European Journal of Social Psychology

Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 35, 361374 (2005)

Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI: 10.1002/ejsp.254
Attitude change in face-to-face and computer-mediated
communication: Private self-awareness as mediator and
moderator
KAI SASSENBERG
1
*, MARGARETE BOOS
2
AND
SVEN RABUNG
2
1
Friedrich-Schiller-University of Jena, Germany
2
Georg-August-University of Go ttingen, Germany
Abstract
Two types of social inuence can be distinguished: norm-based inuence occurs when social identity
is salient and interpersonal inuence occurs when personal identity is salient. In two experiments the
impact of trait and state private self-awareness on interpersonal inuence during face-to-face and
computer-mediated communication (CMC) was investigated. It is argued that interpersonal inuence
resulting from face-to-face communication is stronger than interpersonal inuence resulting from
CMC because CMC heightens state private self-awareness. As a result, it leads to a focus on personal
perceptions and thoughts which in turn reduces attitude change. Experiment 1 suggests that
communication media may inuence attitude change via private self-awareness. Experiment 2 showed
that trait private self-awareness moderates the effect of communication media on interpersonal
inuence. Interpersonal inuence was stronger in face-to-face communication than in CMC only for
individuals higher in private self-awareness. This nding indicates that the impact of situational
variations of a concept can be limited to individuals who have a more elevated sense of private self-
awareness. Copyright # 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Since the invention of the Internet and the World Wide Web, computers have increasingly become a
means for interpersonal communication. Today e-mails, messengers, and chat-rooms form part of
many peoples everyday lives (W3B, 2004; for additional details about Internet use and Internet users
see Nua, 2003); thus the psychological impact of the Internet should be studied. The communication
setting on the Internet differs in several aspects from the usual face-to-face setting (McKenna & Bargh,
2000; Spears & Lea, 1994): First, it is possible to act anonymously on the Internet and to interact with
others who are also (or are not) anonymous to the actor. Second, physical distance or propinquity does
not matter on the Internet. Moreover, physical appearance and visual cues are not present during
communication the way they are in face-to-face settings and communication can take place in physical
isolation. Finally, in asynchronous computer-mediated communication (CMC) there is no need to
coordinate communication in terms of time (so-called entrainment).
Received 18 July 2004
Copyright #2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Accepted 22 October 2004
*Correspondence to: Dr K. Sassenberg, Department of Social Psychology, University of Jena, Jenergasse 8, D-07743 Jena,
Germany. E-mail: kai.sassenberg@uni-jena.de
Social psychologists began in the early eighties to conduct research on the consequences of CMC.
The reduced social cues approachone of the rst modelsassumes that CMC leads to less self-
awareness and in turn to more anti-normative, extreme, and in some cases even rude behaviour (e.g.
Kiesler, Siegel, & McGuire, 1984). Inuenced by this model, differences in social inuence between
face-to-face communication and CMC received substantial attention (e.g. Hiltz, Johnson, & Turoff,
1986; Kiesler et al., 1984; McGuire, Kiesler, & Siegel, 1987; Postmes, Spears, & Lea, 1998; Postmes,
Spears, Sakhel, & de Groot, 2001; Sassenberg & Boos, 2003; Sassenberg & Postmes, 2002; Siegel,
Dubrovsky, Kiesler, & McGuire, 1986; Spears, Lea, & Lee, 1990). In some studiesin line with the
reduced social cues approachmore attitude change was found resulting from CMC than from face-
to-face communication (Kiesler et al., 1984; Siegel et al. 1986); in other studies the pattern was
reversed (McGuire et al., 1987). These inconsistent ndings have lead to two different explanations for
the impact of communication media on social inuence: one based on the distinction between personal
and social identities (e.g. Spears & Lea, 1992) and the other focusing on differences in private self-
awareness. Drawing on both of these explanations, the current research analyses the impact of private
self-awareness as a state affected by media use on social inuence when personal identity is salient.
We also explore whether interpersonal differences in private self-awareness moderate the impact of
different communication media on interpersonal inuence.
