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Admin and Public Officer
Admin and Public Officer
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORP. (CORN DIVISION), VS. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
[G.R. NO. 191427, MAY 30, 2011]
Doctrines:
The thrust of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is that courts must allow
administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the
specialized areas of their respective competence.
Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense for it is
enough that the party is given the chance to be heard before the case against him is decided.
Facts:
Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA), respondent, found that Universal Robina Corp. failed to comply
with government standards provided under Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
Administrative Orders (DAOs) Nos. 34 and 35, series of 1990. After conducting hearings, the LLDA resolved
that respondent is found to be discharging pollutive wastewater. Petitioner moved to reconsider however the
LLDA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration and reiterated its order to pay the penalties. Petitioner
challenged by certiorari the orders before the Court of Appeals. The appellate court went on to chide
petitioners petition for certiorari as premature since the law provides for an appeal from decisions or orders of
the LLDA to the DENR Secretary or the Office of the President, a remedy which should have first been
exhausted before invoking judicial intervention.
Issue:
Whether petitioner was deprived of due process and lack of any plain, speedy or adequate remedy as grounds
which exempted it from complying with the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Held:
No. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our judicial system. The thrust of
the rule is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their
responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence. The rationale for this doctrine is
obvious. It entails lesser expenses and provides for the speedier resolution of controversies. Comity and
convenience also impel courts of justice to shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress
has been completed.Petitioner had thus available administrative remedy of appeal to the DENR Secretary. Its
contrary arguments to show that an appeal to the DENR Secretary would be an exercise in futility as the latter
merely adopts the LLDAs findings is at best, speculative and presumptuous.
The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity
to explain ones side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense for it is enough
that the party is given the chance to be heard before the case against him is decided.
Facts:
Petitioner, then Branch Manager of GSIS Naga Field Office was administratively charged with Dishonesty,
Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service for approving salary loan
requests of 8 employees who lacked contribution requirements. He was preventively suspended for 90 days.
The counsel of the petitioner explained that his client granted the loan applications under an existing board
resolution, with the approval of the GSIS Vice President; the loans were fully paid, without causing any
prejudice to the service. The GSIS President found him guilty of the said charges. This being petitioners
second administrative offense, the penalty of dismissal was imposed upon him with accessory penalties of
forfeiture of retirement benefits, cancellation of eligibility and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in
the government.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner was denied due process
Held:
No. What negates any due process infirmity is the petitioners subsequent motion for reconsideration which
cured whatever defect the Hearing Officer might have committed in the course of hearing the petitioners case.
Again, the GSIS President duly considered the arguments presented in the petitioners motion for
reconsideration when he denied the same. Thus, the petitioner was actually heard through his pleadings.
Facts:
Respondent Antonio Reyes being then the Head Office LTO was found guilty of grave abuse of misconduct by
the Office of the Ombudsman. Based on the affidavits and testimonies of several witnesses (Penaloza, Amper
and Valdehueza) it was said that Reyes would give the flunkers of the drivers license examination the option of
retaking the examination or to simply pay an additional cost to have a passing grade without actually re-taking
the same. It is alleged that he illegally exacted money from Acero in exchange for the issuance of a driver's
license to the latter, notwithstanding that Acero did not pass the requisite written examination therefor.
On appeal, the CA reversed the said judgment and exonerated him from the administrative charge for
insufficiency of evidence.
Issue:
Whether Reyes was denied due process
Held:
Yes. The 5th requirement (the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected) on the cardinal principles on due process in
administrative proceedings as laid down in the case of Ang Tibay v CIR was not complied with. Reyes was not
properly apprised of the evidence offered against him, which were eventually made the bases of petitioner's
decision that found him guilty of grave misconduct. There is nothing on record to show that Reyes was
furnished with, or had otherwise received, a copy of the affidavits of Pealoza, Amper and Valdehueza,
whether before or after the petitioner issued its Decision.
