Canadian Veterans Advocacy

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Examination, Evaluation and Recommendations

The Joint Personnel Support Unit
By
Canadian Veterans Advocacy

27th January 2014

Prepared by:
Sergeant Major (Retd) Barry L. Westholm, CD
At the request of:
Brigadier-General (Retd) J.G.J.C. Barab, OMM, CD
For:
Senator Romeo Dallaire, Lieutenant-General (Retd) O.C., C.M.M., G.O.C, M.S.C., C.D

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Introduction. The Joint Personnel Support Unit (JPSU) replaces an ill-advised

program called the Service Personnel Holding List (SPHL), which was a cobbled
together disaster of an idea. The SPHL was so bad, that unit commanders were not
comfortable sending their ill/injured to this organization for fear of their welfare. So
too, the ill and injured realized that a posting to the SPHL was the end of the line for
their careers, or worse, it was to be forgotten.
This made it a goal then never to get posted to the SPHL or it was curtains for you,
and never to send one of your people to the SPHL for the same reason. The answer
was that the units stood-up their own internal Regimental system for injured and ill
members in unit lines, however this caused a number of issues.
Firstly, the units, in wanting to care for their members, put injured people in jobs
they could handle rather than in their actual profession. In some cases these people
were suffering from an Occupational Stress Injury (OSI), such as Post Traumatic
Stress Disorder (PTSD) and although it was done with the best of intentions, it had
debilitating ramifications to the person. By hiding the person and finding work
suitable for them, they also enabled the injury by not addressing it. This, if allowed
to continue for any length of time, could far worsen the disorder.
For physical injuries, they could post a person internally in their Regiment to an
Injured Platoon. There the person could recover from their injuries, but more times
than not, when they returned to an active platoon they re-injured themselves
because they were not totally recovered and they went back to the Injured Platoon.
In some cases the Injured Platoon was referred to as the place for the sick, lame
and lazy. With this title attached to it, many did not seek aid and in doing so injured
themselves even further, or were so mortified of being there that they returned to
duty early, hiding their injuries.
This traditional Injured Platoon also placed demands on the unit that were not in
keeping with the function of the unit, for example infantry. The Infantry Regiment
should be focusing their energy on those skills and being prepared to deploy in
short order fit, trained and effective. What happened with the retention of too
many injured personnel was that the focus blurred and resources shifted.
Injured/ill people require an inordinate amount of administrative overhead,
support and tracking - appointments, paperwork; one-on-one coaching is just a part
of it. The term often used to describe this situation is that 10% of your people took
up 90% of your time, while the other 90% went about their duties with regular
supervision. An injured and ill person was most likely to fall into that 10% of higher
than normal oversight, and this is to be expected.
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In the past, when the numbers of injured personnel in the Injured Platoon became
too great, the only option available was to grudgingly post them to the SPHL where
they languished and "fell through the cracks". The SPHL suffered from
disorganization, non-standardization, low-priority (many times a secondary duty),
inefficiency, poor control, diluted leadership and poor staffing. In many instances
only one person was assigned to run the SPHL per Base and that person, being Reg
Force, would be posted away leaving it for the next person to deal with. Its
reputation as a military purgatory for injured and ill members was well earned.
The JPSU was designed to replace the SPHL and set a new and respectful tone for
rehabilitating and transitioning ill and injured CAF personnel. It was expected that
when an injured CAF member was posted to the JPSU, that they would have access
to immediate and professional care, services and dedicated military leadership. It
also extended its services to retired veterans, the families of the injured and
