This document summarizes an article that examines how Hyundai Motor Company adapted the Toyota Production System (TPS) at its factories in South Korea. It discusses how Hyundai initially emulated TPS but then modified it over decades to develop its own production model, called the Hyundai Production System (HPS), to better suit its unique circumstances. The article analyzes Hyundai's experience as an example of how the adoption of TPS involves a complex process of organizational learning and interpretation during which the system is adapted and mutated.
This document summarizes an article that examines how Hyundai Motor Company adapted the Toyota Production System (TPS) at its factories in South Korea. It discusses how Hyundai initially emulated TPS but then modified it over decades to develop its own production model, called the Hyundai Production System (HPS), to better suit its unique circumstances. The article analyzes Hyundai's experience as an example of how the adoption of TPS involves a complex process of organizational learning and interpretation during which the system is adapted and mutated.
This document summarizes an article that examines how Hyundai Motor Company adapted the Toyota Production System (TPS) at its factories in South Korea. It discusses how Hyundai initially emulated TPS but then modified it over decades to develop its own production model, called the Hyundai Production System (HPS), to better suit its unique circumstances. The article analyzes Hyundai's experience as an example of how the adoption of TPS involves a complex process of organizational learning and interpretation during which the system is adapted and mutated.
Publisher: Taylor & Francis Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK International Journal of Production Research Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/tprs20 The mutation of the Toyota Production System: adapting the TPS at Hyundai Motor Company B.-H. Lee a & H.-J. Jo b a Department of Sociology, Chung-Ang University, 221 Heuksuk- dong, Dongjak-gu, Seoul, 156-751, South Korea b Department of Sociology, Ulsan University, San 29, Moogeo 2- dong, Nam-gu, Ulsan, 680-749, South Korea Published online: 04 Jul 2007. To cite this article: B.-H. Lee & H.-J. Jo (2007) The mutation of the Toyota Production System: adapting the TPS at Hyundai Motor Company, International Journal of Production Research, 45:16, 3665-3679, DOI: 10.1080/00207540701223493 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00207540701223493 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the Content) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content. This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms- and-conditions D o w n l o a d e d
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International Journal of Production Research, Vol. 45, No. 16, 15 August 2007, 36653679 The mutation of the Toyota Production System: adapting the TPS at Hyundai Motor Company B.-H. LEE*y and H.-J. JOz yDepartment of Sociology, Chung-Ang University, 221 Heuksuk-dong, Dongjak-gu, Seoul, 156-751, South Korea zDepartment of Sociology, Ulsan University, San 29, Moogeo 2-dong, Nam-gu, Ulsan, 680-749, South Korea (Revision received January 2007) This paper examines the spread of Toyota Production System (TPS) through Korea, by focusing on the experience of Hyundai Motor Company. Drawing upon data obtained from field research, this case study interprets the adoption of TPS from an evolutionary perspective, arguing that the emulation of TPS should not entail adopting TPS as Toyota developed it originally, but to develop ones own production model. Over the past 40 years, Hyundai has developed its own production model, Hyundai Production System (HPS), initially emulating TPS, followed by re-interpreting and modifying TPS to adapt to the companys unique circumstances. HPS is a mutated form of TPS. The Hyundai case reveals that the adoption of TPS involves a complex evolutionary process of organizational learning and interpretation. This case sheds light on the possibility of various paths toward lean production, and demonstrates that both external and internal factors combine to form a complicated causal chain, influencing the mutated emulation of TPS and generating a certain pattern of path-dependence in the evolutionary trajectory of a particular production model. Keywords: Toyota Production System; Lean production; Production model; Evolutionary perspective; Hyundai Production System 1. Introduction Over the past two decades, Toyota Production System (hereafter TPS) has demonstrated its overwhelming influence on the restructuring of the global auto industry. This is evidenced by the on-going perception of TPS as a world-class manufacturing model (Oliver et al. 1994) or as the machine that changed the world (Womack et al. 1990), along with the unceasing advances of Toyota amid global auto market competition. Indeed, TPS has disseminated beyond Toyota to other automakers and other industries across the globe, in various formstransplants, joint ventures, imitative learning, and consultancies (Ebrahimpour and Schonberger 1984). *Corresponding author. Email: bhlee@cau.ac.kr International Journal of Production Research ISSN 00207543 print/ISSN 1366588X online 2007 Taylor & Francis http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals DOI: 10.1080/00207540701223493 D o w n l o a d e d
