Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Admissibility (Rule 128, Section 3) en Banc
Admissibility (Rule 128, Section 3) en Banc
EN BANC
VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO,
Petitioner,
- versus THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES
ON PUBLIC INFORMATION, PUBLIC ORDER AND
SAFETY, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY,
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS
TECHNOLOGY, and SUFFRAGE AND ELECTORAL
REFORMS,
Respondents.
X----------------------X
SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA and OSWALDO D.
AGCAOILI,
Petitioners,
- versus THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES,
REPRESENTED BY THE SENATE PRESIDENT THE
HONORABLE MANUEL VILLAR,
Respondent.
X----------------------X
MAJ. LINDSAY REX SAGGE,
Petitioner-in-Intervention.
X----------------------X
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., BENIGNO NOYNOY C.
AQUINO, RODOLFO G. BIAZON, PANFILO M.
LACSON, LOREN B. LEGARDA, M.A. JAMBY A.S.
MADRIGAL, and ANTONIO F. TRILLANES,
Respondents-Intervenors.
1|Page
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
G.R. No. 170338
RULE LII
DATE OF TAKING EFFECT
6|Page
7|Page
REYNATO S. PUNO
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate
Chief Justice
Committees, therefore, could not, in violation
of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in
the legislative inquiry subject of these
consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
aid of legislation by the Senate has to be
Associate Justice
deferred until it shall have caused the
publication of the rules, because it can do so ANTONIO T. CARPIO
only in accordance with its duly published rules
Associate Justice
of procedure.
Very recently, the Senate caused the
(On Leave)
publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure RENATO C. CORONA
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation in Associate Justice
the October 31, 2008 issues of Manila
Bulletin and Malaya. While we take judicial ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
notice of this fact, the recent publication doesAssociate Justice
not cure the infirmity of the inquiry sought to
be prohibited by the instant petitions. InsofarMINITA
as
V. CHICO-NAZARIO
the consolidated cases are concerned, the Associate Justice
legislative investigation subject thereof still
could not be undertaken by the respondent RUBEN T. REYES
Senate Committees, because no published rules
Associate Justice
governed it, in clear contravention of the
Constitution.
ARTURO D. BRION
With the foregoing disquisition, the Court finds
Associate Justice
it unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised
in the consolidated petitions.
CERTIFICATION
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 170338
is DISMISSED, and the petition in G.R. No.
179275 is GRANTED. Let a writ of prohibition be
issued enjoining the Senate of the Republic of
8|Page
CONSUELO YN
Associate Just
MA. ALICIA AU
Associate Just
CONCHITA CA
Associate Just
DANTE O. TING
Associate Just
PRESBITERO J.
Associate Just
TERESITA J. LE
Associate Just
On leave.
Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), p. 168.
[2]
Rollo (G.R. No. 170338), pp. 7-9.
[3]
Id. at 9.
[4]
Id. at 1-38.
[5]
Id. at 36-38.
[6]
Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), pp. 215-220.
[7]
Id. at 169.
[8]
An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire
Tapping and Other Related Violations of the
Privacy of Communications and for Other
Purposes.
[9]
Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), pp. 169-170.
[10]
Id. at 3-17.
[11]
Id. at 7-13.
[12]
Id. at 24.
[13]
Id. at 44.
[14]
Memorandum of RespondentsIntervenors, p. 6.
[15]
Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), pp. 68-70.
[16]
Id. at 71-90.
[17]
Id. at 62. The Court identified the
following issues for discussion in the October 2,
2007 Oral Argument:
1.
Whether the petitioners have locus
standi to bring this suit.
2.
Whether the Rules of Procedure of
the Senate and the Senate Committees
governing the conduct of inquiries in aid of
legislation have been published, in accordance
with Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution.
Corollarily:
(a) Whether these Rules must be published
by every Congress.
(b) What mode/s of publication will comply
with the constitutional requirement.
3.
Whether the inquiry, which is
centered on the so-called Garci tapes, violates
Section 3, Article III of the Constitution and/or
Republic Act No. 4200. (Id. at 66.)
[1]
9|Page
[18]
SECOND DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present:
-versus-
CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
BRION,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD, and
PEREZ, JJ.
Promulgated:
ANTONIO LAUGA Y
PINA ALIASTERIO,
Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before Us for final review is the trial courts
conviction of the appellant for the rape of his
thirteen-year old daughter.