maintained contact with all veterans post-release from the JPSU. It was meant to be
everything the SPHL was not and was long overdue.
The JPSU also made available someone called a Regional Adaptive Fitness Specialist
(RAFS) who could design custom physio programs to assist seriously injured people
(amputees for example), to design specialized programs to build up their strength,
increasing confidence and independence. As well RAFS prepared rehabilitation
programs for the less seriously injured to safely speed up their recovery time. The
end result is they could return to duty faster and fully fit, confident and mentally
prepared. (Because of the initial success, injured people were actually requesting to
come to the JPSU for assistance this is not the case anymore).
Why is the JPSU failing? There is a massive disconnect between the Strategic
Headquarters (SHQ) in Ottawa and the Operational Headquarters (OHQ) located in
the eight Regions across Canada. The OHQ is on the frontlines and knows what is
required to fulfill the responsibilities and vision of the JPSU. In my experience in the
JPSU as a Regional Sergeant Major, I spared no amount of effort working with my
last Command Team partner (Major Lyndon Chubbs) in trying to convince the SHQ
to provide us adequate resources. They never came.
As time passed, the problems worsened and with the increase of posted-in and
supported personnel reached a past-critical state. At our last conference in Ottawa,
our dire situation was relayed to SHQ, as were our recommendations to solve these
issues, but to no avail. Then the conversation turned to Mission Failure, and we
were directed specifically that Mission Failure was not an option and to make it
work. Then the discussion turned to what would have to happen to declare Mission
Failure and it was broached that in the case of the civilian staff it would be defined
as 0 personnel left in the JPSU. This is to say, there would have to be no civilian
staff remaining whatsoever in the entire unit before Mission Failure would even be
considered.
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A suggestion was floated to delay Mission Failure by reducing the amount of Out
Reach (advertising) we were performing. This essentially translated into if we dont
tell them were here, they wont come to us for help and this will keep our numbers
at a steady-state. Then it was suggested by SHQ that perhaps the only way we could
get additional resources was that if the JPSU actually did fail, then they (the highest
brass) would realize that are resources were inadequate. This coined the term in the
JPSU: Success is Failure; Failure is Success.
The following points discuss the specifics of the JPSU, Commentary and
recommendations...
JOINT PERSONNEL SUPPORT UNIT: STRUCTURE
Introduction. The structure of the JPSU has been a point of contention from the
outset. Even on stand-up, mid-level leadership knew that a unit (or regimental)
structure was far too light for an organization such as the JPSU. The founding
members of mid-level leadership tried to convince the senior leadership of the
difficulties of operating such a vast organization with such a structure, but to no
avail. The following is the culmination of proposals over the years and what is
required to make the JPSU legitimate.
STRATEGIC LEVEL
Strategic Level Structure. The Joint Personnel Support Unit (JPSU) is a coast-to-coast
organization consisting of a Strategic Headquarters (SHQ) located in Ottawa, where
the Commanding Officer is situated. The SHQ controls eight Regions
throughout Canada, with one of them being Eastern Ontario Region.
Commentary. A Unit or Regimental structure is something very unusual to use for
an organization such as the JPSU. Given that the JPSU stretches coast-to-coast this
would make it the most strained unit in the history of the CAF. The responsibility
of central control of this unit falls to a single double-hatted Colonel (CO JPSU and
DSCM) in Ottawa, making effective oversight and situational awareness impossible.
The once-yearly conferences (cancelled for 2013 due to budget restraints) are
meager and do not lend themselves to unit integrity, morale or efficiency.
Recommendation. The JPSU must be reconfigured in a Formation Structure, with a
General Officer Commanding in Ottawa and a series of Commanding Officers in each
Region.