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Korean automakers are no exception in attempting to adopt TPS, so as to enhance their operational efficiencies and business competitiveness. TPS has been a prime benchmark for Korean automakers, as they have viewed Toyota as an exemplary role model, having made successful inroads into global markets. At Korean auto plants, however, TPS has not been adopted as it has been in Japan; rather, it has been implemented in a deviant form, for various socio-contextual and organizational reasons. Our study aims to examine the spread of TPS through Korea, by focusing on the experience of Hyundai Motor Company (hereafter Hyundai). Hyundai is an interesting case for several reasons. First, Hyundai is a Cinderella case, having been transformed from a low-cost domestic manufacturer in a developing country in the early 1970s to a major player in the contemporary global auto market. At present, it is ranked among the top 10 automakers worldwide, both in terms of production volume and product quality (Jo 2005). Second, Hyundai is a sterling example that can shed light on how TPS has been implemented by Korean manufacturing firms, since it represents a typical or influential business model in terms of corporate governance, management style, market strategy, and labour relations in Korea. Third, given the fact that little research literature exists on the transferability of TPS to developing countries, the Hyundai case may contribute to broadening our understanding of the logistics, advantages and disadvantages of TPS dissemination to non-Western, developing economies. Finally, Hyundai presents a good case to figure out key factors constraining and shaping the adoption of TPS at a recipient site, thereby helping to further develop a theoretical framework to analyse the processes and outcomes of TPS diffusion in new venues. Drawing upon data obtained from field research, this case study attempts to interpret the adoption of TPS from an evolutionary perspective. Our argument is that the emulation of TPS should not entail adopting TPS as Toyota developed it originally, but to develop ones own production model, thereby creating a competitive edge versus global competition. In this vein, our case study offers a new lens through which to view the spread of TPS across borders. In field work which was conducted between April 2005 and March 2006 we interviewed a number of senior managers and supervisors in production and production technology departments, as well as having additional talks with union officials and collecting primary company data. The next section (section 2) presents a detailed review of the literature on the transferability of TPS, followed by a historical overview of TPS emulation at Hyundai (section 3). In section 4, why Hyundai has adopted a deviant form of TPS is explained. Section 5 compares Hyundais manufacturing performance with that of Toyota. Finally, in section 6, implications of this case study will be addressed. 2. Literature review To examine the transferability of TPS, we need to start by clarifying what TPS is. Since Sugimori et al. (1977) shed light on the basic concepts of TPS in their seminal article, a number of academics have tried to capture the essence of this extraordinary manufacturing innovation, by labelling and configuring it in various ways. Over time, the concept of TPS has evolved from a combination of waste-eliminating 3666 B.-H. Lee and H.-J. Jo D o w n l o a d e d
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manufacturing techniques and full labour utilization (Sugimori et al. 1977) to the post-Ford or lean production system that encompasses supply chain manage- ment, RandD functions, customer relations, and lean production organizations (Womack et al. 1990). As a consequence, TPS has been described as a method, a process or program, a strategy, a goal, a belief or state of mind, and a philosophy (Vokurka and Davis 1996). This multi-facet concept creates some confusion (Bartezzaghi 1999). Moreover, because Toyota evolved its manufacturing operations to deal with labour shortages and changing market demand in the 1990s (Katayama and Bennett 1996, Shimizu 1998, Benders and Morita 2004), TPS can be viewed as an evolving entity, rather than a fixed one, causing further difficulties classifying it. Given this confusion, there has been heated debate over the transferability of TPS along three lines of thought: a convergence perspective; a structuralist perspective; and a contingency perspective. The convergence perspective, which mainly draws upon the International Motor Vehicle Program (IMVP) (founded at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1979), a collaborative research consortium investigating the performance of the global motor industry (Lewis 2000), highlights the superb performance of TPS, as achieved by Japanese manufacturers, including Toyota and several Western emulators. According to this perspective, TPS, which was invented in one context, is recognized as the dominant production system of the 21st century, verified by its superior performance versus global competition (Cusumano 1988, Krafcik 1988, Womack et al. 1990). This school of thought treats TPS, or lean production, as a universal set of management norms that can be transferred anywhere (Adler and Cole 1993, Womack and Jones 1994). Despite some variations reflecting the recipients strategies and contexts, these authors insist that TPS becomes the manufacturing system into