Consistent with the ruling of this Court
in People v. Cabalquinto,[1] the real name and
the personal circumstances of the victim, and
any other information tending to establish or
compromise her identity, including those of her
immediate family or household members, are
not disclosed in this decision.
The Facts
In an Information dated 21 September
2000,[2] the appellant was accused of the crime
of QUALIFIED RAPE allegedly committed as
follows:
That on or about the 15th day of March 2000, in
the evening, at Barangay xxx, municipality of
xxx, province of Bukidnon, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
11 | P a g e
Admissibility in Evidence of an
Extrajudicial Confession before
a Bantay Bayan
14 | P a g e
Penalty
Finally, in increasing the amount of civil
indemnity and damages each
from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00, the Court of
Appeals correctly considered controlling
jurisprudence to the effect that where, as here,
the rape is committed with any of the
qualifying/aggravating circumstances
warranting the imposition of the death penalty,
the victim is entitled to P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity ex delicto[84] and P75,000.00 as moral
damages.[85] However, the award of exemplary
damages should have been increased
from P25,000.00to P30,000.00.[86] Also, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua in lieu of death
was correctly imposed considering that the
imposition of the death penalty upon appellant
would have been appropriate were it not for
the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346, or An
Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty
in the Philippines.[87] We further affirm the
ruling of the Court of Appeals on appellants
non-eligibility for parole. Sec. 3 of Republic Act
No. 9346 clearly provides that persons
convicted of offenses punished
withreclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will
be reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of
the law, shall not be eligible for parole.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 30 September 2008 in CA-G.R. CR
HC No. 00456-MIN is
hereby AFFIRMED. Appellant
Antonio Lauga isGUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of qualified rape, and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole and to
pay AAAP75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages,
and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
[4]
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION
C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate
Justice
MARIANO
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1]
Id. at 32.
Id. at 36.
[6]
TSN, 12 November 2001.
[7]
TSN, 11 March 2002.
[8]
TSN, 5 June 2003.
[9]
TSN, 12 November 2001, p. 4.
[10]
Id. at 5.
[11]
Id. at 4.
[12]
Id. at 4-5.
[13]
Id. at 5; TSN, 11 March 2002, p. 4.
[14]
Id. at 6.
[15]
Id.
[16]
Id.
[17]
Id. at 7.
[18]
Id. at 8; TSN, 11 March 2002, pp. 4-5.
[19]
TSN, 12 November 2001, p. 10.
[20]
Id. at 8-9.
[21]
Id. at 9.
[22]
Id. at 11-12.
[23]
Id. at 12; TSN, 11 March 2002, p. 6.
[24]
Id. at 13.
[25]
Id. at 15.
[26]
Id. at 13.
[27]
Records, p. 5.
[28]
Id.
[29]
TSN, 12 November 2001, pp. 6-8.
[30]
Id. at 10.
[31]
Id. at 12-13.
[32]
Id. at 13.
[33]
Id. at 13-14.
[34]
Id. at 15.
[35]
Id. at 16.
[36]
Id.
[37]
Id. at 17.
[38]
Id. at 18.
[39]
Id. at 19.
[40]
Id. at 21.
[41]
Penned by
Judge Pelagio B. Estopia. Records, pp. 95-104.
[42]
Id. at 104.
[43]
Id.
[44]
Id. at 79.
[45]
Penned by Associate
Justice Elihu A. Ybaez with Associate Justices
Romulo V. Borja and Mario V. Lopez
concurring. CA rollo, pp. 56-79.
[46]
Id.
[47]
Id. at 92.
[5]
WE CONCUR:
[48]
Rollo, p. 31.
Id. at 40-43 and 46-48.
[50]
Id. at 17.
[51]
Id. at 18.
[52]
Id. at 18-19.
[53]
Id. at 19-21.
[54]
Id. at 18-19.
[55]
G.R. No. 170470, 26 September 2006,
503 SCRA 294.
56
(1) Any person under investigation for
the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent
and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he
must be provided with one. These rights cannot
be waived except in writing and in the presence
of counsel.
[57]
(3) Any confession or admission
obtained in violation of this Section or Section
17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence
against him.
[58]
People v. Malngan, supra note 55 at
324-325.
[59]
432 Phil. 471 (2002).
[60]
Id. at 476.
[61]
Executive Order No. 309, Sec. 1(g), as
amended, quoted in Memorandum Circular No.