INTERPERSONAL VERSUS NORM-BASED INFLUENCE
According to the social identity approach (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, 1987), social inuence takes
different routes depending on whether social identity (i.e. the self-perception is dominated by a group
membership) or personal identity (i.e. the self-perception is dominated by the individuality of a
person) is salient. When a social identity is salient, social inuence is based on the adherence to
ingroup norms as a means of acting as a group member (Turner, 1991). We will call this type of social
inuence norm-based inuence in the remainder of this article. Concerning social inuence under a
salient personal identity the social identity approach is less elaborated. Some researchers have argued
that individuals inuence each other the more the closer their interpersonal bonds are (Postmes &
Spears, 2000; Sassenberg & Boos, 2003); others have suggested that social inuence is driven by the
striving for individual distinctiveness from the communication partners when personal identity is
salient (Spears et al., 1990). Social inuence under salient personal identity will be called
interpersonal inuence in this article.
According to the social identity model of deindividuation effects (SIDE; Reicher, Spears, &
Postmes, 1995; Spears et al., 1990; Spears & Lea, 1992) the distinction between norm-based and
interpersonal inuence can be used to explain the contradictory ndings reported in studies comparing
face-to-face communication and CMC. The key difference stressed by SIDE is the anonymity of the
other group members. When social identity is salient, anonymity in CMC fosters norm-based
inuence, because the social categorization remains more pronounced (i.e. more salient), when no
individuating knowledge is available about the fellow ingroup members compared to situations in
which individuating information is transmitted in non-anonymous communication. Thus, the ingroup
norm is more inuential in CMC compared to face-to-face communication. When personal identity is
salient, anonymity hinders interpersonal inuence, because anonymous communication does not allow
for the development of interpersonal bonds that are the basis for interpersonal inuence. If personal
identity is salient, less interpersonal inuence and less attitude change can be expected in CMC
compared to face-to-face communication. Several studies deliver evidence for the assumed effects on
norm-based inuence and the underlying processes (Lea & Spears, 1991; Lea, Spears, & de Groot,
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2001; Postmes et al., 1998, 2001; Postmes, Spears, & Lea, 2002; Sassenberg & Boos, 2003;
Sassenberg & Postmes, 2002; Spears et al., 1990). There is also some evidence that more interpersonal
inuence results from face-to-face communication than from CMC when personal identity is salient
(Spears et al., 1990). In other studies reporting less interpersonal inuence in CMC (Hiltz et al., 1986;
Kiesler et al. 1984; Siegel et al., 1986) personal identity was most likely salient, because of the
instructions stressing individuality (see Spears & Lea, 1992). However, no measure supporting this
conclusion was taken.
Less attention has been paid to the processes leading to these effects but one potential mediator is
private self-awareness (Kiesler et al., 1984; Spears & Lea, 1992). Although research has shown that
differences in norm-based inuence using anonymous and non-anonymous communication are not
mediated by private self-awareness (Postmes et al., 2001), the role of private self-awareness on
interpersonal inuence in CMC so far has not been addressed.
THE IMPACT OF CMC ON PRIVATE SELF-AWARENESS
Following Prentice-Dunn and Rogers (1982, p. 504) public self-awareness involves [ . . . ] concerns
about ones appearance and the impression made in social situations. [ . . . ] On the other hand, private
self-awareness refers to a focus on personal, more covert aspects of oneself such as perceptions,
thoughts, and feelings (for a detailed discussion of the differentiation between personal and social
identity on the one hand, and public and private self-awareness on the other hand see Abrams, 1990,
1994). Both dimensions vary independently of each other (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975). The
trait component of these two characteristics is the general tendency to pay attention to these aspects of
oneself, whereas the state component refers to the tendency to pay attention to these aspects of
the self in a specic situation. Trait private self-awareness has sometimes been labelled private
self-consciousness (e.g. Fenigstein et al., 1975; Scheier, 1976).
1
We will use the term trait private
self-awareness, because state private self-awareness and trait private self-awareness (i.e. self-
consciousness) refer to the same concept and the same mechanisms.
To address whether self-awareness increased or decreased interpersonal inuence in CMC,
Matheson and Zanna (1988) conducted an experiment in which they compared the impact of CMC
and face-to-face communication on public and private self-awareness. As expected, public self-
awareness was slightly lower in the CMC condition. However, contrary to the predictions resulting
from the reduced social cues approach private self-awareness was even higher after CMC than face-to-
face communication. The latter nding was replicated by Matheson and Zanna (1989; see also Franke,
1997), whereas the impact of communication media on public self-awareness did not receive any
additional empirical support. The explanation given for the differences in private self-awareness is that
people are less distracted from themselves by their communication partners during CMC than during
direct communication due to physical isolation. Taken together, these are good reasons to believe that
CMC fosters private self-awareness whereas public self-awareness is most likely not affected by the
communication media.
