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•MINATIONAL FOREST PRODUCTS ASSOCIATION
1619 Massachusetts Avenue, N. W., Washington, D. C. 20036
TECHNICAL SERVICES

March 1, 1971

TO: Building Officials

SUBJECT: "It's The Contents That Count"

The term "fireproof" as applied to buildings is much

abused. The wood products industry has sought for many years
to dispel the myth that wood structures are less "fireproof"
than structures primarily built of "noncombustible" materials.
"Fireproof" suggests that a material or structure is safe from
fire -- which has led to many false impressions about the use of
building materials and a false sense of security about "fire-
proof" buildings.
The great majority of fires originate in the contents of
a building -- in a mattress, wastebasket, stove, clothes closet,
drapes, etc., -- rarely in the structure of the building itself.
By the time fire does involve the building structure, smoke
and the products of the contents fire have already claimed
their toll.
Every year many lives are lost in "fireproof" building
fires where the fire originated in and was solely confined to
the contents of the building. Typical of such fires are those
where a smoldering sofa fire, spreading smoke throughout a
structure, asphyxiates the occupants -- frequently there is no
damage to either contents or the structure.
In a recent article, "It's the Contents That Count,"
Richard M. Patton, president of Patton Fire Protection and
Research, Inc., Freehold, N.J., presents an analysis of fire
safety problems and an approach to their solution. Because of
the unusual interest and educational benefits of Mr. Patton's
remarks, we secured his permission to reprint the article on
the following pages. We believe it worthwhile reading for all
public officials concerned with fire safety.
Additional copies of Mr. Patton's article are available
from the National Forest Products Association.
Sincerely,

