1.

You /never/ use an offensive counter air platform like the Eagle in a DCA environment where
you are tied to defense of a specific asset like a main operating base. Putting the hurt on the
enemy's basing structure is OUR main objective. That's like a Cheyenne dog soldier tying his
foot to the ground in the face of a Cavalry charge and saying "From here I shall not be moved!"
Fixed asset defense is a problem for S2A systems to handle with their very much larger kill
vehicles and multi-track radar systems plus ARM pits and decoys. The way you beat the IAF
trying to attack YOUR airfield is by moving too far from their bases for their tiny jets to play
ball. And putting a PAC-3 ERINT battery on all the likely approach routes as well as sitting on
the runway intersection. And the USAF is stupid if they think otherwise, just on sortie-robbing
from effective prosecution of an OFFENSIVE airwar.
Now, if you want to talk /anti access/ strategies that keep us operating on a very long AAR tether
from whomever will let us in...
2. Everyone knows that the F-15 is a cripple when it comes to penetrating a well developed
IADS, possessed of a MASSIVE all round signature, even the FQ mod ALQ-135 cannot fully
mask, it has no HARM or HARM-cue capabilities (thanks to the weak wingtips and aggressively
nasty underwing acoustics environment, the outboard pylons will never be activated and the
inboards are almost de-rigeur tanked because the internal fuel fraction is so low) and this is why
the F-16CJ.50 is the prefered offensive aircraft that the theater CINCs give the call to. And has
been since the mid-90's when the Serbs made trolling attempts to drag us across the border into
the S2A thickets of The BOz. Certainly the Numero Uno of A2A ops: radar functionality, is more
up to date in the APG-68V8 thru 10 series apertures than it is in the APG-63V(1).
That said, the 3rd TFW is in fact the sole operator of the APG-63(V2) with one squadron of
aircraft being so equipped with a 'brick level' AESA radar. Largely so that Boeing could then
offer the equivalent technology for export. Nobody has taken them up on it because the radar is
so massively heavy that it requires something like 400lbs of aft ballasting, which cannot be
helpful to the type's aero performance. The APG-63V(3) will take this technology down to the
'tile' if not 'button' level and vastly improve the overall reliability and efficiencies of the airframe.
Yet it is ONLY being considered (funded thru Raytheon as an R&D program I believe) if the F15 itself receives a full 'Golden Eagle' modification which will be akin to the Hog Up/Falcon Up
and Falcon CUPID programs in going where MSIP should have gone some 15 years ago. It will
still be lipsticking the pig or crutching the geriatric however and particularly without rerated
ramp system and 132/232 EFE engines, the Eagle is apt to become very sluggish with the added
mass of structural bandaids.
3. Given the above, I would be very surprised if we /ever/ use F-15s again without AEW and
proactive EA/DEAD support. Yet the presence of these assets is unlikely due to the dubious
decision to operate over an _Indian_ instrumented EW range. Given they are direct technical
allies of the FSU, I find little of merit in our being there at all. Furthermore, I see _no_ reference
to S-300 or equivalent Gen-3/4 SAM systems being used and -that- is the primary threat driver.
Similarly there is no mention of advanced illuminator/striker type detached section tactics using
the MIDS/IDM modem which the 3rd TFW also has. These two systems would theoretically
allow an AIM-120C7 or D equipped team (with 2-way, digital, datalinks to the missile) to attack
the threat from highly divorced spatial positionings using a missile with an _11"_ motor
extension. Since the lies about the doppler notch are largely exaggerated given the monopulse

swing angle and multi-PRF tracking (which takes away the famous Russian 'anti-AMRAAM'
tactic of cutting airspeed and then recovering for an MRM shot), the metric then becomes one of
'my six AIM-120 vs. your four R-77 or R-27AE' and the U.S. should be able to use COE or
Contempt Of Engagement tactics to dictate pole numerics from the outset of engagement.