2008-114 dated 17 July 2008 of the Department
of the Interior and Local Government.
[62]
Id.
[63]
Rollo, p. 19.
[64]
420 Phil. 50 (2001).
[65]
Id. at 59-60.
[66]
Rollo, p. 17.
[67]
People v. Villadares, 406 Phil. 530, 540
(2001), citing People v. Gargar, 360 Phil. 729,
741 (1998).
[68]
People v. Aycardo, G.R. No. 168299, 6
October 2008, 567 SCRA 523, 535-536.
[69]
Rollo, p. 19, citing People
v. Mascarias, 432 Phil. 96, 102 (2002), further
citing People v. Tabugoca, 349 Phil. 236, 253
(1998).
[70]
Id., citing People v. Sangil, Sr., 342
Phil. 499, 508-509 (1997), further citing People
v. Mabunga, G.R. No. 96441, 13 November
1992, 215 SCRA 694, 704.
[49]
18 | P a g e
[71]
THIRD DIVISION
CORINTHIAN GARDENS
ASSOCIATION, INC.,
Petitioner,
- versus -
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
The Antecedents:
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20 | P a g e
b)
Whether or not the Court of Appeals has
legal basis to increase unilaterally and without
proof the amount prayed for in the
Complaint, i.e., P2,000.00, as reasonable
compensation for the use and enjoyment of the
portion of the lot encroached upon,
to P10,000.00.[32]
Corinthian claims that the approval of the
building plan of the Cuasos was not tainted with
negligence as it did not approve the survey
relocation plan but merely the architectural,
structural and sanitary plans for Cuasos' house;
that the purpose of the said approval is not to
ensure that the house to be erected on a
particular lot is constructed within its
boundaries but only to ensure compliance with
the Manual of Rules and Regulations; that while
Corinthian conducts actual site inspections, the
inspection and approval of the building plans
are limited to table inspection only; that the
survey relocation plan was never submitted for
Corinthian's approval; that the acceptance of
the builder's bond did not make Corinthian
automatically liable for the encroachment and
for damages; and that Corinthian approved the
building plan with the good faith and due
And then again third party defendantappellee Corinthian Garden required the
posting of a builders cash bond (Exh. 5Corinthian) from the defendants-appellants
Cuasos and the third-party defendant C.B. Paraz
Construction to secure the performance of their
undertaking. Surely, Corinthian does not imply
that while it may take the benefits from the
Builders cash bond, it may, Pilate-like, wash its
hands of any responsibility or liability that
would or might arise from the construction or
building of the structure for which the cash
bond was in the first place posted. That is not
only unjust and immoral, but downright
unchristian and iniquitous.
25 | P a g e
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
26 | P a g e
MINITA V. CHICONAZARIO
Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1]
[13]
Id. at 110-115.
Resolution dated September 15, 2004;
id. at 308.
[15]
Rollo, pp. 310-325.
[16]
Id. at 419-433.
[17]
Id. at 450.
[18]
Id. at 452.
[19]
Penned by Associate Justice Renato C.
Dacudao (now retired), with Associate Justices
Celia C. Librea-Leagogo and Mariflor PunzalanCastillo, concurring; id. at 457-460.
[20]
Motion for Execution dated July 10,
2006; id. at 493-501.
[21]
Rollo, pp. 509-511.
[22]
Id. at 502-508.
[23]
Id. at 517-529.
[24]
Application for a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction dated May 4, 2007; id. at 465-491.
[25]
Opposition dated May 17, 2007; id. at
556-574.
[26]
Almeida v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
159124, January 17, 2005, 448 SCRA 681, 694.
[27]
Philippine School of Business
Administration-Quezon City v. Tolentino-Genilo,
G.R. No. 159277, December 21, 2004, 447 SCRA
442, 448.
[28]
In GSIS v. Court of Appeals, 368 Phil.
36, 50 (1999), citing Firestone Tire and Rubber
Company of the Philippines v. Tempongko, 27
SCRA 418, 424 (1969) and Singapore Airlines
Limited v. Court of Appeals, 243 SCRA 143, 148
(1995), this Court held: The decision of the trial
court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals not
having been appealed by the insurer (MIGC) of
the Toyota Tamaraw, the same is now final as
far as that entity is concerned, and may not be
modified by this Court. Failure of any parties to
appeal the judgment as against him makes such
judgment final and executory. By the same
token, an appeal by one party from such
judgment does not inure to the benefit of the
other party who had not appealed nor can it be
deemed to be an appeal of such other party
from the judgment against him.
