What constitute Impeachment?

The provisions on impeachment are enshrined in Article XI of the 1987

Constitution.
Impeachment in the Philippines is an expressed power of the Congress of the
Philippines to formally charge a serving government official with an impeachable
offense.
Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution declares that Public office is a
public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with
patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. These words echo loud and clear today as
our countrys leaders find themselves at the brink of conducting this constitutional
process.
Impeachment has been defined as a national inquest into the conduct of public
men. It is a necessary safeguard to ensure that public officers have the moral fitness and
integrity to fulfill their mandate.
Who are subject to impeachment?
Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court,
the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed
from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution,
treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All
other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but
not by impeachment. (Art XI)
a. President
b. Vice-President
c. Justices of the Supreme Court
d. Members of the Constitutional Commissions
e. Ombudsman
Other officials can be removed from offices but not by impeachment: those under
the executive department may be dismissed by the president; members of Congress can
be expelled by two-thirds vote of the chamber the member is a part of; local elected
officials can be removed from office through recall.
In the 1935 and 1973 constitutions, the President, the Vice President, the Justices of the
Supreme Court, and the Auditor General were the impeachable officials.

What are the grounds for impeachment?

The Constitution limits the offenses to the following:
a) Culpable violation of the Constitution
For purposes of impeachment, "culpable violation of the Constitution" is defined as
"the deliberate and wrongful breach of the Constitution." Further, "Violation of the
Constitution made unintentionally, in good faith, and mere mistakes in the proper
construction of the Constitution, do not constitute an impeachable offense."
b) Treason (RPC)
According to the Revised Penal Code, treason is defined as "Any Filipino citizen who
levies war against the Philippines or adheres to her enemies, giving them aid or comfort
within the Philippines or elsewhere."
c) Bribery (RA 3019)
The Revised Penal Code defines bribery in two forms:

Direct bribery is "committed by any public officer who shall agree to perform an
act constituting a crime, in connection with the performance of these official duties,
in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present received by such officer,
personally or through the mediation of another."

Indirect bribery is "committed by a public officer when he accepts gifts offered to

him by reason of his office."
d) Graft and corruption (RA 3019)

Any violation of the Republic Act No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
is an impeachable offense.
e) Other high crime and betrayal of public trust
In Francisco Jr. vs. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang
Pilipino, Inc., [G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003] the Supreme Court purposely
refused to define the meaning of "other high crimes or betrayal of public trust," saying
that it is "a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial
power." However, the Court refuses to name which agency can define it; the Court
impliedly gives the power to the House of Representatives, which initiates all cases of
impeachment.
These grounds are exclusive and offenses not falling within these parameters shall not
be sufficient for impeachment purposes.
In the 1935 and 1975 constitution, betrayal of public trust was not an impeachable
offense.

What are the Procedures for Impeachment?

RULES OF PROCEDURE IN IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS
RULE I
APPLICABILITY OF RULES
Section 1. Applicability of Rules. - These Rules shall apply to all proceedings for
impeachment in the House of Representatives against the President, Vice-President, the
Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions and the
Ombudsman for culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes or betrayal of public trust.
RULE II
INITIATING IMPEACHMENT
Section 2. Mode of Initiating Impeachment. - Impeachment shall be initiated by the filing
and subsequent referral to the Committee on Justice of: *
(a) a verified complaint for impeachment filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives; or
(b) a verified complaint filed by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by
any Member thereof; or
(c) a verified complaint or resolution of impeachment filed by at least one-third
(1/3) of all Members of the House.
Section 3. Filing and Referral of Verified Complaints. - A verified complaint for
impeachment by a Member of the House or by any citizen upon a resolution of
endorsement by any Member thereof shall be filed with the office of the Secretary
General and immediately referred to the Speaker.
The Speaker shall have it included in the Order of Business within ten (10) session days
from receipt. It shall then be referred to the Committee on Justice within three (3) session
days thereafter.
RULE III
FINDING A PROBABLE CAUSE
A. COMMITTEE PROCEEDINGS
Section 4. Determination of Sufficiency in Form and Substance. - Upon due referral, the
Committee on Justice shall determine whether the complaint is sufficient in from and
substance. If the committee finds that the complaint is insufficient in form, it shall return
the same to the Secretary General within three (3) session days with a written explanation