which every business player tends to converge when trying to survive in the contemporary global market (Forza 1996). The structuralist perspective denies the universal transferability of TPS, emphasizing the unique socio-economic context in which Toyota exists (Williams et al. 1994). Nakamura et al. (1996) note that the transfer of TPS across national boundaries is considerably more difficult than the spread of specific TPS components, given different social contexts, which include differences in culture, social relations, economic conditions, and business practices. Thus, this school insists that TPS, historically, has evolved under Toyotas singular conditions, and that its substance can be transferred to other structural contexts only with difficulty (Williams and Haslam 1992). Between these two polar positions, the contingency perspective postulates a compromise, by considering both the superiority of TPS and the necessary pre-conditions and constraints related to its transferability. This academic group stresses that the successful implementation of TPS is dependent upon several organizational factors at recipient sites, like long-term management strategies, labour-management cooperation, employee and union involvement, open commu- nication, and investments in training (Harber et al. 1990, White et al. 1999). They also point out that the processes and outcomes of TPS emulation are conditioned by external forces (i.e. market situations, international division of labour, local institutional environment, social culture) (Liker et al. 1999, Mehta and Shah 2004). The mutation of the Toyota Production System 3667 D o w n l o a d e d
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In a similar vein, Doeringer et al. (2003) revealed national differences in the actual adoption of TPS, comparing Japanese multinationals across the United States, the United Kingdom and France. Among the three different theoretical views of the existing literature, the convergence and structuralist perspectives both present a one-sided rationale for assessing the diffusion of TPSthe first disregards the impact of national and organizational factors over the transfer of TPS; whereas the latter underestimates the universal advantage that TPS has enjoyed in the post-Ford era. By contrast, the contingency perspective has the merit of combining these two approaches to generate a more balanced view, thereby helping to capture the variations in process and outcomes in the transfer of TPS across firms and countries. However, the contingency perspective is somewhat limited in its ability to clarify how and why recipient firms adopting TPS develop their own workable production models, deviating from the original model. The contingency approach provides a static picture of variations in the adopted form of TPS, but does not explore the dynamic evolution of TPS implementation, how the components or principles of TPS have been transmuted by recipient sites. The problem with this perspective is that it focuses only on contingencies related to TPS dissemination, ignoring the recipients active rolemanagements strategic capabilitiesin dealing with various eventualities. In this vein, the emergent process perspective, hypothesized by Liker et al. (1999), is useful in compensating for weaknesses in the contingency theory. This perspective views the spread of TPS as an evolving and indeterminate transformation process, which can lead to various outcomes, depending upon the form of TPS adopted. Bartezzaghi (1999) helps to understand the process perspective by distinguishing between contingent models and paradigms. According to him, the production model is a set of optimal manufacturing techniques and practices for a given company, while the production paradigm is a coherent body of general principles to design and manage manufacturing systems. The production paradigm, given its competitive advantage, tends to prevail as the universal standard emulated by most industrial players, until a new system emerges in the changing business environment. TPS was devised as a specific production model suitable for Toyotas unique circumstances in the 1960s (i.e. a lack of natural resources, Japanese work attitudes, life-time employment practices, enterprise unions, little discrimination, and good opportunities for job promotion among blue-collar workers), as stated by Sugimori et al. (1977). Under drastic changes in market conditionsthat involved intensified competition and diversified customer demandsTPS, equipped with a set of new manufacturing principles, like JIT and Kaisen, became recognized as a production paradigm suitable to replace the existing Ford mass production system, with its success verified by the outstanding manufacturing performance that Toyota and its clone plants have achieved since the 1980s. Emulating TPS, as it originated with Toyota, many manufacturers have then developed their own production models, conditioned and constrained by various societal factors (i.e. market situations, institutions, institutions, culture, work norms, supply chain structure) and organizational factors (i.e. business strategy, corporate history, labour-management relations, pre-existing interpretative mechanism of production technology, and the level of worker skills) 3668 B.-H. Lee and H.-J. Jo D o w n l o a d e d
