Social Justice and Human Rights

1. Astudillo vs Board of directors - Manuel

2. SSS Employees vs CA - Recalde
3. People vs Leachon - Rutor
4. PT&T vs NLRC - Sacro
5. EPZA vs CHR San Jose
6. People vs Dulay - Arpafo
7. Letter dated April 18 2011 of PAO Anzo
1. Astudillo vs Board of directors Manuel
1. G.R. No. L-28066 September 22, 1976
PEREGRINA ASTUDILLO vs. THE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS OF PEOPLE'S HOMESITE AND
HOUSING CORPORATION, RAMON P. MITRA,
SALUD O. MITRA, and REGISTER OF DEEDS,
QUEZON CITY
AQUlNO, J .:
Doctrine: The State is committed to promote social justice and
to maintain adequate social services in the field of housing
(Secs. 6 and 7, Art. II, New Constitution). But the State's
solicitude for the destitute and the have-nots does not mean that
it should tolerate usurpations of property, public or private.
The provisions of the PHHC charter (section 11 of
Commonwealth Act No. 648) which provides that the PHHC
should acquire buildings so as to provide "decent housing for
those who may be unable otherwise to provide themselves
therewith" and that it should acquire large estates for their
resale to bona fide occupants - do not justify the act of
squatting on a government-owned lot and then demanding that
the lot be sold the lattet because she does not yet own a
residential lot and house. The latter is not a bona fide occupant
of Lot 16.
FACTS: Mitra applied, in behalf of his minor son, Ramon
Mitra Ocampo, for the purchase of Lot 16, Block E-155 of the
East Avenue Subdivision of the PHHC in Piahan, Quezon
City. After Mitra had paid in full the price, which totalled more
than nine thousand pesos, a final deed of sale was executed in
his favor. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 89875 was issued to
him.
The lot in question is acqually in the possession of Peregrina
Astudillo. She constructed thereon a residential house (a
shanty, according to Mitra). She admits that she has been
squatting on the said lot "uninterruptedly since 1957 up to the
present". She filed with the administrative investigating
committee of the PHHC a request, praying for the cancellation
of the award of Lot 16 to Congressman Mitra and asking the
committee to recommend that it be re-awarded to her. No
action was taken on that request.
Peregrina filed in the lower court her petition against the
PHHC board of directors, the register of deeds of Quezon City
and the spouses Ramon P. Mitra and Salud O. Mitra. She
questioned the legality of the award of Lot 16 to Mitra. She
asked that Lot 16 be sold to her. The lower court dismissed
Peregrina's petition on the grounds that she is a mala fide
squatter and that the sale of Lot 16 to Mitra cannot be assailed
by means of certiorari and mandamus. Peregrina appealed to
this Court.
ISSUE: Whether Peregrina Astudillo has a cause of action to
annul the sale of Lot 16 to Mitra and to compel the PHHC
board to award that lot to her.
HELD: We hold that she has no cause of action to impugn the
award to Mitra and to require that she be allowed to purchase
the lot. As a squatter, she has no possessory rights over Lot 16.
In the eyes of the law, the award to Mitra did not prejudice her
since she was bereft of any rights over the said lot which could
have been impaired by that award. The record does not show,
and Peregrina does not claim, that she is a member of the
Piahan Homeowners Association some of whose members are
"deserving squatters".
In the familiar language of procedure, she was not entitled to
sue Mitra and the PHHC for the enforcement or protection of a
right, or the prevention of a wrong. Those respondents did not
commit any delict or wrong in violation of her rights because,
in the first place, she has no right to the lot.
Peregrina invokes the PHHC charter (erroneously referred to as
section 11 of Commonwealth Act No. 648) which provides that
the PHHC should acquire buildings so as to provide "decent
housing for those who may be unable otherwise to provide
themselves therewith" and that it should acquire large estates
for their resale to bona fide occupants.
Those provisions do not sustain her action in this case. They do
not justify her act of squatting on a government-owned lot and
then demanding that the lot be sold her because she does not
yet own a residential lot and house. She is not a bona fide
occupant of Lot 16.
The State is committed to promote social justice and to
maintain adequate social services in the field of housing (Secs.
6 and 7, Art. II, New Constitution). But the State's solicitude
for the destitute and the have-nots does not mean that it should
tolerate usurpations of property, public or private.
"In carrying out its social readjustment policies, the
government could not simply lay aside moral standards, and
aim to favor usurpers, squatters, and intruders, unmindful of
the lawful and unlawful origin and character of their
occupancy. Such a Policy would perpetuate conflicts instead of
attaining their just solution".
WHEREFORE, the lower court's order of dismissal is
affirmed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
* The PHHC was merged with the National Housing
Commission, which was created under Commonwealth Act
No. 648 (Sec. 14, Executive Order No. 93 dated October 4,
1947; 6 Philippine Annotated Laws 27-28). Section 5 of
Presidential Decree No. 757 dated July 31, 1975 dissolved the
PHHC and created the National Housing Authority.


