Positivism, Functionalism, and International Law

Author(s): Hans J. Morgenthau

Reviewed work(s):
Source: The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Apr., 1940), pp. 260-284
Published by: American Society of International Law
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POSITIVISM, FUNCTIONALISM, AND INTERNATIONALLAW

BY HANS J. MORGENTHAU
AssistantProfessorof Law and Political Science, Universityof Kansas City
If an event in the physical world contradictsall scientificforecasts,and
thus challengesthe assumptionson whichthe forecastshave been based, it
is the natural reactionof scientificinquiryto reexaminethe foundationsof
the specificscienceand attemptto reconcilescientificfindingsand empirical
facts. The social sciences do not react in the same way. They have an
inveteratetendencyto stick to their assumptions and to sufferconstant
defeatfromexperienceratherthan to change theirassumptionsin the light
of contradictingfacts.' This resistanceto change is uppermostin the history of internationallaw. All the schemes and devices by which great
humanitariansand shrewdpoliticiansendeavoredto reorganizethe relations
betweenstates on the basis of law, have not stood the trial of history. Instead of asking whetherthe devices were adequate to the problemswhich
theyweresupposed to solve, it was the generalattitudeof the internationalists to take the appropriatenessof the devices forgrantedand to blame the
facts forthe failure.2 When the facts behave otherwisethan we have predicted,they seem to say, too bad forthe facts. Not unlikethe sorcerersof
primitiveages, they attempt to exorcise social evils by the indefatigable
repetitionof magic formulae. As the League of Nations was a failure,let
us have anotherLeague. As the firstand second Peace Conferencesof the
Hague did not succeed,let us have a thirdone. As arbitrationneversettled
a political conflictwhichotherwisewould have led to war, let us have more
arbitrationfor the preventionof war. As the Disarmament Conference
was a senseless waste of intellect and time, why not convoke another
DisarmamentConference?
It is a strange paradox that the lay public has observed a much more
scepticaland realistic,thereforescientific,
attitudetowardinternationallaw
than the scienceof internationallaw itself. The laymenweremuch quicker
to recognizethe gap betweenthe rulesofinternationallaw as representedby
science,and the rulesof internationallaw as theyexistin actual experience.
The breakdownof the main bulk of post-WorldWar internationallaw has
altogetherdestroyedpublic confidencein a sciencewhich,unmovedby what
'As to thistendency,
see LancelotHogben,The RetreatfromReason (ConwayMemorial
Lecture,London,1936); Lynd,KnowledgeforWhat?(Princeton,
1939).
2See Wild,"What Is the TroublewithInternational
Law?" Am. Pol. Sci. Rev., Vol.
XXXII (1938),p. 479: "Too oftenin thepast he has assumedtheattitudethattheworldis
out ofstepwithhislaw,and tooseldomhas he considered
thepointthatperhapshisscience
is partlyto blame."
260

POSITIVISM, FUNCTIONALISM, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

261

experiencemay show, invariably followsits preconceivedpattern.3 This

breakdownimplies the practical refutationof the ideas which have determinedthe developmentofinternationallaw in thelast half-century. Hence,
the science of internationallaw is now confrontedwith the alternativeof
maintainingthe traditionalpatternof assumptions,conceptsand devices in
spite of the teachingsof history,or of revisingthis pattern and tryingto
reconcilethe scienceof internationallaw and its subject-matter,that is, the
rules of internationallaw as theyare actually applied.4 The presentwriter
has always held that only the latter way leads to theoreticallycorrectand
practicallyusefulresults. In the followingpaper the attemptwill be made
to reexamine the methodologicalassumptionswith which the traditional
science of internationallaw starts. These assumptionsare embodiedin the
positivistdoctrineof law.
THE LEGAL PHILOSOPHY OF POSITIVISM