of the insufficiency. The Secretary General shall return the same to the complaint(s)
together with the committee's written explanation within three (3) session days from
receipt of the committee resolution finding the complaint insufficient in form.
Should the committee find the complaint sufficient in form, it shall then determine if the
complaint is sufficient in substance. The requirement of substance is met if there is a
recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of
the committee. If the committee finds that the complaint is not sufficient in substance, it
shall dismiss the complaint and shall submit its report as provided hereunder.
Section 5. Notice to Respondents and Time to Plead. - If the committee finds the
complaint sufficient in form and substance, it shall immediately furnish the respondent(s)
with a copy of the resolution and/or verified complaint, as the case may be, with written
notice thereof and serve a copy of the answer to the complaint(s). No motion to dismiss
shall be allowed within the period to answer the complaint.
The answer, which shall be under oath, may include affirmative defenses. If the
respondent fails or refuses to file an answer within the reglementary period, he/she is
deemed to have interposed a general denial to the complaint. Within three (3) days from
receipt of the answer, the complainant may file a reply, serving a copy thereof to the
respondent who may file a rejoinder within three (3) days from receipt of the reply,
serving a copy thereof to the complainant. If the complainant fails to file a reply, all the
material allegations in the answer are deemed controverted; together with their pleadings,
the parties shall file their affidavits or counter-affidavits, as the case may be, with their
documentary evidence. Such affidavits or counter-affidavits shall be subscribed before
the Chairperson of the Committee on Justice or the Secretary General. Notwithstanding
all the foregoing, failure presenting evidence in support of his/her defenses.
When there are more than one respondent, each shall be furnished with copy of the
verified complaint from a Member of the House or a copy of the verified complaint from
a private citizen together with the resolution of endorsement by a Member of the House
of Representatives and a written notice to answer and in that case, reference to
respondent in these Rules shall be understood as respondents.
Section 6. Submission of Evidences and Memoranda. - After receipt of the pleadings and
affidavits and counter-affidavits and relevant documents provided for in Section 5, or the
expiration of the time within which they may be filed, the Committee shall determine
whether the complaint alleges sufficient grounds for impeachment.
If it finds that sufficient grounds for impeachment do not exist, the Committee shall
dismiss the complaint and submit the report required hereunder. If the Committee finds
that sufficient grounds for impeachment exist, the Committee shall conduct a hearing. To
that end, the Committee, through the Chairperson, may limit the period of examination
and cross-examination. The Committee shall have the power to issue compulsory

processes for the attendance of witnesses as well as the production of documents and
other related evidence.
The hearing before the Committee shall be open to the public except when the security of
the State or public interest requires that the hearing be held in executive session.
After the submission of evidence, the Committee may require the submission of
memoranda, after which the matter shall be submitted for resolution.
Section 7. Protection to Complainants or Witnesses. - The House may, upon proper
petition, provide adequate protection to a complainant or witness if it is shown that
his/her personal safety is in jeopardy because of his/her participation in an impeachment
proceeding.
Section 8. Report and Recommendation. - The Committee on Justice after hearing, and
by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House containing its
findings and recommendations within sixty (60) session days from the referral to it of the
verified complaint and/or resolution. Together with the report shall be a formal resolution
of the Committee regarding the disposition of the complaint which shall be calendar for
consideration by the House within ten (10) session days from receipt thereof.
If the Committee finds by a vote of the majority of all its Members that a probable cause
exists, it shall submit with its report a resolution setting forth the Articles of Impeachment
on the basis of the evidence adduced before the Committee. Otherwise, the complaint
shall be dismissed subject to Section 11 of these Rules.
Section 9. Report to be Calendared. - The Committee on Rules shall calendar the report
and the accompanying resolution of the Committee on Justice regarding the disposition of
the complaint in accordance with the Rules of the House of Representatives. The House
shall dispose of the report within sixty (60) session days from its submission by the
Committee on Justice.
B. HOUSE ACTION
Section 10. Vote Required for Approval. - A vote of at least one-third (1/3) of all
Members of the House is necessary for the approval of the resolution setting forth the
Articles of Impeachment. If the resolution is approved by the required vote, it shall then
be endorsed to the Senate for its trial.
On the other hand, should the resolution fail to secure the approval by the required vote,
the same result in the dismissal of the complaint for impeachment.
Section 11. Where Dismissal Recommended. - When the report of the Committee on
Justice dismisses the complaint, it shall submit to the House a resolution for the dismissal
of the verified complaint and/or resolution of impeachment. A vote of at least one-third

(1/3) of all the Members of the House shall be necessary to override such resolution, in
which case the Committee on Justice shall forthwith prepare the Articles of
Impeachment.
Section 12. Vote by Roll Call. - The voting on a favorable resolution with the Articles of
Impeachment of the Committee on Justice or a contrary resolution shall be by roll call,
and the Secretary General shall records the vote of each Member.
RULE IV
VERIFIED COMPLAINT/RESOLUTION BY ONE-THIRD OF MEMBERS
Section 13. Endorsement of the Complaint/Resolution to the Senate. - A verified
complaint/resolution of impeachment filed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members
of the House shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and in this case the verified
complaint/resolution shall be endorsed to the Senate in the same manner as an approved
bill of the House.
The complaint/resolution must, at the time of filing, be verified and sworn to before the
Secretary General by each of the Members constituting at least one-third (1/3) of all
Members of the House.
The contents of the verification shall be as follows:
"We, after being sworn in accordance with law, depose and state: That we are the
complainants in the above-entitled complaint/resolution of impeachment; that we have
caused the said complaint/resolution to be prepared and have read the contents thereof;
and that the allegations therein are true of our own knowledge and belief on the basis of
our reading and appreciation of documents and other records pertinent thereto.
___________________
(Signature)
RULE V
BAR AGAINST IMPEACHMENT
Section 14. Scope of Bar. - No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the
same official more than once within a period of one (1) year.
RULE VI
PROSECUTOR IN ALL IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS
Section 15. Impeachment Prosecutor. - The House of Representatives shall act as the sole
prosecutor at the trial in the Senate through a committee of eleven (11) Members thereof
to be elected by a majority vote.