2. SSS Employees vs CA - Recalde
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION et al (SSSEA) VS. CA and SSS
G.R. No. 85279 July 28, 1989
CORTES, J:

DOCTRINE: Government EEs have right to assemble but
with no right to strike. RTC can assume jurisdiction under its
general jurisdiction since NLRC has no jurisdiction over the
same.

FACTS: The SSS filed with the RTC of Quezon City a
complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction against petitioners, alleging that the officers and
members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and barricaded the
entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking
employees from reporting for work and SSS members from
transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was reported
to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council, which
ordered the strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused
to return to work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result
of the strike.
The cause: SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on
the union's demands, which included: implementation of the
provisions of the old (CBA) on check-off of union dues;
payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and
holiday pay etc. and after the SSS deducted certain amounts
from the salaries of the employees and allegedly committed
acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices.
SSSEA filed a motion to dismiss alleging the trial court's lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter which the RTC denied.
Upon motion of the SSS on February 6,1989, the Court issued
TRO enjoining the petitioners from staging another strike or
from pursuing the notice of strike they filed with the
Department of Labor and Employment on January 25, 1989
and to maintain the status quo.

The position of the petitioners is that the Regional Trial Court
had no jurisdiction to hear the case initiated by the SSS as
jurisdiction lay with the DOLE OR NLRC, since the case
involves a labor dispute.
SSS advances the contrary view, on the ground that the
employees of the SSS are covered by civil service laws and
rules and regulations, not the Labor Code, therefore they do not
have the right to strike. Since neither the DOLE nor the NLRC
has jurisdiction over the dispute, the Regional Trial Court may
enjoin the employees from striking.

ISSUE: Whether or not employees of the Social Security
System (SSS) have the right to strike.

RULING:The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social
Justice and Human Rights, provides that the State "shall
guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization,
collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted
activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law"
[Art. XIII, Sec. 31]. In the Bill of Rights the right of the
people, including those employed in the public and private
sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes
not contrary to law shall not abridged. Thus, while there is no
question that the Constitution recognizes the right of
government employees to organize, it is silent as to whether
such recognition also includes the right to strike.
Resort to the intent of the framers would show that in
recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the
commissioners intended to limit the right to the formation of
unions or associations only, without including the right to
strike. Commissioner Eulogio R. Lerum, one of the sponsors of
the provision that "[tlhe right to self-organization shall not be
denied to government employees" [Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(5)]
explained We know that this problem exist; that the moment
we allow anybody in the government to strike, then what will
happen if the members of the Armed Forces will go on strike?
What will happen to those people trying to protect us? So that
is a matter of discussion in the Committee on Social Justice.
But, I repeat, the right to form an organization does not carry
with it the right to strike.At present, in the absence of any
legislation allowing government employees to strike,
recognizing their right to do so, or regulating the exercise of
the right, they are prohibited from striking, by express
provision of Memorandum Circular No. 6 and as implied in
E.O. No. 180.