4. The notion of a need for 'Better Red Air' is contemptibly /laughable/ given the FACT that
Nellis based Aggressors were doing anti-AMRAAM/anti-Wall-Of-Eagle tactics in the late 80's
and were in fact _disbanded_ because they showed a gross lack of 'tact' in humiliating the the
AIM-120/F-15 'big stick, little ball' combination. And we couldn't have that, now could we?.
Snort.
Keeping in mind they were doing this with early generation F-16C.25 or .32 with the Pratt 220
motor and no AMRAAM option themselves, it is not in anyway unsurprising that roughly
equivalent MiG-21 mod 'Bison' and early delivery Su-30 were able to challenge the F-15s ten
years older. I would, again, be more interested in seeing the unrestricted use of radars over our
MOAs and thus a comparitive evaluation of things like AIM-9X vs. Python-4/5 and Derby which
the IAF is supposedly buying for their MiGs and Jags. MICA on the Mirage 2000 is another
'interesting' option. Because I think what you will see is that 60` bore on an 8-12nm (impact
distance) AIM-120B or 12-15nm AIM-120C5 is going to BEAT the extant Russian and Israeli
and French SRM classes. But that the '20km seeker on a 10km motor' AIM-9X (which was taken
to Cope India btw.) will AGAIN cripple the Eagle as a platform too large to be doing WVR crap,
with a micromissile intended for the 'small fighters' like the F/A-18 and F-16. God knows that's
what killed all functionality in the AMRAAM until they got the electronics small enough to stuff
another 5+void-6 inches of motor inside.
5. Until and unless they start giving us REAL flight test data on the F/A-22 (how fast, how far,
what kind of an internal fuel fraction for wingloading/thrustloading/G-rating XYZ in terms of
sustained supercruise) there will be no validity to the types claims of enhanced performance.
Right now, the advertisment is for 100nm in and out at Mach 1.5 or better with a 400-450nm
combat radii. This is NOTHING compared to the 800nm overall mission with 'half' (over enemy
territory) in SSC. Stealth is worthless if it doesn't bring with it the legs to employ _away from_
such incredibly high signature, high risk (in a MEADS/Aster and S-400 age of 300+km
weapons) assets as tankers BEFORE you cross the fence. Equally, if we are talking anti-access
and 'raid-ial' distances from outside 500nm, ONLY sustained supercruise will buy you decent
sortie numbers over target. Here, I am actually very optimistic. Because Air Force lies, and
prevaricative silence actually reinforces the notion that a Raptor with 20-25,000lbs of internal
fuel (the equivalent of an F-15C with 2-3 610 gallon tanks) is actually right up there in the 7league-boots area. And we are only holding back on this fact until the utterly worthless JSF can
be purchased. Of course the USAF 'never planned' on losing the F/A-22 as a viable production
airframe 'in addition to' the F-35 so there may still be some hard choices when you are looking at
a 2-3hr vs. 7-10hr cruise speed difference in the 700-800nm radius category. 1.25:1 manning
ratios simply don't support the notion of a high value (limited inventory $$$$) force that can only
generate 1 mission per day, per airframe, without KILLING the aircrew with fatigue. The UCAV
is the only other option and the Armed Forces don't seem to care for our national security as
much as they do assuring squatters rights for their 'voting majority' of cockpit unionists.
8. Lastly, and most worrying in many ways. Given VLO /works as advertised/, Air Supremacy

shouldn't really be separated from Strike IMO. While 'Air Dominance' is about 80% DEAD and
20% A2A. The first means that if you tie an F/A-22 to a legacy force of F-Teens, _it's_ best
cruise performance and ability to reach-back beyond the frontal layers of air defense will be no
more or less than the loiter and coverage required to make the 15E/16C/18F pylon-mission
happen with bigger bombs. And that is a shame because 90%+ of the target set can be dealt with
using very small charges in a penetrating case munition, and the F/A-22 is the ONLY stealth jet
to have nominally demonstrable LO carriage of these munitions in the GBU-39 on the BRU-61
in it's weapons bays. At the same time, ICAP-3 was cancelled by the USN after a single squadron
of 'testing the electronics for the EA-18G' showboating while the rest of the Prowler fleet
languishes and the AARGM was similarly abandoned in the hopes that Congress would once
again step in and assure funding for these _critical_ EA/DEAD systems while the HG&U
admirals went after more pretty hulls for their so called inshore/littoral program. Except
Congress hasn't. And so you are once more looking at a 'purely air superiority' platform in the
Raptor which _cannot defend itself_. But you are also staring in the eyeball an escort system
(made up of 300nm small weasels cued on by RC-135) that itself is /highly/ vulnerable to the
Gen-4 (ARH on a long loft IMU) SAMs. And may be facing DEWs in another 10 years or so.