PUBLIC OFFICERS
JAPSON VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
[GR NO. 189479, APRIL 12, 2011]
Doctrine:
Dishonesty is defined as the concealment or distortion of truth in a matter of fact relevant to ones office or
connected with the performance of his duty. Misconduct is a transgression of some established or definite rule
of action, is a forbidden act, is a dereliction of duty, is willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not
mere error in judgment.
Facts:
Records show that Japson became the subject of a series of inquiries conducted by the SSS linking him to a
profiting venture involving the processing of claims for SSS death and funeral benefits while he was assigned
at SSS Baguio City from 1997 to May 1998. The inquiry was spurred by an affidavit dated October 6, 1999 of
Mina Balanag, who happened to assist her illiterate mother, Cat-an Paanos, in claiming, as beneficiary, the
SSS death benefits of her deceased father, Kitos Paanos. She alleged that because she knew nothing of the
steps for processing of claims for death benefits, a village mate referred her to spouses Boyet and Shirley
Abuan who have been frequenting their village. The spouses Abuans assured that her mother will receive the
benefits in due time since Shirley has a relative working at the SSS Baguio City who also happened to be their
neighbor at Baguio City. Later, she learned that this neighbor-relative turned out to be Shirleys cousin Japson.
Issue:
Whether Petitioner is guilty of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of
the Service whether or not he gained from such acts.
Held:
Yes. Dishonesty is defined as the concealment or distortion of truth in a matter of fact relevant to ones office or
connected with the performance of his duty. On the other hand, misconduct is a transgression of some
established or definite rule of action, is a forbidden act, is a dereliction of duty, is willful in character, and
implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. More particularly, it is an unlawful behavior by the
public officer. The term, however, does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent. In this case,
petitioners acts were found by the Supreme Court as clearly reflecting his dishonesty and grave misconduct.
He allowed the Spouses Abuan to use his position as SSS Senior Member Services Representative to make
their clients believe that he could give them undue advantage over others without the same connection by
processing their SSS claims faster. Likewise, his acts, according to the SC, imply malevolent intent, and not
merely error in judgment. He was aware of what the Spouses Abuan were doing and was complicit in the
same. At the very least, according to the Supreme Court, he failed to stop the illegal trade, and that constitutes
willful disregard of the laws and rules.
jurisdiction is the commission of an offense while in the public service. The SC observed that indeed it has held
in the past that a public officials resignation does not render moot an administrative case that was filed prior to
the officials resignation. However, the facts of those cases are not entirely applicable to the present case. In
the past cases, the Court found that the public officials subject of the administrative cases resigned, either
to prevent the continuation of a case already filed or to pre-empt the imminent filing of one. Here, neither
situation obtains. First, Andutans resignation was neither his choice nor of his own doing; he was forced to
resign. Second, Andutan resigned from his DOF post on July 1, 1998, while the administrative case was filed
on September 1, 1999, exactly one year and two months after his resignation. What is clear from the records is
that Andutan was forced to resign more than a year before the Ombudsman filed the administrative case
against him. If the SC agreed with the interpretation of the Ombudsman, any official even if he has been
separated from the service for a long time may still be subject to the disciplinary authority of his superiors, ad
infinitum. Likewise, if the act committed by the public official is indeed inimical to the interests of the State,
other legal mechanisms are available to redress the same.
contrary to respondents assertions. We find that such limitation is but a necessary consequence of the
privilege of holding a public office and is akin to the other limitations that, although interfering with a
public servants private rights, are nonetheless deemed valid in light of the public trust nature of public
employment.
2. NO. Said prohibition in Section 7(d) is malum prohibitum. It is the commission of that act as defined by
the law, and not the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has been
violated. Therefore, it is immaterial whether respondent has fully paid her loans since the law prohibits
the mere act of soliciting a loan under the circumstances provided in Section 7(d) of R.A. No. 6713.