Is the SSS covered by the rule? YES. The Court is of the
considered view that they are. Considering that under the 1987
Constitution "The civil service embraces all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters" [Art.IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see
also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the employees in the civil
service are denominated as "government employees" and that
the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an
original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its
employees are part of the civil service and are covered by the
Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes.
This being the case, the strike staged by the employees of the
SSS was illegal.

Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or
associations, either petition the Congress for the betterment of
the terms and conditions of employment which are within the
ambit of legislation or negotiate with the appropriate
government agencies for the improvement of those which are
not fixed by law. E.O. No. 180 vests the Public Sector Labor -
Management Council with jurisdiction over unresolved labor
disputes involving government employees [Sec. 16]. Clearly,
the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the dispute. This being the
case, the RTC was not precluded, in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction under B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, from assuming
jurisdiction over the SSS's complaint for damages and issuing
the injunctive writ prayed for therein.



3. People vs Leachon Rutor
PEOPLE and FARMERS COOPERATIVE AND MARKETING
ASSOCIATION( FACOMA) vs HON LEACHON, G.R. No. 108725-
26. September 25, 1998
PURISIMA, J .:
DOCTRINE:
What is meant by in accordance with law and just and humane manner is that
the person to be evicted be accorded due process or an opportunity to controvert the
allegation that his or her occupation or possession of the property involved is
unlawful or against the will of the landowner; that should the illegal or unlawful
occupation be proven, the occupant be sufficiently notified before actual eviction or
demolition is done; and that there be no loss of lives, physical injuries or
unnecessary loss of or damage to properties. < sec. 10 of Article XIII of the 1987. >
FACTS:
On 8/7/1990, Provincial Prosecutor of Occidental Mindoro filed two separate
informations for violation of P. D. 772, the Anti-Squatting Law, against Noli Hablo,
Edmundo Mapindan and Diego Escala, , before the RTC of Occidental Mindoro
presided over by respondent judge. Trial proceeded, and after prosecution rested its
case, it offered a written offer of evidence. However after almost a year, respondent
judge issued an order dismissing the said case motu proprio on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction. Thereafter, petitioners appealed to SC via a Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus, which was referred to the CA for proper disposition. CA
reversed the appealed Order of dismissal, ordering continuation of trial of subject
criminal cases and accrodinly remanded the case back to the RTC of respondent
judge.However, despite the order of the CA, respondent judge dismissed the
cases motu proprio, once more, opining that P.D. 772 is rendered obsolete and
deemed repealed by Sections 9 and 10, Article XIII of the 1987
Constitution, which provide that urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted
nor their dwellings demolished except in accordance with law and in a just and
humane manner. MR being denied, petitioners came back to SC and filed this
instant petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing subject criminal cases for violation of
the Anti-Squatting Law, and in declaring the said law as repugnant to the provisions
of the 1987 Constitution.

