMOs have in terms of hiring and firing teachers and
principals. In terms of EMO managed charter schools, teachers and
administrators are often-though not always-non-unionized employees of the
contracted company and are hired, fired and evaluated by the EMO (Horn &
Miron, 2002). While private sector managers often have control over personnel
decisions, the choice often depends on local politics. For example, as discussed in
chapter 2, in 2002 Philadelphia implemented a diverse provider model of school
governance. While for-profit and non-profit providers managed schools in
Philadelphia, the amount of control they leveraged was limited; the district
maintained control over personnel decisions. This approach to school reform
created ambiguity over who had ultimate decision making authority and prevented
55
providers from fully implementing their educational values and goals for
schooling (Gill, Zimmer, Christman and Blanc, 2007; Gold, Christman, & Herold,
2007).
In addition, the introduction of a private sector partner can add an extra
layer of management. In a study of the first year of the Philadelphia Diverse
Provider Model, Bulkley, Mundell and Riffer (2004) found that principals felt that
they served "multiple masters." (p. 6). Principals felt "pulled by the provider, the
central office, teachers, the teachers' union, regional district offices, and their own
professional judgment" (p. 6). These experiences raise important questions about
how principals will experience the private-public partnerships of the current small
schools movement. Will they also struggle with multiple masters at the district,
intermediary, union and foundational levels? Ultimately, who possesses control
over the school: the district or the intermediary organization?
Ownership
Proprietary issues surrounding facilities, resources and, most notably,
curricula, reveal another point of tension among partners. Research on charter
schools partnered with EMOs found conflict over who owns the results of the
cross-sectoral collaboration; the design concept, the curricula, and the school
itself? Miron and Nelson (2002) found that "in many EMO schools, the
instructional models and materials used are property of the management
company. Indeed, a number of contracts we reviewed even insisted that any
56
lesson plans or materials developed by the teachers were proprietary in nature and
belonged to the EMO rather than to the public charter school" (p. 179). With
regard to facilities, Miron and Nelson found that while visiting charter schools
during 1998, "we asked each director about the ownership of facilities,
equipment, and furniture. In the EMO-operated schools the equipment was often
reported as belonging to the company" (p. 178). Each of the examples illustrate
the complexities of ownership and the tension that emerges between partners over
which organization ultimately holds proprietorship over defining aspects of a
school. This begs the question: if contracts are terminated or the relationship
ends, who owns the facilities and materials? Furthermore, if a partner exits, does
that mean that the school loses access to certain curriculum or resources provided
by the organization? How would such a change affect teaching and learning in
the school?
This discussion of ownership also raises questions about the transferability
of innovation between these new schooling options. If innovations are owned by
EMOs or intermediary organizations, what incentives exist to encourage free
knowledge transfer to non-affiliated public schools, especially if these
organizations feel pressure to raise a profit for their own survival (Horn & Miron,
2002)? This issue of proprietary rights becomes particularly relevant when EMOs
and i nt ermedi ary organizations seek to become whol e school design model s to be
scaled up nation-wide. In these situations, their brand identity becomes integral to
their success, and the temptation to claim ownership of educational innovations is
57
heightened. These and other tensions become particularly acute when
partnerships end.
Exiting the Partnership
From interviews with EMO representatives, Bulkley's (2005) study of
EMOs and charter schools found that the most common reason for dissolving
relationships "was a mismatch between the goals or management style of the
company and local charter board" (Bulkley, 2005, p. 229). However, before
terminating a relationship, an exploration of the ramifications of such a decision
must necessarily occur. This is because, as Miron & Nelson (2002) suggest,
withdrawing from contracts could strip a school of its resources. "EMO-run
schools are in theory free to fire the companies. However, if firing a company
implies losing a building, equipment, curriculum and brand name, then many such
schools may be effectively unable to exercise this option" (p. 180). Intermediary-
partnered small schools face the same challenge; a loss of access to resources,
materials, and essential start-up funds. Ending the partnership can even mean
changing the school's name. Schools' dependency on their partners for various
types of support elevates the risks involved with exiting, making dissolution less
likely (Richards et al, 1996; Scott, 2002). This discussion about terminating
relationships is a precursor to greater questions about power and control: who is
empowered to make key decisions about the future of the school?
58
This section revealed that while much is understood about the importance
of formal agreements and some of the key points of tension around which conflict
and negotiation occur, there is still much to be explored: how do partners and
administrators negotiate key aspects of their relationship, and how do these
negotiations impact teacher and student experiences at the school level? It also
raises questions about the boundary line between partners and managers,
especially in cases when a contract gives one actor authority over key decisions.
Having discussed the distribution of power, the next section explores criteria for
assessing successful collaborations and raises questions about the future of inter-
organizational relationships.
How Success is Measured, Sustained and Replicated
within Inter-Organizational Relationships
This section begins by examining how the success of inter-organizational
relationships is measured. It continues by considering whether these complex
relationships can be sustained in the long term, and what happens to the initial
pairing when the private sector organization moves to scale up its enterprise.
Findings from the literature on this topic highlight the influence of concurrent
policies, potentially diluting this approach to school reform, but also raising
important questions about how limited funding will impact the future of the
partner-school relationship.
59
Measuring Outcomes
The use of intermediary organizations to co-found and run new small
schools represents a novel approach. As a result, questions have emerged around
how to measure the effectiveness of this type of reform. Honig (2004) asks, "on
what basis shall the success and failure of intermediary organizations be judged?"
(p. 84). Smylie and Corcoran (2006) posit, "they [intermediaries] must possess
the technical ability to 'prove the work,' to demonstrate its effectiveness in ways
perceived as credible, and to legitimate their work as 'worth it' to stakeholders"
(p. 14). Intermediary organizations must choose a mechanism through which
evidence can be collected and the outcomes of their work assessed. In this current
climate of standards-based reforms, measurable results, such as standardized test
scores and attendance and dropout rates, are often used to measure effectiveness.
However, some scholars have suggested that other type of measures could more
fully capture the work of these unusual organizations that straddle the public-
private divide. In particular, Lieberman and McLaughlin's (1992) research on
teacher networks, another type of partner to bring change to schools, found that
"classical measures, such as standardized tests, do not assess or take account of
changes in adult and student behavior, attitudes and learning" (676). As a result,
these hybrid schools must find other means to capture the full scope of their work.
To this end and, in some cases at the request of their sponsors, some intermediary
organizations have elected to hire outside evaluators to judge the effectiveness of
their work in schools.
60
This discussion of measuring outcomes raises issues about the influence of
concurrent school reforms. Berends et al comment: (2002) "given this situation,
federal and state policy makers need to think critically about their current stance
of simultaneously promoting high-stakes testing, comprehensive school reforms
that center on innovative curriculum and instructional strategies, and the adoption
of multiple additional reforms" (p. 174). In the past, the external policy climate
has proven to be troubling for many schools, especially for those created by
educators who espoused progressive approaches to teaching and learning, such as
project-based learning and authentic-assessment. For these schools, the advent of
pro-testing policies led to increased standardization, which threatened their very
existence (Raywid & Schmerler, 2003; Darling-Hammond, Ancess and Ort,
2002). As time progresses, the current policy environment will either foster the
growth and development of new intermediary-partnered schools as unique
learning environments or if, similar to the more traditional high schools, they will
become enveloped in the "grammar of schooling," in which the status quo trumps
innovation and risk taking (Tyack and Cuban, 1995).
Sustainability and Scaling Up
Funding plays a pivotal role in the experiences of intermediary
organizations and the schools that they co-found, as they rely on outside financial
capital for their and their co-founded schools' survival. The foundations that
provide the support for intermediary organizations and their corresponding small
61
schools see the funds as "seed money or risk capital-not indefinite maintenance"
(Lieberman and McLaughlin, 1992, p. 676). In effect, after the school has
reached maximum capacityin high schools this should occur after four years
the school is expected to be able to support itself. While this may be the theory,
in practice the work of starting small schools often requires more time than the
original funding initiative allows.
In McLaughlin's (1990) revisit of the RAND Change Agent Study, she
found that "the problems addressed by current state-driven reforms or change
agent programs are not acute, they are chronic. Reform needs to be systematic
and on-going," (p. 15) otherwise it will not "significantly change educational
practices" (p. 15). Loss of funding becomes a major concern and hindrance to the
implementation of this reform strategy. In fact, the RAND study, Looking Back
over a Decade of Whole-School Reforms: The Experience of New American
Schools, found that, "lack of funding was the single most important reason cited
for schools that decided to drop their design" (p. 172). While this quote refers to
New American School design teams, it has implications for intermediary
organizations as well. Given that providing financial support to schools
represents a substantial part of their mission, loss of funding takes away from
their power to support schools, and to further their own agenda of school reform.
In the future, those intermediary organizations that choose not to pursue
"private and governmental grants," may turn "their expertise in designing and
running small, student-centered model high schools into intellectual property and
62
fee-for-service activities" (American Institute for Research [AIR], 2003, V-24).
In effect, these intermediary organizations will offer their services for sale to the
school or district. Other intermediaries, similar to EMOs or CMOs, may choose
to become fee-charging management organizations. In addition to begging the
obvious question of how an intermediary organization maintains its external lever
of power when it is being funded by the very organization it is trying to reform
(Bodilly, 2004), this scenario also raises issues about the commoditization of
public education.
While some intermediary organizations have embraced this method of
survival, others question the very idea of requiring schools and districts to pay
outside providers for their services, especially in light of funding disparities that
exist across districts (AIR, 2003, VI-25). A leader of one of the Gates Foundation
intermediary organizations commented, "the notion that this is all about products
and selling products, and knowledge becomes a product, and kids become a
product and schools become a product, is really undermining the kind of work
that aims to teach all kids well, to really meet the needs of all students; it is a
hidden conflict in this movement" (p. VI-25). This quotation speaks to fears over
the privatization of public education, which has the potential to transform
educational resources from 'ideas' into 'intellectual property,' and to charge for
access what was previously in the public sphere.
Competition between intermediary organizations over limited foundational
funds or fee-for service opportunities will only increase as more intermediaries
63
enter the market and more small schools reach year-four maturity. Given this
competition, it is essential that intermediary organizations remain keenly aware of
the criteria by which their work will be judged. A fear exists, voiced by Smylie
and Corcoran (2006), that this hyper-competitive climate will push intermediary
organizations "away from innovation and toward seeking safer, more acceptable
changes in the schools" (p. 26). If this occurs, the very theory of what makes an
intermediary organization effective in the first place-the outsider status that
brings potential to build capacity and spark innovation-will be sacrificed in order
to adapt to the demands of organizations functioning within the status quo.
This section revealed that while much is understood about the importance
of consistent funding to successfully implement school change, there is still a
need for more research on how organizations cope with limited or finite funding
streams. Future studies should track how private sector partners adapt to the end
of transient funding streams, and, in turn, how these changes will impact school-
level stakeholders.
Conclusion and Implications
The role of cross-sectoral collaboration in transforming urban schools
holds potential for both positive and negative outcomes, as well as raises
questions about future sustainability. As this chapter revealed, much is known
about the motivations and factors that foster collaboration, the distribution of
power and its impact on governance, and how success is measured, sustained, and
64
replicated within charter schools, EMOs, CMOs, and New American Schools.
More importantly, this review also revealed that the ways in which these factors
impact the intermediary-school relationship remains unclear. This study aims to
fill this gap by investigating contextual factors, power dynamics, and questions of
sustainability and scale. In particular, this study's focus on school decision-
making processes will expose how power is negotiated among stakeholders,
revealing who is truly empowered by these hybrid governance structures. These
findings will not only uncover more about the intermediary-school relationship,
but will also clarify the place of intermediaries within the larger school
management sector; how they act in line with and apart from EMOs, CMOs, and
New American School design teams. As the private sector's role in public
education continues to expand under the new guise of intermediary-school
relationships, the impact on the lived experiences of principals, teachers, members
of intermediary organizations students, and parents requires further research.
65
CHAPTER IV
METHODOLOGY
Introduction and Research Questions
This chapter tells the story of the methods and approaches that I used to
answer my research questions. It begins with an overview of the study's research
design and continues with a description of the sample selection for both the
intermediary organizations and for the schools with which they were partnered.
An accounting of data collection follows in which both challenges to access and
entry, as well as methods of collecting information will be shared. This section
continues with a discussion of my approach to data analysis that focuses on
coding as well as categorical interpretation and direct interpretation, two methods
of analysis associated with case study research. Chapter 4 concludes with a
discussion of the role of the researcher.
Research Questions
In many ways, it is no coincidence that I studied cross-sector partnerships
in the small schools movement, based on the formative experiences of my early
career. My first professional experiences took place in the education department
of a non-profit museum and as a teacher in schools, respectively; making me
66
cognizant of the powerful work that was taking place within and between private
and public sector educational actors. In graduate school, I had colleagues who
were actually creating new small schools in partnership with intermediary
organizations, giving me an opportunity to get involved and to observe early on
the new complexities arising from these cross-sectoral relationships. As noted in
chapter 1, my research questions emerged from these professional experiences as
well as from my graduate coursework, conceptual framework and review of
literature. The following questions guided this study:
1) What motivates public school principals and intermediary organizations to
partner to create and run a school?
2) What are the values, beliefs and goals for schooling that drive members of
public small school communities -including principals, teachers, parents
and members of intermediary organizations?
3) What are the central issues around which public small school communities
experience conflict, cooperation and the process of negotiation?
Research Design
I employed case study methodology (Stake, 1995) to answer my research
questions about the politics of cross-sectoral partnerships cont ext ual l y embedded
at the school level. Case study methodology allowed me to investigate a specific
phenomenon within its "real life context" (Yin, 2003, p. 13), which helped to
67
construct a picture of the lived experiences of administrators, teachers, parents,
and members of the intermediary organization working within public-private
partnerships. Sources of evidence for this study included document reviews,
interviews, and observations. Case study methodology's reliance on multiple
sources of evidence facilitated the gathering of various interpretations of issues
and events, and the ability to create an in-depth description of the phenomena in
context (Stake, 1995, Yin, 2003).
Two case studies were conducted for this study. My research spanned 16
months, although the most intense data collection occurred during the first six
months, from February 2007 to July 2007. Follow-up interviews and less
frequent visits to each site occurred between August 2007 and June 2008.
Spending 16 months investigating both cases allowed me to spend ample time in
schools, and to visit intermediary organizations and district officials'
headquarters. This measured length of time enabled me to pick up on the monthly
patterns and routines that existed in the school, and to attend faculty,
administrative, parent teacher association (PTA) and school leadership team
(SLT) meetings as they occurred on a weekly or monthly basis during the course
of the school year.
The first six months of the study involved spending a great deal of time at
each site. In any gi ven mont h, I woul d alternate bet ween two weeks at Excelsior
and two at ECA, only adjusting my schedule if there were a particularly important
meeting to attend. As a consequence of spending consecutive days sitting in the
68
faculty lounge or front office of each site, members of the school community
became quite comfortable with my presence; I was able to cultivate their trust.
Yet, I chose to limit my intense visits to a six month period because it was enough
time for me to build this trust and to gather significant data without placing an
undue burden on the faculty, administrators and members of the intermediary
organization, all of whom were managing significant responsibilities.
In terms of data analysis, for each individual case study, I created a
detailed description of the case and identified themes. I completed a within-case
analysis for each case and a thematic analysis across the two cases (Creswell,
1998). While the cross-case analysis revealed important themes and the case
study data provided an in-depth and detailed description of school decision-
making, all findings were case specific and not generalizable. As Stake (1995)
reminds us, "the real business of case study is particularization, not
generalization. We take a particular case and know it well, not primarily as to
how it is different from others but what it is, what it does" (p. 8). While not
generalizable, across the universe of intermediary-small school associations,
findings from this study add to the existing theory building on public-private
partnerships and privatization in education. This chapter continues with a
discussion of these methods in greater depth, including sample selection, data
collection and analysis.
69
Sample Selection
The phenomenon of new small schools being created in partnership with
intermediary organizations has occurred in New York City as well as other urban
centers nationally. As the largest school district in the nation and one that has
received millions in funding from foundations to create and run new small
schools, New York City is an excellent venue within which to study the beliefs,
values and goals for schooling that drive partners and school communities, as well
as to examine the distribution of power among these key stakeholders. I drew
from a purposive sample of schools partnered with Metropolitan United (MU)
13
and University Edge (UE) as my research sites (Creswell, 1998). These site
selections permitted me to focus on two new small schools in which
intermediaries acted both as financial agents and founding partners. I selected
schools founded in partnership with these specific intermediaries because they
offered two distinct approaches to starting and managing schools, yet they
targeted demographically similar populations. Specifically, these organizations
required that their partner schools be opened in low-income communities with
high proportions of African-American and Latino students; populations who have
historically been underserved by public education in New York City.
As discussed in chapter 1, both Metropolitan United and University Edge are pseudonyms.
70
Intermediary Organizations
UE and MU reflected two different models of intermediary organizations.
UE had a prescribed school model replete with its own curriculum, extra-
curricular programs, academic schedule and professional development plan for
teachers that its schools must implement. In contrast, MU functioned more as an
adaptive model. From 1997 to 2006 it did not have a design for schools to follow;
instead, schools needed to adhere to common core principles, which included
having a theme and partners. After 2006, when MU signed a contract with the
NYC DOE to manage and support schools in its network, it began to implement a
set school design model, moving closer to UE's model. In terms of scale,
Metropolitan United and University Edge both had networks of schools in New
York City. Yet Metropolitan United was focused locally, while UE was
established statewide and was in the process of scaling up nationally. See Table 1
for a summary of key characteristics.
Both UE and MU were non-profit organizations; however, UE was a much
more established organization with a longer history in education. MU, in
contrast, was founded only in 1997 by a former businessman and was in the
formative process of building itself into an education organization. Because of its
different institutional arrangement, UE had the ability to financially support its
small school initiative without relying entirely on foundational support. UE could
use the revenue it received from its educational products to cover the salaries of
its staff members working on the new small schools' initiative. In contrast, MU
71
did not have a similar revenue stream to pull from and was very reliant on
foundational and other outside funding sources. Still, both organizations received
substantial funding from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation to create new
small schools that emphasized "relationships, rigor and relevance," college
preparation, and a scalable model (Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, 2005).
Table 1: Descriptions oi
Years in operation
Sector Status
Design Model
Geographic location
Number of schools
Funding sources
NYC DOE District
Relationship
Intermediary Organizations
University Edge (UE)
>50
non-profit
Replication: Schools follow a
prescribed design, including set
ELA and Math curricula created
byUE.
New York City, New York State
and plans to scale up nationally
>15
Revenue sources from UE and
grants from Foundation
All schools were part of
empowerment support
organization, formerly called the
empowerment zone.
Metropolitan United (MU)
>15
non-profit
1997-2006: Schools must follow
core principles of themes and
partnerships. 2007 to present:
Implementation of a set design
plan.
New York City
>15
Foundation
All schools were part of
empowerment support
organization. However, since
MU signed a management
contract with the NYC DOE,
schools joined the MU network.
In terms of their relationships with the NYC DOE, all of UE's schools
were in the empowerment support organization, and, as a result of UE's
advocacy, in the same empowerment support network. Officially, all of MU's
schools were also in the empowerment support organization. However, since
signing a management contract with the NYC DOE, MU, according to its
president, considered its schools to be in the empowerment support organization
72
in name only, and in reality believed its schools to be managed within their own
MU network.
School Samples
Both Excelsior Academy: A University Edge School (Excelsior Academy)
and The Metropolitan United Entrepreneurship and Citizenship Academy (ECA)
were college preparatory schools that were located in low income areas and
served primarily African- American and Latino student populations. Both were
secondary schools organized to enroll grades 6-12. Excelsior Academy opened
both its middle school and high school simultaneously, while ECA started with
grade six and added a grade each year. Excelsior was a co-educational school,
though its enrollment was almost 60% female, while MU was an all male school.
Both schools employed fully credentialed teachers and minimally experienced
principals. See Table 2 below.
73
Table 2: Descriptions of Case Study Schools (2006-2007)
Grades Served
Student Demographics
Teachers
Leadership
Community Socio-
Economic Status
Excelsior Academy
6,7,9,10
Enrolls-298
- 4 1 % male, 59% female
~ 50% African American
~ 48% Latino
~ 1% Asian
- 1 % White
~ 0 % English Lang. Learners (ELL)
~ 0% Special Education
- 7 1 % Title 1 Eligibility
Employs - 18 full time teachers
- 100% fully certified
- 28% first year teachers
- 3 vacancies
Principal experience - 2 years
Located in a low income community
ECA
6,7
Enrolls- 125
- 100% male
- 94% African American
- 4% Latino
- 1% Asian
- 0% English Lang. Learners
(ELL)
- 0% Special Education
- 80% Title 1 Eligibility
Employs - 10 full time
teachers
-100% fully certified
- 0% first year teachers
- 1 vacancy
Principal experience - 2 years
Located in a low income
community
While my data collection for this dissertation spanned 16 months, my
relationship with each of the schools began earlier. As a member of the planning
team for Excelsior, I was involved in the school's initial planning stages during
the fall of 2004. I had followed the school's progress via emails from the
principal, Lesley Taylor
16
, but had not visited the school until February 2007. I
had no previous relationships with staff members or faculty, except for Taylor,
who granted me access to study the school and facilitated my introduction to key
personnel at University Edge.
I knew the principal of ECA through professional contacts, and he agreed
to let me use his school as the site of my pilot study in the fall of 2005. This
Data was retrieved from the NYC DOE's CEP Section III: School Profiles from June 2008.
15
The idea for the format for this table came from Marsh (2002).
All names are pseudonyms.
74
allowed me to collect data on the school during the first year of its partnership
with MU, preceding the eventual break-up of the partnership. The dissolution of
the relationship meant that, at first, I did not have a direct connection into the
intermediary partner. It was a challenge gaining access but, in the end, I was
granted an interview with the president of MU. He approved of my study and I
was able to interview other staff members in June and July of 2007. Having
discussed my approach to sample selection, the next section turns to the process
of data collection.
Data Collection
Data collection included semi-structured interviews, observations and
document reviews. I spent the first few weeks at each school site gaining a sense
of its rhythm and routines. Time spent acclimating to the site's culture coupled
with extensive document reviews situated me within each case. As Stake (1995)
explains:
We tout case study as being noninterventive and empathic. In other
words, we try not to disturb the ordinary activity of the case, not to
test, not to interview, if we can get the information we want by
discrete observation or examination of records. We try hard to
understand how the actors, the people being studied, settings...the
different and even contradictory views of what is happening
(p. 13).
During the first few weeks, I mostly observed the formal and informal
interactions of school staff, while also collecting and reviewing school
75
documents. This early groundwork facilitated future interviews with the
principal, faculty, parents and staff.