1
We decided to use private self-awareness (self-consciousness) in the broad sense as it was originally dened (e.g. Fenigstein
et al., 1975) and not to use the subscales introduced by Watson, Headrick, and McKinney (1989), because these subscales seem
to be hard to replicate (Bernstein, Teng, & Garbin, 1986; Britt, 1992) and most of the CMC research refers to the broad concept
of private self-awareness (e.g. Kiesler et al., 1984; Matheson & Zanna, 1988).
Self-awareness and CMC 363
Copyright # 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 35, 361374 (2005)
PRIVATE SELF-AWARENESS AS A MEDIATOR
If higher private self-awareness leads to less interpersonal inuence, it can explain why there is
reduced interpersonal inuence when communication is computer-mediated rather than face-to-face.
Indeed, Scheier (1980) found that individuals with higher levels of private self-awareness state
opinions that are closer to their personal values. Moreover, Froming and Carver (1981) found that
higher private self-awareness as a trait leads to less compliance (for studies on state private self-
awareness see Froming, Walker, & Lopyan, 1982). Hence, due to the higher private self-awareness
resulting from CMC, this medium should result in less interpersonal inuence compared to face-to-
face communication.
Matheson and Zanna (1989) conducted a study that addressed the role of private self-awareness for
media differences in attitude change. They compared the impact of a written persuasive message after
face-to-face communication or CMC interaction that was related to a different topic than the written
message. As predicted, participants showed higher self-awareness after CMC than after face-to-face
communication. However, different communication media did not lead to differences in attitude
change or communicator evaluation. One problem with this study is that Matheson and Zanna (1989)
varied the group membership (ingroup vs. outgroup) of the communication source as an additional
experimental factor (for a similar study see Postmes et al., 2001). Therefore, we think these studies
focused on norm-based inuence and not on interpersonal inuence. Nevertheless, the lower levels of
private self-awareness in CMC compared to face-to-face communication and the above mentioned
evidence for the impact of private self-awareness on interpersonal inuence led us to the following
predictions: CMC leads to less interpersonal inuence and higher levels of private self-awareness than
face-to-face communication. Moreover, we expect that the effect of the communication media on the
interpersonal inuence will be mediated by state private self-awareness.
PRIVATE SELF-AWARENESS AS A MODERATOR
Besides the notion that state private self-awareness might mediate the impact of communication media
on interpersonal inuence, it could at the same time be argued that it moderates the relation between
both variables. Contrary to the mediation, the moderation is not driven by situational differences in
private self-awareness but by interpersonal differences.
Spielberger (1966; Spielberger, Jacobs, Russell, & Crane, 1983) dened trait anxiety as the
frequency of the occurrence of state anxiety. In other words: the features of a situation affect a state
more, the more a person has the respective trait. Applying this reasoning to the current context, we
hypothesized that the impact of the communication media (a manipulation of state private self-
awareness, e.g. via CMC) on interpersonal inuence is especially strong for individuals high in trait
private self-awareness.
In fact, Webb, Marsh, Schneiderman, and Davis (1989) found some evidence supporting this
prediction, even though their research was not about private self-awareness but pertained to self-
monitoring. Self-monitoring is dened as the extent to which people monitor and regulate their
cognitions and interpersonal behaviour on the basis of situational instead of dispositional, represented
information (Snyder, 1979, 1987). Hence, individuals low in self-monitoring show similarities to those
high in private self-awareness as both are strongly guided by their attitudes and self-image and not
likely to adjust to situational cues. Webb et al. (1989) found that individuals low in self-monitoring are
more reactive to manipulations of private self-awareness than individuals high in self-monitoring. This
364 Kai Sassenberg et al.
Copyright #2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 35, 361374 (2005)
nding suggests that trait private self-awareness (similar to self-monitoring) is likely to show an
interaction with situational manipulations of private self-awareness (such as face-to-face commu-
nication versus CMC) in its impact on responses that are generally related to private self-awareness.