RULE VII
APPLICABILITY OF THE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Section 16. Rules of Procedure. - The Rules of Criminal Procedure under the Rules of
Court shall, as far as practicable, apply to impeachment proceedings before the House.
Limitation: No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official
more than once within a period of one year. [Art. XI, Sec. 3(5)]
The 1987 (current) constitution limits the number of impeachment complaints that
can be filed against an official to one per year. There has been controversy over what
counts as an impeachment complaint. While some argued that for a complaint to count
against the limit it must be voted on, and others have proposed other interpretations, the
House has decided that any complaint filed fulfills the quota regardless of how wellformed it is or who filed it. Therefore, supporters of a vulnerable official can file a weak,
flawed, or unconstitutional complaint, thereby using up the quota and protecting that
official from impeachment for that year.
There has also been debate about whether a year should be a calendar year, say
2006, or a full 12-month period. An example of how this limit works in practice is the
attempts to impeach President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. While the Philippine
impeachment procedures parallel the United States' impeachment procedures, the two
procedures differ in two significant ways: the percentage needed to impeach and the
numerical limit on impeachment procedures.

What are the consequences of Impeachment?

Section 3 (7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than
removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the
Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to
prosecution, trial, and punishment, according to law.
The person impeached shall be removed from office and shall be disqualified to hold
any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be
liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law. It is clear that the
liability does not end at the Senate, the person impeached shall also be held for appropriate
action as a result of his illegal and improper acts.

REFERENCES:

http://www.abogadomo.com/law-professor/law-professor-archives/the-impeachmentprocess
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Impeachment_in_the_Philippines
http://www.gov.ph/the-corona-impeachment-trial/
http://www.chanrobles.com/legal11impeachmentrules.htm
http://www.scribd.com/doc/76510860/Chief-Justice-Renato-Corona-s-Reply-toImpeachment-Complaint

The Impeachment of Renato Corona

Appointment of Corona as Chief Justice
Chief Justice Reynato Puno was to retire on May 17, 2010, seven days after
the presidential election. As provided for by Article VII, Section 15 of the 1987
Constitution makes it clear: Two months immediately before the next Presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make
appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued
vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. It prohibits
then-President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo from appointing anyone two months before the
presidential election up to the end of her term.
This caused a suit to be brought to the Supreme Court, in which the high tribunal
ruled on March 17, 2010, that the ban on appointments does not cover the judiciary. The
court ruled on the case with finality on April 20, 2010, with nine justices concurring, one
dissenting and two dismissing the petition for being premature. Chief Justice Puno
and Associate Justices Corona and Antonio Carpio abstained from ruling on the case. The
court then ordered the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) to proceed with its nomination
process and subsequently submit its shortlist of nominees for the Chief Justice to Arroyo.
Corona was appointed Chief Justice on May 12, 2010. He was the "most senior"
Supreme Court justice among the four nominees of the JBC.
With Benigno Aquino III winning the election, he invited all heads of the three
branches of government to his inauguration, although instead of the tradition of him
being inaugurated by the Chief Justice, he instead chose to be sworn in by Associate
Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales, the sole dissenter on the case.

Conflict between President Benigno S. Aquino and Chief Justice Corona

On December 6, 2011, at the National Criminal Justice Summit at the Manila
Hotel, Aquino said in a speech that Corona, who was seated meters away from him, is
beholden to Arroyo. Aquino questioned the court's granting of a temporary restraining
order lifting the watch list order of the Department of Justice against Arroyo, Arroyo's
midnight appointment of Corona, and the ruling of Camarines Sur's two new legislative
districts as constitutional despite falling short of the required population set by the
constitution.
Impeachment
On the December 12, 2011 flag-raising ceremony at the Supreme Court, Corona
revealed that there was "a secret plan to oust me from office by any means, fair or foul."
Corona said that he would not resign.[7]