Identifying and Recruiting Study Participants
Potential study participants included all of the administrators and teachers
in the schools, parents of students who attended the schools, representatives of
intermediary organizations, and district administrators, including empowerment
network leaders. At ECA, the principal invited me to a faculty meeting where I
presented an overview of my study and explained the requirements of
participation. Excelsior, for its part, did not have formal faculty meetings, so
instead I posted information in the faculty lounge. I recruited many teachers for
my study by this approach. At both sites, once I started interviewing teachers, I
found that more teachers wanted to participate. A few teachers shared that they
found the process to be cathartic and enjoyed having a chance to reflect on their
experiences.
Recruiting parents proved to be more challenging, especially at Excelsior.
At first, I placed fliers near entry and exit points to inform parents about the study
and to ask for their participation. At both schools, this tactic received no
responses. I found that, unlike in elementary schools, most middle school and
high school students went home from school by t hemsel ves or with friends, but
definitely not with their parents or guardians. Seeing that my first approach was
unsuccessful, I talked with the principals at each site about attending a PTA or
76
SLT meeting to recruit parents. At ECA, the principal gave me a schedule of
meeting times and I attended both a PTA and SLT meeting. At Excelsior, when I
asked the principal to meet with the SLT and PTA, she said that neither
functioned very well this year and that she would organize a group of parents for
me to meet with. The first time the parent meeting took place, no parents
attended. The second time, one attended but she did not speak English.
Dissatisfied with this situation, I contacted the parent coordinator about effective
ways to reach parents, and also spent time in the front office, where, over the
course of a few weeks, I met parents who agreed to participate in my study.
While I was able to get some parents to participate in my study, more widespread
participation would have added robustness to my findings.
As mentioned earlier, my access to the intermediaries varied. I had
numerous interactions with members of UE's staff at professional development
sessions for teachers and administrators, and at UE sponsored events. Curious
about who I was and what I was studying, UE staff members readily agreed to be
part of my study. In comparison, gaining initial access to MU proved to be very
challenging until I had gained the approval of the president to begin interviewing
his staff.
In addition to interviewing individuals at the school and intermediary
level, I was also interested in capturing the experiences of district officials. Both
Principals Taylor and James recommended that I speak with Seymour Kaufman,
who was their contact at the Office of New Schools, a division of the DOE. In
77
addition, teachers at Excelsior recommended that I contact members of their
empowerment network team, two of whom I was able to interview. When I asked
members of the intermediary with whom I should meet to gain more information
about the intermediary-school relationship, they mentioned individuals at the Bill
and Melinda Gates Foundation. I was able to track down the email addresses of
the individuals and wrote them numerous times, but received no response. As a
result, all of the information on the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation came from
document reviews of media sources, evaluations of their programs and scholarly
articles.
Data Sources
Interviews
I selected participants in this study because of the integral role each played
in starting and running these hybridized schools. Each interviewee represented a
specific interestthe school community's, intermediary's, or NYC DOE'sbut
each also shared a goal of creating a strong and effective school, if differing in
opinion on how to do so. Thus, I interviewed participants to understand the
values, beliefs and goals for schooling that drove their actions regarding school
decision-making. Conducting numerous interviews within a single site permitted
me to, "aggregate perceptions of knowledge" (Stake, 1995, p. 65) leading to a
richer understanding of the lived experiences of key stakeholders in these
hybridized learning environments.
78
In terms of format, I conducted a series of interviews with my study
participants. During my initial interviews, I followed a semi-structured interview
protocol, lasting between 30 to 60 minutes (see Appendix A). In many, but not
all, cases, I also conducted follow-up interviews. The second or third interviews
allowed me to clarify points the interviewee had made previously as well as
pursue emerging concepts and ideas gathered during my initial phase of data
collection. These interviews tended to follow more open-ended interview
protocols. The flexibility of this last phase was essential as case study research is
an iterative and interpretive process. Over the course of my data collection, as
new issues emerged, I needed to be flexible and open to these new findings
(Stake, 1995).
At the beginning of each interview, I explained to interviewees that their
participation was anonymous, confidential, and that they had the right to
withdraw at any time. Each participant signed informed consent forms allowing
me to use their responses in my dissertation. Clarifying the goals of my study,
explicating issues of confidentiality, and giving participants the ability to
withdraw at any time made the interviewees feel more comfortable, facilitating a
more open conversation.
At the start of each interview, I asked the participant if I could record our
discussion; some agreed, and some did not. Duri ng every interview I t ook not es;
however, in situations where audio-recording did not take place, I was careful to
take more detailed notes and to find a quiet place to record my impressions and
79
findings immediately after the interview ended. All of the recorded interviews
were transcribed. See Tables 3,4 and 5 for the total number of individuals
interviewed.
Table 3. Total Individuals Interviewed at Excelsior Academy: A University Edge
School and at University Edge.
University Edge Personnel (including
consultants)
Excelsior Administrators
Excelsior Teachers
Excelsior Parents
TOTALS:
Number of Individuals Interviewed
4
2
10
5
21
Table 4. Total Individuals Interviewed at Metropolitan United's Entrepreneurship
and Citizenship Academy and at Metropolitan United.
Metropolitan United Personnel
ECA Administrators
ECA Teachers
ECA Parents
TOTALS:
Number of Individuals Interviewed
4
1
8
7
20
Table 5. Total Individuals Interviewed at District.
Office of Portfolio Development (formerly
Office of New School Development)
Members of Empowerment Support
Organizations
TOTALS:
Number of Individuals Interviewed
1
2
3
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Observations
Interviews, as Stake (1995) reminds us, are limited because the
interviewer controls them and asks targeted questions, which must be answered in
a specific amount of time in a discrete environment (p. 66). To address this issue,
I conducted observations of administrative and faculty meetings, as well as
meetings sponsored by the intermediary organizations and empowerment zone
network leaders, in order to experience the context in which school decisions took
place. Specifically, I looked for clues as to how members of the administration
interpreted the cross-sectoral partnership; how were meetings being organized,
when were they being held, who was setting the agenda, what was being
discussed and how were decisions being made? In addition, I looked to see how
members of the different organizations and school personnel negotiated their roles
when making school decisions.
At the school level, I observed faculty, SLT, and PTA meetings to gain an
understanding of the interactions and power dynamics among faculty, parents and
administrators. As previously mentioned, the prolonged periods I spent in the
faculty lounge or front office facilitated familiarity with school personnel, many
of whom would sit next to me and share thoughts during their free time. These
interactions helped me to more fully understand the culture of each of the schools
in my study. The idea of spending time in the front office came from Fine's
(1991) critical ethnography of drop-outs in New York City. For this study, Fine
81
spent time "in the back of classrooms, offices and the library" to help her "getting
inside" of the school she was studying (p.6).
During each observation, I recorded a thorough description of the event, in
order to develop what Stake (1995) calls a "vicarious experience" for my readers.
To this end, I combined written descriptions with drawings of the event to more
fully capture inter-personal interactions as well as the physical space (p. 63). As
Stake describes, "during the observation, the qualitative case study researcher
keeps a good record of events to provide a relatively incontestable description for
further analysis and ultimate reporting (p. 62).
. Document Reviews
I collected and reviewed a diverse array of documents from print and
media sources, intermediaries, schools, and the NYC DOE. Documents provided
me with contextual background information about key stakeholders and
organizations, a greater understanding of the values and goals for schooling that
guided the development and operations of the partnerships, and evidence of
decision-making processes within and between individual organizations. To this
end, I reviewed the school mission statements as well as the mission or vision
statements of the intermediary organizations. I examined budgets, informal, and
formal contracts between the organizations, including MOUs. I analyzed the
websites of UE, MU, EC A, Excelsior, the NYC DOE and the Bill and Melinda
Gates Foundation, and I scoured local news sources for current information about
82
the new small schools movement, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, The
NYC DOE, the intermediaries and the schools.
Documents proved to be an invaluable source of evidence for this study.
In particular, contracts and MOUs helped to sort out how the defined association
schools have with their partners often differs from the practical reality of their
relationship. Documents also helped me to verify the authenticity of my findings
by allowing me to triangulate what I witnessed during observations and recorded
during interviews with the evidence that I gathered from document reviews
(Creswell, 1998). See Appendix C for my document review protocol.
Data Analysis
The works of Miles and Huberman (1994), and Stake (1995) guided my
data analysis. I followed Miles and Huberman's guidelines for coding and then
used data analysis techniques specific to case study such as direct interpretation
and categorical aggregation.
Coding
My coding occurred in stages. Prior to my fieldwork, I created a "start
list" of codes that were drawn from my conceptual framework and review of
literature (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 58). Examples included codes for the
educational values of quality, efficiency, equity and choice, as well as a code for
power. The majority of my codes, however, emerged from close readings of my
83
interview transcripts, field notes, documents and observation notes (Miles &
Huberman, 1994; Stake, 1995). I divided the codes into three types: descriptive,
interpretative and pattern codes. Descriptive codes "entail little interpretation"
and provided contextual information for each case (Miles and Huberman, 1994,
p.47). Codes such as "Professional Background" and "Years of Experience" fell
into this category. Interpretive codes, which usually occurred after a second
reading of the data, reflected more "knowledge about local dynamics" and
captured more nuanced findings (p. 57). "Power-Play" was an example of an
interpretive code: highlighting instances when a person or entity used their power
to manipulate a situation. Finally, pattern codes were the most sophisticated and
emerged after numerous reviews of the data. These codes captured "an emergent
leitmotiv or pattern" that had been "discerned in local events and relationships"
(p. 57). Many of these codes, referred to by Miles and Huberman as "meta-
codes" (p. 69), became themes around which my dissertation was organized. For
example, "Support" was an example of a pattern code, which captured the
different types and complexities of support. To conceptualize this theme, I
divided support into four sub-codes: "Support-Resources," which referred to
direct financial support; "Support-in-kind," which referred to non-monetary
support; "Support-Positive" which indicated a positive response to support
offered; and "Support -Negat i ve" to indicate a negat i ve reaction. For each code
that I created, I wrote a definition to help ensure that I applied it consistently over
time.
84
I used Atlas.ti, a qualitative analysis software, to manage and help analyze
my data. In addition to storing all of my textual documents and facilitating the
coding process, Atlas.ti provided "memos" which I could attach to discrete codes
or segments of text. These memos provided a space for me to write down my
reactions, capture revelations and explore questions raised by the data (Miles and
Huberman, 1994). In addition, I used Atlas.ti to count the frequency of certain
codes and to see how codes overlapped with each other. Atlas.ti also helped me
to create visual displays of findings from the data by diagramming how codes
related to each other, facilitating the emergence of themes.
Categorical Aggregation and Direct Interpretation
Specific to case study research, Stake (1995) cites two strategic ways for
researchers to analyze the raw data: categorical aggregation and direct
interpretation. In terms of the former, I combed through the data looking for a
series of related instances from which issue-oriented meaning might arise. For
example, during an early interview at Excelsior with Principal Taylor, she shared
that the union rules hindered her ability to implement her vision for the school.
While this was an important statement, it was also vague. Thus, to gain a fuller
understanding of union dynamics, I gathered together all of my codes on unions,
and the attendant texts. At the same, time, I also regularly employed direct
interpretation, which focuses on a single instance or event (Creswell, 1998; Stake,
1994). With both categorical aggregation and direct interpretation, I engaged in
85
the process of "pulling data apart and pulling them back together again in a more
meaningful way," (Creswell, 1998, p. 154). Based on this analysis, I was able to
make naturalistic generalizations, "interpretations based largely on experience,"
(Stake, 1995, p. 172) which will allow readers to learn from the cases themselves
or which could be applied to a population of similar cases (Creswell, 1998).
Reliability
In order to ensure reliability, I triangulated my data by comparing findings
from multiple sources. Evidence gathered from interviews, document reviews
and observations worked to both confirm and challenge my research findings.
Whenever possible I worked to triangulate claims and findings to ensure
maximum reliability (Stake, 1995). In addition to triangulation, I wrote rich
descriptions of each case. These accounts allowed the readers to transfer findings
from this study to other settings to help them decide whether my findings were
meaningful and reliable (Creswell, 1998).
Role of Researcher
At the time of the study, I was in my early thirties. Having been an
educator for many years in formal and after-school settingsboth in the private
and publ i c sectorsI had insight and empat hy for school-based individuals as
well as an honest intellectual interest in private sector involvement in schools.
86
These experiences helped me to gain the trust of study participants and to blend
into the school community.
Sharing information about my experiences highlights the need for
reflexivity when conducting research in order to control for bias (Creswell, 1998;
Stake, 1995). As illustrated in the above paragraphs, my lived experiences
impacted and influenced how I approached my study design, data collection, and
analysis. Stake (1995) speaks of this when he comments, " standard qualitative
designs call for persons most responsible for interpretations to be in the field,
making observations, exercising subjective judgment, and synthesizing all the
while realizing their own consciousness" (p. 41). Integrating time for reflection
created a space for me to explore the values and biases that I brought into this
study. To this end, I kept field notes to record my initial reactions and responses
to an interview, as well as keep track of key findings. This space to write freely or
brainstorm gave me an outlet, as the sole researcher on this study, to explore how
my own values and experiences were shaping my interpretation of the world.
Acknowledging and recognizing the biases that I brought with me into the field
made me more effective at listening to and absorbing what my study participants
had to share.
Concl usi on
I conducted two case studies of public-private partnerships in New York
City. In this chapter, I chronicled how I gained access to my research sites,
87
approached data collection and analyzed my data to uncover the themes within
my findings and to facilitate theory building about these hybrid governance
structures. Having discussed the methodology in this section, in chapters 5 and 6
I tell the story of the partnership relationship as it played out in two new small
schools.
88
CHAPTER V
THE CASE OF EXCELSIOR ACADEMY: A UNIVERSITY EDGE SCHOOL
Overview of the Case
This case examines decision making within a public-private collaboration
at a new small school in New York City. Findings from the case reveal points of
strong commonality as well as areas of deep dissonance among key
stakeholders-University Edge (UE), the intermediary organization; Taylor
Lewis, the principal; teachers and parents. This dichotomy is exemplified in the
juxtaposition between the generally positive, symbiotic relationship between
principal Taylor and UE at the executive level, versus the nearly 50% yearly
attrition rate of faculty and staff at the school level. Findings from this case serve
to highlight the complexities of mission alignment, an important theme
throughout this study. In addition to alignment, the themes of capacity and
ownership emerge. In the case of capacity, this study chronicles the experiences
of a new principal, new teachers and an intermediary new to starting schools
working together to create a new public school. These capacity issues sometimes
prevent ed Excel si or from living up to its promi se of bei ng an innovative, effective
new small school. On the other hand, the theme of ownership surfaced whenever
89
private and public norms intertwined to create new hybrid identities, as
exemplified by the name of the school: Excelsior Academy: A University Edge
School. In particular, disagreements over proprietary issues revolving around
curriculum were common. Points of conflict, negotiation and cooperation raised
by these themes reveal how complicated the actual act of partnering is for all
stakeholders and illustrate the complexity of these relationships. Specifically, the
findings suggest that this intermediary-school relationship fits more into a
management than partnership paradigm because of the amount of control UE
asserts in terms of the integration of its overall school model and its
accompanying package of curricular and professional development programs.
Divided into three parts, this chapter begins by putting the collaboration
into context. This section explores various factors that impact the partnership and
development of the new small school, including motivations for partnering and
stakeholder characteristics. Part II focuses on decision-making processes to
understand how partners and school communities negotiate power. Personnel,
curriculum and professional development are key areas explored in this section.
Part III examines sustainability and scalability by considering the experiences of
key stakeholders at Excelsior and the future of the relationship. Cognizant of
policy arguments behind this reform initiative, the final section examines how
findings and themes interact to test the policy claims that these new small schools
create more innovative, caring, safer, and better performing academic
90
environments for students, and that intermediaries are necessary tools for
realizing these goals.
Part I: Contextual Factors that Impact Public-Private Ventures
The Partnership Quest: Alignment and Association
Two facts characterize the UE-Excelsior partnering process: the decision
was made quickly, and solely at the executive level. In the fall of 2004, Taylor
was eager to start her own school, having recently completed three years of
teaching at a charter school, earned her Master's degree in educational
administration, and interned for one year as part of her principal training program.
Of European and African-American descent, thirty-year old Taylor was keenly
aware of New York City's policy environment. Savvy and aggressive, she knew
that if she wanted her own school, she would have to partner with an intermediary
organization because a partnership would provide her school with extra start-up
funding as well as increase her chances of opening a school; in the fall of 2005,
the DOE had announced that it was working with the Gates Foundation to open a
critical mass of new small schools partnered with intermediary organizations
(AIR, 2003; Huebner, 2003; NYC DOE, 2006). Taylor observed: "It
[partnership] does happen very quickly. There was a real push for a principal to
get an i nt ermedi ary organization. A lot of us basically felt like if we di dn' t get
one, we wouldn't be opening up a small school." This quote reveals the
paradoxical nature of this approach to school reform, which makes principals feel
91
obligated to associate with intermediaries, rather than allowing these relationships
to form organically or not at all.
After the initial steps of creating a school planning team and writing a
concept paper to be submitted to the Office of New Schools at the NYC DOE,
Taylor began to search for an intermediary organization. Taylor described her
goals:
I knew what student population I wanted to work with. I wanted
to work with students of color. I wanted to work with students who
live in low socioeconomic areas. And so what I really looked at is
what are students not getting in the middle schools and high
schools now that will allow our students to really excel and go to
college? Because the goal, really, of our school is to ensure 100
percent of our students go to college.
To facilitate the process of matching prospective principals and members of
intermediary organizations, the Office of New Schools of the NYC DOE invited
principals with accepted concept papers to meet with intermediaries. At this
meeting, Taylor learned about UE's vision for education, which, according to
their website, sought to connect students to success in college and beyond. A well
known non-profit organization within the world of college preparation, UE
entered small school reform to, according to Miranda Blanco, the UE director of
new school development: "give students, especially underserved students, access
to a high quality education that puts them on the path to success in college." As
Taylor's and the UE's goals for schooling seemed to overlap, Taylor applied to be
a principal at a UE school: she responded to essay questions covering topics
relating to school governance and instructional leadership, and scheduled an
92
interview. Within a few days, Taylor learned that she had been selected to partner
with the UE, and they began working together on the new small school
application due to the Office of Small Schools. It is significant to recall that
partnering happened in early November, and new small school applications were
due by January 1
st
, leaving little time for these partnerships to germinate.
While Taylor felt lucky that she and Blanco "think the same way" about
their goals for school, she noted that some of her fellow principals "had to find
intermediaries so quickly - and some of these intermediaries were created so
quickly- that there wasn't time to say 'well, what really are you all about?'" This
pace of partnership formation created real potential for misalignment over values.
In fact, studies of EMO managed charter schools have revealed that differences in
educational philosophies and school management practice often resulted in
dissolved partnerships (Bulkley, 2005; Horn & Miron, 2000). In this situation,
Taylor's clear vision for a college preparatory school, and the UE's longstanding
commitment to and involvement in the college preparation process, resulted in
good synchronization between the two partners as they founded Excelsior. Over
time, while Taylor's vision did align closely with the UE's, as the school grew
there was a greater diversity of viewpoints amongst other school staff and parents,
the implications of which will be discussed in further detail later in this section.
93
An Introduction to the University Edge and its School Design Model
UE's local and national reputation within the world of educational
research made them one of the better-known and well-funded school partners.
UE's Gates funding-over $16 million-meant that partnering with them translated
into more discretionary funds for school leaders than might be provided by less
established intermediaries, with a few exceptions including Metropolitan United.
Still, as Tom Lee, a staff member at UE, explained: "Sometimes people like to be
a UE school because they get more money in their budget. I mean let's put it
frankly. They really do get more money. They get $550,000 for four and a half
years, which is more than they're going to get from any other intermediaries." As
organization in operation for several decades, with revenue streams extraneous to
the recent small schools initiative, UE was also differentiated from newer
intermediaries in its ability to pay for its senior staff members' salaries, rather
than deriving them from foundational funding alone. This situation could
potentially allow UE to give more money directly to schools and to continue its
support after foundation money ends.
The UE Model
In spite of UE's long history, its new small school program was only a
year old when it part nered t o found Excelsior. As such, Excel si or endured a
common experience for new small schools working with intermediary partners;
grappling with the implementation of a fluidly developing design model, on top of
94
learning to work with a new partner. As described by charter school researchers,
Griffin and Wohlstetter (2001), such ambiguity is akin to "building a plane while
flying it" (p.343). For example, UE did not require the principals of schools
opening in the 2004-2005 and 2005-2006 school years to sign MOUs or legal
contracts outlining their roles and responsibilities, while those opening in 2006-
2007 did. While some of UE's requirements corresponded to those set forth by
the New York City DOE, the UE asserted its own requirements in regards to
curriculum, programs, scheduling, coursework, testing, professional development
and branding, and a commitment to use UE resources.
The empowerment support organization's network leader for UE schools,
reflecting on UE's design model as compared to others,
17
commented, "in terms
of urban education, in looking at these different partners, UE has the best model
for this environment and that is because it's far more explicit, prescripted, etc.,
which I think a lot of our schools need. If we were in another place, I might say
something different. Transforming Schools Inc. relies on a totally organic
approach, which requires tremendous capacity at the school-level to understand
and implement a lot of things. And many of our schools don't have that." Table 6
provides an overview of the UE design model.
Excelsior was part of the Empowerment Support Organization (ESO). All UE schools were part
of the same empowerment network and had the same network leader.
95
Table 6: University Edge School Design Model
School Size 70-80 students per grade, 525 total
School Theme College Preparatory
Grade Range 6
th
grade through 12
th
grade
Targeted Populations Low-income and minority students in urban areas
School Admissions None
Schedule Extended Day (8:00 am to 5:00 pm)
Curriculum Achievement First, a 6-12 English language arts curriculum
Achievement First, a 6-12 math curriculum
UE Career Explorer for grades 6 - 1 2
Professional
Development
Summer "On Boarding" for all faculty and administrators
Saturday Retreats for new teachers (bi-monthly)
Achievement First training sessions
Advisory training sessions
Advanced Placement training sessions
Train the Trainer sessions for second and third year schools
Principal Retreats (monthly)
Branding School logo, promotional items and school signage all of
which must clearly brand the schools as UE
Funding $550,000 over a four and a half year period (including six month of
start-up monies). Funding may cover costs associated with the
implementation of UE programs and services as well as additional
costs associated with opening a new UE School including supplies,
furniture, professional development stipends for faculty,
subscriptions to professional organizations, and school branding
and marketing. Funding does not cover personnel costs, i.e.
salaries.
Source: Information collected from UE Memo of Understanding and Design
Implementation Manual.