Hence, we predict that trait private self-awareness moderates the relationship between the commu-
nication media and interpersonal inuence. We expect that for individuals with high trait private self-
awareness CMC will result in less interpersonal inuence than face-to-face communication, whereas
this difference should disappear or even show a reversed pattern for individuals with low private self-
awareness.
THE CURRENT RESEARCH
In Experiment 1 we tested the hypothesis that private self-awareness mediates the effect the
communication medium has on interpersonal inuence. In addition to the face-to-face communica-
tion and the CMC condition we included a control condition in which participants communicated
face-to-face but in which their private self-awareness was heightened. This additional condition was
included in the design to test the impact of state private self-awareness on interpersonal inuence
separately from other differences between face-to-face communication and CMC. If state private
self-awareness is the crucial psychological state (a) differing between both communication media
and (b) leading to differences in interpersonal inuence, the results in the control condition should
match those in the CMC condition even though participants in the control condition communicate
face-to-face. Statistically, our prediction is best tested by a -2 (face-to-face) 1 (CMC) 1 (control)
contrast.
We conducted Experiment 2 to test the prediction that trait private self-awareness moderates the
impact of communication media on interpersonal inuence. We therefore assessed dispositional
differences in private self-awareness 1 week before the experimental session took place. In the
experimental session, participants communicated with each other either via computers or from face-
to-face. As in the rst experiment, we measured the degree of interpersonal inuence in each
experimental condition.
Both experiments made use of instructions that are usually employed to make personal identity
salient in order to study interpersonal inuence. More precisely, the participants were addressed as
individuals working with each other but never as a group member. Unlike experimental manipulations
of social identity salience, the instructions did not refer to any shared social categories that might be
relevant for the participants. Moreover, the experimenter asked participants to introduce themselves to
each other by their rst name and participants received no group number or label.
EXPERIMENT 1PRIVATE SELF-AWARENESS AS A MEDIATOR
Method
Design and Participants
An experiment with three conditions (CMC, face-to-face, and control) was conducted. Thirty-six
female and 18 male undergraduate students of the Georg-August-University of Gottingen (Germany)
with a mean age of 23 years (range 1942) took part in this experiment.
Self-awareness and CMC 365
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Procedure
Participants were invited to the lab in groups of three. First, they were asked to work on a problem-
solving task individually. A shortened version of the NASA survival tasks (Bottger & Yetton, 1988)
was administered. Participants rank ordered nine items concerning their importance for survival
on the moon. After they had reached an individual decision, they were asked to introduce
themselves to each other in order to make their personal identity salient. Then they discussed the
rank ordering within the group until they reached a common decision. In the CMC condition a chat
tool was used for the communication. Participants rst names were used as nicknames in the chat.
In a separate window that was visible on the screens to all three participants they could rank order
the items (a so-called shared whiteboard). In the other two conditions face-to-face communication
was used and the rank order of the items had to be noted down on a sheet of paper. There was no
time limit.
After the discussion concerning the survival task, participants in the CMC and the face-to-face
condition were asked to discuss an unrelated topic for another 5 min. In the control condition
participants listened to a relaxation tape that was based on biofeedback during these 5 min. Biofeed-
back relaxation is very likely to strengthen private self-awareness, because it directs attention to
physiological and psychological processes. Then participants in all three conditions were asked to
solve the NASA task again individually. Afterwards, participants received a questionnaire assessing
state private self-awareness (PSA, M. Appel, K. Sassenberg, & M. Boos, poster presented at the 41st
Conference of the German Psychological Society, Dresden, Germany, 1998). The scale consisted of
seven items (e.g. In this moment I am very much aware of my intentions, 0.66; internal
consistency reported by M. Appel et al., poster presented at the 41st Conference of the German
Psychological Society, Dresden, Germany, 1998: mean 0.77). This scale is an adaptation of the
private self-consciousness subscale from the self-consciousness questionnaire by Fenigstein et al.
(1975) for the assessment of situational variations in private self-awareness. Finally, participants were
debriefed and thanked.
Two indices for interpersonal inuence were computed. First, a measure of disagreement was
taken. This index was similar to the one employed by Hiltz et al. (1986) in a rank order task. More
precisely, the mean of the absolute differences between the rank position in the group decision and in
the individual decision after the discussion for each item was computed. Second, the change in the
individual rank order induced by the group discussion was computed (attitude change). This is the
most common index in research on interpersonal and social inuence in CMC (e.g. Kiesler et al., 1984;
Sassenberg & Boos, 2003; Spears et al., 1990). The score was computed by averaging the mean of the
absolute differences between the rank position in the individual decision before and after the
discussion for each item (range 0 to 4.44). Thus, higher amounts of disagreement indicate less
interpersonal inuence, whereas higher values of attitude change indicate more interpersonal
inuence.