Later in the day, a caucus amongst Aquino's allies in the House of Representative
was called. Minority leader Edcel Lagman said that discussion amongst Aquino's allies
heightened when the Committee on Justice passed an impeachment case involving
Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo on his alleged plagiarism. Lagman further said that
if the vote passed, he would question its "legal and factual basis." [8] The deputy
presidential spokesperson, on the other hand, stated that the Palace "is not privy to the
discussions of the Liberal Party in the House."[9]
At the conclusion of majority bloc's caucus, Committee on Justice chairman Niel
Tupas, Jr. presented the impeachment complaint; after the presentation, only two
representatives asked for more questions, while an overwhelming majority asked to sign
the complaint. He said that there were no instructions from the Palace to impeach Corona,
nor was the pork barrel of representatives who did not sign would be held back, but he
said that he informed the president of their decision to impeach Corona, and that the
president supported it. The House of Representatives then voted in session to endorse the
complaint, getting 188 votes, well above the one-third (95) of the members required by
the constitution.[10]
Navotas representative Toby Tiangco resigned from the majority bloc, and the
chairmanship of the Committee on Metro Manila development, after the impeachment
was passed by the House of Representatives. Tiangco said that the complaint was
approved without the members

of Congress scrutinizing it.[11] Batangas

2nd

district representative Hermilando Mandanas, who did not sign the complaint, was
relieved of the chairmanship of the Committee on Ways and Means. Mandanas
quoted Speaker Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. on saying that the Aquino administration wanted
his removal.[12] The majority bloc was not surprised with Tiangco's resignation from the
majority, with Majority Leader Neptali Gonzales IIdescribing Tiangco as a "maverick"
and has "more than many times identified he with the minority." [13]

Articles of Impeachment against Chief Justice Renato Corona

On December 12, 2011, 188 of the 285 members of the House of Representatives
of the Philippines voted to transmit the 56-pageArticles of Impeachment against Supreme
Court Chief Justice Renato Corona.
Of the six exclusive grounds laid down in Section 2, Article XI of
the Constitution, the three grounds of (1) betrayal of public trust, (2)graft and corruption,
and (3) culpable violation of the Constitution were distributed among the eight Articles of
Impeachment tried by the Senate starting January 16, 2012.
On May 29, 2012, the Senate, voting 203, convicted Corona under Article II of
the Articles of Impeachment filed against him pertaining to his failure to disclose to the
public his statement of assets, liabilities, and net worth.[1]
Below are the eight Articles and the respective arguments presented by
the prosecution and defense panels in support of their allegations.
Article 1 - Respondent betrayed the public trust through his track record marked by
partiality and subservience in cases involving the Arroyo administration from the time

of his appointment as Supreme Court Justice which continued to his dubious

appointment as a midnight Chief Justice and up to the present.

Coronas partiality
Prosecution: The First Article of Impeachment alleges that Corona betrayed public trust
by his track record marked by partiality and subservience in cases involving the Arroyo
Administration, which is traced to his history as President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyos
chief of staff, spokesman, and acting Executive Secretary.
In relation to this, a press release by Senator Franklin Drilon enumerated some 19 cases
where Corona allegedly voted in favor of the Arroyo Administration.
Defense: Refuting the ground of partiality, Corona stressed in his Answer that by
mentioning decisions and actions of the Supreme Court in the impeachment complaint,
the prosecutors demonstrate their lack of understanding of the concept of a collegial
body like the Supreme Court, where each member has a single vote, and that whether
he be the Chief Justice or the most junior associate, his vote is of equal weight with that
of the others.
Corona also emphasized that he cannot be held accountable for the outcome of cases
before the Supreme Court which acts as a collegial tribunal.
As to the allegation that his previous association with the Arroyo Administration was the
cause of his alleged partiality, Corona highlighted the fact that it is not uncommon for
Justices to have previously worked as professionals in close association with the
President.
The Chief Justice also observed how the complaint in effect asks the Senate to review
certain decisions of the Supreme Court. This, according to him, cannot be done in line
with the essential feature of checks and balances in a republican form of government
that no other department may pass upon judgments of the Supreme Court.
Coronas Answer cites the 1990 case of Maglasang vs. People, where the Court declared
that the Supreme Court is supremethe third great department of government entrusted
exclusively with the judicial power to adjudicate with finality all justiciable disputes,
public and private.
In that landmark case, the High Court stressed that No other department or agency may
pass upon its judgments or declare them unjust. Consequently, and owing to the
foregoing, not even the President of the Philippines as Chief Executive may pass
judgment on any of the Court's acts.
Midnight appointment
Prosecution: Despite the overwhelming majority decision of the Supreme Court in De
Castro vs. Judicial and Bar Council (JBC), the complainants also insist that Corona is a
midnight appointee under a persistent belief that his appointment violated section 15,
Article VII of the Constitution.
The oft-quoted provision reads, Two months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make

appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued

vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
Defense: Corona points out that the Court already categorically held in De Castro that
section 15 confined the prohibition to appointments made in the Executive Department,
which means that the bar on midnight appointments applies only to executive positions.
The decision penned by Justice Lucas Bersamin reasoned that The framers [of the
Constitution] did not need to extend the prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary,
because their establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and screening
of candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior process of the
JBC ensured that there would no longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary.
The insistence of the complainants that Corona is a midnight appointee contrary to the
abovementioned ruling leads to the conclusion that the First Article is also an attack on
the Supreme Courts ruling in the De Castro case. This is, of course, beyond the Senates
power as an impeachment court.
Article 2 - Respondent committed culpable violation of the Constitution and/or
betrayed the public trust when he failed to disclose to the public his Statement of
Assets, Liabilities, and Net worth as required under Sec. 17, Art. XI of the 1987
Constitution.
Prosecution: The Second Article alleges that Corona failed to disclose to the public his
statement of assets, liabilities, and net worth in violation of section 17, Article XI of the
Constitution as well as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. 3019).
Section 17, Article XI provides that, A public officer or employee shall, upon
assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a
declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth. In the case of the President,
the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, the
Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional offices, and officers of the armed
forces with general or flag rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to the public in the
manner provided by law.
The complaint also alleges that Corona and his wife acquired a 300-sq.m. Apartment
in the Fort, Taguig worth beyond his income as a public official and this was not reported
this in his SALN.[3]
Defense: Corona notes that what the Constitution requires from every public official is
the submission of their SALNs. Disclosure to the public, on the other hand, shall be in
the manner provided by law.
The implementing law is section 8 of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees (R.A. 6713) which, while recognizing the public's right
to know the SALNs of public officials, prohibits any person to obtain or use SALNs for
(1) any purpose contrary to morals or public policy; or (2) any commercial purpose other
than by news and communications media for dissemination to the general public.
After an official submits his SALN, the disclosure is no longer up to him. While failure to
file his SALN can render Corona liable, failure to disclose such SALN would not. Corona
has stated in his Answer that he has faithfully complied with this requirement every

year, and that this may be verified upon a proper request with the Office of the Clerk of
Court.
The Answer also states that Corona has not prevented the public disclosure of his
declarations of assets, liabilities, and net worth. Firstly, it is not for the Chief Justice to
unilaterally decide whether to disclose or not to disclose them. Secondly, the release of
the SALNs of Justices is regulated by law and the Court's various Resolutions cited
above. Thirdly, CJ Corona never issued an order that forbids the public disclosure of his
above declarations.
As to the Taguig property, Corona admitted in the Answer that he and his wife indeed
purchased the apartment on installment and declared it in his SALN. Again, this may be
verified upon a proper request with the Office of the Clerk of Court.
Additional points: Attention was brought to Supreme Court circular A.M. No. 92-9-851RTC which regulates the publics access to the SALNs of justices and judges to protect
them from circumstances which may endanger, diminish or destroy their independence
and objectivity in the performance of their judicial functions or expose them to revenge
for

adverse

decisions,

kidnapping,

extortion,

blackmail,

or

other

untoward

consequences.
In a way, this circular may be considered as a prohibition on the disclosure of the SALNs
of justices. But this circular, a collegial action of the Court, was issued in 1992; Corona
was appointed to the Supreme Court in 2001.
Article 3 - Respondent committed culpable violations of the Constitution and betrayed
the public trust by failing to meet and observe the stringent standards under Art. VIII,
section 7 (3) of the Constitution that provides that [a] member of the judiciary must be
a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence in allowing the
Supreme Court to act on mere letters filed by a counsel which caused the issuance
of flip-flopping decisions in final and executory cases; in creating an excessive
entanglement with Mrs. Arroyo through her appointment of his wife to office; and in
discussing with litigants regarding cases pending before the Supreme Court.
The Third Article alleges that Corona betrayed public trust in three specific instances.
The first involves a labor case against Philippine Airlines; the second concerns
the Vizconde Massacre case; and lastly, the appointment of Coronas wife in government.
Recall of the flight attendants case
Prosecution: The impeachment complaint alleges that Corona allowed the Supreme
Court to act on mere letters from counsel in Flight Attendants and Stewards Association
of the Philippines (FASAP) vs. Philippine Airlines (PAL), which resulted in flip-flopping
decisions in that case.
It was also alleged that the Court did not even require FASAP to comment on those
letters of PALs counsel, Atty. Estelito Mendoza, betraying Coronas lack of ethical
principles and disdain for fairness.
What happened: In FASAP vs. PAL, a Special Division of the Supreme Court found
PAL guilty of illegal dismissal and ordered the reinstatement of 1,423 employees. Later

