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Cambridge Programme for Security in International Society (C-SIS)

C-SIS WORKING PAPER N 1

Follow the money: the modus operandi and mindset of


HAMAS fundraising in the USA and the PA using American and
Saudi donations

by
Ronen Bergman
Tel Aviv/Cambridge
February 2003

Centre of International Studies

2003 C-SIS & BERGMAN

Content
Content ................................................................................................................................2
Introduction.........................................................................................................................4
HAMAS History and Main Characteristics ......................................................................8
History ..................................................................................................................................8
Ideology ................................................................................................................................8
The Political Bureau ..............................................................................................................9
Terrorist Operations.............................................................................................................10
HAMAS Fundraising.........................................................................................................13
American intelligences activity against HAMAS ................................................................13
FBIs overall estimation.......................................................................................................14
Inter-HAMAS US-front-organizations links.........................................................................15
The Case of Abu-Marzook ................................................................................................16
Background of Abu Marzook...............................................................................................16
Abu-Marzooks position in HAMAS ...................................................................................18
The case of Mohammad Salah ..........................................................................................20
Salahs recruitment to HAMAS ...........................................................................................20
Salahs August 1992 trip to Israel for HAMAS ....................................................................22
Salahs January 1993 trip to Israel and the territories ...........................................................25
The Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLFRD) ................................30
History ................................................................................................................................30
Organizational structure.......................................................................................................30
The HLFRD activity for HAMAS........................................................................................31
Intercepted discussions of HAMAS Leaders ........................................................................31

1993 Philadelphia meeting .......................................................................................31


1994 Oxford Mississippi meeting .............................................................................35
HLFRD, Marzook and Salah................................................................................................35
Recipients of HLFRD Fund overseas ...................................................................................36
HLFRD and its leadership identified as HAMAS .................................................................38
Search of the HLFRD office in Jerusalem ............................................................................39
1997 HLFRD closure...........................................................................................................42
Quranic Literacy Institute ("QLI")..................................................................................45
QLIs scheme to generate income for HAMAS activites ......................................................46
HAMAS tries to minimize losses.........................................................................................46
ZAKAT Committees In The West Bank And Gaza .........................................................48
Islamic Charity Association (a.k.a. Islamic Charitable Society in Hebron)............................49
Tulkarem ZAKAT Committee .............................................................................................50
Orphan Care Association (Bethlehem) .................................................................................51
Recipients of money outside of the West Bank and Gaza ................................................53
Sanabil Association for relief and development (Sanabil).....................................................53
Human Appeal International - Jordan (HAI) ........................................................................54
Saudi Support to HAMAS.................................................................................................56
Saudi Arabian Committee for support of the Intifada al Quds...............................................57
PAs knowledge of HAMAS financing ................................................................................60
Conclusions........................................................................................................................62
Appendix A: The payment cycles made by the Saudi Committee to support of Intifada AI
Quds....................................................................................................................................65
Appendix B: Saudi duplicitous messages regarding HAMAS actions ..................................69
Appendix C: Affidavit of Brigadier General Yaacov Amidror, head of the analysis and
assessment division of the Israel Defence Forces Intelligence, as attached to Marzook
Extradition Request. ............................................................................................................71
The Hamas Leadership abroad ...........................................................................................72

Hamas control, guidance and operational bodies abroad.....................................................73


Structure of Hamas in the territories...................................................................................76
Apparatuses.......................................................................................................................77
Funding.............................................................................................................................79
Abbreviations and acronyms.............................................................................................80

Introduction

On March 9, 2002, an unusual hearing took place in the Chicago District Court. On the one
side sat Joyce and Stanley Boim. They are both American citizens living in Israel for the last
fourteen years who were the parents of David Boim, a yeshiva student murdered in 1996 by
two HAMAS members. Next to them sat a battery of lawyers, headed by Nathan Lewin, one
of Washingtons most well known attorneys. On the other side, also accompanied by a
contingent of lawyers, sat representatives of six of the Islamic associations in the USA,
headed by members of the Holy Land Foundation. American Justice Department official says
that the precedent set by this case will address the critical issues and difficulties in fighting
the financial structure of terrorism1.

David Boim was born in Brooklyn, New York, on March 27, 1979. On May 13, 1996, he
was waiting, together with other students, at a bus stop near Beit-El in the West Bank, when
he was shot by a passing car, hitting him in the head. He died instantly. His two assailants
were HAMAS terrorists who had earlier opened fire on a civilian bus, wounding two
passengers. They then drove on for a few hundred meters to shoot David and the other
students. At this point, the two escaped at top speed, but lost control of their car. They
abandoned it and fled on foot to the nearby village of Jilazun, under the control of the
Palestinian Authority (PA).

Following the attack, the two murderers, Khalil Tawfiq Al Sharif and Amjad Hinawi, were
arrested by the PA. Hinawi, tried by a Palestinian court on February 17, 1998, admitted that
he had committed the murder and was sentenced for ten years imprisonment. However, he
only remained in prison for a very short period of time, and is currently a free man. Living
somewhere in the Palestinian Authority, probably in Gaza. Al Sharif, the other murderer,
was the suicide bomber in the attack on the Ben Yehuda pedestrian mall in the centre of
Jerusalem on September 4, 1997.

David Boims parents are now suing Hinawi, Al Sharifs estate and a list of organizations
they claim supported HAMAS and financed its operations, together with two other people
who were involved in the transfer of funds to HAMAS2.

For Joyce Boim it was a traumatic meeting


I left there in a state of panic. The judge demanded that we meet with the other side, in order
to see whether it was possible to reach some kind of compromise or settle out of court. But
what kind of compromise can you reach with the people who wittingly and maliciously

financed the death of your son? Mohammed Salah, one of the leaders of HAMAS in the USA,
was sitting there looking me straight in the face, and saying he didnt know anything, didnt
have a clue what I was talking about, and that he and the movements he is connected to dont
have any money at all.

That they live from hand to mouth and have no connection

whatsoever to HAMAS.

You cant imagine what kind of guilt feelings were eating at me from the inside. My son was
killed by two terrorists one of whom blew himself up a year later on the Ben Yehuda
pedestrian mall, killing five more people. That hit me even harder than Davids murder. Our
claim against the terrorists wont bring David back. The money we receive wont make
anything better, and its not even for the sake of revenge. I thought that perhaps I could have
done more to prevent others from going through this terrible suffering, this destruction of a
family, and the hell we have been through. If I could at least harm those who paid for the gun
which was used to kill my son, and for the escape car which helped him get away, and the
explosives and the incitement all around then perhaps I could somehow assuage my guilt
feelings, and spare more sorrow.3

This lawsuit raises a complex legal issue. Can organizations and individuals who gave
economic support to an organization which has claimed responsibility for murders and other
acts of international terrorism, and is known to have committed them, be sued for damages in
respect of the murder of a 17 year old American citizen in Israel4?

Boims American attorney Nathan Lewin claimed at the hearing that the law enables the
victim of a terrorist attack to sue any person who encouraged the main perpetrator, and
assisted in committing the offence. We see great importance in following the money trail.
HAMAS social and terrorist infrastructure is heavily dependent on the existence of cash flow
from foreign sources. Fighting these would eventually damage HAMASs capabilities. The
Defendants were well aware, said Lewin, through articles published in the American press,
that HAMAS had taken responsibility during the years 1992 1996 for suicide bombings and
bombs on buses in Israel, which had killed many citizens. Donations and contributions made
to HAMAS after the publication of this material turned the Defendants into entities bearing
responsibility for any murder or violent act organized by HAMAS.5

The court file details responses to the lawsuit submitted by most of the defendants over the
last year (the claim was filed in December 2000). They all flatly deny any connection
whatsoever to HAMAS or Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). They claim that their support was
contributed to charity and welfare organizations only, thus requesting that the case be

dismissed. Their request was not granted. The American Justice Department, asked to submit
an opinion in the proceedings, transferred to the court a document that expressed strong
support to the Boim family position.

This legal question has its roots in the late Eighties. Then, following a series of successful
preventative measures and operations taken by Israeli intelligence and police against
HAMAS, an urgent need arose in this organization to raise funds abroad for future
operations. There were two objectives for these funds. The first was to finance HAMAS
large support of various social institutions (childrens kindergartens, hospitals, detoxification
facilities, mosques, etc.). This support is used to enlarge HAMASs power on the Palestinian
street and hence, recruit new supporters. The other objective was to finance what is described
by HAMAS as military operations, and as terrorism by its victims6.

This research will focus on the foreign (i.e. outside of Israel\Palestine) material support of
HAMAS while trying to follow the modus operandi and mindset of HAMAS fundraising in
the USA and the Palestinian National Authority (PA) making use of American and Saudi
donations. I will try to answer a few main questions:
1. Who are the main donors?
2. What are the main channels used to funnel money to the PA territory? What are the main
methods, if at all, used to bypass law enforcement agencies?
3. Is there any connection between the fundraising network and the military\terrorist actions
taken by HAMAS? Are the operatives of the fundraising activity were aware of such a
connection?
4. To what degree, if any, did the American authorities have knowledge of the issues
discussed above?
5. In what way, if at all, did the money aid HAMAS?

Brigadier General Yaacov Amidror, head of the analysis and assessment division of the Israel
Defence Forces Intelligence implied7 in 1997 that it transpires that the HAMAS encountered
very few difficulties in operating in countries ostensibly deemed to be progressive, to be
strictly observant of the Law and to be combating terrorism. Ostensibly, however,
According to Brigadier General Amidror is the operative word.

The FBI has been collecting material on these movements for over ten years. Innumerable
surveillance operations, wiretaps, briefings, analyses of bank accounts and other actions have
been taken by the FBI, and particularly its Chicago Terrorist Task Force (CTTF), to crack the
complex system of the front movements for HAMAS in the USA.

According to FBI reports, about two thirds of the HAMAS annual budget, which totals
several tens of millions of dollars, came from fund-raising operations and money transfers in,
from and through North America and Western Europe. In the USA, the FBI has identified at
least six organizations that raise funds for HAMAS. According to American, British, French
and Israeli intelligence sources, interviewed for this research, a major portion of this money
originates in Saudi Arabia.

This paper will try to analyse the mindset and modus operandi of HAMAS financing network
while focusing on a number of individuals (Marzook, Salah) and organizations (QLI,
HLFRD), which are, in my opinion, an ample example of the entire phenomena. This
research is based upon classified intelligence documents from the US, Israel, and the PA,
some of which are exposed here for the first time. The research is also based upon 25
interviews in the US, France, the UK, Bosnia, Israel and the PA, and on books and news
clips.

I have strongly attempted not to be misled by the natural desire of intelligence services to
portray reality according to their own subjective view.

Thus, I repeatedly question the

interpretations given to raw material. However, in some cases, as for example in FBI bagging
transcripts, I had to relay on the honesty and goodwill of the secret agents not to fabricate a
document of this kind.

HAMAS History and Main Characteristics

History
HAMAS is a social, political and militant (i.e. terrorist) organization that espouses an
extremist Islamic fundamentalist ideology. HAMAS is an acronym for Harakat AlMukawama Al-Islamia- the Islamic Resistance Movement, and also bares the Arabic meaning
of Great enthusiasm or desire. It was founded in 1988 in the Gaza Strip and is dedicated to
the establishment of an Islamic Palestinian State that encompasses Israel, the West Bank and
Gaza. HAMAS is a militant Palestinian off shoot of the Muslim Brotherhood that was
founded in 1928 to replace secular rulers with an Islamic society8.

In late 1987, activist members of this Muslim Brotherhood opted to play a more direct role in
the popular uprising, known as the Intifada, than the Muslim Brotherhood leadership would
allow. As a result, Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, then head of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gaza
Strip, formed HAMAS9. In May 1989, Yassin was arrested and in October 1991, he was tried
and sentenced to life imprisonment by an Israeli court for HAMAS terrorist activities.

In October 1997, following a failed MOSSAD attempt to assassinate Khlid Mishal, another
HAMAS leader, in Amman, Jordan, using a biological agent, Yassin was released to the
Jordanians and subsequently returned to Gaza. On October 29, 1998, Yassin was placed
under house arrest by the Palestinian Authority (PA) following an unsuccessful HAMAS
suicide attack to blow up a bus full of school children in Kfar Darom, which resulted in the
death of an Israeli soldier. Yassin was released from house arrest two months later, in
December 1998.

Ideology
HAMAS is primarily based in the West Bank and Gaza. When the Government of Israel
(GOI) declared HAMAS an illegal organization in 1989, HAMAS leaders moved its support
structures outside Israel10.

HAMAS has publicly rejected Yasir Arafat and the PA as the representatives of the
Palestinian people. HAMAS has also announced that it opposes the Palestine National
Council's 1988 decision to establish an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank. Since

the group's inception, HAMAS has forged significant inroads into acceptance by mainstream
Palestinians.

The ideology of HAMAS is codified in the HAMAS covenant. This covenant establishes
HAMAS' primary goal as the creation of an Islamic State in all of Palestine through Jihad
(Holy War). Jihad, according to the covenant is the immediate and sole solution to all
Palestinian problems. The participation in the armed struggle is the duty of every Muslim.
HAMAS rejects absolutely any political solution entailing the concession of any part of
historic "Palestine."11

The primary tenets of HAMAS philosophy are opposition to compromise with Israel over the
creation of a Palestinian State and replacement of the PA as the sole representative of the
Palestinian people. To these ends, HAMAS pursues a combined program of violence and
terror on one hand, and educational, charitable, and social functions on the other. The
principle purpose of its armed attacks is to intimidate and coerce the GOI and its civilian
population (for further discussion of HAMAS ideology, please refer to appendix c).

Through its acts of violence, HAMAS has established itself as one of the primary Palestinian
terrorist organizations continuing the "armed struggle" against Israel. These terrorist attacks
target not only military targets, but civilian ones as well. HAMAS terrorist attacks have
resulted in scores of deaths and hundreds of injuries in Israel, including the killing of several
U.S. citizens. The use of suicide bombers has become a HAMAS trademark.

The Political Bureau


The political bureau operates as the highest ranking leadership body in the HAMAS
organization, setting policies and guidelines with respect to HAMAS activities. In addition to
its other functions, this bureau has responsibility for directing and coordinating
military\terrorist acts by HAMAS against soldiers and civilians in Israel and the occupied
territories.

An interview with a senior HAMAS spokesman identifies the influence that the political wing
of HAMAS has over the military wing. In a July 31, 2001 Reuters article, Abdel-Aziz alRantissi, a senior HAMAS official and spokesman stated, "The (HAMAS) political
leadership has freed the hand of the brigades to do whatever they want against the brothers of

monkeys and pigs." The term "brigades" refers to the group's military wing, the Izz A-Din alQassam brigades.

Rantissi further stated "I urge all the brigades to chase and target the Israeli political leaders
and members of parliament, the killer (Prime Minister) Ariel Sharon and the criminal
(Foreign Minister) Shimon Peres." This was believed to be the first public call by HAMAS to
target Israeli leaders. According to the article, "HAMAS political wing determines overall
policy for the movement . . ."

Even after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the World Trade Centre and
Pentagon, HAMAS public statements urge support for continued violence against Israel and
the United States. In a September 2001 public statement published by Reuters, Rantissi
echoed calls by Taliban clerics in Afghanistan, urging, "Muslims on Friday to unite against
any U.S. retaliation for the terror attacks in New York and Washington." He went on to say,
"It is impossible for Muslims to stand handcuffed and blindfolded while other Muslims, their
brothers, are being attacked. The Muslim world should stand up against the American threats,
which are fed by the Jews.

Terrorist Operations
In comparison to all other militant organization in the territories, HAMAS is, without doubt,
the most active and deadly. Looking at some of the statistics can give some idea on the extent
of HAMAS involvement in terrorism12:

HAMAS was the first organization to use suicide bombers in the Israeli/Palestinian arena. In
contradiction to all Israeli intelligence estimation that this modus operandi would only be
used in Lebanon by radical Shiaa Muslims, HAMAS launched the first suicide bombing
operation in 6.4.9313. The person involved was an avid HAMAS fan from the Balata refugee
camp, trying to drive a car, loaded with explosives into a parking bus near Kibbutz Mechola.
Since then, and until September 2000, 61 suicide bombers were sent to Israel. Out of them,
41 were HAMAS and all the rest PIJ.

Since the outbreak of violence in September 2000, HAMAS has sent 59 suicide bombers to
Israel in comparison to 40 by PIJ, 46 TANZIM, 8 PFLP and another 13 that are still not
associated to any particular organization.

10

Out of the total number of Israeli casualties in the current Intifada, 687 civilians and soldiers,
HAMAS was definitely in charge of operations that took the lives of 271 people. Out of the
overall number of 4122 wounded, HAMAS was in charge of 1564, with the real HAMAS
contribution probably being even higher. There is still a considerable number of operations
that is not as yet associated with any organization.

The following are some examples of HAMAS operations:

On July 28, 1990, a HAMAS activist placed an explosive charge that went off on a beach

in Tel Aviv, killing a Canadian tourist and injuring several other persons14

On December 14. 1990, two HAMAS activists stabbed three Israeli civilians to death

while they were working in an aluminium factory in the Jaffa area of Tel Aviv15.

On January 1, 1992, two HAMAS activists shot a man, an Israeli civilian, in Kfar Darom

in Gaza and the victim subsequently died of his wounds16.

On May 17, 1992, an Israeli civilian was killed in his car in the Beit La'hiah region (an

area in Gaza) by HAMAS activists from the Gaza strip17.

On June 25, 1992, two Israeli civilians, employees, in a packing plant in Sijaeya (an area

in Gaza) were stabbed to death by HAMAS activists18

On July 1, 1993, a woman, a civilian, was killed when three HAMAS terrorists got on a

passenger bus travelling in French Hill, a neighborhood of Jerusalem, and began shooting at
the passengers. Eight other passengers on the bus, most of them civilians, were wounded in
this attack. Another victim, a civilian, was killed when the terrorists, attempting to escape,
stopped a passing car, kidnapped the woman driver, forced her to continue driving and then
shot and killed her19.

On April 6, 1994, a car bomb exploded alongside a regular Egged commuter bus in the

Israel city of Afula. Eight civilians were killed and 46 others were wounded. The HAMAS
activist who drove the car containing the bomb was killed20 .

On April 13, 1994, a HAMAS activist killed himself in a suicide bomb attack while

riding as a passenger on a regular Egged commuter bus in the Israeli town of Hadera. The
explosion killed four civilians and one soldier, as well as wounding twelve civilians and
eighteen soldiers21.

On October 9, 1994, one civilian and one off-duty soldier were killed and eighteen

civilians, including one United States citizen, were injured when two HAMAS activists
sprayed a crowded downtown Jerusalem pedestrian mall with machine-gun fire. The
HAMAS activists were killed in the subsequent shoot-out22.

On October 19, 1994, a HAMAS activist killed himself in a suicide bomb attack while

riding as a passenger on a heavily used Dan commuter bus line in the Israeli city of Tel Aviv.

11

The explosion killed twenty-two civilians, including one tourist, and wounded forty-six
others23 .

On August 9, 2001, HAMAS claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing in Jerusalem

that killed 15 civilians and injured more than 130 others. The attack occurred at one of
Jerusalem's most prominent street corners. Two American citizens, including a 31 year old
pregnant elementary school teacher died and four other American citizens, including a three
year old boy were wounded when a Palestinian walked into a Sbarro pizzeria at the height of
the lunch hour and detonated an explosive device filled with nails. At the funeral for five
members of a family from the West Bank settlement of Salmon, an 11 year old, on a hospital
bed with plastic breathing tubes in her nose, was wheeled into the cemetery, where her father,
mother and three siblings, ages two, four, and 14 were to be buried.

On June 1, 2001, HAMAS claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing in Tel Aviv,

Israel that killed 21 Israeli youths and injured nearly 100, as they stood outside a popular
disco. Most of the youths killed or injured were girls, between the ages of 14 and 18,
celebrating their high school graduation. According to eyewitnesses, two HAMAS operatives
drove the suicide bomber to the disco, a popular club often packed with Russian immigrant
teenagers. They said the bomber slipped unnoticed into line and positioned himself among
several girls, including a 14-year-old who had survived a previous bombing in Netanya.
Then, while flirting with one of the girls, he triggered the explosives. The blast was so intense
that it tore limbs from the victims' bodies, scattered their flesh up to six blocks away and
vaporized the bomber and the girl next to him.

On May 25, 2001, HAMAS took credit for carrying out a truck bombing to mark the

anniversary of Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon. According to a May 25, 2001, Associated
Press article, Islamic militants said they were trying to undermine Israel's morale with the
bombings. The article stated that there have been more than a dozen explosions in the past
eight months of Israeli-Palestinian fighting. On that date, Sheikh Yassin, the spiritual leader
of HAMAS, was quoted as saying, "We want to plant terror in the heads of the enemies".

On February 25, 1996, HAMAS conducted suicide bombings in both Jerusalem and

Ashkelon, claiming the lives of 26 people and wounding at least 79 others. Those blasts
occurred at two of the country's busiest intersections at the height of rush hour. The Jerusalem
blast occurred at 6:48 a.m. on a local bus that was stopped at a red light just a block away
from the central bus station. The suicide bomber killed 24 people and wounded 50 others.
Two Americans, Matthew Eisenfeld, 25, and his girlfriend, Sarah Duker, 23, were among the
dead. The second attack took place 50 minutes later at a hitchhiking stop for soldiers, near
Ashkelon. That suicide bomber killed two people and wounded 29. HAMAS took credit for
both attacks.

12

HAMAS Fundraising

American intelligence activity against HAMAS


The Chicago FBI Terrorist Task Force has been conducting an investigation into certain
Hamas activity dating back to 1989 and continuing to the present day. This investigation
involves the transfer or transmission of money from Europe and the Middle East to a network
of individuals and organizations in the United States24 .

Agent Robert Wright of the FBI states at the begging of the his affidavit about HAMAS that:
In this capacity, I have become familiar with techniques used by international terrorist
organizations to surreptitiously move and launder money in and out of the United States,
including through use of domestic financial institutions, in support of extortionate terrorist
and paramilitary activities and operations in the United States and abroad, including the
State of Israel and elsewhere.

The FBI maintains that some of these transfers or transmissions have been of money intended
for use in support of domestic and international terrorist activities, thus violating the money
laundering statute25. As set forth in greater detail below, the illegal transfers have supported
specific terrorist activities involving the extortion, kidnapping and murder of the citizens and
government of the State of Israel as part of an ongoing movement and campaign publicly
pledged to the goal of forcing, through coercive and violent means, the State and citizens of
Israel to cede physical and political control and dominion over the lands comprising Israel,
the occupied territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Another push to act against the HAMAS network in the USA occurred in 1995. Pursuant to
the provisions of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), the President
of the United States may invoke the provisions of the Act to deal with any
"Unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside
the-United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if
the President declares a national emergency with respect to such threat.26 "
Accordingly, on January 23, 1995, President Clinton issued an Executive Order27 declaring a
national emergency on the grounds that "grave acts of violence committed by foreign
terrorists that disrupt the Middle East peace process constitute an unusual and extraordinary
threat to the national security."

13

On January 25, 1995, the US Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control
issued a list of persons and groups designated by the President as "Specially Designated
Terrorists" (SDTs) threatening the Middle East Peace Process or those found to be owned or
controlled by, or to be acting for or on behalf of, these terrorist organizations. The Islamic
Resistance Movement, HAMAS, was designated a SDT.

In his order, the President specifically determined that the making of donations to terrorist
organizations was prohibited.