HELD:
NO. The Court holds that respondent judge did not err in so construing the
aforecited constitutional provision. Under the Constitution, what makes the eviction
and demolition of urban or rural poor dwellers illegal or unlawful is when the same
are not done in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner.
PD 772 enjoys this presumption of constitutionality. At the time the respondent
Judge rendered the questioned Decision and issued the orders of dismissal in 1993,
PD 772 was still effective. Neither has this Court declared its unconstitutionality,
notwithstanding the social justice provision of Article XIII sec 9 and sec 10 of the
1987 Constitution, specifically on urban land reform and housing.
Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution, provides:
Section 9. The State shall, by law, and for the common good,
undertake, in cooperation with the private sector, a continuing program
of urban land reform and housing which will make available at
affordable cost decent housing and basic services to underprivileged and
homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas. It shall also
promote adequate employment opportunities to such citizens. In the
implementation of such program the State shall respect the rights of
small property owners.
Sec. 10. Urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their
dwellings demolished, except in accordance with law and in a just and
humane manner.
No resettlement of urban or rural dwellers shall be undertaken without
adequate consultation with them and the communities where they are to
be relocated."
PD 772, on the other hand, states:
Sec. 1. Any person, with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or
taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner, succeeds
in occupying or possessing the property of the latter against his will for
residential, commercial or any other purposes, shall be punished by
imprisonment ranging from six months to one year or a fine not less
than one thousand or more than five thousand pesos at the discretion of
the Court, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. xxx
The reason of respondent Judge in dismissing subject cases is that the eviction of the
accused was not effected in a just and humane manner as the government has not yet
established a resettlement area for the accused, and those who would be evicted have
not been consulted as to the place of their relocation. The import of the Order of
dismissal under scrutiny is that- should the eviction be in a just and humane manner,
the same shall be valid and upheld.
However, respondent Judge erred in predicating the validity or legality of eviction
on the existence of a resettlement plan and area. The constitutional requirement that
the eviction and demolition be in accordance with law and conducted in a just and
humane manner does not mean that the validity or legality of the demolition or
eviction is hinged on the existence of a resettlement area designated or earmarked by
the government. What is meant by in accordance with law and just and humane
manner is that the person to be evicted be accorded due process or an opportunity
to controvert the allegation that his or her occupation or possession of the property
involved is unlawful or against the will of the landowner; that should the illegal or
unlawful occupation be proven, the occupant be sufficiently notified before actual
eviction or demolition is done; and that there be no loss of lives, physical injuries or
unnecessary loss of or damage to properties.
Precisely, the enactment of an anti-squatting law affords the alleged squatters the
opportunity to present their case before a competent court where their rights will be
amply protected and due process strictly observed. By filing the proper
informations in court, complainants have complied with the first requirement of due
process, that is, the opportunity for the accused to be heard and present evidence to
show that his or her occupation or possession of the property is not against the will
or without the consent of the landowner and is not tainted by the use of force,
intimidation, threat or by the taking advantage of the absence of or tolerance by the
landowners.
Furthermore, what gives impetus to P. D. 772 is the constitutional mandate that -
no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law. Far from contravening, P. D. 772 conforms with the 1987 Constitution, in
that it protects the rights of a property owner against unlawful and illegal intrusion.
MOOT AND ACADEMIC
But the foregoing antecedent facts and proceedings notwithstanding, the petition
cannot now prosper because on October 27, 1997, Republic Act No. 8368, entitled
An Act Repealing Presidential Decree No. 772 Entitled Penalizing Squatting and
Other Similar Acts was enacted. Section 3 of the said Act provides that all
pending cases under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 772 shall be
dismissed upon the effectivity of this Act.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED, without any
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

4. PT&T vs NLRC Sacro
[G.R. No. 118978. May 23, 1997]
PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE
COMPANY,
*
petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION and GRACE DE
GUZMAN, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:

DOCTRINE: PT&Ts policy of not accepting or disqualifying
from work any woman worker who contracts marriage is afoul
of the right against discrimination provided to all women
workers by our labor laws and by our Constitution.

FACTS:

PT&T (Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company) initially
hired Grace de Guzman specifically as Supernumerary Project
Worker, for a fixed period from November 21, 1990 until
April 20, 1991 as reliever for C.F. Tenorio who went on
maternity leave. She was again invited for employment as
replacement of Erlina F. Dizon who went on leave on 2
periods, from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991 and July 19, 1991
to August 8, 1991.

On September 2, 1991, de Guzman was again asked to join
PT&T as a probationary employee where probationary period
will cover 150 days. She indicated in the portion of the job
application form under civil status that she was single although
she had contracted marriage a few months earlier. When
petitioner learned later about the marriage, its branch
supervisor, Delia M. Oficial, sent de Guzman a memorandum
requiring her to explain the discrepancy. Included in the
memorandum, was a reminder about the companys policy of
not accepting married women for employment. She was
dismissed from the company effective January 29,
1992. Labor Arbiter handed down decision on November 23,
1993 declaring that petitioner illegally dismissed De Guzman,
who had already gained the status of a regular
employee. Furthermore, it was apparent that she had been
discriminated on account of her having contracted marriage in
violation of company policies.