Results
It was predicted that PSAwould be higher in both the CMC and the control condition compared to the
face-to-face condition. To test this prediction an analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the condition as
an independent factor and PSA as criteria was computed. As hypothesized, the PSA differed between
conditions, F(2, 51) 4.78, p 0.013,
2
0.158. A planned contrast (2 1 1) revealed that the PSA
was higher in both the CMC condition (M2.47) and the control condition (M2.15) than in the
face-to-face condition (M1.78), t(51) 2.75, p 0.008,
2
0.129.
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Moreover, we expected that the face-to-face condition would lead to more interpersonal inuence
than the other two conditions. This prediction was tested with two ANOVAs, one for the disagreement
and one for the attitude change. The effect of the condition on the disagreement was in line with the
hypothesis, F(2, 51) 3.40, p 0.041,
2
0.117. A planned contrast (2 1 1) showed that there was
less disagreement in the face-to-face condition (M0.25) than in the control condition (M0.39) and
the CMC condition (M0.51), t(51) 2.40, p 0.020,
2
0.102. For the attitude change measure,
the ANOVA and the planned comparison (2 1 1) did not show a signicant impact of the condition,
F(2, 51) 0.38, p 0.687,
2
0.015, t(51) 0.73, p 0.470,
2
0.010. However, attitude change
was (descriptively) higher in the face-to-face condition (M1.23) than in the control condition
(M1.14) and the CMC (M1.02).
To test whether changes in private self-awareness mediate the relationship between the commu-
nication media and interpersonal inuence, we conducted a mediation analysis following the
regression based procedures suggested by Baron and Kenny (1986). The procedure was applied to
both dependent measures even though attitude change was not affected by the experimental condition
to a signicant extent. Following Kenny, Kashy, and Bolger (1998), a test for a mediation can be
applied even though the direct effect is not signicant because indirect effects can be signicant
without a signicant direct effect.
The test for indirect effects was restricted to the CMC and the face-to-face condition. In the CMC
condition (0) PSA was higher, 0.43, p 0.009,
2
0.213,
2
and disagreement was lower,
0.39, p 0.019,
2
0.157, than in the face-to-face condition (1). However, no mediation of
the effect of communication media on disagreement by PSA was found, Sobel t(35) 0.28,

2
0.002. No difference concerning attitude change was found between both communication media,
0.15, p 0.388,
2
0.022, but a trend towards an indirect effect of the communication media on
attitude change via PSA was found, t(35) 1.53, p 0.067, one-tailed,
2
0.063. The regression
weight of the communication media on attitude change is reduced from 0.15 to 0.003 by
including the PSA ( 0.33) into the regression (see Figure 1). The indirect effect of the
experimental condition via both interpersonal inuence measures on PSA was not signicant, both
Sobel ts <1. Similar results are found, when the CMC and the control condition are combined before
the mediation analyses are computed.
Figure 1. Path diagram (with standardized regression coefcients from multiple regression analysis) of the
mediating role of state private self-awareness. The impact of media on attitude change without including private
self-awareness into the regression is given in brackets (Experiment 1; CMC and face-to-face condition only)
2
All effect sizes for from multiple regressions have been computed using the General Linear Model module of SPSS12 and are
therefore partial
2
s.
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Discussion
The aim of Experiment 1 was to show that less interpersonal inuence in CMC compared to face-to-
face communication occurs due to the higher state private self-awareness produced by CMC. As
predicted group members disagreed more with their groups decision after CMC than after face-to-face
discussions. There was no direct effect of the experimental condition on the other measure of
interpersonal inuence (attitude change). One reason why we failed to nd this effect might be the
moderating impact of trait private self-awareness discussed in Experiment 2. However, there was a
trend towards the predicted indirect effect of the experimental condition on attitude change. The
absence of this pattern for disagreement, which at the same time was more strongly inuenced by the
communication media, suggests that different processes might underlie the effect of communication
media on the amount of disagreement. The impact of communication norms might be stronger for
disagreement than for attitude change (e.g. after agreeing on a group decision one does not diverge
from it). Moreover, the range of the disagreement was very restricted in our sample (01.33,
SD0.32) compared to the range of attitude change (03.11, SD0.70) and the possible range of
the index (04.44). This also works against the predicted indirect effect.