FBI overall estimation


According to FBI reports, about a third of the HAMAS annual budget, which totals several
tens of millions of dollars, comes from fund-raising operations in North America and
Western Europe. In the USA, the FBI has identified at least six organizations which raise
funds for HAMAS:

The Quranic Literacy Institute (herby QLI);

The Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (herby HLFRD);

The Islamic Association for Palestine;

American Muslim Society;

American Middle Eastern League for Palestine;

The United Association for Studies and Research. They are all charitable organizations;

They are all recognized as nonprofits organizations, and all totally deny any connection to
HAMAS or to any political activity.

These front organizations seek donations directly at mosques in Muslim-populated areas in


Illinois and Texas. The Holy Land Foundation also solicits donations over the Internet. The
Anti-Terrorism Act of 1990 prohibits entities from providing economic support to recognized
terrorist organizations. This is the reason why funds are injected into the various
organizations by means of a complex series of transfers, changing hands on a number of
occasions, and mingling, along the way, with the monies of the organizations legal business,
before being transferred out of the country. At the end of this convoluted process some
money does reach genuine charity targets. But part of it also reaches the families of shahids
(martyrs) while the rest is used to support HAMAS and Islamic Jihad activists in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip who use it to further their terrorist operations.

14

Inter-HAMAS US-front-organizations links


On the face of it, the pro-Islamic organizations on the FBIs suspect list are very different
from one another. They have different objectives, are located in different States throughout
America, and in their responses, including in the Boim trial and in other forums, always deny
any connection between one another. Nevertheless, a careful study of the internal documents
of these organizations quickly reveals they do indeed form an intricately woven network.
Here are some examples:

The Islamic Association for Palestine and the American Middle Eastern League for Palestine,
for example, are both listed with the same telephone number and the same address in all the
records. The American Middle Eastern League distributes publications of the Islamic
Association for Palestine, and it also constitutes the Associations tax-exempt channel and the
means through which the Association files its Form 990 (Return of Organization Exempt
from Income Tax) to the IRS. In the Leagues Form 990, the registered telephone number and
address are identical to those of the Association. In addition, two former presidents of the
Association, Yasser K. Salah Bushnak and Omed Ahmed are currently on the Board of
Directors of the League.

Another example is the connection between the Holy Land Foundation and Musa AbuMarzook. Marzook was never ashamed of his membership in HAMAS, and his support for
the movement. At the same time, a thorough examination of the Form 990 filed by the Holy
Land Foundation in 1994, donations in the sum of half a million dollars, transferred from
Musa Abu-Marzook and his assistant, Nasser El-Hativ, to the Foundation, were expressly
declared. Despite the fact that a deportation order had already been issued against AbuMarzook at that time, the Americans did nothing to halt this financing.

15

The Case of Abu-Marzook

Mousa Abu Marzook was a central figure in building the HAMAS fundraising network in the
US and transferring money for various purposes, mainly for terrorism, in the occupied
territories. He was arrested on July 25, 1995, at John F. Kennedy International Airport in
New York City by United States immigration authorities28, following an extradition request
from GOI, which he has since fought29.

Israel sought the extradition of Abu Marzook in order to bring him to trial for the criminal
offences of murder, attempted murder, manslaughter, harm with aggravating intent, harm and
wounding under aggravating circumstances, and conspiracy to commit a felony, in
connection with his criminal responsibility for the following terrorist attacks carried out by
the HAMAS organization.

According to this classified request, published here for the first time,
Abu Marzook is criminally liable for the criminal acts committed by the HAMAS terror
organization since he was a leader of that organization, and he aided and abetted,
counselled, solicited and procured others -- members of HAMAS -- to commit these criminal
offences.

Background of Abu Marzook


According to Israeli and American intelligence communities, Abu Marzook is the head of the
political bureau of the HAMAS Organization. In his role as head of the political bureau, Abu
Marzook financed certain activities of the HAMAS, including terrorist activities. In addition,
he played an important role in organizing and structuring HAMAS and in supervising the
activities of the wing of HAMAS responsible for the terrorist attacks and in appointing
individuals to important leadership roles within its military wing30.

Even by the time that Abu Marzook became a leader in HAMAS in 1989, he was already
clearly aware of the nature of the terror attacks committed by HAMAS31 . After he became a
leader in 1989, and due to his position in HAMAS, Abu Marzook was clearly aware of the
nature of such attacks, and he was active in bringing them about.

The fact that Abu Marzook was aware of approved of and sought the murder of civilians as
part of the military operations of HAMAS was made clear by Abu Marzook himself in an

16

interview he gave on television following a HAMAS terrorist attack on civilians in the centre
of Jerusalem32. On October 9, 1994, two HAMAS terrorists sprayed a crowded downtown
Jerusalem pedestrian mall with machine-gun fire, killing two, one a civilian and one other an
off-duty female soldier in civilian clothing. Eighteen civilians, including one American, were
injured in this attack. Israelis killed the two HAMAS terrorists in the course of the attack. The
next day Abu Marzook was interviewed by Hizballah's 'AI-Manar' TV in Lebanon. In
claiming responsibility for this attack on behalf of the HAMAS, he said, "Death is the highest
hope of the holy fighter on the land of Palestine. This is not the first martyrdom mission that
the heroes Izz AI-Din AI-Qassam (i.e., the military wing of HAMAS called after a famous
Islamic military hero that fought the crusaders) have undertaken; it is rather a continuing
mission. . . . We perpetrate these activities for a noble cause: to fully reinstate the rights of the
Palestinian People.33 (Emphasis Added)

In addition, Abu Marzook gave interviews to the media in which he clearly acknowledged the
role of his HAMAS organization in terror attacks, stated his approval of past attacks and
proclaimed his desire that such attacks to continue34.

Intelligence information shows that, in his role as a high-level HAMAS official, he took
numerous steps to finance, coordinate and approve the ongoing activities of HAMAS,
including facilitating terrorist attacks on both military and civilian targets, by HAMAS
military wing.

Abu Marzook's role in HAMAS shows quite clearly that, at a time when HAMAS attacks on
civilians were already underway, he took significant organizational and financial steps in
furtherance of HAMAS goals. According to two HAMAS members who were interrogated
by SHIN-BET following their arrests in 1991, Abu Marzook arrived in Gaza in 1989 after a
series of arrests of HAMAS officials, in order to reorganize the infrastructure of the active
HAMAS group in Gaza. On that 1989 trip to Gaza, Abu Marzook directed changes in the
organizational structure of HAMAS, and instructed HAMAS activists to organize activities
into three categories:

The security apparatus

The propaganda apparatus

The activity apparatus.

Abu Marzook also directed the division of responsibility into different geographical areas in
the Gaza district, and was responsible for the appointment of persons responsible for each

17

area. He also organized the channels of communication within the HAMAS organization
between Gaza and the West Bank. As an example, on that 1989 trip, in order to finance these
activities, he transferred approximately $100,000 to the HAMAS organization in Gaza35.

Thereafter, his activity increased. The most significant information against Abu Marzook was
obtained by Israeli authorities from HAMAS member, Muhammad Al Hamid Khalil Salah,
(a.k.a "Abu Ahmad"), who had resided in the United States until he was arrested while on a
HAMAS mission in Israel in early 1993. In his early statements, Salah attempted to protect
Abu Marzook and did not implicate him.

However, in the end, Abu Ahmed prepared, in his own handwriting, a report of his activities
for individuals whom he believed to be fellow high-level HAMAS operatives but who, in
reality, were cooperating with Israeli authorities.

Salah eventually pled guilty to charges arising from his HAMAS activities, and was
sentenced to five years imprisonment.

The information obtained from Salah clearly shows that Abu Marzook took active and
significant steps to further the violent terrorist activities of HAMAS36 . This report, prepared
by Salah, is further corroborated by evidence from other sources, such as statements from
other HAMAS operatives, correspondence and bank records.

Abu-Marzooks position in HAMAS


With respect to Abu Marzook's ranking in the HAMAS, Salah stated at one point that there
was no one more senior than Abu Marzook. Later, at the end of the interview, he confirmed
that Abu Marzook had the highest visible role in HAMAS but that in the HAMAS there is a
secret leadership that is more senior that he, Salah, knew about because of his senior security
position37.

The American court acknowledged his position as the leader of the political branch of
HAMAS. The court found probable cause to believe that Abu Marzook, in his leadership
capacity, had knowledge of these and other terrorist acts, that he had promoted and defended
them publicly, and that he had directed underlying activities in support of HAMAS terrorist
activities, including the activities of Salah in both the United States and Israel38.

18

FBIs investigation corroborates the GOI's statement that Marzook was a significant member
of HAMAS. According to the July 25, 1995, FBI interview of Marzook, he described himself
only as a "mid-level political activist" within the political arm of HAMAS since 1990.
However, as of August 15, 2001, the HAMAS website, www.palestine-info.com/hamas,
identified "HAMAS symbols and leaders." The website stated that Marzook was "Elected as
Chairman of HAMAS Political Bureau in 1991." Based on Marzook's well-established
affiliation with HAMAS, Marzook was subsequently designated by the U.S. Government on
August 25, 1995, as a SDT39 .

FBI investigation has revealed that during March, 1992 and August, 1992, Marzook
deposited a $100,000.00 check from The Central Fidelity Bank Account #7920439173 and a
$100,000.00 check from a First Virginia Bank Account #68168179 to the HLFRD account at
Bank of America, California Account #0941402284. Ismail Elbarrase's name was printed on
the check along with Marzook's. The 1993 HLFRD tax form 990 further reflects the receipt
of $210,000.00 from Marzook40.

During an FBI interview of Nasser Alkhatib on March 15, 1994, he advised that he worked
for Marzook and conducted various bank transactions for him. FBI investigation has
determined that on August 31, 1992, Nasser Alkhatib deposited a check for $22,000.00 into
the HLFRD Bank One Account #1070001258. This check was dated August 24, 1992, and
written to "Holy Land Foundation" from First Virginia Bank Account #5065 0599, listing
Nasser and Narman Alkhatib, 6166 Leesburg Pike, Falls Church, as the owner of the check.

19

The Case of Mohammad Salah


The interviews of Salah passed through various stages, with him elaborating more and more
information as time went on.

From these initial statements, the Police and the GSS learned that Salah was sent by HAMAS
leaders operating outside of Israel to Gaza and the West Bank to assess the status of HAMAS
activities, to make recommendations, to obtain and distribute financing and set up military
operations41. In these statements, Salah made reference to Abu Marzook, identifying him as
the political leader of HAMAS in the United States, and as the HAMAS representative who
attended a 1992 meeting with Fattah (the main component of the Palestine Liberation
Organization) which was represented at the meeting by Yasir Arafat42.

Salahs recruitment to HAMAS


Later on, Salah related that after the beginning of the Intifada (the Palestinian unrest that
began in the Territories in 1987) he was recruited by Abu Marzook to join a paramilitary type
group based in the United States under his command, called Palestine Organization. Salah
described the organization as one that is both an independent group and an affiliate of the
Muslim Brotherhood43.

Salah stated that, in the beginning, he was made responsible for recruiting the Palestine
Organization's membership. His recruitment activities included, among other things,
conducting interviews and background checks, as well as identifying and sorting prospective
candidates on the basis of expertise and skills relating to, among other things, knowledge of
chemicals, explosives and the construction of terrorist devices that might be used in HAMAS
military operations in Israel and elsewhere.

During 1990 Salah hand selected ten people to serve on a military test and had them trained
in the United States by Muslim instructors with military expertise from the United States and
Lebanon. Their training included mixing poisons, development of chemical weapons, and
preparing remote control explosive devices44.

Because of the group's suspicions that the training activities had come under American
surveillance, the number of trainees was reduced from ten to three, and their training

20

continued in absolute secrecy45 . The three were later reduced to two. Salah confirmed the
goals of these recruits: "They want to fight a Holy War, they want to fight."

As another example of such activities, in connection with certain events that took place in
1990, Salah stated to the GSS interviewers that he had been authorized by Abu Marzook to
recruit individuals for training in the use of explosives to fight in the "holy war." Based on
Abu Marzook's authorization, Salah began the training of ten recruits. Eventually, three of the
recruits were chosen to go to Israel to engage in terrorist activity. This number was later
reduced to two. Abu Marzook decided to postpone their departure to allow for additional
training. Because of Salah's arrest in early 1993, the recruits were never sent on the intended
terror missions to Israel46.

Abu Marzook was apprised of intended acts of violence on the part of HAMAS. For example,
Salah told Israeli authorities that in 1992, while he was on a mission in Israel, he discussed
with another member of HAMAS the possibility that PLO supporter and adviser Sari
Nusseibah be murdered because of his active role in efforts to reach a peaceful resolution
with Israel. Upon his return to the United States, Salah advised Abu Marzook of the proposal,
and Abu Marzook conveyed his enthusiasm for the plot. The murder was never carried out
when Salah lost contact with his HAMAS connection in Israel, who was subsequently
arrested in 199347 .

Salah also described a number of missions which he made on behalf of HAMAS to Israel and
the territories, including one in August, 1992 and another in January, 1993 for the purposes of
organizing and financing HAMAS activities. Prior to each of these two trips, Salah met Abu
Marzook, who gave him explicit instructions that the cash he was to bring to the Territories
should be used, in part for a series of humanitarian activities initiated by HAMAS and in part
to finance military operations (i.e., terrorist attacks), at a time when it was clear that
HAMAS military operations regularly included attacks on civilians targets. Part of this
money was indeed utilized for, among other purposes, the purchase of arms later used in
terrorist attacks48.

Salah's relationship with Abu Marzook is independently corroborated by bank records


showing more than $752,800 flowing from Abu Marzook (or accounts controlled by Abu
Marzook) to Salah between 1989 and January 199349 .

21

Salahs August 1992 trip to Israel for HAMAS


Prior to the August 1992 trip, Salah met with Abu Ubada and Abu Marzook in the United
States to learn about his mission and the names of the people that he was to make contact
with in order to obtain information on the military operations in the West Bank50.

Abu Marzook had the authority to make the highest military appointments. Salah stated that,
prior to the trip, Abu Marzook and Abu Hani contacted him and offered him the
responsibility for the Jihad, ("'Holy War") meaning the military activities of the HAMAS in
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip51 . Salah stated that because of personal and financial
reasons he did not want the responsibility; however, at Abu Marzook's request, he still agreed
to come to Israel and assess the military situation.

During the August 1992 trip from the United States to the Territories, Salah delivered at least
$100,000 to HAMAS operatives52. Prior to his departure, Abu Marzook instructed Salah that
a portion of the funds be used to finance military operations. On the trip, Salah made clear to
at least one of the operatives with whom he met that Abu Marzook had instructed that a
portion of the funds be used to finance military operations, and that Abu Marzook had
complained that monies sent in the past had been diverted from military to other uses53 .

During that trip, Salah met with Adel Awadallah in Ramallah, located in the West Bank. In
these meetings the two reviewed the status of the squads and/or cells under Adel Awadallah's
command. In the course of the meetings, Awadallah sought permission through Salah to
murder Seri Nouseiba, senior PA official, because he was considered the brains of the peace
talks between Israel and the PLO. Subsequently, upon his return to the United States, Salah
raised the potential murder with Abu Marzook and Abu Marzook conveyed his enthusiasm
for the plot, stating "they should really kill him."54

Salah met with a HAMAS operative by the name of Abu Saabh concerning the HAMAS
military group under his command. This consisted of 53 people active in the Gaza Strip.
Salah stated that Abu Saab had 53 recruits who were prepared to carry out military attacks
and that his squad was planning to carry out an attack on the beach in Gaza against Israeli
soldiers and policemen. These latter came regularly to swim there and, whilst swimming,
would leave someone to guard their weapons. The plan was to kill the guard and steal the
weapons55 . Salah stated that he told Abu Saab that the controlling body abroad and especially
Abu Marzook, was dissatisfied because they had not heard of any military activity despite
the fact that enough money had been sent for such activity.

22

In the August, 1992 trip, Salah brought at least $100,000 with him on a mission to the
territories. Records of the Salahs U.S. bank accounts that he did, in fact, carry at least
$50,000 with him on his mission in August, 199256.

Salah met with and gave the cash to Salah Arouri (a.k.a Dar Suliman) and also referred to as
Salah AI-Arouri), a HAMAS activist in the Hebron area. In conformity with Abu Marzook's
instructions that a part of the funds be used to finance military operations, Salah, according to
his statement, gave Arouri the $100,000 to use for military purposes, approximately half of
which was for a specifically planned weapons deal. This included the purchase of Uzi and
Kalashnikov rifles.

Arouri, who used the funds to purchase arms, subsequently called the United States and in a
telephone conversation with Abu Marzook, made in the presence of Salah, request additional
funds.57

Salah's admission is corroborated by a number of independent sources, including statements


of Salah Al-Arouri to Israeli authorities in early 1993. AI-Arouri has confirmed that he
received approximately 96,000$ from Salah during a face-to-face meeting at Hebron
University late in the summer of 1992. According to Al-Arouri, Salah gave him the money
specifically for the procurement of weapons and the financing of the activities of HAMAS
military apparatus in Hebron. AI-Arouri further related that weapons were in fact purchased
with the money provided by Salah.

Al-Arouri, also confirmed that he gave an individual named Musa Dudin approximately
$45,000 of the money he received from Salah in order to purchase weapons in September of
1992. Among the weapons Musa Dudin purchased were one short M-16 rifle; two
Kalashnikovs, two Uzis, a number of 9 millimetre pistols, and numerous magazines and
hundreds of rounds of ammunition for various weapons. Al-Arouri further related that the
weapons purchased with the money from Salah ware subsequently used in terrorist attacks,
including a suicide attack resulting in the murder of an Israeli soldier in Hebron in October of
1992. According to AI-Arouri, the attack was carried out with the short M-16 rifle purchased
with the money he received from Salah. Shortly after purchasing the rifle with the Salah
money, he gave it to HAMAS operatives Bashir Hamada and Talal Salah, who used the
weapon in their October 1992 murder of an Israeli soldier.

23

After this attack, Al-Arouri, then assisted Hamada and Talal Salah in evading the Israeli
Authorities who had initiated a massive manhunt for the two HAMAS killers. According to
published news reports based on Israeli military sources, the two men soon thereafter escaped
to Egypt by sea in a rubber dinghy launched from the border town of Rafah in the occupied
territory of Gaza.

In statements to Israeli authorities in January and April of 1993, Musa Dudin confirmed his
role in the events revealed by AI-Arouri as summarized in the previous paragraph.

Additionally, Musa Dudin admitted his involvement in the planning and execution of a
HAMAS terrorist attack in Hebron on December 12, 1992, which resulted in the killing of
Israeli soldier Yuval Tutanji. Musa Dudin stated that one of the weapons used in the ambush
attack was a Kalashnikov rifle from the Hebron military squad, bought with the money AlArouri gave him58.

Bank records from a LaSalle Bank account number 02-203453-2, held in the names of
Mohammed and Azita Salah, corroborate the statements of Salah and AI-Arouri regarding
their dealings. Specifically, the bank records reveal that from August 12 through September
12, 1992, deposits in an amount exceeding $52,000 were received in Salah's LaSalle Talman
account. Within that same period, on September 3,-1992, while in Israel, Salah withdrew
$50,000 from his LaSalle Bank account by executing ten $5000.00 checks made out to
"Cash." The reverse side of each check indicates that it was cleared through the central
branch of an Israeli bank in Tel Aviv on September 8, 1992, and debited against Salah's
LaSalle Bank account in the United States the following day59.

On his mission in August, 1992, Salah carried a set of important instructions from Abu
Marzook appointing a new head of HAMAS military wing in Gaza60 . Upon his return to the
United States, Salah called Abu Marzook and requested more money for him to finance the
organization's activities. Abu Marzook promised to send more money61 .

Subsequently, Abu Marzook had a series of conversations with Salah in which Abu Marzook
and another HAMAS official sought to persuade Salah to agree to serve as the head of all of
HAMAS military activities62.
Salah's statements to Israeli authorities after his arrest in January 1993 suggest that his
supposed employment with QLI was just a cover for his position as a high-level HAMAS
military operative.

24

Salah also admitted having served as a financial conduit for HAMAS operations. He admitted
to directly financing domestic and international travel and terrorism training for new
HAMAS members. Airline records obtained by the FBI show that Salah purchased airline
tickets for travel between the United States and places in the Middle East for himself and
other suspected HAMAS terrorists, including Alwan Shareef and Razick Saleh Abdel Razick,
both of whom flew from the United States to Syria with tickets purchased by Salah in
September of 1992. A review of the Salahs' bank records revealed that Salah paid for the
airfare by executing a check, dated September 29, 1992, drawn from the LaSalle Bank
account, which Salah jointly held with his wife Azita. Additionally, Salah has acknowledged
in statements to Israeli authorities that these trips were taken for the purpose of receiving
training in preparation for HAMAS military and terrorist operations in Israel63.

Bank and airline records obtained by the FBI and reviewed in conjunction with statements to
Israeli authorities by Salah and other HAMAS operatives indicate that between June 18, 1991
and December 30, 1992, Mohammad Salah spent in excess of $100,000 in direct support of
HAMAS military activities.

In October, 1992, Bassam Musa, a high level HAMAS activist in Gaza, sent a letter by fax to
Abu Marzook, referring to him as "Brother Abu Omar", acknowledging the receipt of money
for military purposes and asking for more. The writer of this letter apologizes for diverting
some of the money intended for military purposes to other uses. This letter also informed Abu
Omar of the details of a planned arms purchase64.

During this period, Bassam Musa had an arrangement whereby Wael Banat would send and
receive HAMAS related fax correspondence on the behalf of Musa through his Gaza
apartment Among those with whom Banat was in fax contact was Salah65.

Salahs January 1993 Trip to Israel and the territories


Salah's next trip to Israel and the Territories took place in January 1993, with the preparations
beginning in the end of 1992. Salah explained that at the end of 1992 and as a prelude to his
trip to Israel on January 15, 1993 (which resulted in his arrest on January 25, 1993) he
received telephone calls from Abu Marzook from Syria, Sudan and Lebanon66 (where Abu
Marzook had gone to meet with the deportees)67.

25

According to Salah, Abu Marzook reported to him in the immediate wake of these events that
HAMAS' situation inside Israel was serious because the mass deportations and arrests had
decimated the organization within the Occupied Territories. Abu Marzook characterized the
situation as most serious in Ramallah and Hebron because of the sudden removal of the
HAMAS leadership structure.

Salah further related that Abu Marzook instructed that, due to the mass deportations of
Hamas personnel by the Israeli government, it was necessary that Salah go to Israel to assist
in reorganizing and re-staffing the military calls in Habron, Ramallah, Nablus, Bathlehem,
Jaricho and Jerusalem. Salah also stated that Abu Marzook instructed him to distribute
790,000$ to HAMAS cells in support of HAMAS-sponsored military (i.e. terrorist)
activities68.

Salah told Israeli authorities that Abu Marzook also identified by name specific contacts and
operatives with whom Salah was to meet to gather further information and make assessments
regarding HAMAS' situation following the mass deportations and subsequent vacuum in the
HAMAS leadership. Additionally, Abu Marzook provided Salah with the names of specific
individuals who were to be placed into leadership positions in various mosques and units to
replace those who had been deported.

In response to Abu Marzook's various directives, Salah made arrangements for air travel from
the United States to various places in the Middle East for himself and other HAMAS
operatives. The air travel was booked through Ghada Sharif. Sharif, Salah's regular travel
agent for such purposes. This agency had previously booked the airline reservations for
Salah to fly to Israel for HAMAS purposes in August and September of 1992, as all well as
those for HAMAS operatives Alwan Shareef and Razick Saleh Abdel Razick to fly to Syria
in September 1992 for military training.