As the figure illustrates, UE provided a set design model for its schools
and a comprehensive professional development plan for its teachers. The UE
MOU was explicit in defining its role in curri cul um devel opment , asserting: "all
materials devel oped by the UE for use in UE school s and all UE
programs/ servi ces are the sole property of UE" ( UE MOU, 2006). Thi s
delineation of ownershi p, the literature shows, was common in EMO managed
schools as well (Miron & Nel son, 2002).
96
In addition to the requirements defined in the memo of understanding and
design model, UE schools were required to follow certain branding protocols.
The implementation manual created by UE stated that all "schools must be clearly
branded as UE schools within the district." To help schools with branding, the
UE lent its own graphic designers to create logos, promotional items, and signage.
This was another example of a requirement that only emerged over time; first and
second year schools did not necessarily have the UE moniker. Later schools, such
as Excelsior, did. Printed brochures, banners, and web pages all carried the title
"Excelsior Academy: A UE School," and invariably included information about
UE. In fact, these slickly designed promotional materials played a pivotal role in
UE affiliated schools' recruitment processes. In a highly marketized environment
such as New York City, a professional-looking brochure could be very influential
at school recruitment fairs, setting UE schools apart from the competition
(Lubienski, 2007).
School Acceptance, Placement and Regional Support
After the Office of the New Schools accepted her concept, Taylor was
placed, along with another new small school, in a former elementary school in the
Bronx. Taylor described the process:
97
Space was a really hot topic at the time because they had to do
some shifting of schools in order to make sure that there was
enough space for my school. What they decided was that there was
a person who, at that time, was a wiz of mathematics at the region.
His name was Steve Chang and he was also going through the
process of opening a new small school in conjunction with School,
Inc [another intermediary]...What the region decided was they
wanted to put two college-preparatory schools together because
they felt it would really be a powerhouse.
Recognizing that the school placement process raises complicated
facilities management logistics, the UE made a point of sending its most
experienced personnel to accompany Taylor on her first walkthrough. UE also
made it clear that if they were something significantly wrong with the facilities,
that it would, as a member of UE described, "push back with the Office of New
Schools, and the other intermediaries present if need be". This was not required.
Taylor's next step was to hire faculty and staff, and to begin recruiting students.
Teacher Motivations for Choosing Excelsior
Teachers chose to apply to Excelsior for a variety of reasons. Some
teachers were attracted by the student population, others were drawn to the
school's college preparatory theme, still others were impressed by Taylor herself,
while others were primarily excited to have a role in the creation of a new school.
Strikingly, none of the teachers interviewed mentioned the UE partnership as a
motivating factor. In fact, many of the teachers struggled to describe even the
basic details of the partnership relationship.
98
While many of the values teachers mentioned-such as high quality schools
for urban students and strong college preparation-were in line with the UE vision,
none of the teachers had a clear understanding of UE itself or its relationship to
Excelsior. Recall that the partnering process took place before the school was
created, and involved only Taylor. This situation revealed that Taylor's vision
alignment with UE and the particularities of the partnership agreement had not
been explicitly communicated to the teaching staff.
This lack of information proved problematic for some teachers. For
example, as teachers learned of the UE design model, which prescribed
curriculum in ELA and math and an AP curriculum in the upper grades, tension
emerged as some teachers did not support UE's approach to teaching and
learning. These issues of buy-in, documented also in the literature on New
American Schools (Berends, Bodilly & Kirby, 2002) and with EMO or CMO
managed charter schools (Horn & Miron, 2000), tend to be a source of
dissatisfaction and turnover in hybrid schools. In Excelsior's case, 50% of its
faculty left the school in its first to second, and again second to third, years.
While it would be a stretch to pin the turnover on a single factor, teachers'
discontent with the teaching model, exacerbated by poor upfront communication
about the intermediary's integral relationship with the school, was clearly a
significant contributor. The next section provi des a more detailed description of
teacher characteristics.
99
Teacher Demographics and Experience
The faculty at Excelsior tended to be inexperienced. This findings is not
unusual. Research conducted in New York City found that teachers in new small
schools tended to be less experienced than teachers citywide (Rubenstein,
Reisner, Coon & Fabiano, 2005). On average, teachers had three years of prior
teaching experience, but this number was somewhat skewed by two teachers who
were 10 year veterans. Four were members of the New York Teaching Fellows
programs and one was part of the Teach for America program, all in their first
year of teaching. See Table 7 below for more detailed information.
100
Table 7: Teacher Demographics, Experience and Retention Data at Excelsior
Name
Ms. Wilson
Ms. Fields
Ms. Tabor
Ms.
Livingston
Mr. Kramel
Ms. Phillips
Mr. Griffith
Mr.
Samuels
Mr. Caison
Ms. Akel
Mr.
Knowly
Ms. Crane
Ms.
Santiago
Ms. Sands
Ms. Loem
Ms. Polmer
Ms. Taft
Mr. Simons
Ms. Bianca
Ms. Lopez
Sex
F
F
F
F
M
F
M
M
M
F
M
F
F
F
F
F
F
M
F
F
Ethnicity
African-
American
African-
American
European-
American
European-
American
European-
American
Hispanic-
American
African-
American
African-
American
European-
American
European-
American
European-
American
European-
American
Hispanic-
American
European-
American
African-
American
African-
American
European-
American
African-
American
Hispanic-
American
Hispanic-
American
Subject Taught
Middle School
English
Middle School
English
High School
English
High School
English
Middle School
Math
Middle School
Math
High School
Math
High School
Math
Middle School
Social Studies
Middle School
Social Studies
High School
History
High School
History
College Ed
Teacher/
Advisor
Special
Education
Middle School
Science
High School
Science
High School
Science
Technology
Teacher
Drama
Teacher
French
Teacher
Experience
2
11
3
5
0
0
12
Refused to
be in study
1
Refused to
be in study
Refused to
be in study
0
Not Asked
0
Refused to
be in study
Refused to
be in study
0
Refused to
be in study
Refused to
be in study
On medical
leave
Retention
Status
As of
Sept. 2007
Left
Present
Left
Present
Present
Present
Left
Present
Present
Present
Left
Present
Left
Left
Present
Present
Left
Left
Left
Left
Teaching
Fellow or
Teach for
America
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
101
This section discussed the factors that motivated teachers to join the
Excelsior community and, in turn, the demographic characteristics, experience
and retention rates of teachers. The next section will examine parents who, like
teachers, chose Excelsior for a variety of reasons and also exhibited a very limited
understanding of the UE-Excelsior partnership.
Parent Motivations for Choosing Excelsior
Similar to teachers, parents cited numerous reasons for sending their
children to Excelsior. Quality of programs, selectivity, school size, reputation and
"it was a last resort" guided parents' decision making. Parents, similar to
teachers, did not cite UE as a deciding factor. When prompted to describe UE
and its relationship to the school, parents were only able to cite the most basic
facts; that UE was in the school's title, and that events were sometimes held at the
UE headquarters downtown. In fact, since many of Excelsior's parents had not
attended college, they did not really understand what being a "college
preparatory" school meant. Ms. Donaldson, a parent of a seventh grade student,
felt that the school needed "to coach parents along to know what to expect. Some
could say that parents don't know what to expect. Some say that doesn't matter,
but it's not true!" Ms. Donaldson would have liked the school to communicate
about the college selection, application and financial aid processes so that parents
could help their children gain access to college. This same parent questioned:
"How can parents be empowered if the school is not communicating with them?"
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As these quotes suggest, UE's communication and interaction with parents was
limited to non-existent. This raises questions about the implications of this
reform model for parent participation not only in school decision-making, but also
in the lives of their "college bound" children. This section explored the role of
parents as "choosers" within the educational marketplace, next Excelsior's role as
a "chooser" of students will be examined.
Admissions Procedures and Student Selection Processes
Complexity and controversy surrounded student selection processes at
Excelsior. Tension arose between the intermediary organization's presentation of
its vision for equity-minded public education and the reality of how admissions
policies were enacted at the school level, where the principal and faculty
experienced pressure to perform based on local, state and federal accountability
mechanisms. Reviews of documents and interviews with members of UE
surfaced a key theme in regards to admissions: that no screening of applicants
would occur. On the UE website, it was written, "any resident student who has
met the promotional standards of the state is eligible for admission." This was in
line with UE's push to create non-selective, equity minded schools. In fact, when
discussing another partner school, the leader of UE expressed strong concern that
they were being selective in their admissions policies: "I also believe there's been
tensions in that school from the beginning for me on a personal basis because I
think that the purpose of these schools was to take all kids. I think smart kids
103
were put in that school." Yet, in spite of this clear vision, the admissions process
at Excelsior did appear to exhibit a bias towards selection, particularly with the
middle school.
Middle School Admissions Processes
Various student sorting mechanisms were enacted at Excelsior's middle
school to select for a high achieving student body. The sixth grade admissions
process at Excelsior, for example, required students and their families to go to
Excelsior to pick up an application, to bring the application back to their home
schools where their guidance counselor would fill out information (including test
scores), and then return to Excelsior to schedule an interview. Ms. Wilson, a
middle school teacher, described the selection process, "they usually come in for
interviews. They have to fill out an application. And then they are chosen based
on how well they perform in the interview and their scores. I'm pretty sure that
Taylor has to look at that, because by and large the last two sixth grade classes
came in with ridiculously high scores." According to Taylor, questions asked
during the interview process included:
Tell me about yourself.
What is your favorite subject?
What subject are you good at?
What subject is difficult for you?
What are your goals?
Why did you apply?
Do you have any questions?
104
Studies of charter schools have shown that various admissions processes -
from the act of having parents accompany children to school open houses to the
requirement to submit applications-act to filter out potentially low-performing
students in favor of high-performing students and their supportive parents
(Ascher, Fruchter & Berne, 1996; Lacireno-Paquet, Holyoke, Moser & Henig,
2002; Lopez, Wells & Holme, 2002). Some studies have shown that "high
performing" has become a proxy for economically advantaged students and
higher performing females, and for weeding out students receiving special
education services and English language learners (Lopez, Wells & Holme, 2002).
Ball and Gewirtz (1997) found that schools in highly marketized environments
enrolled disproportionately larger numbers of female than male students because
girls performed higher on standardized examinations and had better behavior in
school. Following this trend, on Excelsior's roster there were 18% more females
than males in the 2006-2007 school year.
The sense of selectivity filtered down to the teachers. Mr. Casion, a
middle school social studies teacher, explained: "it's funny-everybody always
asks, "So you work at a private school?" And I'm like, "Well, no, but yes. I'm
like, it's not a private school but you have to apply and be interviewed." Another
teacher commented that he told his 6
th
graders who did not want to work that they
should, "read the title" of the school to see that it is college preparatory, and that
if they were unhappy they should "go ask for a transfer." He also shared that
teachers were excited in 2007 because one of the 5
!
graders who was interviewed
105
for the 6 grade came in with a resume. Excelsior's focus on recruiting and
selecting high achieving students raises important questions about the role of
choice and equity within this new market-based, public school system.
While teachers and parents were generally excited about the selective
admissions process, its effectiveness was somewhat undermined by the fact that
the school had yet to achieve full enrollment. This meant that if empty seats
existed at the beginning of the school year, the region could send students to the
school-because, in theory, it was non-selective. This dual process-Excelsior
selecting students and the region filling empty seats-confused parents, and was a
key example of the complex relationship between the school, NYC DOE, and its
intermediary. Ms. Perez, the mother of a middle school student, described her
child's experience:
When I went to the open house about Excelsior, the kids were
tested and went on a weekend orientation. As a result, the students
met some of their future classmates. But, then when the school
opened there was a whole new population. The region sent kids
over. Parents were unhappy, 'Why make our kids do all of these
things to get in, when other kids just get in?'
Parents believed that their children were competing against others to earn a spot
in the school, and were upset to find other children did not have to pass the same
criteria.
Principals' and teachers' preference for selectivity was not surprising in
the current outcomes based, accountability-oriented environment. It was in the
principal's best interest to have high performing students, to help the school
achieve its federal annual yearly progress (AYP) indicators, and earn a high rating
106
from the New York City Department of Education. Studies of charter schools and
New American School's design teams suggest that policymakers' championing of
high stakes testing has the potential to push new schools away from innovative
approaches in curriculum and non-selective admission policies towards a laser-
like focus on achieving high test scores (Berends, Bodilly & Kirby, 2002;
Darling-Hammond, Ancess & Ort, 2002; Lacireno-Paquet, Holyoke, Moser &
Henig, 2002). In this case, the school was clearly influenced by this pressure,
which pushed it to stray from one of its intermediary partner's guiding principles,
and a key tenet of "public," democratic education.
Choice without Choice: The High School Matching Process
The high school admissions processes, which afforded much less input
from the principal, undercut the school's efforts at selectivity. This, in turn,
created a different set of tensions between students and teachers, and parents and
administrators. In New York City, the high school admissions process was
organized as a matching process. Students listed the top schools they were
interested in attending; principals received a list limited to names, feeder middle
schools, and ELL and special educations status. New schools were exempted
from taking special needs students in the first two years of operation; otherwise,
they needed to accept all students.
In theory, the high school matching process gave students the freedom to
choose the school that best aligned with their learning needs. In practice, they
often found themselves at schools they had ranked last or not at all. Describing
107
this situation, Principal Taylor commented, "usually the 12 choices are met, but a
student might get their 12
th
choice. But, let's be honest your 12
th
choice is not a
school that you really want to go to." Because Excelsior was a new school, it
usually had vacancies and received some of these students.
The enrollment of students who ranked Excelsior 12
th
and who were
assigned to the school by the district may have explained why teachers observed a
level of resistance among students to aspects of Excelsior's school design.
Excelsior was an extended day school , where students wore uniforms, attended
Saturday School and experienced a rigorous college preparatory curriculum.
While some students had chosen the school for these very reasons, others did not
learn about the policies until the first day of school. The principal commented "in
my opinion they really need to revamp the high school process. Because quite
often kids end up in schools where they really don't want to be, where it's not the
right match." Ms. Tabor, an English teacher, described the situation, "last year
that was a part of my disenchantment. I was like, 'Whoa,' I had no idea I was
going to have all these kids who didn't want to be here and didn't want to be
wearing a uniform." She found that students "chose it [Excelsior] just kind of
randomly, like they didn't really do the research. They're like, 'What, it's an
extended day school?' And last year they were here until 6:00 pm." Some of this
discontent even manifested itself in vandalism at the high school level; during one
visit, the school banners that adorned the hallways had been torn down. Teachers
18
The school day ended at 6:00 pm rather than at 3:00 pm three days per week during Excelsior's
first year, and at 5:00 pm during its second year.
108
said that the students were expressing their anger with the school environment,
particularly with all of the rules. These students' experiences undercut a central
assumption of intermediary-led public school reformthat informed students and
parents will choose a school best fitted for their needs.
Student Demographics and the Populations of High Needs Students
In the 2007-2008 school year, Excelsior was in its 3 year of existence
and served over 400 students in grades 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11. Looking at the
school's demographics, Excelsior is predominantly female (59%) with 54% of its
student population being of African-American descent, 43% of Hispanic descent
and less than 1% of European American, Asian or American Indian descent. In
general, Excelsior enrolled fewer English language learners, students receiving
special education services and males than other schools citywide. It did, however,
enroll more students living at or below the poverty line as compared to citywide
averages (NYC DOE, n.d.).
As mentioned earlier, the lower percentages of special needs students
could be attributed to Excelsior's new school status, which would expire in year
three. Concerned about her school's capacity to take these students, Taylor
shared some of her anxieties with a member of UE in the spring of 2007. Dr.
Suzanne Pena, a member of the intermediary organization and a former
superintendent in NYC, advised Taylor to write to her network leader
immediately and say that she did not have the capacity to take self contained
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students, but that she could take students who needed an environment with
collaborative team teaching (CTT). The intermediary representative then stressed
that she must be sure to explain that it was "not that you do not want them, but it
was that you could not serve them because you don't have the flexibility." In
finessing the system, this vignette raises questions once again about the equity of
public education when private sector partners selectively use their influence to
shape their associate schools. If these schools cannot serve special needs
populations, does the burden become greater on traditional neighboring public
schools that lack that special clout?
This section explored the complexities and limits of choice as they relate
to middle and high school admissions processes. It illuminated fissures in
alignment as UE's vision for non selective schools ran counter to Excelsior's
admissions processes, and as students who had cavalierly selected the school, or
not selected it at all, chafed against the requirements of a "college preparatory"
institution. Having now concluded the Part I discussion of the motivations for
partnership, the partnership process, stakeholder characteristics and admissions
policies, Part II will investigate how decisions were made and power was
negotiated within the public-private partnership.
Part II: Decision Making Processes
This section explores how decision making occurred and power allocated
amongst stakeholders within this private-public partnership; looking specifically
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at which actors were empowered by this new governance structure and which lost
voice.
Parameters of Influence: A Nuanced Relationship of Support versus Control
Taylor and the members of UE were very aware of how power was
distributed between them, with Taylor at the helm. However, UE chose the
curricula and professional development program. Taylor commented: "one of the
things I love most about UE is that because-especially when I hear about other
intermediary organizations, which try to boss you around and tell you what to do.
They're not like that. They're really more like a support system, and all they
really ever ask is, "How can I help you?" And it's not like coming in and trying to
run my school because it's my school." From Taylor's perspective, UE existed to
support her vision for Excelsior, and not the other way around. Interviews with
members of UE revealed that they purposely cultivated these types of
relationships with their school principals, even though they found creating this
type of relationship to be challenging. Blanco, the director of UE, described the
relationship she hoped to build with her schools as one that was "built on honesty
and trustworthiness."
Blanco and her staff cultivated trust by being available to principals at all
hours, by being present at required professional development events for principals
and teachers, and by figuring out a balance between offering advice and requiring
schools to make certain decisions. She shared:
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One thing we bring to the work as an intermediary organization is
experience. Like it or not, they may have a difference of opinion.
And I have learned-and I've had to relearn, and particularly with
Jaime and Suzanne [staff members at UE]we've had to learn that
you can no longer mandate your opinion, so to speak. And that it is
learning how to use influence. If you keep at the heart of
everything-kids, principals, teachers-I don't think you can miss.
And you have to demonstrate that by your actions and your
behaviors. So if they call and yell at me, they call and yell at me.
It's a different role.
As the above quote suggests, striking a balance between support and
instruction was a challenge-especially for former principals and superintendents.
However, in their new roles as members of an intermediary organization, their
authority over hired principals was limited. Yet on the key question of
curriculum, there remained specific requirements in the MOU mandating
Achievement First curriculum and professional development and threatening loss
of funding and dissolution of the partnership should the school go another way.
The empowerment network team, for its part, had chosen to closely align
with UE, just as Taylor and UE had generally aligned their educational values. A
member of the empowerment network team commented, "we've made their
[UE's] agenda our agenda
19
. Our role is through support. We are not there to
supervise. The fact that UE has a common agenda actually makes our job a little
bit easier." Communication among these three groups-through meetings at the
UE and at Excel si or - kept dialogue open and relations copacetic bet ween these
There were five people in the Excelsior's empowerment network team; one of whom was the
lead liaison to all UE schools. This staff member attended UE trainings in Achievement First and
other curricula and products to allow her to be informed and to constructively support the schools
in the network. In addition, the network leader and members of the network team met regularly
with Blanco, the director of University Edge's small school initiative.
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stakeholders. This alignment was particularly important as studies of charter
schools have shown that divergence in educational philosophies create the most
conflicts among school stakeholders (Horn & Miron, 2000).
In contrast to this executive level alignment, teachers and parents were left
noticeably absent from these interactions and had limited interface, especially in a
decision-making capacity, with UE or the network team. As a consequence,
teachers and parents often missed being involved in key discussions and decisions
about the school and its future. This issue of teacher and parent voice and
empowerment has been explored in the literature on EMO managed charter
schools (Bulkley, 2005; Scott, 2002). Scott's (2002) research, in particular, found
that in some cases, "rather than being more accountable to marginalized
communities, some [EMOs] blatantly ignored the wishes of parents and teachers"
(p. 21). When an implicit goal of private sector public school reform is to make
schools more responsive to local needs, omitting parents and teachers from the
decision making process has the potential to do the opposite. In the case of the
UE-Excelsior relationship, the addition of the private sector player, from the
perspective of teachers and parents, added another layer of management and
further distanced them from having a role in school decision-making. Having
introduced the nuanced balance between support and control that UE provides to
Excelsior, the next section operationalizes power by exami ni ng how personnel ,
curricular and professional development decisions were made.
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The Partnership in Action: Personnel, Curricular,
and Professional Development Decisions
This section examines concrete examples of decision-making within the
partnership. It captures the ways in which UE leverages decision-making control
via its financial position, the influence of its experienced staff, and Principal
Taylor's buy-in of the UE agenda, balanced against teachers' acts of resistance
against aspects of the UE design model.
Partnership in Action: Personnel Decisions
Observations of administrative meetings and interviews with school-level
administrators, teachers and members of the intermediary organization revealed
confusion concerning who had ultimate decision making power over personnel at
Excelsior. This confusion can be traced back to the initial partnership process
when, according to members of UE, they "chose" Taylor to lead one of "our"
schools. In the UE implementation manual, the following phrases occurred
regularly, "we operate 17 UE Schools, and "our schools are designed and
managed in partnership with the NYC DOE." These examples suggest that UE
considered itself an owner, or at least partial owner, of its partner schools.
Adding to this confusion, the NYC DOE website described the UE as "running
their schools," thus strengthening the impression of ownership.
However, according to Taylor, the situation was not so clear: the UE was
one of "three people that hired me, basically the Office of New Schools, Region
X, and UE." Yet critically, according to City regulations, the responsibility of
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actually appointing, rating and firing belonged to the DOE alone. Unlike many
EMO managed charter school relationships, where the EMO has the right to hire
and fire personnel (Horn & Miron 2000), in this case the district retained those
rights. Thus, this and other intermediary-school partnerships in New York City
more closely resembled the "thin management" model of governance, as defined
in Chapter 2 (Gold, Christman & Herold, 2007). Under thin management in
Philadelphia, the district gave private sector providers limited authority over the
schools they managed and worked to improve. The importance of this distinction
is readily apparent in the intermediary partner's response that claimed a right to
hold veto power over the principal selection process (UE MOU, 2006).
While the intermediary organization may not have "owned" the school in
terms of controlling its leadership, it did have the ability to influence this
decision-makingfirst, because of the financial and in-kind resources that it
provided to the school. Miranda Blanco, the director of UE, explained: "Gates
made it explicit that their funds follow the intermediary," to be a lever or catalyst
for change at the school level. If that, according to the intermediary, was not
happening, then it could sever its relationship and pull the attendant funding.