on, in a September 7 resolution, the Courts Second Division denied with finality PALs
motion for reconsideration and ordered that no further pleadings will be entertained.
However, on October 4, 2011, the Court en banc issued A.M. No. 11-10-1-SC recalling
the September 7 resolution. This was in response to a letter sent by PAL lawyer Estelito
Mendoza pointing out a procedural lapse because the September 7 resolution was issued
by the Second Division, when it should have been resolved by the Special Division that
rendered the original decision.
The recall of the resolution caught media attention and was portrayed to be a reversal of
the original ruling in favor of the employees.
Defense: According to Coronas Answer, Lawyers and litigants often write the Supreme
Court or the Chief Justice regarding their cases. The Supreme Court uniformly treats all
such letters as official communications that it must act on when warranted.
It also pointed out that the practice is that all letters are endorsed to the proper division
or the Supreme Court en banc in which their subject matters are pending. No letter to the
Supreme Court is treated in secret.
The Answer also explained that A.M. 11-10-1, in response to such letter, did not reverse
the ruling to favor PAL. Instead, it merely recalled the original decision so that it can be
heard by the proper division of the Court. That proper division has yet to decide the case,
so there really is no decision yet reversing anything.
Additional points: Whether Corona can be held liable for this collegial act of the Court
is for the Senate to determine. One thing is certain though: That Corona had never
participated in this FASAP vs. PAL case, having inhibited since 2008.
Discussing the Vizconde Massacre Case with Lauro Vizconde
Prosecution: The second instance of betrayal of public trust involves the Vizconde
massacre case. In Lejano vs. People, Corona voted to affirm the conviction of Hubert
Webb et al., but lost by a slim majority to his colleagues who went on to acquit the
accused.
Corona was said to have accused Senior Justice Antonio Carpio of lobbying with the
other Justices to secure Webbs acquittal. This was allegedly discussed by Corona with
complainant Lauro Vizconde while Webbs appeal was pending in the Supreme Court.
It should be recalled that before Carpio was appointed to the Supreme Court, he was one
of the witnesses who claimed to have seen Webb in the United States at the time the
crime was committed.
Defense: Corona does not deny the meeting with Vizconde. However, he stressed that
only Dante Jimenez, as head of the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption (VACC)
was cleared to make a courtesy call on the newly appointed Chief Justice, and that he
was thus surprised to see Lauro Vizconde come into his chambers with Jimenez.
While the Answer admits that Vizconde remained during that meeting as a result of
etiquette and manners, Corona denied having told Vizconde that Carpio lobbied with the
other Justices for Webbs acquittal.[4]

Appointment of Coronas wife in John Hay Corporation

Prosecution: The third instance under Article III involves Coronas wife Cristina. The
complainants attack the Chief Justice for having compromised his independence when
his wife accepted an appointment from Mrs. Arroyo to the Board of John
Hay Management Corporation (JHMC).
They also claim that complaints have been filed against Mrs. Corona by disgruntled
members of the Board of JHMC and certain officers and employees.
Defense: Pointing out that No law prohibits the wife of a Chief Justice from pursuing
her own career in the government, Coronas Answer stressed that Mrs. Corona was
already part of JHMC even before her husband was appointed to the Supreme Court.[5]
Regarding the alleged complaints against Mrs. Corona, the Answer simply shrugged them
aside because Corona is not being impeached for alleged offenses of his wife.
Article IV - Respondent betrayed the public trust and/or committed culpable violation
of the Constitution when it blatantly disregarded the principle of separation of
powers by issuing a status quo ante order against the House of Representatives in the
case concerning the impeachment of then Ombudsman Merceditas Navarro-Gutierrez.
Prosecution: The Fourth Article alleges that the Courts issuance of the status quo ante
order against the House of Representatives was a blatant disregard of the principle of
separation of powers in order to protect then Ombudsman Gutierrez.
What happened: On July 22, 2010, an impeachment complaint was filed against
Gutierrez. On August 10 that same year, another impeachment complaint was filed
against her.
Considering that the Constitution prohibits two impeachment proceedings against one
official within one year, the Supreme Court issued a status quo ante order until it could
decide the case filed by Gutierrez questioning the validity of the second complaint.
Being a collegial act, it was majority of the Court that issued the order, not Corona.
Defense: Corona called attention to the landmark case of Francisco vs. House of
Representatives to answer the question on whether the Supreme Court disregarded
separation of powers by assuming jurisdiction over an impeachment proceeding.
In this case, it was Justice Conchita Carpio Morales herself who affirmed the Supreme
Courts power to determine whether the House of Representatives committed a violation
of the Constitution or gravely abused its discretion in the exercise of its power of
impeachment.
Additional points: Despite the status quo ante order, the Supreme Court eventually ruled
in Gutierrez vs. House Committee on Justice that the second impeachment complaint did
not violate the Constitution. The Court actually allowed the House to pursue its case
against the Ombudsman, which eventually led to her impeachment.[6]
Article V - Respondent committed culpable violations of the constitution through
wanton arbitrariness and partiality in consistently disregarding the principle of res
judicata and in deciding in favor of gerrymandering in the cases involving the 16
newly-created cities, and the promotion of Dinagat Island into a province.