Compared to the face-to-face condition, the amount of disagreement was higher in the control
condition where private self-awareness was manipulated independently of the communication media.
Combined with the trend towards an indirect effect of communication media on attitude change via
private self-awareness, this result suggests that private self-awareness is the crucial psychological
effect of CMC leading to less interpersonal inuence than in the case of face-to-face communication.
One might object that the indirect effect was only marginal and that private self-awareness was not
manipulated during but after the communication in the control condition. However, the converging
evidence from the mediation analysis and the manipulation of the mediator in our opinion compensate
for these limitations.
In general, the results of Experiment 1 are in line with earlier research providing evidence that
private self-awareness lowers attitude change (Froming et al., 1982; Froming & Carver, 1981; Scheier,
1980). The current research extends earlier ndings because a trend towards mediation of the impact
of situational factors on attitude change via private self-awareness to our knowledge has not been
shown so far (see also Postmes & Spears, 1998). Froming et al. (1982) used the presence of a mirror
and an evaluative audience to manipulate private and public self-awareness. The manipulations
showed the predicted effects on compliance. However, it was not tested whether or not differences in
self-awareness mediated these effects. Scheier (1980) and Froming and Carver (1981) tested the
impact of dispositional self-awareness on the public expression of personal beliefs and compliance
respectively. Although they found effects of private and public self-awareness on their dependent
measures, they focused on long lasting interpersonal differences. This aspect of private self-awareness
will be addressed in Experiment 2.
EXPERIMENT 2PRIVATE SELF-AWARENESS AS A MODERATOR
The current experiment addresses the role of trait private self-awareness as a moderator of the impact
of communication media on interpersonal inuence. As explained above, results from Webb et al.
(1989) suggest that trait private self-awareness moderates the effect of communication media on
interpersonal inuence (i.e. lower interpersonal inuence resulting from CMC compared to direct
communication). More precisely, we predict that this effect is stronger, the higher trait private self-
awareness is.
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The quasi-experimental test of this hypothesis overall was very similar to Experiment 1, but
some adjustments were made. Only a CMC and a face-to-face condition were included, because no
control condition was necessary to test the prediction. In some groups the CMC discussion in
Experiment 1 lasted more than 1 h. In order to be able to schedule sessions adequately and to run the
study in a more economical way, the rank order task was replaced by a dilemma similar to the most
frequently used dilemma in other research on interpersonal inuence (e.g. Postmes et al., 2001;
Sassenberg & Boos, 2003). Additionally, the participants were informed about the xed time frame for
their discussions. However, no group was actually told to stop before the members reached a common
decision.
Method
Design and Participants
A quasi-experiment with trait PSA and communication media (CMC vs. face-to-face) as independent
variables was conducted. Thirty-eight female and 15 male undergraduate students of the Georg-
August-University of Gottingen (Germany) with a mean age of 25 years (range 1943) took part in this
experiment.
Procedure
Participants were approached in a university building and asked to ll out a questionnaire. This
questionnaire consisted of 20 items including a six item scale measuring trait PSA. The items were
taken from Merz (1986), a German translation of Fenigstein et al. (1975; e.g. I watch signals from my
body carefully., 0.69; internal consistency reported by Merz, 1986: 0.91). Hence, the state
PSA measure used in Experiment 1 and the trait PSA measure administered in this experiment are
based on a similar set of items, but were phrased differently to capture the stable versus variable
component of PSA, respectively. Each item had to be rated on a 6-point scale ranging from 1 for I do
not agree to 6 I entirely agree. The mean PSA score was M4.61 (SD0.65). The remaining 14
items were distractor items asking for team work experience and computer knowledge.