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(Liker et al. 1999, Lewis 2000). Those production models have two inherent characteristics: 1. The models are specific to individual manufacturers, even though they attempt to simulate the basic principles of TPS; and 2. The models have evolved over time, by means of the continuous selection, interpretation, assimilation, and transmutation of the principles and operational elements of TPS, in order to deal with changing business conditions (Bartezzaghi 1999). As indicated by Lewis (2000), drawing upon resource-based theory, no manufacturer produces an exact replica of Toyotas manufacturing arrangements. Each must follow the trajectory of its own production model to establish its own competitive advantages. Figure 1 depicts a hypothetical research model, summarizing the above literature review on the diffusion of TPS. Here, TPS is defined as a collection of principles (including manufacturing methods, work organization, human resource manage- ment, and supply chain management), which originated with Toyota, but now is recognized as a standard for manufacturing worldwide. Those TPS principles may be emulated by various means; including prototyping (an initial replica of manufactur- ing arrangements), technical transfer (imitation or import of manufacturing facility and technical knowledge through Toyota-related consultancies), and benchmarking (establishing goals and comparative standards). Through this emulation process, the recipient mutates the TPS principles; in other words, it develops its own production model by selecting, interpreting, and transmuting TPS principles to meet its own business context, comprised of both external and internal (or organizational) forces. Note that this research model is applicable to ordinary manufacturers that have adopted their own course while emulating TPS, without having any direct linkages to Toyota, such as transplants or joint ventures. Consequently, it offers more generalized insights about the spread of TPS across borders. The next section applies this research model, in order to examine the specific case of Hyundai. TPS Recipient's Mutation of TPS Internal contingencies External contraints Manufacturing method and techniques Work organization HRM Prototyping Emulation channel Technical transfer Supplier management [Japanese context] Figure 1. Hypothetical diagram of a TPS diffusion model. The mutation of the Toyota Production System 3669 D o w n l o a d e d
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3. Historical trajectory of TPS emulation at Hyundai Hyundai, established in 1967, started to emulate TPS when it began production of its subcompact car model, Pony, in 1975. At the time, the company invited Seiyu Arai, the former senior engineer for Mitsubishi, to be a technical advisor while it was building its first assembly plant. Arai, who had been a student of Ohno Taiichi, the inventor of TPS, played a crucial role in devising the technical layout and operational processes of the Hyundai plant. In particular, he encouraged Hyundai to adopt some TPS principles in its manufacturing processes. For instance, Arai taught Hyundai management how to carry out Toyotas three-problems ban policy, to eliminate (1) irrationality, (2) imbalance, and (3) superfluity (in sequence of priority) in manufacturing operations (Kang 1986). Interestingly, however, he reversed the original order of the policy priorities, in order to cope with Hyundais resource shortage during its start-up stage, by stressing the elimination of superfluity as the first priority, followed by elimination of imbalance and irrationality. In addition, the Japanese advisory group, led by Arai, adopted TPS manufacturing methods to improve the tooling of stamping dies, to shorten the set-up time for press lines, and to make the body-welding line more efficient at the Hyundai plant. They also shaped the organization of manufacturing processes (including the leading role of shop-floor foremen), imitating the prototype of Toyota and other Japanese automakers. During our interviews, Hyundai senior managers admit that Arai and his advisory group helped Hyundai management to enjoy the advantage of late-development, by emulating TPS in a selective manner. In the mid 1980s, Hyundai made significant inroads into the global auto market, along with the successful entry of its Excel (a subcompact car) into the North American market. Since then, it has exhibited rapid growth owing to domestic motorization and increases in demand overseas. Its domestic production volume soared more than 10-fold between 1980 (64 070 units) and 1990 (650 388 units), and almost 30-fold between 1980 and 2000. Against a backdrop of dramatic business growth, Hyundai aggressively expanded its manufacturing capacity through the 1980s and 1990s. During this period, it adopted elements of TPS in a piecemeal and discontinuous way; whenever it renovated production lines along with the introduction of new car models, or when it opened new assembly plants. In the early 1980s, when Hyundai renovated its first assembly plant to establish mass production lines for Excel, Hyundai management made a large investment in automated production equipment, and implemented the concept of just in time (JIT), in a rudimentary form, by changing the method of material handling from the existing bulk-parts delivery system to sequential parts delivery. In the late 1980s, when a second assembly plant was built, Hyundai management introduced the production scheme of flexible automation by installing the flexible body line (FBL), thereby enabling them to facilitate the production flow of various cars (24 models) and to smoothly adjust production volume via a reduction in set-up time. While building the FBL, Hyundai contracted for technical consulting from Yamashita Machinery, which had designed and supplied the main buck system of the body-building line for Toyota, and had devised the Toyota-imitated one buck system along with its own invention of the windmill jig system (Jo 1998). The one buck system and the windmill jig system are both automated systems using a set of modified 4-dimension main bucks to weld panels into auto body frames at the 3670 B.-H. Lee and H.-J. Jo D o w n l o a d e d