Immediately following the organizational crisis initiated by the December 17, 1992
deportations, and the communications between Abu Marzook and Salah, Zaki Hameed and
Amer Haleem of QLI separately made efforts to raise as much money as possible. In these
communications, Zaki Hameed repeatedly said that the money was needed immediately for
"a mission above all else".

Bank records reviewed by the FBI reveal that shortly after these events, close associates of
Abu Marzook initiated a series of wire transfers into Salah's La Salle Bank account totaling
$985,00069.

26

According to Salah, he provided Abu Marzook with the account number of the LaSalle
Talman Savings checking account that he held with his wife, so that Abu Marzook could wire
him the funds to be distributed to HAMAS operatives in the Middle East.

Bank records reviewed by the FBI reflect that on December 29, 1992, Ismail Selim Elbarasse
who, according to Salah, is a HAMAS operative in the United States, wire transferred
$300,000.00 to Salah's LaSalle Bank account. The Elbarasse wire originated from an account
at the First American Bank of McLean, Virginia, which Elbarasse jointly held with Abu
Marzook70. Additional sums of $300,000 and $135,000 were transferred from that account
during the mission in January, 1993, while Salah was in Israel and the Occupied Territories.
Moreover, a further $50,000 was transferred to Salah from another Marzook subordinate71.
Salah related that he transferred portions of the money to Israel and the territories through a
Palestinian moneychanger72. Bank records confirm these transfers73 .

In the days just prior to this wire transfer, there was a substantial influx of money into the
First American Bank of Virginia account jointly held by Elbarasse and Abu Marzook. This
money came principally from international sources, most of which
MOSSAD as originating in Saudi-Arabia

74

were identified by

On December 23, 1992, $99,985 was wire

transferred into the account by an individual named Gazi Abu Samah from an as yet
unspecified source. It was followed with a December 23, 1992 wire transfer of $200,000 from
Faisal Financial of Geneva 75 , Switzerland, and a December 29, 1992 wire transfer of
$73,475.77 from Dubai, United Arab Emirates.

Bank records indicate that, in early January of 1993, Salah withdrew a significant portion of
the $300,000.00 placed into his account by Elbarasse. Specifically, bank records reviewed by
the FBI show that on January 7, 1993, just days prior to flying to Jerusalem on January 13,
1993, Salah wrote a check for 53,000 to Amer Haleem of QLI76. They also show that on
January 12, 1993, the day before his departure, Salah withdrew an additional $2,000 in cash
from his account. The largest withdrawal, of $200,000, was directed by Salah from Israel.

Salah has related to Israeli authorities that he arrived in Jerusalem on January 14, 1993 for the
purpose of meeting other HAMAS operatives to coordinate, among other things, a terrorist
attack against Israel. Salah further related that on January 19, 1993, subsequent to his initial
round of meetings with various HAMAS operatives, some of whom Salah met as a result of
Abu Marzook's instructions, he placed an international call from Israel to his wife Azita in
Chicago and instructed her to wire $200,000.00 from their joint LaSalle Bank account to First

27

Chicago Bank of Ravenswood account number 678006002654-4 held in the name of Rihbe
Abdel Rahman. According to Salah, Rahman was an unlicensed moneychanger.

Bank records reviewed by the FBI indicate that Azita Salah carried out her husband's
instructions on the same day. According to Salah the $200,000.00 was then transferred from
the Abdel Rahman account to the Middle East.

According to bank records reviewed by the FBI, the successful transfer of the $200,000.00 on
January 20, 1993 was closely followed by a succession of large wire transfers from HAMASrelated sources into Mohammad and Azita's LaSalle Bank account. Records from the Salahs'
LaSalle Bank account and the First American account of Elbarasse and Abu Marzook show
that on January 20, 1993, Elbarasse wire transferred $135,000 into the Salahs' La Salle Bank
account, and followed it with another wire transfer of $300,000 on January 25, 1993

Bank records for the First American Bank of Virginia account held jointly by Abu Marzook
and Elbarassa show a further influx of overseas money just prior to this second round of wire
transfers to the Salahs' LaSalle Bank account. On January 4, 1993, a second $599,985 wire
transfer was received into the First American account from Gazi Abu Samah. On January 22,
1993, the First American account was credited another $65,000 from a wire transfer from
Faisal Financial of Geneva, Switzerland.

The FBIs review of bank records also show that during the same period, Nasser Al-Khtib, a
United States-based supporter and financial backer of HAMAS and close associate of Abu
Marzook, wire transferred additional funds into Salah controlled accounts in Chicago. In an
interview with the FBI in March of 1994, AI-Khatib acknowledged being a supporter of
HAMAS, and that he donated money to HAMAS causes. AI-Khatib further stated that, prior
to leaving the United States in June of 1993, he was an employee of Abu Marzook, serving
essentially as Abu Marzook's personal secretary. In that capacity, AI-Khatib explained, he
had access to and was a signatory to some of Abu Marzook's financial accounts, and that he
had made financial transactions on Abu Marzook's behalf77.

A review of bank records reveals that on January 21, 1993, AI-Khatib wired $550,000 into
Salah's La Salle Bank account. On the same day, he wired an additional $30,000 into
Standard Bank & Trust account number 2393255006-2 held jointly by Salah and his wife.
Standard Trust Bank records reflect that the wire from AI-Khatib was credited in Azita
Salah's name. AI-Khatib followed with a $170,000 wire transfer on January 22, 1993 into the
Salah's Standard Trust Bank account number 239325006-2.

28

On January 25, 1993, Salah was arrested by Israeli authorities. At the time of his arrest , he
was found in possession of $97,400. He also was in possession of extensive notes he had
compiled from his meetings with over 40 HAMAS operatives and contacts in Israel and the
occupied territories over the preceding eleven days.

One of these meeting was with Adel Awadallah, a prominent HAMAS militant figure.
According to Salahs testimony, during this meeting, they both discussed the possible murder
of the "doctor"78 because he "spoke crudely" about Islam and the Muslim people79, and the
proposed murder of three Israeli engineers known to be working in the area. Additionally,
Awadallah asked for $100,000 for a weapons deal80.

On Awadallah's request, Abu Ahmad gave Marwan Hawajah, one of Awadallahs assistants,
$60,000. They also agreed that future sums of money would be transferred through Marwan
Hawajah, because Adel Awadallah did not want to continue his involvement with money
dealing.

Salah recounted the meetings he had had with Abu Majahad and Abu Saab concerning
military operations and financing for weapons in the Gaza Strip. At the meeting with Abu
Saab they assessed the needs of the "Izz A-Din Al-Qassam Brigades" for shelters, weapons
and training. The shelters were for fugitives in hiding. Abu Saab wanted money to purchase
weapons and had accounts that could be used to launder the money.

Salah confirmed the distribution of the funds that he was able to make; $60,000 to Marwan
Hawajah for Ramallah, $30,000 to Abu Majahad and $50,000 to Abu Saab, who was
responsible for military activities.

29

The Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLFRD)


The FBI has obtained information that indicates that the HLFRD acts for or on behalf of
HAMAS. The Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, (HLFRD), is located at
525 International Parkway, Suite 509, Richardson, Texas.

History
The HLFRD was established in 1989 as a non-profit, non-political, charitable, and taxexempt organization that solicits donations to help Palestinian people in the West Bank and
Gaza. As noted above, the HLFRD is listed as a tax-exempt charity, not a religious
organization.

The HLFRD was originally known as the Occupied Land Fund, and incorporated in
California on January 11, 1989, with a mailing address of P.O. Box 1448, Los Angeles,
California 90053. The Occupied Land Fund's physical address at the time was located at 5855
Green Valley Circle, Suite 207, Culver City, California 90230. On July 27, 1992, the
Occupied Land Fund relocated to Texas, and had a forwarding address of P.O. Box 832390,
Richardson, Texas 75083.

Following a series of negative reports in the American press, The Occupied Land Fund was
registered with the Texas Secretary of State on November 18, 1992, under the name, "HOLY
LAND FOUNDATION FOR RELIEF AND DEVELOPMENT." The HLFRD is listed as a
non-profit corporation with a registered office of 850 N. Dorothy Drive, Suite 516,
Richardson, Texas. In August 1994, the HLFRD relocated from 1710 Firman Drive, Suite
100, Richardson, Texas 75081 to its current address (see above.)81.

The Texas Secretary of State records further reveal that the HLFRD proposed to pursue, in
conducting its affairs in Texas,
"charitable-relief for refugees and the indigent needy, fund raising furthering the
corporation's exempt purposes and to sponsor charitable activities benefiting and to make
contributions or distributions to other organizations.."

Organizational structure

30

Until its closure by order of President Bush, in April 2002, the HLFRD was headquartered in
Richardson, Texas, with branch offices and representatives scattered throughout the United
States, West Bank and Gaza. Key leaders at the HLFRD include: Shukri Abu Baker,
President, Secretary, and Chief Executive Officer (CEO); Haitham Maghawri, Executive
Director; Mohamned E1 Mezain, Director of Endowments; and Ghassan Elashi, Chairman of
the Board.

According to public records, the HLFRD raised 13.0 million in 2000; $6.3 million in 1999;
and $5.2 million in 1998.

The HLFRD activity for HAMAS


The HLFRD acts for or on behalf of HAMAS based on the following analysis:

1. Intercepted Discussions Of HAMAS Leaders: In 1993 and 1994, the FBI monitored
meetings between identified HAMAS leaders and senior representatives of the HLFRD.
During these meetings, discussions were held regarding the need for HAMAS fund-raising in
the United States, as well as the primary role of the HLFRD to serve this function.

2. HAMAS Financing: FBI investigation has determined that in the early 1990s, HAMAS,
through Mousa Abu Marzook, channeled substantial funds via the HLFRD.

3. Fund Recipients: FBI investigation has determined that a majority of the funds collected by
the HLFRD are used to support HAMAS activities in the Middle East.

4. HLFRD Leadership: Key decision-makers within the HLFRD have been identified as
active members of HAMAS.

Intercepted Discussions of HAMAS Leaders


1993 Philadelphia meeting

An electronic surveillance of Abdelhaleem Hasan Ashqar disclosed that he organized a


meeting that took place in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on October 1 to October 3, 1993. FBI
physical surveillance and subsequent investigation corroborate that this meeting took place.
The electronic intercepts disclosed that participants in the meeting included Ashqar, Akram

31

Kharroubi, Mohammad Al-Hanooti, Ismail Elbarasse, Muin Kamel Mohamned Shabib, three
officials from the HLFRD: Shukri Abu Baker, Ghassan Elashi and Haitham Maghawri,
together with representatives from the Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP)82 .

The FBI deems this meeting significant since it represented a meeting in the United States
among senior leaders of HAMAS, the HLFRD and the IAP. A brief review of key attendees
includes:

Abdelhaleem Hasan Ashqar: In November 1992, the GSS advised FBI that Ashqar was a
U.S.-based HAMAS activist who was involved in transferring funds from the United States to
HAMAS in the West Bank and Gaza83 . Interviews conducted by the Israeli GSS of selfadmitted HAMAS member Sufian Abu Samara provided evidence of Ashqar's membership in
HAMAS. Samara stated84 that he was recruited and appointed as head of HAMAS in the
Southern Gaza Strip by Mousa Abu-Marzook in 1989 and also headed the HAMAS Security
Apparatus in 1990. Samara described several instances where Ashqar transferred thousands
of thousands of dollars on behalf of HAMAS, at Samara's direction85.
During the February 21, 1993 GSS interview of self-admitted HAMAS member Mahmud
Rumahi, he stated that he was recruited into HAMAS in December 1990 by his brother-inlaw, Mahmud Qazim. Qazim gave Ashqar's phone and fax numbers to Rumahi so that he
would be able to get money and pamphlets. In April 1991, Ashqar sent a representative from
the United States to Israel to obtain detailed reports on HAMAS activities in Renahi's region.
Additionally, Rumahi confirmed that in July 1991, he traveled to the United States to meet
with Ashqar, who arranged for him to fly to Tennessee and meet with Abu Omar (a.k.a.
Mousa Abu Marzook). Rumahi gave a full report to Mussa on his group's HAMAS activities.
After Rumahi returned, he gave Ashqar a detailed report of that conversation.

Akram Kharroubi: During the early 1990s, Akram Kharroubi (a.k.a- Haroubi, Harroubi)
was head of the Washington, D.C. Muslim Arab students Association. He was in contact With
HAMAS leaders, including Mousa Abu Marzook. He reportedly distributed HAMAS
statements when they were issued.
He returned to the West Bank and Gaza in 1994. In early 1999, the GSS detained him for
questioning- During his interview be admitted that from 1994 to 1999, he was a money
courier between HAMAS members in Jordan and the West Bank.
Kharroubi further stated that in approximately 1997, the HAMAS headquarters in Jordan
gave instructions to found a united headquarters of HAMAS in the West Bank, which was to
include representatives of all the regions 86 . Due to the objection of all the regional
headquarters to the establishment of a united headquarters for the West Bank, it was decided

32

to establish an Inter-Regional Coordinating Committee where Kharroubi served as the


Ramallah region representative.

Mohammad Al-Hanooti: In April 1992, an FBI source codenamed HLFRD-I, who,


according to the Action Memorandum, has been found to be reliable in the past, stated that
AI-Hanooti was a big supporter of HAMAS. The source further stated that it was well known
in the Palestinian community in the northern New Jersey area that AI-Hanooti was an active
HAMAS supporter, purportedly holding fund-raising activities, as well as helping visitors to
the United States from Israel and Jordan, to speak on behalf of HAMAS.
Another FBI source condemned HLFRD-2, who has been found to be reliable in the past
stated in 1993, that Al-Hanooti collected over six million U.S. dollars for support of HAMAS
in Israel.

Ismail Elbarasse: During questioning by Israeli authorities, SDT Mohamnad Salah stated
that he was directed by Marzook to receive funds from Elbarasse to be used for funding
HAMAS military operations. Salah's financial records document that Elbarasse wiretransferred a total of $735,000.00 to Salah from December 1992 to January 1993. A review of
financial records notes that in the 1990s, Elbarasse had a joint bank account with Marzook87.

Muin Kamel Mohammed Shabib: Shabib was interviewed by the FBI on March 16, 1994,
at which time Shabib admitted supporting HAMAS financially and politically. During GSS
interviews of arrested HAMAS operative Sarah Arouri, Shabib was identified by Arouri as
being involved in the HAMAS terrorist apparatus. The GSS has concluded that Shabib is a
senior HAMAS activist and was formerly in charge of HAMAS' Central Sector (RamallahJerusalem) in the West Bank. According to the GOI, in 1990, Shabib recruited Salah Arouri,
into the ranks of HAMAS, and assigned him with the founding of an infrastructure for the
military apparatus in Hebron; recruiting young men, preparing squads and procuring weapons
and equipment.
Shukri Abu Baker (HLFRD's CEO) : In a press interview in 199388 Baker admitted to
wiring $60,000.00 a month to the Occupied Territories. Baker stated that he sent Haitham
Maghawri, the Social Services Coordinator for the HLFRD, to Lebanon with funds for the
396 expelled Palestinians that the GOI claimed to be HAMAS activists. Numerous FBI
sources have identified Baker as being a member of HAMAS89.

Baitham Maghawri (HLFRD's Executive Director): According to the U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) records, on November 4, 1990, Maghawri filed a request for

33

asylum in the United States. In his asylum request he stated his reasons for seeking asylum
were that he was being persecuted for his religion by the AMAL Movement (Shia terrorist
group in Lebanon, a rival to Hizballah). Maghawri's asylum request was denied. On
December 19, 1991, he married a U.S. citizen, Eadia Tariq Akilah. As a result of his
marriage, Maghawri received permanent residency status on September 15, 1992.
Ghassan Elashi (HLFRD's Chairman of the Board) 90 : Elashi and his brothers are the
founders of InfoCom, Inc., a computer hardware business and Internet service provider
located across the street from the HLFRD in Richardson, Texas. Elashi is currently the VicePresident of marketing. In September 2001, OFAC blocked the assets of InfoCom, based
upon evidence that InfoCom received $250,000 from Marzook, during the same time frame
as Marzook was providing funds to the HLERD and others associated with HAMAS.

The electronic surveillance of the 1993 Philadelphia Meeting revealed the following mindset:

The overall goal of the meeting was to develop a strategy to defeat the Israeli/Palestinian
peace accord, and to continue and improve their fund-raising and political activities in the
United States. During the meeting the participants went to great length and spent much effort
hiding their association with the Islamic Resistance Movement, a.k.a. HAMAS. Instead, they
referred to HAMAS as "SAMAH", (HAMAS spelled backwards). Most of the time, the
participants referred to HAMAS as "The Movement."

The Participants decided that for fund-raising purposes, the United States Theatre was very
valuable to them. They stated they could not afford to lose it. In the United States, they could
raise funds, propagate their political goals, affect public opinion and influence decisionmaking of the U.S. Government. In addition, they hoped that, sometime in the future, they
would be viable and strong enough to represent an alternative to the Palestinian Liberation
Organization (PLO).

During the meeting, it was mentioned that the United States provided a secure, legal base
from which to operate. The democratic environment in the United States allowed them to
perform activities that are extremely important to their cause. In discussing financial matters
the participants stated a belief that continuation of the Holy War was inevitable.

It was decided that most or almost all of the funds collected in the future should be directed to
enhance the Islamic Resistance Movement and to weaken the self-rule government.

34

Increasing spending on the injured, prisoners and their families, as well as martyrs and their
families, should support the Holy War effort.
1994 Oxford Mississippi Meeting
Electronic surveillance of Ashqar and Muin Shabib disclosed that in Early 1994, Ashqar's AIAqsa Educational Fund (AAEF) and the HLFRD were in conflict over fund-raising issues.
The electronic surveillance further disclosed that HAMAS Political Bureau head, Mousa Abu
Marzook, designated the HLFRD as the primary fund-raising entity in the United States and
ordered the AI-Aqsa Educational Fund to curtail fund-raising operations.

Ultimately, Marzook travelled to the United States and chaired a meeting in Dallas, Texas,
regarding this issue. Two senior HAMAS activists, Jamal Hamami, one of the founders of
HAMAS, and Sheikh Mohammad Siyam (a.k.a. Siam), a self-admitted HAMAS official, met
with Ashqar in Oxford, Mississippi, on March 13, 1994, to explain Marzook's decision.

In March 13, 1994, the FBI watched Ashqar travel to Memphis International Airport where
he picked-up Sheik Jamal Hamami and Sheik Mohammad Siyam. Ashqar drove Hamami and
Siyam to his residence where the three remained until March 14, 199491.

FBI investigation has further determined that the HLFRD has used both Hamami and Siyam
as guest speakers at HLFED fund-raising events. American Express records reveal that from
September 20, 1990 to November 29, 1991, the HLFRD paid for at least six trips to the
United States by Hamami. The HLFRD also paid for at least five trips taken by Siyam, (a.k.a.
M. Siam, M. Seyam), from April 20, 1992 to March 9, 199492.

HLFRD, Marzook and Salah


In 1992, Marzook, Elbarasse and Alkhatib were providing funds to the HLFRD. During 1992
to January 1993, these same HAMAS activists were also providing funds to Mohamad Salah,
(See below). Salah was designated by U.S. Government as an SDT in February 1995. He
was arrested January 25, 1993 in Israel for supporting HAMAS terrorist activities. At the
time of his arrest, he had $97,000.00 in cash in his possession, after having admitted to
already disbursing approximately $140,000.00 to individuals identified by the GOI as
members of HAMAS.)

35

Records verify that Marzook deposited a total of $23,410.00 into Salah's U.S. bank account
during the time period of May 20, 1990 to November 29, 1992. Records also verify that
Elbarasse deposited a total of $740,000.00 in Salah's account from August 8, 1992 to January
25, 1993, and that Nasser Alkhatib deposited a total of $251,000.00 into Salah's account from
August 21, 1992 to January 22, 1993.

Business records further indicate that, during the same period that Marzook was funding the
HLFRD and Salah, he was also providing large sums of money to an organization called the
American Middle Eastern League for Palestine (AMEL). Ahmad Agha (who has served as
the HLFRD's treasurer) and Ismail Elbarasse are listed as Directors of AMEL. In addition,
financial records reveal that Elbarasse and Marzook opened a bank account in the name of
AMEL on January 12, 1990, at the Central Fidelity Bank, Arlington, VA. Elbarasse was the
signatory on that account. Bank records show deposits of seven checks totaling $125,000 to
this AMEL account in 1990 and 1991.

Recipients of HLFRD Fund Overseas


In an interview, published in the London Filastin Al-Muslimah, with Dr. Ibrahim AI-Yazuri,
one of the founders of HAMAS, he described the HAMAS philosophy and thinking
concerning charitable donations and how this activity promotes the HAMAS terrorist agenda.
He stated that:

Everyone knows that the Islamic Resistance Movement, HAMAS, is a Palestinian Jihad
movement that strives for the liberation of all Palestine, from the (Mediterranean) sea to the
river (Jordan), from the north to the south, from the tyrannical Israeli occupation, and this is
the main part of its concern. Social work is carried out in support of this aim, and it is
considered to be part of the HAMAS movement' s strategy . . . The HAMAS movement is
concerned about its individuals and its elements, especially those who engage in the blessed
jihad against the hateful Israeli occupation, since they are subjected to detention or
Martyrdom. The movement takes care of their families and their children and provides them
with as much material and moral support as it can. This is one of the fundamental truths of
Islamic work and thus represents the duties of the Islamic state . . . The HAMAS movement
provides financial assistance, material aid of food packages in the blessed month of
Ramadan, and gifts, clothes, and sacrifice meats for the Id Al-Adha (Holiday of Sacrifice) to
poor and needy Palestinian families without discrimination. It also provides poor and needy
students and sons of martyrs in the first year of study with school bags containing paper and

36

other study essentials and supports orphans in the Gaza Strip. The movement provides this
aid through the support and assistance it gives to the ZAKAT (Islamic alms-giving)
committees and the Islamic associations and institutions in the Gaza Strip.

In a Washington Post article, dated August 11, 2001, Sheikh Yassin described the purpose of
HAMAS charitable works in the West Bank and Gaza. The article states that:
According to Yassin, the group distributes $2 million to $3 million in monthly handouts to the
relatives of Palestinian suicide bombers; martyrs" who have been killed by Israelis;

HLFRD provided charitable aid to the very same individuals and institutions described by
HAMAS as its recipients. Assessing the information provided by the FBI leads to the
conclusion that HLFRD transfers funds to HAMAS overseas utilizing at least three methods:
1. Direct fund transfers from the HLFRD Richardson, Texas, office to The HLFRD offices
in the West Bank and Gaza.
2. Transfers of funds from the HLFRD Richardson, Texas office to the to ZAKAT (Islamic
charity) committees located in the West Bank and Gaza, controlled by HAMAS.
3. Transfers of funds from the HLFRD Richardson, Texas office to other "charitable"
organizations in the Middle East, not controlled by HAMAS, but believed to be supporting
HAMAS.

As to the individuals receiving support from the HLFRD (through one of the 3 channels
described above), evidence strongly suggests that the HLFRD has provided crucial financial
support for families of HAMAS suicide bombers, as well as Palestinians who support the
HAMAS movement. It is believed that by providing these annuities to families of HAMAS
members, the HLFRD assists HAMAS by providing finance to a constant flow of suicide
volunteers and buttresses a terrorist infrastructure that is heavily reliant on moral support of
the Palestinian population. According to HLFRD-4, an FBI source, quoting the words of
Shukri Abu Baker, HLFRD's mission is to support the families of the martyrs93 .

FBI analysis indicates what appears to be the more common use of the HLFRD offices in the
West Bank and Gaza as a preferred means of distributing funds to ZAKAT committees.