ISSUE: Whether the alleged concealment of civil status can be
grounds to terminate the services of an employee.

HELD:

Article 136 of the Labor Code, one of the protective laws for
women, explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason of
marriage of a female employee. It is recognized that company
is free to regulate manpower and employment from hiring to
firing, according to their discretion and best business judgment,
except in those cases of unlawful discrimination or those
provided by law.

PT&Ts policy of not accepting or disqualifying from work
any woman worker who contracts marriage is afoul of the right
against discrimination provided to all women workers by our
labor laws and by our Constitution. The record discloses
clearly that de Guzmans ties with PT&T were dissolved
principally because of the companys policy that married
women are not qualified for employment in the company, and
not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.

The government abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature
adopted by PT&T. As stated in the labor code:

ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be
unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of
employment or continuation of employment that a woman shall
not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon
getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned
or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or
otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of
marriage.

The policy of PT&T is in derogation of the provisions stated in
Art.136 of the Labor Code on the right of a woman to be free
from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection
with her employment and it likewise is contrary to good morals
and public policy, depriving a woman of her freedom to choose
her status, a privilege that is inherent in an individual as an
intangible and inalienable right. The kind of policy followed
by PT&T strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose of
marriage as an inviolable social institution and ultimately,
family as the foundation of the nation. Such policy must be
prohibited in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as
discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the land not
only for order but also imperatively required.
It is logical to presume that, in the absence of said standards or
regulations which are as yet to be established, the policy of
respondent against marriage is patently illegal. This finds
support in Section 9 of the New Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 9. The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full
employment and equality in employment, ensure equal work
opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed, and regulate the
relations between workers and employees. The State shall
assure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions
of work x x x.

5. EPZA vs CHR San Jose
Export Processing Zone Authority vs. The Commission on
Human Rights
G.R. No. 101476 April 14, 1992
Grino-Aquino, J.
FACTS:
A parcel of land was sold by Filoil to EPZA. Before EPZA
could take possession of the area, several individuals had
entered the premises and planted agricultural products therein
without permission from EPZA or its predecessor, Filoil. To
convince the intruders to depart peacefully, EPZA, in 1981,
paid a P10,000-financial-assistance to those who accepted the
same and signed quitclaims.