[29]
Philippine Sinter Corporation v.
Cagayan Electric Power and Light Co., Inc., 431
Phil. 324, 333 (2002).
[14]
27 | P a g e
[30]
FIRST DIVISION
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY
G.R. No.
156052
(SJS), VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T.
CABIGAO and BONIFACIO S.
TUMBOKON,
Petitioners,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
-versusCORONA,
AZCUNA and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.
HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR.,
in his capacity as Mayor of the
City of Manila,
Respondent.
CHEVRON PHILIPPINES INC.,
PETRON CORPORATION and
PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM
CORPORATION,
Movants-Intervenors.
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY,
Movant-Intervenor.
Promulgated:
February 13, 2008
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
xxx
xxx
30 | P a g e
(a)
Ordinance No. 8119, the enactment and
existence of which were not previously brought
by the parties to the attention of the Court and
(b) writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction
and preliminary mandatory injunction and
status quo order issued by the RTC of Manila,
Branches 39 and 42 and
3. whether the implementation of Ordinance
No. 8027 will unduly encroach upon the DOEs
powers and functions involving energy
resources.
During the oral arguments, the parties
submitted to this Courts power to rule on the
constitutionality and validity of Ordinance No.
8027 despite the pendency of consolidated
cases involving this issue in the RTC.[27] The
importance of settling this controversy as fully
and as expeditiously as possible was
emphasized, considering its impact on public
interest. Thus, we will also dispose of this issue
here. The parties were after all given ample
opportunity to present and argue their
respective positions. By so doing, we will do
away with the delays concomitant with
litigation and completely adjudicate an issue
which will most likely reach us anyway as the
final arbiter of all legal disputes.
Before we resolve these issues, a brief review of
the history of the Pandacan Terminals is called
for to put our discussion in the proper context.
SEC. 1.
Who may intervene. A person
who has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the
parties, or an interest against both, or is so
situated as to be adversely affected by a
distribution or other disposition of property in
the custody of the court or of an officer thereof
may, with leave of court, be allowed to
intervene in the action. The court shall consider
whether or not the intervention will unduly
delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights
of the original parties, and whether or not the
intervenors rights may be fully protected in a
separate proceeding.
32 | P a g e
41 | P a g e
44 | P a g e
45 | P a g e
47 | P a g e
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SECTION 3. Scope of MMDA Services. Metrowide services under the jurisdiction of the
MMDA are those services which have metro-
xxx
xxx
52 | P a g e
Sgd.
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
Sgd.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the
above resolution had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
Sgd.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1]
[30]
55 | P a g e
[54]
[63]
[77]
Id.
Transcript of April 11, 2007 Oral
Arguments, p. 244.
[79]
Rollo, p. 698.
[80]
Memorandum of respondent, pp. 3031.
[81]
Memorandum of oil companies, p. 26.
[82]
Answer, paragraphs 20.1 and 20.3, pp.
20-21.
[83]
Alfelor v. Halasan, supra note 56 at
460, citing Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227,
232 (1948), in turn citing McDaniel v. Apacible,
44 Phil. 248 (1922).
[84]
Republic Glass Corporation v. Qua,
G.R. No. 144413, 30 July 2004, 435 SCRA 480,
492.
[85]
Republic of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals, 359 Phil. 530, 582 (1998), Romero, J.,
separate opinion.
[86]
Sec. 84 of Ordinance No. 8119
provides:
Repealing Clause. - All ordinances, rules or
regulations in conflict with the provisions of
this
Ordinance are hereby
repealed; PROVIDED, That the rights that are
vested upon the effectivity
of this
Ordinance shall not be impaired. (Rollo, p.
493.)
[87]
Memorandum of oil companies, pp.
44-45, citing Annex C of Ordinance No. 8119.
Annex C (Zone Boundaries) of Ordinance No.
8119 enumerates and specifies the areas
covered by the different zones:
High Density Residential/Mixed Use Zone
R-3/MXD
Color: Yellow
District I
1.
area covered by Smokey Mountain
Development and Reclamation Project.
