PROOF

Contents
Acknowledgements

Chronology

xi

Introduction

1.

Frege, Husserl and the Future of Philosophy

1. Psychologismus-Streit
2. Husserl and Frege, the grandfathers
3. The question of influence
4. Contra psychologismus
a) Freges critique of psychological logic
b) Husserls formulation of anti-psychologism
5. The crisis and its aftermath

2.

Questioning Metaphysics in Weimar Germany:

Carnap, Heidegger, Nonsense
1. Disputation at Davos
2. Neo-Kantianism and the interpretation of Kant
3. The end of Neo-Kantianism during the
Heidegger-Cassirer dispute
4. Further remarks on the historic background
to the disputation
5. Heideggers interpretation of Kant
6. Carnaps encounter with Heidegger
7. Carnaps metaphysics
8. Is Heidegger a metaphysician?
9. Heideggers nothing
10. Heideggers logic
11. Logic, praxis and ontology
12. Learning to express ones feelings without metaphysics
13. Music lessons for metaphysicians
14. Overcoming first principles
15. What does nothing mean?
vii

8
8
11
14
16
18
21
24

31
31
32
37
39
41
46
48
50
51
53
55
60
64
65
68

PROOF
viii

Contents

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
3.

Contradictions
Confrontation
Carnap and Heideggers shared background
Husserls influence on Carnap
Metaphysics and politics

Was There a Sun before Men Existed?: Ayer, Sartre,

Bataille, and Merleau-Ponty
1. A pornographer, a phenomenologist and
a logical positivist walk into a bar
2. Ayers criticism of Heideggers Das Nichts and
the British reception of Logical Positivism
3. Ayers criticism of Sartres le nant
4. Ayer encountering Merleau-Ponty
5. And they ask the barman, Was there a sun before
men existed?
6. Ayers response: the question of empiricism
7. The abyss stares back at Bataille
8. Unknowing the nothing

4. La Philosophie Analytique at Royaumont:

Gilbert Ryles Ambivalent Phenomenology
1. The battle of Royaumont
2. Continental analysts, Anglo-Saxon continentals
3. Ryles three Austrian rail-stations and
one Chinese game of chance
4. Ryles sympathetic articles on phenomenology
5. Phenomenology and meta-philosophy
6. Systematically misleading expressions,
or how to sharpen Ryles razor
7. Shaving Husserls beard
8. Rylean phenomenology
9. Husserls method for detecting category mistakes
10. Analysis and Husserls meta-philosophy
11. Analysis v. Mistress Science
12. Phenomenology and The Concept of Mind
13. Fr. Van Bredas response to Ryle
14. Merleau-Ponty and the borders of the continent

71
72
77
79
84

87
87
89
91
96
98
101
103
106

110
110
111
114
118
119
121
123
125
131
133
136
139
143
148

PROOF
Contents

5.

6.

ix

Derrida and Searle: The Abyss Stares Back?

1. Balliol, 1967
2. Austin and phenomenology
3. Derridas Austin
4. Searles reply to Derrida
5. Questioning the confrontation between two
prominent philosophical traditions
6. Forces and fronts
7. In whose name?

160
160
163
166
171

Conclusion

182

174
178
180

Notes

184

Bibliography

223

Index

251

PROOF

Introduction

Western academic philosophy in the twentieth century has been

responsible for producing an image of itself that haunts it to this
day. This is an image of philosophy as cut into two parts which are
separated by an unsurpassable gulf.1 Over this gulf, a limited number
of thinkers have unsuccessfully attempted to shout, their voices
plunging down into the abyss. And each failure to communicate has
widened the gulf a little more, forcing the two sides to drift further
and further apart.
This image purports to depict the divide between analytic and
continental philosophy. The idea that such a divide exists was first
conjured up following the end of the Second World War, and gradually became instituted within academic philosophy during the
nineteen-sixties and -seventies. And though there are many today
who rightly seek to downplay the importance of the divide, it is
indisputable that this image of division within philosophy still functions in various manners in the practical organisation of philosophy
departments, not simply in European and American universities, but
throughout the academic world.
The image of the divide itself has functioned as a barrier precluding
communication between philosophers thought to belong to either
side. Failures to engage in dialogue between various leading figures in
twentieth century philosophy have often been employed as signposts
marking the existence of barriers in communication.2 The differences
among figures who had engaged in attempts towards dialogue, such
as Frege and Husserl, Carnap and Heidegger, Sartre and Ayer, Ryle and
Merleau-Ponty, as well as Derrida and Searle, have been pointed to as
1