ALL this is 'bad, very bad' when you consider the fact that the Raptor is supposed to itself be the
'enabler' force. The doorkicker element of GSTF which protects the B-2 and F-117 and EA-6B
/before/ the F-legacy jets get into play.
And it can (now) only do so with a glide-out ballistic weapon whose average Mach point is
going to be less than 1.4 for targets in the 20nm category. AND less than .75 for targets in the
longreach areas of 50-80nm. HSAD/HSARM are in the running to replace HARM with a
potentially ramjet driven + Quickbolt autonomously seekered (no more 'microwave oven'
decoys!) _internal carriage_ weapon. But it too is very young as a program and thus apt to
cribkill vulnerabilities as benchwork transitions to producing flight test hardware for a major
weapons qualification.
ESPECIALLY given the low numbers of F/A-22 being purchased, the low numbers and
protracted delays that are looking likely for the F-35. And the U.S. armed forces utterly moronic
notions of why they won't buy UCAVs to act as sacrificial droid-air /instead/ of running a
manned systems risk; there is simply no justification whatsoever to support the F/A-22 as a
JDAM/SDB weasel aircraft. It cannot provide coverage of the flanks and forespace areas of even
a small raid package against threats with such huge envelope bubbles and the abiltiy to put
'torpedo spread' salvoes of missiles into a seeker cube that is NOT dictated by launch-site
detection threshold WEZ dynamics as the older SARH and CG systems were 1-shot:1-plane
limited to.
S2A fires have claimed, by far, the majority of downed aircraft from the very earliest days of our
taking warfare into the 3rd dimension. We MUST therefore begin to look at these platforms, no
matter what the nominal letter in front of them, as systems which divorce themselves from the
nominal 'predictive zone' of sensor-here, missile box there, cross coverage. While maintaining
the ability to WIN missile chicken games, either with hypervelocity ramjet (HSARM) or
sustained supersonics (Lethal MALD) that pushes our weapons out further, faster than their
SAMs can come back at a very limited procurement of VLO assets.
I would also advocate the development of very low observable, endurant, UAVs to supplement
the Darkstar scaleup used in OIF. Because these are the systems which will have to be available
to use both LPI doppler radar and IRST lookdown in backtracing the launch plume and speedrise of missiles coming out of 'dumbfire' launch boxes which are little more sophisticated than a

U-Haul trailer with an ADGE datalink or 'roadside plugin' ability to take shot handoffs from
other, outside, cueing sensors.
Missiles with hunting, classification capable, sensors are _worthless_ if you are flinging them
upwards of 200km without precise cueing as to seeker footprint and restrictor data for trajectory
optimization and no-collaterals flyout. And only a separate aperture can achieve this needlefrom-hay localization from 'on-high'.
Can the Indian's help define this new operational metric by making (deliberate) fools of the
USAF using predictably (AIMVAL/ACEVAL) and Bore-only AIM-9L shooting F-5Es 'beating'
F-15s with AIM-7F) 'golf handicapped' tactics vs. technology leveraging?
I doubt it. KPl.

>>
The MOST LETHAL fighter ever made shouldn't just be replaced, sure, it is getting
old and maintnance costs are going up, but that doesn't mean we can't build new f15s, with better radar, engines, etc. Instead, the F-15 and F-22 should be paired,
until the F-22 has been proven in battle, and even the F-4 hasn't been replaced,
even though it is one of the worst jet fighters in history. So why on earth replace the
F-15 without even considering building newer, better ones??