While ZAKAT committees formerly received larger sums directly from the HLFRD
Richardson, Texas office, since 2000 the FBI has observed a decrease or elimination of funds
sent directly to the ZAKAT committees. This coincides with the increase in funds to the
HLFRD offices in the West Bank and Gaza, located in the same region as those ZAKAT
committees.

37

HLFRD and Its Leadership Identified As HAMAS


During the 1990s the FBI had received numerous reports from live agents confirming the
overlapping between the identity of prominent figures in HAMAS and HLFRD leadership. It
had been also evidenced that this leadership indeed saw HLFRD as part of HAMAS. Among
those reports were the following:

FBI source HLFRD-1, reported that during a speech at the Islamic Center of Passaic

County (ICPC) in November, 1994, Mohammad EI-Mezain, the HLFRD's current Director of
Endowments and former Chairman of the HLFRD Board, admitted that some of the money
collected by the ICPC and the HLFRD went to HAMAS or HAMAS activities in Israel. EIMezain also defended HAMAS and the activities carried out by HAMAS.

FBIs source HLFRD-4, reported that on November 5, 1994, the IAP held a conference at

the Culver City Memorial Building in Culver City, California. The HLFRD's CEO, Shukri
Abu Baker was introduced to the audience as the Director of the HLFRD in Dallas, Texas,
and the Senior Vice-President in HAMAS (second only to Mohammed El Mezain). The
source reported that, at this conference, El Mezain and Baker stated that the monies raised by
the HLFRD were strictly for HAMAS terrorists.

HLFRD-4 further reported that HAMAS leaders Shukri Abu Baker and Mohamed EI-

Mezain attended a Muslim Arab Youth Association (MAYA) Conference, December 30,
1994 to January 2, 1995, at the Hyatt Regency in Los Angeles, wherein Sheikh Muhammad
Siyam was the keynote speaker. Siyam was introduced as "Head of Operations of Al Jihad Al
Islamia in Gaza, the HAMAS military wing." Siyam stated, "I've been told to restrict or
restrain what I say . . . I hope no one is recording me or taking any pictures, as none are
allowed . . . because I'm going to speak the truth to you. It's simple. Finish off the Israeli's.
Kill them all! Exterminate them! No Peace ever. Do not bother to talk politics."

Following Siyam's speech, EI-Mezain exhorted the crowd to contribute money. It was

subsequently announced that $207,000 was raised for "the Cause."

At that conference, EI-Mezain reportedly stated that during 1994 he had raised

$1,800,000 inside the United States for HAMAS. EI-Mezain and Abuaker stated that funds
raised by the HLFRD were strictly dollars for HAMAS.

In December 1994, HLFRD-3, an FBI source (who has, according to the Bureau,

provided both reliable and unreliable information in the past), reported that Baker described
the HLFRD as follows, "We raise funds for Islam, money goes to projects." In describing the
projects the HLFRD funded, Baker said, "Some money goes to HAMAS, but we build
hospitals, schools, etc."

38

On September 30, 1997, HLFRD-4, reported on the HLFRD fund-raising event at the

Sequoia Convention Centre, Buena Park, California. At that event, Shukri Abu Baker stated
that the individuals present had a duty to give money to the HLFRD and the people fighting
for the Islamic state in the West Bank and Gaza. He also talked about the HLFRD mission to
support the families of the martyrs. He stated that the goal of HAMAS - to form an Islamic
State - could not be thwarted. Abu Baker indicated that in the end HAMAS would throw out
Arafat and an Islamic State would be established.

In March 1998, HLFRD-6, an FBI source, advised that Ammar Hussein Imreish, whom

the source identified as the local leader of the HLFRD, specifically talked about HAMAS and
its ties to HLFRD. Imreish stated that the HAMAS leadership wanted to hit only military
individuals and targets, not civilians. Additionally, according to the source, the HAMAS
leadership said that HLFRD was their voice. Imreish surmised that in the future, HAMAS
would be recognized as a legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and then the
HLFRD's ties to HAMAS would become known94.

Search of the HLFRD Office in Jerusalem

In May 7, 1995 Israeli GSS agents and policemen searched the HLFRD office in Beit Hanina
(an arab village outside Jerusalem) that was run by Muhammad Anati. According to The
Action Memorendum it is the FBI's analysis that the documents seized and statement by the
head of that office demonstrate the control the HLFRD headquarters in Richardson, Texas,
had over the HLFRD Jerusalem office
Israeli and American intelligence experts95 maintain that documents retrieved in the search
show that the two HLFRD offices were in frequent contact. Numerous documents seized
from the office were facsimiles that bore the HLFRD letterhead and included the "sender's"
fax number from the HLFRD office in Richardson, Texas.

The following were the main findings of the search:

Records reflecting funds transferred from the HLFRD to the Islamic Aid Committee, a.k.a.
Islamic Relief Agency (TRA) and lists of people supported by those funds. Those lists bear
the HLFRD name and Richardson office telephone number on the top of the pages, indicating
the lists of recipients were reviewed in the HLFRD's Richardson office and then faxed from
Texas to Jerusalem. Furthermore, according to GSS analysis, people who were not known to
be affiliated with HAMAS received relatively low monthly payments96.

39

The lists contained dozens of names of recipients who received more significant sums. Most
of those individuals have been identified by the GOI as having ties to HAMAS activists. The
GOI has provided the FBI over 50 names of individuals listed by the HLFRD as recipients,
having HAMAS connections97.

Among those were 16 transfers of between $ 100.00 and $200.00 each to families of
deportees (in December 1992 the GOI deported approximately 400 HAMAD and PIJ
members to Lebanon98). The payment was for February 28, 1993. Each of these transfers
bears the registration, family of a deportee, the date (usually January 15 or February 15,
1993), and the sum to be paid. It is also noted that these families had not received any
previous payments;

The search findings also included transfers of 200$- $400 to each of the following:

Ansharah Mahmoud Shukri. Ramallah; date of payment, January 15, 1992; last payment,

October 31, 1992; Ansharah Ali Shukri is the mother of Ahmed Hussein Mahmoud Shukri ,
who is in jail for the murder of a Jew at a Tel Aviv building site in September 1989, as well
as an attempt to cause a bus (line 405) to go off the road. He was arrested in September 1989
and sentenced to life imprisonment. While in prison, Shukri murdered a warden.

Fawzi Salman Abd AI-A'al, Gaza; date of payment, January 15, 1992; last payment,

October 31, 1992; Fawzi Salman Mahmoud Abd AI-A'al, Gaza, born in 1946, was a former
detainee in 1989. He was fired from his job at the civilian administration (he was a male
nurse) following his arrest. AI-A'al's sons, Mazzen and Muhammad, are former detainees and
HAMAS activists.

The father of Mullammad Shawan, a wanted member of the Izz-Al -Din AI-Qassam who

was killed in a clash with an IDF force in March 1994, and who participated in several
attacks, including the murder of two grocers in the Khan Younes area in May 1993;

The widow of Abd AI-Rahman Aruri, a former deportee, and a senior member of Izz AI-

Din AI-Qassam, who was killed in a clash with the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) in December
1993;

The family of Suleyman Idan, killed during a car-bomb attack in Beit-EI in October

1993;

The mother of Ashraf Ba'aluji, serving a life sentence for the murder of three Jews in

Jaffa, in December 1992;

The wife of Jamil AI-Baz, a HAMAS activist serving a life sentence for running over a

soldier at Nitzanim crossing on July 19, 1991;

40

The wife of Majdi Hamad, a senior Izz AI-Din Qassam activist in Jabaliyah who killed

local residents and is serving a life sentence;

The family of Yasser Hajaj, a HAMAS activist serving a life sentence for placing an

explosive charge on a Tel Aviv beach on July 28, 1990, killing a Jewish tourist from Canada;

The brother of Raid Zakarana, a HAMAS terrorist who committed suicide in Afula in

April 1994;

An agreement between HLFRD Richardson, Texas and HLFRD Jerusalem was also found in
the search. This agreement was dated June 3, 1994, and was signed by Shukri Abu Baker, as
executive Director of the HLFRD, and Mohamed Anati, Executive Director ,HLFRD
Jerusalem office. That agreement states that the HLFRD recognized HLFRD Jerusalem as its
sole agency in the West Bank and Israel and authorized it to oversee fund disbursement for
programs.

According to a statement Anati gave to Israeli authorities in 1995, his office performed the
functions of liaison, mediation and supervision on behalf of the Fund in the United States and
did not conduct money transfers. The budget of the Jerusalem office was between $80,000.00
and $120,000.00 per year. This money was earmarked for regular operation of the office and
was directly deposited in the HLFRD's account at the Mercantile Discount Bank in East
Jerusalem

The Jerusalem office's task was to draw up lists of the needy from the West Bank and to
provide those lists to the HLFRD office in Richardson. After HLFRD sent monies to the
ZAKAT committees, the Jerusalem office was then tasked to confirm that the individuals
identified by the HLFRD had received their due allocations from the ZAKAT committees in
the West Bank99 .The money was transferred directly from the United States to the ZAKAT
committee's bank accounts abroad.

The HLFRD in the United-States had two branches in Israel, one in Beit Hanina, which was
operated by Anati, and the second in the Gaza Strip, which was under the direction of Zuhair
Baghadi. Both branches were directly subordinate to the HLFRD's management in the United
States. The annual budget of the fund in the West Bank was assessed at about one million
dollars (valid to 1993-1994). The center of the fund was in the United States where the
contributions are collected. Shukri Abu Baker, who operated from the main office in Texas,
headed the fund. There was further branch office in New Jersey, headed by Muhammad BIMezain.

41

Anati's statement, together with the above lists seized from the HLFRD Jerusalem office,
which designate the recipients of funds, clearly indicate that Shukri Abu Baker played a
controlling role in deciding who would receive support by the HLFRD. Many of these
recipients have been identified as being HAMAS supporters.

1997 HLFRD Closure


On May 6, 1997, the Israeli Minister of Defence named five Islamic associations as "nonpermissible" and on that basis declared that funds reaching individuals and organizations in
the West Bank and Gaza through those associations could be confiscated. The HLFRD was
the only U.S. organization listed in this group100 . The HLFRD offices in Israel were closed,
based on evidence that HLFRD raised funds to support the HAMAS terrorist apparatus. On
December 10, 1997, the head of the HLFRD's Jerusalem office, Mohammad Anati, was
arrested and detained on charges of aiding and abetting a terrorist organization.

During his interview by the GSS and IP, Anati stated that he was enlisted by HAMAS in
1990 and participated in writing HAMAS slogans and throwing stones.

In early 1993, he met Shukri Abu Baker, who personally hired him to run the HLFRD
Jerusalem office. Anati ran the HLFRD Jerusalem office from early 1993 until its closure.
This office was responsible for HLFRD activities throughout the West Bank. Anati stated the
following about the HLFRD:

1. On March 17, 1996, the army and police came to the HLFRD office in Jerusalem and on
authority of a decree by the Minister of Defense, shut down the office for one year. A year
later, Anati re-opened the office, since he had not received an extension of the closure decree.
According to Anati, despite the closing down of the office, all the branches received their
money regularly, directly to their bank accounts. In 1997, when he re-opened the office, he
received sufficient funding for the entire year.

Anati stated the HLFRD provided aid to the needy, but some of the aid was channelled to
HAMAS. Anati enabled every branch to allocate the money freely, and since some of the
heads of the branches were connected with or supporters of HAMAS, some of the money
served HAMAS101 .

42

While working for the HLFRD, Anati also secretly promoted HAMAS interests. For
example, when he helped build an Islamic clinic in a certain area, everyone around knew that
it was the HAMAS organization behind the clinic. When food was distributed during
holidays, the population knew that HAMAS was behind this102.

Anati described the HLFRD's headquarters in Richardson, Texas, and Shukri Abu Baker as
being in charge. Funds were transferred from the United States to Israel. The HLFRD office
in Dallas sent the funds directly to the bank accounts of the different organizations in the
West Bank, as well as the bank accounts of the various projects. The money did not pass
through his office, except for funds intended for the Jerusalem area, which Anati personally
allocated.

According to Anati, the HLFRD was connected with HAMAS. When he visited the United
States in 1994, it was clear and obvious to him that they were pro-HAMAS and engaged in
helping this organization. He also stated that he was told by HLFRD members visiting Israel
that during parties and conventions held by the HLFRD abroad, it was mentioned that they
were pro-HAMAS and they sang HAMAS songs103.

HLFRD HEBRON OFFICE


According to FBI analysis of the HLFRD's Richardson office bank records, the HLFRD
Hebron office has only been receiving funds from the HFLRD Richardson since October
1998. Hebron received the following:

1999: $442,491.00;

Jan.Sept.2000: $1,001,492.00

The former head of the HLFRD Hebron office was Kamal al Tamimi. Tamimi has been
identified by the GSS as a HAMAS activist. In 1992 he was one of the HAMAS activists
deported to Lebanon104 .

HLFRD Gaza Office.


The HLFRD Richardson office sends significantly less money to its Gaza office, as compared
to the West Bank. FBI analysis indicates that the HLFRD Gaza has received the following:

1997: $ 231,434.00

1998: $76,697.00

1999:$217,495 .00

Jan-Sept. 2000: $65,458.00

43

According to GSS and public source reporting, on September 25, 1997, as a result of
HAMAS terrorist attacks, the PA closed what they identified as 16 HAMAS institutions and
associations as part of it's efforts to degrade the terrorist infrastructure. The HLFRD's Gaza
office was one of those 16 offices that the PA closed.

According to HLFRD-4, an FBI source, who has provided

reliable information in the

past, at the September 30, 1997 HLFRD fund-raising event in Buena Park, California,
Shukri Abu Baker commented on the closing of the HLFRD office. Baker discussed the
HLFRD mission to support the families of the martyrs. He also talked about Arafat closing a
number of charitable organizations' offices in Gaza, including the HLFRD office. Baker
stated that Arafat would be sorry that he did this and that the goal of HAMAS to form an
Islamic State could not be thwarted. This office has now re-opened.

The GOI has further reported that Zuhari Brghati was the former Director of the HLFRD
Gaza office. The GOI identified Barghati as a HAMAS activist and the nephew of Ismail
Barghati, who had a joint account with Marzook while Marzook served as the head of the
Political Bureau of HAMAS.

44

Quranic Literacy Institute ("QLI")

A review of bank records obtained by the FBI demonstrates that Salah previously has claimed
to be an employee of the Quranic Literacy Institute ("QLI") of Oak Lawn, Illinois.

QLI represents itself to be a not-for-profit research institute devoted to the translation and
publication of sacred Islamic texts and to scholarly research devoted to such topics. QLI's
principals include its President, Ahmad Zaki Hameed (hereby "Zaki") Corporate Secretary
and Trustee Amer Haleem, and Treasurer Abraham Abu-Sharif105 .

Bank records obtained by the FBI include an employment verification letter issued for
Mohammad Salah by QLI to Standard Bank & Trust Co of Evergreen Park, Illinois. The
letter, printed on QLI organizational letterhead and signed by Amer Haleem, states that Salah
began working for QLI as a computer analyst on January l, 1991, for a salary of $36,000106.

Other information obtained by The FBI indicates that Salah either was not employed by the
QLI in the capacity claimed or that QLI is seeking to conceal and disguise the relationship it
had with Salah107.

A review of bank records further indicates that QLI-related entities or individuals likely were
a source of funds for Salah's HAMAS-related expenditures from 1991 until his arrest in
January of 1993 as well as afterwards. . They also suggest that the QLI-related transfers of
funds to Salah were, to a significant extent structured to conceal QLI as the source of the
funds.

For example, bank records show that on October 29, 30 and 31, 1991, Salah received a daily
check for $18,000 ($56,000 in total), written by Ahmad Zaki Hameed, the President of QLI.
The checks were not drawn on QLI bank accounts, but rather on Zaki's personal bank
account108.

A review of bank records also revealed that on June 18, 1991, Salah received $40,500.00 in
the form of five cashier's checks, each for the amount of $8,100.00, drawn on an account
belonging to the George Washington Savings and Loan Association of Oak Lawn, Illinois.
Bank records show that the cashier's checks were obtained for and given to Salah by Linda
Abusharif, the sister of QLI Treasurer Abraham Abusharif. Bank records further reflect that
the five cashier's checks were countersigned by Salah who deposited them into his LaSalle
Bank account.

45

QLIs Scheme to Generate Income For HAMAS Activites


Bank records further suggest that the planned source of the funds that were relayed to Salah
by QLI related entities was, at least in part, the proceeds of a local land deal involving QLI
and Goldan Marble Corp. The deal was funded with money transferred from a Swiss account
of a Saudi Arabian entity to the United States.

The details of this scheme are highly complicated and are thoroughly described in FBI
documents109.

The bottom line, however, is that through false statements and fraud QLI

president Ahmad Zaki Hameed has succeeded in laundering $820,000, to HAMAS benefit.
The money came from a Saudi businessman named Yassin Kadi who, according to
intelligence sources, operated as a front for the Saudi government110 . Kadi, CEO of Kadi
International, wired the money from a Swiss bank account and disguised it as part of a realestate deal111. A review of tax records reveals that for the fiscal years 1991 to 1995, QLI
never filed the annual IRS Form-990 required of tax-exempt organizations. This fact helped
to further conceal and obscure QLI's business dealings in general, and its effective receipt of
$820,000-worth cross-border transfer by Kadi International112 into the United States.

HAMAS tries to minimizes losses


Bank records show that on January 29, 1993, four days after Mohammad Salah's arrest by the
Israelis, an unidentified individual attempted to cash a check for $299,950 payable to Nasser
AI-Khatib, purportedly executed by Salah. The check was drawn from the LaSalle Talman
account which Salah held jointly with his wife. LaSalle Talman declined to clear the check
when the unidentified individual attempted to cash it. A cursory examination of a copy of the
check obtained from LaSalle Talman bank records indicates that it was executed in
handwriting that substantially differed from Mohammad Salah's handwriting appearing in
checks and drafts that were known to have been executed by Salah.

Following a series of bank transactions commenced by Azita Salah,

in an attempt to

113

withdraw money from her husbands and her main account , she was summoned to attend
an FBI interview, to which she came accompanied by counsel. She stated that she believed
the money placed into the joint LaSalle Bank and Standard Bank & Trust accounts she held
with her husband was intended for distribution by her husband to charitable organizations
overseas. However, Azita Salah stated that she decided to keep the money herself after her

46

husband was arrested in Israel. Azita Salah further stated that she transferred the money into a
new account because she feared the United States Government might attempt to take it
away114 .
The FBI maintains that QLI funds115 were involved in financial transactions that violated the
Money Laundering Act. These assets were derived from an $820,000 wire transfer made by
Yassin Kadi in Saudi Arabia. The illegally transferred funds were used to generate income to
facilitate the activities of Mohammad Salah and others in the HAMAS. These activities
involved violent terrorist attacks, extortion, kidnapping and murder of citizens, soldiers and
policemen, most of them Israelis. All this to further HAMAS' publicly declared goals of
sabotaging the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

47

ZAKAT Committees in the West Bank and Gaza

FBI analysis has determined that HAMAS uses the ZAKAT charity committees to provide
social services needed by the Palestinian people, thereby gaining support for their movement.
These charity committees receive funds from such organizations as the HLFRD to manage
social services, such as hospitals and schools, and distribute food and clothing.

An August 13, 2001 USA Today article describes how HAMAS social infrastructure, in this
case HAMAS-run schools, serve HAMAS ends:

In HAMAS-run kindergartens, signs on the walls read: "The children of the kindergarten are
the Shaheeds (holy martyrs) of tomorrow." The classroom signs at AI-Najah University in the
West Bank and at Gaza's Islamic University say, "Israel has nuclear bombs, we have human
bombs." At an Islamic school in Gaza City run by HAMAS, 11-year-old Palestinian student
Ahmed states, I will make my body a bomb that will blast the flesh of Zionists, the sons of pigs
and monkeys . . . I will tear their bodies into little pieces and cause them more pain than they
will ever know." "Allah Akbar," his classmates shout in response: "God is great." "May the
virgins give you pleasure," his teacher yells, referring to one of the rewards awaiting martyrs
in paradise. Even the principal smiles and nods bus approval. "You don't start educating a
shaheed at the age of 22," says Roni Shaked, a terrorism expert and former officer in Israel's
GSS. "you start at kindergarten so by the time he's 22, he's looking for an opportunity to
sacrifice his life."116.

ZAKAT committees are located in most communities throughout the West Bank. Financial
analysis of the HLFRD office records in Richardson, Texas, reveal that it has provided funds
to the ZAKAT committees representing the major communities in the West Bank, including
Hebron, Ramallah, Jenin, and Nablus.

According to an FBI's analysis, the ZAKAT committees receiving HLFRD financial support
are controlled by HAMAS. GSS analysis has also determined that HAMAS activists have
been elected or appointed to senior leadership positions on these ZAKAT committees. GSS
analysis, as well as open source reporting, has identified that the civilian population is aware
that the services being provided by the ZAKAT committees, whether it's the distribution of
food, medical services or other social services, are being provided by HAMAS. Following are
a few examples of the role that ZAKAT committees play in building grassroots support for
HAMAS through charitable projects. Following are some examples of the activities of the
ZAKAT committees.

48

Islamic Charity Association (a.k.a. Islamic Charitable Society in Hebron)


A March 2, 2001, Associated Press article described a large unfinished building in Hebron,
West Bank, where Palestinian men and teen-age boys worked on a makeshift assembly line
packing food items into boxes. Inspirational music extolling HAMAS played in the
background, "The holy war is calling," a singer intoned on a tape. "We will continue the
resistance, the HAMAS revolution."

The article went on to explain that the warehouse is run by the Islamic Charity Organization
in Hebron, which distributed 50,000 food packages to destitute Palestinian families in the
West Bank before the Muslim holiday of Eid al Adha. The article stated that across the
Palestinian areas Islamic charities are filling a growing need created by skyrocketing
unemployment and poverty. In so doing, they are winning hearts and minds for HAMAS'
unyielding doctrines at the expense of the PA. "People realize more than before who is honest
and who is not. In the long run, it will pay off in increased political popularity," said Khaled
Amayreh, a Palestinian journalist close to the Islamic movement.

The article describes that, along Shuhada Street in Hebron, 56 families have received
monthly donations of food from Islamic charities. Anaya Bader of Shuhada Street said that
she desperately needed the donations to make ends meet. With 10 children to feed, she said
her Islamic brothers had not only her thanks, but also her support. "All we know is that they
are the ones who bring us food," she said.

Financial analysis of HLFRD bank records, presented by the FBI, indicates that the ICA
received the following sums from the HLFRD:

1997: $138,302.00;

1998: $690,297.00;

1999: $275,313.00;

Between January and September 2000, no funds were received.


Additionally, from January 1997 to April 1999, approximately $52,474.00 was transferred to
this ZAKAT committee from the HLFRD Richardson office, exact dates remaining unknown.

According to information from the GOI, the ICA has been identified as a HAMAS entity. In
addition, the GSS identifies leaders of ICA as prominent operatives in HAMAS. This claim
was corroborated during interviews with those individuals and other HAMAS members.117

49

Tulkarem ZAKAT Committee


Financial analysis of HLFRD bank records indicates that this ZAKAT committee received
the following:

1997:$23,820.00;

1998:$18,314.00;

1999:$30,079.00

Jan.-Sept.2000: no funds.

From January 1997 to April 1999, the amount of approximately $15,344.00 was

transferred, exact dates unknown118.

According to documents captured in the "Charity Committee" offices, the committee held
extensive correspondence with the Holy Land Foundation regarding contributions and
participation of the Holy Land Foundation in projects. The funds were transferred to the bank
accounts of the "charity committees" in the Arab Bank in Tulkarem119.