Yet aside from this ultimatum, it was the currency of the UE staffs
extensive experience that allowed it to take a position of authority in the day-to-
day basis of influencing key personnel decisions. All of the senior UE staff
members were seasoned educators that had held positions as teachers and
administrators within New York City's Department of Education. Contrasted
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with her relative inexperience, Principal Taylor appreciated their input in hiring
decisions, explaining "I take into account what they [UE] state because of the
simple fact is that they've been educators for much longer than I have. And so if
they're adamant about, 'This person is just not the right decision,' there's a good
chance I would agree with them." This experience also translated into access to
networks. For example, during a meeting between Principal Taylor and Dr. Pena,
who was a former superintendent, it surfaced that Taylor was strongly considering
a particular candidate for an assistant principal position. This candidate had
recently left a school that he had worked in for over 10 years. Dr. Pena asked for
his name and said that she would, through her contacts at schools across the city,
find the "back story" as to why he had left his former position. As the above
scenario illustrates, the experience and connections possessed by members of the
intermediary organizations helped them to gain the trust of their principals, and to,
in turn, influence their decision-making. Yet while UE successfully cultivated the
confidence and trust of Principal Taylor, teachers remained skeptical about UE's
involvement in personnel decisions.
Teachers expressed frustration and confusion over UE's lack of
involvement in filling school vacancies in music, French and chemistry. The
chemistry position, in particular, was not filled until April of the school year. Ms.
Crane, a history teacher, commented, "if the UE is banking its success on these
schools and they see a school as having trouble-I was surprised they never-they
didn't step in sooner. Or I don't think they've stepped in at all. That's the one
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thing that's made me curious about the UE." Here, the teacher expressed concern
that a clear and urgent need was not being addressed by the school's partner,
raising questions about its awareness of school-level needs, and whether its set of
priorities was matching that of the school.
Overall, when asked to describe her relationship with schools, the director
of UE's School Initiative commented, "it's like the pebble in the pond. We're out
here somewhere as an intermediary organization, trying to influence." Using their
Gates funding, their organization's reputation, and their staff members' advanced
educational experience and networks, UE sought to "make waves" at the school
level as best they could. Still, while their ability to influence personnel-related
decision-making had DOE-regulated limits, the UE's ability to influence teaching
and learning practices had more latitude.
The Partnership in Action: Curricular Decisions
As noted, one of the requirements of partnership with UE was that
Excelsior would use UE's curricular materials and programs. As a result, a
portion of Excelsior's funding went to purchasing UE's Achievement First in
Math and ELA, as well as the Strive in College curriculum. All of these curricula
were made for grades six through twelve. The English and math Achievement
First curricula were aligned to national standards for what the UE believed
students should be able to know and do to succeed in college. Members of UE
described the Achievement First curriculum as being "backward mapped" from
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the first year of college to ensure that students would achieve success at the
university level. Depending on age level, the Strive in College curriculum laid
out the steps students needed to take in order to make themselves strong
applicants and successful college students. These books provided background
information about the college experience for students who lived in communities
where college matriculation and completion rates were low. In addition to these
curricula, all students at UE schools were expected to take two Advanced
Placement exams before graduating. Teachers' lived experiences with these
curricula as well as their interactions with the UE varied sharply depending on the
subject they taught, and on whether their philosophies of teaching aligned with
those of UE.
Experiences of English and Math Teachers
The experiences of math and English teachers varied dramatically from
those of history and science teachers. While history and science teachers were
pretty much "left alone to create their own curriculum or buy curriculum,"
according to a high school teacher, English teachers had to incorporate
Achievement First into their curriculum. Math teachers, on the other hand, were
not currently implementing the Achievement First Math because it did not address
enough of the topics covered on the New York State Regents exams. Seeing the
weakness in their Math curriculum in terms of its alignment with state standards,
UE schools in New York City used another math program while UE re-aligned
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their math curriculum. The English teachers' experiences exemplify how the UE
curriculum was implemented.
Some of the teachers embraced the UE curriculum as comprehensive,
while others feared that because it was not directly aligned to the state and city
standards it would negatively affect test scores. Still others complained that
having a set curriculum limited their ability to tailor their teaching to the needs of
their students. Ms. Tabor, an English teacher who embraced the program, felt that
she had been part of a team of teachers that chose to require the use of
Achievement First curriculum in the school. She commented that although
teachers can "change things [the curriculum] around a little bit, it [Achievement
First] is supposed to be the center of your instruction." This exchange
underscored the confusion that existed at the school level about the intermediary-
school relationship. Specifically, some teachers did not understand that using the
Achievement First curriculum and attending UE retreats were key, in fact
mandated, components of the partnership.
Other teachers saw the merits of a set curriculum because of the high
numbers of first year teachers working at the school. As Ms. Livingston, an
English teacher, described:
I love the idea that an English teacher has Achievement First-
especially because, in New York City, we're going to have first
year teachers the majority of the time... if I'm bossing everyone
around and this is my fifth year, it tells you something. So I love
the idea that we can get new English teachers in and they have
Achievement First.
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In contrast, a few teachers resisted the Achievement First English curriculum
either because they felt that it did not align to city and state standards or because it
limited what they were able to teach. In terms of the standards, one experienced
English teacher, Ms. Fields, expressed concern that the Achievement First
curriculum did not teach basic grammar and writing skills, which were key
components of the state standards and state tests. This teacher feared that if she
only followed the Achievement First curriculum, she would not be preparing her
students to succeed on their tests, some of which had high stakes attached. Still,
other teachers felt that having a set curriculum limited their ability to have their
teaching meet the direct needs of their kids. For example, Ms. Crane, a history
teacher who had many students from Mali in her class, would have liked to
incorporate literature from Mali into the course, but felt that the Achievement
First curriculum did not foster that type of adaptation. This use of a set
curriculum, while not unusual in traditional public schools, was particularly
prevalent in EMO and CMO managed charter schools as curricular materials,
similar to UE's Achievement First, represented a key part of their brand.
Misaligned Expectations: Challenging Students
or Setting Them up for Failure?
While teachers universally supported the use of Thrive in College
curriculum to help acquaint their students with the concept of college, many
expressed concern over the expectation that in order to graduate their students
would have to take two Advanced Placement (AP) exams. Ms. Crane felt that she
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was setting her students up for failure: "You know one thing I think we need to
realize is that our students are in different places, but also the AP exams are
incredibly above grade level." Ms. Crane argued that, since many of her 9* and
10th graders were reading on a 6
th
grade level, it would be unrealistic for them to
be expected to do college level work. Regardless of level, teachers also
questioned when students would be able to complete heavy assignments in
preparation for the AP exams, noting that many had an hour commute home, and
worked after school to help support their families. These sentiments reflected an
overall concern that in the school's quest to raise expectations, they were putting
extreme pressure on students. In contrast, conversations with members of the UE
and Principal Taylor yielded very different conceptions of the significance of
taking the AP exam. Rather than viewing AP exams as a high stakes experience,
they viewed it as an intellectual one that would expose students to rigorous,
college-level coursework. Principal Taylor explained:
Different organizations have done a lot of studies that show that
those students who are mediocre students or, let's say, C students
and so on, when they are exposed to Advanced Placement, even if
they fail the class, even if they just pass the class by the skin of
their teeth, they're more successful in college because they've been
exposed to college-level coursework in high school. And so that's
what they're really all about is making sure that there is equity and
making sure that even our mediocre students are exposed to
Advanced Placement.
Some t eachers' objections to the Achi evement First curriculum and AP
requirements illustrated a lack of teacher voice in curricular and academic
scheduling, and philosophical differences between the teachers and Taylor and the
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UE staff. Yet while teachers might have disagreed, they ultimately had to either
fall in line or leave the school. As a mandated part of the Excelsior-UE
partnership, the school had committed to an integral feature of UE's school design
model. The next section will examine another mandated feature of the UE design.
The Partnership in Action: Professional Development Decisions
In general, teachers reported that UE offered enriching and useful
professional development sessions, with some reservations that will be examined
later. The sessions, all of which took place at UE's headquarters, included a
week- long summer training in the UE model, with specific attention to the
Achievement First math and ELA curricula for new teachers, bi-monthly Saturday
new teacher retreats, and additional specialized professional development
programs on guidance or school community building. Overall, teachers
responded positively to UE's professional development offerings, characterizing
them as being both informative and professional. Many teachers also appreciated
being paid, on average $18.00 per hour for their attendance. Ms. Tabor shared,
"when we go to professional development there's always very nice food. They're
respectful of our time. When we do go to professional developments and things
like that they pay us. The Saturday professional developments are paid for by
UE. . .1 really feel like t hey' re on the cutting edge of education. "
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Mixing Public and Private Goals
While many teachers shared the view that the professional development
sessions at the UE were well ran and worth their time, a few complained that they
sometimes felt like infomercials. Mr. Kramel, a middle school teacher, said:
The Saturday ones we've gone to throughout the year though,
sometimes the stuff where they're talking about pedagogy or
curriculum or those kinds of things are good. But then a lot of
times you have to do these two-hour long sessions on how to use
a UE product in your classroom, which doesn't really apply as
much. So I'm just sitting there, and it feels like a big long
advertisement.
Observations of the Saturday retreats and interviews evidenced that the training
time was divided into two parts: the first focused on a UE product, such as
computer programs, to be used in schools, and the second focused on pedagogical
issues and approaches to teaching or ways to improve the overall school
environment.
This sentiment, that the UE possessed the dual goals of improving public
education and selling products, resonated across the faculty. Some further raised
concerns about issues of ownership and their curricula. These concerns emerged
at a professional development session held for all UE English teachers across
New York City. At this meeting, teachers were asked to discuss how they used
the Achievement First curriculum in their classrooms, to share any modifications
they had made, and to exchange lesson plans with one another, and with
representatives from the UE. While some teachers willingly shared, a few
expressed concern about giving information to the UE to improve its curriculum
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without being compensated for their work. Ms. Tabor asked: "Will I get credited?
Will I get compensated for my work? The UE makes money from selling their
curriculum, but will I see any of it? No, I will not. This is a big deal!"
This situation raises questions about ownership of curriculum in hybrid
schools. If the school were entirely public, the knowledge generated within it
would be in the public domain. However, since the school was the result of a
private-public partnership, it was less clear who owned the knowledge generated
while the school was in session. Also, to what extent did the private sector
partner's example, in and of itself, provoke the teachers' determination that their
intellectual capital was something that should be monetized rather than shared
freely? EMO and CMO managed charter schools faced similar ownership
questions. Miron and Nelson (2002) found that in some charter schools, lesson
plans or material developed by teachers were considered property of the EMO, a
stipulation usually outlined in the original school or district contract. Since no
contract or MOU existed between UE and Excelsior, these types of ownership
questions remained unresolved.
The University Edge Model versus Union Rules
Tension emerged with another aspect of Excelsior's professional
devel opment requi rement s. Whi l e the principal can strongly recommend that
staff attend UE Saturday and weeklong training sessions, and the UE can offer
incentives, per union rules, teachers cannot be mandated to attend. Although this
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extra professional development time was part of the UE model and was implicitly
supported by the principal, the extra time was not part of the teachers' union
contract. As Mr. Griffith, a high school teacher, explained:
The Saturday Retreat is optional for a teacher; it's if he or she
chooses to come. If they don't want to come, there's literally
nothing you can do to make them come because the teacher
contract-that's the whole thing-New York City is governed by
contract and that contract doesn't stipulate that you have to go to
the Saturday retreats.
On the day that I observed the Saturday Retreat only three of Excelsior's eight
new teachers attended. Taylor explained that while she could encourage teachers
to participate, she could not penalize them for not participating. In her words, the
teachers' union contract "really hampers and makes it difficult" for her to
implement UE's design model. In contrast to new small schools, studies of
charter schools revealed that many charter school teachers were not unionized.
While these teachers expressed pride in working at a charter school and shared
that they enjoyed being free of the union contract, they also reported being
overworked and close to being burned out (Scott, 2002; Vasadeva & Grutzik,
2002; UCLA Charter School Study, 1998). Similar to charter schools, teachers at
Excelsior reported being overworked, which they attributed to working in a new
school, especially one that had both extended day and Saturday programs.
As this section illustrated, quality professional development, a vision of
higher achievement standards, and a rigorous curriculum were all benefits of the
UE sector partnership. However, at the same time, a clear disconnect existed
between UE and some of the teachers at Excelsior, manifested in the teachers'
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lack of voice in personnel, curricular and scheduling decisions. In addition,
tensions over the corporate aspect of UE, ownership of curricular materials, and
conflict between the theories of the school design model and the realities of the
union contract revealed some of the complexities bubbling beneath the surface of
these new small schools. Having now examined both context and decision-
making in the Excelsior-UE relationship, Part III will examine the future of this
hybrid school.
Part III: Sustainability and Scaling Up
In theory, the intermediary-school relationship will be finite. Under the
Gates funding guidelines, the intermediary will financially support schools for the
first four and half years of their existence-from the planning stage through year
four. After year four, the school and intermediary would have to negotiate a new
relationship, or part ways. By year four, the school should be at full capacity;
fully enrolled and less dependent on, and influenced by, outside funding. In the
case of Excelsior, key stakeholders-the intermediary, the principal, the teachers
and the network-each had different views about how this future would unfold.
Leaving Before Year Four: Teacher Attrition at Excelsior
As previously cited, Excelsior experienced very high teacher turnover
rates its first couple of years. High turnover, in turn, made creating a rigorous and
coherent academic environment more challenging. The principal revealed that 16
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of the 29 teachers were new in the fall of 2007. Teachers suggested that many left
because they felt unsupported by the principal; many shared that they had not
been officially observed by the principal and missed receiving feedback about
their practice. This was especially true for first year teachers who yearned for
more mentoring. Others left because they felt that they had been sold, as Mr.
Casion, a middle school history teacher explained, "a false reality of the school."
In Casion's words: "during interviews with the principal, teachers were told that
students will sit at their desks, raise their hands and they do not. Compared to
others in the neighborhood, this school is better, but most of the teachers who left
don't understand that." Ms. Berry, the school secretary, later reiterated in a high
whisper, that "teachers leave because they don't feel appreciated by the
principal." The school's teacher union representative shared that teachers were
unhappy because some of them taught four classes in a row and a few others felt
they had been threatened by students and there had been no recourse; both of
which were in violation of the union contract. Whether it educational values and
personality clashes with the principal or violations of the union contract, teachers
were leaving Excelsior in high numbers and the intermediary partner seemed
unable to step in and change the trend. This churn certainly impacted teaching
and learning standards
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Parents' Dream Making and Breaking Experiences
Many parents, for their part, expressed concern about the ability of
Excelsior to deliver on the kind of educational environment that had been
promised to them at high schools fairs and open houses. Parents expressed anger
that a number of promises had been made, including French classes, an array of
sports, and after school activities, which had not yet occurred. In addition, a few
parents commented that they had thought that the school environment would
resemble that of an elite private school rather than the previous public schools that
their children attended. Ms. Perez, a parent of a middle school child said:
The school sounds good and looks good on paper, but it is not
living up to its expectations to what was promised. At
orientation, the principal promised various languages, career
explorations and those things never happened. If you promise one
thing, but it looks like what we already had, then what? I may not
have money for private school, but I want to give my kids
opportunities -like the kind of education at Creighton.
Recall that Excelsior had been encouraged by UE, with the help of its in-kind
support, to create professional, attractive marketing materials. Yet, practical
reality could not keep up with marketing hyperbole, raising the question of how
parents were supposed to make informed choices in an educational marketplace
with little accountability for erroneous claims.
In fact, a few parents shared that they were thinking of withdrawing their
children from Excelsior because they did not have time to, as Ms. Perez said, "be
part of an experiment," especially when, as asserted by Ms. Jackson, another
middle school parent, all of these small "boutique" schools weren't really
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different from the larger, traditional schools that parents and students had came
from. In the future, whether or not students and their families stay on at Excelsior
will be an important way of measuring its success.
University Edge: Scaling Up
Conversations with members of UE about the future of the partnership
focused on scale and sustainability, enculturation, and becoming a fee for service
model. The director of UE Schools as well as other members of UE expressed a
desire to sustain success and to scale up across the country. In fact, initial funding
by the Gates Foundation hinged on sustainability and scaling up. Blanco, the
director of UE, explained, "part of the money that we were given from the
foundations was to figure out a model for the UE that you could replicate in deed
and perhaps scale." She continued to share that before scalability could be
tackled, sustainability was essential: "How do you sustain good work? And then
what are the elements that you need to think about as you build strategic or
organizational plans?" In terms of sustaining good work post funding, the
director described a fee for service approach, whereby schools would pay for
curricular materials, or pay to attend conferences sponsored by UE. While use of
UE's programs and services made up one part of the model, professional
development remained an important element-which tended to be very expensive.
The director of UE discussed these challenges:
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What we're struggling with internally is how do you run a fee-for-
service? You run an annual Achievement First conference. You
can bring everyone to one of our schools to do it. Every school
pays. And I think that would be nominal, not too expensive for
Achievement First. Steve [a paid professional development
consultant], on the other hand, that kind of work is very expensive.
Essentially, UE was struggling with how to ensure implementation of their
model at the school level. A key finding of a longitudinal study of the scale up
phase of the New American School's whole school designs revealed that teacher
buy-in-usually through strong teacher-administrator communication and
professional development-was a key factor for successful long term
implementation of a school design (Berends, Bodilly &Kirby, 2002). While
currently, on-site professional developers fulfilled this aspect of the UE model,
alternative methods for knowledge transfer would need to be devised when the
Gates funding ended.
The future financial relationship between UE and Excelsior remained
ambiguous as well. The director of UE's small school initiative discussed a fee-
for-service relationship; however, it was unclear in which direction the President
of UE would guide the organization. The director of the small schools initiative
commented, "our funding is four and a half years-half year for planning and four
years. Sustainability, we talk about that all the time in regards to what we do
afterwards. And the president of UE always says he wants to support the schools,
but what that means we don't know." In addition to the "train the trainer" model
and having a fee-for-service relationship, at the time of the study the UE was in
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the process of creating a Phase Two MOU, so that as schools move past year four
there would be an official, legal document outlining their new relationship.
While ambiguity surrounded the future of UE, a perception did exist that
momentum was building around their model. The director noted that as opposed
to early years when just hand a handful of principals would be attending
orientation sessions, they now commanded audiences of over 100 people. In
addition, since beginning its program, UE had scaled up its new school creation
by 120%, with schools opening in New York City and other cities in the United
States. The year 2008 marked the first time that UE schools would be graduating
seniors; in the future, it will be important to track the graduation and college
placement rates of UE's partner schools. From UE's perspective, these metrics,
in addition to UE's record of growth based on a defined design model, should
position it to bring its model to a national level.
Excelsior Academy: An Uncertain Future
Conversations with the principal and teachers about their post year four
relationship with UE revealed a more immediate set of concerns, such as the need
for greater physical spaceyet funding was not a paramount concern. The
principal believed that UE had the capacity to continue to support Excelsior in the
future and noted that UE was currently applying for educational grants. When
probed about the potential for a fee-for-service model, the principal did not know
about one and did not believe that one was an option. In her view, UE "is
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obtaining grants so that they can continue to give us funding because that's a big
question. I mean, after four years-originally, it was kind of like you're on your
own, but UE doesn't want that to happen. They really want to be able to support
us and continue to support us." Expressing a similar view that support will
continue, Mr. Griffith, a high school teacher, asserted that, "it's Bill Gates. His
money doesn't run out," meaning that the intermediary or school could just
reapply and receive more funding. On the other hand, Ms. Livingston, who used
the Achievement First curriculum on a regular basis, expressed concern that, if a
fee for service model came to pass, the school might not be able to afford the
curriculum. She commented, "If we're going to have to pay for it? Is she [the
principal] going to be willing to pay for it, or are we just going to be
photocopying? Because I love it, and my intention is that we'll still use it because
it's phenomenal. But how expensive is it? Can we afford it?" The assumption of
continued support, and the ignorance to the intermediary's consideration of a
"fee-for-services" model, illustrates a serious lack of understanding about what
the future relationship would look like.
Discussion and Conclusion
As a partnership, the UE-Excelsior collaboration is a complicated story of
executive level al i gnment and teacher and parent contention. At the executive
level, the partnership thrived; Principal Taylor, members of University Edge, and
the empowerment zone administrators had generally aligned visions that
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advocated for the implementation of UE's school design model. These
stakeholders communicated actively with each other to make school policy.
Taylor had the authority to make many decisions, yet the luxury of relying on
UE's seasoned guidance and access to networks. At the same time, UE brought
innovative curricular materials, a college initiation program, and professional
development sessions to Excelsior. However, at the school level, the benefits
were less clear. Because the initial partnership involved only UE and Principal
Taylor, teachers generally did not understand UE's role or influence in setting the
conditions of the school. Teachers did not always understand the rationale for
having to enact the UE design model with little variation, and sometimes chafed
against expectations that they attend professional development sessions promoting
UE's products. These requirements suggested that, to teachers, UE acted like an
unseen manager, rather than an equal partner, ruling their professional lives from
afar. Teachers were expected to cede decision-making power over core aspects of
their professional lives-curriculum and professional development-without having
had a chance to understand and buy-in to the intermediary's underlying rationale.
This partner/manager dichotomy also raised questions about the dual
missions of UE. Teachers were unclear, and in some cases uncomfortable, with
UE's public and private goals; supporting public education while selling
educational materials at a profit. That Excelsior had to purchase UE curricula
with their Gates' money was not communicated to teachers, leading many to
believe that it was a gift from UE. In addition, the fact that half of teachers'
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professional development time at Saturday Retreats was being used to market UE
products or that teachers were asked to enrich the UE curriculum without
compensation fostered skepticism among some faculty that they were being used
in a business venture.
Like teachers, parents and students were also confused by the UE-
Excelsior partnership. They did not understand UE's role, beyond a basic notion
that having a private sector partner involved with the school made it seem more
exclusive, While some students chose to attend Excelsior-going through a
comprehensive admissions process-many were placed there, creating tension
when they did not buy-in to the school's founding vision. As they acted out,
parents were disappointed that the school was not living up to its marketed
depiction. This reality raises questions about the limits of choice; if parents and
students are misinformed, the misalignment between their needs and the schools
they select can be severe. Finally, the admissions discussion raised concerns not
only about student and parent satisfaction, but also about the role of equity, as
Excelsior selected for high achievement students even as students themselves self-
selected by being drawn to certain themes.
Poor communication, a lack of transparency, and weak teacher and parent
support for the partnership at the school level created tension and confusion that
ultimately weakened the school community, most seriously by driving high
teacher turnover. With access to financial and institutional resources, connections
to high status networks, experienced staff and high quality professional
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development offerings, UE brought a lot of capital to the intermediary-school
relationship. However, rather than being embraced, their model was resisted by
teachers. Part of this opposition occurred because of confusion over UE's role in
the school and in public education: Was it a partner or manager? Was it furthering
the public good or addressing a private goal? Further defining its organizational
identity, clarifying its goals, and communicating them to school-level
stakeholders would be a productive first step to building a more positive
relationship. As the partnership continues, and Excelsior grows, it will be
important to see whether there will be a push to illuminate the partnershipor
management relationshipto the whole school community, or whether it will
remain tightly controlled by a few closely aligned individuals at the top.