>>
There are a lot of reasons why the F-15 is no longer adequate as a player in our
kinds of ops (expeditionary into the bad guys landscape).
1. It's a broken design and always has been.
The F-15 was engineered light to give it the snapup capabilities to engage the MiG25. Unfortunately, this lightness (more aluminum than it should have had, not
enough high strength titanium or iconel), along with specific design elements like
the conical cambered wing (effectively like flying around with LEF in permanent
deployment) creates a _very_ aggressive aerodynamic environment that spills back
all across the wings and into the empennage with the result lost wingtips, shredded
stabilators and a thousand other downed-then-bandaided structural uncertainty
moments. Many Eagles are more patch than pretty now and that's /after/ about half
of them have had effectively new wingsets applied back in the 80s.
Similar conditions enforce limiters on the way the MRM are carried (huge spillflow
from the nodding inlets tore up the fins on early AMRAAM) and the acceptable
jettison envelopes of the tanks. The PW-100 engines could no longer use VMAX,
even in war and the 220E mod upgrade actually takes away thrust. There have been
reported problems with the gear struts cracking and the hydraulics for the CAS have
always been a mess, all of which are getting harder and harder to find support for
as DMS conditions take new parts out of the spares pipe and refurbished ones are
not to the same quality.
2. It's Performance Compromised.
Across the board. In terms of combat persistence, the F-15 has always been short
on fuel fraction (11,000lbs in the A and about 14 in the C whereas the F-14 has
about 16 internal and another 3+ in supersonic capable external tanks), especially
given it's design opponents performance band required long forays into supersprint
this is really not an acceptable condition. The radar is not particularly amenable to
upgrade, those few (late C) jets capable of accepting the upgrade into AESA also
have about 400lbs of ballast in the tail. Though the ALQ-135 is finally close to giving
the spectrum and spatial (FQ) coverage it should have had in 1979, it in no way
matches up to the types overall signature penalty and thanks largely to the harsh Q
environment, it cannot carry HARM out board to self-defend. When the NATO
commanders in Italy started facing a lot of Grinder, and Post Hole type border

crasher missions as Serbia tried to 'draw us offsides' during the 1990s adventure
into the Balkans, they didn't ask for F-15s, they requested F-16CJs because only if
you are prepared to swat snakes do you dare chase birds into a SAM thicket. Put
HARM under the midwing stations and you compromise the upper shoulder
positions for AAM as well as stealing wing tanks. Put CFT on the fuselage to
compensate for the absent wingtanks and suddenly you're driving a cement truck
on skates. And then of course there's the notorious signature issue. No jet can beat
an NEZ missile that can see to track it. Not even the Raptor. Yet even the common
bandaid improvements like ALE-50/55 which are being applied to the F-16 don't
work on the Eagle because of the configuration (wing pylons are too close to the
stabs, centerline trails into the afterburner stream etc. etc.).
The F-15 is an illustration of what happens when you take a machine designed just
before the CATIA/Finite Elements mission optimization period of digital design and
drag it too far forward into another age. Less missing link than Encino Man it is still
not the jet that it seems to be.
ARGUMENT:
Some things I want you to think about.
A. Ask an honest pilot: It's not the crate, nor even the man in it. It's the systems and
weapons. While this nominally favors your argument, the fact of the matter is that it
also favors the F-16C.50+ or E and the F-35. Both of which, as new manufacture
systems, give the excuse of deaging the inventory at the profit of Congress and the
industrialists.
2. The most maneuverable fighter on the planet is a missile. While this again means
an F-15C (or SG) with AIM-9X can theoretically /beat/ 'the better fighter' as an Su-30
with Archer, it also means that if both launch at the same time you're gonna get a
lot of Pyrrhic victories. Which highlights the fact that a fighter isn't any good if it is
at such risk that you cannot afford to throw it away.