PROOF
2

Encounters between Analytic and Continental Philosophy

indicative of the existence of a divide. In serving as signposts of this

division, particular elements of these encounters have often been the
subject of misinterpretation and overinflation, as well as elementary
errors in scholarship in some cases. The institution of the divide was,
to a great extent, founded upon such supposedly failed attempts at
communication, which were often mistakenly considered to be precedents of the divide.
The analytic-continental divide is admittedly not a dialogical affair.
The phenomenon at hand is, for the most part, thought to be characterised by the silence among the parties involved. Within certain
contexts, it is the accepted norm that philosophers will proudly
refuse to read the work of their peers from the other side. Those who
try to deviate from this norm often tend to give up all too soon, and
negative verdicts are often made too easily, in passing, without much
backing by philosophical argument. As a result of this overall silence,
the few instances of attempted exchange have become surrounded
by a certain aura of significance. The usual willingness not to read
(Glendinning, 2006, p. 6) might find its justification in some factoid
(usually unconfirmed, often simply false) about a past master being
equally unwilling to read. This study revisits these past masters
attempts to engage with each others thought, showing how in each
case it is inappropriate to consider these as paradigm cases of division between two, and only two, movements in twentieth century
philosophy.
At the outset, one is faced with the obvious problem of defining
the two traditions at hand. The recent turn towards the study of
the history of analytic philosophy has given rise to a vivid debate
regarding what the term analytic philosophy itself means.3 Strict
definitions (e.g. Dummetts (1993) designation of the linguistic turn
as a necessary and sufficient criterion for philosophy to count as
analytic) have faced numerous significant objections and criticisms.4
This has led various authors towards constructing more loose definitions of analytic philosophy, for example seeing it as a combination of stylistic, methodological, topical, doctrinal, and other family
resemblances in the work of philosophers thought to be affiliated
with it.5
Despite the difficulties regarding the meta-philosophical definition
of analytic philosophy, there is broadly speaking some consensus
amongst scholars regarding the course of its historical development.

PROOF
Introduction

This may be summed up by saying that analytic philosophy is a

twentieth-century development which goes through various phases:6
an early phase that includes Frege, Russell, and Moore, a revolutionary
phase in the anti-metaphysical tendencies of Wittgenstein and those
he influenced in Cambridge and Vienna, furthered by the revision of
this revolutionary phase on the one hand by Oxford linguistic philosophers and on the other hand by various post-positivistic tendencies in American philosophy.7 Subsequent approaches to philosophy,
mainly within but certainly not limited to Anglo-American academia,8
that hold family resemblances to this series of thinkers have to this
day tended to be placed under the banner of analytic philosophy,
though this designation is gradually coming to be challenged.
When it comes to defining continental philosophy, matters are
even more difficult. The title of analytic philosophy was one which
philosophers in Britain (and later in the United States) took up as a
self-description sometime during the fifties;9 indeed, for many the
term designated a revolution in philosophy10 that they partook in.11
As both Critchley (2001, p. 5) and Glendinning (2006, p. 3) have
pointed out, this is not the case when it comes to the term continental philosophy, which presumably when practiced on the continent is philosophy simpliciter.12 The name is not a self-description, but
rather may be viewed as a side-effect of the founding of the tradition
of analytic philosophy.13 Some of the earliest statements regarding a
division between two movements in philosophy (conceived of at the
outset in national terms) were made by those who instituted the idea
of an analytic revolution in philosophy. Ryle (1971b, p. 181), as we
shall see in Chapter 4, and later R. M. Hare (1960), did not hesitate
to attribute this division to the lack of a continental equivalent of
the Oxbridge tutorial system. Though continental philosophy may
have been intended to generalise over what analytic philosophy is
not, this is an inadequate definition since non-analytic philosophy
is not limited to continental philosophy, but also insofar as it arbitrarily imagines continental philosophy to be unified. Though it is
possible that there are common themes linking various branches of
continental philosophy, it would be difficult to determine exactly
what unifies phenomenology and existentialism, hermeneutics,
the Frankfurt school, psychoanalytic theory, structuralism (and
what in America is called post-structuralism), deconstruction,
Neo-Thomism, and Neo-Kantianism.14 Indeed, engagement between