Whether respondent used her position or authority as a CDA official is of no consequence in the
determination of her administrative liability.
The Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan several information charging the said DPWH officials and
employees with plunder, estafa through falsification of official/commercial documents and violation of Section
3(e), RA No. 3019. On the other hand, the Ombudsman granted the respondents' request for immunity in
exchange for their testimonies and cooperation in the prosecution of the cases filed.
Issue:
Whether the Ombudsman has the authority to grant immunity from prosecution to witnesses
Held:
Yes. RA No. 6770 specifically empowers the Ombudsman to grant immunity "in any hearing, inquiry or
proceeding being conducted by the Ombudsman or under its authority, in the performance or in the
furtherance of its constitutional functions and statutory objectives." In the exercise of his investigatory and
prosecutorial powers, he enjoys the same latitude of discretion in determining what constitutes sufficient
evidence to support a finding of probable cause and the degree of participation of those involved or the lack
thereof. His findings and conclusions on these matters are not ordinarily subject to review by the courts except
when he gravely abuses his discretion, which the petitioner has failed to establish in this case.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IN
FAVOR OF NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ
[GR NO. 191805, NOVEMBER 15, 2011]
Doctrine:
The presidential immunity from suit exists only in concurrence with the presidents incumbency but not beyond.
Facts:
Petitioner Noriel Rodriguez is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan (Kagimungan), a peasant
organization affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP). He claims that the military tagged KMP as
an enemy of the State under the Oplan Bantay Laya, making its members targets of extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances.
Rodriguez was abducted by military men and was tortured repeatedly when he refused to confess to his
membership in the NPA. When released, he filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and and Petition for the Writ
of Habeas Datawith Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and Production of Documents and
Personal Properties. The petition was filed against former Pres. Arroyo, et al. The writs were granted but the
CA dropped Pres Arroyo as party-respondent, as she may not be sued in any case during her tenure of office
or actual incumbency.
Issue:
Whether former Pres GMA should be dropped as respondent on the basis of presidential immunity from suit
Held:
No. As was held in the case of Estrada v Desierto, a non-sitting President does not enjoy immunity from suit,
even for acts committed during the latters tenure; that courts should look with disfavor upon the presidential
privilege of immunity, especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right. The
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission also reveal that the intent of the framers is clear that
presidential immunity from suit is concurrent only with his tenure and not his term. Therefore, former Pres.
GMA cannot use such immunity to shield herself from judicial scrutiny that would assess whether, within the
context of amparo proceedings, she was responsible or accountable for the abduction of Rodriguez
Facts:
Petitioners Board of Inquiry and Discipline found Tanfelix, a Supervising Mechanical Engineer, guilty of grave
misconduct for rigging the bidding for the construction of the wind break fence of its (NPC) thermal power
plants coal storage in Batangas to favor ALC Industries, Inc. He was then ordered by the NPC-BID to be
dismissed from service.
On appeal, the CSC, which initially affirmed the Boards decision, reversed itself and exonerated Tanfelix on
the ground that the misconduct which warrants removal must have direct relation to and be connected with the
performance of official duties. As it happened, Tanfelix was neither a member of the NPC bids committee nor
was there any proof that he influenced the members of that committee.
The NPC appealed to the CA but the court affirmed CSCs ruling.
Issue:
Whether Tanfelix was guilty of grave misconduct
Held:
Yes. Tanfelix wrongfully and unlawfully used his station or reputation to rig the bids for an NPC construction
project. Although he was not a member of NPCs bids committee, he was NPCs supervising mechanical
engineer, a public officer endowed with the duty to protect the public bidding of his organization. Instead, he
misused his position to gain access to information on construction projects that were up for bidding and to the
NPC staffs involved in them. And he misused his reputation and credibility as a ranking NPC officer to bring
the pre-qualified bidders together to hammer out with them a scheme for cheating NPC of a large sum of
money, the result of rigged bids.