3. The easiest way to beat this problem is to put a small laser jammer called a
DIRCM on the 'more advanced jet' and let it burn out the optics of the inboud threat
weapon. Unfortunately, the Soviets are closer to achieving that capability as a
baseline than we are (low drag IRSTs with imbedded 'laser rangefinders' as part of
the baseline design). And with lasers in the picture, it becomes a lot easier to point
one at the 10ft canopy from 15 miles instead of a 6" missile seeker at 4.
4. There is a (fairly) new doctrinal idea out there called 'MFFC' or Mixed Fighter
Forces Concept' tactics. It's also known as fighter director or 'shooter/illuminator'.
What it basically comes down to is one guy emits from a safe standoff point and
everyone else takes a datalink version of his 'picture' from which a common shoot
list is generated to fire. While this doesn't fully remove the launch aircraft from the
picture (it still helps to kinematically boost a given shot for shorter times of flight
with supersonic sprinting at altitude for instance) what it does mean is that if you
make the weapon /capable enough/ and the launch platform _cheap enough_ you
can disperse the formation across a wider area, making it harder for the enemy to

engage all of them as a function of radar cone and missile envelope overlap. What
this comes down to is an in-place chainsaw option tactic and it is made even more
powerful by the fact that modern AAM no longer have to be tether-tuned to operate
on ONE aircraft's radar sideband. But rather can take midcourse steering from
nearly any authorized network member. So that shoot and scoot takes on whole
new meanings. All together, MFFC means that 4 F-16, with nominally the same
missile load of 16 AMRAAM as a single pair of F-15s can (max out) to, in fact is
about an order of magnitude more efficient because they are not relying on their
own APG-68 radar. But rather on the APG-77 in the Raptor behind or to the side of
them. With AIM-120D, they can kill targets they cannot see and then either
complete their strike mission. Or retire from the battle altogether, acting as little
more than spare launch rails to the F-22.
5. The Air Force has a missile they've been on and off testing for about 10 years
called the MALD.It in turn has a derivative system called MALI. The Miniature Air
Launched Interceptor 'ideally' costs around 75-120 grande. It only weighs about
150-200lbs. And it's just about 6ft long. i.e. Half the size of a Sidewinder. This
missile can fly for 230nm or roughly 20-30 minutes. At least 10 minutes of which
can be supersonic at between Mach 1.1 and 1.4. And thanks to it's decoy origins, it
is GPS programmable to either follow a specific route or to sit on station until called
to 'leap into action' in mimicking a strike package that is just arriving in the combat
area behind it. If you were to optimize this kind of missile system into a HUNTING Air
To Air Missile, you would effectively give any aircraft with spare payload capacity a
Phoenix equivalent capability in a pint jar. What is most important about this system
is that it is inexpensive enough to be swarmed into huge skirmish lines so that it can
find even stealth targets using nothing but normal optics. And if it /misses/ it can
come 'round again and make another pass. An F-22 at 50,000ft and Mach 1.78 is
likely untouchable by such dogpile tactics, it is simply moving too high, too fast, in
too thin air. But _every other asset_ is fair game. Including the very ISR and BMC2
systems by which the Eagle depends to gain dominant initial intercept positioning.