Positivistphilosophyrestrictsthe object of scientificknowledgeto matters

that can be verifiedby observation,and thus excludes fromits domain all
mattersof an a priori,metaphysicalnature.5 Juridicpositivismtransfers
this delimitationinto the legal sphere. The juridic positivistdelimitsthe
subject-matterof his researchin a dual way. On the one hand, he proposes
to deal exclusivelywithmatterslegal, and forthis purposestrictlyseparates
the legal spherefromethicsand moresas well as psychologyand sociology.
Hence, his legalism. On the otherhand, he restrictshis attentionwithinthe
legal sphere to the legal rules enacted by the state, and excludes all law
whose existencecannotbe traced to the statute books or the decisionsofthe
courts. Hence, his 6tatistmonism. This "positive" law the positivist
accepts as it is, withoutpassingjudgmentupon its ethicalvalue or questioning its practical appropriateness. Hence, his agnosticism. The positivist
3Professor
Law sincethe
QuincyWrightcouldreportin 1930 (Researchin International
onlytwo
War, p. 25): "Of the twentyjuristswithwhomthe writerhas corresponded,
and thatin bothcases was qualified."
betrayeda noteofpessimismat theprospects,
is called forby manywriters;see, forinstance,Philip Marshall
4Such reexamination
de
Brown,thisJOURNAL, Vol. 33 (1939), p. 149; Djuvara, Recueildes Coursde l'Acadgmie
as Hague Recueil),Vol. 64 (1938), p. 485; Hudson,
(cited hereafter
Droit International
Law (WashofTeachersofInternational
ofthe2nd,3rd,and 5thConferences
Proceedings
of
MacKenzie,Proceedings
ington,1925,1928,1933),pp. 86 etseq.,72, 94,95, respectively;
ofTeachersofInternational
1938),p. 109; Friedman,
Law (Washington,
the6thConference
of European Civilizationand the Future of InternationalLaw,"
"The Disintegration
ModernLaw Review,Vol. 2 (1938),p. 213.
positif
see Comte,Discourssur 1'esprit
of positivistphilosophy,
6 For the characteristics
(Paris, 1844), p. 41 et seq.; Mill, AugusteComteand Positivism(London,1866), p. 6 et
seq.; see especially,theexcellentarticle,"Positivism,"by Ruggieroin Encyclopediaofthe
Social Sciences,Vol. 12,p. 260.
of positivistscienceis to be foundin
criticism
The most penetrating
contemporaneous
MortimerJ. Adler,What Man Has Made of Man (New York,1937),especiallypp. 28, 87,
97, 131,132,158 etseq.,192,233,238 etseq.

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cherishesthe beliefthat the "positive" law is a logically coherentsystem

which virtuallycontains,and througha mere process of logical deduction
willactuallyproduce,all rulesnecessaryforthe decisionof all possible cases.
Hence, his system worshipand dogmaticconceptualism.6
The historicimportanceof the positivistschool of jurisprudenceforthe
science of law was fourfold. First, positivism accepted the breakdown
of the greatmetaphysicalsystemsofthe eighteenthand the earlynineteenth
centuriesand the resultingdecadence of metaphysicaljurisprudenceas an
established fact. It endeavored to save the scientificcharacterof jurisprudenceby eliminatingfromit all metaphysicalelements,thus separating
it fromthe discrediteddoctrinesof natural law. In the second place, positivismrecognizedthat the subject-matterof jurisprudencewas the law and
nothingbut the law, and that neithernon-legalsubjects nor non-legalconsiderationscould have any place in it. Furthermore,
legal positivismlearned
fromthe positivistmovementin philosophyand the natural sciences that
scientificobjectivityis dependentupon an object intelligiblein experience,
and a method aimed at knowledge,not at evaluation. Finally, the great
legal codificationsof the European continentalcountriesand the AngloAmericanstatutorylaw found in positivisma technique of interpretation
and representation. This technique fulfilledits purpose satisfactorilyas
long as the social and political philosophyof the statutes, either directly
expressedby them or indirectlyderivedfromthemby way of logical deduction,was sufficient
to meetthe economicand social needs as wellas the political demandsand ethicalrequirementsofa givensocietyat a givenhistorical
moment.
To be sure,this correspondencebetweenthe statutesand the standardsof
societyhas neverexistedcompletely;even understationaryconditionsthere
will always be a marginal sphere which does not allow the mere logical
subsumptionof a given case under statutorylaw without violating the
standards of society. In orderto satisfythe positivistassumptionsof the
logical completenessof the legal orderand at the same time meetthe standards of society,these standardswere firstto be read into the statutesfrom