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body-welding shopthe former in the body-building line and the latter in the body- re-spot and the body-completion areas. The two body-welding technologies enabled Hyundai management to flexibly switch car models in the production flow and save working spaces. In addition, the Hyundai plants computerized sequential parts inventory management, in order to upgrade the level of JIT parts delivery and reduce work in process (WIP). At the same time, the company launched various shop-floor campaigns (i.e. Kaisen and the suggestion program; the Three-Rights Campaign Do Right things at the Right time in the Right place the Five Work Attitudes CampaignPlain, Orderly, Clean, Neat, and Disciplined Work; and the shop-floor dialogue forum) patterning itself after Toyotas workplace innovation activities. According to the Hyundai managers we interviewed, the rapid development of a mass production system enabled the company to achieve Toyota productivity levels during this period. In the third assembly plant, which opened its doors in 1991, Hyundai moved towards a flexible mass production model (Lee 1997). It upgraded the FBL and assembly line control (ALC) system with computerized operations to synchronize production orders, thereby expanding its capability to manufacture more diverse car models in a production line, with less WIP and parts inventory. This advanced production process was aided by the implementation of an MRP (material requirements planning)-based system and a value-added network (VAN) to directly control and link assembly line parts orders with outside vendors in a JIT manner. From the early 1990s, Hyundai management also introduced the principles of TPM (total preventive maintenance) and TQC (total quality control), encouraging production workers to cover maintenance and quality assurance jobs in their work areas, like Japanese workers at Toyota plants. In the late 1990s, Hyundai management built a green-field plant (in Asan), simulating Toyotas Kyushu Miyata plant. Designing this new plant, Hyundai utilized a group of retired Toyota engineers to reproduce the manufacturing layout and facilities of the Miyata plant. The Asan plant, which started its operations in 1996, was almost identical to the Miyata plant in its layout of production processes. Like the Toyota green-field plant, for instance, the Asan plant consisted of a set of segmented assembly lines, with inter-line buffers (about three vehicle units), and it improved the working environment by automating production facilities using an ergonomic design. It is noteworthy that the new plant attempted to adopt the pull production system, controlled by MRP-based scheduling, rather than by the Kanban system, thereby remarkably improving the ratio of completed sequential production up to 95% (compared with 75% at the brown-field plants) and reducing parts inventory down to 0.8 days (compared with 1.7 days at the old plants) during its start-up stages (Chung 1997). However, this attempt was halted by the economic crisis in 1997 and the companys unprecedented massive downsizing in 1998, so that this plant then returned to the traditional push production model (Jo 2001). Furthermore, this green-field plant implemented such new programs as direct supplier delivery (of auto parts to production lines), a 100-PPM (parts per million) quality assurance campaign, a work team quality guarantee plan, and various fool-proofing tools, both to mimic and catch up with Toyota. After recovering from the economic slump of 19971998, Hyundai officially began making efforts to develop its own unique production model, the so-called Hyundai Production System (HPS) in pursuit of a global manufacturing network. The mutation of the Toyota Production System 3671 D o w n l o a d e d
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In devising HPS, Hyundai management continued to benchmark itself against Toyotas manufacturing performance. At the same time, it made clear that HPS was deviant from the core principles of TPSof pull production and worker involvementwhich were tried at the Asan plant, but with little effect. The core of HPS is demonstrated by its ambitious multi-year plan of production management innovation, as illustrated in table 1. In accordance with this strategic plan, the company implemented APS (advanced planning and scheduling) in 2002 and E-BOM (enterprise bill of material) early in 2006, while planning to install ERP (enterprise) by the end of 2006 and establish a comprehensive production management system combining SCM (supply chain management) and OTD (order to delivery) in 2007. Hyundai management expects that, once the OTD systemthat can complete the business process of order-to-delivery