• R.B. Buchan, Director

Building Code Department
 IT'S THE CONTENTS THAT COUNT
The fire hazard of a facility is often judged to be a function of
its basic construction. For example, a fire resistive (often
termed fireproof) hotel is considered a "safe" building. A
combustible hotel (frame or ordinary construction) is
frequently thought to be unsafe. If a combustible structure is
more than twenty years old it is often termed a "firetrap."
It is time we take a careful look at these generalities.
Misconceptions concerning the role of the basic structure in
fire are, in my opinion, key deterrents to the solving of our
national fire problem.
The generalities that a "fireproof' structure is inherently
"firesafe," and that a combustible building is inherently unsafe
are most often applied where life -- not property -- is
concerned.
It is quite apparent that a fire resistive building that is
sheathed on the interior with a highly combustible ceiling tile
or wall paneling can be an unsafe building, and that a
combustible building sheathed thruout with gypsum wallboard
has the basic characteristics of a fire resistive building. So it is
a relatively easy matter to demonstrate technically that the
"safe" building can be made unsafe, and that the combustible
building can be made fire resistive.
But it is not my intent here to attempt to demonstrate that
combustible construction can be made reasonably safe, or that
fireproof construction can be compromised. Rather, it is my
intent to question the premise that basic construction is the
single most important factor where life safety from fire is
concerned. The main thrust of this newsletter will be to
present the argument that preoccupation with structural fire
protection is causing us to-fail to see more important factors.
Let us begin by looking at the fireproof (fire resistive)
building.
The original "fireproof' building was considered an inherently
safe building. "If the building can't burn the occupants are
safe," it was reasoned.
Such reasoning is patently false. If the fireproof structure is
inherently anything, it is inherently nonfiresafe. The basic
criteria of a fireproof building is that the structural steel be
protected so as to be able to resist a fire. In some manner
(there are several ways), the steel is insulated with heat
resisting materials so it will remain cool and strong during a
fire.
1970 Patton Fire Protection & Research, Inc., 647 Colts Neck Road, Freehold, New Jersey, October 1970.
A "Class A" fire resistive building is constructed so that the
main structural elements will withstand a four hour fire
producing temperatures in excess of 2000 degrees F. Since
fireproofing materials are costly there is a clear implication
that there is reason to expect that there may well be a four
hour fire within the structural shell. A fireproof building is a
structure that is intentionally designed to survive an intense
internal fire. It's basic design is similar to that of a furnace, to
be able to contain a fire without failure.
Occupants of a fireproof structure have no similar capabilities
of surviving the anticipated interior fire. While the resistance
of the structure is measured in hours the resistance of human
flesh and lungs to high temperature is measured in minutes or
seconds. Structural elements are measured against a standard
Underwriters' Laboratories test fire that reaches 1000 degrees
F within five minutes. Long before 1000 degrees F is reached,
humans die.
These facts, however, did not deter original designers of
fireproof buildings from considering them to be inherently
safe. The evidence of this is that the need for fire exits was
virtually ignored in early fireproof construction. For example,
in 1946, 119 died on an upper floor in a multi-story fireproof
41)
hotel that contained a single open stairway. Adequate exits
were not considered needed because the building was
FIREPROOF.
Over the years there have been many additional fires in
fireproof buildings, and many more people have died. So there
is a very clear historical evidence proving that a building is
NOT INHERENTLY SAFE SIMPLY BECAUSE THE STEEL
IS PROTECTED.
However, each major fire has produced investigations. Each
time there are determinations of causes. And each time new
structural regulations are developed. So today we have more
than a so called fireproof structure, we have a structure built
to a building code that covers many things in addition to the
insulation for the steel. For example, a building code limits the
combustibility of the interior sheathing, requires that
stairways be enclosed, specifies travel distance to exits, etc. IT
IS THIS CODE SPECIFIED STRUCTURE THAT IS NOW
CONSIDERED INHERENTLY SAFE.
But I think that it is now appropriate to question the inherent
safety of even the most modern of the Code designed
structures. As the Fire Chief of New York City said recently,
following a major fire in a skyscraper not yet completed,
 "These new buildings may be fireproof, but they are not that
safe."
In my opinion, the reason why the modern code defined
fireproof structures are not as safe as they are supposed to be
is that it is not possible to solve the internal fire problem by
defining structural features. It is the contents that really
count, and codes generally do not cover the contents.
Combustible contents are inherent in most occupancies.
Where people live, sleep, or work under nonfactory conditions
(dwellings, apartments, hotels, offices, stores) or are cared for
(nursing homes, institutions, hospitals) the natural human
desire for pleasant surroundings will result in a demand for
combustible furnishings and contents. As a general rule, places
where people are most likely to be are most likely to contain
combustibles. I will very loosely define such places as
habitable occupancies.
The contents are the major fire problem. Even when the
structural shell is combustible, the contents are most easily
ignited and burn most rapidly. By the time the basic structure
is significantly involved it is probable that the damage has
already been done to the occupants.
Smoke and toxic gases, not flames,kill most people in building
fires. Human lungs are also very susceptible to high
temperatures. A very small fire, as building fires go, can
rapidly produce adequate smoke, toxic gases, and heat to kill.
A fire in one room can involve all combustibles in that room in
a matter of minutes, and this one room size fire can produce
sufficient heat and smoke to kill well beyond the confines of
the room.
It is very unusual habitable occupancy that does not have a
level of combustibles that is capable of producing a very
deadly fire very quickly. Anyone who has ever started a fire in
a fireplace while forgetting to open the damper will realize
how rapidly a little fire can become a big problem.
Fire doors aid fire partitions can stop flames. But controlling
the movement of smoke is more difficult. When fire Changes
solids to gases the increased volume produces increased
pressure to drive the smoke thru all available openings. Smoke
has been known to travel extensively, even in multi-story
compartmented fire resistive buildings. If a fire is allowed to
become large, control of smoke becomes most difficult.
.Summarizing, building codes attempt to eliminate the fire
hazard by regulating the shell, but it is the nonregulated
interior contents that are most likely to be ignited, are most
•
likely to burn rapidly, and are most likely to produce large
quantities of toxic gases. While building codes can significantly
reduce the fire hazard, there is no complete structural solution
to fire.
We are now at a stage in the development of fire protection
technology where a decision should be made. We can continue
with a structural solution to fire, ignore the contents, and
accept a determinable level of fire deaths. Or, we can realize
that we have achieved about the best level of fire safety that
can be achieved by structural regulation, and redirect our
efforts toward the contents.
The second course of action is preferred for three reasons.
First, there is no indication that the public and the lawmakers
are prepared to accept a concept of fire safety based on a
predetermined minimum acceptable burn rate. Each large loss
of life fire will result in new demands for more rigid building
controls. (In other words, if we don't find a better solution,
the structure will be subjected to ever more restrictive
regulations.)
The second reason why we should turn our attention to the
contents is that the structure is ALREADY regulated beyond
the point of diminishing returns. That is, there are many
dollars being spent on some facets of structural fire safety that
are poorly spent and accomplish little. A reorientation of fire
protection expenditures can produce more safety at a reduced
net cost.
Finally, and most important, we should look to the content
fire problem because we can save lives. People are dying
needlessly. We have a technology in this country that could
virtually eliminate fire as a problem. We need only apply what
we know more directly to the basic problem.
What IS the solution to the content fire problem?
The solution does not lie with additional structural regulations
because regulating the shell does not eliminate the content fire
problem.
It does not lie with greater compartmentation and elaborate
plans to trap the fire. These schemes have already been
promoted beyond their worth.
Regulating the combustibility (or toxicity of combustion
products) of the interior finish material is not a complete
solution because these materials represent but a portion of the
total contents. Inspections, training of employees, and exit
drills are all desirable, but human failures are not infrequent,
especially when it comes to fire.
The complete elimination of combustibles is not practical.
Combustible furnishings, materials and clothing, within reason,
are a part of our lives.
There is only one meaningful solution to the content fire. The
solution is to PUT IT OUT.

