Analogy of the Divided Line

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The Analogy of the Divided Line (or Allegory of the Divided Line; Greek:
) is presented by the Greek philosopher Plato in theRepublic (509d511e). It is
written as a dialogue between Glaucon andSocrates, in which the latter further elaborates
upon the immediately preceding Analogy of the Sun at the former's request. Socrates asks
Glaucon to not only envision this unequally bisected line but to imagine further bisecting
each of the two segments. Socrates explains that the four resulting segments represent
four separate 'affections' () of the psyche. The lower two sections are said to
represent the visible while the higher two are said to represent the intelligible. These
affections are described in succession as corresponding to increasing levels of reality and
truth from conjecture () to belief () to thought () and finally to
understanding (). Furthermore this Analogy not only elaborates a theory of the
psyche but also presents metaphysical and epistemological views.
This analogy is immediately followed by the Analogy of the Cave at 514a.
Contents
1 Description
2 The visible world
3 The intelligible world
4 Tabular summary of the Divided Line
5 Metaphysical importance
6 Epistemological meaning
7 See also
8 Notes
9 External links
Description[edit]

The Divided Line (AC) is generally taken as representing the visible world and (CE) as representing the
intelligible world.
[1]

In The Republic (509d510a), Plato describes the Divided Line this way:
Now take a line which has been cut into two unequal parts, and divide each of them again in the
same proportion,
[2]
and suppose the two main divisions to answer, one to the visible and the
other to the intelligible, and then compare the subdivisions in respect of their clearness and
want of clearness, and you will find that the first section in the sphere of the visible consists of
images. And by images I mean, in the first place, shadows, and in the second place, reflections
in water and in solid, smooth and polished bodies and the like: Do you understand?

Yes, I understand.

Imagine, now, the other section, of which this is only the resemblance, to include the animals
which we see, and everything that grows or is made.
[3]

The visible world[edit]
Thus AB represents shadows and reflections of physical things, and BC the physical things
themselves. These correspond to two kinds of knowledge, the illusion ( eikasia) of
our ordinary, everyday experience, and belief ( pistis) about discrete physical objects
which cast their shadows.
[4]
In the Timaeus, the category of illusion includes all the
"opinions of which the minds of ordinary people are full," while the natural sciences are
included in the category of belief.
[4]

The intelligible world[edit]
According to some translations,
[2]
the segment CE, representing the intelligible world, is
divided into the same ratio as AC, giving the subdivisions CD and DE (it can be readily
verified that CD must have the same length as BC:
[5]

There are two subdivisions, in the lower of which the soul uses the figures given by the former
division as images; the enquiry can only be hypothetical, and instead of going upwards to a
principle descends to the other end; in the higher of the two, the soul passes out of hypotheses,
and goes up to a principle which is above hypotheses, making no use of images as in the
former case, but proceeding only in and through the ideas themselves (510b).
[3]

Plato describes CD, the "lower" of these, as involving mathematical
reasoning ( dianoia),
[4]
where abstractmathematical objects such as geometric
lines are discussed. Such objects are outside the physical world (and are not to be
confused with the drawings of those lines, which fall within the physical world BC).
However, they are less important to Plato than the subjects of
philosophical understanding ( noesis), the "higher" of these two subdivisions (DE):
And when I speak of the other division of the intelligible, you will understand me to speak of that
other sort of knowledge which reason herself attains by the power of dialectic, using the
hypotheses not as first principles, but only as hypotheses that is to say, as steps and points
of departure into a world which is above hypotheses, in order that she may soar beyond them to
the first principle of the whole (511b).
[3]

Plato here is using the familiar relationship between ordinary objects and their shadows or
reflections in order to illustrate the relationship between the physical world as a whole and
the world of Ideas (Forms) as a whole. The former is made up of a series of passing
reflections of the latter, which is eternal, more real and "true." Moreover, the knowledge that
we have of the Ideas when indeed we do have it is of a higher order than knowledge of
the mere physical world. In particular, knowledge of the forms leads to a knowledge of
the Idea (Form) of the Good.
[1]

Tabular summary of the Divided Line[edit]
Segment
Type of
knowledge or
opinion
Affection of the
psyche
Type of
object
Method of the psyche
or eye
Relative
truth
and
reality
DE Noesis()
Knowledge:
understanding
of only the
Intelligible
()
Only Ideas,
which are all
given
existence and
truth by
the Good
itself (
)
The Psyche examines all
hypotheses by
the Dialectic making no
use of likenesses, always
moving towards a First
Principle
Highest

CD Dianoia()
Knowledge:
thought that
recognizes but
is not only of
the Intelligible
Some Ideas,
specifically
those of
Geometry and
Number
The Psyche assumes
hypotheses while making
use of likenesses, always
moving towards final
conclusions
High

BC Pistis()
Opinion: belief
concerning
visible things
visible things
()
The eye makes probable
predictions upon
observing visible things
low

AB Eikasia()
Opinion:
conjectures
concerning
likenesses
likenesses of
visible things
()
The eye makes guesses
upon observing
likenesses of visible
things
lowest

Metaphysical importance[edit]
The Allegory of the Divided Line is the cornerstone of Plato's metaphysical framework. This
structure, well hidden in the middle of the Republic, a complex, multi-layered dialogue,
illustrates the grand picture of Plato's metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics, all in one. It is
not enough for the philosopher to understand the Ideas (Forms), he must also understand
the relation of Ideas to all four levels of the structure to be able to know anything at
all.
[6][7][8]
In the Republic, the philosopher must understand the Idea of Justice to live a just
life or to organize and govern a just state.
[9]