within a weekis active, HPS can become as lean and responsive to market demands as TPS. Despite its effort to emulate the JIT operations of TPS, HPS (equipped with ERP and OTD) primarily is governed by the traditional principle of push production. HPS is also a technology-oriented and engineer-driven approach, moving towards minimizing worker involvement, which is in sharp contrast to TPS. Hyundai management has made massive investments in automation over the past two decades. As a result, the automation of the press and body-welding shops has reached almost 100% and that of the assembly lines has increased up to 15%, comparable with Toyota. Hyundai management chiefly has pursued automation to save labour, compared with Toyota, wherein automation has been treated as a supplementary means to make each workers job efficient and easy. Similarly, according to Hyundai management, the HPS approach to fool-proofing machinery is somehow different from Toyotas system: the former stresses the elimination Table 1. Roadmap of production system innovation at Hyundai. Stage and component Description 1. APS (advanced planning and scheduling) To enhance the accuracy of production planning and maintain the optimal level of auto parts inventory by visually controlling the due date of customer delivery 2. E-BOM (enterprise bill of material) To develop the corporate-wide BOM data base necessary for implementing ERP 3. ERP (enterprise resource planning) To build an IT system to manage the entire work flow from product development, manufacturing, sales and customer service 4. SCM (supply chain management) To establish a systemic network to inter- connect manufacturing processes to suppliers, sales dealers, and customers 5. OTD (order to delivery) To build the total management system to maximize the efficiency of business processes, comprising customer orders, parts supplies, manufacturing, and distribution Source: HMC internal document. 3672 B.-H. Lee and H.-J. Jo D o w n l o a d e d
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of tasks in which workers may make a mistake, whereas the latter underlines the prevention of faulty operations among workers. Another example of Hyundais engineer-oriented approach can be identified in its emphasis on modular production. Hyundai management set out a long-term plan to develop a modular production system for establishing just-in-sequencing (JIS) operations, as illustrated in table 2. According to the plan, the overall level of modularization increased from 30% in 2005 to 40% in 2006. This modularization has entailed the outsourcing of parts- sequencing jobs, the automation of modular parts assembly, and the simplification of main production lines (Lee 2003). As displayed in figure 2, HPS also includes a Toyota-style workplace innovation programme, comprised of basic management, thereby strengthening the shop-floor ethic of hard work and substance manage- ment, stressing Kaisen activities and manufacturing performance (i.e. quality, operational costs, and productivity). However, this workplace innovation program and the previous shop-floor campaigns at Hyundai are contrary to the TPS principle of worker involvement, in that they are solely driven by shop-floor management, without production worker commitment. Instead, college-graduated engineers Workplace management Substance management Common management Objective management Organizational management Basic management Work environment Worker morale Safety and energy-saving Work attitude Figure 2. Conceptual map of HPS workplace management innovation. Source: HMC internal document. Table 2. Modularization plan at Hyundai. 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Cockpit module Module design & parts development Integrated modules development Chassis module Simple assembly Module design & parts development Integrated modules development Front-end module Module design & parts development Integrated modules development Source: Cho et al. (2004). The mutation of the Toyota Production System 3673 D o w n l o a d e d
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are the main force of production process innovation, since they are very motivated to apply for numerous patents (i.e. four patents per engineer in 2005) because of a merit-pay system and other performance incentives. To summarize, Hyundai has developed a production model that deviates from TPS, even though it has tried to emulate TPS via replication of a manufacturing prototype, technical consultancies, and benchmarking over time. Hyundais emulation of TPS is characterized as being (1) a selective and graduated adoption, linked to the expansion of manufacturing capacity, (2) technology-driven radical innovation (Fujimoto 1999, Liker et al. 1999), and (3) an engineer-led and worker-exclusive approach. 