The handwritten message "My congratulatory wishes to Kamal Tamimi" was found on a
document of the Saudi Committee for the Support of Intifadat al-Quds. The Committees
secretary general penned the message. In a brief on the Holy Land Fund prepared by the
Department of State's Assistant Coordinator for Anti-Terrorism, Kamal Tamimi is cited as
the former head of the Holy Land Funds Hebron office. According to the GSS, Tamimi was
identified as a HAMAS activist. In 1992, he was one of the HAMAS activists expelled to
Lebanon.

The GSS indicates that the Tulkarem ZAKAT Committee exists to support HAMAS
activities. Most of the Tulkarem ZAKAT Committee members were identified by the GSS as
HAMAS members, in some cases senior members in the Tulkarem area120.

Tulkarems Charity Committee, whose offices hold the documents of the Saudi Committee,
is identified as one of the HAMAS power bases in Tulkarem. A veteran HAMAS member,
Hussein Hawaja, a former school principle, teacher and businessman heads it. The Committee
does indeed carry out a broad range of social, religious and economic activities for the benefit
of the Palestinian residents, from clinics and schools to a project for providing jobs to the
unemployed121 . But the documents seized by the IDF at the Committees offices also clearly point to other areas of activity.

50

From the material captured in the Tulkarem Charity Committee offices it is apparent that the
committee also has ties with the HAMAS operational apparatus that recruits youths to
perpetrate suicide attacks and is engaged in carrying out terrorist acts. Thus, for example, the
following materials were found in the offices:

A large poster with the photo of Abed AI-Basat Muhammad Ouda, the perpetrator of the

Park Hotel attack in Netanya. The poster is of the HAMAS Iz AI-Din AI-Qassam Battalions
in Tulkarem. Another of their posters concerning the Park Hotel attack was found in the Zeid
mosque in Tulkarem.

A leaflet displayed in a mosque with the words of the mother of the suicide terrorist,

Muhammad Fathi Farhat From 10 March 2002. The mother encourages the acts of suicide
bombers and calls for the women of Palestine not to save their sons from Holy Death and
Jihad (note: Muhammad Farahat from Saja'iya in the Gaza Strip was killed during a suicide
attack in Atzmona on 7 March 2002. He infiltrated the settlement and fired at Israeli
teenagers studying in a pre-army boarding school. Five boys were killed and twenty-four
were wounded).

Encouragement cards for youths from the Islamic movement in Tulkarem. These cards

contain a call for executing suicide attacks in order to expel the enemy from the lands.

Material regarding the Iz AI-Din AI-Qassam Brigades: details on attacks perpetrated,

"AI-Qassam posters", photos of Martyrs (Shahids), quotes from the "engineer" Yihie Ayyash,
commander of the AI-Qassam Brigades who was killed by Israelis in 1996.

Posters, leaflets and quotes by Sheikh Dr. Abdallah Azam, spiritual mentor and close

friend of Usama Bin Laden.

A leaflet entitled The Jewish Hatred for the Human Race containing a strong anti Jewish

tone. The leaflet, based on Koranic verses, describes the Jews as the enemies of Islam and its
values, the murderers of prophets, and as carriers of "deep-seated aversion to the whole
human race."122

In addition to large sums of money that came from the HLFRD, more money was deposited
in the bank accounts of the Tulkarm Charity Committee by Islamic associations from
around the world, including groups identified with radical Islam, such as "The Coalition of
Benevolence" "A'atalef Al-Khir") headed by Sheikh Yousef Kardawi who lives in Qatar123 .

Orphan Care Association (Bethlehem)


Financial analysis of HLFRD bank records indicates that this ZAKAT committee received
the following:

51

1997 - 1998: no funds

1999: $38,435.00

No funds were received between January and September 2000.

According to the GSS, prominent HAMAS activists run this association. It is located on the
ground floor of the Salah al Din Mosque in Bethlehem.

52

Recipients of money outside of the West Bank and Gaza

The largest HLFRD recipients and QLI outside of the West Bank and Gaza are Sanabil
Association for Relief and Development in Lebanon and Human Appeal International in
Jordan. As will be discussed, these organizations have been linked to HAMAS.

Sanabil Association for Relief and Development (Sanabil)


Sanabil is a Lebanon-based organization. Financial analysis of HLFRD bank records
indicates that this organization received the following:

1997: 125,744$

1998: 232,110$

1999: 649,386$

Jan-Sept. 2000: 456,105$

Additionally, from January 1997 to April 1999, transfers totalling $161,145.00 were

made to Sanabil by HLFRD, , exact dates unknown.

FBI analysis suggests that the HLFRD has devoted large amounts of money to gain favour
and/or facilitate projects with the Lebanese government. For example, on March 10, 2000,
Shukri Abu Baker, CEO, and Haitham Maghawri, Executive Director, flew to Lebanon to
present a $100,000.00 check to the President and Prime Minister of Lebanon for the
reconstruction of power plants destroyed by the Israeli air force on February 8, 2000. The
Israeli attack on the power plants was retaliation for Hezbollah guerrilla attacks, in which five
Israeli soldiers have been killed since January 25, 2000.

Sanabil also has ties to the Palestine Relief Fund (a.k.a Interpal), a United Kingdom-based
organization, which the GSS has identified as belonging to the HAMAS organization.
FBI analysis has linked Sanabil, Interpal and the HLFRD based on the following findings: 124

On its website, www.interpal.org, Interpal describes itself as

The Palestinians Relief and Development Fund, is a non-political, non-profitable,


independent charitable organization. The Charity is principally concerned with providing
much needed support to the poor and needy Palestinian people in the primary areas of
operation in Palestine - West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the refugee camps in Jordan and
Lebanon."

53

According the Interpal website as of August 24, 2001, most of the donations received by

Interpal are ZAKAT payments, which places the charity under a religious duty to distribute
funds according to Islamic Law.

Interpal's website as of August 15, 2001, states that it "works closely with Sanabil."

Interpal identifies other organizations for those wishing to make "International

Donations." The only organization listed for the United States is the HLFRD.

A review of the HLFRD's financial records shows that on April 11, 2000, the HLFRD

wired Interpal $66,000.00.

Human Appeal International - Jordan (HAI)


While there is no evidence that HAI is a HAMAS organization, FBI investigation has
revealed a close relationship among the HLFRD, HAMAS and HAI. FBI investigation has
determined that the HLFRD provides significant funding to HAI, which benefits the
HAMAS agenda.

Financial analysis of HLFRD bank records indicates that HAI received the following:

1997: $31,475.00

1998: $105,236.00

1999: $281,608.00

Jan.-Sept. 2000 $233,377.00.

Additionally, between January 1997 and April 1999, transfers totalling approximately

$34,745.00 were made, exact dates unknown.

FBI investigation has determined that Bassam Fares was the HLFRD's Projects and Grants
Director from February 1997 until his voluntary departure from the United States in 2000.
Fares held a senior HLFRD position. From April 1990 to May 1993, Fares was the Deputy
Regional Manager for HAI in Jordan.

In February 1996, an HLFRD-5, an FBI source, reported on a meeting at which Bassam Fares
and others discussed how HAMAS meetings should be structured.

According to the source, Fares, a Jordanian, indicated that he had been affiliated with the
Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP) for approximately ten years, and that organization
donated to the Palestinian area approximately $3 million per year. These donations were
reportedly sent to the Holy Land Foundation in Palestine, and the money went to HAMAS.

54

The IAP also received funds from Mousa Marzook in the early 1990s, at the same time as
Marzook, acting on behalf of HAMAS, was providing funds to the HLFRD and InfoCom.

55

Saudi Support to HAMAS


During Operation Defensive Shield, documents of Saudi Arabian and Palestinian origin125
were captured. These describe the systematic and ongoing transfer of large sums of money
by Saudi Arabian institutions and associations to the PA areas, via the USA, as financial
support for the Intifada. These sums are transferred for various purposes: support for families
of those killed in the Intifada, including to families of suicide terrorists killed during attacks;
support for families of imprisoned terrorists; aid for medical care of wounded terrorists;
various projects, occasionally of a political nature, such as renovation of the Cave of the
Patriarchs and nearby houses, or rehabilitation of houses in the old city of Jerusalem126 .

A title of one of the captured documents is, for example, "The aid project for Palestinian
families, the coalition of benevolence - financing of the Saudi committee for support of the
Intifada Al Aqsa, in cooperation with the Tulkarm "Charity Committee". The document
includes details of 89 families (apparently a project of the Saudi committee in cooperation
with the "Charity Committee" which the Coalition of Benevolence has decided to assist).

On the face of it, this looks like Saudi Arabian aid is that of a purely religious and
humanitarian nature. However, the captured documents reveal another side to the Saudi aid: it
is clear from the documents that these funds were used, inter alia, to support HAMAS and
organizations linked to HAMAS, in the PA areas especially since the outbreak of violence in
September 2000. Using this framework, the Saudis transferred funds to the HAMAS
organization, to entities and persons identified with it, to other radical groups in the PA areas
and to families of suicide terrorists who carried out murderous attacks in Israels densely
populated areas.

For many years, the Israeli intelligence community has been harbouring unfriendly
sentiments toward the regime in Riyadh. But where Saudi Arabia was concerned, the United
States remained silent.

This was the case even when details surfaced of the Saudi

involvement in the Pakistani nuclear project; or when the Saudi lied to the Americans and
bought, under their very noses, surface-to-surface missiles from China, which they did not in
fact need. Or when it became clear that the Saudis were involved in financing terrorist
organizations; or when it was proven, beyond a shadow of a doubt, that the Saudi family was
rotten to its very core with corruption and an unbridled lust for power. The United States said
nothing and effectively forced Israel to do the same.

September 11 stirred things up. Many people in the USA, both in and outside the

56

Administration, felt freer to air the grievances which had been stored up in their gut for years.
Richard Pearle, the Pentagons chief strategist, says127 :
In my opinion, the Saudis are not part of the solution, but part of the problem. When we
need them to help us in our war against terrorism, they are useless. At the same time, they are
funnelling billions into the establishment of religious schools and colleges around the world,
where they are systematically preaching against the USA and the West. The very fact that
they transferred that money, when they knew exactly what it is being used for, and the money
they sent to the Taliban to buy themselves some peace and quiet, should be interpreted as a
hostile step against the USA, and should be handled accordingly. We were naive in claiming
the Saudis as friends. We had all the reasons in the world to assume that they would be
grateful to us for saving them in the Gulf War, and that they wouldnt do anything to harm us.
I have huge reservations about the way the Saud family runs its kingdoms business and its
foreign relations.

Saudi Arabian Committee for Support of the Intifada al Quds


Among the Saudi Arabian institutions and organizations involved in transferring funds for
"aid to the Intifada", the "Saudi Arabian Committee for Support of the Intifada al Quds" (AlQuds- Arabic for Jerusalem), headed by Saudi Interior Minister, the Emir Naif Ibn Abed al
Aziz, is particularly notable.

The "Saudi Committee for Support of Intifada al Quds" is a Saudi body established in order
to provide assistance to the Palestinians following the outbreak of the violent confrontation in
September 2000. The "committee" operates under the full patronage of the Saudi regime and
is headed by the Saudi Interior Minister, Emir Naef Ibn Abed Al Aziz. Prior to IDF Operation
Defensive Shield, the committee transferred to the PA areas, according to its declarations,
$55.7 million. A significant part of the committee's contributions is not devoted to aiding a
general population in need, but is openly transferred to families of persons killed in the
Intifada, including - according to captured documents - families of notorious terrorists killed
in murderous suicide attacks against Israel.

According to the Internet site of the Saudi embassy in Washington, Saudi Arabia recently
collected a sum of $109.56 million during a "telethon" to raise money for the "Palestinian
victims". Most of the activities held in the framework of the "telethon" were directed by the
"Saudi Committee for Support of the Intifada" which channelled a large part of the donations.

57

According to internal Saudi documents, much of the money was transferred from the Saudi
institutions and organization to Chase Manhattan Bank, New York, NY and Citibank,
Buffalo, NY then to The Arab Bank branch in Tulkarem, where it was deposited into the
account of The Tulkarem Charity Committee (identified with HAMAS) 128 .

This committee, according to the captured documents, transferred large sums of money to
families of Palestinians who died in violent events, including notorious terrorists who
masterminded and directed murderous attacks in Israel or who carried out attacks in which
hundreds of Israelis were killed and wounded. The captured documents reveal that the Saudi
committee knew which families received the aid funds, and in some cases were also aware of
the circumstances under which the suicide terrorists met their death.

According to the captured documents, the Saudi committee received this information from
Islamic entities in the PA areas, including the "Charity Committee" of Tulkarm, which is
identified with the HAMAS.

According to the captured documents, the Saudi committee does not transfer its financial aid
via the PA but operates via charity committees and Islamic charity bodies, most of which are
identified with HAMAS. The AL Salah Association in Gaza (mentioned in one of the
captured documents) and the Islamic Association in Hebron, two of the largest HAMAS
institutions in the PA areas, play a prominent role in channelling the money. Prominent
HAMAS activists, such as Ahmed AI Kared in the Gaza Strip and Nabil Naim Al Natse in
the West Bank, are senior members of the committees and have ties with the Saudi
committee129 .

Up until Operation Defensive Shield, the Saudi Committee for Support of the Al-Aksa
Intifada had transferred US$55.7 million to the territories, according to its own declarations.
The Committee even initiated a fund-raising drive for its soldiers, similar to the Israeli
telethon, which raised US$109.56 million in support of the Palestinian victims.

Some of the Saudi money was received through the International Islamic Relief Organization
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (IIRO). This organization is known as one of the largest
charities in Saudi Arabia. Its purpose is to aid Muslims in need, all over the world.130

Not all Saudi money was funnelled through the US. A part of it was sent via Jordan and part
through Europe. Israeli MOSSAD claims to have strong proofs131 that major portions of the
money sent to HAMAS and HAMAS affiliated organizations was channelled via Bosnia.

58

This information is corroborated by AID, Bosnian intelligence132 . On the 26th of September,


2001 hundreds of soldiers, part of the 20,000-man international peacekeeping force known as
SFOR surrounded the offices of the "Saudi High Committee for Welfare" in Sarajevo. They
shot open the locked doors and broke in. Big trucks were loaded up with the contents of the
offices: computers, documents, lists, pictures, videotapes and $200,000 in cash that was
found in one of the safes.

Investigation of the detainees together with the intelligence file that arrived from the CIA
opened up a new world to the special anti-terrorism team that was set up in Bosnia. Zlatko
Miletic, coordinator of the combined team, comprised of Americans and British, and who
also serves as personal assistant to the prime minister of Bosnia says133 that: One of the
subjects that bothered us the most," Miletic says, "were the documents we found at the Saudi
"'Welfare Committee.'" It has become clear that Saudi sources sent over $800 million dollars
since the end of the war. We have succeeded in understanding what happened to $700
million. According to the material confiscated, we fear that the rest of the money went to
purposes related to terrorism. We have strong reason to believe that some of it was sent to
HAMAS.

According to an IIRO report, 14 Islamic committees and bodies were given IIRO money. All
14 bodies are known to be identified with the HAMAS. It is noted in the report that the
money is provided for supporting the fatalities, the wounded, as well as the HAMASidentified committees/bodies themselves134 .

In the documents of Tulkarms Charity Committee, for example, data was found that
concerns the tenth round of payments, dated March 2002 (see appendix A). According to the
records, the part paid by the Saudis was 2,040,000 riyals (approx. $545,000). This sum was
divided between 102 families of shahids, including families of suicide bombers. Each family
received 20,000 riyals (approx. $5,340). The document attached to this research was found in
the computer of the Tulkarm Charity committee" (in a payments" file dated 17 March
2002). The "logo" which appears in the tables is of the "Saudi Arab Kingdom, the Saudi
Committee for Support of Intifada al Quds". The money was transferred to families of
terrorists killed in the PA areas from the Saudi committee to Chase Manhattan Bank in New
York and from there, through the Arab Bank in Tulkarem, was handed over to beneficiaries
whose names and ID number are mentioned in the table.

A quick glance at the list of names of shahids whose families are receiving support is
sufficient to understand exactly to whom the Saudis are paying their money. For eight of the

59

names, the reason for the payment is expressly stated: they were killed during Amaliah
Istishadiah (Arabic for a suicide bombing). Among these eight names are Abd al Fatah
Muhammad Muslah Rashed, who detonated a car bomb at the Beit Lid junction on September
9, 2001, injuring eight Israelis; Abd al Karim Omar Muhammad Abu Na'asah, born in Jenin,
who committed a suicide bombing in Afula, killing two Israelis and wounding fifty; and Ali
Ibrahim Abd Al Rahman Al Julani, who carried out a shooting attack at the Kiryah (the IDF
General Staff compound) in Tel Aviv. The table also shows the names of dozens of other
terrorists, including many notorious arch-terrorists. This list is headed by Mahmoud AbuHanud, the former commander of the HAMAS military wing in the West Bank, who
supervised many suicide attacks, leaving dozens of Israelis dead and hundreds wounded.

Another list, from January 2001, also bearing the logo of the Saudi Committee for Support of
Intifada A1 Quds contains the names of junior activists killed at the beginning of the Intifada.
According to the organizations that claimed responsibility for them, most of these attacks
were carried out by HAMAS activists and others were joint HAMAS and Fattah activities.

The same list contains also a page listing notorious terrorists who carried out murder attacks
that caused the death of dozens of Israelis (mostly civilians) and wounded hundreds. These
are operational activists, almost all of whom belong to the HAMAS, killed throughout the
1990s, before the eruption of the current confrontation135.

The Saudis were very keen to make their generosity known. For example, one of the Charity
Committees directors was quoted in an Arab newspaper 136 as saying that he works in
coordination and cooperation with the Saudi Committee for Support of Intifada Al Quds and
that families of those killed can receive allowances from branches of the Arab Bank. He
immediately received a very harsh answer. The General Secretary of the Saudi Committee for
Support of Intifada AI Quds, Dr. Walid Bin Abed al-Razak al-Dali wrote to him: I am to
remind you that the house rules of the Saudi Committee for Support of Intifada A1 Quds
Prohibits publications in the name of the committee to be made without a written consent or
official appointment to the matter.

PAs knowledge of HAMAS financing


The captured documents show that the PA intelligence led by Arafat were well aware of these
negative implications. An example can be found in a memorandum sent by the Preventive
Security Apparatus HQ in Bethlehem on 15 February 2001. The memorandum notes that

60

during January, Saudi Arabia transferred aid to Palestinians imprisoned in Israel. The Saudis
refused to transfer the aid via the PA, fearing that these funds will not reach the prisoners.
The money was sent to the HAMAS who paid only its own leaders and hid the rest of the
money. Only after the exposure of the affair in Megiddo prison, since some prisoners
received money and others did not, was the HAMAS forced to pay all prisoners from all the
organizations.

The PA officials were especially concerned with the strengthening of the status of the
HAMAS vis-a-vis the PA, i.e. it was clear to the PA that the trail of the Saudi money
effectively ends up at the HAMAS door.

PAs attempts in the first months of the Intifada to urge the Saudis to send this aid via the PA
were unsuccessful since the Saudis, for their own reasons, preferred to send the funds to
Islamic entities, and mainly those identified with the HAMAS. This is demonstrated in an
extensive correspondence between the PA and the Saudis during the first months of the
Intifada (December 2000 - January 2001). In these documents, Arafat complains about the
fact that the Saudi aid is not transferred to the PA areas via the PA, and it does not reach the
Fatah, but is given to HAMAS, thus weakening the PA. The documents concern discussions
held in Riyadh between the Palestinians and the Saudis on this issue. In hindsight, it can be
stated that Arafat failed in his attempt to persuade the Saudis to channel the financial aid via
the PA, and the phenomenon of transferring Saudi funds to HAMAS elements continued and
continues until the present day. The Saudis, for their own reasons (apprehension of PA
corruption, hostility to Arafat, and ideological proximity to HAMAS) preferred to transfer the
money to HAMAS and additional Islamic organizations. One of the most interesting
documents in this regards is a 7 January 2001s except from a news compilation transferred to
Arafat, containing a report from MBC television, according to which the Saudi Minister of
Interior has informed that "to this day, a sum of 123,750,000 Riyal was paid in support of the
families of Intifada al Quds fatalities, prisoners, wounded and disabled, as well as needy
Palestinian families". In response, Arafat wrote on the news compilation, in his own
handwriting, an instruction addressed to the PA representative in Saudi Arabia: "Please find
for me where did these funds go to and who received them, since the fatalities and wounded
received nothing". Arafat meant that the PA received nothing.

61

Conclusions
The details described in this research determine the powerful connection between HAMAS
personnel and operations in the occupied territories\PA and a series of individuals and
organizations in the US. During the period of 1989 to 2001, (until the presidential order to
shut down these organizations), it is estimated by the FBI that HAMAS received a third or
even 60%, as estimated by MOSSAD137 , of its budget directly from American sources or
from Saudi origin, funnelled through the US. HAMAS used that money for social purposes,
as well as for military\terrorist operations. The connection between the front organizations in
the US, mainly HLFRD and QLI, on one hand, and HAMASs Political Bureau and its
military wing on the other, is also well established.

The US fundraising network is essential for HAMAS's existence, its daily functions and its
prompt ongoing recovery from blows it suffers from the hands of Israeli authorities.

American and Israeli intelligence investigations of HAMAS activities in the United States
have revealed that the HLFRD is the primary fund-raising entity for HAMAS. A significant
portion of the funds raised by the HLFRD are clearly being used by the HAMAS
organization. The information provided in this document confirms that the HLFRD is acting
for or on behalf of HAMAS. Furthermore, senior members of HLFRD support HAMAS, its
ideology and activities. The FBI maintains that these HAMAS activities interfere with the
Middle East peace process and pose a threat to the national security, foreign Policy, or
economy of the United States.
Both the individuals and the organizations based in the US took a series of measures to
conceal their connection to HAMAS and its leaders. This may act as a further proof of their
understanding of the fact that the fundraising network is involved in activities, which amount
to violations of the law in the US and Israel. While trying to raise as much money as possible,
the US front organization has also been involved in tax fraud and money laundering.

The monitoring of meetings between identified HAMAS leaders and senior representatives of
the HLFRD is a solid proof of the connection between the two. Alongside is the
understanding and enthusiasm of all the persons involved as to the purpose of the money, the
ideology of HAMAS and its involvement in terrorism.

Most of the money was channelled either by direct fund transfers from HLFRD in the US to
The HLFRD offices in PA, or by transfers of funds from the HLFRD in the US to ZAKAT
(Islamic charity) committees located in the West Bank and Gaza. These local committees are

62

controlled by HAMAS. Transfers of funds from the HLFRD in the US, were also made, to
other "charitable" organizations in the Middle East, not controlled by HAMAS, but
supporting it.

The HLFRD and QLI had provided crucial financial support for families of HAMAS suicide
bombers, and Palestinians who support the HAMAS movement.

The Saudi government took a doubled-face approach toward HAMAS and Islamic terrorism
(see appendix B). While seemingly taking a moderate approach toward the Israeli-Arab
conflict, it financed HAMAS and its front Charity committees.

The money sent for families of Shahids (martyrs)/suicide bombers can not be classified as
mere humanitarian aid. Such vast sums, by the standards of the territories, have far-reaching
implications. The knowledge that terrorist actions, including suicide bombings, will guarantee
decent remuneration for the family of the perpetrator creates an economic incentive for the
potential suicide bomber.

The potential suicide bomber knows that in his absence, there will be someone there
generously looking after his family. Calculations made by the Research Division of Military
Intelligence show that the financial aid received from various Arab states, with the Saudis
being the main donors, by the shahids family is equivalent to six years of work138 .