6. The ultimate fighter plane on our planet in 10 years time is going to have 4
engines and weigh close to a million pounds on takeoff. It will have a thrust to
weight ratio on the order of .31 and a wingloading around 137lbs per square foot. It
will need a minimum of 10,000ft to safely take off and land and it will require about
50 miles to successfully turn 180` at combat altitude. Do you know what aircraft
that machine will be? If you said a 747 ABL-1, you are dead on correct, have a
cookie. One of the reasons we are shifting to standoff munitions delivered from
above 30 and even 40,000ft is simple. Ground based lasers. If you close within
about 10-20km of an FDOW unreduced defensive target overlap, you will be
fricasseed in your own juices. OTOH, if you fly high and make the enemy come as
much as 60nm away from the target in their QRA intercept _just to prevent your
hitting BRL and turnign away_, suddenly you give a platform it's own 1.2MW laser
the time interval to discriminate them against a nice clear, cold, thin-aired horizon
terminator. And kill them on approach. Now, the official 'weaponization' range of the
YABL-1 is between 250 and 400km against fast-rise TBM/MRBM targets, depending

on profile. But did you know that it has to check /behind/ the target to look for high
altitude airliners and even satellites beyond? What this tells me is that, against
relatively slow moving fighters coming on at 40,000ft you are looking at between
600 and 1,000km (line of sight to the horizon) ranges. What this means is that,
particularly given the typical small engagement numbers involved, ONE ABL-1 could
standoff, completely clear from even the most deadly of S-300/400/Aster class
systems, and with perhaps a 10 instead of 4 second emission window, destroy
utterly any jet on the planet. No ducking, no jamming, no cloud cover. Just BAM. And
your a freeflying cinder in formation with pieces of your plane. This is a critical leap
forward because it removes completely the notion that you have to operate 'outside
the cover' of a penetration corridor where jammers and chaff and other penaids are
protecting the main (predictable) package ingress. The latter is where the primary
enemy defensive effort has traditionally been focused and it is the the premise on
which the F-117 and ATF-22 were designed to free themselves from 'one target, one
raid' limitations in how soon they could effect bomb delivery or target intercept. Yet
it is still a clumsy system when you have to wait multiple minutes for the 'escort' or
even 'MiGCAP' jets to sweep out, close up and engage an enemy. Particularly when
INS autonomous weapons are involved and you're never completely sure if even
stealth is 'really invisible'. If you shoot early you avoid merged plots and
deconfliction issues. If you combine early shots with drones or even MALI type
weapons looking right into the enemy baselane for target ID, you get a generally
cleaner, quicker resolved, engagement overall.
CONCLUSION:
Air Dominance is one of the most wasteful missions you can practice in all it's
various forms. It's literally flown 70% of the time, maneuvered 20% of the time and
killed 10% of the time. Which means you have 'fighters' flying alongside tankers and
other HVA systems as well as fighters delousing returning raiders. And fighters
sweeping beyond the target to hold it safe while the package is in the combat area.
And fighters waiting to run interference for CSAR assets. Even as you also have
'fighters' that are really bombers with AAM attacked but maintain supersonic
performance because hey, it's cool.
However; with AAMs about to evolve to an entirely new level of capability. Multiple
kill chain sources to target them without a hogs nose radar required. And thus every
launch platform reduced to the basics of how many pylons it can suspend ordnance
from a gun-cabinet resource _backup_ to high altitude DEWS platforms, it is pretty
clear that the traditional notion of 'fightering' itself is changing.
And hence you have to measure the F-15 by values like Reliability, Maintainability
and Availability on a cost-per-flying-hour basis of judgment (12-14,000, depending
on variant, compared to 5,700 for an F-16C). And then correlate this to the number
of actual, _available_ pylons it has to dropfire a weapon like the AIM-160B MALI.
Unfortunately, the F-15 falls short in every area as a legacy platform that has next
to nothing in common with the support tails as much as docrtinal systems on which
our modern air doctrine is based.

Particularly given we are looking at 2015-2020 (with the F-35 less than ten years in
service) _at the latest_ before threat countries like China and India as well as Russia
catch up to us in high energy optical applications like groundfire equivalents of the
ABL and cheap relay mirrors, I would actually rather see more resources devoted to
generic UCAV platforms which cost one tenth what a modern 'fighter' does to simply
make big wagon tracks in the sky until needed. Because the reality of life is that if
you can put a missile just 60-100 miles off your nose for half an hour you beat what
even the F-22 can do in firing an AIM-120D that takes say 3-5 minutes to fly out to
half as far because the missile doesn't waste time of flight getting close. And it has
full reserve thrust available for the terminal endgame maneuvers. Given you
mothership that capability with a system that never has to worry about being
randomly detected or exposed by high end S2A systems under it's ground track
(because it is stealthier and and cheaper than a manned system), even though said
mothership /and/ it's missile nominally cruise in a performance band that is closer to
that of a civilian business jet, the functional 'fighter mission' will be better fulfilled
with more redundant backup. While other, similar, assets carry the bombs that
pound ground targets in a truly sortie-generation flexible system that maximizes the
force fraction available to to 'non fighter' missions once Air Supremacy is won
Unless you believe the Syrians who had several runins with the type during the late
70s along the Golan and supposedly used MiG-25s to ambush a pair of Eagles after
they used the same trick against MiG-21s, The F-15 has never lost an _air to air_
engagement.