4. Factors distinguishing HPS from TPS As exemplified in table 3, HPS is quite distinct from TPS in the core aspects of production management, as laid out by Sugimori et al. (1977). While TPS primarily is governed by pull production, based upon JIT process control and flexible labour utilization, HPS is a push production model, utilizing centralized IT-driven process control. On the technical aspect, HPS and TPS both have pursued the reduction of operational cost, though in a contrasting manner. The most crucial difference between HPS and TPS is observed in the way of utilizing worker capabilities: HPS has relied on engineer-driven workplace innovations and operation control, rather than the full utilization of worker capability and involvement, highlighted by TPS. What has made the Hyundai production model deviate from TPS over its 40-year development? The differences at Hyundai can be explained by several inter-related factors. First, unlike Toyota, Hyundai management has emphasized high utilization of production capacity under a supplier-dominated market condition, rather than stressing flexible responses to customer demands. This business orientation, which has led Hyundai management to stick to the push production model, is associated with its dominant position in the domestic market and its sustained growth overseas. Second, the poor technical capability of auto parts suppliers has been a key source of uncertainty in Hyundai production processes. Most auto parts suppliers are small- to medium-sized firms, which lack the resources (i.e. capital and Table 3. Comparison of production management between Hyundai and Toyota. Hyundai Toyota Production mode PUSH PULL Production control tool MRP system JIT (Kanban) Operational goal Planning-led production Minimization of inventory Production management Hourly plan-based process; management controlled by production engineer division Flexible control of production process at the level of production departments Production condition High uncertainty and fluctuation Low uncertainty and stable repetitiveness Source: HMC internal document. 3674 B.-H. Lee and H.-J. Jo D o w n l o a d e d
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highly-educated labour) to develop and maintain flexible and defect-free production processes to meet automaker work orders (Lee and Lee 2005). Thus, Hyundai management, as well as suppliers, cannot maintain a buffer to protect against defects and the untimely delivery of supplied parts, thereby preventing HPS from adopting the pull-mode JIT principle. Third, and most importantly, confrontational labour-management relations at Hyundai have been a major constraint (Cho and Lee 1989, Jo 2005). Labour management cooperation and worker collaboration is a key pre-condition of the operation of the JIT production principle at Toyota (Forza 1996). The problematic labour relations climate at Hyundai has been derived from worker mistrust of the labour-exclusive management style. In the pre-democratization period (until 1987), Hyundai management, aided by an authoritarian governments labour control policy, forced low wages and harsh working conditions on workers, who organized a militant labour union in late 1987. In 1998, the massive downsizing which Hyundai management undertook during an unprecedented economic slump, caused workers to feel even more alienated from management. Given its deep distrust of management, the labour union has prevented management from adopting performance-based human resource management (HRM) practices and from flexibly utilizing labour. In the mid 1990s, for instance, Hyundai management failed to implement performance- based HRMplans, modelled on the career and compensation systemof Toyota, due to opposition from the labour union, which preferred an egalitarian system of wage determination and job promotion (Lee 1997). The labour union also has interfered with managements policy to promote workplace innovation and flexible job rotation, thereby resulting in rigid and Kaisen-free working practices on the shop floor. In fact, the labour union forced management to reduce the items of TQC from 30 to 10, and to use an increasing number of irregularly-contracted workers in the early 2000s. Given the degree of mutual distrust between the militant labour union and Hyundai management, management has been unable to promote any systemic flexibility in terms of labour utilization and workplace innovation, aided by the performance-based HRM schemes, which are a key part of and a prerequisite for TPS, thereby moving further towards an engineer-led production model. In summary, both external (i.e. a supplier-dominated market, the authoritarian governments labour control policy, part suppliers poor technical capabilities, and the recent economic crisis) and internal factors (i.e. top managements emphasis on high utilization, a militant labour union, and worker distrust) have combined to contribute to a technology-driven and push-mode production model at Hyundai, which has, over time, deviated further from TPS, despite the companys unceasing efforts to emulate it. 5. Comparing Toyota and Hyundai production performance Hyundai managements efforts to emulate TPS, which have evolved into its unique production model, have been remarkably successful in boosting the companys manufacturing competitiveness to the level of Toyotas. Drawing upon the recent manufacturing performance of Hyundai, HPS can be compared to TPS. As shown in figure 3, HPS has enhanced its utilization ratio up to 95.6%, close to that of TPS (97%), over the past 5 years. It also has improved product quality (measured by the The mutation of the Toyota Production System 3675 D o w n l o a d e d