PROOF
4

Encounters between Analytic and Continental Philosophy

members of these schools often involves even more controversy than

one finds in the brief encounters between continental and analytic
philosophers.15
Intriguingly, the birth of the very idea of continental philosophy
is related to the series of misunderstandings that this study discusses.
When Ryle, Ayer, and others began to assert that there exists a gulf
between their own meta-philosophical outlook and one that predominates in Europe, they directed their attacks against members of the
phenomenological movement (broadly construed to include existentialism). Though during the late nineteen-forties and -fifties these
movements played a central role in European intellectual trends,
there were also numerous different approaches to philosophy alive
on the continent which the analytic philosophers use of the term
continental philosophy did not seem to take into consideration. It
was only later, when a variety of intellectual imports from France
and Germany were placed under this banner in American and British
academia, that the problem of the unity of continental philosophy
would arise.
It might be noted here that, though the explicit idea of a divide
only arose after the Second World War, there have been various
efforts to relate this idea to earlier disagreements between philosophers and movements.16 An early ancestor of the divide may be found
in the comparison by John Stuart Mill of Bentham and Coleridges
philosophies, where in fact we find one of the earliest uses of the
term continental philosophy.17 Mills diagnosis may have something to do with the subsequent rejection by Russell and Moore of
so-called British Idealism,18 which can be said to have set a precedent for analytic philosophers hostility towards their continental
peers. The early analytic turn against idealism, however, may be seen
as part of an overall crisis that European philosophy underwent in
response to the rise of experimental psychology, rather than a specifically British battle between realism and idealism.19 The demise of
the idealist schools that prevailed in European philosophy prior to
the First World War gradually led not only to the development of
analytic philosophy but also to the rise of phenomenology and existentialism in France and Germany (as we shall see in our examination
of Heideggers relation to Neo-Kantianism in Chapter 2).
Though this study does relate to the complexities of defining
analytic philosophy and of untangling the meaning of the term

PROOF
Introduction

continental philosophy, I shall not here attempt to propose a solution to either problem. It is obvious that no definition of analytic
philosophy, which prima facie excludes the contributions of Frege,
Carnap, Ayer, Ryle, Austin, or Searle, would adequately explain the
phenomenon at hand. Similarly, no introduction to the phenomenological movement can afford to leave out such figures as Husserl,
Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, or even Derrida. It is also, however,
doubtful whether these figures are representatives of two, and only
two, mutually exclusive movements in twentieth century philosophy.
Indeed, as I shall show in what follows, the assumption of the existence of two, and only two, such movements severely limits the story
to be told regarding the encounters between these philosophers. This
assumption has often distorted the richer detailed view one sees if
one is attentive enough not to gloss over the multiple approaches to
philosophy by dividing them into two types.
In the work that follows, I closely examine five such encounters
involving primarily six prominent figures of the analytic movement in
philosophy and six thinkers aligned with the phenomenological tradition.20 In Chapter 1, I begin by discussing the correspondence between
Gottlob Frege and Edmund Husserl during the eighteen-eighties. I
consider the question of influence between Husserl and Frege (13)
and outline their different responses to the philosophical crisis posed
by the emergence of experimental psychology (4). I examine the
so-called Psychologismus-Streit in German philosophy, pointing to
the reasons that caused Husserls work to become prominent in
Germanophone philosophy, while Freges work remained unknown
on the continent and was better received in England (5).
In Chapter 2 (13), I begin by considering the aftermath of
the Psychologismus-Streit and in particular the rivalry between
Neo-Kantianism and Lebensphilosophie leading up to Martin
Heideggers dispute with Ernst Cassirer at Davos in 1929. I present
Heideggers interpretation of Kant and his arguments against Cassirer
(5). I proceed (617) to examine the use by Rudolf Carnap of
sentences taken from Heideggers 1929 inaugural lecture at Freiburg
(titled Was ist Metaphysik?) in his 1931 article Overcoming
Metaphysics through the Logical Analysis of Language. Carnaps
claim that Heideggers sentences are metaphysical nonsense is traced
back to Husserls theory of meaning and his differentiation between
two types of nonsense. By examining Heideggers arguments in

PROOF
6

Encounters between Analytic and Continental Philosophy

connection with his interpretation of Kant, I develop an account of

Carnaps criticism which shows that Carnaps philosophical claims lie
quite close to those made by Heidegger. Their respective approaches
to metaphysics are shown to be reactions to the Psychologismus-Streit
(1820).
In Chapter 3, I examine A. J. Ayers encounter with Maurice
Merleau-Ponty and Georges Bataille in a Parisian bar in 1951. I present
Ayers argument against Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre as constituting the background of this meeting, and as being derived from
Carnaps use of Heidegger outlined in Chapter 2 (13). I proceed to
examine Merleau-Ponty (46) and Batailles views on the question
of whether the earth existed before men, demonstrating how Sartre
had already attacked Bataille using Ayers critique, and how Bataille
in turn mimics Ayer in attempting to repudiate Sartre (78).
In Chapter 4, our subject becomes the colloquium titled La
Philosophie Analytique, which took place at Royaumont in 1958.
Following a brief demonstration of why the colloquium was in fact
not the failure in communication between analytic and continental
philosophers that it has been considered (12), I go on to examine
Gilbert Ryles presentation there, titled Phenomenology vs. The
Concept of Mind. I consider the relation between Husserls theory
of meaning (and particularly his conception of nonsense) and Ryles
interest in it (311), and present the ways in which Ryle responds
to several of Husserls arguments in some of his central claims (e.g.
the notion of systematically misleading expressions (67) and
category mistakes (9)). I go on (1214) to dispel several misconceptions created by the Royaumont colloquium and its misinterpretation by scholars, by closely examining the dialogue among Ryle, Fr.
Herman Van Breda (13) and Merleau-Ponty (14) following Ryles
presentation.
In Chapter 5, I begin by discussing Derridas encounter with the
Oxonians (who had been present at Royaumont) at Oxford in 1967
(1). Tracing Derridas quasi-autobiographical claims regarding this
meeting, I examine several of Austins central concepts of speech-act
theory (2). I proceed to elucidate Derridas uses of Austins arguments in his later dispute with John Searle; in particular, I attempt to
show how Derrida introduces the work of Austin in his discussion in
response to Husserls conception of nonsense (3). I examine Searles
argument against Derridas interpretation of Austin (4); I then