Ten years later, on May 10, 1991, respondent Teresita Valles,
Loreto Aledia and Pedro Ordoez filed in the CHR a joint
complaint praying for "justice and other reliefs and remedies."
Respondents alleged that on March 20, 1991, at 10:00 o'clock
in the morning. Engineer Neron Damondamon, EPZA Project
Engineer, accompanied by his subordinates and members of
the 215th PNP Company, brought a bulldozer and a crane to
level the area occupied by the private respondents who tried to
stop them by showing a copy of a letter from the Office of the
President of the Philippines ordering postponement of the
bulldozing. However, the letter was crumpled and thrown to
the ground by a member of Damondamon's group who
proclaimed that: "The President in Cavite is Governor
Remulla!"
On May 17, 1991, the CHR issued an Order of injunction
commanding EPZA, the 125th PNP Company and Governor
Remulla and their subordinates to desist from committing
further acts of demolition, terrorism, and harassment until
further orders from the Commission and to appeal before the
Commission.
On May 25, 1991, two weeks later, the same group
accompanied by men of Governor Remulla, again bulldozed
the area. They allegedly handcuffed private respondent Teresita
Valles, pointed their firearms at the other respondents, and
fired a shot in the air.
On May 28, 1991, CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista
issued another injunction Order reiterating her order of May
17, 1991 and expanded it to include the Secretary of Public
Works and Highways, the contractors, and their subordinates.
ISSUE:
Does the CHR have jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction or
restraining order against supposed violators of human rights, to
compel them to cease and desist from continuing the acts
complained of?
HELD:
NO. The CHR is not a court of justice nor even a quasi-judicial
body. The constitutional provision directing the CHR to
"provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the
underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or
need protection" may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on
the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of
injunction for, if that were the intention, the Constitution would
have expressly said so. Jurisdiction is conferred only by the
Constitution or by law. It is never derived by implication.
Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services"
mentioned in the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and judicial
remedies which the CHR may seek from the proper courts on
behalf of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a
court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the
writ. A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It
is available only in a pending principal action, for the
preservation or protection of the rights and interest of a party
thereto, and for no other purpose.
Dissenting Opinion:
Padilla, J.:
I dissent for the reasons stated in my separate opinion in Hon.
Isidro Carino, et al. vs. Commission on Human Rights, et al.,
G. R. No. 96681, 2 December 1991. In addition, it is my
considered view that the CHR has the unquestioned authority
in appropriate cases to "provide for preventive measures and
legal aid services to the under privileged whose human rights
have been violated or need protection." (Section 18(c), Article
XIII, 1987 Constitution).
If the CHR can not, by itself, issue any cease and desist order
in order to maintain the status quo pending its investigation of
cases involving alleged human rights violations, then it is, in
effect, an ineffective instrument for the protection of human
rights. I submit that the CHR, consistent with the intent of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution, may issue cease and desist
orders particularly in situations involving a threatened violation
of human rights, which it intends to investigate, and such cease
and desist orders may be judicially challenged like the orders
of the other constitutional commissions, which are not
courts of law under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, on
grounds of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion.

6. People vs Dulay Arpafo
PEOPLE V. DULAY
G.R. No. 193854 September 24, 2012
PERALTA, J .:
FACTS:Appellant convinced AAA to accompany her at a
wake at GI San Dionisio, Paraaque City. Before going to the
said wake, they went to a casino to look for appellant's
boyfriend, but since he was not there, they went to Sto. Nio at
Don Galo. However, appellant's boyfriend was also not there.
When they went to Bulungan Fish Port along the coastal road
to ask for some fish, they saw appellant's boyfriend.
Afterwards, AAA, appellant and the latter's boyfriend
proceeded to the Kubuhan located at the back of the Bulungan
Fish Port. When they reached the Kubuhan, appellant suddenly
pulled AAA inside a room where a man known by the name
"Speed" was waiting. AAA saw "Speed" give money to
appellant and heard "Speed" tell appellant to look for a younger
girl. Thereafter, "Speed" wielded a knife and tied AAA's hands
to the papag and raped her. AAA asked for appellant's help
when she saw the latter peeping into the room while she was
being raped, but appellant did not do so. After the rape,
"Speed" and appellant told AAA not to tell anyone what had
happened or else they would get back at her.
Dulay was convicted by the lower court as principal by
indispensable cooperation in the crime of rape. The SC
however modified the decision and instead convicted Dulayof
violating Section 5 (a), Article III R.A. 7610. As regards Social
Justice, the question is the amount of damages that should be
awarded to the victim.
ISSUE: Whether accused is civilly liable.
HELD: Yes.As to the award of damages, the same must be
consistent with the objective of R.A. 7610 to afford children
special protection against abuse, exploitation and
discrimination and with the principle that every person who
contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to
another shall indemnify the latter for the same. Therefore, civil
indemnity to the child is proper in a case involving violation of
Section 5 (a), Article III of R.A. 7610. This is also in
compliance with Article 100 of the RPC which states that every
person criminally liable is civilly liable. Hence, the amount of
P 50,000.00 civil indemnity ex delicto as awarded in cases of
violation of Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. 7610 shall also be
the same in cases of violation of Section 5 (a), Article III of
R.A. 7610.