But neither has the F-14 or 16 in U.S. service while the only Hornet loss is still listed
as 'uncertain'.
However; at least 2 F-15Es, 1 F-14B and 7 F-16s have have been lost to various
forms of surface to air fire. In the case of the Mudhen to AAA early on night one of
Desert Storm when they foolishly went in at low level and again later in the conflict
when they strayed too near a Roland missile site that had the night EOCG guidance
to kill them as they flew overhead without a command link jamming capability in
the lowband.
Another Israeli F-15A was effectively lost crossing the fence back out of Lebanon
when, depending on whom you listen to, it either passed over a ridgeline of the
Shouf high enough to take a Manpads hit. Or a MiG-21 ran it down from behind.
Though not shot out of the sky, it was a writeoff on return to base.
The F-15 is routinely defeated in training, simply because everyone knows it's
capabilities and runs 'anti Eagle/anti AMRAAM' tactics to embarrass it. This being
why the Nellis Aggressors were shut down for instance. As for why the F-15 loses so
irregularly in actual warfare that is simple:

1. The USAF trains between 120 and 200hrs per year and particularly /before
combat/ surges their training to maximize their 'edge'. Where it takes a minimum of
20hrs per mission, per month, to be anywhere's near competent, only doing the Air
Dominance mission makes you pretty good at it, whereas the F-16 community has
at least one specialist A2G mission role and so must 'swing' between competency
peaks in their training schedule.
Add to this a highly conservative approach to fighting the air dominance mission
(always high and fast, always late into the game) and the Albino Eagle seldom
operates in an active radar S2A environment because it uses lookin to standoff and
avoids the trashfire/terminal area envelope like plague.
2. The F-15 always flies against very poorly trained foreign opponents who get the
worst of the Russian's 'export' grade handoffs. A well handled F-4E will beat any
MiG-23 on the planet in a dogfight or straight up missile exchange, simply because
the APQ-120/AIM-7 is so much better than the Sapfir/R-24 combination and the MiG
cannot put Gs on the airframe when it's wings are cycling. About the only thing the
Flogger is good at is running. The MiG-21 hasn't got the legs or the weapons system
to compete and particularly in the later versions is something of a kluge for
handling. The Mirage F-1 actually has a fairly radar weapons system option in the
Super-530F but it's Cyrano IV has been completely compromised to the USAF by the
French themselves. Magic I is no better than AIM-9P2 and Magic II is not as widely
exported as is thought. The key to victory in the technology race is to always make
sure your enemy is responding to your previous generation rather than pioneering a
_new mission_ that complete renders your approach unsustainable. That monkeysee-do competition complex is what destroyed the Soviets because we could lead
them where we wanted to and they would respond according to the lie of 'similar
mission, similar solution'.
3. The Latest and Greatest Just Ain't That Great.
The MiG-29 export variant is basically a heat shooter with minimal if any radar
weapon capabilities as frequently it's radar does not even support the AA-10. Which
is not to say that the RuAF Fulcrum is much better because the No-19 is a maze of
doppler and PRF manual variables. The IRST and helmet sight should compensate
for this but doesn't, thanks to low sensitivity, narrow bore cue limits and a very
primitive mechanical cueing system (akin to the HMS used by the F-4S, nearly 25
years ago).
Also, contrary to popular myth, the F-15C will out maneuver the MiG-29 from almost
any start condition because the latter's lack of freedom of maneuver renders it
unable to fight mixed EM condition duels without departing the manual FLCS.
Combine roll and vertical moves at slow speeds and the RD-33 engines spoolup
problems and you have an aircraft which has /always/ been vastly overrated. It also
retains the MiG-21's traditional persistence problems with low internal fraction,
tanks that either cannot be jettisoned or cannot go supersonic and a very limited
set of weapons options on the outboard pylons.