PROOF
Introduction

proceed to show that the controversy is misconstrued as an exchange

between analytic and continental philosophy (5). I conclude the
chapter by indicating the importance of acknowledging a shift in
the meaning of the terms analytic and continental philosophy
between this and their prior uses (56).
It must be noted that the choice of telling the story of the encounter
of analytic philosophers with phenomenologists21 excludes various
aspects of a more general story to be told regarding encounters
between analytic and continental philosophers. For example,
another volume could be devoted to exchanges between analytic
philosophers and critical theorists (of the Frankfurt Institute for Social
Research). This long series of encounters may be seen to run parallel
to our study: its roots could be found in the so-called Methodenstreit
among economists of the late nineteenth century; the series may
start with Otto Neuraths polemical dispute with Max Horkheimer;22
it continues with the so-called Positivismusstreit;23 followed by
Bar-Hillels critique of Habermas use of speech-act theory;24 the latest
dispute in the series may be seen as that between John Rawls and
Jrgen Habermas on the question of justice.25
There are also a number of other miscellaneous encounters which
go beyond the scope of our enquiry.26 There is, for example, Bertrand
Russells very harsh criticism of Bergson.27 Michel Foucaults televised dispute with Noam Chomsky presents an interesting case of
exchange (one could even see it as non-polemical) between the two
traditions, possibly because neither Foucault nor Chomsky fall neatly
under the banner of continental and analytic philosophy.28 Nearer
to the present, the aftermath of the Sokal affair may be considered to
be linked to the lack of communication between the more humanistically minded continentals and the scientistic analysts;29 this is, of
course, no more than a badly painted caricature.

PROOF

Index
abyss, 1, 1035, 108, 149, 181,
184, 211
Acton, Harry B., xiii, 112, 208, 211,
212, 213
Adorno, Theodor, xii, 186, 213
Allen, Woody, 221
Alqui, Ferdinand, 112, 212
Ambrosino, Georges, 87, 99,
105, 205
Anglo-Saxon, 29, 111, 128, 13840,
145, 147, 148, 154, 157, 158, 159,
179, 181, 212, 216
anti-Semitism, 41
Apostel, Leo, 111, 212
Aquinas, Thomas, 27
arch, 657, 723, 75, 85,
201, 202
Aristotelian Society, 101, 118, 122,
123, 211, 213, 219
Aristotle, 21, 27, 73, 145, 188, 189,
196, 199, 202
Austin, John L., xiii, xiv, 5, 6, 153,
1616, 16877, 181, 184, 212,
21820
Avenarius, Richard, 34
Ayer, Alfred J.
and Austin, xiii, 165, 218
and Bataille, 878, 99, 1049, 161,
182, 220
and Camus, 205
and Carnap, 8991, 945, 105,
108, 109, 206, 218
and Derrida, 1602,
165, 206
and film criticism, 206
and Heidegger, 8991, 94,
206, 207
and Merleau-Ponty, xii, xiii, 6,
878, 96, 99103, 109, 1489,
161, 182, 192, 205, 207, 208,
209, 210, 211

and Sartre, xii, xiii, 1, 89, 915,

96, 97, 101, 105, 108, 109, 206,
2078, 209, 211
and Vienna Circle, xi, 8991,
108, 11920, 165, 185, 193,
206, 214, 218
at Royaumont, 148, 153, 1567,
182, 209, 211, 212
back to Kant, 33, 38, 194
back to things themselves, 194
Badiou, Alain, 180
Bar-Hillel, Yehoshua, xiv, 7, 186,
204, 205
Bataille, Georges, xiixiv, 6, 878,
94, 989, 1039, 149, 161, 182,
184, 186, 205, 211, 220
Bauhaus, 196, 200201
Beck, Leslie, 110, 111, 114, 14950,
152, 156, 212
Bentham, Jeremy, 4
Berger, Gaston, 112, 212
Bergson, Henri, ix, 7, 35, 48
Berlin, Isaiah, xiii, 211
Beth, Evert Willem, 111, 212
Bocheski, Jzef Maria, 111, 212
Bollnow, Otto Friedrich, 32
Bolzano, Bernard, 114, 115, 118,
126, 189, 191
Brentano, Franz, x, 14, 114, 115, 118,
126, 128, 163, 184, 186, 190,
191, 192, 215, 216
British Idealism, 4, 190
British Society for Phenomenology,
xiv, 222
Brun, Jean, 112, 212
Brunschvicg, Lon, 32, 197, 209
Bhler, Karl, 47
Camus, Albert, 89, 205
Cantor, Georg, 145, 191