7. Letter dated April 18 2011 of PAO Anzo
RE: Letter dated April 18, 2011 of Chief Public Attorney
Requesting Exemption from payment of Sheriffs Expenses


FACTS:
This case stemmed from the February 7, 2011 letter of
Attorney Persida V. Rueda-Acosta, Chief Public Attorney of the
PAO, to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). In the said
letter, she claimed that sheriffs expenses should not be exacted from
PAOs clients since Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9406 (R.A. No.
9406) specifically exempts them from the payment of docket and
other fees incidental to instituting an action in court and other quasi-
judicial bodies.
In its letter dated March 23, 2011 to Atty. Acosta, the OCA
clarified that PAOs clients, notwithstanding their exemption under
Section 6 of R.A. No. 9406 from payment of docket and other fees
incidental to instituting an action in court, are not exempted from
the payment of sheriffs expenses. The OCA explained that sheriffs
expenses, strictly speaking, are not considered as legal fees under
Rule 141 of the Rules of Court since they are not payable to the
government; they are payable to the sheriff/process server to defray
his travel expenses in serving court processes in relation to the
litigants case.
In her letter dated April 18, 2011 to the OCA, Atty. Acosta
maintained that, while sheriffs expenses may not be strictly
considered as a legal fee, they are nevertheless considered as a fee
which is incidental to the filing of an action in court and, hence,
should not be exacted from PAOs clients. She pointed out that the
imposition of sheriffs expenses on PAOs clients would render the
latters exemption from payment of docket and other fees under
Section 6 of R.A. No. 9406 nugatory. Considering that the matter
involves an interpretation of R.A. No. 9406, Atty. Acosta requested
that the same be referred to the Court en banc for resolution.
In its report and recommendation dated September 14, 2011,
the OCA maintained its position that PAOs clients are not exempted
from the payment of sheriffs expenses; it stressed that the P1,000.00
sheriffs expenses are not the same as the sheriffs fee fixed by
Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court and, hence, not covered
by the exemption granted to PAOs clients under R.A. No. 9406. The
OCA further alleged that the grant of exemption to PAOs clients
from the payment of sheriffs expenses amounts to disbursement of
public funds for the protection of private interests. Accordingly, the
OCA recommended that Atty. Acostas request for exemption of
PAOs clients from payment of sheriffs expenses be denied.
Adopting the recommendation of the OCA, the Court en banc denied
Atty. Acostas request for exemption from the payment of sheriffs
expenses.

ISSUE:
Whether or not PAO clients are also exempted from payment
of sheriffs expenses.

HELD: NO.

At the core of this case is the proper interpretation of Section
6 of R.A. No. 9406 which, in part, reads: Sec. 6. New sections are
hereby inserted in Chapter 5, Title III,
Book IV of Executive Order No. 292, to read as follows:
x x x x
Sec. 16-D. Exemption from Fees and Costs of the Suit The
clients of PAO shall be exempt from payment of docket and other
fees incidental to instituting an action in court and other quasi-
judicial bodies, as an original proceeding or on appeal. The costs of
the suit, attorneys fees and contingent fees imposed upon the
adversary of the PAO clients after a successful litigation shall be
deposited in the National Treasury as trust fund and shall be
disbursed for special allowances of authorized officials and lawyers
of the PAO.