6 For the characteristics

of juridicpositivism,
see Finch,Hague Recueil,Vol. 53 (1935),
p. 557, and The Sourcesof ModernInternational
Law (Washington,
1937),p. 20; Oppenheim,"The Scienceof International
Law: Its Task and Methods,"thisJOURNAL, Vol. 2
(1908), p. 333 et seq.; Bergbohm,
und Gesetzeals Quellendes Voelkerrechts
Staatsvertraege
(Dorpat,1876),p. 40 etseq.; and Jurisprudenz
und Voelkerrecht
(Leipzig,1892),pp. 51, 52;
Kelsen, Die philosophischen
der Naturrechtslehre
Grundlagen
und des Rechtspositivismus
(Berlin,1928); Pound, "MechanicalJurisprudence,"
ColumbiaLaw Rev., Vol. 8 (1908),
Law," Politica,Vol. 4
p. 605; MorrisCohen, "The Conceptsof Juridicaland Scientific
(1939),p. 8 etseq.; Ripert,"Droitnatureletpositivisme
juridique,"Annalesde la Facultede
Droitd'Aix,nouvelles6rie,No. 1 (Marseilles,1918),pp. 19,20,32 etseq.; Anzilotti,
Coursde
DroitInternational,
Vol. 1 (Paris,1929),p. 18 et seq.; Waline,"Positivisme
philosophique,
juridiqueetsociologique,"
MelangesCarrede Malberg(Paris,1936),p. 519; G6ny,Scienceet
Technique
enDroitprivFpositif(Paris,1915),Vol. 2, pp. 15 etseq.,31,37,38. A goodsurvey
is to be foundin Erim,Le Positivisme
juridiqueetle DroitInternational
(Paris,1939).

POSITIVISM,

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263

whichthey then appeared to have been derivedby a mere logical process.

Throughthe back door of pseudo-logicalinterpretationthe outlawed company of natural law and extra-legalvalue judgments reenteredthe legal
system. This kindofpseudo-logicallegerdemainbecame the predominating
interpretativetechnique of legal positivismin the period of its decadence.
In the last decades of the nineteenthcenturythe standardsof societywent
far away fromthe economic,social, political,and ethical assumptionsfrom
which the systemsof statutorylaw had started.7 Hence, the positivists
were compelledto resortto a seriesof pseudo-logicalmakeshiftsin orderto
8 on which positivistjurismaintain the fictionof "legal self-sufficiency,"
prudencehad foundedits theoreticalsystem.
From threesidesthisfictionwas, and stillis, underattack. Fromthe one
side, sociological and realist jurisprudence,inspired partly and indirectly
by the originalsociologicalpositivismof Comte,does away withthe artificial
barriersby whichpositivismhas separated the legal spherefromthe whole
domainof the social sciencesto whichit actually belongs. Thus it destroys
the positivistassumptionstogetherwith the positivistconclusions. From
the otherside, the neo-positivismof Kelsen's pure theoryof law maintains
the basic assumptionsof positivismbut undertakesto achieve the positivist
ends by purifying
the legal sciencefromall material,non-legalelements,thus
eliminatingthe subject-matterof positivistcrypto-metaphysics.
Several schools of revived natural law, as well as the politico-ideological
power of totalitarianism,have joined in this dual scientificattack. Totalitarianism has ostracized positivist jurisprudenceas a manifestationof
liberalisticdecadencein Germanyand Italy, wherethe dominationofjuridic
thoughtby positivismhas been at timesalmost undisputed,and wherepositivismhas exertedits mostfar-reaching
and fertileinfluenceon the developmentofthelegal science. Deprived ofits traditionalstrongholdsby political
suppressionand underminedby scientificcriticism,positivismis no longera
guidinginfluencein modernlegal thought.
POSITIVISM

AND INTERNATIONAL

LAW

In internationallaw, unlikethe otherbranchesof legal science,positivism

is stilla determining
influence. Ever since the turnof the century,internationalistshave started with positivistassumptions,have followedthe positivistmethod,and have professedadherenceto the principlesof positivism.9
7An excellentanalysisof thisdevelopment
is to be foundin Bonnecase'shistoryof the
Vol.
de 1804 d l'heurepr6sente,
French"kcole de l'Ex6gese."La PensFejuridiquefranQaise
1 (Bordeaux,1933).
8 Roscoe Pound,An Introduction
to the Philosophyof Law (New Haven, 1937),p. 57.
9Cavagliericould writein 1911 ("La Conception
positivede la sociWtd
internationale,"
Revueg6n.dr. pub.,Vol. 18 (1911),p. 260): "Parmiceuxqui s'adonnentaux 6tudesde droit
d'adprofession
international,
il n'estaujourd'huipersonnequi ne fassepas solennellement
h6rerAla nouvelleconceptionpositivedu droit.. . ." SomeyearslaterRipertcouldsay
juridiqueabsolu."
professeun positivisme
(Annales,kbc.cit.,p. 18): ". . . cettegeneration