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CHAPTER VI
THE CASE OF THE METROPOLITAN UNITED ENTREPRENEURSHIP
AND CITIZENSHIP ACADEMY
Overview of the Case
This case tells the story of a conflict-ridden public-private association at a
new small school in New York City. The relationship spanned three years,
beginning with the initial partnering process between Principal Kevin James and
Metropolitan United (MU) in November of 2004, and ending with its dissolution
in January of 2007. Misalignment of educational philosophies, especially over
issues of teaching and learning, created tension between members of the
Entrepreneurship and Citizenship Academy (ECA) school community and MU, as
each group fought for control. While pedagogical conflict is a common feature of
the micropolitics of schooling, this tension was exacerbated by MU's decision to
sign a management contract with the NYC DOE in the second year of the
partnership, which moved it, in effect, from partner to manager. This mid-
partnership switch caused confusion and anger in the school community as MU
began to assert its perceived right to greater control over the school. In the end,
rather t han cultivating a strong, i nnovat i ve and academi cal l y sound new small
school community, the partnership contributed to a fragile and uncertain
educational environment.
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This chapter unfolds over four parts. It begins, in Part I, by focusing on
the contextual factors that influence the partnership and contribute to the growth
of the new small school. Motivations for partnership, the partnership process,
stakeholder characteristics and student selection processes will be discussed in
this section. Part II examines whose educational values-those of the school
community or those of the intermediary-set the agenda at the school level, and
how power was negotiated when conflict emerged. This section explores issues
of personnel, budgets and teaching and learning. These issues culminate in Part
III, where the breakdown of communication and assertions of power between the
key playersMU, Principal James, and the NYC DOElead to the dissolution of
the partnership. The case of ECA concludes with Part IV, which explores issues
of sustainability and scaling up for each organization-MU and ECAas well as
of this approach to school reform.
Part I: Contextual Factors that Impacted the Partnership
The Partnership Quest: A Speedy Union
In the fall of 2004, ECA was co-founded by the Department of Education
in partnership with an intermediary organization called Metropolitan United; the
union happened quickly. The vision for ECA came from Principal James, an
African-American in his thirties, who himself had attended an all male, college
preparatory school. Before founding ECA, James had worked as a math teacher
in New York City for three years, and later co-founded charter schools in New
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York and New Jersey. During this time, he earned his master's degree in
Educational Leadership and enrolled in a principal preparation program, which
carried the expectation that participants would become school principals
following a year-long apprenticeship. Rather than seeking a placement in an
existing school, James wanted to create a new school that followed his own
educational vision and philosophies.
James's completion of his aspiring principal's program corresponded with
the New York City Department of Education's push for schools to be co-founded
with intermediary organizations. James understood that partnering with, in
particular, a Gates funded intermediary would provide his school with, "an
additional $575,000 of grant money to spend over the next four years," as well as
in-kind support. This was money that James described as being free of "DOE red
tape" which often makes purchasing difficult because of long turn-around times
and vendor restrictions. To this end, James isolated his search; The City
University of New York (CUNY), and the University Edge (UE) were his top
choices. James explained "my first choice was CUNY because of the promise of
graduating kids with an associate's degree.. .My second choice was the University
Edge because they were new, have a ton of funding, and a ton of institutional
clout. When you think of college, you think of the University Edge." However,
upon further reflection James deci ded that neither woul d work; CUNY, because
most of the school planning meetings occurred during the school day which
would have pulled James away from his principal residency program, and UE,
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because its application process was, according to James, too "slow on the trigger."
In particular, James was concerned that the UE partnership process, which
included information sessions and interviews, would prevent him from having a
partner before he submitted his school concept paper to the Office of New
Schools. By happenstance, at one of UE information sessions, he ran into a friend
who was also starting a new school with an organization called Metropolitan
United (MU). The friend recommended that he contact MU because they moved
quickly and interviewed on Saturdays. James explained, "I e-mailed Metropolitan
United and they got back to me. It was an ultra quick turnaround. My first
interview was on a Saturday afternoon, my second was on Monday night and then
they hired me on Tuesday or whatever partnered with me."
Kevin James' Vision
James knew that he wanted to create a school that would be all male,
college preparatory, and which would develop urban leaders. ECA's mission
statement read:
The Metropolitan United Entrepreneurship and Citizenship
Academy is an all-boys, college prep school serving grades 6
through 12..Our mission is to develop young men into urban
leaders in two ways: (1) by providing a rigorous academic
program, that includes business education in every grade, leading
100% of t hem to t he college of their choice, and (2) by devel opi ng
their understanding of their place in the world through character
education and community service in every grade.
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According to Ms. Styles, the school's partnership coordinator, the principal's
vision for ECA was to "take young boys and have them graduate as men that are
ready to go out and be urban leaders because they learned about both the business
side, finance, economics, how to start, run a business, but then they have also
learned about how a city develops, city planning and they have also done a lot of
community service." Throughout the spring of 2005, James and MU worked
together to get the school accepted by the office of New Schools, and then to
prepare for its opening in the fall of 2005. Having introduced Kevin James and
his motivations for starting ECA, this next section provides a snapshot of MU's
growth and development as on organization.
From Partner to Manager: An Introduction to Metropolitan United
Since the late 1990s, Metropolitan United has been involved in the
creation of more than fifteen schools in New York City. Predominantly serving
low-income students, every MU school was organized around a theme, and
enrollment averaged about 100 students per grade. From the fall of 2004 until the
spring of 2006, MU's role was solely as an intermediary organization co-founding
new small schools and supporting their development. MU's founder and
president, Steven Burger, was a white male in his sixties, who was trained as a
lawyer and had spent the majority of his life in business before entering the
educational realm. Burger's original vision for new small school reform rested on
140
three pillars: leadership, themes and partnerships. Unlike University Edge, which
had a school design model, MU functioned from Burger's vision, and would only
seek to create a comprehensive model later on in the evolution of the
organization. See Table 8 for an overview if MU's guiding principles.
Table 8: Metropolitan United's Principles Pre-Management Contract
Funding $575,000 over four years. Only 10% of funding could be used on
capital spending per year. Funding could be used for procession,
but not to cover a teacher's salary. For the first two years, $50,000
was taken out each year to cover the salary and health insurance of
partnership coordinator.
School Size 100 Students per grade on average
School Theme Each school must select its own theme, ranging from architecture
or business, and have private and public sector partners to help
implement the theme.
6
th
grade through 12
th
grade
Grade Range
Targeted Populations Low-income and minority students in urban areas
School Admissions None, all schools are non selective
Schedule No set design
Curriculum No set design but curriculum must integrate theme
Professional Development Limited to high school teachers
Extensive training sessions for the partnership coordinator
Branding School logo, promotional items and signage all must clearly brand
the schools as MU
Source: Information collected from MU website and interviews with members of
the MU staff, and principals and teachers at ECA.
Themes and partnerships were two of the pillars of MU's vision for school
reform. Themes, such as sports or law, provided a base around which a school
would build goals for education, which in turn helped to define its curriculum and
approaches to teaching. With a theme selected, schools would form partnerships
with organizations whose focus reflected their theme, providing students with an
opportunity to see how what they were studying related to real life career
opportunities. Ancess and Allen's (2006) study of themed high schools in New
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York City reveals that themes have the dual potential of raising student
engagement and achievement, while at the same time serving to sort students by
race, class, gender and academic ability as certain themes tend to attract particular
groups of students. Highlighting Ancess and Allen's former findings, Burger
commented, "Metropolitan United is much more serious about the themes and the
partnerships than anybody else so far. And I just did it because it seemed like a
good thing to do. You get kids excited about the outside world. You give them
exposure." Implications of that on selectivity issues will be addressed later in this
chapter.
To help with the integration of the school's theme and to coordinate the
work of partners, each MU school was required to have a partnership coordinator.
Sandra Styles, the partnership coordinator for ECA, described her position:
My job is basically managing the partnerships with organizations.
Part of bringing our theme to life is working with businesses,
working with non-profit organizations. Working with government
organizations, colleges, to have people come in and speak to
students, have students visit these places and experience
everything that the city has to offer. Then also I bring those people
in to consult with teachers about the curriculum.
Hired by Metropolitan United and the school's principal, the partnership
coordinator worked inside of the school. For the first two years, the partnership
coordinator was an employee of MU, which trained, paid, and professionally
devel oped her. Whi l e MU covered the cost of t he partnership coordinator,
funding originated from a school's Gates grant, and after two years, the school
would have to absorb the position into their regular budget. The hybrid nature of
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this position is illustrative of the types of questions raised by a fragile partnership:
how would a valued support be maintained, should the partnership change or fail?
Having described MU prior to the July 2006 contract, the next section turns to
MU's later renaissance as a school manager.
The Metropolitan United Contract
On July 1
st
2006, Metropolitan United signed a contract with the
Department of Education to independently manage and support schools in the MU
network (Agreement between the NYC Department of Education and
Metropolitan United, 2006). When interviewed about Metropolitan United's new
relationship with schools, Burger said, "we're operating and managing the
schools. There's no district, there's no region. There's no empowerment zone."
When asked why he chose to take this route, his main reason was that schools in
the MU network received inconsistent support from the regions; which he thought
could be better served with direct support. According to Burger:
What happened was, I don't know, probably three years ago I'm
watching the schools open at the same time with the same thing,
the same support. One opens in the Bronx, one opens in Brooklyn.
The one in Brooklyn is being tortured by the region. The one in
the Bronx is being supported by the region. And most of them
were just getting benign neglect.
MU was able to realize this desire for more control by leveraging Burger's
professional and personal ties. Specifically, his rel at i onshi ps wi t h t he Chancel l or
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and other high-ranking officials at the DOE were instrumental. Burger
described the access he had to the schools' Chancellor:
I picked up the phone, I called [Chancellor] Klein, I said I want to
get all my schools out of your system. I want to report to you.
And he told me, okay. I do not want the regions. We made the
switch the following year, and then finally last spring-not this
spring, but the spring of a year ago-he said I'm ready. And I said
fine. We negotiated a contract. Others watched this. Other
intermediaries watched this.. .They all watched it, and they all
backed off. And I think they just wanted to say, okay, we're going
to see what happens to Metropolitan United.
This quote tells a story of networks, ownership, competition and connections.
Burger's comment that he just "picked up the phone," reveals his close
relationship with Joel Klein, the Chancellor of schools, and helps to explain his
comfort in asserting his power and influence over Principal James, as will be
discussed more folly. Interviews with officials at the Department of Education
confirmed their relationship and shared that it gave him tremendous access to the
Chancellor, allowing him to make, as one official described it, "back door deals
for his schools." As Scott and Holme (2002) revealed in their study of charter
schools in California, "personal and political connections to people with money
and political power" bring valuable resources and key negotiating power to
schools (pp. 102-103). In fact, Burger also stated that part of the reason he was
able to negotiate such a contract without a negative response from the teachers'
uni on was that he enjoyed "a good relationship wi t h Randi [Weingarten, t he head
of the Teachers' Union] and I've done her favors in the past." In the case of MU,
20
One the day of my interview with Burger, he had a lunch meeting with one of the Deputy
Chancellors.
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Burger's social networks helped secure, as the MU website described, "an
unprecedented collaborative management agreement that may become a prototype
for other public/private school management contracts." The contract gave MU
authority "to operate public schools and assume responsibility for their success
and student achievement" (MU Website, 2008).
Under a "prototype contract," ambiguity existed around what "operating
public schools" would entail, especially since the Metropolitan United contract
remained distinct from the types of relationships the other three existing school
support structures had with schools. From Burger's point of view, the fact that all
MU schools were listed as being in the empowerment zone was "administrative
only. We are not reporting to the empowerment zone, it's a technicality." While
MU affiliated schools were officially listed as being in the empowerment zone,
later called the empowerment support organization, principals reported and were
held accountable to MU. An aura of mystery surrounded the MU-NYC DOE
contract. It was not officially recognized as a type of school support on the NYC
DOE website. Further, members of the Department of Education declined to
comment on the contract or Burger's relationship with the Chancellor in
interviews. This lack of transparency, often associated with the private sector,
raises troubling questions about the role of democratic decision-making and
participation wi t hi n t hese hybrid public/private- partnerships, and the need for
increased public accountability (Minow, 2003; Sclar, 2000).
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In many ways, the contract looked similar to the type of management
agreement that an EMO or a charter school might have with a district, specifying
the terms and conditions of school support, funding, personnel, accountability and
exiting the agreement (Bulkley, 2005; Horn & Miron, 2000; Miron & Nelson,
2002; Richards, Sawicky, & Shore, 1996; Smith & Wohlstetter, 2006). On this
note, Burger described this contract as a type of privatization in education,
breaking away from "a system of top down control." As conceived, principals
would be empowered to run high performing schools, echoing the theories of
Chubb and Moe (1990) and Hill, Pierce and Guthrie (1997), positing that private
sector involvement would foster better public schools. Along with this greater
latitude, Burger also hoped that this new governance structure would mean that
principals would be pulled away from school less often, as they now reported to
MU alone, an assumption to be tested in the near future with ECA.
The Transition from Partner to Manager or Metropolitan United
Becomes the "the Man"
When Metropolitan United presented this new contractual relationship to the
principals of MU schools in summer 2006, they highlighted certain "non-
negotiables," which the principals and their teachers would have to follow: 1)
meeting performance expectations; 2) attending MU principal meetings and
events; 3) participating in the principals' network; 4) providing accurate school
data; 5) collaborating on key hires: Principals, assistant principals, mentorships
and partnership coordinators; and 6) implementing programs in key areas:
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college-bound, mentors and partnerships (Metropolitan United Network
Presentation, 2006). These "non-negotiables" marked a stark shift in the way MU
would be interacting with schools. No longer simply acting as an agent of support
for the theme and partnerships, MU would be officially playing a role in hiring
and firing, professional development, accountability measurements, and curricular
programs. A member of Metropolitan United's Network Team reflected on the
governance change: "Metropolitan United had been in a relationship with our
schools where we were their advocates, we fought the man for the schools, and
now Metropolitan United is the man! This new role changed the relationship.
Last year [2006-2007] was a transition year. We each did our dance."
These past few sections concentrated on MU's vision for schooling, access to
networks, and evolution from partner to manager. The next section focuses on the
experiences of members of the school community, beginning with a discussion of
teacher and parent motivations for choosing ECA and continuing with a
discussion of student selection processes.
Teacher Motivations for Choosing ECA
Teachers' motivations for choosing to work at ECA varied; a majority
were attracted to the vision of a single-sex, all-male approach to education; others
were drawn by Principal James' s personality and vision; some had personal ties to
the school through Mr. James or other faculty; a few were primarily interested in
starting a new school. Strikingly, none singled out the MU relationship. Echoing
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the MU-Excelsior case, many of the teachers did not know about MU until after
they had been hired, and were still-even after working at ECA for two years-
confused about MU's involvement with the school. As one teacher commented,
"I didn't know anything about the Metropolitan United. I was interested in it
being an all boys' school." As this is in many ways a break up story, it is
significant that teachers were primarily drawn to James' vision of an all-male
school, rather than any ideology espoused by its partner MU. As at Excelsior,
Principal James had chosen this partnership without teacher or parent
involvement, and, with the limited exception of the partnership coordinator's
presence on campus, teachers had no opportunity to interface with representatives
of MU. Thus, it is not surprising that teachers displayed a basic lack of
understanding of the MU-ECA relationship.
Teacher Demographics and Experience
In terms of years of demographics and experience, ECA had a varied
teacher population. On average, teachers had eight years of experience teaching-
though this figure was skewed by one teacher who had over 22 years of
experience. See Table 9 below for more detailed data.
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Table 9: Teacher Demographics and Experience at EC A
Name
Ms. Gilbert
Ms. Willow
Ms. Dumas
Ms. Sendee
Ms. Clark*
Ms. Marks
Mr. Stevens
Ms. Potter
Mr. Tencer*
Mr. Saran
Gender
Female
Female
Female
Female
Female
Female
Male
Female
Male
Male
Ethnicity
European-
American
African-American
European-
American
Hispanic-
American
African-American
African-American
Caribbean-
American
African-American
African-American
Hispanic-
American
Subject Taught
English
English
Social Studies
Social Studies
Math
Math
Math
Science
Science
Latin
Years of
Experience
2
10
5
12
Not
Available.
6
22
3
Not
Available.
4
These individuals were not interviewed for the study.
As the table illustrates, the majority of teachers had between three to five years of
experience, more than their counterparts at Excelsior. In terms of demographics,
the majority of the teachers at the school were female and many were of African-
American descent. Having discussed teacher motivations for joining ECA and the
characteristics of the teacher population, the next section examines why parents
chose to send their children to ECA. Much like the varied expectations and goals
articulated by teachers, parents indicated that their hopes for ECA did not
necessarily meld with those of the teachers, principal, or MU.
Data for this table were collected during the 2006-2007 school year.
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Parent Motivations for Choosing ECA
In interviews with parents, the concept of "hope" kept coming up as a
major factor in decision-making. Parents "hoped" that ECA, with its all-male
approach and themes of entrepreneurship and citizenship, would give their
children access to a better life, and the tools to improve their communities. One
mom explained, "ECA is a stepping stone to better schools and a chance in life."
ECA's size and small classes also attracted many of the parents; the majority of
parents hoped that smaller schools would be safer for their children.
On the other hand, most parents, like teachers, did not cite the
Metropolitan United relationship as an important factor. Only one parent said that
she had heard that MU had a good reputation and that its schools had been very
successful. Generally, parents commented that they enjoyed having a choice of
an all-male education. In their own words: "this was the first time that I'd ever
been presented with anything from a school that said that it was all boys!"
Belief in the importance of single sex education and a desire to raise
"successful black men" motivated teachers to work at ECA, and parents to send
their children there. This vision for the school, created and cultivated by Mr.
James, gave the school and its community a clear identity around which to grow.
At the same time, the question remained unresolved as to how an intermediary,
such as MU, fit within this larger vision, since teachers' and parents' awareness,
let alone buy-in, of MU's own vision for education was so weak (Berends,
Bodilly & Kirby, 2002; Horn & Miron, 2000). Having examined why teachers
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worked at EC A, and why parents sent their children there, the next section
focuses on the process by which students become part of the ECA community.
Student Characteristics and Selectivity
ECA opened in Paddington. One of the largest African-American
neighborhoods in the country, and an area notorious for having some of the
highest crime rates in New York City, though rates had improved by 40% since
2005 (Police Department NYC, 2007). In the 2007-2008 school year, ECA
served 147 students in grades 6, 7 and 8, and was in its 3
r
year of existence.
Looking at school demographics, all of ECA's students were male and a vast
majority of the students (90%) were of African American descent; the rest were
Hispanic (8%) or of either American Indian or Asian descent (2%). ECA had
fewer English language learners as compared to citywide averages, while it served
about the same proportion of students receiving special education services, all
whom fell into the least restricted environment and could therefore be serviced
from the general education classroom. ECA's population also consisted of more
students living in poverty than in other schools across the City (NYC DOE, n.d.).
Besides its all-male approach, ECA had instituted clearly defined
admissions criteria, including a review of grades, test scores, attendance, and
punctuality, and an interview. In many ways, this interview functioned as a
screening process, indicating that even within a school focused on achieving
greater educational opportunity, that practices existed which limited which
students would have access to the school. Principal James explained:
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There is an interview process. It's about an hour and a half. It's
more like an orientation. It's a half hour of a shtick by me, with a
quick tour, and then an hour of two things happening at the same
time. One is the kid going through a cycle of four things...They're
in a waiting room, where they just listen, and the Dean is observing
their interpersonal behavior. So they don't know that that's part of
the interview. So if the kid misbehaves, he's got his feet up, if he
curses a lot, if he's whatever, he's toast. Then they go to a place
where they get interviewed. They sit in the back first, and they're
filling out math sheets that get progressively harder while they're
waiting to get called up for the interview. Then the interview is six
questions. It takes 10 minutes. Name some school rules at your
school. Why do you think they have them? Why do you think
those are good rules? And then the fourth thing is they go to a 10-
minute ELA class. They're in class and they have to read
something for a little bit. They write a little bit, they answer
questions. Each of the things takes about 10 or 15 minutes each, so
that's an hour. Meanwhile, the parents have me captive in a room
and they ask me any question they want.
After running applicants through this gauntlet of cognitive and inter- and intra-
personal skills tests, James and the teachers involved in the admissions process
would meet to rank their top choices for the school. As James described, "If we
had 100 applicants, if we had a 100 fifth grade boys pick us either one or two,
they send me the 100 names and I rank those kids one to 100 of the ones I want."
James based this process on the example of the school where he had done his
residency as part of his leadership training program. These selectivity criteria, a
reminder of similar efforts at Excelsior, again support the findings of studies of
charter school admission procedures which revealed that schools used various
sorting mechanisms-from interviews to attendance at orientations-to select for
high performing students and to exclude students receiving special education
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services, English language learners and low academic performers (Ascher,
Fruchter & Berne 1996, Lacireno-Paquet, Holyoke, Moser & Henig 2002, Lopez,
Wells & Holme 2002).
While this process was thorough, James observed that it was limited in
creating a selective student population since "the only glitch in the system is if we
don't have more applicants than seats." If this were the case, the school would
not be able to be as selective in ranking students. He made it clear, however, that
students who behaved very badly or did not show up for the interview would not
be ranked at all. After the first round of admissions, if the school still had room
for more students it participated in subsequent rounds. Finally, if there was still
space in the school at the beginning of the school year, the City could send over
children to make sure that all of the seats were filled.
Teachers were on board with selecting for, in the words of Mr. Saran, the
"right type of student." When probed about what that meant, teachers responded
that they were looking for academically motivated, hard-working students who
are reading on at least a fifth grade level; someone "focused on his education and
not on fooling around." Selecting the "right type of student" signaled that
teachers had bought-into James' vision for the school.
MU, for its part, had its own strong ideas about admissions processes.
Burger felt that for MU schools to be effective, students woul d have to have
chosen the school because they were interested in or curious about its theme.
Thus, he expressed great frustration that after the selection period ended, the City
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kept sending "over the counter students who know nothing about the schools."
Burger commented, "I've been exchanging emails with Klein the last couple of
weeks and saying our schools are taking 'over the counter students,' we're taking
incarcerated kids, we're taking everybody. But don't give me a kid that is not
interested in this theme and doesn't understand the culture of the school." Burger
continued to share that often the "over the counter students" created the most
problems within the school:
We were forced to take into the Metropolitan United Academy for
Space and Exploratory Sciences.. .25 over the counters in August.