Facts:
Petitioner Samuel Ong, as a career employee in the NBI , was appointed as Director III co-terminus with the
appointing authority and would end effectively at midnight on June 30, 2004, unless a new appointment would
be issued in his favor by the President consistent with her new tenure effective July 1, 2004; and until then, he
shall only hold his position in a de facto/ hold over status. On Dec. 1, 2004, the President appointed
respondent Victor Bessat as Director III replacing the petitioner. Ong filed a quo warranto before the CA but
was denied.
Issue:
Whether petitioner has been removed from his position as NBI Director III
Held:
No. Ong lacked the CES eligibility required for the position of Director III and his appointment was co-terminus
with the appointing authority. His appointment being both temporary and co-terminous in nature, it can be
revoked by the President even without cause and at a short notice.
Doctrine:
While a temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible even without the employee's prior
consent, it cannot be done when the transfer is a preliminary step toward his removal, or a scheme to lure him
away from his permanent position, or when it is designed to indirectly terminate his service, or force his
resignation.
Facts:
Respondent Minerva Pacheco, through a Revenue Travel Assignment Order (RTAO) issued by the BIR, was
reassigned as Assistant Chief of Legal Division from Quezon City to San Fernando, Pampanga. The BIR cited
exigencies of the revenue service as basis for such issuance. Pacheco claims that she was constructively
dismissed as her reassignment will result in the reduction of her salary and let her suffer physical burden from
waking up early and coming home late at night. The CSC dismissed her complaint on the ground that she was
not constructively dismissed as she maintained her position as Revenue Atty. IV and was designated as
Assistant Chief. The CA reversed the CSCs decision and ordered her immediate reinstatement with full
backwages and benefits.
Issue:
Whether respondent was constructively dismissed, and, therefore, entitled to backwages
Held:
Yes. The contention of the CSC, through the OSG, that the deliberate refusal of Pacheco to report to work
either in her original station in QC or her new place of assignment in Pampanga negates her claim of
constructive dismissal is untenable. It was legally impossible for Pacheo to report to her original place of
assignment in Quezon City because the said RTAO also reassigned another personnel as Assistant Chief from
Pampanga to QC, the very same position that Pacheco held. It is also erroneous on the part of the CSC to
argue that the subject RTAO was immediately executory, unless otherwise ordered by the CSC, and, thus, it
was incumbent upon Pacheco to report to her new place of assignment. The Court held that it is an order to
detail that is immediately executory and not reassignment. However, Pacheco is not entitled to full backwages
and benefits. It is a settled jurisprudence\ that an illegally dismissed civil service employee is entitled to back
salaries but limited only to a maximum period of five (5) years, and not full back salaries from his illegal
dismissal up to his reinstatement.
Facts:
NEA is a GOCC created in accordance with PD 269 wherein it states that the NEA Board is empowered to
organize or re-organize NEAs staffing structure. When The Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA
Law) was thereafter enacted to restructure the electric power industry, including the privatization of the assets
of the National Power Corp. (NPC), it imposed upon NEA additional mandates in relation to the promotion of
the role of rural electric cooperatives to achieve national electrification. Its Implementing Rules and Regulations
provides that all NEA employees shall be considered legally terminated with the implementation of a
reorganization program pursuant to a law enacted by Congress or pursuant to Sec. 5(a)(5) of PD 269 through
which the reorganization was carried out. The
Issue:
Whether the NEA Board has the power to terminate all the NEA employees
Held:
Yes. Pursuant to PD 269, the termination of all the employees of NEA was within the NEA Board's powers and
may not successfully be impugned absent proof of bad faith to which the petitioners have clearly failed to
establish. It is undisputed that NPC was in financial distress and the solution found by Congress was to pursue
a policy towards its privatization. The privatization of NPC necessarily demanded the restructuring of its
operations. The privatization and restructuring of the NPC was, therefore, done in good faith as its primary
purpose was for economy and to make the bureaucracy more efficient.