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OPERATIONAL LEVEL
Operational Level Structure. Using JPSUs Eastern Ontario Region, as an example, is
structured as a Company (Coy) with its Coy Headquarters (CHQ) in Petawawa. This
Coy has four smaller sub-units known as Integrated Personnel Support Centres
(IPSCs) spread throughout the Region, with each IPSC containing a Support
Platoon. The IPSCs are located in Petawawa, Ottawa, Kingston and Trenton with a
small detachment in North Bay it is very similar to various Regions across Canada.
Eastern Ontario Region is by far the largest (most populous) Region in Canada with
close to 500 ill/injured posted-in and caters to over 1000 non-posted-in that are still
receiving service in one form or another. Over and above this, the IPSCs must also
track recently released members for up to six-months and as well as provide
support to families of injured and ill soldiers. Each IPSC is responsible to get the
word out regarding services to the tens of thousands of people located within its
Region, and must be prepared to back up their words with action. Currently to
manage the entire Region there is an OHQ staff of only four military personnel.
Commentary. Just as a Regimental structure is unsuitable for the JPSU at the
Strategic Level, a Company structure is eminently unsuitable for a Region at the
Operational Level. No Company in existence has 5000 square kilometers to cover,
or the requirement to lead, mentor and support strength of 500 (+) posted-in
personnel and staff, not to mention the other associated duties of the JPSU to
recently retired members and military families.
Recommendation. Each Region should be reconfigured as a Regimental (+) or
Brigade (-) structure. There should be a Col/LCol Commanding each Region with an
appropriately sized staff.
TACTICAL LEVEL
Tactical Level Structure. The Support Platoon is the front-lines of support for our
injured and ill, recently released members of the JPSU, retired service members and
military families. It carries the enormous responsibility of being the face of this unit
and bears the scrutiny of Unit Commanders to injured Privates alike. Each platoon
contains the smallest structure, the Section; this is the place to where injured and ill
members are assigned to a solitary person the Section Commander (normally a
Sergeant). Adding complexity to the military component of the IPSC is the civilian
component Services. The Services component handles the admin aspects such as
Return To Work and part of Outreach (an information distribution task). Both the
military and civilian components are co-located in a building and together they
make up the Integrated Personnel Support Centre (IPSC). The IPSC itself is led by no
single person an unusual arrangement.
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Commentary. The platoon structure is wholly impractical for the mission of
supporting and leading injured and ill service members at the tactical level. The size
of some platoons have swollen to approximately 150 people, while still maintaining
the administrative and leadership oversight capabilities of a platoon one Platoon
Commander (Captain) and one Platoon Warrant Officer. This means that it is
impossible for such an undersized leadership component to have proper situational
awareness. At the Section, you can often find a posted-in strength of 40-to-70
people, depending on the platoon. A Section Commander Sergeant has the
formidable task of the day-to-day oversight of a group of people who normally
require extensive administrative and one-on-one interaction. The IPSC itself has no
single point-of-contact no one who is the face of the IPSC. The reason for this is
an ongoing grudge match of who should be in charge of the IPSC a military or
civilian person. This low-level conflict has been allowed to simmer since the
inception of the JPSU, and has caused great inefficiency, tension and at times ill will.
To make things even more complicated the Services Component has a direct
stovepipe communication link to the Strategic Headquarters the SHQ Operations
Officer (Ops O). The SHQ Ops O is unlike any other, this person a civilian) deals
primarily with the civilian staff at the IPSC bypassing both the RHQ and Support
Platoon Commanders. This makes the communications path extremely convoluted,
and one that is amplified by the JPSU COs policy that any supported member of the
JPSU or CAF can contact the CO directly, and in confidence, without any
knowledge of any of his/her CoC.
Recommendations. Each Platoon Structure must be increased to a Company
Structure (+); there must be depth to the structure as well in the form of Platoon
and Section 2 I.C.s. Currently when a Section Commanders goes on leave, his
charges are passed to other already overborne Section Commanders. Each IPSC
must have an Officer in Charge (OIC) that bridges the military and services
components, and presents a united face of the JPSU and builds unit cohesion at the
tactical level. The stovepipe communication between the Services staff and SHQ
must cease and al comms go through the Regional HQ to the IPSC OIC. The policy of
direct communications surreptitiously to the Commanding Officer must cease and
be replaced by the standard, and well-proven policy of requesting to speak with
ones CO.
JOINT PERSONNEL SUPPORT UNIT: MANNING RATIOS
Near the end of Phase III of the stand-up of the JPSU, it became very apparent to all
those on the frontlines (OHQ and IPSC) that there were significant shortfalls with
the unit. This is not to say they were difficult to overcome, but they were significant
nonetheless and pains were taken to address them. The following org chart is the
actual situation at one Support Platoon in Eastern Ontario Region:

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Integrated Personnel Support Centre

Kingston
Platoon
Commander
Platoon Warrant Officer
1

10

15

20

25

By 2013, The manning ratio for the

Kingston Support Platoon became
totally unmanageable. There was no
Section Commander, just a Platoon
Commander and Warrant Officer.
(Currently there is only a Platoon
Commander). At its peak, there were
over 70 posted-in injured and ill CAF
members to manage but the
management doesnt stop there.
Due to the unique responsibilities of
the JPSU, the staff also have to keep in
contact and check-up on recently
released CAF personnel to ensure
they had transitioned satisfactorily to
civilian life. This responsibility is
normally that of the Platoon Warrant
Officer

30

35

40

45

50

55

60

Over and above this are the normal

responsibilities of leadership and
administration, including bi-annual
Performance Development Reports
(PDRs), yearly Performance
Evaluation Reports (PERs) and a host
of other administrative tasks.
Duties unique to the JPSU were
oversight of a Return-To-Work (RTW)
program for each person posted-in.
Each posted-in person would be
found and assigned a work
environment conducive to recovery.
Then the Platoon Staff would ensure
that that environment was
maintained.
This situation was brought up timeand-again to the senior leadership of
the JPSU, and time-and-again they
denied us resources. There were two
suicides in this platoon and a number
of very complex injuries.

On the following page is the culmination of proposals over the years of what is
required to make the JPSU manning ratio adequate, in order of precedence:

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TACTICAL LEVEL: IPSC SERVICES and SUPPORT COMPANY
OIC IPSC. The addition of an Officer In Charge (OIC) of the IPSC, Major rank level,
and one per IPSC (currently there is no single person in charge of an IPSC, which is
problematic).
IPSC Sergeant Major. The addition of an IPSC Sergeant Major (Master Warrant
Officer rank level), one per IPSC. This position would provide the senior NCO
leadership required of both the Services and Support Platoon elements.
IPSC Administration. The addition of a Company Clerk (Sergeant/Warrant Officer)
would alleviate the need of.
OIC
IPSC

Company Sergeant
Major

IPSC Services

Services Manager

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IPSC Clerk

Support Platoons

Platoon
Commanders/WO's

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Platoon Commander. At the Platoon Commander (Captain) Level, a ratio of no more
than 1:4 (Platoon Commanders to Platoon WOs).
Platoon Warrant Officer. At the Platoon Warrant Officer Level, a ratio of no more
than 1:4 (Platoon Warrant Officer to Section Commanders (and their Supported
Troops).
Section Commander. At the Section Commander Level, a maximum ratio of no more
than 1:18 (Section Commander to Supported (Ill and Injured) Troops).
Depth. The addition of 2 I.C. positions for Section Commanders.
"A" Platoon
Commander

Platoon Warrant
Officer

Section 1
Commander

Posted-In
Member

10

Posted-In
Member

Section 1
2 I.C.

Section 2
Commander

Posted-In
Member

Posted-In
Member

Section 2
2I.C.

Section 3
Commander

Posted-In
Member

10

Section 3
2I.C.

Posted-In
Member

10

The above org chart depicts an adequate structure and staff ratio to support our ill and injured at the Tactical (Platoon/IPSC) Level

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OPERATIONAL LEVEL: REGIONAL HEADQUARTERS
Regional Commanding Officer. The increase of the Regional Officer Commanding
from Major to Lieutenant Colonel and authority from OC to CO.
Regional 2 I.C. The addition of a Regional Second-in-Command (Major).
Regional Adjutant. No Change.
Regional Sergeant Major. The increase of the Regional Master Warrant Officer to
Regional Chief Warrant Officer.
Regional Ops. The addition of a Regional Operations cell of one Captain and one
Sergeant.
Regional Administration. The Increase of Regional Clerk Warrant Officer, to Master
Warrant Officer. The addition of appropriate clerical staff (Master
Corporal/Corporal) based on the size of the unit, a minimum two (one Master
Corporal, one Corporal), and an additional Corporal or Master Corporal per 150 pers
posted in to the Region.
Services. The addition of a Regional Services Representative.

