CIPRIANO PRIMICIAS V VALERIANO FUGOSO 80 PHIL 71

(1948)
FACTS:
An action was instituted by the petitioner for the refusal of
the respondent to issue a permit to them to hold a public
meeting in Plaza Miranda for redress of grievances to the
government. The reason alleged by the respondent in his
defense for refusing the permit is, "that there is a reasonable
ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon
the fact that passions, especially on the part of the losing
groups, remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will be
delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of
the people in their government, and in the duly constituted
authorities, which might threaten breaches of the peace and
a disruption of public order." Giving emphasis as well to the
delegated police power to local government. Stating as well
Revised Ordinances of 1927 prohibiting as an offense against
public peace, and penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any act, in
any public place, meeting, or procession, tending to disturb
the peace or excite a riot; or collect with other persons in a
body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or disquiet
any congregation engaged in any lawful assembly." Included
herein is Sec. 1119, free use of Public Place. A Manila
ordinance at that time required a mayors permit to hold a
parade or procession, or, by analogy, a public meeting or
assembly. Primicias filed a case to compel the mayor to grant
the permit.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not the freedom of speech was violated.
HELD:
Yes. Dealing with the ordinance, specifically, Sec. 1119, said
section provides for two constructions: (1) the Mayor of the

City of Manila is vested with unregulated discretion to grant

or refuse, to grant permit for the holding of a lawful assembly
or meeting, parade, or procession in the streets and other
public places of the City of Manila; (2) The right of the Mayor
is subject to reasonable discretion to determine or specify the
streets or public places to be used with the view to prevent
confusion by overlapping, to secure convenient use of the
streets and public places by others, and to provide adequate
and proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder. The court
favored the second construction. First construction
tantamount to authorizing the Mayor to prohibit the use of
the streets. Under our democratic system of government no
such unlimited power may be validly granted to any officer of
the government, except perhaps in cases of national
emergency.
The Mayors first defense is untenable. Fear of serious injury
cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly.
It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of
irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech there
must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result
if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground
to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There
must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be
prevented is a serious one. The fact that speech is likely to
result in some violence or in destruction of property is not
enough to justify its suppression. There must be the
probability of serious injury to the state.

PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYEES

ORGANIZATION VS. PBM, 51 SCRA 189
FACTS:
The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees
Organization (PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union composed
of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills
Co., Inc., and petitioners. Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo
Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner Union.
Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to
stage a mass demonstration at Malacaang on March 4,
1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police.
PBMEO thru Pagcu confirmed the planned demonstration and
stated that the demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled
because it has already been agreed upon in the meeting.
Pagcu explained further that the demonstration has nothing
to do with the Company because the union has no quarrel or
dispute with Management. The Management, thru Atty. C.S.
de Leon, Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO that
the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union
guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized that any
demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice
the normal operation of the Company. Workers who without
previous leave of absence approved by the Company,
particularly , the officers present who are the organizers of
the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the
following morning shall be dismissed, because such failure is
a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be

amounting to an illegal strike. Because the petitioners and

their members numbering about 400 proceeded with the
demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent Company
that the first shift workers should not be required to
participate in the demonstration and that the workers in the
second and third shifts should be utilized for the
demonstration from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969, filed a
charge against petitioners and other employees who
composed the first shift, for a violation of Republic Act No.
875(Industrial Peace Act), and of the CBA providing for 'No
Strike and No Lockout.' Petitioners were held guilty in by CIR
for bargaining in bad faith, hence this appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or Not the petitioners right to freedom of speech
and to peaceable assemble violated.
HELD:
Yes. A constitutional or valid infringement of human rights
requires a more stringent criterion, namely existence of a
grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the
State has the right to prevent. This is not present in the case.
It was to the interest herein private respondent firm to rally
to the defense of, and take up the cudgels for, its employees,
so that they can report to work free from harassment,
vexation or peril and as consequence perform more
efficiently their respective tasks enhance its productivity as
well as profits. Herein respondent employer did not even
offer to intercede for its employees with the local police. In
seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as
their right of assembly and of petition against alleged
persecution of local officialdom, the employees and laborers
of herein private respondent firm were fighting for their very
survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the

