Session 8

Tan v. Del Rosario Digest

Tan v Del Rosario
Facts:
1. Two consolidated cases assail the validity of RA 7496 or the Simplified Net Income
Taxation Scheme ("SNIT"), which amended certain provisions of the NIRC, as well
as the Rules and Regulations promulgated by public respondents pursuant to said
law.
2. Petitioners posit that RA 7496 is unconstitutional as it allegedly violates the following
provisions of the Constitution:
-Article VI, Section 26(1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only
one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
- Article VI, Section 28(1) The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The
Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.
- Article III, Section 1 No person shall be deprived of . . . property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
3. Petitioners contended that public respondents exceeded their rule-making authority in
applying SNIT to general professional partnerships. Petitioner contends that the title
of HB 34314, progenitor of RA 7496, is deficient for being merely entitled, "Simplified
Net Income Taxation Scheme for the Self-Employed and Professionals Engaged in
the Practice of their Profession" (Petition in G.R. No. 109289) when the full text of the
title actually reads,
'An Act Adopting the Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme For The Self-Employed
and Professionals Engaged In The Practice of Their Profession, Amending Sections
21 and 29 of the National Internal Revenue Code,' as amended. Petitioners also
contend it violated due process.
5. The Solicitor General espouses the position taken by public respondents.
6. The Court has given due course to both petitions.

1. Uniformity of taxation, like the concept of equal protection, merely requires that all
subjects or objects of taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike both in
privileges and liabilities. Uniformity does not violate classification as long as: (1) the
standards that are used therefor are substantial and not arbitrary, (2) the
categorization is germane to achieve the legislative purpose, (3) the law applies, all
things being equal, to both present and future conditions, and (4) the classification
applies equally well to all those belonging to the same class.
2. What is apparent from the amendatory law is the legislative intent to increasingly shift
the income tax system towards the schedular approach in the income taxation of
individual taxpayers and to maintain, by and large, the present global treatment on
taxable corporations. The Court does not view this classification to be arbitrary and
inappropriate.
ISSUE 2: Whether or not public respondents exceeded their authority in
promulgating the RR
No. There is no evident intention of the law, either before or after the amendatory
legislation, to place in an unequal footing or in significant variance the income tax
treatment of professionals who practice their respective professions individually and
of those who do it through a general professional partnership.

Lung Center of the Philippines vs. Quezon City [GR No. 144104 June 29, 2004]

Facts: Lung Center of the Philippines is a non-stock and non-profit entity established
by virtue of PD No. 1823. It is the registered owner of the land on which
the Lung Center of the PhilippinesHospital is erected. A big space in the ground floor
of the hospital is being leased to private parties, for canteen and small store spaces,

ISSUE: Whether or not the tax law is unconstitutional for violating due process

and to medical or professional practitioners who use the same as their private clinics.

NO. The due process clause may correctly be invoked only when there is a clear
contravention of inherent or constitutional limitations in the exercise of the tax power.
No such transgression is so evident in herein case.

Also, a big portion on the right side of the hospital is being leased for commercial

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purposes to a privateenterprise known as the Elliptical Orchids and Garden Center.

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considered include the statute creating the enterprise, its corporate purposes, its
When the City Assessor of Quezon City assessed both its land and hospital building

constitution and by-laws, the methods of administration, the nature of the actual work

for real property taxes, the Lung Center of thePhilippines filed a claim for exemption

performed, that character of the services rendered, the indefiniteness of the

on its averment that it is a charitable institution with a minimum of 60% of its hospital

beneficiaries and the use and occupation of the properties.

bedsexclusively used for charity patients and that the major thrust of its hospital
operation is to serve charity patients. The claim for exemption was denied, prompting

However, under the Constitution, in order to be entitled to exemption from real

a petition for the reversal of the resolution of the City Assessor with the Local Board

property tax, there must be clear and unequivocal proof that (1) it is a charitable

of Assessment Appeals of Quezon City, which denied the same. On appeal, the

institution and (2)its real properties are ACTUALLY, DIRECTLY and EXCLUSIVELY

Central Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon City affirmed the local boards

used for charitable purposes. While portions of the hospital are used for treatment of

decision, finding that Lung Center of the Philippines is not a charitable institution and

patients and the dispensation of medical services to them, whether paying or non-

that its properties were not actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable

paying, other portions thereof are being leased to private individuals and enterprises.

purposes. Hence, the present petition for review with averments that the Lung Center
of the Philippines is a charitable institution under Section 28(3), Article VI of the

Exclusive is defined as possessed and enjoyed to the exclusion of others, debarred

Constitution, notwithstanding that it accepts paying patients and rents out portions of

from participation or enjoyment. If real property is used for one or more commercial

the hospital building to private individuals and enterprises.

purposes, it is not exclusively used for the exempted purposes but is subject to
taxation.