Prosecution: The Fifth Article specifically attacks the Supreme Courts decisions
in League of Cities vs. Comelec regarding 16 new cities created by R.A. 9009,
and Navarro vs. Ermita involving the creation of the Province of Dinagat Island by R.A.
9355.
These gerrymandering cases both arose from acts of Congress.
Also, FASAP vs. Philippine Airlines once again takes the spotlight in Article V with the
allegation that Corona disregarded the principle of res judicata by abandoning a previous
ruling in that case.
Defense: Coronas Answer quoted Justice Roberto Abads concurring opinion in
Navarro to better explain that there really was no flip-flopping in the League of Cities
case: Of 23 Justices who voted in the case at any of its various stages, 20 Justices stood
by their original positions. They never reconsidered their views. Only three did so and not
on the same occasion, showing no wholesale change of votes at any time.
It was noted that in the League of Cities case, a total of 23 Justices participated because
of the seven retirements that occurred during its pendency. Of all these Justices, only
three switched votes, and as Justice Abad points out, these three did not flip-flop
because they only switched once.
As to the Navarro case, the Answer refused to dwell on it considering that it is still
subject of a pending motion for reconsideration.
Regarding FASAP vs. PAL, as mentioned in our earlier discussion under the Third
Article, Corona inhibited in this case, so he never had any participation in the recall of the
original decision. Also, the FASAP case has not been decided by the Court yet. It was
merely reassigned to the proper divisionwhich has yet to resolve it.
Additional points: In these three cases, the impeachment complaint tries to pin down
Corona for collegial actions of the Supreme Court. While Corona may be primus inter
pares among the magistrates, he surely has only one vote out of 15.
Article VI - Respondent betrayed the public trust by arrogating unto himself, and to a
committee he created, the authority and jurisdiction to improperly investigate an
alleged erring member of the Supreme Court for the purpose of exculpating him. Such
authority and jurisdiction is properly reposed by the constitution in the House of
Representatives via impeachment.
Prosecution: The Sixth Article alleges that Corona betrayed public trust when he
created the Supreme Courts Ethics Committee that investigated the allegation that
Justice Mariano Del Castillo plagiarized material for the Courts decision in Vinuya vs.
Executive Secretary.
The Court en banc, voting 102, eventually adopted the Ethics Committees
recommendation to absolve Del Castillo of the charge in a resolution titled In re Charges
of Plagiarism against J. Del Castillo.
The impeachment complaint also questions the Supreme Courts power to create the
committee for encroaching upon the impeachment power of the House of
Representatives.

Defense: Corona refuted the allegation by stressing that The Committees power is only
recommendatory. If the offense is impeachable, the Supreme Court en banc will refer the
matter to the House of Representatives for investigation. On the other hand, if the offense
is non-impeachable, the Supreme Court en banc may decide the case and, if warranted,
impose administrative sanctions against the offender.
As to the creation the committee, Corona traces it to the power of the Supreme Court to
discipline its own members as provided for in section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution,
granting the High Court administrative supervision over all the courts and the personnel
thereof.
Pursuant to this power, the Ethics Committee was created through A.M. 10-4-20SC under Chief Justice Reynato Punoway before Del Castillo allegedly plagiarized the
Vinuya decision, and definitely not under or by Corona. Nonetheless, the creation of the
committee was a collegial act of the Court which cannot be attributed to one person
alone.

Article VII - Respondent betrayed the public trust through his partiality in granting a
temporary restraining order (TRO) in favor of former President Gloria MacapagalArroyo and her husband Jose Miguel Arroyo in order to give them an opportunity to
escape prosecution and to frustrate the ends of justice, and in distorting the Supreme
Court decision on the effectivity of the TRO in view of a clear failure to comply with
the conditions of the Supreme Court's own TRO.
Prosecution: The Seventh Article dwells on the temporary restraining order (TRO)
issued by the Supreme Court against a Department of Justice Watch List Order (WLO)
that prevented Arroyo from leaving the country for medical treatment.
The complaint alleges that Corona granted the TRO to provide Arroyo the opportunity to
escape prosecution and that the Court was coordinating with the Arroyos who made
multiple flight bookings in expectation of the issuance of the TRO.
Article VII also alleges that Corona (or the Court) violated the Courts own Internal Rules
by disregarding the ponentes recommendation that a hearing be held before they issue
the TRO.
The impeachment complaint also claims that Corona distorted the Courts decision
regarding the effectivity of the TRO in line with Justice Lourdes Serenos opinion that its
effectivity was suspended pending Arroyos compliance with all the conditions laid down
by the Court, one of which was the amendment of the Special Power of Attorney (SPA)
given to Arroyos lawyer.
What happened: Pursuant to DOJ Circular 41, the Secretary of Justice issued a WLO
against Arroyo after the former president expressed her desire to leave the country to seek
medical treatment for a rare bone disease. Arroyo filed a petition for the issuance of a
TRO against the Justice Secretary so she can leave the country.
Note that a TRO is a provisional remedy under Rule 58 of the Rules of Court which is
resorted to by a litigant against acts which would probably work injustice or would be
in violation of the rights of the applicant.