Furthermore, the Saudis provide financial assistance to the Shahids families on a regular
basis. They also assist the families of prisoners and injured Palestinians. Hence the names of
500 prisoners appear on a list issued by the Saudi Committee in Support of the Al-Aksa
Intifada as eligible for financial assistance.

According to testimonies of HAMAS members, collected by Israeli General Security Service,


part of the monies transferred by Saudi Arabia to HAMAS or organizations related to
HAMAS, also got through to the organizations operational-military wing, the Izz A-Din ElKassam Brigades. These funds were used directly to finance military operations and terrorist
attacks. Saudi funds were also strengthening HAMAS's status among the Palestinian
population. The Palestinian public associated the financial support it was receiving with
HAMAS and with its ramified system of welfare and assistance organizations. This enhanced
popular support for HAMAS has weakened the power and status of the Palestinian Authority.
It created an economic and social infrastructure for HAMAS, upon which it had based its
recruiting system.

63

Many Israeli readers, and particularly Justice Department and GSS officials139, may find the
extent of the material contained in the FBI documents, part of which is set forth above, as
somewhat frustrating. Examination of the activities of HAMAS in the USA might lead to
some extremely gloomy conclusions regarding the worlds war against terrorism prior to
September 11.
Up until September 11th, 2001, Israel had made an all-out effort to convince the USA to
outlaw some of these organizations. Attorney Irit Kohn, Director of International Affairs at
the Israeli Ministry of Justice went as far as actually visiting the States on several occasions
for this precise reason. Khon was accompanied by various GSS officials, joining forces to
advance the matter, but to no avail. The Americans said that Israel was demanding too much,
and that acceding to its demands would be tantamount to a breach of freedom of expression
and other basic human rights. They went further to say that Israel had not supplied enough
proof that the money was in fact not going to orphans, but instead being used for to finance
acts of terror140.

The Israeli Ministry of Justice was furious. It can now be maintained that the FBI had known
for years that the Holy Land Foundation had been transferring the funds raised in the USA to
HAMAS, through a secret bank account at Barclays Discount Bank. Ironically, the bank, of
all the places in the world, is situated right next to the Israeli Ministry of Justice, in Salah ADin Street, East Jerusalem.

The main point put forward herewith is that as far back as the 1980's, the intelligence
community in the USA knew that a smooth workable system was in operation in their
country, serving to finance terrorist organizations in Gaza and the West Bank. Over the years,
the Americans collected vast quantities of information about these organizations. Still, it took
three American airliners to crash into the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon, to get the US
government moving141.

64

Appendix A: The payment cycles made by the Saudi Committee to Support of Intifada
AI Quds142
In the "Tulkarem Charity Committee", which is identified with the HAMAS, were found
tables listing four payment cycles made by "the Saudi Committee for Support of Intifada al
Quds" for the Intifada victims: first (50 names); second (132 names); third (we have one page
containing 22 names - there may be more pages) and tenth (102 names).

The table pertaining to the 106 cycle includes the names of 102 people who died in the
Intifada during 2000-2001 (most in 2001), arranged in the following columns: serial number;
the beneficiary's form number; name of the victim; age; date of death; address; area of
residence; manner of death; the bank [via which the Saudi money is transferred]; name of the
beneficiary; ID [of the beneficiary]; the payment cycle [106 cycle in all rows]; sum [20,000
Riyal in each row, 2,040,000 Riyal total].

Of the names appearing in these payment cycles, the 10th cycle - found in the computer of
the "Tulkarem Charity Committee" (17 March 2002) - was examined.

Of the 102 names included in the table, we chose to describe 36 notorious terrorists, in two
groups: first, 8 terrorists whom the Saudi table explicitly mentions as the ones killed while
carrying out suicide operations and in several cases citing the place where the suicide attack
was carried out ("the suicide attack in Afula", for instance). This is of importance since it
proves that the Saudis were well aware to which families their aid money was transferred.
The second group is of 28 terrorists, including notorious activists who took part in directing
and perpetrating terror and murder attacks.

The following 6 terrorists were mentioned in the Saudi table as perpetrators of '"suicide
operations (marked yellow in the Arabic original):
1. Mued Mahmud Ayadah Salah al Din (number 49 in the table), a HAMAS activist. He
was a student at Bir Zeit University and later at AI-Najah University (institutions where the
fundamentalist Islamic movements have considerable influence). He carried out a suicide
attack in Baq'a al Sharqiya on 8 November 2001. He blew himself up next to a border guard
force approaching to arrest him en route to a suicide attack inside Israel. As a result, two
Israeli border guard policemen were lightly wounded. HAMAS claimed responsibility for the
attack.

65

2. Abd al Fatah Muhammad Muslah Rashed (number 15 in the table), Born in Tulkarem,
served as a police officer in the Palestinian Authority. At the end of the 1980s he was a Fattah
activist who participated in attacks against Palestinian collaborators and in the kidnapping of
a Jew in Tulkarem. He later joined the PIJ. On 9 September 2001, he carried out a suicide
attack in Bet Lid Junction, where a car bomb wounded 8 Israelis. The PIJ claimed
responsibility for the attack.
3. Abd al Karim Omar Muhammad Abu Na'asah (number 17 in the table, cited in the table
as perpetrator of "a suicide operation in Afula"). Born in Jenin, in the past served as a
Policeman in the Palestinian Police in Jenin. An activist of Fatah / Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades,
directed by the Fatah senior leadership (Abd al Karim Aweis). He was recruited for the Afula
suicide attack by Haj Ali Safuri, commander of the PIJ military-security apparatus in Jenin.
(Note: according to captured documents, the expenses of this suicide attack were paid for by
the PIJ Secretary, Dr. Ramadan Shalah, who resides in Damascus, from where he directs his
organization's terrorist attacks against Israel). The attack was carried out in the city market in
Afula on 27 November 2001. Two Israeli civilians were killed in the attack and 50 were
wounded, 9 severely. The PIJ and the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades claimed joint responsibility
for the attack.
4. Nidal Thayssir Shhadeh Jibali (number 87 in the table). He used to serve in the
Palestinian National Security Apparatus. He carried out a shooting attack in Hadera on 28
October 2001 with another terrorist. As a result, 4 Israeli civilians were killed and 31 injured
(3 severely). The PIJ claimed responsibility for the attack.
5. Natir Muhammad Mahmud Hamed (number 91 in the table). A Fattah activist from Jenin.
He carried out a shooting attack at the Afula central bus station on 4 October 2001 (disguised
as an IDF soldier). As a result, 3 Israelis were killed and 14 wounded. Apparently he was a
Fatah member although the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades and HAMAS each claimed
responsibility for the attack independently.
6. Nimer Muhammad Yussuf Abe Sayfin (number 92 in file table). He originated from
Yamun (a village in the Jenin area). He perpetrated a suicide attack in Haifa (Checkpost
Junction) on 9 December 2001. As a result, 29 Israelis were wounded. The PIJ claimed
responsibility for file attack.

The following 28 notorious terrorists were also mentioned in the Saudi table (marked pink in
the Arabic original):
1. Mahmud Muhammad Ahmed Shuli Abu Hunud (number 68 in the table), commander of
the HAMAS military wing in the West Bank. Involved in suicide attacks in which dozens of
Israelis were killed and hundreds wounded.

66

2. Abd al Rahman Muhammad Said Hamed (number 14 in the table). Senior HAMAS
activist from Qalqilya. He was involved in suicide attacks in which 23 Israelis were killed
and over 100 wounded, including the suicide attack next to a discotheque in the Tel Aviv
'Dolphinarium', 1 June 2001 (21 Israelis killed).
3. Amer Mansur Hassan al Hudairi (number 9 in the table). Senior HAMAS activist from
Tulkarem. He was involved in terror attacks in which 8 Israelis were killed and over 100
wounded.
4. Ma'amun Rashid Mahmad Hasha'ika (number 48 in the table). Senior HAMAS
operational activist from the Nablus area. Assisted senior terrorists including Mahmud Abu
Hunud. Apparently involved in shooting and explosive charge attacks in the Nablus area.
5. Muhammad Ahmed Mahmad Basharat (number 53 in the table), PIJ activist and one of
the leaders of the PIJ operational infrastructure in the Jenin area.
6. Muhammad Yousef Muhammad Hamed Rayhan (number 66 in the table), operational
HAMAS activist in the Nablus area. Involved in the terrorist attack in Emmanuel (12
December 2001) in which 11 Israelis were killed.
7. Muhaned Raja'a Mahmud Abu al Hija (number 83 in the table). Operational HAMAS
activist and explosive charge manufacturer from Jenin. Killed by an explosive charge in a
working accident.
8. Yasser Ahmed Ayoub Assidah (number 97 in the table). Operational HAMAS activist
from the Nablus area. Killed on his way to a suicide attack in Israel.
9. Wa'el Mutaleq Muhammad 'Assaf (number 94 in the table). One of the heads of the PIJ
operational infrastructure in northern Samaria. Directed terrorist attacks inside Israel.
10. Isa Hassan al Khatib Abayat (number 35 in the table), Fattah activist, involved in
shooting attacks in the Bethlehem area.
11. Firas Shahadah Salah Hamdan al-Salahat (number 41 in the table), Fatah activist. Killed
during an attempt to fire mortar bombs at the Jerusalem Gilo neighborhood.
12. Nidal Abd al Karim Ali Sandaq (number 88 in the table). Fatah activist, involved in the
production of explosive charges for a Fattah cell in Bethlehem. Killed during the production
of an explosive charge.
13. Nidal Muhammad Sabhi Rashdi al-Fakhuri (number 89 in the table). Activist in both the
Fattah and the PA Preventive Security Apparatus, involved in shooting attacks.
14. Wa'al Dif Allah (lsmail al-Abayat (al-Nabahin) (number 93 in the table). Fattah activist,
killed during an attempt to place an explosive charge directed against IDF forces in the
Paradise Hotel, Bethlehem.
15. Ubeir Tawfiq Abdallah Hamdan (number 22 in the table). Fatah activist, planned to place
an explosive charge in a restaurant in Netanya. Akramah Muhammad Hadr Astiti (number 24

67

in the table). Senior military activist in the Fatah cell in Jenin, involved in numerous
explosive charge laying operations in the Jenin area.
16. Firas Sabri Fa'iz Ja'aber (number 42 in the table). Senior activist in the Fattah Tulkarem
terror infrastructure. Participated in the murder of two Israeli restaurant owners in Tulkarem.
17. Majdi Musa Tayb Jaradat (number 51 in the table). Senior activist in the Fattah terror
infrastructure in Jenin, involved in directing numerous shooting and explosive charge attacks
in the Jenin area and Israel, including the murder of an Israeli in Wadi 'Ara.
18. Muhammad Sa'id Hanun Ghanem (number 59 in the table), Fatah activist.
19. Muhammad Marwah Ta'eh Ghanem (number 65 in the table), Fatah activist, served in the
Palestinian Police.
20. Mamud Nawaf Hussein al Jilad (number 69 in the table), Fatah activist.
21. Mustafa Ahmed Hassan 4Anbatz (number 74 in the table). Fatah activist, member in the
squad of Ra'ad Karmi, senior terrorist in the Tulkarem Fattah cell.
22. Yasser Jumah Abd al Rahim Badwi (number 99 in the table). Senior Fattah activist from
Nablus. Arms dealer.
23. Ya'aqub Fathi Rabia ad-Dakidak (number 100 in the table), senior HAMAS operational
activist from Hebron.
24. Yussef Mohammed Ahmed Abayat (number 102 in the table). PIJ activist, attempted to
penetrate IDF position in Bethlehem.
25. Sufian Ahmed Tawfiq Saradah (number 1 in the table). PIJ activist in northern Samaria.
26. Mustafa Ali al-A3i al-Zubairi (number 76 in the table), the General Secretary of the
PFLP / Habash.

Names of other terrorists whose cause of death is stated in the Saudi document as "Suicide
Act" appear on the page containing the ninth cycle of payment. Among those are:
1. Ahmad Amr Hamdan Alyan (second name on the list) - The table states that Alyan
committed a "suicide act in Netanya" on 4 March 2001. The said suicide attack occurred on a
street in Netanya and resulted in the deaths of three Israeli civilians and injuring of 56
civilians, one critically. HAMAS took responsibility for this attack.
2. Mahmud Ahmad Mahmud Marmash (twelfth name on the list) - The table states that
Marmash committed a 'suicide act" on 18 May 2001. The said suicide attack took place at the
Sharon Mall in Netanya and resulted in the deaths of five Israeli civilians and the injuring of
more than 100 civilians. The HAMAS took responsibility for this attack.

68

Appendix B: Saudi duplicitous messages regarding HAMAS actions143


Ghazi Algosaibi - Saudi Arabia's ambassador to the UK - wrote a poem praising martyrs" (the
poem's title was Al- Shuhada', Arabic for martyrs) which appeared on the front page of AIHayat (published in London and distributed throughout the Arab world). The poem was
penned two weeks after a female suicide terrorist blew herself up in Jerusalem. British
commentators claimed that the poem was dedicated to her memory144 .

Following is a translation of the poem. As published in 13 April 2002:


Allah witnesses that you are a witness to the prophets, holy men, and
Muslims.. .You died to raise Allah's word aloft to the summit, whose
zenith is the Asra (Muhammad's night journey from Mecca to A1-Aqsa).
Did you commit suicide?! We committed suicide by living like the dead.
Oh, (Arab) Nation! We died...And we listen to lamentations. We have
become helpless.until helplessness suffers from us, and then we
cried...until crying was reviled and we supplicated...until supplication
was disgusted with us and we begged for mercy... and begging for mercy
and complaining turned for help to idol worshippers in the White
House...whose heart is filled with darkness...we kissed Sharon's
shoe...until it shouted: Slow down, you're choking me." The shoe, Oh,
Nation! We have died, but the land detests us too much to contain us.
Recite the verses of the Koran, oh bride of the peaks! All that is good of
your two eyes which are our forgiveness, when the men shall be
castrated.. .the best of my nation sallies forth against the criminal; the
good woman kisses death whilst she laughs joyfully. Leaders hasten
from death, while Paradise opens its gates....and cried for peace and
received you, who was plucked among flowers. Say to those that pen
Fatwas (Islamic edicts): Slow down! Pass an edict that will convulse the
heavens, when it calls for Jihad.. .which will shock and make the inc
stand still...and the books....and the men of jurisprudence. When it calls
for Jihad.Not writing fatwas, the Day of Jihad, Blood.
Saudi government officials expressed what might be interpreted as duplicitous messages
regarding the Saudi reading and view of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and HAMAS actions.
On the one hand, Saudi government officials claim145 that Saudi Crown Prince Abdallah
warned Arafat in a telephone conversation that the latter should act urgently and strongly
against the Hamas, which claimed responsibility for the Rishon Le Zion bombing. Adel alJaber, foreign policy advisor to Crown Prince Abdallah, went as far as to express regret for
the deaths of innocent civilians who have no connection to the reason that caused their
death."146

The Saudis continue to claim that the assistance that they offer to the Palestinians is
humanitarian in nature. The Saudi Interior Minister, Na'ef Bin Abed A1 Akziz, stated147 that

69

"the contributions were for humanitarian purposes" and that Saudi Arabia" is assisting every
family that lost its livelihood or whose home was destroyed" and he assured that this aid
would continue.

On the other hand, the Saudi delegate to the Islamic conference which took place in Malaysia
(on the evening of the Hamas suicide bombing in Rishon Le Zion) expressed his principled
support of suicide actions. Sheikh Saleh Abd al-Adz Muhammad al-Sheikh - Saudi Minister
for Islamic Affairs - represented his country in the meeting of religious affairs ministers in the
Homework of the International Islamic Conference, which took place in Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia. A heated debate transpired between the Saudi minister and the Deputy Prime
Minister of Malaysia on the issue of suicide terrorist attacks.148

Abdallah Ahmad Badawi, Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, said that it is impossible to
win a holy war through violence and suicide terrorists, which reap nothing but dead Israeli
civilians and prestige for Palestinian terrorists. He added that building robust economies is
more important than fighting injustice.

Sheikh Saleh Abd al-Adz Muhammad al-Sheikh, Saudi Minister for Islamic Affairs,
dissented, expressing a differing principled opinion. He clarified his statement by saying that
the Palestinian armed Jihad is permissible" and added: "The suicide bombings are permitted.
The victims are considered to have died a martyrs death".

70

Appendix C: Affidavit of Brigadier General Yaacov Amidror, head of the analysis and
assessment division of the Israel Defence Forces Intelligence, as attached to Marzook
Extradition Request.
20TH SEPTEMBER, 1995

SUBJECT: HAMAS - ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND DECISIONMAKING PROCEDURE - AN EXPERT OPINION


GENERAL

1.

THE

HAMAS

(AN

ABBREVIATION

OF

"THE

ISLAMIC

RESISTANCE

MOVEMENT" AND AN ARABIC WORD MEANING VALOUR AND COURAGE) WAS


FOUNDED IN THE TERRITORIES AT THE BEGINNING OF THE INTIFADA, ON THE
ORGANIZATIONAL AND IDEOLOGICAL BASIS OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERS
MOVEMENT. IT DEFINES ITSELF AS THE 'PALESTINIA

WING' OF THE

"BROTHERS"

2. SINCE THEN, THE HAMAS HAS BEEN VERY ACTIVE IN BOTH SUBVERSIVE
AND TERRORIST OPERATIONS, ALONGSIDE EXTENSIVE SOCIAL-CIVILIAN
ACTIVITIES PERVADING ALL AREAS OF LIFE, LIKE ITS PREDECESSOR ITS LIST
OF PRIORITIES IS TOPPED BY THE JIHAD - THE SOLE STRATEGIC OPTION FOR
'LIBERATION OF ALL OF PALESTINE' , THE HAMAS HAS TURNED INTO A FOCAL
POINT FOR EXTREMIST ELEMENTS, IT HAS GATHERED MOMENTUM AND ITS
ATTRACTIVENESS IN THE EYES OF THE LOCAL POPULATION HAS INCREASED,
FOLLOWING ITS TERRORIST ACTIVITY, IT WAS OUTLAWED IN SEPTEMBER
1989

3. THE HAMAS IS CURRNTLY CONSIDERED THE SECOND ORGANIZATION IN


THE TERRITORIES BOTH IN SIZE AND IMPORTANCE (AFTER THE FATAH) AND
A PRIMARY OPPOSITIONIST ELEMENT. IT REJECTS ANY NEGOTIATIONS OR
AGREEMENTS WITH ISRAEL THAT INVOLVE GIVING UP ANY OF THE 'ISLAMIC
LAND'; IT DENIES ISRAEL' S RIGHT TO EXIST ON THIS LAND.

4. ORGANIZATIONALLY, SINCE 1991 THE HAMAS HAS BEEN CHARACTERIZED


BY A HIERARCHIAL LEADERSHIP WHICH IS OPERATING ABROAD, THE RISE IN
THE STATUS AND IMPORTANCE OF THE LEADERSHIP ECHELONS ABROAD,
BEYOND THE PREVIOUS CLOSE AFFILIATION WITH "MUSLIM BROTHER"
ELEMENTS THERE , WAS PART OF THE LESSONS LEARNT BY THE MOVEMENT

71

FROM THE RECURRING WAVES OF ARREST OF ITS MEMBERS IN THE


TERRITORIES, AND WAS MEANT TO PREVENT SIGNIFICANT CURTAILMENT OF
FURTHER HAMAS ACTIVITIES IN THE AREA (THE MOVEMENT IS KNOWN FOR
ITS SURVIVAL AND REHABILITATION CAPABILITIES, AND FOR ITS SPEEDY
ADAPTATION TO NEW CIRCUMSTANCES) .

5. SIMULTANEOUSLY, THE 'INSIDE' HAS REMAINED THE HAMAS'S MAIN ARENA


OF ACTIVITY. MOREOVER, SINCE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SELF-RULE AND
THE RESULTING FOCUS OF ALL THE LOCAL FORCES ON THE AREA, IN THEIR
ATTEMPT TO WIN THE SUPPORT OF THE PALESTINIAN PUBLIC, THE
TERRITORIES HAVE BECOME EVEN MORE IMPORTANT.

6. AS AN ORGANIZATION WHOSE ACTIVITIES ARE MOSTLY CLANDESTINE THE


HAMAS IS VERY CAREFUL, IN THE SPIRIT OF THE 'TAQIA' (CAUTION) , A
PRINCIPLE INHERITED FROM THE MUSLIM BROTHERS, THE MOVEMENT FROM
WHICH IT DEVELOPED. DUE TO THIS CAUTION AND COMPARTMENTATION,
OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE MOVEMENT, ITS ACTIVITIES, STRUCTURE AND
DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURES ARE NECESSARILY BASED ON ASSESSMENT
AND ANALYSIS.

THE HAMAS LEADERSHIP ABROAD


GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

7. DUE TO THE MOVEMENT'S POLICY NOT TO CONCENTRATE ITS ACTIVITIES


IN ONE PLACE FOR SECURITY REASONS, THE HAMAS LEADERSHIP ABROAD IS
CURRENTLY

SPREAD

OVER

SEVERAL

STATES

NEVERTHELESS,

FOR

PRACTICAL REASONS, A CONSIDERABLE PART OF ITS ACTIVITIES AND


LEADERSHIP ARE LOCATED IN THE WEST, WHERE IT ENJOYS A GREAT DEAL
OF

FREEDOM

OF

ACTION,

ACCESSIBLE

COMMUNICATION

CHANNELS,

FINANCIAL RESOURCES AND THE EXTENSIVE PRESENCE OF LEGAL BODIES


SERVING ITS INFRASTRUCTURE. IN ADDITION, THE HAMAS MAINTAINS A
WIDESPREAD NETWORK OF ACTIVISTS, LOCATED IN ARAB AND ISLAMIC
STATES, AS WELL.

72

8. FOLLOWING THE EXTENSIVE MEDIA PUBLICITY OF ITS ACTIVITIES IN THE


U.S.A. (IN 1993, THE HAMAS MOVED THE FOCUS OF ITS OVERSEAS LEADERSHIP
MAINLY TO BRITAIN AND JORDAN (THIS WAS TRUE UNTILJUST RECENTLY,
SINCE WE DO NOT KNOW AS YET HOW THE DEPORTATION OF TWO HAMAS
LEADERS FROM JORDAN IN EARLY JUNE, 1995, WILL AFFECT THIS SITUATION).
NEVERTHELESS, THE U.S. HAS REMAINED AN IMPORTANT CENTER OF
ACTIVITY, MAINLY AS REGARDS INFRASTRUCTURE

9. THE LEADERSHIP ABROAD RELAYS INSTRUCTIONS IN VARIED FIELDS OF


ACTIVITY TO THE MOVEMENT'S REGIONAL HQ'S IN THE TERRITORIES (SEE
BELOW). THESE ACTIVITIES COMPRISE ALL THE MAIN ISSUES, FINANCING OF
THE OPERATIONS AND REPORTS FROM THE FIELD.