The suppression concept is the great enigma of fire protection.
There is no fire solution that is a more direct and a more viable
solution. There is nothing that can provide greater safety than
a plan to suppress and extinguish the fire before it produces
extensive quantities of heat, or smoke. Yet the suppression
concept remains the most underdeveloped concept of our fire
technology.
The sprinkler system was developed about 1896 and its
purpose was to protect the factory. Without a pipe schedule in
his hands the average man cannot distinguish between the
1896 sprinkler system and the 1970 system. They are virtually
identical. During all these years there has been no significant
effort made to transform the sprinkler system from a factory
tool to a life safety tool.
But even the old sprinkler system appears to be more directly
related to life safety than the characteristics of the structural
shell. An editorial in the July 1970 NFPA Fire Journal points
out that there are only six known fatal fires in sprinklered
buildings during the years 1965 to 1969. Fatal fires in modern
fireproof buildings are not so rare.
If the all but obsolete sprinkler system designed for factories is
able to achieve such a fine life safety record, then imagine
what could be accomplished with a water base fire suppression
system of modern design specifically oriented toward life
safety.
Here's just one hint of the potential of a modern Life Safety
Fire Suppression System. The existing U.S. sprinkler standard
calls for a water supply of 500 to 750 GPM with a 60 minute
duration for a light hazard occupancy. This is a minimum total
supply of 30,000 gallons to put out a fire with a sprinkler
system in a light hazard property such as a nursing home.
Adding insult to injury, it is also customary to demand an
additional quantity of water for fire department use to back
up the sprinkler system. The usual minimum for hose streams
is another 30,000 gallons. Under our present sprinkler system
approval procedures it is often impossible to obtain
recognition for a sprinkler system unless these excessive water
requirements (and also a great many other questionable
requirements) are met. (The sprinkler standard does define a
pressure tank supply containing a much smaller quantity of
water but approval practices have all but ruled this solution
out, and they are very rarely installed.)
Now contrast the water supply associated with an approved
sprinkler system with the actual amount of water needed to
•
completely control and extinguish a fire in a subdivided light
hazard property. The article "Minimum Water Requirements
For Suppression of Room Fires" in the February 1970 issue of
Fire Technology discusses research in connection with
extinguishing room size fires after flashover has occurred,
(total involvement of all combustibles in the room).
Extinguishment was accomplished with a small hose line (one
inch) and spray nozzle. The article reports "For the single
room fires, the total amount of water necessary for control
and extinguishment averages 15 gallons when applied at the
rate of 18 GPM."
Clearly, there is some point between 15 gallons and 60,000
gallons, but closer to 15, where a modernized, fully
engineered, Life Safety Fire Suppression System can control
the room size fire.
If we are going to move forward in the 1970's to improve life
safety in buildings we must do three things:
I) Recognize that there is no way to design
an inherently firesafe structure.
2) Develop a water base fire suppression
system specifically fitted to the life safety
needs of habitable occupancies and
designed to control the content fire.
Restructure our building codes with
greater emphasis on fire suppression,
including a liberalization of structural
requirements for properties containing a
built-in fire suppression system.
At the direction of the Copper Development Association Inc.,
Patton Fire Protection and Research, Inc. is now developing a
Life Safety Fire Suppression System for institutional
buildings, multiple dwellings, motels, and similar properties.
Incidently, fire tests of prototype design are scheduled for the
Spring of 1971 and we are looking for a vacant motel, medical
care facility, apartment or school that is divided into rooms
and would be available for field fire tests. Since these tests
may damage the structure we are thinking in terms of a
condemned and isolated building that will not be demolished
until at least late 1971. If you know of such a facility in the
East, please contact me.