In applying for the TRO, Arroyo invoked her constitutional right to travel under section
6, Article III of the Constitution. She claimed that the WLO violated her right to travel
considering that only those who have pending cases in court may be validly prevented by
a judge to leave the country.
At the time of the issuance of the TRO, not a single case was pending in any court in the
country against Arroyo. It was only after the TRO was issued that all of a sudden, a case
was filed in court[7] and a warrant for her arrest issued.
Defense: Corona denied the allegations that there was coordination between the Court
and Arroyo in the issuance of the TRO by pointing to the fact that Information that the
Supreme Court en banc would be taking up those TRO applications on the morning of 15
November 2011 was widely known since crews of all major television stations and
print reporters had been camping at the gates of the Supreme Court that very morning.
Thus, it was logically not surprising that the Arroyos and their lawyers apparently
prepared for the chance that the Supreme Court might favorably act on their applications
for TRO and so, had their plans in place.
Coronas answer also denied the allegation that the Chief Justice (or the Court) violated
the Courts Internal Rules by disregarding the ponentes recommendation that a hearing
be held before a TRO is issued.
Attention was brought to the fact that the Supreme Court en banc is not bound by the
Member-in-Charges recommendation. As in any collegial body, the decision of the
majority prevails. Note also that it is not unusual for the Court to grant TROs without
conducting prior hearing.
This is the reason why after the deliberations, the Court, voting 85, decided to grant the
TRO and set oral arguments to be conducted seven days later.
As to Serenos claim that Corona distorted the Courts decision on the effectivity of the
TRO, the Answer pointed out that it was majority of the Courtand not Corona alone
that decided that the TRO was not suspended.
By a vote of 76 (the answer wrongly stated it to be 9-4), the Court ruled that the TRO
was immediately executory and was not suspended by Arroyos failure to comply with
the SPA requirement. In any case, Arroyo was able to comply with this condition within
the 5-day period.
Article
VIII
Respondent
betrayed
the
public
trust
and/or
committed graft and corruption when he failed and refused to account for the judiciary
development fund (JDF) and special allowance for the judiciary (SAJ) collections.
Prosecution: The last Article deals with Coronas failure and refusal to (1) report the
status of the Judiciary Development Fund and the Special Allowance for the Judiciary;
(2) remit to the Bureau of Treasury SAJ collections; (3) account for funds released and
spent for unfilled positions in the Judiciary; (4) remit fiduciary funds in the amount of
P5.38 Billion; and, (5) correctly state the balance of the SAJ in the amount of P559.5
Million.
Defense: To debunk the allegations in the Eighth Article, the Answer cites the following
official records: (1) Statement of Allotment, Obligation and Balances for 2010 submitted

to the Department of Budget and Management (DBM); (2) Reports of Collections and
Disbursements on the JDF and the SAJ Fund submitted to the Commission on
Audit (COA), the DBM, the House of Representatives, and the Senate; (3) Report of
Collections and Disbursements on the Fiduciary Fund for 2008 and 2009 submitted to the
Senate; and (4) Report on the Utilization of Savings for 2008 and 2009 submitted to the
Senate.
Report on the JDF
The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Coronas Answer invokes this mandate of
section 3, Article VIII of the Constitution. In line with this fiscal autonomy, the accounts
of the Judiciary may only be examined, audited, and settled on a post-audit basis, i.e.,
only after disbursement.
The Answer stressed that the question on whether the disbursement vouchers for the JDF
and SAJ in 2010 (the year Corona became Chief Justice) were reported to the resident
COA auditor for post-audit is a matter that can easily be determined by checking with
the records of the COA.
Corona then stated categorically that all disbursement vouchers for the funds of the JDF
and SAJ are submitted to the resident COA auditor.
Remittance of SAJ collections
Coronas Answer calls attention to R.A. 9227 to better understand whether Coronas
failure to remit the SAJ collections constitutes an impeachable offense. Note that R.A.
9227 gives the Chief Justice the power to use the SAJ surplus to grant additional
allowances to other court personnel.
The Answer cites this as the reason why on January 13, 2011, the Supreme Court and the
DBM executed Joint Circular No. 2004-1 providing that collection of the Judiciary from
funds enumerated under items 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 above shall no longer be remitted to the
National Treasury. Instead, these shall be deposited in an authorized government
depository bank as may be determined by the Supreme Court.
Funds for unfilled positions in the judiciary
Corona

highlights

the

power

of

the

Chief

Justice

to

realign

savings

from appropriations for the Judiciary as a constitutionally-recognized fact.

Section 25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution provides that the President, the President
of the Senate, The Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized
to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from
savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
How Corona realigned savings from regular appropriations, including those for unfilled
positions in the Judiciary, may be evaluated by looking into the Supreme
Courts Statement of Allotment, Obligation and Balances (SAOB) for 2010 submitted to
the DBM. The savings for 2008 and 2009, though not accumulated under Coronas term
as Chief Justice, had also been submitted to Congress during the 2011 budget hearing.

In connection with unremitted fiduciary funds, A.M. No. 10-8-3-SC was also cited to
clarify that the Chief Justice may not remit such fiduciary funds to the Bureau of
Treasury without authorization from Congress. It would be illegal for Corona to remit
such funds because these are private property, and a law is necessary to authorize
the escheat or forfeiture of such private unclaimed funds in favor of the State.
Nonetheless, the Answer noted that these amounts accumulated way back in 2009.
Corona became Chief Justice in May 2010.