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sign-off ratio) up to 92.3%, drawing near Toyota levels (9495%), over the same period. In particular, Hyundais improvements in quality can be evidenced by the recent favourable recognition of overseas markets; for instance, its passenger cars rank as one of highest quality products in JD Powers IQS (initial quality satisfaction). Moreover, despite its push-mode production system, Hyundai has reduced its inventory of parts delivery to 2 hours, comparable to Toyota, through tight control of parts suppliers. These notable accomplishments mainly are attributable to the companys great efforts in engineer/technology-driven production management innovation. At the same time, HPS has a crucial problem in its labour productivity. As illustrated in figure 3, the allocation ratio at Hyundai assembly plants has declined from 75.8% in 2000 to 67.4% in 2005. A rough comparison of labour productivity, measured in terms of production units per worker, reveals that Hyundais (31.9) productivity was less than half that of Toyota (65.6) in 2003. This problem could be explained by rigid work practices and little worker involvement in shop-floor innovations, against a backdrop of confrontational labour-management relations and employee mistrust of corporate management. Nonetheless, as shown in table 4, since labour costs at Hyundai are around 40% those at Toyota (as of 2003), the former has been able to maintain its price competitiveness, despite poor labour productivity. In short, Hyundai has achieved fairly good manufacturing performance (in terms of utilization, product quality, and parts inventory) with its own production model, HPS, despite experiencing declining labour productivity, caused by deviations from TPS, which is worker-exclusive production management. 6. Conclusions Over the past 40 years, Hyundai has developed its own production model, HPS, initially emulating TPS, followed by re-interpreting and modifying TPS to adapt to Figure 3. Manufacturing performance of Hyundai (unit: %). Source: HMC internal document. Sign off ratio is the aggregate index calculated by multiplying OK rates at the four inspection spots: assembly line, final test, water-proof test, and ore-shipping test. Allocation ratio is the relative ratio of net assembly working hours out of total assembly working hours by production workers at the assembly plants. 3676 B.-H. Lee and H.-J. Jo D o w n l o a d e d
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the companys unique circumstances. In other words, HPS is a mutated form of TPS. Although it deviates from the ideal model of TPS (JIT pull production, equipped with flexible human buffers and incremental innovation capacity), HPS (based on technology-driven push production) has gained a remarkable competitive advantage in terms of manufacturing utilization, product quality, and inventory management, thereby overcoming limitations caused by the pre-existing low wage business model, as indicated by Womack et al. (1990). Of course, it also should be noted that HPS entails a labour-exclusive manufacturing approach, derived from the companys authoritarian management style (reflecting the owner-driven governance structure and, as a consequence, ignoring the voice and interests of other stake-holders, such as workers and the labour union) and unstable labour relations, contrary to TPS. Our case study addresses several implications for future research on the dissemination mechanisms of TPS. First, the Hyundai case reveals that the adoption of TPS involves a complex evolutionary process of organizational learning and interpretation, as indicated by Bartezzaghi (1999) and Liker et al. (1999). In contrast to the convergence perspective that stresses the universal transferability of TPS in a simplistic manner, emulating TPS involves complicated interactions between managements strategic choices and both internal and external factors, so that the manufacturing arrangement at recipient sites ultimately may evolve into a unique production model, deviant from the original form of TPS, that is better suited to the recipients environment. In this light, future study of TPS dissemination needs to further explore the recipient companys active role and strategic capabilities in transmuting or mutating TPS principles to meet that companys idiosyncratic circumstances, something which largely has been overlooked in existing literature. Second, the Hyundai case sheds light on the possibility of various paths toward lean production. Of course, TPS represents an exemplary lean manufacturing paradigm in the post-Ford era. However, as Lewis (2000) points out, a variety of lean production models, capturing the essential virtues of TPS, can be developed as diverse workable configurations of the manufacturing system. Indeed, HPS has embodied lean manufacturing via its own way of radical innovation, evidenced by its notable operational performances, although it is constrained by low labour productivity, mainly derived from confrontational labour relations. Therefore, another future task is to examine commonalities and differences between various lean production models among firms emulating TPS, going beyond our single case study. Table 4. Comparison of operational performance between Hyundai and Toyota. Hyundai Toyota 2000 2001 2002 2003 2000 2001 2002 2003 Labour cost per worker 34 888 32 401 40 245 40 128 96 059 88 824 91 507 104 046 Production unit per worker 25.2 30.3 37.0 31.9 62.1 60.3 62.5 65.6 Source: HMC internal document. Unit: US dollar. The mutation of the Toyota Production System 3677 D o w n l o a d e d
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The Machine That Changed the World: The Story of Lean Production-- Toyota's Secret Weapon in the Global Car Wars That Is Now Revolutionizing World Industry