1. Director Of Lands V.

IAC (1986)
G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986
Lessons Applicable: Sec. 3 Art. XII, 1987 Constitution (Land Titles and Deeds)

FACTS:
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., a corp. represented by Mr. Rodolfo
Nazario, acquired from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat
tribe 5 parcels of land
possession of the Infiels over the landdates back before the Philippines was
discovered by Magellan
land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to RA 3872 granting
absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied
by them or their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable
public land or within the public domain
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than P45M worth of
improvements
ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered was duly
recognized by the government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon,
Isabela
donated part of the land as the townsite of Maconacon Isabela
IAC affirmed CFI: in favor of
ISSUES:
1. W/N the land is already a private land - YES
2. W/N the constitutional prohibition against
private corporations or associations applies- NO

their

acquisition

by

HELD: IAC affirmed Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc

1. YES
already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of
the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be
issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application
therefore is sufficient
it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private
property, at least by presumption
The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not
affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and
the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent.
The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to
establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law
2. NO
If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which
the Infiels had a legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962

when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme
had a perfect right to make such acquisition
The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold
or lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares
2. REPUBLIC vs. RIZALVO
G.R. No. 172011
March 7, 2011
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

FACTS:
On December 7, 2000, respondent Teodoro P. Rizalvo, Jr. filed before the MTC of
Bauang, La Union, acting as a land registration court, an application for the
registration of a parcel of land, located in Bauang, La Union. Respondent alleged
that he is the owner in fee simple of the subject parcel of land, that he obtained
5
title over the land by virtue of a Deed of Transfer dated December 31, 1962, and
that he is currently in possession of the land. In support of his claim, he presented,
among others, Tax Declaration for the year 1994 in his name, and Proof of Payment
of real property taxes beginning in 1952 up to the time of filing of the application.
On April 20, 2001, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed an Opposition. The
MTC of Bauang, La Union, acting as a land registration court, rendered its Decision,
approving respondents application. The Republic of the Philippines through the
OSG filed a Notice of Appeal. However, the CA found no merit in the appeal and
promulgated the assailed Decision, affirming the trial courts decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent have shown indubitably that he has complied with
all the requirements showing that the property, previously part of the public
domain, has become private property by virtue of his acts of possession in the
manner and length of time required by law.
HELD:
NO. Under Section 14 (1) of PD 1529, applicants for registration of title must
sufficiently establish first, that the subject land forms part of the disposable and
alienable lands of the public domain; second, that the applicant and his
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the same; and third, that it is under a bona fide claim
of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
The first requirement was satisfied in this case. The certification and report dated
July 17, 2001 of the CENRO of San Fernando City, La Union, states that the entire
land area in question is within the alienable and disposable zone, certified as such
since January 21, 1987. Respondent has likewise met the second requirement as to
ownership and possession. The MTC and the CA both agreed that respondent has
presented sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence to show that he and his

predecessors-in-interest were in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious

possession and occupation of the land in question.
However, the third requirement, that respondent and his predecessors-in-interest
be in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject property since June 12, 1945 or earlier, has not been satisfied. Respondent
only managed to present oral and documentary evidence of his and his mothers
ownership and possession of the land since 1958 through a photocopy of the Deed
of Absolute Sale dated July 8, 1958 between Eufrecina Navarro and Bibiana P.
Rizalvo. He presented Tax Declaration for the year 1948 in the name of Eufrecina
Navarro and real property tax receipts beginning in 1952. Even assuming that the
1948 Tax Declaration in the name of Eufrecina Navarro and the tax payment
receipts could be taken in this case as proof of a claim of ownership, still,
respondent lacks proof of occupation and possession beginning June 12, 1945 or
earlier. What is categorically required by law is open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Indeed, even assuming arguendo that the DENR-CENRO certification and report is
enough to signify that the land is no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth, respondent is still not entitled to registration
because the land was certified as alienable and disposable in 1987, while the
application for registration was filed on December 7, 2000, a mere thirteen (13)
years after and far short of the required thirty (30) years under existing laws on
prescription.
5. TITONG v. CA
For one to file an action to quiet title to a parcel of land, the requisites in Art 476 of
the NCC must be complied with meaning there should be an instrument, record,
claim, encumbrance setting forth the cloud or doubt over the title. Otherwise, the
action to be filed can either be ejectment, forcible entry, unlawful detainer, accion
reivindicatoria or accion publiciana.
FACTS:
A 20,592 square meter parcel of land located at Barrio Titiong, Masbate is the
subject property being disputed in this case. The property is being claimed by 2
contestants, however legal title over the property can only be given to one of them.