251

PROOF
252

Index

Carnap, Rudolf
and Austin, 165, 170
and Ayer, 8991, 945, 105, 108,
109, 206, 218
and Derrida, 169, 220
and Frege, ix, xiii, 14, 26, 190,
201, 202, 2034
and Husserl, x, xiii, 14, 29, 66,
7884, 1689, 171, 189, 191,
198, 202, 203, 2045, 209, 220
and Neo-Kantianism, 49, 63, 767,
83, 90, 193, 199
and Quine, 197, 199, 203, 208
and the Royaumont colloquium,
111, 116, 117
and Wittgenstein, 79, 823, 195,
2034
Carroll, Lewis, 945, 208
Cassirer, Ernst, xi, xii, 5, 313,
3542, 59, 66, 104, 186, 193,
194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 217
Cassirer, Toni, 401, 197
Cavaills, Jean, 32, 148, 191,
193, 197
Chomsky, Noam, 7, 186
Cohen, Hermann, ix, 35, 199, 217
Coleridge, Samuel T., 4, 186
Collingwood, Robin G., 185
Condillac, Etienne de, 166
Couturat, Louis, 148
Critchley, Simon, 3, 14950, 185,
211, 217
Croce, Benedetto, xiii, 211
Culler, Jonathan, 161, 220
Dascal, Marcello, 222
Dawes Hicks, George, xi, 213
deconstruction, 3, 162, 169, 171,
176, 219, 220
Deleuze, Gilles, 112, 180, 196, 212, 219
Delmer, Isabel, 88, 205
Delors, Jacques, 150
Dempsey, Peter J. R., xiii, 208
Derrida, Jacques
and Austin, 6, 1612, 16671,
218, 219
and Ayer, 1602, 165, 206

and Carnap, 169, 220

and Continental philosophy,
17681, 185, 220, 221
and Foucault, 172, 177, 185, 221
and Heidegger, 169, 196
and Husserl, 5, 6, 162, 16671,
174, 219, 220
in 1967, xiv, 1602, 218
and phenomenology, 5, 16671,
17780, 186
and Searle, xiv, 1, 6, 17180,
184, 2202
at Oxford, xiv, 6, 1602
Devaux, Philippe, 111, 212
Dilthey, Wilhelm, 35, 186, 200
Dreyfus, Hubert, 16, 180, 220, 221
Duhem, Pierre M. M., 148
Dummett, Michael, 2, 1213, 29, 78,
184, 185, 187, 188, 192
empiricism, 101, 103, 209, 211
enlightenment, 36, 176, 178, 187,
220, 221
epistemology, xi, 78, 142, 169, 170,
186, 189, 191, 194, 196, 199,
200, 214, 219
Eucken, Rudolf, 10, 35
European Union, 150
existentialism, 3, 4, 77, 89, 912,
947, 104, 11113, 118, 162, 179,
190, 193, 206, 207
Fichte, Johann G., 489
Findlay, John N., 148, 217
Fink, Eugen, 32
First World War, ix, 4, 11, 25, 29, 31,
35, 78, 192, 194
Fllesdal, Dagfinn, xiii, 1415, 17,
185, 187, 188, 213
Foucault, Michel, 7, 172, 177, 185,
186, 191, 219, 220, 221
Frankfurt school, 3, 7, 104, 221
Frege, Gottlob, ix, x, xiii, 1, 3, 5,
1122, 2530, 34, 534, 77,
78, 79, 114, 115, 117, 121, 126,
140, 182, 18792, 199, 2015,
208, 217