Issue: Is the Lung Center of the Philippines a charitable institution within the context
of the Constitution, and therefore, exempt fromreal property tax?

Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance G.R. No. 115455, August 25,

1994

Held: The Lung Center of the Philippines is a charitable institution. To determine

Facts: The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods
and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to
widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by

whether an enterprise is a charitable institution or not, the elements which should be

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Session 8
amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits challenging
the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.

1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only
of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. That upon the
certification of a bill by the President the requirement of 3 readings on separate days
and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of
legislative practice.

One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution, because it is in
fact the result of the consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630.
There is also a contention that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings as required by
the Constitution.

Bengzon v Senate Blue Ribbon

Committee Digest

Issue: Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) of the
Constitution

G.R. No. 89914 November 20, 1991

Padilla, J.:

Held:
The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear
analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the
Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. To insist that a
revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process
culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House
bill would be to deny the Senates power not only to concur with amendments but
also to propose amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the
initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public
debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of
Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the
members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and
problems. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill
in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate
as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.

The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on
separate days as required by the Constitution because the second and third readings
were done on the same day. But this was because the President had certified S. No.

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Facts:
1. Petitioner was one of the defendants in a civil case filed by the government with the
Sandiganbayan for the alleged anomalous sale of Kokoy Romoaldez of several
government corporations to the group of Lopa, a brother-in-law of Pres. Aquino.
2.

By virtue of a privilege speech made by Sen. Enrile urging the Senate to look into the
transactions, an investigation was conducted by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee.
Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the Committee to appear before
it and testify on "what they know" regarding the "sale of thirty-six (36) corporations
belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez."

3.

At the hearing, Lopa declined to testify on the ground that his testimony may
"unduly prejudice" the defendants in civil case before the Sandiganbayan.

4.

Petitioner filed for a TRO and/or injunctive relief claiming that the inquiry was
beyond the jurisdiction of the Senate. He contended that the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee acted in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose. One of the
defendants in the case before the Sandiganbayan, Sandejas, filed with the Court of
motion for intervention. The Court granted it and required the respondent Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee to comment on the petition in intervention.

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ISSUE: W/N the Blue Ribbon inquiry was in aid of legislation

evidence before it only because the inquiry is not in aid of legislation and if pursued
would be violative of the principle of separation of powers between the legislative
and the judicial departments of the government as ordained by the Constitution.

NO.
1.

There appears to be no intended legislation involved. The

purpose of the inquiry to be conducted is not related to a purpose within the
jurisdiction of Congress, it was conducted to find out whether or not the relatives of
President Aquino, particularly Mr. Lopa had violated RA 3019 in connection with the
alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez
to the Lopa Group.

2.

The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not
absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the Constitution. As provided
therein, the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It follows then that the rights of
persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due
process and the right not to be compelled to testify against one's self.

3.

The civil case was already filed in the Sandiganbayan and for the Committee to
probe and inquire into the same justiciable controversy would be an encroachment
into the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that had already earlier set in. The
issue sought to be investigated has already been pre-empted by the Sandiganbayan.
To allow the inquiry to continue would not only pose the possibility of conflicting
judgments between the legislative committee and a judicial tribunal.

4.

Finally, a congressional committees right to inquire is subject to all relevant

limitations placed by the Constitution on governmental action including the
relevant limitations of the Bill of Rights. One of these rights is the right of an
individual to against self-incrimination. The right to remain silent is extended to
respondents in administrative investigations but only if it partakes of the nature of a
criminal proceeding or analogous to a criminal proceeding. Hence, the petitioners
may not be compelled by respondent Committee to appear, testify and produce
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Senate vs. Ermita , GR 169777, April 20, 2006

Senate vs. Ermita , GR 169777, April 20, 2006
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused
power by issuing E.O. 464 Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of
Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of
Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the
Constitution, and for Other Purposes. Petitioners pray for its declaration as null
and void for being unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its
various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation
which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive
department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned
and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the
Philippine National Police (PNP).
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive
Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the
railway project, others on the issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine
elections, wire tapping, and the role of military in the so-called Gloriagate
Scandal.
Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as
provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in
Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either
house of Congress.