The OCA maintains that sheriffs expenses are not covered
by the exemption granted to PAOs clients under R.A. No. 9406
since the same are not considered as a legal fee under Rule 141 of
the Rules of Court. Stated differently, the OCA asserts that the
exemption provided for under R.A. No. 9406 only covers the legal
fees enumerated under Rule 141 of the Rules of
Court. The court agrees.
It is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words
of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary
acceptation and signification, unless it is evident that the legislature
intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words.
Contrary to Atty. Acostas claim, a plain reading of the said
provision clearly shows that the exemption granted to PAOs clients
cannot be extended to the payment of sheriffs expenses; the
exemption is specifically limited to the payment of fees, i.e., docket
and other fees incidental to instituting an action. The term fees is
defined as a charge fixed by law or by an institution for certain
privileges or services. Viewed from this context, the phrase docket
and other fees incidental to instituting an action refers to the totality
of the legal fees imposed under Rule 14116 of the Rules of Court. In
particular, it includes filing or docket fees, appeal fees, fees for
issuance of provisional remedies, mediation fees, sheriffs fees,
stenographers fees and commissioners fees. These are the fees that
are exacted for the services rendered by the court in connection with
the action instituted before it. Sheriffs expenses, however, cannot be
classified as a fee within the purview of the exemption granted to
PAOs clients under Section 6 of R.A. No. 9406.
Sheriffs expenses are not exacted for any service rendered
by the court; they are the amount deposited to the Clerk of Court
upon filing of the complaint to defray the actual travel expenses of
the sheriff, process server or other court-authorized persons in the
service of summons, subpoena and other court processes that would
be issued relative to the trial of the case. It is not the same as
sheriffs fees under Section 10,18 Rule 141 of the Rules of Court,
which refers to those imposed by the court for services rendered to a
party incident to the proceedings before it.

The Court, however, is not unmindful of the predicament of
PAOs clients. In exempting PAOs clients from paying docket and
other legal fees, R.A. No. 9406 intended to ensure that the indigents
and the less privileged, who do not have the means to pay the said
fees, would not be denied access to courts by reason of poverty.
Indeed, requiring PAOs clients to pay sheriffs expenses, despite
their exemption from the payment of docket and other legal fees,
would effectly fetter their free access to the courts thereby negating
the laudable intent of Congress in enacting R.A. No. 9406.
Free access to the courts and adequate legal assistance are
among the fundamental rights which the Constitution extends to the
less privileged. Thus, Section 11, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
mandates that free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and
adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason
of poverty. The Constitution affords litigantsmoneyed or poor
equal access to the courts; moreover, it specifically provides that
poverty shall not bar any person from having access to the courts.
Accordingly, laws and rules must be formulated, interpreted, and
implemented pursuant to the intent and spirit of this constitutional
provision.
Access to justice by all, especially by the poor, is not simply
an ideal in our society. Its existence is essential in a democracy and
in the rule of law. Without doubt, one of the most precious rights
which must be shielded and secured is the unhampered access to the
justice system by the poor, the underprivileged and the marginalized.
Having the foregoing principles in mind, the Court, heeding the
constitutional mandate of ensuring free access to the courts and
adequate legal assistance to the marginalized and less privileged,
hereby authorizes the officials and employees of PAO to serve
summons, subpoena and other court processes pursuant to Section
3,23 Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. The authority given herein by the
Court to the officials and employees of PAO shall be limited only to
cases involving their client.

Authorizing the officials and employees of P AO to serve the
summons, subpoenas and other court processes in behalf of their
clients would relieve the latter from the burden of paying for the
sheriff's expenses despite their non-exemption from the payment
thereof under Section 6 of R.A. No. 9406. The amount to be
defrayed in the service of summons, subpoena and other court
processes in behalf of its clients would consequently have to be taken
from the operating expenses of P AO. In turn, the amount advanced
by PAO as actual travel expenses may be taken from the amount
recovered from the adversaries ofPAO's clients as costs of suit,
attorney's fees or contingent fees prior to the deposit thereof in the
National Treasury.
The officials and employees of the Public Attorney's Office
are hereby AUTHORIZED to serve summons, subpoenas and other
court processes in behalf of their clients pursuant to Section 3, Rule
14 of the Rules of Collli, in coordination with the concerned court.
The amount to be defrayed in serving the summons, subpoenas and
other court processes could be taken from the operating expenses of
the Public Attorney's Office which, in turn, may be taken from the
amount recovered by it from the adversaries of PAO's clients as costs
of suit, attorney's fees or contingent fees prior to the deposit thereof
in the National Treasury, or damages that said clients may be
decreed as entitled to in case of the success of P AO' s indigent
clients.