2026079b

Jacob Bennett-Woolf

Philosophy 2K

Russell on Matter
Bertrand Russell's The Problems Of Philosophy is a renowned book for an overview of many
questions in Philosophy. In this essay, I will be regarding his views in The Problems Of
Philosophy about whether there exists a world of matter independently of us.
The chapters on matter and sense perception can be seen as a discussion across 200 years between
Bertrand Russell and George Berkeley, so I will be referencing the First Dialogue in Three
Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous by George Berkeley as well.
In Russell's argument for the existence of a world independent of us, he uses what he calls sense
data, so I shall begin by explaining what sense data is. Sense data is all of the information that we
get from our senses. For example, I am currently getting sense data of a blue desk. The act of
getting that data is called sensation. Assuming that there is an independent world outside of
ourselves, it may be thought natural to assume that the objects of this independent world would be
what our sense data tells us it is. Russell claims that this is not true, and tries to prove it by giving an
example of a table. He explains what the table appears to be and then he argues that if we look at
the table from any different point of view, the colour will look different, and as we cannot favour
any point of view over any other point of view, the colour of the table must not be what we see.
Although I believe that the table is really of the same colour all over, the parts that reflect the
light look much brighter than the other parts, and some parts look white because of reflected light.
(Problems of Philosophy, page 2). Russell uses similar arguments for the other types of sense data,
and thus proves that the independent world (if it exists) must be different from what our sense data
tells us it is.
Although we may talk about features of the independent world, if it has not been proven, to a
sufficient degree, that this world exists, we are merely making flights of fancy, as we cannot use the
independent world as a solid foundation on which to base future proofs. Russell's (and Berkeley's)
view on whether there exists an independent world is that this world does exist, and thus, if it can be
proven sufficiently, we can make judgements about it. Russell explains this by giving a fairly simple
example of a cat, If the cat appears at one moment in one part of the room, and at another in
another part, it is natural to suppose that it has moved from the one to the other, passing over a
series of intermediate positions. (Problems of Philosophy, page 10). While he concedes that this is
not a proof, he argues that it is the best explanation for the facts.
While Russell and Berkeley both believe in an independent world, they have differing views on the
nature of this independent world. Russell believes that the independent world, however Berkeley
takes the view of most philosophers of his time, and believes that the independent world is made up
of solely mental things. This view is called Idealism. Berkeley explains the fact that things do not
disappear when they are not looked at by anyone by saying that all things are ideas in the mind of
God.
Russell argues against Idealism by specifically looking at Berkeley's arguments and rejecting each
claim of the argument as, in Russell's opinion, Berkeley uses fallacious logic. To try and prove
Russell's claim that the independent world is made up of non-mental things (matter), Russell uses
science as his tool. Russell explains that science does its work in some public space which we
must all aware of, but not directly acquainted with, and that our own sense data give us a private
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Jacob Bennett-Woolf

Philosophy 2K

space for each sensation, so there is a private space for sight, touch, smell, and each of the other
forms of sense data. We know that this public space is not the same as the private spaces by the fact
that science explains light as motions of a wave. As our sense data for sight is not the motion of a
wave, (he uses the reasoning that the motion of a wave can be explained to a blind man, while what
you cannot explain what it is like to see to a blind man), private spaces and the public space must be
different. Russell argues that these private spaces correspond directly to the public space, so that
there exists something in the public space which causes all the sensations in the private spaces (it
can be thought of as grids overlaying each other so that they all correspond to the same points).
Russell argues that there exists something independent of ourselves by explaining that it was the
best explanation we had for certain situations, as shown in his cat example. While this may be the
best explanation for the circumstances, we have no way of knowing whether explanations of this
form will also be the most truthful, and so we will have to find a way to show that this is true.
However, Russell may explain this by bringing in instinctive beliefs. These are beliefs that we
assume without conscious realisation, such as the principle of induction. Russell argues that in order
to be able to know anything about the independent world, we must start on some footing, and he
thinks that we should start with instinctive beliefs. All instinctive beliefs would be assumed to be
true unless they clash with another instinctive belief, in which case we take the instinctive belief we
believe the most out of the two. Russell would probably argue that assuming that the best
explanation of all our facts is the most truthful would be an instinctive belief.
Russell argues that the world is not mental by specifically looking at Berkeley's reasoning and then
showing that each of his claims involve fallacies, however to truly reject Idealism, he would have to
show that any claims were spurious, as other philosophers did not take the same view as Berkeley,
for example Leibniz.
Russell's argument for the fact that sense data does not give us a description of the world
independent of us, rests almost entirely on the fact that different points of view of the same object
will give you different sense data and no point of view can be given precedence. However it can be
argued that just because the sense data for, for example, colour, may seem different, that there is in
fact one point of view which does take precedence, and which is a property that the independent
object has.
Descartes proved, using systematic doubt, that the only thing which we truly know is that we exist,
I think therefore I am. Thus all philosophers can only give explanations on the existence of
anything else, and these explanations can never be completely proved. This should be kept in mind
for all forms of philosophical arguments.
In conclusion, while Russell produces many arguments for the existence of a world of matter
independent of us, ultimately his arguments appear to have enough flaws that they have no merit.
Russell talks about Berkeley by saying The arguments employed are of very different value: some
are important and sound, other are confused or quibbling. (Problems of Philosophy, page 4),
however this quote seems rather apt for Russell himself.

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Bibliography
Problems of Philosophy, Bertrand Russell, 1912
Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, George Berkeley, 1713
Fraser MacBride Lecture Notes

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Philosophy 2K