Regional
Commanding Officer

Regional 2 I.C.

Regional
Adjutant

Regional
Sergeant Major
Regional
Operations
Officer

Regional Clerk

Clerks
Asssisstant

Ops 2 I.C.

Regional Services
Rep

IPSC "A"

Services

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IPSC "B"

Support
Company

Services

IPSC "C'

Support
Company

Services

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IPSC "D"

Support
Company

Services

Support
Company

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JOINT PERSONNEL SUPPORT UNIT: POLICY
ANNUITANTS
Situation. When I first heard of the JPSU I was very interested in becoming a part of
it but it was a very unusual procedure to accomplish this. First I had to apply, be
interviewed by three senior officers and then again by the Officer Commanding. If
chosen, I would have to component transfer to the Reserves and become an
annuitant. Why? Well I asked that same question because my Corps (RCEME) was
prepared to allow me a term to be part of the JPSU, but the JPSU leadership did not
want me as a Regular Force soldier.
I was told that the JPSU was looking for mature soldiers with plenty of experience,
something the Regular Forces could provide, but also wanted the stability of a
Reserve soldier (no postings of career moves). This made sense to me so I
component transferred from the Regular Force to the Reserves and became what is
known as a Class B Reservist annuitant. The first generation of JPSU staff all went
through this vetting process and I believe it brought an exemplary staff to the JPSU.
I heard nothing but high praise for the staff at the IPSC level, made up almost
entirely of annuitants. This, I believe, is largely because they have all volunteered to
be there and have put their experience, leadership ability, maturity and dedication
into this project. This is a critical characteristic to maintain in the JPSU Staff, and
ironically the annuitant policy worked to ensure that the JPSU got the best there is.
Unfortunately only two years into the life of the JPSU, it was told to us that all
positions would be converted to Reg Force positions.
In doing so, the JPSU ended the critical vetting process and the philosophy of a
stable, mature, highly trained and committed staff. In the Ombudsmans Report on
the JPSU, there is mention of the Deputy Minister providing exemptions for the
hiring of 46 Class B personnel, but I am fairly certain that these are the same 46
identified in 2012 not as new positions, but as temporarily spared (from Reg Force
conversions). Also, there is mention in the report of development of a candidate
profile interview. This, I suspect is the interview process all original staff members
went through, but was cancelled.
Recommendation. If the staff of the JPSU is offered exceptions, then it will attract a
large number of applicants, from which the best can be chosen - this is an
exceptional mechanism to use to get the best people for a particularly tough job.
These annuitants, have tackled the stigma of the SPHL, worked to remove the stigma
of OSI's, added to the efficiency of the Regular Force Units from which they all came,
so of course the CAF changed the policy it was working too good for its own good!