The Divided Line also serves as our guide for most past and future metaphysics. The
lowest level, which represents "the world of becoming and passing away" (Republic, 508d),
is the metaphysical model for a Heraclitean philosophy of constant flux and for Protagorean
philosophy of appearance and opinion. The second level, a world of fixed physical
objects,
[10][11]
also became Aristotle's metaphysical model. The third level might be a
Pythagorean level of mathematics. The fourth level is Plato's ideal Parmenidean reality, the
world of highest level Ideas.
Epistemological meaning[edit]
Plato holds a very strict notion of knowledge. For example, he does not accept expertise
about a subject, nor direct perception (see Theaetetus), nor true belief about the physical
world (the Meno) as knowledge. It is not enough for the philosopher to understand the
Ideas (Forms), he must also understand the relation of Ideas to all four levels of the
structure to be able to know anything at all.
[12]
For this reason, in most of the "earlier
Socratic" dialogues, Socrates denies knowledge both to himself and others.
For the first level, "the world of becoming and passing away," Plato expressly denies the
possibility of knowledge.
[13]
Constant change never stays the same, therefore, properties of
objects must refer to different Ideas at different times. Note that for knowledge to be
possible, which Plato believed, the other three levels must be unchanging. The third and
fourth level, mathematics and Ideas, are already eternal and unchanging. However, to
ensure that the second level objective, physical world is also unchanging, Plato, in
the Republic, Book 4
[14]
introduces empirically derived
[15][16][17]
axiomaticrestrictions that
prohibit both motion and shifting perspectives.
[10][18]

See also[edit]
The Form of the Good
Notes[edit]
1. ^ Jump up to:
a

b
"divided line," The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd edition,
Cambridge University Press, 1999, ISBN 0-521-63722-8.
2. ^ Jump up to:
a

b
Older Greek texts do not differentiate unequal from an equal (,
)
3. ^ Jump up to:
a

b

c
Plato, The Republic, Book 6, translated by Benjamin Jowett, online
4. ^ Jump up to:
a

b

c
Desmond Lee and Rachana Kamtekar, The Republic, Notes to Book
6, Penguin, 1987, ISBN 0-14-044914-0.
5. Jump up^ Let the length of AE be equal to and that of AC equal to ,
where (following Socrates, however, ; insofar as the equality of the
lengths of BC and CD is concerned, the latter restriction is of no significance). The
length of CE is thus equal to . It follows that the length of BC must be equal
to , which is seen to be equal to the length of CD.
6. Jump up^ Gail Fine, Knowledge and Belief in Republic V-VII, in G. Fine (ed.) Plato
I (1990), also in S. Everson (ed.) Cambridge Companions to Ancient Thought I:
Epistemology (Cambridge University Press: New York, 1990), pp. 85-115.
7. Jump up^ Nicholas Denyer, Sun and line: the role of the Good, in G. R. F. Ferrari (ed.)
The Cambridge Companion to Plato's Republic (Cambridge University Press: New
York, 2007), pp. 284309.
8. Jump up^ Republic 520c: "For once habituated ... you will know what each of the
idols is and whereof it is a semblance, because you have seen the reality of the
beautiful, the just and the good."
9. Jump up^ Rachel G.K. Singpurwalla, Platos Defense of Justice in the
Republic "justice is a virtue appropriate to both cities and individuals, and the nature or
form of justice is the same in both (Republic, 435a)."
10. ^ Jump up to:
a

b
James Danaher, The Laws of Thought "The restrictions Plato places
on the laws of thought (i.e., "in the same respect," and "at the same time,") are an
attempt to isolate the object of thought by removing it from all other time but the
present and all respects but one."
11. Jump up^ Cratylus 439d-e "For if it is ever in the same state, then obviously at that
time it is not changing (Plato's realism); and if it is always in the same state and is
always the same, how can it ever change or move without relinquishing its own form
(Aristotle's realism)"
12. Jump up^ Republic 520c "For once habituated you will discern them infinitely better
than the dwellers there, and you willknow what each of the idols is and whereof it is a
semblance, because you have seen the reality of the beautiful, the just and the good."
13. Jump up^ Cratylus 439d-e "How, then, can that which is never in the same state be
anything? ... nor can it be known by anyone."
14. Jump up^ Republic 4.436b "It is obvious that the same thing will never do or suffer
opposites in the same respect in relation to the same thing and at the same time"
15. Jump up^ Republic 4.437a "let us proceed on the hypothesis that this is so, with the
understanding that, if it ever appear otherwise, everything that results from the
assumption shall be invalidated"
16. Jump up^ Also see the Timaeus 29c on empirical "likelihood"
17. Jump up^ It is interesting to note that modern logical analysis claims to prove that the
potentially falsifiable "empirical content of a theory is exactly captured by ...
axiomatization ... that uses axioms which are universal negations of conjunctions of
atomic formulas" (C. Chambers, The Axiomatic Structure of Empirical Content)
18. Jump up^ Plato's Principle of Non-Contradiction (Republic, 4.436b) for the objective,
physical world is presented with threeaxiomatic restrictions: The same thing ... cannot
act or be acted upon ... in contrary ways ... (1) in the same part (2) in relation to the
same thing (3) at the same time.
External links[edit]
At MIT.edu: Plato's Republic: Translated by Benjamin Jowett
At Perseus Project: Plato's Republic: Translated by Paul Shorey (1935) annotated and
hyperlinked text (English and Greek)
James Danaher, "The Laws of Thought", The Philosopher, Volume LXXXXII No. 1
Plato's Analogy of the Divided Line: A read at the Eastern Division Meetings of the
American Philosophical Association, December 1988.
Singpurwalla, Rachel G.K. "Platos Defense of Justice in the Republic", in Santas,
Gerasimos (ed.). The Blackwell Guide to Platos Republic (Oxford: Blackwell
Publishing, 2006).