After a time period of at least 1 week the experimenter called the participants in order to arrange the
main experimental session. Participants were invited in dyads or groups of three and randomly
assigned to the experimental conditions. The group size did not differ between communication media
conditions,
2
(1, N53) 0.01,
2
<0.001. Participants were asked to answer the following dilemma
item (administered in German):
A woman has cancer in an advanced state. There is no chance of recovery. Her physician Dr D.
knows that she will die in less than six months time. She suffers from indescribable pain but is so
weak that a strong pain killer would most likely lead to her immediate death. She has visions and
is crazed with pain. Several times she asks Dr D. for help in order to commit a medically assisted
suicide. She explains to him that she cannot stand the pain anymore and that she has to die soon
anyway. Dr D. knows that euthanasia is illegal; nevertheless he considers fulfilling the womans
desire. Please try to imagine that Dr D. asks you for advice. At which probability level of Dr D.s
help remaining undetected by others, would you suggest him to follow the womans wish?
Participants in the face-to-face condition rst noted down probability levels on different tables in
the same room. After the participants completed the dilemma item they were then seated around a
Self-awareness and CMC 369
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common table and asked to introduce themselves to each other in order to make their personal identity
salient. Then they discussed their decision with the other participant(s). In the CMC condition
participants were seated in front of a computer in separate rooms. A chat tool was used to discuss the
dilemma item concerning the probability levels. Again, participants rst names were used as
nicknames. Participants were asked to come to an agreement after 40 min. In the face-to-face
condition participants were asked to stop the discussion as soon as possible with a maximal duration
of 10 min. The shorter time interval was chosen to compensate for the fact that typing is roughly four
times slower than speaking (e.g. Kiesler & Sproull, 1992). Face-to-face discussions were recorded by a
video camera. The video camera might have heightened public self-awareness, but the content of the
CMC was likewise logged and the study was said to be about communication processes in groups.
Hence, participants in both conditions most likely were aware to the same extent that researchers were
interested in their (communication) behaviour. After the discussion individual attitudes were assessed
once again. Finally, participants were debriefed and thanked.
Dependent Measure
The attitude change computed as the absolute difference between the attitude before and after the
discussion served as a measure of interpersonal inuence. Higher values indicate more interpersonal
inuence.
Results
To test the impact of communication media on attitude change, a t-test was computed. Both conditions
did not differ signicantly in the amount of attitude change, t(51) 1.14, p 0.261,
2
0.025. On a
descriptive level the difference was in the same direction as found in Experiment 1. Attitude change
was higher after face-to-face discussions (M26.85) than after CMC discussions (M20.19). The
attitude change was slightly higher in three person groups (M26.84) than in dyads (M15.63),
t(51) 1.79, p 0.080,
2
0.059. Therefore, group size was included as an additional factor in the
analyses reported below.
Concerning the impact of trait PSA, it was predicted that PSA would not directly impact attitude
change but that an interaction between PSA and communication media would occur. More precisely,
we expected that individuals with high trait PSA would react more strongly to the manipulation of
communication media (i.e. show less attitude change in CMC compared to face-to-face communica-
tion) than individuals with low trait private self-awareness. To test this prediction, a multiple
regression with attitude change as criteria and Media, Trait PSA and a Media Trait PSA interac-
tion-term as predictors was computed. To control for the impact of group size, Group Size, the Group
Size PSA interaction and the Group Size Media interaction were included in the analysis.
Following Aiken and West (1991) the interaction terms were computed as a product of the centred
PSA measure and the media variable (0 for CMC and 1 for face-to-face communication). Overall
the predictors explained a signicant amount of variance, adj. R
2
0.15, F(6, 46) 2.51, p 0.035.
Neither the Group Size ( 0.21, p 0.116,
2
0.053), nor the Group Size Self-Awareness
interaction ( 0.26, p 0.118,
2
0.052), nor the Group Size Media interaction ( 0.24,
p 0.100,
2
0.058) contributed signicantly to the explanation of the attitude change. Moreover,
there was neither a main effect of Media ( 0.06, p 0.678,
2
0.004), nor a main effect of PSA
( 0.02, p 0.917,
2
<0.001). Most importantly, the Trait PSAMedia interaction testing our
hypothesis was signicant ( 0.34, p 0.017,
2
0.118). Again following the suggestions of
370 Kai Sassenberg et al.
Copyright #2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 35, 361374 (2005)
Aiken and West (1991), we computed simple slopes of attitude change depending on communication
media for individuals with (a) mean PSA, (b) 1 SD above mean, and (c) 1 SD below mean. The pattern
in Figure 2 indicates that for participants with high PSA (b), face-to-face communication leads to more
attitude change than CMC ( 0.39, p 0.043,
2
0.086). However, for individuals with mean (a)
( 0.06, p 0.678,
2
0.004) or below mean (c) PSA ( 0.27, p 0.196,
2
0.036) no
signicant difference between face-to-face communication and CMC occurred. Thus, the hypothesis
that individuals with high PSA responded more strongly to media differences than individuals with
low or average PSA was supported.