Session 8
ISSUE:
Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section
2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house
of Congress, valid and constitutional?
RULING:
No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the
executive privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that
certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of
the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the
obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of
such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a
particular case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch
whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such
information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the
reason therefor and why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade
congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to
do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said
provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is
frustrated.

Republic v Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 155832)

FACTS:
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) Commissioner Daza gave
written authority to two lawyers to sequester any property, documents, money, and
other assets in Leyte belonging to Imelda Marcos. A sequestration order was issued
against the Olot Resthouse in Tolosa, Leyte. Imelda Marcos filed a motion to quash
claiming that such order was void for failing to observe Sec. 3 of the PCGG Rules and
Regulations. The Rules required the signatures of at least 2 PCGG Commissioners.
The Republic opposed claiming that Imelda is estopped from questioning the
sequestration since by her acts ( such as seeking permission from the PCGG to repair
the resthouse and entertain guests), she had conceded to the validity of the
sequestration. The Republic also claims that Imelda failed to exhaust administrative
remedies by first seeking its lifting as provided in the Rules; that the rule requiring
the two signatures did not yet exist when the Olot Resthouse was sequestered; and
that she intended to delay proceedings by filing the motion to quash.
Sandiganbayan granted the motion to quash and ruled that the sequestration order
was void because it was signed not by the 2 commissioners but by 2 agents. Hence
the certiorari.

Belgica vs. ochoa

Araullo vs. abad
____________________________________________________________________

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ISSUE:
Whether or not the sequestration order is valid.

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HELD:
No. The Order is not valid. Under Sec. 26, Art 18 of the Constitution, a sequestration
order may be issued upon a showing of a prima facie case that the properties are illgotten wealth. When the court nullifies an Order, the court does not substitute its
judgment for that of the PCGG.
In the case, the PCGG did not make a prior determination of the existence of the
prima facie case. The Republic presented no evidence to the Sandiganbayan. Nor
did the Republic demonstrate that the the 2 PCGG representatives were given the
quasi-judicial authority to receive and consider evidence that would warrant a prima
facie finding. The Republic's evidence does not show how the Marcoses' acquired
the property, what makes it ill-gotten wealth,and how Ferdinand Marcos
intervened in its acquisition.
As regards the issue on estoppel, a void order produces no effect and cannot be
validated under the doctine of estoppel. The Court cannot accept the view that
Imelda should have first sought the lifiting of the sequestration order. Being void,
the Sandiganbayan has the power to strike it down on sight.

Estrada, went on air and accused the Estrada, his family and friends of receiving
millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The expos immediately ignited reactions of
rage. On January 19, Estrada fell from power. At 1:20 p.m. of said day, the
Erap informed then Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that General Angelo
Reyes, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, had defected. January
20 turned to be the day of Eraps surrender. On January 22, the Monday after taking
her oath, Arroyo immediately discharged the powers and duties of the Presidency.
After his fall from the pedestal of power, Eraps legal problems appeared in clusters.
Several cases previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set
in motion.
ISSUE: Whether or not Arroyo is a legitimate (de jure) president.

HELD: The SC holds that the resignation of Estrada cannot be doubted. It was
confirmed by his leaving Malacaang. In the press release containing his final
statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of therespondent as President of the
Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was

*Decision of Sandiganbayan affirmed and orders the annotation of lis pendens on

the title of the Olot Resthouse with respect to the claim of the Republic in another
civil case.

leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to
begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace
due to any kind of inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as

ESTRADA VS. ARROYO g.r. no. 146738

Joseph Erap Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President. From the beginning of Eraps term, he
was plagued by problems that slowly but surely eroded his popularity. His sharp
descent from power started on October 4, 2000. Singson, a longtime friend of

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soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the
opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity
given him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from
any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country.
Estradas reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president

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which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the
promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly,
the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not
give up the presidency. The press release was petitioners valedictory, his final act of
farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense. Even if Erap can prove that he did
not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the
ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to
rest by Congress and the decision that respondentArroyo is the de jure President
made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.

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