PROOF
Index 253

Freud, Sigmund, 175

Friedman, Michael, 38, 40, 467,
85, 193, 194, 197200, 202,
205, 206
Gandillac, Maurice de, 32, 41
Gewirth, Alan, 112, 212
Glendinning, Simon, 2, 3, 113, 150,
155, 1601, 177, 184, 186, 191,
205, 207, 209, 215, 216, 217, 218
Gomperz, Heinrich, 47
gulf, 1, 4, 138, 147, 14851, 154, 176,
181, 183, 184, 220
Habermas, Jrgen, 7, 185, 186, 187
Hahn, Hans, 47, 191, 195, 202
Hampshire, Stuart, xiii, 206
Hare, R. M., xiii, 3, 221
Hartmann, Nicolai, 33
Hegel, Georg W. F., 48, 63, 97, 148,
185, 186, 193, 196, 199
Heidegger, Martin
and Ayer, 8991, 94, 206, 207
and Derrida, 169, 196
and Frege, 25, 190, 199, 205
and Husserl, x, xi, 5, 26, 27, 28,
30, 31, 40, 545, 58, 66, 78,
834, 184, 194, 197, 198, 205,
207, 209, 210, 213, 215, 216, 220
and Neo-Kantianism, 4, 32, 33,
3541, 59, 767, 83, 193, 196
and Russell, 199
and Ryle, 11819, 121, 21314
and Wittgenstein, xi, 203, 213
Hempel, Carl, 111
hermeneutics, 3, 59, 75, 76, 77, 84,
177, 196
Hilbert, David, 145, 191, 204
history of
analysis, 184, 218
analytic philosophy, 2, 111, 184, 222
ideas, 191
metaphysics, 66
philosophy, 30, 66, 135, 144, 184,
186, 196, 218, 223
Horkheimer, M., xii, 7, 205
Hulme, Thomas E., ix, x, 192, 208

humanities, 7, 23, 34, 76, 77, 135,

177, 181
Hume, David, 102, 201, 208
Husserl, Edmund
and Adorno, xii, 213
and Austin, 163, 164, 166, 1701,
174, 220
and Ayer, 96, 156, 207, 208, 215
and Carnap, x, xiii, 14, 29, 66,
7884, 1689, 171, 189, 191,
198, 202, 203, 2045, 209, 220
and Derrida, 5, 6, 162, 16671,
174, 219, 220
in England, x, 29, 1923
and Frege, ix, xii, 1, 5, 1118, 21,
26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 34, 126, 182,
1878, 189, 190, 205, 208, 217
and Heidegger, x, xi, 5, 26, 27, 28,
30, 31, 40, 545, 58, 66, 78,
834, 184, 194, 197, 198, 205,
207, 209, 210, 213, 215, 216, 220
and Lebensphilosophie, 36, 40
on logic, 214, 28, 54, 58, 140,
189, 219
and Merleau-Ponty, 5, 27, 96, 150,
184, 210, 215
and Neo-Kantianism, x, 10, 256,
34, 54, 188, 190, 194
and psychologism, ix, x, 5, 10,
1118, 207, 1345, 1878, 189,
190, 207, 215, 219
response by Tarski and Quine,
216, 217
and the Royaumont colloquium,
112, 113, 128, 13648, 1526,
213, 217
and Russell, ix, x, 96, 120, 153,
192, 204, 208
and Ryle, x, xi, xii, 6, 29, 11318,
1209, 13148, 1525, 163, 168,
171, 189, 1923, 208, 213, 214,
21516, 217
and Schlick, x, 25, 29, 190, 191
theory of meaning, 5, 6, 7983,
11517, 121, 1313, 1401, 164,
16771, 174, 189, 204, 214, 216,
217, 219, 220

PROOF
254 Index

Ingarden, Roman, 126

intentionality, 98, 1012, 1267,
207, 211
Jaensch, Erich R., 35
Jaspers, Karl, 27
Kant, Immanuel
interpretation of, 56, 31, 324,
3740, 416, 49, 59, 66, 76, 194,
196, 198
Kantian consensus, 179
and logic, 23, 1889
Platonism (quasi-Platonist,
semi-Platonic)
and psychologism, 20, 187
schematism, 426, 197, 198
on the term phenomenon, 128
Kaufmann, Felix, 29, 191
Kierkegaard, Sren, 63, 112, 118
Kraft, Viktor, 47
Kusch, Martin, 9, 11, 186, 187, 189,
190, 194, 195, 197, 205
Lange, Friedrich Albert, 63, 201
Lask, Emil, ix, 33, 54
Lebensgefhl, 623, 72, 74, 195
Lebensphilosophie, 5, 35, 369, 77, 83,
90, 193, 194, 195, 200
Levinas, Emmanuel, 27, 32, 104,
193, 196, 197, 198
Liebmann, Otto, 194
Lipps, Gottlob F., 35
logic
Aristotelian, 19, 58,
188, 197
logical grammar, 82, 115, 140,
169, 217, 219, 220
logical syntax, 50, 64, 68, 79, 115,
116, 201
modern, 8, 11, 19, 25, 49, 64, 82,
83, 84, 117, 188
non-Aristotelian, 19
post-Aristotelian, 200
logical idealism, 33
logical objectivism, 118