And we now have seen them for four years. It's a good school.
It's a fun school, so they didn't leave. But close to 100% of all
disciplinary problems come from those kids. Those kids are not
graduating.
High school graduation rates were one of the criteria factored into accountability
targets, and MU had signed its new 2006 contract with the NYC DOE that
outlined new responsibilities of accountability, as well as new powers. How the
MU network of schools performed, then, would directly reflect on MU's political
capital as an educational reformer, and potentially imperil the status of its contract
with the City, and any plans to scale up in the future. This provided a further
incentive to screen out undesirable students.
Part II: Decision-Making Processes
Having discussed the contextual factors surrounding this case, Part II
describes the power struggles waged between members of the EC A community
and members of MU, particularly those that took place after the 2006 MU-DOE
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contract. As the MU model of governance shifted further along the spectrum
from affiliation to thin management, James and teachers felt increasingly under
siege. Ultimately, the principal and teachers formed a strong allegiance against
MU's influence at the school level, leading to the partnership's dissolution. This
section begins with a discussion of personnel and budget decisions, followed by
an examination of decision-making around curriculum selection and approaches
to teaching and professional development.
Decision-Making Processes: Personnel and Budget
Personnel
Administrative decisions, such as budgeting and facilities, primarily fell
under the domain of the principal, with the exception of faculty and
administrative hiring decisions. These personnel decision were made in concert
by the principal, teachers and MU, though Principal James's involvement was the
most extensive; he coordinated and ultimately hired all new teachers and support
staff. Yet MU, according to their list of non-negotiables, retained the right to
collaborate "on key hires: Principals, assistant principals, mentorship and
partnership coordinators." When probed about why MU wanted to be involved in
hiring decisions, Burger shared that a lot of it had to do with experience. In his
opinion, since all of MU' s principals were first timers they were not experienced
at hiring other administrators, making it important for MU and its staff to act as
another check. Interviews with members of the NYC DOE confirmed the
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presence of a member of the school's intermediary organization on the hiring
committee for assistant principals.
MU also wanted to play a role in hiring teachers, especially during ECA's
first year of operation. Principal James expressed frustration with MU's
involvement, characterizing the situation as having a "double boss," meaning both
the region (NYC DOE) and Metropolitan United. As he explained:
One of the things they had us do in the planning period was that all
of the people that we were considering hiring, Metropolitan United
also wanted to interview. So number one they didn't ask us, they
told us. Number two, it was just illegal. It is against the law they
can't do that. So, it was more of a conversation, so they termed it.
On the positive side, James admitted that MU added, "another objective third
party perspective on these people, which is tremendously helpful." Still, James'
sense of lost control was not unusual. Studies of inter-organizational
collaboration have revealed that less autonomy was a cost associated with
operating in partnership with another organization (Kronley & Handley, 2003,
Smith & Wohlstetter, 2006).
In the second year, MU's involvement in the hiring of teachers declined,
with teachers stepping up to take its place. Teachers began accompanying
Principal James to recruiting fairs, and were involved in interviews. These
teachers expressed pride in this process, feeling like they were advocating on
behalf of teachers that would fit well into the school's culture. Yet James retained
the ultimate responsibility for hiring, firing, and evaluating teachers and
administrators. To this last point, MU observed classes and made comments
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about teachers, through James, but not by working directly with teachers. Thus,
the web of stakeholders involved in making personnel decisions was complex,
though defined by the Principal's ultimate authority. Yet what was not clearly
defined was the question of who had hiring and firing authority over James
himself; MU, the NYC DOE, or both? This lack of clarity would prove a
flashpoint for later conflict, as will be examined in upcoming sections.
Budget
Members of the school community and MU had different understandings
about who had provenance over budgetary issues. When interviewed, unilaterally
all of the teachers agreed that Principal James made those decisions. Similarly,
James agreed that he had had final say when it came to budget and operations
decisions, and if he needed help or advice, he would consult with the leadership
coach supplied to him by the NYC DOE. In sharp contrast, Burger and
colleagues at MU expressed a sense of ownership over their schools, extending to
budget control. Burger commented that if a school were struggling to meet its
academic targets, MU planned to "institute this idea of a school in need of
intervention, and then depending on what the problem is and how pervasive, et
cetera-when they lose control over their budget then they lose the ability to hire
teachers." In this way, Burger saw it as within MU' s purview to reassert control
if necessary, including taking away budgetary control.
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The intermediary's custodial sense of possession, which Burger articulated, and
which was in several ways outlined in MU's contract with the DOE, was not
clearly understood at the school level. This ignorance suggested a lack of
communication over administrative roles and responsibilities at all levels-from
the NYC DOE, to MU, to ECA. This finding can only raise questions about the
empowerment of teachers, parents and even principals within these hybrid -
public/private- schools (Handler, 1996; Scott, 2002)if stakeholders have no
understanding of the underlying rules of the game, how can they be expected to
play well and win? Decision-making related to teaching and learning would
prove equally complicated and, often, ripe for conflict.
Decision-Making: Teaching and Learning
Who had decision-making power and what types of curricular and
teaching decisions they made varied tremendously from the 2005-2006 to 2006-
2007 school years, corresponding to the periods when the school was under the
regional and MU governance structures, respectively. As one teacher exclaimed:
" [this school is] such a good school to choose [to study] because we've been
under the region, we've been in the network and we've been in a partnership.
We've really experienced it all!" Depending on the governance structure, each
group of deci si on-makers possessed its own educational phi l osophi es. Under t he
regional structure, teachers reported following the regional curricular guidelines,
especially in math and English Language Arts, and attending professional
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development opportunities offered by the region. Although many mentioned
trying to implement the theme of the school into their lessons, MU had no role in
the selection of curricula.
While the majority of teachers referred to the region providing
professional development sessions during this period, only one teacher recounted
attending a professional development sponsored by MU for English teachers.
Teachers reported appreciating the guidance provided by the region, especially
since many of them were in their first five years of teaching and wanted lots of
support. However, teachers' experiences were set to change drastically in the
following year, as MU hired managers to do the work of the region.
The contract that MU signed with the NYC DOE stipulated that MU
needed to have a network support team, guided by a network leader, to work with
its schools. Burger understood that his MU team needed to grow to fulfill its role
as manager of schools. He explained:
The biggest thing, of course, is academic preparation. We
didn't have the capacity to address that structure or anything else
in a serious way. We were good advocates. We'd try and find
help for people. We had a small staff of like five people who had
taught mostly. Some of them got public policy degrees and things
like that. But we weren't in a position to really support the schools
in terms of teaching and the teachers. So now we're building a
department to do only that.
In the summer of 2006, a network leader and team were hired Burger to provide
schools with support in curriculum and teaching, accountability, for students with
special needs and finance.
In describing the work of the network team, the new network team leader,
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Shannon Shaken, explained, "we have an achievement coach, a special services
manager, and a business manager.. .think of us as a mini-district, closer to the
locus of control." A white female in her late fifties, Shaken has worked in the
NYC DOE for over 30 years as a teacher and an administrator. Along with these
new staff members, MU also hired a new executive director, Claire Sondheim, a
former superintendent, to guide the organization in its new capacity. In addition
to these personnel changes, MU began researching new curricular programs for its
schools to implement, including Jensen's College Readiness program and the
Education Trust program. By the summer of 2006, the new members of MU were
in place-bringing with them their own educational philosophies and agendas.
From the beginning, the new MU players found themselves at pedagogical odds
with members of the EC A community.
The Learn Now Incident
Teachers and Members of UE recounted "the Learn Now incident" as a
harbinger of the separation to come. In August of 2006, the Executive Director
and Network Team Leader began organizing a summer retreat for MU schools.
However, the planning neglected to take into account that in the spring of 2006,
James and his faculty, with the approval and encouragement of MU, had won an
Learn Now grant. The program focused on teaching academi cal l y at-risk st udent s
of color the necessary study skills to achieve in school, in line with the ECA's
mission. While James had informed MU about the dates of this professional
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development, that information seemed to have been lost in the personnel shuffle
at MU. Thus, dates conflicted, and James chose Learn Now over MU's
professional development session. Recalling the small steps that led to the break-
up, Sandra Styles, the partnership coordinator, shared "I know they [MU leaders]
had brought up that he didn't attend the principal retreat in the summer, but it was
because we were at the Learn Now training that he'd told them about months in
advance. They were unhappy about that." Some teachers also believed that the
new director and network leader of MU had philosophical differences with Learn
Now's approach to teaching and learning. Specifically, that Learn Now focused
on basic study and organizational skills, while the network leader was very "anti
explicit teaching." Similar issues of conflicting educational philosophies would
arise during MU staff members' visits to ECA.
Shannon Shaken's First Visit and Memorandum
Tension between ECA and MU became markedly more acute after
Shaken, the MU network's new leader, first visit to the school. Shaken's review
was negative, souring the relationship between the partners. In fact, every teacher
interviewed for this study mentioned Shaken's visits and her resulting
memorandum; one even carried pieces of it around with him as a reminder.
Describing the visit, Principal James recalled:
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She's visiting classes, she's talking with teachers, she's talking
with kids. She's going to lunch and recess. She's all over the
place. At the end she gives me a 100% negative review, like she
had nothing good to say. So at the end I say, you had nothing good
to say? And she was just like, 'yeah, I know it's hard to hear,' that
was her response.
In her memorandum to James, Shaken spoke critically about the school
environment, approaches to teaching, curricular content, and the overall lack of
classroom libraries, without targeting specific faculty, administrators or support
staff. An excerpt from the memo read:
If you used the ECA Teacher Checklist, with the exception of one
teacher, none would receive a satisfactory. I stated to you that
there was virtually no engagement in any classes I saw. Teachers
do not smile at students and students do not smile much either. I
saw no interactions between individual students and teachers. Not
one student went up to a teacher before or after class. I saw no
relationships developed between students and staffs. The
classrooms are uninviting as are the halls. The walls have little on
them or have prepackaged materials. There are no leveled libraries
and not all classrooms have many books.
Although this is a small excerpt from the memorandum, it accurately captures its
overall tone and style. While Shaken did offer some suggestions toward the end
of the memorandum, such as increasing teachers' knowledge of "pre-adolescent
and adolescent development," she did not provide clear strategies on how to
tackle the many problems she perceived in the school.
Shaken's memo, with James' appended comments, was disseminated to
faculty and staff. The memorandum and subsequent visits made ECA's faculty
and staff very frustrated, particularly because, in their previous experiences
working with the region and with MU, they had received generally positive
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feedback. Ms. Dumas explained: "I don't understand what caused the change, but
it did feel like it was night and day from one year to the next in our relationship
with them."
Teachers posited the change was the result of a shift in governance. Ms.
Dumas continued:
This year MU kind of took on more of the regional role. They
would come in and look at the classes. Except for, with the region,
I always knew what they wanted to see. It's a Learning Point (LP)
region, so if I'm doing LP in here, they're happy. But Metropolitan
United didn't give us any kind of materials so when they came, it's
like, 'I don't know what you're looking for.' They didn't seem to
be looking at boards, they didn't seem-it was-especially coming
from a region five school where it's, like, scrutinizing dates and
things like that, it was very strange. I didn't know what they
wanted.
Teachers felt that they were being held to shifting standards, with no clear
guidance on expectations. Supporting this idea, another teacher shared that she
wanted to know what MU's mandates were for the school. Recall that MU's
interface with the school, up to this point, had been mainly through Principal
James. ECA's teachers had missed the MU orientation at the beginning of the
school year, and could not recall being invited to any MU-sponsored professional
development sessions in the 2006-2007 school year; all of which contributed to
their lack of buy-in (Berends, Bodilly & Kirby, 2002). Ms. Potter explained,
"MU was constantly speaking poorly of us without any kind of support or any
kind of conversations around it. Everything we got passed down from them came
through Mr. James." Rather than sparking positive change, MU's feedback
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served only to galvanize the school community's opposition to the influence of its
intermediary partner.
Outsider versus Insider Status
Generally speaking, school-level stakeholders did not feel like they had
any kind of meaningful interaction with the intermediary partner. For example,
most interviewed parents had never met a MU staff person, aside from the
partnership coordinator. Teachers, for their part, felt just as alienated. As Ms.
Dumas, a middle school teacher, put it, "I do feel like an outsider in this because I
never felt like I, personally, had a relationship with them...There was never any
Metropolitan United and Ms. D. time!" For faculty, the frustration was doubled
by the fact that these administrators were judging their work. Styles, the
partnership coordinator, described this phenomenon, "it felt to me like these
people come in from Midtown and stay here for a day or sometimes an hour or
two and don't really see everything that's going on at this school." With their
headquarters on Park Avenue, MU was not a community-based organization with
roots in and connections to the neighborhood served by ECA. Moving beyond a
general disconnect, teachers particularly attributed these poor interactions to
MU's lack of familiarity with ECA's largely male, African American, low income
student population. Ms. Sendee described this suspicion: "I don't think they
understood all boys. I don't think they understood our racial demographic and I
don't think they understood our neighborhood." These sentiments suggest that as
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an external intermediary, MU's physical and symbolic distance from the schools
and communities it was serving made it difficult to gain buy-in from those same
stakeholders (Honig, 2004, Kronley & Handley, 2003). This loss of credibility
would ultimately contribute to faculty and staff siding with Mr. James in his soon-
to-be conflict with MU.
Drawing the Battle Lines
By the middle of the fall semester, teachers felt that "there was some type
of battle going on between Mr. James and MU." Ms. Styles, the partnership
coordinator, conjectured that MU was particularly upset with Mr. James because
"James would push back on some of MU's ideas and say, that's not going to work
at my school." As rancorous behavior continued, teachers began to wonder about
their fate, the school's fate and the fate of Principal James. Ms. Gilbert
remembered:
For the longest time we didn't know what was going on. We
didn't know if we were leaving the network. We didn't know if
MU was going to get rid of Mr. James. We didn't know. We were
at a loss-at least for a month or two we had no idea what was going
on. And you know we would get little bits of information here
and there, but we didn't really know much.
Part of the reason the faculty and staff did not know what was happening was
because Principal James was often pulled away from the school for meetings with
the district or MU, or was absent due to illness, which teachers attributed to the
stress of the ongoing situation. Teachers estimated that Mr. James was away from
school more than 50% percent of the time.
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Though the staff expressed frustration at the absent leadership, and the
need to work harder to fill the space left by Mr. James, they remained supportive
of their principal. Ms. Sendee recalled:
I remember people saying, if we had to choose we'd rather
not be part of Metropolitan United. If this is what it's going
to mean to be a MU school we don't want any part of it. If
we're going to lose our principal in order to be a MU school
we'd rather keep our principal and not be a MU school.
Remember that the majority of teachers had been motivated to join ECA because
of Principal James' vision, not MU's. Teachers also worked with James on a day-
to-day basis, whereas their interactions with MU were very rare, and generally
negative. It is not surprising then, that they would not be interested in buying into
the new MU modeleven if they could explain what that was.
Part HI: The Dissolution of the Partnership
This section blends data gained from interviews and documents to create a
retrospective story of break-up between Metropolitan United and ECA. While
previous sections looked at teacher and parent responses, this section magnifies
the relationship between the key players in the break-up: Kevin James, the
principal of ECA; members of Metropolitan United; and the Office of New
Schools within the NYC DOE. It highlights how miscommunications, racist and
classist undert ones and t he quest for control of ECA caused the break-up of t he
ECA-MU partnership. Providing a chronology of the break-up, this section
begins with a discussion of the poor initial interactions between James and
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Metropolitan United, and concludes with Principal James choosing to have ECA
leave the Metropolitan United Network at a meeting in The Tweed Courthouse,
the headquarters of the NYC DOE.
Poor Interactions
As previously recounted, by September 2006, negative interactions
between the network team and school staff had begun to sour the partnership. A
new incident exacerbated the divide; teachers and the principal interpreted a
critique of the school made by the network leader as having racist undertones. In
one of her visits, Shaken expressed a concern that the school had too many deans
and staff involved in discipline, giving the school, as she wrote in her
memorandum, "an angry feel." Recounting the conversation, James said, "she's
like yeah, you and those guys, you sort of walk around, you puff up your chest.
You guys should take some conflict resolution classes. And I said the dean is a
conflict resolution specialist. That's what he does. She's like, well you guys are
just, big black guys walking around intimidating everybody." When probed about
whether she wrote those comments down, James continued, "she didn't write it,
but she said it verbally. And I was just like, so what are you saying? She's like,
well of course it's important for them to have black men around but... and I tuned
her out . " Shaken woul d later characterize James as "not budgi ng in his bel i efs, "
yet having deeply offended him, this interaction could not have helped in
overcoming his intellectual objections to the guidance offered by MU. Also, this
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vignette once again underscores the creeping suspicion of the school staff that
MU was an outsider, ill attuned to the needs of the school's demographic
community.
After the critical first memorandum from the network leader, it had been
settled that Principal James would be creating a work plan for improving ECA
due in early October. Yet right before the deadline, James received a letter
requesting an intervention conference with the principal and the principal's union
representation. Surprised that this meeting, usually a precursor to termination,
would be scheduled before he had even handed in his work plan, James contacted
his union representation.
The intervention meeting would surface key tensions within the public-
private partnership, as the limits of MU's authority were revealed. James
described the meeting:
It was the most horrible meeting I have ever been to in my life.
And of course I've been to thousands of meetings. But it was like
they asked me everything conceivable. How many years had I
taught before and what's your instructional vision, what does your
instruction look like. It was all this because they were trying to
assess my capacity to do the job. So near the end of the meeting
my union rep says nothing the whole time. She's writing, taking
notes. So near the end of the meeting she says, so you're not his
grading officer so what does all this mean?
The representative from the principal's union was referring to local legislation
and union regulations that stipulate, among other things, that the community or
high school superintendent, depending on the grade level, was the principal's
rating officer, and was the only official who could evaluate the work of the
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principal. Thus, the representative informed the MU participants, that as they
were not James' rating officers, and, in fact, Sondheim was not even an employee
of the DOE, the community superintendent would need to get involved.
Reflecting on the situation, James commented that the principals' union
was particularly supportive of him because of the view that the Mayor was
"creating quasi-charter schools; which is illegal. He's privatizing public
education in such a way where the people, the community, or our membership no
longer has the authority to supervise these principals and assistant principals."
Recalling the spectrum of control introduced in Chapter 2, MU had quickly
moved from being affiliates of EC A to thin managers with apparent designs on
comprehensive managementa move toward further privatization that had
apparently irked the union representative. The community superintendent visited
EC A in November. James described the superintendent's review of ECA as being
"very middle of the road;" not strong enough to have him fired as principal.
Meanwhile, members of MU were disgruntled with the recent
developments. MU staff had operated under the assumption that they had the
authority to hire and fire at will principals and administrators in their network at
will. However, a close reading of their contract with the NYC DOE revealed that
members of the MU network support team could only "make recommendations to
the DOE regarding principal hiring, termination and incentives decisions." The
DOE would give their recommendations "great weight consistent with the intent
of this agreement when making such decisions," but no explicit authority was
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granted. Yet still, Burger espoused an expanded interpretation of the parameters
of his power. He explained:
We definitely hire them [principals]. The understanding is that I
can hire and fire. That's the understanding. They can't say that,
you know, put it in writing. And so basically what the contract
says is that decisions, our recommendations on those matters will
be given great weight. So the decision is still technically-well,
certainly the Chancellor's. I mean certainly if the Chancellor
doesn't want us to do something, we won't do it. But it also means
that the community superintendents still have to technically do all
that stuff.. .technically Shaken is not the rating officer, but she
really is the rating officer. And our leverage, you know, basically
we've got to persuade them that this is the right thing to do, and
they can persuade us back.
This disconnect between the public, explicit, agreement outlined in the MU-DOE
contract, and the private, implicit "understanding" Burger believed he had with
the Chancellorraises questions once again about the lack of transparency
engendered by privatization-fueled public school reform.
New York City Department of Education Response
Eventually, members of the DOE's Office of New Schools had to step in
to make the ultimate decision about the fate of the partnership. In spite of this
forced compromise, Burger would continue to argue for a broad interpretation of
the powers afforded under MU's contractual agreement with the City. Yet when
interviewed about personnel issues and intermediary organizations, Seymour
Kaufman, an official at the Department of Education, described it as being a
series of "checks and balances." As he described it, members of the intermediary
organization had a seat on the administrative committee, called a C30, which
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makes hiring decisions. This position gave members of the intermediary a say in
hiring, but no role in firing principals. When members of the central offices at the
NYC DOE looked into what was happening at ECA they came up with the
following conclusion, according to Kaufman:
The principal had a very good first year and a strong relationship
with the partner. Early on in the second year the school was
struggling for a variety of reasons. The leader was struggling.
And the intermediary moved, from our perspective, and, again, this
is where we play shepherding, refereeing from our perspective, and
we spent a lot of time with both the principal and the partner. The
partner moved very quickly to ask the principal to be removed, and
ultimately moved faster than we were comfortable with. So
ultimately we made the determination that good principals are hard
to find and that we weren't willing to give up on the investment in
the person and that the school could run without the partner and so,
again, we dissolved the relationship.
Officials at the Office of New schools decided to support Principal James over
MU. At a follow-up meeting, he was given several options for the future; his
choice was to stay on as principal at ECA, but to leave the Metropolitan United
network.
Regardless, Burger still believed that he had always had the option to fire
James from ECA, but had decided not to exercise that right because it would be
politically disadvantageous for him and his relationship with the Chancellor.
Burger explained: "I had authorization to fire him [James]," but decided not to
fire him because it would have displeased the Chancellor and the Office of New
Schools." He added, "Joel [Chancellor Klein] had been getting beaten up in the
press a lot." In Burger's view, his political capital had afforded him a 'back door'
agreement with the Chancellor, and now political expediency was dictating MU's
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restrained response to an unruly principal.
The School Community's Response to the Break
Teachers and parents responded to the news of the break with a mixture of
relief and concern, as they wondered what the future without Metropolitan United
would look like. Although parents had complained about their lack of
involvement with MU, they did like the concept of the school being involved in a
partnership. In particular, that an "outside" partner meant that their "children
were able to get more, and able to get stuff that other children in other schools in
our neighborhoods weren't." Another parent shared similar sentiments: "I kind
of feel the other public schools in the better neighborhoods that their children are
getting everything, and they're not paying for it. And us, the only way that we
can get a good education is you go out there and pay for it." Without knowing
exactly how MU had been supporting the school up to this point, parents were
concerned that the loss of a partner meant that the school might also lose access to
extra resources. Teachers, for their part, seemed to be mostly relieved to have the
ambiguity surrounding their place of employment somewhat resolved.