The Mirage 2000C is only as good as it's radar and operating radius, having to trade
all heavy BVR capability for decent persistence and usually being limited in it's RDM

configuration to the Super-530 it can support.

The Su-27 though crippled by the R-27, is just the opposite, having power, fuel,
pylon and envelope superiorities across the board which just continue to get better
and better as the Russians bring Zhuk and Bars options into the mix on the Su-30.
But the F-15 has never faced this airframe in an 'as equals' combat condition where
emulation of AIM-120 full pole capabilities and MFFC has allowed a fair comparison
with the still largely inferior Russian longrange AAM systems.
Again, the only real definition of combat capability is in the missile and guidance
support and the doctrines that exploit them and here, exercises like Cope India are
deliberately slanted to make the F-22 look good by protecting U.S. electronics
options and preseting fixed ROE limits on kinematic and seeker options for our radar
missiles.
Given I think it incredibly foolish to give our enemies (that's right, India, as a
Russia's largest military export client state is no friend) /any/ instrumented range
lookin to our system capabilities or tactics, it's a given that whatever we do will be
deceptive in either the proofing or denigration of the F-15.
ARGUMENT:
You cannot suggest upgrades are enough for a 25 year old system design baseline
because if you were to do so, that design would be the Flanker.
It simply has the aerodynamic and volumetric design elements to be superior to the
F-15 across the board.
Multiple Wing Stations = freedom to carry varied mission stores.
20-25K internal fuel = freedom from drag and signature penaltied fuel tanks.
LEX and active rather than fixed LE cambering on an aft wing= massive drag
advantagement in sprinting and much less aggressive wing aeroacoustics. Also
supports a much broader static margin for any given loadouts and general pitch
pointing/drag improvements.
AL31FP = F110-GE-129 in terms of thrust arc and AL-41F = F110-GE-132. While the
USAF is 'happy' to have finally completed the F100-PW-220E mod which brings the
F-15C up to about a mid 80s level thrust arc and lifing balance (i.e. massive derates
in peacetime, massive component wear in war, all for about 24Klbst, max). To which
one can only add that the F-15s fuselage Q environment is nearly as hostile as the
it's wingstations and always will be thanks to the contrived nodding inlet and spill
system which dumps high energy air over the single-use fuselage sides.
Sorbitsaya= much easier to mod, steerable lobe, RFCM system alternative to ALQ135 'bump' mods for FQ coverage.
Massive Radome= huge antenna area advantage.
IRST = potential for passive engagement/fusion tracking/ID not possible on the F15.
CONCLUSION:
The F-15 _has lost_ to the one threat that matters most: surface to air. It probably

has lost air to air as well but the details are muddy because they are Israeli.
It cannot compete in the one area where it most needs to: swing missioned Air to
Ground, because it lacks the targeting and pylon options to make a post SDB (4060nm standoff) tactics dynamic useful.
And provided your BRL is that far out, the traditional interpretation of
TARCAP/Sweep is needlessly dangerous in clearing the farside of a protected target
so that bombers can drop SALH weapons within 6-8nm of threat defenses.
Indeed, given proper MFFC, the nominal 'bombers' can self defend or run away from
any threat as well if not better (modems and mixed loads) as the Eagle can.
Finally, it's not yesterdays hero that matters. But tomorrows victim. And the victim
tomorrow will be protected by loitering AAM far ahead of the strike package or
destroyed by hunting skirmish lines of equivalent ground weapons, long before any
'personal' escort platform system can become useful. Add to this DEW threats and
the only useful airpower will be that which sacrificial.
In this, the UCAV beats all modern jets because it has loiter, signature and force
massing capabilities that no manned airframe can match.
When added to MFFC from equivalent (RQ-4 RTIP) platforms and dominant DEW, the
only way forward is to completely abandon the white scarf mentality and start to
play air warfare like chess. With pieces that can be sacrificed and board spacings
that support cross coverage without commitment to a common (radar cone) as
much as mutually supporting vulnerability.