separate occasions, private resps, with their hired laborers, forcibly entered a
portion of the land containing an approximate area of 2 hectares and began
plowing the same under pretext of ownership. On the other hand, private resps
denied the claim and said that the subject land formed part of the 5.5 hectare
agricultural land which they had purchased from their predecessor-in-interest,
Pablo Espinosa.
Titong identified Espinosa as the his adjoining owner asserting that no controversy
had sprouted between them for 20 years until the latter sold lot 3749 to V. Laurio.
The boundary between the land sold to Espinosa and what remained of Titongs
property was the old Bugsayon river. When Titong employed Lerit as his tenant, he
instructed the latter to change the course of the old river and direct the flow of
water to the lowland at the southern portion of Titongs property, thus converting
the old river into a Riceland.
Private resps, on the other hand, denied claim of Titongs, saying that the area and
boundaries of disputed land remained unaltered during the series of conveyances
prior to its coming into his hands. Accdg to him, Titong first declared land for
taxation purposes which showed that the land had an area of 5.5 hectares and was
bounded on the north by the B. River; on the east by property under ownership by
Zaragoza, and on the west by property owned by De la Cruz. He also alleges that
Titong sold property to Verano. The latter reacquired the property pursuant to
mutual
agreement
to
repurchase
the
same.
However, the property remained in Titongs hands only for 4 days because he sold it
to Espinosa. It then became a part of the estate of Espinosas wife, late Segundina
Espinosa. Later on, her heirs executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with
Simultaneous Sale whereby the 5.5 hectares was sold to Laurio for 5,000 pesos. In
all these conveyances, the area and boundaries of the property remained exactly
the same as those appearing in the name of Titongs.
The court found out that 2 surveys were made of the property. First survey was
made by Titong, while the second was the relocation survey ordered by the lower
court. Because of which, certain discrepancies surfaced. Contrary to Titongs
allegation, he was actually claiming 5.9789 hectares, the total areas of lot nos 3918,
3918-A and 3606. The lot 3479 pertaining to Espinosas was left with only an area of
4.1841 hectares instead of the 5.5 hectares sold by Titong to him.

The case originated from an action for quieting of title filed by petitioner Mario
Titong. The RTC of Masbate decided in favor of private respondents, Vicente Laurio
and Angeles Laurio as the true and lawful owners of the disputed land. The CA
affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Apprised of the discrepancy, private resps filed a protest before Bureau of Lands
against 1st survey, and filing a case for alteration of boundaries before the MTC,
proceedings of which were suspended because of instant case.

Titong asserts that he is the owner of an unregistered parcel of land with an area of
3.2800 hectares and declared for taxation purposes. He claims that on three

Private resps. Avers that Titong is one of the four heirs of his mother, Leonida
Zaragoza. In the Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale of Estate of late Zaragoza, the

heirs adjudicated unto themselves the 3.6 hectares property of the deceased. The
property was bounded by the north by Verano, on the east by Bernardo Titong, on
the south by the Bugsayon River and on the west by Benigno Titong.
Instead of reflecting only .9000 hectares as his rightful share in the extrajud
settlement, Titongs share bloated to 2.4 hectares. It then appeared to Laurio that
Titong encroached upon his property and declared it as part of his inheritance.
The boundaries were likewise altered so that it was bounded on the north by
Verano, on the east by B. Titong, on the south by Espinosa and on the west by
Adolfo Titong. Laurio also denied that Titong diverted course of the B. river after he
had repurchased the land from Verano because land was immediately sold to
Espinosa thereafter.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Titong is the rightful owner of the subject property?
RULING: NO
The remedy for quieting of title may be availed of under the circumstances
mentioned in Art 476 of the NCC wherein it says that action to quiet title may be
made as a remedial or preventive measure. Under 476, a claimant must show that
there is an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which casts a
cloud, doubt, question or shadow upon owners title to or interest in real property.
The ground for filing a complaint for quieting title must be instrument, record,
claim,
encumbrance
or
proceeding.
In the case at bar, Titong failed to allege that there was an instrument, claim etc be
clouded over his property. Through his allegations, what Titong imagined as clouds
cast on his title were Laurios alleged acts of physical intrusion into his purported
property. The grounds mentioned are for action for forcible entry and not quieting
title.
In addition, the case was considered to be a boundary dispute. The RTC and CA
correctly held that when Titong sold the 5.5 hectare land to Espinosa, his rights and
possession ceased and were transferred to Laurio upon its sale to the latter.
Thus, it is now a contract of sale wherein it is a contract transferring dominion and
other real rights in the thing sold. Titong also cannot rely on the claim of
prescription as ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith
and with just title for the time fixed by law.

6. HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES HEIRS OF

MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES GR No. 179987 April 29,
2009
FACTS:
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration
before the RTC of Cavite-Tagaytay, covering a parcel of land situated in Silang
Cavite, consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had
purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-ininterest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful
possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years. Velazco testified that the
property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his
great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo
and Estebanthe fourth being Aristedess grandfather. Upon Linos death, his four
sons inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966,
Estebans wife,Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties
inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and
Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties,
includingLot9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was
this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated
11 June 2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated
that the subject property was verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land
per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and
approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982. On 3 December 2002, the
RTC approved the application for registration.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan
had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land
of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in
possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law
for confirmation of imperfect title. On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals
reversed the RTC ruling and dismissed the appliocation of Malabanan.
ISSUES:
1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be
registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as
the Property Registration Decree, should the land be classified as alienable and
disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at any
time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration provided that it is established
that the applicant has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a parcel of
land classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land and therefore
susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil Code?

3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of its

use or because its slope is below that of forest lands be registrable under Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to the provisions of the Civil
Code on acquisitive prescription?
4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names
under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both?
HELD:
The Pertition is denied.
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that those who by themselves
or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12,
1945 have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the
length and quality of their possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not
require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire
period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his
title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the
timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further
confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider
that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring
ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only
patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or
disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that the
property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the
development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when
the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition
of property of the public dominion begin to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires
ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to
secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be
acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive
prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through
possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under
extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a persons uninterrupted adverse possession
of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or just
title, ripens into ownership.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan
has acquired ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public

Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or

petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property
since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their
possession, according to their own evidencethe Tax Declarations they presented
in particularis to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration
under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While
the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no
competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the
development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil
Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of
the public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion
under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by
prescription.