Post Break-Up: Settling Accounts and Changing Names
In t erms of logistics, breaki ng with Met ropol i t an United directly affected
the school's funding from the Gates foundation, the position of the partnership
coordinator, external partnerships cultivated with the help of MU, and the
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question of the school's name. As previously described, the Gates Foundation's
small school model in NYC revolved around outside organizations receiving the
grant money so that they could act as levers of change at the school level. To this
end, Burger explained, "we fought hard for the Gates money to continue, but
Gates was very firm and very clear. We give the money to the intermediaries, not
the schools. And so they-there wasn't a lot involved anymore, but they lost it."
When asking Principal James how much money the school had lost he said, "I
don't know. I've avoided counting...whatever I didn't spend." Since the school
received $575,000 over a four-year period, James estimated that the school spent
about one third of the Gates money and that MU kept two thirds of it. When
compared to the overall annual school budget of about one million dollars, this
was not a predominant funding stream, but as previously described, was
particularly useful as a funding stream with little "red tape." From a logistical
perspective, MU and James decided on an end date, which they used as a cut off
point for accessing MU funds.
In addition to the cessation of funding streams, the fate of Ms. Styles was
an issue for the former partners as both saw her as a valuable asset to the school.
Burger commented: "The school had a great partnership coordinator and a lot of
programs that were working very well. And we didn't want to see it disrupted.
We didn' t want to see her lose her job." Styles shared the uncertainty of the
moment: "for a little while they [MU] were saying I would stay for a month or
something and then go to MU and work out of their office. And meanwhile
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James and I were talking, saying if that's what they want to do I'm just going to
quit and you can hire me on a DOE line." In the end, MU and Principal James
worked out a way for the partnership coordinator to stay at ECA by effectively
transitioning the partnership coordinator to an NYC DOE position. Recalling the
literature on EMO managed charter schools, the dissolution of the partnership had
translated into a loss of financial and in-kind resources for the school (Horn &
Miron, 2000; Miron & Nelson, 2002; Scott, 2002). This loss of resources created
further tension among teachers, parents and students as they were unsure of how
much money the school had lost and how it would impact its operations (Bulkley,
2005; Conn, 2002; Richards, Shore & Sawicky, 1996; Scott, 2002).
Having settled the issues of funding and the partnership coordinator
position, James turned to ECA's other partnerships. While James had direct
relationships with some partners, others were facilitated through Burger's
networks. James recalled:
One thing that Metropolitan United does for you very early and
does relatively well is establish partnerships for you based on your
theme. I called Ms. Styles into my office two days later and [I]
said, Metropolitan United is going to call and say we're going to
notify your partners that we're no longer with you. We need to
figure out how to preempt that, so let's strategize.
In reaching out preemptively, the school was successful in maintaining
these external relationships. The last issue that ECA had to address was its name.
Following the break, there was pressure to drop Metropolitan United from the
school's title. Describing the climate, one of the teachers shared: "It was not a
pleasant break, so it wasn't like well, you can use our name. It wasn't a marriage
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who splits nicely and you still have your husband's last name. It wasn't a nice
divorce." Immediately following the break, James recalled receiving an email
from the executive director of MU, in which she "copying me on it, copying the
world, said take Metropolitan United off the name of the school." MU's moniker
was officially removed from the school title, stationary and signage as well. This
echoed the experiences of charter schools managed by EMOs or CMOs, who,
when partnerships were terminated, would find the private sector organization
demanding that their name be removed. For example, when the KIPP
organization decided to remove its support from the KIPP Sankofa Charter School
in Buffalo, New York, it became the Sankofa Charter School (Matthews, 2007).
EMOs, CMOs, and now intermediaries did not want their name attached to poorly
performing schools, to the detriment of their "brand" (Scott and DiMartino,
2009b).
Part IV: Sustainability and Scaling Up
The Post Break Experience: Metropolitan United
This final section will examine the impact of the partnership's dissolution
on issues of sustainability and scaling up, beginning with the partner's
perspective, and moving on to the school's. Discussing the post-break
at mosphere, Burger said, "I got rid of a principal last year. It was t raumat i c for
DOE and it was traumatic for my principals. So I've promised that I will not fire
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another principal." The fact that he sensed that principals were "traumatized"
suggested that this break caused a great deal of churn within the MU network.
When the partnership between MU and ECA ended in the winter of 2007,
ECA was left with 16 schools, yet the MU-NYC DOE contract stipulated that MU
must have a minimum of 17. Thus, in the spring of 2007 MU worked with three
new principals to launch more new small schools. Looking forward, Burger
discussed further refining the MU model. Burger shared, "I'm interested in
reaching as many kids as possible which means creating schools, and also means
hopefully creating a model that can be emulated afterwards as a best practice."
To this end, MU was also in the process of designing a curriculum for its schools,
as well as setting up a more defined series of professional development sessions.
Yet, creating a school design model and opening more schools costs
money. During the course of this study, MU operated using primarily
foundational funding. Much of the funding was finite; the Gates support, recall,
would end after four years. Perhaps in recognition of these expiring timeframes,
MU had recently created a development office. Burger also mentioned that MU
was in the process of negotiating with the Gates Foundation to receive more
funding from them to "build out," or scale up, their model. In comparison to, for
example University Edge, which appeared to be moving towards to a fee for
service approach, Met ropol i t an Uni t ed seemed to be setting itself up to mor e
closely resemble an EMO or a charter school management organization (Scott and
DiMartino, 2009b).
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The Post Break Experience: Entrepreneurship and Citizenship Academy
After the break with MU, the members of the EC A community gradually
reunited and began refocusing on their school's original mission. At the same
time, the school was reassigned to a network team within the Empowerment
Support Organization. Although some teachers expressed frustration that the new
professional development was, again, not always attuned to the needs of all-male
instruction, overall, the school's relationship with the network leader was very
positive. In fact, the network leader wrote the following message in May, to the
director of Empowerment Schools: "James continues to be receptive to
suggestions and is eager to provide a quality teaching and learning environment
for his school community.. .We know that there is a lot of work to do at the
school, but we have seen quite a bit of progress since January." With the support
of its new network team, conditions at EC A seemed to be on the upswing.
The Post Break Experience: Parents' Hopes and Goals for Schooling
Parents also had to readjust to the new identity of the school, post-
partnership. When interviewed about their reasons for choosing ECA, many
parents had previously cited the entrepreneurship aspect of the school. Materials
such as the "Frequently Asked Questions" sheet shared with parents at
recrui t ment fairs and orientations, whi ch claimed that classes on Business
Education, Research Skills & Technology, and Community Development would
be conducted at ECA, gave parents the distinct impression that their children
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would have the opportunity to, in the words of the pamphlet, build "basic business
skills on the way to preparing them for a great college and career." Many of these
activities and classes had occurred during the first year when the school had a
business teacher, but in the second year after that teacher left, James had trouble
filling the vacancy. This unfulfilled promise, compounded by the loss of cache in
having lost an intermediary partner, persuaded some interviewed parents to
seriously consider pulling their children from the school if its entrepreneurship
focus did not improve. Harkening back to parents' experiences at Excelsior
Academy, a gap had grown between the marketed image of the school, based on
the principal's original vision, and the more mundane reality of a school
navigating its first few years of existence (Lubienski, 2007). Parents faced a
choice-whether to stay on with ECA and gamble on the school's success, or to
avoid the risk of failure and withdraw their children immediately. Future
enrollment figures will reveal the choices that most parents make, and the
sustainability of ECA's vision for its school without private sector support.
Discussion and Conclusion
A quick initial matching process contributed to a poorly conceived
partnership, where the values of the school and intermediary proved to be
misaligned. This precarious relationship was damaged even further by the
ambiguity that resulted from MU's still-evolving sense of its role in school
governance. Recalling the spectrum of control introduced in Chapter 2: MU
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began its relationship with ECA as an affiliate, yet would shift quite dramatically
towards thin management with desire for comprehensive management in the
second year of the relationship. The school had no say in this shift of control.
Principal James' hasty decision would eventually come back to haunt him, when
core pedagogical disagreements would became so great that the intermediary
actually would actually move to have him replaced outright.
At first, the partner provided some welcome support: funding, the
partnership coordinator, and advice on hiring administrators for the first time. Yet
as the relationship progressed, the intermediary partner created more and more
tension as it tried to assert control over the school. All the same, James and his
staff held tightly to their visions for how best to serve the needs of the school's
student body, even when this amplified the conflict. This toxic soup, made even
worse by poor inter-organizational communication and a penchant for aggressive
moves on both sides, created serious unrest at the school level as parents and
teachers, excluded from decision-making processes, were left to wonder about the
school's fate. Unfortunate byproducts of this public-private partnership included:
an absentee school leader and teachers who were not receiving constructive
feedback and professional development. Rather than creating an innovative,
dynamic and empowered educational community-as promised by the advocates
of this reformthis part nershi p fomented chaos and distraction, to t he detriment of
the school community.
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CHAPTER VII
CROSS CASE ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
Introduction and Overview of the Study
This dissertation presented two case studies of new small public schools
founded in collaboration with intermediary organizations. It explored the school-
intermediary partnership in order to capture the distribution of power among key
stakeholdersprincipals, teachers, parents, members of the intermediary
organizations and district officialsas negotiated in central moments of decision-
making. From the perspective of local stakeholders, the partnerships generated
some positive results; affording schools financial and in-kind support, high
quality professional development sessions for faculty, and access to high-status
social capital. Yet, the key finding from this study is that the actual nature of
these cross-organizational partnerships was misunderstood, as the intermediaries
enjoyed greater power than local stakeholders did in realizing their organizational
missions, confounding the notion of the relationships as partnerships. For the
most part, rather than acting as partners with equal rights and responsibilities,
i nt ermedi ary organizations sought to assume manageri al roles. Thi s caused
confusion and tension as stakeholders struggled to define and, at times, fully
comprehend their roles and responsibilities within the relationship. This turmoil
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contributed to the high teacher attrition rates at UE, and to the eventual
dissolution of the ECA-MU partnership.
In addition to this key discovery about the nature of the intermediary-
school partnership, other important findings emerged from the data. These
findings will be discussed in terms of the micro-politics of partnerships and the
macro-politics of the current school reform arena. Findings on the micro-politics
of partnerships capture the parameters of power within joint venturesto be
discussed by revisiting the spectrum of control introduced in Chapter 2;
contextual factors that impact and influence partnerships; and the competing
public versus private goals of collaborating organizations. Turning to the macro-
politics of school reform, findings consider how choice, test-based accountability,
and marketing- all hallmarks of marketized, decentralized and privatized school
systems- suggest a shift in educational and social policies.
While this study does not draw normative conclusions about the
appropriate role of the private sector in public education, it does make
recommendations for those educational leaders and policymakers interested in
pursuing this policy route that would help to address many of the tensions found
across the two cases in this study. The policy trends of the last five years reveal
that district officials continue to engage in the use public-private partnerships as a
vehicle for school reform. Public school officials in The District of Columbia,
New Orleans and Philadelphia all have contracted with private sector organization
to manage some of their public schools. Given this reality, policymakers,
181
practitioners and educational researchers must engage in a healthy debate about
the benefits and pitfalls of using private sector partners, and particularly
intermediary organizations, to reform public education. Simultaneously, they
must be mindful of the impact of privatization on members of school
communities, in particular on the experiences of teachers and students.
In addition to encouraging a healthy debate about the effectiveness of this
approach to school reform, findings from the case studies highlight specific
recommendations to be used to guide current and potential future policymakers
and practitioners. This dissertation calls for: increased regulations, improved
transparency, and the slowing down of the pace of the reform at both the
intermediary and school levels. Attention to these recommendations will help to
ensure that schools being created not only provide innovative and rigorous
educational experiences, but also promote democratic decision-making and
equitable access to quality public education.
Having provided an overview of this study, the chapter begins with a
discussion of the micro-political findings, beginning with the placement of UE
and MU along the spectrum of control. This placement will illustrate where the
intermediary organizations fit into the larger field of private sector school support
and management organizations, as well as where each organization belongs
within the range of its own sector. Next, the discussion of findings from the data
will continue, in which findings unique to individual cases, and those that
occurred across cases, will be examined. Following, findings related to the
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macro-politics of school reform will be discussed. The dissertation will conclude
with a reflection on implications for further research, and with a series of policy
recommendations.
Micro-Politics of Partnerships
Parameters of Power: The Spectrum of Control Revisited
One outgrowth of this study was the need to understand the place of
intermediary organizations within the larger spectrum of private sector
organizations involved in education services and reform, including New
American Schools design teams, EMOs, CMOs, and more general school
partners. Placement of the two intermediary organizations in this study along the
spectrum of control revealed that they act more like managerseither thin or
comprehensivethan affiliations. The implications of this finding were profound
for school level stakeholders who found themselves with a new boss rather than a
partner in new school development. The spectrum also highlights the particularly
fluid nature of these relationships, exemplified best in the case of MU.
In the conceptual framework of this dissertation, the spectrum of control
was introduced. Recall that this continuum operationalizes power by placing
various types of private sector actors on a spectrum (See Figure 3).
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Manager
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-Ex: EMOS, CMOS
Figure 3. Spectrum of Control.
This spectrum provides a useful way of conceptualizing the interactions between
intermediary organizations and schools. It also provides ideas about the different
paths intermediaries may take in the future, especially after foundational funding
ends.
Along the spectrum, UE fell firmly within the thin management section.
With its set professional development plan, scheduling and design model, UE
sought a high degree of influence in many aspects of Excelsior, particularly in
regards to teaching and learning. On the other hand, UE had limited control over
the school's budget or personnel. It could only mandate how Excelsior spent its
funding, and while UE was involved in hiring principals for UE-network schools,
it did not have the right to fire them. In addition, teachers in UE schools were
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unionized, leading Principal Taylor on many occasions to complain that union
rules limiting the work week were preventing her from fully implementing the UE
model. Finally, UE's cultivation of local and national networks as well as its non-
profit status all supported its position on the spectrum.
Thin management may be the most complicated position on the spectrum
as, in comparison, an affiliate has only a peripheral relationship with the school
and is not held accountable for its success, while comprehensive managers have
ultimate control and thus full latitude in implementing their educational values.
In contrast, "thin managers," as exemplified by UE, have the challenge of striving
to implement a set vision with only limited control over curriculum selection and
professional development. Thus, playing on the capital of its long experience and
reputation, MU influenced Principal Taylor as best it could.
Unlike UE, whose placement along the spectrum remained static, MU
shifted from affiliation to thin management over the course of this study. As an
affiliate, MU maintained loose ties with its schools and no codified design model,
though it did organize based around a core group of ideas about partnerships and
themes. During this period, MU viewed itself as responsible for helping ECA
implement its entrepreneurship and citizenship theme, but did not seek to control
the curriculum or the professional development of teachers. However, in line
wi t h t hi n management , MU had cultivated a local network of schools, and had
also partnered to found ECA under the belief that it had chosen to hire Principal
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James to work in one of its affiliated schools, foreshadowing its move up the
spectrum.
MU's 2006 management contract with the NYC DOE changed its
relationship with ECA. The contract gave MU more explicit control over the
schools in its network, and held it to higher accountability standards for their
success. MU became thin managers; developing a design model, instituting
professional development sessions for teachers, and monitoring approaches to
teaching and learning at the school level. All of these changeswhich took place
without the consent of the entire school community-proved quite problematic, as
MU's vision for schooling clashed with that of the stakeholders at ECA,
distracting them from their daily task of creating a strong academic environment.
With this change, the intermediary partner was claiming power away from those-
principal, teachers and parents-who, according to the theory of privatization,
should have been the ones being empowered by the reform to respond to the
needs of their school's community.
While MU was now, per the terms of the contract, afforded the rights of a
thin manager, its actions and words belied an interest in comprehensive
management. This would prove to be a great burden for principals and teachers
who now experienced the phenomenon of, according to Principal James, "two
bosses." Played out in a constant tug and pull between MU and the NYC DOE,
James would often be pulled away from school, reducing his ability to respond
promptly to the school's needs, and distracting teachers who were concerned
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about the future of the school. It should also be noted that these meetings did not
tend to include teachers and parents, calling into question the reform's underlying
call of empowering parents and students with choice.
The question of financing also defined where the intermediaries placed
along the spectrum. Part of what attracted MU to the 2006 contract was the
opportunity to receive payments from schools for its support; ECA paid $28,000
annually to MU. While MU used this funding to cover its own operational costs,
it also added a complicated wrinkle to the relationship as it was simultaneously
giving and receiving funds to ECA. Part of the rationale for this arrangement
stemmed from the fact that MU was more reliant on outside funding than UE,
which had its own institutional revenue streams. MU, on the other hand, was
relying mostly on the termed Gates funding. Though small in a nominal sense, it
could be argued that this payment was a precedent-setting move on MU's part.
Particularly, that MU seemed to be setting itself up for a future role in school
management, perhaps resembling the models of CMOs or EMOs. The UE
director, for her part, mentioned that after year four UE itself might become a fee
for service provider, more closely resembling the design teams of the New
American Schools. It is unclear whether this will be a successful model for
sustaining the intermediary's mission, and how the intermediary's mission will be
altered when interacting wi t h local schools on a l ong-t erm basis.
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Contextual Factors that Impact and Influence the Partnership
Across the cases, mission alignment, capacity, stakeholder buy-in, and
resources and networks emerged as four contextual factors that impacted the
effectiveness of cross-sectoral collaboration.
Mission Alignment
As the review of literature revealed, both mission alignment and
misalignment are to be expected with inter-organizational relationships. The
research, especially on charter schools, shows that inter-organizational
collaborations are filled with tension. It is, in fact, these inherent tensions that
push organizations to become clearer about their goals. Findings from this study
highlight the various points of alignment and misalignment that emerged from the
intermediary-school joint venture. While issues of alignment and misalignment
occurred at both Excelsior and ECA, each school experienced them differently.
At Excelsior, the principal and members of UE had closely aligned educational
values and goals for schooling. In part, this can be traced to the UE requirements
for prospective partner principals: information sessions, interviews, and a written
test. These requirements slowed down the partnering process, allowing time for
UE and the principal to understand each other's educational goals, and to
ascertain a good match. Recall that ECA's Principal James had originally
considered partnering with UE as well, but was dissuaded because UE was "slow
on the trigger." In contrast, the MU process worked in fast forward: two
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interviews and four days later, a partnership was struck. While James might not
have reasonably anticipated that MU would later decide to move beyond
affiliation towards thin management, the quick partnership certainly raises doubt
about how well the two understood one another's educational goals. This
ambiguity existed throughout their relationship as affiliates, and bloomed into
outright clashes when MU moved to a thin manager role, with airs of
comprehensive management. As MU began to assert a discrete design model,
tension mounted, pedagogical clashes occurred, and the school environment was
rendered chaotic. Misalignment of vision, as reflected in conflicting approaches
to teaching and learning, led to the eventual dissolution of the partnership.
Capacity
Capacity also factored into the success of the partnerships. Neither
principal had prior leadership experience running schools. As a result, their
ability to anticipate what kinds of support they would need from a partner was
limited. At the same time, each of the intermediaries seemed to struggle with its
own capacity issue, especially MU. Founded by a former businessman, MU was
inexperienced in the realm of public education, at the same time as it was plowing
ahead to create a new local paradigm in its 2006 contract with the NYC DOE. Its
naivete woul d lead it to make assumpt i onsl at er proven falseabout t he extent
of its latitude to control key decisions in its network of schools.
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UE, in comparison, had been designing curriculum and studying school
outcomes for many years, even if its small school division was new. As a result,
UE's sense of identity was stable, and it was able to provide a proscribed school
design model which some less experienced teachers found quite helpful. Perhaps
because of the advanced experience of its staff, UE was also much sawier in
promoting change as a thin manager than its counterpart at MU. Using soft
influencing skills, the organization had developed a mutually respectful
relationship with Principal Taylor, who was a regular and willing recipient of
their seasoned guidance. Contrast this with MU, whose harsh criticisms of the
school and clumsy assertions of power served only to galvanize the school in
opposition. Having discussed alignment between the intermediary and the
principal, the study will now turn to alignment between the intermediary and the
school community; just as important and perhaps even more challenging to
cultivate.
Stakeholder Buy-in
Another finding was thus: the success of public-private partnerships
hinged on deep vision alignment among all stakeholders, not just the principal and
intermediary. Yet at both sites, parents and teachers were left out of the
partnership process; pretty remarkable considering that, particularly in MU's case,
the partner effectively added a layer of management to the school. With no direct
window into the hopes, desires, and dreams of the school community, how could
190
intermediaries expect to be sparking the appropriate types of change that would
best service the school community?
In fact, in the case of Excelsior, there was close vision alignment between
the Principal and the partner; Taylor bought into the UE model and supported its
implementation. Excelsior faculty and staff, however, had not, and expressed
concerns about the burden of what they saw as unrealistic expectations set for
their students as well as for themselves in terms of professional development
requirements. Teacher's voices were silenced, which likely contributed to the
50% attrition rate each year.
In comparison, ECA's experiences with alignment and stakeholder buy-in
looked very different. Since MU had no set design model at first, there was less
for the school level stakeholders to be aligned with. In fact, during the first year
of operation, MU's role in curricular decision-making and teaching and learning
was almost nonexistent. As a result, faculty worked with the principal and the
region to build a curriculum that best matched the school's all male population,
and teachers knew very little about the work of MUbesides the presence of the
partnership coordinator. In year two, MU suddenly, in the eyes of school staff,
inserted itself into decisions about teaching and learning in a radically new way.
Teachers resisted and lined up behind the Principal, a reflection that James had
done a strong j ob selling t hem on his approach, and that MU had not.
Across both cases, teachers and parents had limited knowledge of and very
little interaction with the intermediary; they usually knew the partner name, and
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not much else. Parents tended to hope that an external organization would bring
the school additional resources on par with a private school, which initially
attracted them. Yet as to the actual day to day practicalities of what the partners
were contributing, there was a real lack of comprehension. Thus, intermediary-
school alignment remained at the executive levelwith the intermediary and
principaland never trickled down to deeply saturate the school. Yet it is the
deep saturation and corresponding buy-in that numerous studies have shown
allows for the full impact of a partnership, and corresponding attributes of the
partners, to be experienced and implemented by all stakeholders (Berends,
Bodilly & Kirby, 2002, Horn & Miron, 2000).
Resources and Networks
On a generally positive note for the two partnered schools, intermediaries
brought access to extra funding. Each intermediary initially added over $550,000
dollars in seed money to the schools to be used over its first four years of
existence. Principals and teachers commented that these funds were easy to
access and had few stipulations attached to them, making them extra useful as the
schools ramped up operations with all kinds of startup purchasing. This funding
was particularly critical in schools with less than one hundred students in their
first year of existence, where it supplemented the NYC DOE' s per pupil
allocations.