logical positivism, 34, 40, 74, 77, 89,

92, 105, 106, 111, 184, 194, 202,
206, 210, 218
logicism, 1920, 26, 77, 188
Lvov-Warsaw school of Logic,
29, 185
Mace, Cecil A., xiii, 208
Mach, Ernst, 34, 209
Mandelbaum, Maurice, xiii
Marx, Karl, 175
Marxism, 85, 111, 195, 205
McCarthyism, 221
McCumber, John, 222
McDowell, John, 179
Meinong, Alexius, x, 90, 11416,
118, 124, 126, 190, 191, 192,
206, 215
Meister Eckhart, 119
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice
and Ayer, xii, xiii, 6, 878,
96, 99103, 109, 1489, 161,
182, 192, 205, 207, 208, 209,
210, 211
against empiricism, 1013,
209, 210
and phenomenology, 5, 27, 978,
112, 209, 210, 215
and Ryle, 114, 14954, 180, 218
against Sartre, 978, 209, 210
on temporality, 99103, 208, 210
and Wittgenstein, xiv, 211, 218
metalogic, 734, 139
meta-philosophy, 2, 4, 18, 30, 33,
37, 70, 74, 113, 11921, 1337,
139, 142, 215
metaphysics
as Begriffsdichtung, 624, 201
Continental, 177
of Dasein, 46
and deconstruction, 169, 177, 219
descriptive, 48
Destruktion of, 39, 45, 47, 51, 60,
72, 76
elimination of, 32, 51, 90, 91, 95,
193, 195

PROOF
Index 255

as an expression of Lebensgefhl,
623, 72
as first philosophy, 73
laying the ground for, 38, 39, 43,
44, 46, 66
meaninglessness of, 49, 50, 606,
70, 73, 74, 76, 91, 94
and modernism, 200
naturalistic ontology, 48
and Neo-Kantianism, 49, 63,
84, 199
overcoming of (berwindung), 5,
6, 47, 48, 49, 62, 64, 76, 117,
193, 202
and poetry, 624, 756
and politics, 85, 200, 205
post-Kantian, 48, 91
traditional, 49, 50, 75,
85, 91
under attack, 47, 50, 75
Verwindung of, 202
Mill, John Stuart, 4, 20, 21, 115,
186, 187
Mohanty, Jitendra Nath, 1516, 17,
187, 200
Montefiore, Alan, 161
Moore, George E., ix, xiii, 3, 4, 13,
96, 114, 115, 184, 190, 192, 193,
208, 214
Mora, Jos Ferrater, 111
Murdoch, Iris, 95, 208
music, 634, 201
mysticism, 107, 11819
Nagel, Ernest, xii, 185
National Socialism, 31, 41, 47, 85,
143, 206, 217
Natorp, Paul, 10, 25, 26, 33, 187,
190, 217
Neo-Kantianism
and Carnap, 49, 63, 767, 83, 90,
193, 199
in France, 195, 197, 209
and Heidegger, 4, 32, 33, 3541,
59, 767, 83, 193, 196
and Husserl, 25, 84, 190

on the interpretation of Kant,

334, 194
and Lebensphilosophie, 5, 358,
193
not a unified school, 25, 345, 37,
76, 196
and psychologism, 25, 34, 121,
187
Neo-Thomism, 3
Neurath, O., x, xii, 7, 36, 191,
195, 202
Nietzsche, Friedrich W., 35, 63, 90,
175, 185, 186, 201
nonsense
Sinnlosigkeit, 80, 116, 131, 167,
168, 169
Unsinn, 80, 81, 116, 131,
168, 219
and Widersinn (absurdity), 80, 81,
116, 131, 167, 168, 219
Nowell-Smith, Patrick H., xiii
obscurantism, 501, 53, 101, 106,
172, 194, 206, 221
Ockhams razor, 123, 125
Paton, Herbert J., 114
Perelman, Cham, 111, 212
petition against experimental
psychology, ix, 10, 35
Pfnder, Alexander, 126, 163
Planck, Max, 145
Plato, 27, 147, 160, 193, 201, 208
poetry, 624, 746, 201
Poincar, Henri, 123, 148
polemics, ix, xiii, 7, 28, 30, 35, 62,
84, 90, 91, 109, 110, 111, 114,
121, 138, 139, 141, 146, 150,
152, 172, 174, 181, 182, 185,
191, 192, 205, 207, 208, 218
Pos, Hendrik, 41, 46, 198
Positivismusstreit, xiv, 7
postmodernism, 176, 178, 2201
pragmatism, 100, 112, 209, 210
Pre-Socratics, 66, 201
psychoanalysis, 3, 177