HAMAS CONTROL, GUIDANCE AND OPERATIONAL BODIES ABROAD


10. "THE POLITICAL BUREAU" - THE MOST SENIOR EXECUTIVE LEADERSHIP
BODY OF THE MOVEMENT, CONSIDERED A KIND OF 'GOVERNMENT'. IT IS.
HEADED BY MUSSA ABU MARZUK AND INCLUDES SENIOR MEMBERS OF THE
MOVEMENT ABROAD (KHALED MASHAL, IMMAD AL-ALAMI, ETC.). THE
BUREAU GUIDES THE ACTIVITIES OF THE ' COMMTTEES' WHICH MAKE UP THE
MOVEMENT' S LEADERSHIP ABROAD, AND IS IN CHARGE OF 'OFFICES'
(OFFICIAL HAMAS REPRESENTATIONS) IN SEVERAL ARAB AND MUSLIM
STATES. ITS FUNCTIONS INCLUDE:

A. DETERMINING THE HAMAS POLICY ON THE MAIN ISSUES ON THE


AGENDA, AND ESPECIALLY THE MOVEMENT'S TERRORISM POLICY AND
ITS STAND VERSUS THE POLITICAL PROCESS. THE INTERNAL PUBLICATION
OF THE HAMAS, 'AL-RASALA, SHOWS THAT THE "BUREAU" DETERMINES
TERRORISM POLICY, DRAWS CONCLUSIONS FROM TERRORIST ATTACKS
ALREADY PERPETRATED AND RELAYS THEM TO THE ACTIVISTS, ASSISTS
HAMAS

FUGITIVES,

SUPPORTS

TERRORIST

ATTACKS,

ENCOURAGES

ADDITIONAL TERROR AND PRAISES THE MOVEMENT FOR ' HAVING


ADVANCED THE INTIFADA FROM THE STONE AGE TO SUICIDE ATTACKS ' .
IN ADDITION, IT INCITES AGAINST THE PEACE PROCESS, THE ' ZIONIST
ENTITY' AND IMPERIALISM (THE U.S.) WHICH SUPPORTS IT.

73

B. IT RELAYS INSTRUCTIONS TO THE ACTIVISTS IN THE TERRITORIES AND


THE HAMAS ARENAS ABROAD, ACCORDING TO THE POLICY DETERMINED
BY THE "BUREAU.

C. IT RUNS THE MOVEMENT'S FOREIGN TIES, INCLUDING TIES WITH IRAN,


PLO/FATAH,

PALESTINIAN

OPPOSITION

ORGANIZATIONS

AND

FUNDAMENTALIST ORGANIZATIONS (HIZBALLAH, ETC.) ABU MARZUK


REPRESENTS THE HAMAS IN INTERNATIONAL FUNDAMENTALIST EVENTS
(SUCH AS THE "CONVENTION IN SUPPORT OF PALESTINE" HELD IN TEHRAN
ON THE EVE OF THE 'MADRID CONVENTION', WHICH RESOLVED TO OPPOSE
THE POLITICAL PROCESS) HE ALSO PARTICIPATES IN MEETINGSOF
PLO/FATAH

LEADERS

AND

ATTANDS

MEETINGS

WITH

WESTERN

DIPLOMATS (WHERE HE ATTEMPTS TO PRESENT THE HAMAS AS A


LEGITIMATE 'FREEDOM SEEKING' ORGANIZATION WHICH HAS NOTHING
TO DO WITH TERRORISM).

11. "THE ADVISORY COUNCIL" (MAJLES AL-SHURA) - A SENIOR BODY WHICH


DOES NOT CONDUCT REGULAR ACTIVITY. ITS FUNCTION IS TO DECIDE
ESSENTIAL ISSUES ON WHICH THERE IS DISAGREEMENT IN THE MOVEMENT
(SUCH AS ESTABLISHMENT OF A PARTY). IT HAS RECENTLY BEEN LEARNT
THAT TIES BODY NUMBERS ABOUT 80 PROMINENT ACTIVISTS, INCLUDING
MUSA ABU MARZUK. THEY COME FROM THE TERRITORIES AND FROM
ABROAD,

AND

INCLUDE

MUSLIM

BROTHER

ELEMENTS

IN

SEVERAL

COUNTRIES. THE COUNCIL DOES NOT NEED A QUROM TO REACH A DECISION


BUT RESOLVES ISSUES W

12. THE "INTERNAL COMMITTEE" - IN CHARGE OF RUNNING THE HAMAS IN


THE TERRITORIES, INCLUDING LIASION (AND POSSIBLY ALSO SUPREME
RESPONSIBILITY) FOR MILITARY OPERATION. IT IS HEADED BY IMMAD ALALAMI, RECENTLY DEPORTED FROM JORDAN, TOGETHER WITH MUSA ABU
MARZUK. ITS FUNCTIONS INCLUDE:

A. RELAYING INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING VARIOUS SPHERES OF ACTIVITY


TO THE REGIONAL HQ'S IN THE TERRITORIES, CONCERNING THE MAIN
ISSUES ON THE PALESTINIAN AGENDA. THESE INSTRUCTIONS ARE
USUALLY FORMULATED BY THE POLITICAL BUREAU, AT TIMES WITH THE
PARTICIPATION OF SENIOR ACTIVISTS IN THE TERRITORIES.

74

B. IT SERVES AS THE MAIN CHANNEL BETWEEN THE HAMAS LEADERSHIP


ABROAD AND THE ACTIVISTS IN THE FIELD, AND ALSO SUPERVISES
BUDGET MATTERS. MOREOVER, IT IS THE MAIN COORDINATING ELEMENT
AMONG THE VARIOUS REGIONAL HAMAS HQ'S IN THE TERRITORIES, DUE
TO THE INTERNAL COMPARTMENTATION PRINCIPLE ADHERED TO BY THE
MOVEMENT.

C. IT WAS IN CHARGE OF RUNNING AND GUIDING ALL THE INTIFADA


ACTIVITY, BUT IT SEEMS THAT FOLLOWING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
SELF-RULE IN THE GAZA STRIP, IT NOW CONCENTRATES ON THE
MOVEMENT' S PREPARATIONS TOWARDS THIS STAGE. IT ALSO DEALS
WITH PRISONERS AND TRANSFERS FUNDS TO HAMAS APPARATUSES IN
THE FIELD (INCLUDING, IN PART, TO THE MILITARY APPARATUS).

D. IT DEALS WITH THE OVERT AND SEMI-OVERT ACTIVITY OF THE


MOVEMENT "DAWA" - SEE BELOW), INCLUDING MOSQUES DEVELOPMENT
AND ORCANIZATIONAL GUIDANCE OF BODIES 'AND INSTITUTIONS,
APPOINTMENT OF ACTIVISTS IN THESE SPHERES AND IN COORDINATION
WITH FIELD ELEMENTS, THE TRANSFER OF THE FUNDS THEY REQUIRE

13. THE "INFORMATION COMMITTEE" AND "INFORMATION OFFICE" - THESE


BODIES ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE HAMAS PROPACANDA ACTIVITIES
INCLUDING PUBLICATION OF MANIFESTOES AND VARIOUS PUBLICATIONS
EXPLAINING ITS POLICY. IT ALSO MAINTAINS CONTACT WITH THE MEDIA. IT
SEEMS THE COMMITTEE IS IN CHARGE OF PUBLISHING THE MOVEMENT'S
PERIODICAL, WHICH IS DRAWN UP ABROAD, OF PUBLISHING ITS MAIN ORGAN
THE 'FALESTIN AL-MUSLAMAH' , IN LONDON, OF MAINTAINING CONTACT
WITH THE 'QUDS PRESS' NEWS AGENCY WHICH SERVES THE MOVEMENT AND
OF THE INTERNAL PUBLICATION "AL-RASALA". IBRAHIM OUSHA (this is a
misprint, should be Rousha. R.B), THE HAMAS SPOKESMAN WHO IS STATIONED IN
JORDAN, IS THE LEADING FIGURE OF THE MOVEMENT'S PROPAGANDA
APPARATUS.

14. THE "FINANCE COMMITTEE" IS IN CHARGE OF THE FUNDS OBTAINED FROM


THE VARIOUS SOURCES. WE HAVE NO DETAILS ABOUT THIS COMMITTEE, BUT
ACCORDING TO THE MODEL ADOPTED BY THE HAMAS, ITS MEMBERS ARE

75

PROBABLY SPREAD THROUGHOUT SEVERAL COUNTRIES. IT IS NOT CLEAR


WHETHER THE TERRITORIES ARE ALSO REPRESENTED IN THE COMMITTEE. IN
ANY CASE, THAT IS WHERE MOST OF THE MONEY GOES.

STRUCTURE OF HAMAS IN THE TERRITORIES


GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

15. DESPITE THE NECESSITY TO TRANSFER A CONSIDERABLE PART OF ITS


LEADERSHIP ABROAD, THE TERRITORIES ARE THE HAMAS'S MAIN ARENA OF
ACTIVITY. THIS IS WHERE ITS PUBLIC IS LOCATED, AND THIS IS ALSO WHERE
THE DAILY STRUGGLE AGAINST ISRAEL TAKES PLACE. THE STRUCTURE AND
ORGANIZATIONAL DISPOSITION OF THE HAMAS IN THE TERRITORIES IS
DESIGNATED TO PROVIDE A SOLUTION TO THESE REQUIREMENTS, AND THAT
IS WHY SOME OF IT IS DEFINITELY OPERATIONAL IN CHARACTER.

16. ANOTHER IMPORTANT CHARACTERISTIC OF THE HAMAS IS THE ABILITY


TO ADAPT ITSELF QUICKLY TO CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCES, SUCH AS THE
RECENT IMPLEMENTATION OF SELF-RULE IN GAZA. THERE ARE ALREADY
SIGNS OF A CHANGE IN THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE HAMAS IN
THE TERRITORIES, CONSISTING MAINLY OF SHIFTING THE CENTER OF
ACTIVITY TOWARDS TWO POLES;

A. THE INSTITUTIONS SERVING THE HAMAS INFRASTRUCTURE.


B. THE MILITARY ARM WHICH CARRIES OUT THE TERRORIST ATTACKS.

FUNCTIONAL-REGIONAL DIVISION

17. AS A RULE, IN THE TERRITORIES THE HAMAS OPERATES IN A COMBINED


REGIONAL-FUNCTIONAL STRUCTURE, DIVIDING THE TERRITORIES INTO FOUR
SUB-UNITS (EACH COMPRISING ANOTHER SUB-DIVISION). THE GAZA STRIP IS
ONE UNIT, WHILE THE WEST BANK IS DIVIDED INTO THREE UNITS: THE
HEBRON AREA, JERUSALEM-RAMALLAH AND SAMARIA.

18. USUALLY, THE HAMAS ACTIVITIES IN EACH OF THESE AREAS ARE


SIMILAR, ALTHOUGH THERE ARE CERTAIN DIFFERENCES, ORIGINATING

76

MAINLY IN DIFFERENT CONDITIONS AND SITUATIONS, SUCH AS WAVES OF


ARREST OF HAMAS MEMBERS. WE ASSESS THAT SEVERAL BODIES PARALLEL
TO THE HAMAS ABROAD ARE BEING SET UP, OR HAVE ALREADY BEEN
FOUNDED. THIS CONCERNS MAINLY THE 'POLITICAL COMMITTEES' ON THE
REGIONAL

LEVEL,

WHICH

SERVE

AS

AN

ALL-REGIONAL

'POLITICAL

LEADERSHIP', AND COMMITTEES ACCORDING TO SUBJECTS, THAT DEAL WITH


CARDINAL ISSUES SUCH AS THE MOVEMENT'S PRISONERS, VIS--VIS THE
HAMAS ABROAD.

APPARATUSES
19. THE POPULAR, CLANDESTINE AND VIOLENT ACTIVITY OF THE HAMAS IN
EACH OF THE REGIONS IS CARRIED OUT BY SEVERAL BODIES, OR
APPARATUSES. HOWEVER, IT SEEMS THAT SINCE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE SELF-RULE IN THE GAZA STRIP. AND TOWARDS ITS IMPLEMENTATION IN
THE WEST BANK, THESE APPARATUSES ARE UNDERGOING A CHANGE,
ADAPTING THEMSELVES TO THE NEW SITUATION. THE APPARATUSES
INCLUDE:

A. THE INFRASTRUCTURE APPARATUS (DAWA - SEE BELOW) - THE MOST


SENIOR APPARATUS GUIDING THE HAMAS ACTIVITIES. IT MAINTAINS
CONTACT WITH THE HAMAS LEADERSHIP ABROAD, TRANSFERRING
FUNDS FROM THEM TO OTHER APPARATUSES. A CONNECTION BETWEEN
THIS APPARATUS AND THE MILITARY APPARATUS OF THE HAMAS WAS
FOUND IN THE GAZA STRIP (THE INFRASTRUCTURE APPARATUS SERVED
AS AN ADDRESS FOR THE LATTER'S REQUIREMENTS).

B. THE ACTIVITY APPARATUS - IN CHARGE OF THE INTIFADA ACTIVITIES


AND THE SHOCK SQUADS

C. THE PROPAGANDA APPARATUS - WHICH HAS ALMOST DISAPPEARED


SINCE THE AUTHORITY TO COMPOSE THE MOVEMENT'S PERIODICAL
MANIFESTO WAS TRANSFERRED ABROAD.

77

D. THE SECURITY APPARATUS - IN CHARGE OF SURVEILLING SUSPECTED


COLLABORATORS WITH THE AUTHORITIES'; THIS APPARATUS IS TO
EXPAND UNDER THE SELF-RULE

E. THE MILITARY APPARATUS (THE AZZ AL-DIN AL-QASSEM BATTALIONS)


- IS MOSTLY INDEPENDENT. RECEIVING PART OF THE FUNDING AND
INSTRUCTIONS

DIRECTLY

FROM

ABROAD.

AS

MENTIONED,

THE

TERRORISM POLICY IS DETERMINED BY THE MOVEMENT'S POLITICAL


BUREAU. IT IS OF NOTE THAT THE HAMAS IS THE DOMINANT
ORGANIZATION BEHIND SEVERE AND DARING ATTACKS, INCLUDING A
SERIES OF SUICIDE ATTACKS AGAINST ISRAELI TARGETS IN THE
TERRITORIES AND WITHIN THE 'GREEN LINE. THE ATTACK APPARATUS.
FIRST CALLED "AL-MUJAHEDDIN AL-FALESTINAYUN" AND CURRENTLY
KNOWN AS THE AZZ AL-DIN AL-QASSEM BATTALIONS IS THE MAIN
EXECUTIVE ARM WHICH CARRIED OUT THESE MASS-MURDER ATTACKS
(INCLUDING SUICIDE ATTACKS, SHOOTING ATTACKS, ETC.). DURING THE
PAST THREE YEARS. YIHYE AYASH, AKA "THE ENGINEER", HAS OCCUPIED
A CENTRAL ROLE. HE IS THE HAMAS'S CHIEF DEMOLITION EXPERT,
INVOLVED IN PREPARING A SERIES OF SUICIDE AND MASS-MURDER
ATTACKS.

THE INSTITUTIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE CONNECTED WITH THE HAMAS

20. ALONGSIDE THE CLANDESTINE SYSTEM OF THE HAMAS APPARATUSES,


THE MOVEMENT ALSO OPERATES A MOSTLY OVERT SYSTEM KNOWN AS THE
DAWA, WHICH MEANS 'PREACHING'. THIS NAME ALSO SERVES THE HAMAS
INFRASTRUCTURE
OVERLAPPING

APPARATUS,

THIS

SYSTEM

AND

THE

COMPRISES

TWO

ARE

NUMEROUS

SOMEWHAT
INSTITUTIONS

(MOSQUES, WELFARE ASSOCIATIONS) CONNECTED WITH THE HAMAS,


OPERATING MAINLY IN THE FIELDS OF EDUCATION, RELIGION, HEALTH,
PROPAGANDA AND SOCIAL SERVICES. THESE SERVE THE MOVEMENT'S
INFRASTRUCTURE AND HELP IT TO EXPAND. THE HAMAS HAS RECENTLY
ATTEMPTED TO WIDEN AND DEEPEN THESE ACTIVITIES AS PART OF ITS
STRUGGLE WITH THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY AND ITS ATTEMPT TO
TIGHTEN THE HOLD ON THE PUBLIC.

78

FUNDING
21. THE HAMAS ACTIVITIES IN THE TERRITORIES ARE FINANCED MAINLY
FROM ABROAD, WHERE THE MOVEMENT'S LEADERSHIP OBTAINS THE MONEY
AND FUNNELS IT TO THE FIELD BY VARIOUS MEANS. THE HAMAS ACTIVISTS
IN THE TERRITORIES FREQUENTLY EMPHASIZE THE NECESSITY TO RECEIVE
REGULAR FUNDING, DEFINING IT AS "THE MOVING FORCE" WITHOUT WHICH
THE MOVEMENT CANNOT OPERATE. THE FUNDS ARE MEANT FOR BOTH THE
CLANDESTINE APPARATUSES AND THE OVERT INSTITUTIONS SERVING THE
INFRASTRUCTURE, AND IT INCLUDES SUPPORT OF ACTIVISTS' FAMILIES,
RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES, CLINICS, RUNNING A PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN, ETC.
USUALLY, THE HAMAS DOES NOT LACK THE NECESSARY FUNDS. WE ASSESS
THAT IT TRANSFERS ABOUT 10-12 MILLION DOLLARS TO ITS ACTIVISTS IN THE
TERRITORIES PER YEAR. THESE SUMS ARE INTENDED FOR THE CLANDESTINE
APPARATUSES OF THE MOVEMENT AND THE INSTITUTIONS IDENTIFIED WITH
IT, AND THEY DO NOT INCLUDE FUNDING OF WELFARE BODIES AND SPECIAL
PROJECTS, WHO RECRUIT THEIR OWN FUNDS, ALTHOUGH THEY, TOO, SERVE
THE MOVEMENT'S INFRASTRUCTURE.

79

Abbreviations and acronyms


AAEF

AI-Aqsa Educational Fund

CIA

(American) Central Intelligence Agency

DCI

Director of Central Intelligence (CIA)

GOI

Ggovernment of Israel

GSS\ SHIN-BET

Israeli General (Domestic) Security Service (Sherot Bitahon Klali

HAMAS

The Islamic Resistance Movement (Harakat Al-Mukawama Al-Islamia)-

HLFRD

The Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLFRD)

IAP

Islamic Association for Palestine

IDF

Israel Defence Forces (Tzva Hahaganah LeIsrael)

IIRO

International Islamic Relief Organization the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia


Izz AI-Din Qassam Brigades, HAMASs Military Wing

MFA

(Israeli) Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MI\ AMAN

Israeli Military Intelligence (Agaf Modiin)

MOSSAD

Israeli Foreign Intelligence Service (HaMossad LeModiin VeTafkidim


Meyuhadim)

PA

Palestinian (National) Authority

PIJ

Palestinian Islamic Jihad

PLO

Palestinian Liberation Organization

QLI

Quranic Literacy Institute

STD

Specially Designated Terrorists

Footnotes
1
2

Interview with the author, New-York


UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT YOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION, CASE 00C 2905: STANLEY BOIM, Individually and as


administrator of the estate of David Boim, deceased, and JOYCE BOIM, (Plaintiff)
Vs,

QURANIC LITERACY INSTITUTE;

HOLY LAND FOUNDATION FOR RELIEF AND DEVELOPMENT;

ISLAMIC ASSOCIATION FOR PALESTINE

AMERICAN

MUSLIM

SOCIETY

PALESTINE IN CHICAGO)

80

(a.k.a

ISLAMIC

ASSOCIATION FOR

AMERICAN MIDDLE EASTERN LEAGUE FOR PALESTINE

UNITED ASSOCIATION FOR STUDIES AND RESEARCH

MOHAMMED ABDUL HAMID KHALIL SALAH (a/k/a ABU AHHED)

MOUSA MOHAMMED ABU MARZOOK

AMJAD HINAWI

ESTATE OF KHALIL TAWFIQ AL-SHARIF

and JOHN DOES 1-99

(Defendants)
3

interview with Joyce Boim, Jerusalem

The Anti-Terrorism Act (18 USC 2333(a)) determines the following:

Any national of the United States injured in his or her person, property or business by reason
of an act of international terrorism, or his or her estate, survivors or heirs, may sue therefore
in any appropriate district court of the United States and shall recover threefold the damages
he or she sustains, and the cost of the suit, including attorney's fees.
5

Interview with Nathan Lewin, Washington D.C.

Interview with Gen. Meir Dagan, MOSSAD director (Head of Headquarters for

counterterrorism at the time of the interview), Tel-Aviv


7

In an interview with the author, IDF MI Headquarters, Tel Aviv

Classified FBIs ACTION MEMORANDUM dated November 5, 2001 from Dale L. Watson,

Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division to Richard Newcomb, Director Office of


Foreign Assets Control Department of Treasury titled HOLY LAND FODNDATION FOR
RELIEF AND DEVELOPMENT INTERNATIONAL EMERGENCY ECONOMIC POWERS
ACT (hereby Action Memorandum), p. 3
9

The infrastructure of an Islamic social relive organization was set by Yasin already in 1984,

though it did not bare the name of HAMAS and had no militant activity. According to a few
publications, the GOI and GSS turned a blind eye on this initial step, opting that the Islamic
opposition would act as a counter force to PLO dominance in the territories. True or not,
HAMAS was identified as a terrorist organization almost from the day it got involved in the
Intifada. GSS and HAMAS started an intelligence dual that continues ever since (See also
Bergman, Authority Granted, p.205-219)
10

FBI Action Memorandum p. 4

11

ibid and interviews with source 4(GSS), Mohammad Abu Shaker (see also Amidror

affidavit at appendix C)
12

The statistics are updated to 22.12.02 and taken from GSS and IDF databases.

13

Interviews with Gen. Amidror, Gen Gilaad, Gen Ayalon, Sources 4, 12, 6 (GSS), 5

(MOSSAD). See also Bergman, Authority Granted, p. 242

81

14 Affidavit of Commander Madam Golan attached to the Request for the Extradition of
Mousa Mohalnmad Abu Marzook, by the Israeli Ministry of Justice (hereby Marzook
Extradition Request) Attachment 3
15

ibid

16

Affidavit of Chief Superintendent Avraham Barzilai, attached to Marzook Extradition

Request as Attachment 8
17

ibid

18

ibid

19

Affidavit of Chief Superintendent Ami Fhima which is attached to Marzook Extradition

Request as Attachment 6
20

Affidavit of Superintendent George Krikorian, attached to Marzook Extradition Request as

Attachment 7
21

Affidavit of Superintendent Itzkah Bar which is attached to Marzook Extradition Request as

Attachment 5
22

Affidavit of Chief Superintendent Amir Solomon, attached to Marzook Extradition Request

as Attachment 4
23

Affidavit of Commander Miriam Golan, attached to Marzook Extradition Request as

Attachment 3
24

AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT WRIGHT, Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation

(FBI) assigned to the Chicago Division Counter-Terrorism Task Force (CDCTTF), submitted
to the district Court, COUNTY OF COOK, STATE OF ILLINOIS, April 2000 (hereby FBI\
Wright Affidavit), p.1
25

ibid, p.2

26

IEEPA Sec. / 202(a)

27

E.O. 12947

28

Affidavit of Joseph Hummel, a Special Agent with the United States Federal Bureau of

Investigation (FBI), who reports concerning false statements which Abu Marzook made to
this agent and to others shortly after he arrived in the United States on July 25, 1995. The
Affidavit is marked "Attachment 18" to the Marzook Extradition Request
29

Abu Marzook is described in the opening of the request also by the following details:

Known as: Abu Omar; Date of Birth: February 9, 1951; Place of Birth: Rafiah, Gaza;
Heidht: 5' 9"; Weight: 190 lbs; Eyes: Brown; Hair: black/Balding; U. S. Alien Registration
Number: A 41685264
30

Marzook Extradition Request p. 4 and attached Affidavits of: Avraham Barzilai,

Attachment 8; "Nadav" (codename an agent for Israel's General Security Service, who was
the investigator who conducted the interviews of "Abu Ahmad"), Attachment 10; Goel Neoti,

82

who was responsible for the Police investigations into the illegal activities of the Hamas terror
organization in Judea during the period of 1986 to 1990, Attachment 11: and expert opinion
of Yaacov Aalidror, head of the Analysis and Assessment Division of the Israel Defense
Forces Intelligence, Attachment 9
31

See affidavit of Avraham Barzilai, attachment 8, concerning the HAMAS terrorist attack in

March, 1988, in Gaza in which an Israeli civilian was shot and wounded
32

Affidavit of Ayal, a member of the Israeli Defense Force\MI, who reports on an interview

which Abu Marzook gave on a television station in Lebanon. Attachment 17 to the Marzook
Extradition Request
33

Affidavit of "Abu Hamed", an intelligence officer with Israel's General Security Services.