Constitution the untrammelled enjoyment of their basic

human rights. The pretension of their employer that it would
suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its
employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the
afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely of their
property rights. The employees' pathetic situation was a
stark reality abused, harassment and persecuted as they
believed they were by the peace officers of the municipality.
As above intimated, the condition in which the employees
found themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig, was a
matter that vitally affected their right to individual existence
as well as that of their families. Material loss can be repaired
or adequately compensated. The debasement of the human
being broken in morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be
fully evaluated in monetary terms. As heretofore stated, the
primacy of human rights freedom of expression, of
peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances
over property rights has been sustained. To regard the
demonstration against police officers, not against the
employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining
and hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement
and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the
demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of
the collective bargaining agreement, is "a potent means of
inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as
mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free
expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition. Circulation
is one of the aspects of freedom of expression. If
demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then by that much
the circulation of the Issue raised by the demonstration is
diminished. The more the participants, the more persons can
be apprised of the purpose of the rally. Moreover, the
absence of one-third of their members will be regarded as a
substantial indication of disunity in their ranks which will
enervate their position and abet continued alleged police
persecution.

agree on ground rules for the conduct of the rally. At some

point in the protest action, the demonstrators reneged on
their commitment not to barricade the entire portion of a
national highway so as not to obstruct traffic. After the
demonstrators failed to effect a dispersal of the crowd or to
open at least half of the road to allow passage to vehicles,
the local command prepared a dispersal operation and called
in fire-fighting personnel and equipment. When water from
firetrucks and teargas bombs were unable to disperse the
demonstrators, the military and para-military forces opened
fire lasting for a few minutes. Twenty (20) demonstrators
were shot dead and twenty-four (24) others were wounded.
Of several persons charged with various counts of murder
and frustrated murder, only three (3) were convicted -Generoso N. Subayco, Alfredo T. Alcalde and Eleuterio O.
Ibaez were convicted by the respondent Sandiganbayan.
They now come to the Supreme Court insisting on their
innocence and pleading to be set free.
ISSUE:
The Supreme Court affirms the conviction.
GENEROSO N. SUBAYCO, ALFREDO T. ALCALDE, AND
ELEUTERIO O. IBAEZ V. SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
In September 1985 when the Marcos government was
becoming increasingly unpopular, its celebration of the
anniversary of the declaration of Martial Law was greeted by
massive public protests in different parts of the country. One
of the biggest protest rallies was dubbed a Welga ng Bayan
(People's Strike) and held at Escalante, Negros Occidental.
The rally was without permit from the local authorities,
although the plan was not kept secret from them. The local
command met with the leaders of the projected protest to

Right of the people to assemble peacefully and to petition for

redress of grievance. The use of bullets to break up an
assembly of people petitioning for redress of grievance
cannot but be bewailed. So we expressly held in the early
case of US v. Apurado: "It is rather to be expected that more
or less disorder will mark the public assembly of the people
to protest against grievances whether real or imaginary,
because on such occasions feeling it always brought to a high
pitch of excitement, and the greater the grievance and the
more intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule, will be
the disciplinary control of the leaders over their irresponsible
followers. But if the prosecution be permitted to seize upon
every instance of such disorderly conduct by individual
members of a crowd as an excuse to characterize the

assembly as a seditious and tumultuous rising against the

authorities, then the right to assemble and to petition for
redress of grievances would become a delusion and a snare
and the attempt to exercise it on the most righteous occasion
and in the most peaceable manner would expose all those
who took part therein to the severest and most unmerited
punishment, if the purposes which they sought to attain did
not happen to be pleasing to the prosecuting authorities. If
instances of disorderly conduct occur on such occasions, the
guilty individuals should be sought out and punished
therefor, but the utmost discretion must be exercised in
drawing the line between disorderly and seditious conduct
and between an essentially peaceable assembly and a
tumultuous uprising." The Constitution did not engage in
mystical teaching when it proclaimed in solemn tone that
"sovereignty resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them." It should be clear even to
those with intellectual deficits that when the sovereign
people assemble to petition for redress of grievances, all
should listen, especially the government. For in a democracy,
it is the people who count; those who are deaf to their
grievances are ciphers.