2.
area bounded on the N by Manila
Navotas boundary, on the SW by Estero de
Maypajo, on the NW by Malaya, on the NE by
Simeon de Jesus, and on the NW by Taliba
3.
area bounded on the N by Estero de
Maypajo, on the SW by Estero de Sunog
Apog/Rodriguez, on the NW by Younger, and on
the NE by Estaro de Maypajo
[78]
4.
area occupied by a portion in Vitas
Complex (as indicated in the Zoning Map)
5.
area bounded on the SE by F. Varona, on
the SW by Lallana, on the NW by Roxas, and on
the NE by Jacinto
6.
area bounded on the E by Estero de Vitas,
on the SW by C-2 Road, on the NW by
Velasquez, and on the NE by Osorio
7.
area bounded on the SE by Varona, on
the NW by Pitong Gatang, on the SW by Lacson,
on the S by Chesa, on the W by Quezon, on the
NW by Liwayway, on the W by Garcia, and on
the NE by Harbosa (except the area covered by
C-2/MXD Zone area bounded on the N by
Bulacan, on the E by Magsaysay, on the S by
Dandan, and on the W by Garcia)
8.
area bounded on the SE by Estero de
Vitas, on the SW by Zamora, on the NW by
Herbosa, on the SW by Franco, on the NW by
Concha/Nolasco, on the SE by Pavia, on the NE
Sta. Maria, on the SW by Perla, on the W by
Varona, on the NE by Herbosa on the NW by
Velasquez, and on the NE by Inocencio (except
the area covered by INS-G bounded on the SE
by Dandan, on the SW by Sta. Maria, and on the
NW by Pealosa/Sta. Maria)
9.
area bounded on the SE by
Corcuera/Estero dela Reina, on the NW by
Pavia, and on the NE by J. Luna
10. area bounded on the SE by a line
parallel/extending from Arqueros, on the SW by
Dist. 1/Dist. II boundary on the NW by a line
parallel/extending from Ricafort, and on the NE
by Dagupan Ext.
11. area bounded on the E by Dama de
Noche, on the SW by Lakandula, on the SE by
Asuncion, on the SW by C.M. Recto, on the W
by Del Pan, on the S by Zaragosa, on the W by
Kagitingan, and on the N/NE by Tuazon
Distinct II
1.
area bounded on the N by ManilaKalookan boundary, and on the E/S/W by Estero
de Maypajo
2.
area bounded ion the N by ManilaKalookan boundary, on the SW by J. Luna, on
57 | P a g e
9.
area bounded on the NE by San Andres,
on the SW by Diamante, on the S by Zapanta,
on the NW by Singalong, on the NE by Cong. A.
Francisco, and on the NE by Linao.
District VI
1.
area bounded on the SE/SW by ManilaQuezon City boundary/San Juan River, on the
NW by PNR Railway, and on the N/NE by R.
Magsaysay Blvd. (except the area occupied by
C-3/MXD area bounded by R. Magsaysay and
Santol Ext./area bounded by R. Magsaysay
Baldovino, Hintoloro, Road 2, Buenviaje, and V.
Mapa)
2.
area bounded on the SE by PNR Railway,
on the SW by San Juan River, on the NE by
Dalisay, on the NW by Lubiran, and on the NE
by Cordeleria
3.
area bounded on the SE by San Juan
River, on the SW by Manila-Mandaluyong
boundary/Panaderos, and on the NW/SW/NE
by Pasig River
4.
area bounded on the E/SW by Pres.
Quirino Avenue, and on the NW/NE by Estero
de Pandacan
5.
area bounded on the SE/E by Estero de
Pandacan, on the W by Pres. Quirino Avenue,
and on the NE by Pasig River
6.
area bounded on the SE by Pasig River, on
the SW by PNR Railway, on the NW/SW by
Estero de Pandacan,/PNR rail tracks, on the NW
by Pres. Quirino Avenue, and on the NE by
Estero de Pandacan
7.
area bounded on the N by Estero de
Pandacan, on the SW by PNR rail tracks, and on
the NW by Estero de Pandacan
8.
area bounded on the SW by
Kahilum/Felix, on the NW by Pedro Gil, on the
NW by Pedro Gil, on the NE by Estero Tripa de
Gallina, on the NW by Estero de Pandacan, and
on the NE By Pres. Quirino Avenue
9.
area bounded on the SE by Estero de
Pandacan, on the SW/SE by Pasig River, on the E
by a line parallel/extending form Vista on the
south side, on the SW by Pedro Gil, on the NW
by M. L. Carreon, and on the NE by PNR Railway
10. area bounded on the SE/SW by Pasig
River/Manila-Makati boundary on the NW by
[106]
[134]
[155]
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[170]
- versus -
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the October 14, 2003 Decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 75322.