Discussion
Experiment 2 sought to test whether trait private self-awareness moderates the impact of commu-
nication media on interpersonal inuence. As predicted we found that face-to-face communication
leads to more interpersonal inuence than CMC only for participants with high trait private self-
awareness. For participants with medium or low private self-awareness no signicant difference was
found. For participants with low trait private self-awareness the pattern even reversed on a descriptive
level. They show a slight trend towards more interpersonal inuence after CMC than after face-to-face
communication. Taken together, the trait private self-awareness moderates the impact of commu-
nication media on interpersonal inuence.
How can one explain the interaction between trait private self-awareness and communication
media? Trait private self-awareness is the tendency to pay attention to ones perceptions, thoughts, and
feelings in general. During face-to-face communication attention is distracted by the interaction
partner(s). However, during CMC this distraction by others behaviour is reduced and cognitive
resources are available to also pay attention to oneself. This opportunity will more likely be used by
individuals who generally have the tendency to pay attention to personal aspects of themselves than by
individuals who do not have this general tendency. In other words, only individuals with high trait
private self-awareness will allocate their attention to themselves in CMC. Hence, only for these
individuals does CMC lead to less interpersonal inuence than face-to-face communication.
Figure 2. Attitude change as a function of communication media and level of trait private self-awareness (PSA;
Experiment 2)
Self-awareness and CMC 371
Copyright # 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 35, 361374 (2005)
CONCLUSION
The current research has shown that the interplay between the communication media on the one hand
and private self-awareness on the other hand, impacts interpersonal inuence in two ways. First, state
private self-awareness mediates the inuence of the communication media on interpersonal inuence.
CMC strengthens the private self-awareness of the communication partners compared to face-to-face
communication. There is some evidence that the heightened private self-awareness, in turn, might
reduce the interpersonal inuence. This nding can be explained by the fact that in CMC less attention
is used by the interaction partners because only written communication is available. Therefore, in
CMC more attention might be paid to ones own personal values, perceptions, and attitudes. Hence,
interpersonal inuence might become less likely to occur. Second, trait private self-awareness
moderates the impact of the communication media on interpersonal inuence. For individuals with
high private self-awareness CMC results in less interpersonal inuence than face-to-face commu-
nication. This effect does not occur for individuals low in trait private self-awareness.
Further research on interpersonal inuence in CMC should address the moderated mediation resulting
fromthe interplay of both effects reported here. The mediation of the impact of the communication media
on interpersonal inuence by state private self-awareness is most likely moderated by trait private self-
awareness. Research in personality psychology has argued that the general tendency to show a certain
behaviour (i.e. a trait) is a precondition for the impact of many situational variations. At the same time the
respective state will mediate the impact of the situation. Scaring someone mildly (situational variation)
will only make very anxious people (trait) run away and this is so because they feel anxiety (state)
(Spielberger et al., 1983). This state-trait interaction as well as the overall pattern of the ndings presented
here (i.e. a state mediating an effect that the respective trait moderates) has rarely been addressed in social
psychological research. However, this pattern may certainly also apply to other domains. Hence, the
current approach might also be a model for research in other domains.
In sum, the current results indicate that the impact of communication media on interpersonal
inuence is mediated by state private self-awareness and moderated by trait private self-awareness.
Earlier research has shown that media differences in norm-based inuence are mediated by the
salience of the social categorization (Lea et al., 2001; Postmes et al., 2001). These different mediators
point to the fact that different characteristics of CMC are responsible for the stronger norm-based
inuence and the weaker interpersonal inuence found in CMC compared to face-to-face commu-
nication. The salience of self-categorization is inuenced by the higher levels of anonymity in CMC,
whereas the differences in state private self-awareness are most likely elicited by the physical isolation
in CMC (Spears & Lea, 1994). All in all the current ndings contribute to the understanding of the
effect of CMC on social inuence.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
We are grateful to Kai J. Jonas, Andrew K. Woltin, Heather Smith, and three anonymous reviewers for
their extremely useful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
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