Abu Hamed is the agent who received a letter which had been seized in Khan Yunis. This
letter had been sent by fax by a leader of Hamas in Gaza to Abu Marzook in the United
States. The Affidavit is marked Attachment 13 to the Marzook Extradition Request.
34

Affidavit of Yigal Sheffy, who reports on interviews which Abu Marzook gave to various

Arabic language newspapers concerning the activities of Hamas. Attachment 16 to the


Marzook Extradition Request ";
35

Affidavit of Avraham Barzilai, attachment 8

36

Affidavit of GSS agent codenamed Nadav Attachment 10 to the Marzook Extradition

Request.
37

Affidavit of Nadav, Attachment 14-15

38

The district court's decision's published in the Matter of the Extradition of Abu Marzook v.

Christopher, 924 F 511pp 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)


39

FBI Action Memorandum p. 13

40

form 990- Return of Organization Exempt Income Tax, 1994, p.10

41

Salahs Statements of January 27, 1993, January 30, 1993, at 1-2, 5, and 8, February 21,

1993.
42

Salahs Statement of February 21, 1993, p.8

43

The Muslim Brotherhood is an international organization which gave rise to HAMAS in

Israel and the occupied territories in 1987 during the beginning of the Intifada.
44

Handwritten Statement of Salah, p. 3-4

45

ibid

46

Affidavit of Nadav, Attachment 10 to Marzook Extradition Request

47

ibid

48

Affidavit of Goel Neoti, Attachment 11 to the Marzook Extradition Request.

49

Among the transfers, the largest was a check executed by Abu Marzook for $5,000 and

dated August 8, 1992, just two weeks prior to Salah's trip to Israel to provide weapons money

83

to HAMAS operative Salah AI-Arouri. In the extradition proceedings, Abu Marzook


acknowledged this transfer to Mohammad Salah.
50

The individuals he was directed to contact were Adel Awadallah from Ramallah, Salah AI-

Aruri (whose real name is Salah Dar Suliman, and he is also referred to as Salah Arouri) from
Hebron and Ramallah, Najah Ufana from Jerusalem and AI-Za'Tari from Bethlehem.
51

Handwritten Statement of Salah, p.5

52

ibid, p. 8

53

Affidavit of Nadav, Attachment 10 to Marzook Extradition Request, p.9

54

ibid, ibid, interview with source 4 (GSS), Frank Anderson (CIA)

55

Anatis Statement of February 21, 1993, p.3-4

56

Affidavit of the accountant Ephraim Rabin, Attachment 12

57

Affidavit of Nadav, Attachment 10 and affidavit of Goel Neoti, Attachment 11

58

Salah's transaction of HAMAS business is supported by Israeli border control records

which, according to Israeli police, show that Salah entered Israel's Ben Gurion Airport from
the Unitad States on August 25, 1992, and departed from Israel Ben Gurion Airport on
September 9, 1992.
59

FBI\ Wright Affidavit, p.11

60

Affidavit of Nadav, Attachment 10 and interview with source 7 (GSS) and 8 (Israeli

Ministry of Justice)
61
62

Affidavit of Nadav, Attachment 10


Marzook Extradition Request, p.13

63

FBI\ Wright Affidavit, p.8

64

Affidavit of Police Sergeant Major Karawany Monder, Attachment 15; Affidavit of "Abu

Hamed" (GSS agent), Attachment 13; and Affidavit of Avraham Barzilai, Attachment 8
65

Affidavit of Meir Naggar, Attachment 14

66

Affidavit of Nadav, Attachment 11

67

The mass deportations by the Israeli government of 415 HAMAS operatives in Israel and

the Occupied Territories on accrued December 17, 1992. In public statements, the Israeli
government indicated that the mass deportation was a direct response to the murder of a
number of members of Israeli military and police units in the previous weeks for which
HAMAS had claimed credit. Among these precipitating incidants was the murder of Israeli
soldier Yuval Tutanji in which Musa Dudin assisted, and which was undertaken by the
Hebron military cell of HAMAS that was supported with weapons and money provided by
Al-Arouri with funds he received from Salah in September of 1992. The last among these
operation was the December 15, 1992, dumping of the stabbed and mutilated body of a
kidnapped Israeli border police officer in the West Bank on the main road between Jerusalem

84

and Jericho. The discovery of the body was the precipitating event for Israel's immediate
arrest and detention of approximately 1100 Palestinians, followed on December 17, 1992 by
the Israeli deportation of approximately 400 suspected HAMAS members.
68

According to Salah, Abu Marzook directed that Salah allocate the funds as follows:

5100,000 to Ramallah; 5130,000 to Nablus; $100,000 to Hebron; 5300,000 to Gaza


(specifically for military activity there); with the remainder to be distributed according to
military and general requirements that would be determined following Salah's arrival and
assessment of HAMAS organizational needs in Israel and the occupied territories. Salah
testimony, p. 32
69

FBI\ Wright Affidavit, p. 23

70

A review of bank records indicates that the account was the same one from which Abu

Marzook had drawn from in executing a $5,000 check to Salah on August 8, 1992. It is also
the same account from which Abu Marzook wrote a November 27, 1992 check to Salah in the
amount of $2,110 (which Abu Marzook also acknowledged in his extradition proceedings).
71

Affidavit of the accountant Ephraim Rabin, Attachment 12 to Marzook Extradition

Request.
72

Afffidavit of Nadav, Attachment 10; interview with source 6.

73

Affidavit of the accountant Ephraim Rabin, Attachment 12 to Marzook Extradition

Request.
74

Interview with source 2.

75

This is the same entity that transmitted a total of 107,000$ directly into Salah's First

Chicago account through a series of three substantial wire transfers from Geneva Switzerland.
76

Bank records reviewed by the FBI also reveal that on January 12, 1993, the day before

Salah left Chicago for the Middle East Zaki Hameed of QLI Executed check for $1,040 to
Salah's travel agent, Ghada Sharif.
77

AI-Khatib had previously written a check to Salah on August 21, 1992, immediately prior

to Salah's trip to Israel during which he gave money to Salah AI-Arourri for the purchase of
arms for HAMAS military operations. Bank records indicate that the check was deposited by
Salah into the LaSalla Bank account that he jointly held with his wife, Azita.
78

Salah was referring to the murder of Dr. Albert Glock on January 19, 1992. Dr. Glock has

been the Director of the Institute of Archeology at the Bir Zeit University, located near
Ramallah.
79

Affidavit of Nadav, Attachment 14 to Marzook Extradition Request. Interview with source

8.
80

ibid, ibid

81

FBI Action Memorandum p. 6

85

82

Review of American Express records determined that the above-mentioned individuals

travelled to Philadelphia on October 1-3, 1993, and stayed at the Courtyard by Marriott Hotel,
8900 Bartram Avenue, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Among the individuals physically
observed by the FBI to be at the Courtyard by Marriott on October 1-3, 1993, were: Ashqar,
Maghawri, Shabib, Elbarasse, Baker, and Elashi. See FBI Action Memorandum p. 9
83

ibid and interview with sources 11 and 12

84

In GSS interviews in January 7, 1991 and January 14, 1991

85

FBI Action Memorandum p. 9

86

Interview with source 4

87

FBI Action Memorandum p. 11

88

Dallas Observer, dated March 4 - March 10, 1993

89

FBI Action Memorandum p. 11

90

Mr. Al-Ashi, as all members of HLFRD declined to comment on the findings of this

research.
91

ibid p. 13

92

These trips were charged on either the Occupied Land Fund/Baker Corporate American

Express Account # 3783-647335-91006 or the HLFRD/Baker Corporate American Express


Account # 3783-64733592004 or 93002
93

FBI Action Memorandum p. 18

94

ibid p. 46

95

Interviews with Gen. Gilaad, Brig. Gen Amidror, source 13 (DGSE), source 14 (British

Diplomatic core)
96

FBI Action Memorandum p. 19

97

ibid, p.20

98

The deportees were not admitted to Lebanon, and were forced to live in makeshift tent

cities for several months on the Lebanese border. As previously mentioned, during this time,
the HLFRD sent funds to these deportees.
99

FBI Action Memorandum p. 22

100

The GOI orders stated that despite its declared goals, the HLFRD "deals in the practice of

transferring monies to the families of HAMAS activists, who carried out deadly attacks, or
who were jailed in the wake of these attacks and benefits from funding sources which are
identified, according to security assessments, with the overall financial network of HAMAS.
101

Anatis testimony in front of GSS and IP interviews, at the Petah Tiqva police

headquarters, 11.12.97, 1100AM, pg. 4


102

Anatis testimony in front of GSS and IP interviewrs, at the Petah Tiqva police

headqarters, 17.12.97, 1000AM, p. 7

86

103

FBI Action Memorandum p. 24

104

ibid, 24

105

FBI\ Wright Affidavit, p.5

106

The letter was provided to Standard Bank & Trust by QLI in support of Salah's securing of

a mortgage loan in excess of $100,000 for his residence at 9229 S. Thomas, Bridgeview,
Illinois. In making application for the loan, Salah claimed as his only employment the
purported job with QLI. Bank records further show that Salah also claimed an employment
relationship with QLI when he opened his subject account with First National Bank of
Chicago, (account: number 8060700) , in late July of 1991. The bank obtained an oral
verification of Salah's employment with QLI from QLI treasurer Abraham Abusharif.
107

QLI initially responded to FBI and INS inquiries by refusing to discuss Salah's

employment status. -FBI review of QLI business records did not reflect any type of -regular
periodic payments to Mohammad Salah, such as paychecks or tax "withholding records,
which would reflect the existence of the employment relationship claimed in the employment
verification Letter submitted to Standard Bank. Additionally, speaking through its attorney
Ralph Brown during a February 6, 1998, in a telephone conversation with FBI agents, QLI
has expressly denied hazing employed Salah at any time. Salah's wife, Azita Salah, in an
interview with FBI agents, denied that her husband was employed by QLI and stated that he
merely performed volunteer work for the organization.
108

FBI\ Wright Affidavit, p.12

109

ibid, p.12-18

110

interview with source 3 (IDF\MI)

111

Vakufska Banka in Bosnia has blocked a series of accounts belong to Shaykh Yasin Kadi,

who is one of the six co-owners of the Muwafaq humanitarian organization. There are
numerous charges against Shazkh Kadi and Muwafaq because of their alleged support for
terrorism. As early as July 1995, Africa Confidential magazine linked this foundation with
terrorist activities in Africa. After Muwafaq-s lawsuit, the magazine lost the court case.

In 1996, Usama bin Laden stated, in the magazine al-Watan al-Arabi, that Muwafaq, in
Zagreb, was one of the humanitarian organizations that he supported. Kadi disavowed such
aid, doubting that this interview with bin Ladin was authentic. Muwafaq closed its accounts
during 1997 and ceased its operations. In October 2001, the US Government added the name
of Shaykh Yasin Kadi to its list of persons suspected of financially supporting terrorism,
asking governments worldwide to block their property. Government officials have cited (to
Hecimovic) an alleged report by the Saudi controller of banks, according to which Kadi sent
$3 million to Bin Ladin. Shaykh Kadi has initiated lawsuits in Great Britain and the United

87

States in order to clear his name. In the meantime, his property in Albania has also been
blocked. The authorities in Sarajevo have hushed up the blocking of Kadi's account to the
public, although he has been under various investigations in B/H for years. Rizvanovic
refused to answer the question of whether the owners of the money had been informed about
the blocking of their accounts in Sarajevo. The information about Kadis involvement in B-H
is taken from a soon to be published report by Esad Hecimovic, a terrorist expert and Bosnian
journalist, working for Anticorruption program of Irex Pro media in Bosnia. This information
was partly corroborated with Israeli intelligence officials from MI research branch and French
DGSE source.
112

FBI\ Wright Affidavit, p. 18

113

Bank records reviewed by the FBI further show that of the $985,000 wire transferred into

Salah's account in Between December 29, 1992 and January 25, 1993, $723,541.18 was
transferred out through the following transactions: On February l, 1993, Azita Salah
Withdrew $723,541.18 from the Salahs' two accounts and deposited 717,041.18$ into a new
savings account, Standard Bank & Trust Account No. 56002850-0. Bank records for the
account show that Azita Salah than began to draw substantial amounts of money.
114

Azita Salah was right in her fears. On February 10, 1995, the Office of Foreign Asset

Control, U.S. Department of Treasury, having reason to believe that Mohammad Salah acted
on behalf of an organization (HAMAS) ordered the freeze of all of Mohammad and Azita
Salah's known bank accounts including the new Azita Salah's Standard Bank & Trust savings
account
115

In First National Bank of Chicago account number 11310153, QLI funds in First National

Bank of Evergreen Park account number 1411446, QLI-held funds in Midland Federal
Savings & Loan account number 001093002113
116

see also an interview by the author with Roni Shaked

117

One example is Adnan abd al-Hafez Musbah Maswada, Directorate Co-Chairman of ICA.

He was detained June to July 1989 and April to October 1994 for HAMAS activity. Maswada
was a 1992 deportee to Lebanon. According to the GSS, Maswada is a member of HAMAS
headquarters in Hebron and is connected to HAMAS terrorist activities against settlers.

When HAMAS founder Sheikh Ahmad Yassin was interviewed by the GOI, he said that in
the period of April to May1989, he received a message from HAMAS activists in Jordan
stating that operational HAMAS representatives should be appointed in Gaza, Hebron and
Nablus- Yassin asked his aide to forward the message to Maswada in Hebron, so that he could
assist and advise them whom to appoint.

88

Yahya Arshad, a HAMAS activist, was interviewed by the GOI. He stated that in early 1996,
HAMAS/Muslim Brotherhood established the Hebron Majles AI-Shura to be responsible for
advising and deciding on the political platform of both organizations. Arshad stated he
attended both meetings of this forum and Maswada had also attended.

Mun Wazuz, a Hebron HAMAS activist was interviewed by the GOI. He stated that Maswada
was a senior HAMAS activist.

Assad Heimuni, a Hebron Democratic Front for Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) activist, was
interviewed by the GOI. He stated that he knew Maswada to be a HAMAS activist.
118

FBI Action Memorandum p. 37

119

IDF\Military intelligence\ Analysis and Assessment Division, Brief on Saudi Money

funneled to HAMAS, TR2-350-02, 6 May 2002 (hereby MI\TR2-350-02), p.21


120

Among them:
Hammad Muhammed Ramed Qa'adan, head of the Committee, identified
by the G02 as a HAMKS activist who belongs to the HAMAS headquarters
in Tulkarem and is in contact with the HAMKS leadership in Samaria.
Ibrahim Muhammad Salim Salim Nir AI Shams, member of the HAMAS
Financial Committee in Tulkarem, and as an Imam of the Mosque. Salim
also reportedly belonged to the Supreme HAMAS Leadership in Nur AIShams. He 'was imprisoned from October to December 1990 for rioting.
Rind Abd AI-Latif Abd AI-Karim AI Ras is a HAMAS activist assigned to
the HAMAS Headquarters in Tulkarem. He is also in contact with the
HAMAS leadership in Samaria and he is also a member of the Majlis AI
Shura in Tulkarm.
Husni Hassan Hussein Hawaja head of the Committee and a HAMAS
activist.
Bilal HAMAS Yussef Abu Safira, Committee member. Safira is the head
of the waqf (Islamic Trust) in Tulkarm and a senior HAMAS member.

121

It operates two large centers for the study of the Koran, hospitals, clinics, a

beehive project, sewing factories, elementary school and a kindergarten. It owns a


residential building with some units rented out to the needy. Interview with source
17 (CIA) and Dr. Stanly Bedlington (CIA).

89

122

IDF\Military intelligence\ Analysis and Assessment Division, Brief on Saudi Money

funneled to HAMAS, TR5-399-02, 688/0042, 19 May 2002 (hereby MI\TR 688/0042), p.12;
Interview with source 3 (IDF\MI)
123

The "Coalition of Benevolence" ("A'atalef AI-Khir"), which assists the "charity

committees" and is in contact with the Saudi committee constitutes a money raising project
for the PA areas in cooperation with HAMAS. It operates a network of Islamic and ProPalestinian organizations around the world, it is headed by Sheikh Yousef Kardawi, a radical
Moslem cleric who was born in Egypt and emigrated to Qatar. In the past he made statements
in favor of terrorist attacks against Israel, and issued a Fatwa (cleric order) permitting suicide
attacks by women; he is a world leader in religious incitement against Israel, he preaches
against the US and calls for the boycott of American products.
124

FBI Action Memorandum p. 44

125

In April 2002, Israel raided seven of the eight major cities in the West Bank. Only Jericho

was left untouched. During the raids, vast quantities of means of combat were seized, but the
true booty was actually the documents, which were to cause a genuine change in the attitude
of the world towards the Palestinian Authority and its chief. A special secret unit of the
Intelligence Branch had accompanied the IDF raids, going into action immediately after the
combat soldiers had finished clearing out the area. The units task was simple: to take
everything. One after the other, IDF Rio trucks loaded with documents and computers left the
Mukataa, headed for North Tel Aviv. There was enough material collected to fill the IDF
hanger twice over. Some of these Documents Raids took place at offices and ZAKAT
committees identified with HAMAS.

Even experts well acquainted with the intelligence material that was collected prior to the
events of Operation Defensive Shield (during which the documents were taken) were
surprised by the depth of the documents, and by the severity of their implications. The
Palestinians, against their own best interests, tended to keep records of practically everything.

At first, the Israeli claims based upon the documents were received with great suspicion.
Chris Patten, External Relations Commissioner of the European Union, simply did not want
to hear about it. The documents are fabricated, he charged. The first person to be convinced
of their authenticity was the head of the CIA delegation in Israel, Jeff OConnell, who left this
position in June 2002. The British were far more suspicious. Representatives of MI6 in Israel,
received the documents from Israels Military Intelligence agents, politely informed them that
they needed more time to review them, and then sent the documents to London. The
Supervisory Committee of British Intelligence, known as JIC, set up a special team to

90

evaluate the documents. At the end of a thorough examination, the team was convinced,
beyond a shadow of a doubt, that the documents were reliable. The French DGSE and the
German BND conducted similar examinations and all reached the same conclusion.

Today it would appear that there is no one, save perhaps a few spokesmen for the Palestinian
Authority, who still disputes the reliability of the documents. Even senior spokesmen, such as
Rajoub, Dahlan or Tirawi, confirm their authenticity, but strongly contradict the interpretation
given to them by MI experts. (see interviews with Colonel Reven Erlich, Colonel Miri Eisin,
sources 12, 13, 14 (GSS) and also Bergman, Authority Granted p.17-21)
126

MI\TR2-350-02, p.1.

127

In an interview with the author, Washington DC.

128

for example, account no. 9070500010-6/500 (see MI\TR2-350-02, p.15 and MI\TR

688/0042 p. 7)
129

MI\TR2-350-02, P.18

130

ibid, P.46

131

Interview with source 5

132

Interview with Munir Alibabic, chief of intelligence services of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

133

In an interview with the author, Sarajevo

134

Following, a short description of the entities listed in the I.I.R.O. report:

The Islamic Heritage Committee - Jerusalem.

The Zakat committee - Ramallah.

The Orphan Care Committee - Bethlehem [note: its director is

among the HAMAS activists deported to Lebanon; it was shut down by


the PA due to its identification with HAMAS; recently resumed activity].

The Islamic Charity - Hebron

Islamic Youths Association - Hebron.

The Nablus Zakat Committee [handwriting: the Jordanian

Islamic Bank, A1 Wahadat branch, account no. 81336].

The Zakat Committee Assira Shainaliah [near Nablus].

The Tulkarm Zakat Committee [identified with HAMAS; in its

office were found the Saudi Contmittee for the Support of Intifada A1
Quds documents].

The Jenin Zakat Committee.

91

The Islamic Integrity Association - in Gaza [note: a large

association, identified with the HAMAS, receives many donations


including from the Saudi Committee for Support of Intifada A1 Quds.

The "AL Rahame" Zakat Committee - Khan Yunes. [note:

previously shut down by the PA because of its identification with


HAMAS; recently resumed activity.

The Islamic Society - Nussirat [note: previously shut down by

the PA because of its identification with HAMAS; recently resumed


activity.

The Islamic Center - Gaza [note: previously shut down by the

PA because of its identification with HAMAS; recently resumed


activity].

135

The Zakat and Welfare Charity Committee - Rafiah.


Some of these notorious names:
Ayad Isa al-Batat (no. 201 on the list). Senior HAMAS

operational activist. Perpetrated a shooting at an IDF patrol in Hebron


(18 May 1998), stabbing of a soldier (11 March 1997), shooting at an
IDF car (10 November 1998 and 13 January 1999).

Ibrahim al Sarahne (no. 191 on the list). Operational HAMAS

activist. Carried out a suicide aback in Ashkelon (25 February 1996),


killing 1 Israeli and wounding 29.

Musa Abd al Qadr Ghanimat (no. 197 on the list). Operational

HAMAS activist. Carried out a lethal attack in a coffee shop at the center
of Tel Aviv (21 March 1997). 3 Israelis were killed and 47 wounded.

Sufian al Jabarin (no. 206 on the list). Operational HAMAS

activist. Carried out a suicide attack on a bus in Jerusalem (21 August


1995), killing 4 Israelis and wounding 107 others. One of those killed
was a US citizen.

Majdi Abu Warda (no. 195 on the list). HAMAS operational

activist. Perpetrator of a bomb attack on a bus in Jerusalem (25 February


1996), in which 26 Israelis were killed and 47 wounded (mostly
civilians).
136
137

"Al Hayyat A1 Jedida" no. 2336 dated 6/11/1422 (HIGRA), 18 February 2002
Interview with source 2

92

138

Since the outbreak of the Intifada, various Arab states have sent lump sum contributions to

the families of killed terrorists as follows:


Donor State

Scope in Aid Per Pamiiy in $

Iraq

25,000 (increased the aid from 10,000)

Saudi Arabia

5,300

PA

2,000

Qatar

500

UAE

500

TOTAL

33,000

139

Interviews with sources 11, 1, 12.

140

Interview with source 11

141

It was only in April 2002, following the September 11th attack, that President George Bush

ordered the FBI to raid the offices of the Holy Land Foundation throughout the USA, to
confiscate all equipment and to close the offices. The White House now denounced it as an
Organization that supported terrorism.
142

The figures appearing in this appendix are taken from the document found in the Charity

Committee offices. The background information about the past activity of the beneficiary are
supplied my Israeli Intelligence (see MI\TR2-350-02, p.24-32)
143

This appendix is based upon MI\TR2-350-02, p.8-10

144

On 29 March 2002, Ayat Muhammad Lutfi al-Akhras - resident of Deheishe refugee camp

-- blew herself up in the entrance to a supermarket in Jerusalem. This suicide terrorist attack
left two dead civilians and 22 injured civilians. The AI-Aqsa Brigades (Fatah) took
responsibility for this attack
145

New York Times, 9 May 2002

146

In an interview to MSNBC, 8 May 2002

147

AI Siasa, 11 May

148

AP, as quoted by Turkish Daily News, 7 May 2002

93

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