The Facts
CA
C
A
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x x x x[9]
SO ORDERED.
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The Issues
I
WHETHER OR NOT GHI IS A PARTY TO THE
LABOR DISPUTE BETWEEN NAMAWU AND
MMC.
II
WHETHER OR NOT,
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE PERTINENT
DECISION OR ORDER IN THE SAID LABOR
DISPUTE BETWEEN MMC AND NAMAWU MAY
BE ENFORCED AGAINST GHI, THERE IS ALREADY
A FINAL DEETERMINATION BY THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES IN SAID
LABOR DISPUTE CONSIDERING THE PENDENCY
OF G.R. NOS. 157696-97.
III
WHETHER OR NOT GHI IS THE ABSOLUTE
OWNER OF THE PROPERTIES UNLAWFULLY
GARNISHED BY RESPONDENTS SHERIFFS.
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE HENRY D.
ARLES CORRECTLY ISSUED A WRIT OF
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Our Ruling
Before we delve into an extended discussion of
the foregoing issues, it is essential to take
judicial cognizance of cases intimately linked to
the present controversy which had earlier been
elevated to and decided by this Court.
Judicial Notice.
Judicial notice must be taken by this Court of its
Decision in Maricalum Mining Corporation v.
Hon. Arturo D. Brion and NAMAWU,[34] in which
we upheld the right of herein private
respondent, NAMAWU, to its labor
claims. Upon the same principle of judicial
notice, we acknowledge our Decision
in Republic of the Philippines, through its
trustee, the Asset Privatization Trust v. G
Holdings, Inc.,[35] in which GHI was recognized
as the rightful purchaser of the shares of stocks
of MMC, and thus, entitled to the delivery of
the company notes accompanying the said
purchase. These company notes, consisting of
three (3) Promissory Notes, were part of the
documents executed in 1992 in the privatization
sale of MMC by the Asset Privatization Trust
(APT) to GHI. Each of these notes uniformly
contains stipulations establishing
and constituting in favor of GHImortgages over
MMCs real and personal properties. The
stipulations were subsequently formalized in a
separate document denominated Deed of Real
Estate and Chattel Mortgage on September 5,
1996. Thereafter, the Deed was registered on
February 4, 2000.[36]
We find both decisions critically relevant to the
instant dispute. In fact, they should have
guided the courts below in the disposition of
the controversy at their respective levels. To
repeat, these decisions respectively confirm the
right of NAMAWU to its labor claims[37] and
affirm the right of GHI to its financial and
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3.
The aforesaid control and breach of duty
must proximately cause the injury or unjust loss
complained of.
Time and again, we have reiterated that mere
ownership by a single stockholder or by another
corporation of all or nearly all of the capital
stock of a corporation is not, by itself, a
sufficient ground for disregarding a separate
corporate personality.[74] It is basic that a
corporation has a personality separate and
distinct from that composing it as well as from
that of any other legal entity to which it may be
related. Clear and convincing evidence is
needed to pierce the veil of corporate fiction.[75]
In this case, the mere interlocking of directors
and officers does not warrant piercing the
separate corporate personalities of MMC and
GHI. Not only must there be a showing that
there was majority or complete control, but
complete domination, not only of finances but
of policy and business practice in respect to the
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**
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice
*
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[35]
[59]
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THIRD DIVISION
SPOUSES OMAR and MOSHIERA LATIP,
Petitioners,
versus ROSALIE PALAA CHUA,
Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Challenged in this petition for review
on certiorari is the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 89300:[1] (1)
reversing the decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 274, Paraaque City in Civil
Case No. 04-0052;[2] and (2) reinstating and
affirming in toto the decision of the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 78, of
the same city in Civil Case No. 2001-315.[3]
WITNESSETH
First, we sift through the varying facts found by
the different lower courts.
The facts parleyed by the MeTC show that
respondent Rosalie Chua (Rosalie) is the owner
of Roferxane Building, a commercial building,
located at No. 158 Quirino
Avenue corner Redemptorist Road, Barangay
Baclaran, Paraaque City.