PROOF
256 Index

Psychologismus-Streit, 5, 6, 811, 14,

1618, 24, 26, 345, 70, 778,
83, 146, 190, 192
psychology
descriptive, 190, 215, 216
distinct from logic, 15, 213, 189
distinct from mathematics, 190
distinct from philosophy, 811,
213, 30, 5960, 701, 120,
1345, 200, 214
empirical, 60, 134
experimental, ix, 45, 811, 14,
19, 30, 146, 192
Gestalt, 98, 101
important to mathematics, 14
important to philosophy, 186
Pythagoras, 198
Quine, Willard V. O., xi, 14, 48, 89,
153, 179, 184, 197, 199, 203,
208, 216, 217
rapprochement, 1501
Rawls, John, 7, 186
realism, 4, 98, 100, 101, 112,
184, 209
Reinach, Adolf, x, 126, 1634
Rickert, Heinrich, 10, 25, 26, 33, 35,
36, 38, 54, 187, 190, 195
Riehl, Alois, 10, 34, 187
Ritter, Joachim, 32
Rosenzweig, Franz, 193
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 161
Russell, Bertrand, ixxiv, 3, 4, 7, 13,
18, 19, 26, 534, 823, 90, 111,
114, 11517, 11920, 126,
13941, 147, 1515, 184, 186,
190, 191, 192, 199, 203, 204,
206, 208, 212, 214, 215, 217, 218
Russells paradox, 19, 26, 201
Ryle, Gilbert
and Heidegger, 11819, 121,
21314
and Husserl, x, xi, xii, 6, 29,
11318, 1209, 13148, 1525,
163, 168, 171, 189, 1923, 208,
213, 214, 21516, 217

and Merleau-Ponty, 114, 14954,

180, 218
and Sartre, 139, 185, 214
Sartre, Jean Paul
and Ayer, xii, xiii, 1, 89, 915, 96,
97, 101, 105, 108, 109, 206,
2078, 209, 211
against Bataille, 107, 108
and phenomenology, 5, 27, 97,
101, 184, 2078, 210
and Ryle, 139, 185, 214
Scheller, Max, 36, 195, 196
Schelling, Friedrich W. J., 48
Schlick, Moritz, x, xi, xii, 25, 289,
34, 190, 191, 195, 203, 213
Schopenhauer, Arthur, 63
Schrder, Ernst, 1516
Schtz, Alfred, 126
science
advances of, 32, 33, 37,
49, 120
conditions of possibility of, 23, 33
critical relation to philosophy, 28,
70, 121, 134
exact, 34, 135
inductive, 48
and logic, 22, 53, 54, 72, 73, 84,
115, 199
and metaphysics, 489, 51, 52, 60,
72, 76, 84, 202, 209
Mistress Science, 1368, 142,
145, 216
natural, 48, 76
and nothing, 52
observational, 124, 215
philosophy as a rigorous science,
27, 28, 136, 137, 141, 191, 192
science of, 27, 54, 137
social, 24, 177
special, 59, 60, 66, 70
theory of, 22, 24, 27, 84, 174, 219
unified, 22, 23, 48
scientific Weltauffassung, 32, 76,
191, 195
scientism, 7, 176
Scotus, Duns, 33, 194

PROOF
Index 257

Searle, John, xiv, 1, 5, 6, 29,

162, 1718, 1802, 214,
220, 221, 222
Second World War, xiii, 1, 4, 87, 89,
92, 104, 120, 135, 165, 205, 211
Sellars, Wilfrid, 179
Snow, Charles P., 181
Society for Phenomenology and
Existential Philosophy, xiv, 222
Sokal hoax, 7, 186
Solomon, Robert, 15, 218
Special Operations Executive, 87
speech-act, xiv, 6, 7, 1625, 170,
171, 176, 189, 219
Spengler, Oswald, 36, 195
Spinoza, Baruch, 112, 198
Stoicism, 19, 188
Strawson, Peter F., 48, 153, 1602,
179, 185, 218, 219
structuralism, 3, 179, 221
Stumpf, Carl, 186, 190
subjectivism, 98, 119
subsumption, 40, 41, 42, 46, 102,
130, 188, 197
Tarski, Alfred, 111, 216
Taylor, Charles, xiii, 1013, 110,
209, 211, 215
Thatcher, Margaret, 150
Thomasson, Amie L., 133, 204,
21317
Trakakis, Nick, 88, 206

Twardowski, Kazimierz J. S., 29

Urmson, James O., 153, 184, 213,
214, 218, 219
Vaihinger, Hans, 34, 194
Van Breda, Herman L., 6, 112, 117,
1438, 151, 154, 212, 213, 217
Vienna Circle, 25, 26, 29, 36, 47,
8991, 93, 148, 184, 191, 195,
204, 209, 214
Wahl, Jean, x, xiii, 87, 108, 11112,
149, 155, 205, 210, 212, 218
Waismann, Friedrich, xi, xiv, 184,
191, 203
Warnock, Mary, 95, 208
Weimar Republic, 356
Whitehead, Alfred N., 26, 53, 111,
147, 204, 212
Williams, Bernard, 112, 185, 212
Windelband, Wilhelm, ix, 10, 25,
33, 187, 195
Wisdom, John, 184
Wissenschaftslehre, 223, 27,
48, 189
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, x, xi, xiii, xiv,
3, 26, 79, 823, 11516, 11920,
13941, 1507, 184, 186, 191,
195, 2034, 205, 206, 211, 213,
21720
Wundt, Wilhelm, 9, 19, 186, 190

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