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The use of annuitants also brings in the element of stability these injured troops
require a stable environment and stable leadership and not to have their Section
Commanders and Warrant Officers posted in and out at the needs of the Reg Force.
The effects of this on the injured from the medical staff changing over are difficult
enough - the specter of both changing would be chaotic and traumatizing to them at
best.
But annuitants are not the only means, I have suggested that the JPSU become its
own trade which would also allow this stability, as would it be if belonged
to temporary component of the Cadet Organizations Administration and Training
Service (COATS), which would allow for the employment of the seriously injured
themselves (this one is a stretch).
UNIVERSALITY OF SERVICE
Situation. I understand and support the requirement of the Universality of Service
(UoS) but I also understand the principles of war and the need for flexibility. The
government owns the UoS and can amend it or leave it as is and give a very special
unit such as the JPSU, a means to temporarily circumvent it.
Recommendation. If the JPSU was given a notwithstanding option to retain injured
troops for employment within the JPSU, they could fill our shortfalls with select
injured personnel for three-year, renewable, contract extensions which would help
the unit immensely. It would also I believe, be very popular with veterans and the
civilian populous alike.
ACCOMMODATION
Situation. There is a policy in the CAF that if a trade were under-strength
accommodation could be made to retain an injured person for a length of time. The
logic is that since the trade is under-strength, releasing the member would hurt the
trade even more; so this policy would allow retention, trade health while not
making the trade over-borne. However, if the trade was at strength, no
accommodation would be made because there was no need. And, if the person was
kept, it would make the trade over-borne affecting personnel management and
movement throughout the trade group.
If a person was injured and sent to the JPSU, he or she was out of the trade stream so
to speak. Also, if this person was facing certain release, it was a given that the JPSU
was the place to be. However, when the JPSU was in dire need of specific trade
specialties we could not offer them an accommodation. Why?
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Because the accommodation policy still effected them even though they had nothing
to do with their trade, trade management or postings. For example, we desperately
required administrative staff at the JPSU, and we had some of the most experienced
administrative clerks in the CAF on the road to release. Many would have stayed to
assist the JPSU, but their trades were at strength so the policy wouldnt allow us to
accommodate them even though this would have absolutely no effect on their
trade group.
Recommendation. If the JPSU was given a notwithstanding option to retain injured
troops for employment within the JPSU, they could fill the shortfalls with select
injured personnel for three-year, renewable, contract extensions which would help
the unit immensely and not hurt the trade group one iota. It would also I believe, be
very popular with veterans and the civilian populous alike.
TRAINING
Situation. The staff of the JPSU, particularly the front-line staff, has an
unprecedented amount of responsibility, unconventionality and stress, yet they are
not allowed to take the adequate training for the job. For example, never in the
history of the CAF will you find a Colonel in the Section commanded by a Sergeant
this is unheard of. But this is the day-to-day responsibility of a JPSU Section
Commander. To interact respectfully with a higher rank in your section takes tact,
discipline, respect and finesse. While I was a Sergeant major in the JPSU, I attempted
to get my Sergeants and Warrant Officers on available leadership courses where
they could receive higher-level training, especially in communication and
chairmanship this training was denied them.
Also, the JPSU front-line staff has an inordinate amount of interaction with soldier
suffering from OSIs such as PTSD. I tried to get these troops training on this subject,
but it was denied them. The same holds true for resiliency training, as these frontline staff must interact with terribly injured soldiers and their family members it is
something that can be very difficult on a person. This training was denied them.
Recommendation. The CAF must train the staff working at the JPSU adequately; this
includes, but is not limited to, resiliency, leadership, communication and dispute
resolution training.

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SUMMARY
The JPSU was designed to rectify the shortfalls of the SPHL but despite a great start
and vision, it is failing because of inflexibility, outdated or dysfunctional policy, poor
staff manning, questionable structure, unimaginative leadership, and intestinal
fortitude - indeed it has coasted to a stop and is now reverting back to an SPHL type
organization.
When the JPSU first stood-up, things were manageable as the ratio between postedin personnel and support personnel were adequate. Also, in the move to stand-up
the organization, much effort was expended in this task and there was not much
time to take account of how we were doing; but the JPSUs numbers have increased
steadily. My model, Eastern Ontario Region, now has the numbers that the entire
JPSU had only two years ago, and this normally would be a great and celebrated
milestone - but it is not it is instead a cause for alarm.
For some reason, the senior leadership of the JPSU and CMP will not address the
issues facing this important unit and the results I do believe have been mortal, or
have played a part through negligence, of the deaths of CAF veterans. It would be a
shame to lose what we have gained so far, and not to build on our success. The JPSU
is truly Canadian in every respect and takes care of those who gave an oath to
serve Canada, and when asked, gave of their bodies and minds to fulfill that oath they do not deserve another SPHL called the JPSU.
The JPSU model should have been stood-up in 1914, and should it have been, we
would have saved countless lives of Canadian soldiers, and our Country would have
been the better for it. But it was not. Instead, those that read this paper are
encouraged to make up for the lost opportunities of our predecessors and the
mismanagement of our contemporaries we must act where they did not.

// Signed //
Sergeant Major (retd) Barry L. Westholm, CD
Director, Canadian Forces Engagement
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