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In addition to financial resources, the partnerships brought other in-kind
resources to the schools. UE was particularly beneficial in this regard; lending
graphic designers to help Excelsior create its school emblem, providing space in
its downtown headquarters for special school events, and running essay and
poetry writing contests to encourage students to think critically and prepare for
college, to name a few examples.
Both intermediaries used political connections to advocate on behalf of
their schools, garnering them special clout. UE's experienced staff members used
their connections within the NYC DOE to negotiate having all of its schools in the
same empowerment support network. In addition, the study observed staff
members using networks to find out information about potential school hires,
providing timely advice. While MU may not have, initially, possessed the same
spread of connections throughout the New York City educational community, it
did enjoy relationships with key figures. Burger's pull with Chancellor Klein and
Teacher's Union head Randi Weingarten, for example, afforded him the
credibility to negotiate an unprecedented management agreement with the City
that, he believed, would result in a more consistent level of support for his
schools. Having now revisited the various contextual factors that most impacted
these partnerships, the next sections explores the complexities that arise when
organizations support t he dual goals of serving the publ i c and pri vat e good.
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The Competing Public and Private Goals Inherent
in Cross-Sectoral Collaborations
While marketing and branding, the commercial ownership of ideas as
products, and non-unionized working conditions are common in the private
sector, they are historically less common in the public sector. As this next section
will highlight, the growth of public-private partnerships created new tensions over
ownership, proprietary rights and union authority.
Ownership and Proprietary Rights
Intermediaries, with their private sector roots, were very interested in
pushing the concept of branding into the public school sphere. Branding was
prominent at both Excelsior and ECA; each being required to have the
intermediary's title on the school name and symbol, uniforms, stationery and
recruitment materials. The University Edge even hired staff to provide its schools
with professional-quality graphic designers, concerned as it was with burnishing
its brand. It could be argued that for new schools such as Excelsior and ECA,
branded materials played an integral role in selling the school. At school
recruitment fairs sharply designed emblems and crafted brochures attracted
students and parents alike. However, parental discord would later arise when the
day to day reality of the schools could not live up to the idealized representation
of the marketing materials. Branding also made exiting the partnership thornier,
as for example, MU demanded that ECA scramble to disassociate its brand,
costing time and money on an issue of arguably minor import to students and
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teachers. Next, this section will examine how issues of proprietorship at
Excelsior were also complicated by the requirement that faculty use curricular
materials and programs that UE owned.
Another theme that kept reasserting itself was the private partners'
proprietorship of intellectual concepts, which underscored their sometimes
conflicting goals of sparking educational innovation in public schools and making
an enterprise-sustaining profit. Best exemplified in the Excelsior case, UE's
specified design model meant that faculty was expected to use the UE owned
Achievement First curriculum and to attend their sponsored professional
development sessions. Tensions emerged when teachers began questioning who
should benefit from innovations to the Achievement First curriculum. A few
teachers expressed dismay that UE expected them to share their improvements,
which could later be packaged and sold by the intermediary to school districts
across the nation. Whereas previously, the thought of commoditizing adjustments
to lesson plans might never have crossed their minds, given the context of the
private actor's involvement these teachers were now understandably wary of
being cheated out of compensation for their work. In fact, similar issues have
emerged within EMO managed charter schools (Horn & Miron, 2000; Miron &
Nelson, 2002). To overcome this boundary to sharing, formal mechanisms will
need to be put into placeeither in an MOU or contractcovering t he rights of the
intermediary and teachers as they relate to intellectual property.
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Teachers at Excelsior also expressed mi sgi vi ngs about t he dual goals of
UE. Specifically, that UE was providing resources and support to the school at
the same time as it was requiring them to use its materials and products-from
Achievement First to College Now. As mentioned earlier, some teachers
complained that professional development sessions that felt like "advertisements"
for UE products. While this was a tension inherent in a public-private
partnership, it could have been mitigated if more transparency existed about UE's
motivations-which included both giving underserved students access to a high
quality education, and selling an educational "product." Such transparency would
have allowed teachers and parents to more fully understand the type of
partnership they were entering into when they selected a UE school, and to head
off the eventual frustration which was apparent in both cases studied. Continuing
this discussion of public versus private goals, the next section looks at the discord
between the partner's design models and the union contract.
Private Sector Ideas and the Union Contract
The frame of reference within which these private and public sector
organizations were used to conducting business tended to be subject to different
rules. Specifically, public organizations were used to the unionized model, while
pri vat e sector organizations were less so. As a result, bot h MU and UE made
decisions that either stretched, or were in outright violation, of union rules. UE's
professional development sessions were scheduled outside of typical union
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regulated hours, though it was seasoned enough to recognize that it could not
impose this requirement. On the other hand, MU, with leadership fresh from the
business world, tried to fire Principal James, clearly overstepping its authority. In
each case, union officials stepped in to advocate for their constituents. This
advocacy was important because, as mentioned earlier, the intermediaries had
access to resources and were well networked, which gave them more power and
clout than individual principals or teachers. This tension over private sector ideas
and the union contract was a direct result of cross-sectoral collaboration, and
illustrates how intermediaries acted more like managers than partners. It also
raises questions about why these organizations had elected to start new small
schools in the first place, instead of charter schools, which often employed non-
unionized staff.
This section explored the micro-politics of inter-organizational
collaboration by examining both the contextual factors that influence partnerships
and the competing public and private goals implicit in these cross-sectoral
relationships. Moving beyond the particulars of partnerships, the next section
looks at macro-political implications of this study for current school reform.
Macro-Politics of the Current School Reform
While much of this dissertation has focused on private-public partnerships,
this reform is representative of underlying policy changes to the overall education
system. As Gewirtz (2002) reminds us, "managers, teachers and schools do not
197
operate in a vacuum" and are in fact highly influenced by the socio-economic
policy of a given period (p. 21). In particular, privatization policies meant to
devolve power to schools, increase accountability mechanisms and infuse market
competition into school systems have clearly altered public education, and cannot
be divorced from this discussion. Findings from this study suggest that this
privatization-led approach has fostered a greater emphasis on outcomes, such as
test scores, than inputs, such as teacher quality. This pressure clearly drove the
schools in this study to compete for the highest achieving students, and to enact
barriers to exclude the rest.
Student selection processes at both ECA and Excelsior exemplified this
highly competitive environment. Excelsior and ECA each used various strategies
to screen for more motivated applicants, from requiring a separate school
application to scheduling interviews. Excelsior's screening strategies proved to
be particularly effective, with a high female population, which tends to test better,
and with test results well outstripping district averages. ECA had no students in
years one and two scoring the lowest score on the ELA exam, and 65% and 74%
of its incoming classes, in fall 2006 and fall 2007, earning high level 3 or 4
scores
22
. These screening practices call into question how "public" the new
intermediary-led school reform movement really is, as in a competitive
envi ronment for funding and political capital, schools were incentivized to
disavow the rights, or "choices" of low-performing and special-needs students.
22
It should be noted that the ELA exam occurred each year in early January, after only four
months of school.
198
These grave equity concerns raise fundamental questions about the
narrowing of the goals for public education. In a competitive, market driven
environment, laser like attention to test scores and attracting "the right," high-
performing students "limits schooling to being the equivalent of a consumer
product rather than a social institution charged with broader social objectives to
service a wider community of citizens" (Anderson, 1998, p. 584). If indeed
current reforms lead to this narrowing, what are the implications of these changes
for society as a whole? First, there are real incentives for public education to
become a system of segregated winners and losers, with principals creaming for
the best students, and students themselves self-selecting. The question arises, are
we, as a society, prepared to let those with the greatest needs fend for themselves?
Should the system allow low-performing students coming from the toughest
economic circumstances, with the least parental support, to be grouped into
schools of "leftovers"? How does this fulfill the universal right to equitable
public education? This is the difficult implication of market-led reform, as
represented in its recent iteration of public-private partnerships, which must be
considered for the future. This discussion of the macro-political impacts of the
current economic-policy climate provides a useful segue into the implications of
this study for research and policy.
199
Implications for Research, and Policy Recommendations
The two cases studied in this dissertation provide lessons for policymakers
and practitioners alike. While a limited sample size cannot be generalizable
across the entire universe of public-private hybrid schools, findings from this
study can bridge theory helping to suggest routes for future research and
providing policymakers with a snapshot of the impact of this reform. There are
also strong implications which, if heeded, could markedly improve this reform's
likelihood of success, as well as an overarching implication which calls into
question the underlying rationale for the reform in the first place. This section
begins with a discussion of areas of future research that were uncovered by the
study, and then moves on to a set of policy recommendations that concludes this
dissertation.
Implications for Research
The recent emergence and proliferation of intermediary organizations into
the school reform arena warrants continued research. In many ways, this
dissertation acts as an exploratory study from which other studies must follow.
This section begins by discussing the need for an overarching mixed methods
study that investigates the role of intermediaries on a larger scale, and then makes
recommendations about distinct aspects of these hybrid schoolssuch as branding
and additional layers of management-that would benefit from further research.
200
It would be useful for policymakers and practitioners, especially as
organizations and principals consider partnering, to understand where an
intermediary organization falls on the spectrum of control. Armed with this
knowledge, principals would be able to predict the parameters of influence they
would need to be willing to negotiate and potentially give ground on, as opposed
to focusing only on the benefits. Understanding the spectrum, and the partner's
placement, would also benefit parents and teachers by providing information
about what to expect in terms of how their voices might be empowered, or
limited, in decision-making with this new partner. This information would be
helpful to all stakeholders-facilitating more closely aligned partnerships. To
achieve this, a comprehensive mixed methods study of intermediaries in New
York City and across the nation needs to be commissioned which combines case
study research with surveys to intermediaries, to place private sector
organizations involved in public education along this spectrum.
Returning to the roles of markets and choice, another study should focus
on the marketing-based approach to attracting students that takes on heightened
importance within an "educational marketplace." Specifically, it would be
interesting to examine the claims made versus reality: if discrepancies exist, what
impact do they actually have? Do parents and students "shop with their feet," per
Friedman (1962), or do they stay in the hopes that the school will improve? Does
this really enhance choice, or does misinformation on the front end and inertia on
the back end dull that choice? To this end, it would be useful to track student
201
attrition, matriculation and graduation rates, to determine if patterns existed
concerning how students selected, and changed, schools.
Turning to another aspect of choice, it would also be useful to track the
attrition rates of principals at these new small schools. With "two bosses," the
bureaucracy-busting principle behind this privatization led reform was turned on
its head-principals seemed to spend an inordinate amount of time managing up.
Considering that the system historically struggles with a shortage of school
leaders, there is a real danger of burning out future leaders, and such an impact
should be explored. At the same time, it was the principals' defining visions and
personalities which had most attracted teachers to the schools in the first place,
certainly not the influence of the intermediary partnership. Yet, the partnership
agreements were negotiated at an entirely executive level, between principal and
partner. So what happens when the principals leave? Will teachers follow, and
will the partnerships, tenuous to begin with, survive?
Further investigations seeking to improve the transparency of the
intermediary-school partnerships, questioning the place of marketization within
public education, and measuring the impact of so-called "empowered choice"
would arm policymakers, practitioners and consumers with better information as
they decide upon the future of this reform.
202
Policy Recommendations
The development of new small schools occurred rapidly in New York
City. From the fall of 2003 to the fall of 2008, over 260 new small secondary
schools were created, the majority of which were co-founded in partnership with
an intermediary organization (NYC DOE, 2008). Findings from this study, while
not generalizable across intermediaries and schools citywide, do address the
theories behind this reform and provide policymakers and practitioners with
guidelines to help them make more informed choices in the future. Advocates of
this reform posit that replacing low performing comprehensive high schools with
new small schools co-founded by private sector organizations will create higher
quality, innovative, efficient school environments that increase academic rigor
and are more responsive to local community needs. Yet findings from this study
reveal that this approach to school reform is falling short. Rather than creating
innovative, rigorous and responsive schools, these partnerships created chaotic
learning environments rife with stakeholder dissatisfaction, confusion, and
distraction. To improve this reform, education researchers, policymakers and
practitioners must: 1) improve transparency, 2) increase regulations and 3) slow
the pace of reform.
Improve Transparency
Additional attention needs to be paid to the transparency of
communication regarding the intermediary and school's relationship. The answer
203
needs to be clear: are intermediary organizations supposed to be partners or
mangers? Identifying and acknowledging the goals and identities of these
organizations will allow for more honest and fruitful relationships. If an
intermediary wants to manage a school rather than partner with it that distinction
needs to be clear to all stakeholders. To help clarify the relationship and protect
all actors, schools and their intermediaries should have formal agreements
outlining the parameters of their relationships. These contracts or MOUs should
outline personnel protocols, budget allocations, branding requirements, curricular
implementation and professional development commitments, proprietary issues
and exiting requirements. Outlining and defining these often ambiguous aspects
of the partnership would clarify the roles and responsibilities of all stakeholders.
While the principal and intermediary are the usual designees on such agreements,
they should also be shared with teachers and parents. This will allow all
stakeholders to be fully informed about the extent and nature of the partnership
and how it will impact their personal and professional experiences. The existence
of such a document at Excelsior would have resolved a lot of the conflict around
teachers' use of UE's Achievement First curriculum and around ownership issues
pertaining to teacher modifications of the Achievement First curriculum. In
addition to increased transparency of organizational identities and goals, their
needs to be mor e publ i c oversight of budget ary and accounting practices.
Another important policy area that emerged from this study of hybrid
schools arises at the interface of accountability and transparency. As private
204
organizations, intermediary organizations were not held to the same standards of
public accountability as public schools. For example, while school progress
reports and quality review results were readily available and were used to judge
the effectiveness of ECA and Excelsior, little information existed on the
effectiveness of the work of the intermediaries. In particular, scant data existed
about the types of innovations intermediaries brought to schools and, in turn, the
impact and sustainability of these changes. Similarly, while school budgets were
available for public review on the NYC DOE schools' websites, information
about how intermediaries allocated and spent their foundational money was not in
the public domain. This made it difficult to discern what percentage of their
funding went to the intermediary's own start-up, facility and personnel costs and
what percentage went directly to schools, raising doubts about the assumption of
superior private sector efficiency in the public school realm.
Overall, policymakers need to provide a window of public oversight into
intermediary organizations. By requiring information related to organizations'
allocations of resources to be published publically, both proponents and detractors
would be able to understand the net impact-in terms of innovation and academic
achievement-that intermediary organizations are providing to schools. This
would help prove, to a more convincing degree, how resources were being used to
leverage change, or not. Either way, greater disclosure is absolutely necessary for
a transparent and equitable public debate.
205
Increase Regulation
The NYC DOE needs to put policies in place that regulate how hybrid
schools advertise themselves and how school admissions policies are enacted in
these new schools. First, there needs to be some oversight over how schools
market themselves to ensure a fair representation. Both ECA and Excelsior's
admissions materials presented visions of fully formed and high functioning
schools. Both enticed students with classes, such as business or technology, and
after school offerings, from chess club to football, which, if planned, were never
implemented during the course of the study. Parents and students were attracted
to the images of the schools portrayed in their admissions materials and made
choices based on this information. If an underlying assumption of the reform is
that parents and students should be informed and critical consumers of schools, it
is only fair to provide them with some assurance that they are receiving valid
information. This is the type of oversight that the NYC DOE could provide.
Intervention is also necessary to monitor how schools are selecting
students to ensure that students' civil rights are not being violated. Policymakers
and practitioners need to stop the gatekeeping processes enacted at the school
level which cream for the best students and crop the rest, to ensure that public
schools are indeed meeting the needs of all citizens.
206
Slow the Pace of Reform
The intersection of new principals, teachers, partners, and reform is a
departure from the small schools movement of the 1970s and 1980s, where
seasoned educators would come together to run a school in their own vision. This
new reform enables and even seems to encourage inexperienced leaders, on both
the school and intermediary side, to create schools from the ground up; a very
challenging job. Reformers need to be careful to avoid scaling up so quickly that
a critical mass of experienced leaders, teachers and partners cannot keep pace.
Rushing to open, as occurred in the NYC DOE, hundreds of new intermediary-
sponsored schools in the span of two years is a recipe for extremely mixed
success. This is particularly true when core pedagogical philosophies are, as in
the case of MU, still in flux. It is tempting to implement reform quickly, but
policymakers would do well to be mindful of the students and families involved
in this experiment in school reform.
Conclusion
As the policy recommendations suggest, improving transparency,
increasing oversight, and slowing the pace of reform will help to create more
democratic, equitable and higher functioning public-private partnerships. Yet, at
the same time as these policy recommendations are being implemented, a healthy
debate needs to occur about the overarching necessity of the reform itself. For,
when viewed through the context of these cases, the theoretical basis of public-
207
private partnerships is called into question. For nearly every posited benefit of the
use of intermediaries in small schools, a countervailing result arose. To wit: the
theory holds that the reform was going to empower teachers and parents, yet the
reality of the case studies showed that they had no window into the intermediary
organization, no audience to espouse their concerns, and were largely cut out of
key decisions. The theory holds that students were supposed to be enticed by
schools that sparked their imaginations, but the cases revealed that students were
misled by false advertisements. The theory holds that schools were going to be
inspired to live up to greater accountability standards, yet the case studies
demonstrated that schools were incentivized to simply select already high-
performing students. The theory holds that the use of intermediary organizations
in small schools was supposed to make education more democratic, yet the case
studies revealed that intermediaries instead encouraged "back-door" deals on
behalf of partnered schools to the presumed detriment of non-partnered
counterparts. The theory holds that intermediaries would spark innovation, yet
the case studies show that instead intermediaries' desire for set school design
models stifled teachers' ability to create their own curriculum. Finally, and the
main implication that ties together all of these findings, the theory holds that the
addition of a private sector partner was going to knock down entrenched layers of
bureaucracy in order to devolve power from government to the school
community, yet the case studies demonstrated that principals instead found
themselves simply dealing with a new layer of management. This gap between
208
theory and practice suggests that more deliberation is needed to fully consider the
impact of intermediary organizations on the small schools movement.
209
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APPENDIX A
PROTOCOLS
Principal Interview Protocol
Time of interview:
Date:
Place:
1) Can you please tell me about your teaching and administrative background?
2) How did this school come to be? What were the motivations behind starting
this school?
3) Tell me about the process of partnering with your intermediary.
a. How did the process unfold? Tell me more about why you selected
intermediary?
b. What were major events or benchmarks in that process?
c. Tell me more about the key participants? How did they participate in the
process?
4) Tell me about your hiring/appointment and evaluation processes.
5) Describe your relationship with the intermediary.
a. How does it impact your role as principal?
b. Tell me about your working relationship with the intermediary liaison?
How is that experience for you?
6) Tell me about a typical administrative meeting.
7) Who makes decisions about staff hiring and evaluations, curriculum choice and
implementation, professional development, student discipline, budgets, facilities
and scheduling?
8) In what ways are parents or community members involved in decision-making?
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9) Tell me more about how the experiences of students and teachers at this school
compare to those of other "traditional" public middle school students and teachers
in New York City.
10) How are students selected for this school?
11) What new challenges have you faced this year?
12) What advice might you offer to a principal contemplating partnering with an
intermediary organization?
13) Are there any useful documents that will help me understand this school?
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Intermediary Interview Protocol
Time of interview:
Date:
Place:
1) Can you please tell me about your management and educational background?
2) Tell me about this organization. Why was this organization started?
3) Why is your organization starting new small schools?
4) How would you describe the process of partnering with the DOE?
5) Tell me more about the selection of the school principal.
6) Tell me about your relationship with the principal.
a) Who evaluates and reappoints the principal?
7) Describe your organization's relationship with the district or region?
8) Describe your relationship with the Bill and Melinda Gates' Foundation?
9) In what ways are you involved in decision-making or shaping school policy?
b) What types of decisions does the intermediary make exclusively?
10) In what ways are parents or community members involved in decision-
making?
11) Tell me about a typical administrative meeting.
12) How are teachers selected and evaluated?
13) How is the curriculum selected?
14) What are your hopes for this school? What are your hopes for the
intermediary?
15) What advice might you offer to other intermediary organizations?
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16) Are there any useful documents that will help me understand this
organization?
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Teacher Interview Protocol
Position of interviewee:
Time of interview:
Date:
Place:
1) Can you please tell me about your teaching background?
2) What were your motivations behind working at this school?
3) Describe your hiring/appointment process.
4) Tell me more about how the experiences of students and teachers at this school
compare to those of other "traditional" public middle school students and teachers
in New York City?
5) How are students selected for this school?
6) Tell me about your relationship with the intermediary.
7) Describe the school's relationship with the intermediary
8) In what ways are you involved in decision-making or shaping school policy?
a. What school level policies do you have control over?
b. Which areas of school policy feel more set by others?
9) In what ways are parents or community members involved in decision-making?
10) Tell me about a typical a faculty meeting.
11) What type of professional development have you received this year?
a. Who organizes the professional development?
b. What is the focus of the professional development?
12) Who makes decisions about staff hiring and evaluations, curriculum choice
and implementation, professional development, student discipline, budgets,
facilities and scheduling?
13) What new challenges have you faced this year?
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14) Are there any useful documents that will help me understand this school?
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Parent Interview Protocol
Time of interview:
Date:
Place:
1) How did you learn about this school?
2) Why did you enroll your child in this school?
3) What do you know about the intermediary organization?
4) Describe your child's experiences at his previous school.
5) Describe your child's experiences at this school?
6) How are parents involved with this school? How are you involved?
7) Does the school have enough resources? [For example: academic support
services, curricular materials, lab and gym equipment]
8) If the intermediary organization ended its relationship with this school, would
you continue to send your child here?
9) What are your hopes for this school?
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District Administrator/ Empowerment Zone Network Leader Interview Protocol
Position of interviewee:
Time of interview:
Date:
Place:
1) Can you please tell me about your teaching and administrative background.
2) Tell me about your relationship with this school.
3) Who was involved in starting this school?
4) How was the district or network leader involved in the partnering process?
5) In what ways is the district or region involved with the intermediary
organization? The school?
6) From your perspective, who is responsible for this school?
7) Tell me about how this school is evaluated.
8) Who do you report back to about the school?
9) How will the relationship between the intermediary organization and the school
change when funding from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation ends?
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APPENDIX B
OBSERVATION PROTOCOL
Name of Event:
Date:
Length:
Location:
1) What is the nature of this event?
2) Who is in attendance? [In terms of positions, no identifiers will be used]
3) Voice description: Observe who speaks, for how long they speak, and the tone
of the conversation
4) Other observations
5) Sketch of room set-up
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APPENDIX C
DOCUMENT REVIEW PROTOCOL
Title of document:
Date acquired:
Place acquired:
Position of document donor:
1) Who created the document?
2) Who was the intended audience(s)?
3) Why was it created?
4) What story does the document tell?
5) Reflections/ Questions raised by the document
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