On July 6, 2001, Rosalie filed a complaint for
unlawful detainer plus damages against
petitioners, Spouses Omar and Moshiera Latip
(Spouses Latip). Rosalie attached to the
complaint a contract of lease over two cubicles
in Roferxane Bldg., signed by Rosalie, as lessor,
and by Spouses Latip, as lessees thereof.
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(sgd.)
OMAR LATIEF
LESSEE
SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF:
(sgd.)
1. Daisy C. Ramos
C. Chua
(sgd.)
MOSHIERA LATIEF
LESS
(sgd.)
2. Ferdinand
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
BEFORE ME, a Notary Public for and in the City
of Manila personally appeared the following
persons:
Rosalie P. Chua with CTC No. 05769706
at Paraaque City on 2/1/99; Moshiera Latief
with CTC No. 12885654 at Paraaque City on
11/11/99; Omar Latief with CTC No. 12885653
Paraaque City on Nov. 11, 1999.
known to me and to me known to be the same
persons who executed this instrument
consisting of two (2) pages duly signed by them
and the two (2) instrumental witnesses and
acknowledged to me that the same is their free
and voluntarily acts and deeds.
IN FAITH AND TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have
hereunto affixed my hand and Notarial Seal this
____th day of December, 1999 at the City of
Manila, Philippines.
ATTY.
NOTARY
Until
PTR #
Received by:
Rosalie Chua
3.
Received cash
P70,000.00 from
Moshiera Latip
12-11-99
____(sgd.)___
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___
Rosalie Chua
[6]
SO ORDERED.[7]
(1)
the sum of PhP1,000,000.00 as moral
damages;
In stark contrast, the RTC reversed the MeTC
and ruled in favor of Spouses Latip. The RTC did
not give credence to the contract of lease,
ruling that it was not notarized and, in all other
substantial aspects, incomplete. Further on this
point, the RTC noted that the contract of lease
lacked: (1) the signature of Ferdinand Chua,
Rosalies husband; (2) the signatures of Spouses
Latip on the first page thereof; (3) the specific
dates for the term of the contract which only
stated that the lease is for six (6) y[ea]rs only
starting from December 1999 or up to
December 2005; (4) the exact date of
execution of the document, albeit the month of
December and year 1999 are indicated therein;
and (5) the provision for payment of deposit or
advance rental which is supposedly uncommon
in big commercial lease contracts.
The RTC believed the claim of Spouses Latip
that the contract of lease was modified and
supplemented; and the entire lease rentals for
the two (2) cubicles for six (6) years had already
been paid by Spouses Latip in the amount
of P2,570,000.00. As to Rosalies claim that her
receipt of P2,570,000.00 was simply goodwill
payment by prospective lessees to their lessor,
and not payment for the purchase of lease
rights, the RTC shot this down and pointed out
that, apart from her bare allegations, Rosalie
did not adduce evidence to substantiate this
claim. On the whole, the RTC declared an
existent lease between the parties for a period
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(2)
the sum of PhP500,000.00 as exemplary
damages;
(3)
the sum of PhP250,000.00 plus
PhP3,000.00 per court appearance as and for
attorneys fees; and
(4)
costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[8]
In yet another turn of events, the CA, as
previously mentioned, reversed the RTC and
reinstated the decision of the MeTC. The CA
ruled that the contract of lease, albeit lacking
the signature of Ferdinand and not notarized,
remained a complete and valid contract. As the
MeTC had, the CA likewise found that the
alleged defects in the contract of lease did not
render the contract ineffective. On the issue of
whether the amount of P2,570,000.00 merely
constituted payment of goodwill money, the CA
took judicial notice of this common practice in
the area of Baclaran, especially around
the Redemptorist Church. According to the
appellate court, this judicial notice was
bolstered by the Joint Sworn Declaration of the
stallholders at Roferxane Bldg. that they all had
paid goodwill money to Rosalie prior to
occupying the stalls thereat. Thus, ruling on
Rosalies appeal, the CA disposed of the case:
SO ORDERED.[9]
Rosalie
______(sgd.)______
Ferdinand Chua
2.
Received cash
P500,000.00
From Moshiera Latip
(sgd.)
12/10/99
Received by
Rosalie Chua
3.
Received cash
P70,000.00 from
Moshiera Latip
12-11-99
___(sgd.)
____
[14]
Received by:
There is nothing on the receipts and on record
that the payment and receipt of P2,570,000.00
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MINITA V. CHICONAZARIO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution and the Division Acting
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice
*
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[2]
Id. at 42.