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Neitherthe oppositionofnaturallaw,'0norKelsen's neo-positivistcriticism,"

nor,finally,the ratherimplicitcriticismof legal sociologists,'2has been able
to affectthe predominanceof positivistthoughtover the science of international law. The PermanentCourt of InternationalJusticestillfollowsthe
time-honoredpseudo-logicalmethod of traditional positivism which prevailed in the jurisdictionof the domesticsupremecourtsat the turn of the
century. The annals ofthishighestinternationaltribunalrecordno instance
where an advocate, like Brandeis in Muller v. Oregon,13 dared to break
throughthe networkof positivistformulae,nor of any majority opinion
whichwould not have clung,on a veryhighlevel of technicalperfection,to
the traditionalpatternof positivistargumentation. When JudgeHudson
looks fora realisticdecisionwithrespectto internationallaw he has to turn
to the Court of Appeals of the State of New York.14 Compared to municipal law, internationallaw is in a retarded stage of scientificdevelopment. As representedby its sanest elements,the science of international
law stillstands wherethe scienceof municipallaw stood in 1910; in termsof
its post-WorldWar development,its most spectacularbranches,invaded by
the political ideologyof Geneva, have gone back at least to the point from
whichpositivismstartedin the last decades of the nineteenthcentury.
The collapse ofthe internationallaw of Geneva, whenforthe firsttimeits
fictionswere confrontedwiththe fullreality,meant of necessitythe breakdown of the science which had been only its ideological reflection. The
10ProfessorLauterpacht(Private Law Sources and Analogiesof InternationalLaw
(London,1927),p. 27, note 5; p. 58, note 7; Oppenheim-Lauterpacht,
International
Law,
Vol. 1 (1937, p. 100) defendsthe opinionthat positivismno longerdominatesthe
scienceofinternational
law,but has been replacedby a new doctrineof moderatenatural
law. It is difficult
to sharethisopinion. Naturallaw and thepost-warscienceofinternationallaw haveonlythisin common,
thattheyoverstepthelimitsofexperience. However,
one woulddo injusticeto thegreatmetaphysical
systemsofnaturallaw byidentifying
them
withthe post-warscienceof international
law. WhereasSuarez and Grotiuswerefully
awareof the aprioristic,
metaphysical
characterof theirpropositions
and had good philosophicalreasonsforadheringto them,post-warpositivismhelplesslyconfusesrealityand
imagination,
wish and fact,becauseno longerdoes it possessthe scientific
meansof distinguishing
betweenboth. Cf.,also,Laski,The State in Theoryand Practice(New York,
1935), p. 198; Wild,loc.cit.,p. 483 etseq.
11See, especially,
Das ProblemderSouveraenitaet
unddie Theoriedes Voelkerrechts
(1928).
des Voelkerrechts
12See, especially,Max Huber, Die soziologischen
Grundlagen
(Berlin,
1928); Ray, Hague Recueil,Vol. 48 (1934), p. 631 et seq.; Schindler,
ibid.,Vol. 46 (1933),
desdiffgrends
p. 229 etseq.;Morgenthau,
internationaux
La Notiondu " politique"etla thgorie
(Paris,1933),pp. 37 etseq.,65 etseq.,and La RkalitM
desnormes
desnormes,
enparticulier
du
droitinternational
(Paris,1934),pp. 139,140,215.
13 208 U. S. 412 (1908). An excellent
ofthiscase
appraisalofthetheoretical
importance
is to be foundin Frankfurter,
"Hours of Labor and Realism in Constitutional
Law,"
HarvardLaw Rev., Vol. 29 (1916),p. 353.
14See the reference
to Cardozo'sopinionin Techtv. Hughes,229 N. Y. 222, 241 (1920),
in Hudson,"InternationalLaw in the TwentiethCentury,"CornellLaw Quarterly,
Vol.
10 (1925),p. 435,note75.

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post-WorldWar scienceofinternationallaw sharedthe short-livedand delusive splendorofits politicalmaster,and now shareswithhimthe finaldetection oftheircommonsham existenceas well as the resultingdisrepute. The
helplessnessof the science of internationallaw in the face of those dangers,
its very unawarenessof them, its sincereself-deceptionas to its scientific
character,are perhapsthe gravestindictmentswhichcan be broughtagainst
value ofthe positivistdoctrineofinternationallaw.'5 The failthe scientific
ure ofthepost-WorldWar scienceofinternationallaw is notdue to personalor
accidental circumstances;it growsout of the veryassumptionsand methods
whichhave led juridicpositivismto defeatin the domesticfield. Yet, in the
internationalfieldthe disastrousconsequencesofthe genuineweaknessofthe
positivistdoctrineare doubled by the absence of the conditionswhichin the
domesticdomain made juridicpositivismat least a temporaryand apparent
success.
Juridicpositivismstarts with the assumptionthat its subject-matteris
to be found exclusivelyin the writtenlaw of the state. Only the rules of
law, and all the rules of law which statutes and court decisionspresentas
such, are the materialwith whichthe positivistdoctrinehas to deal. The
criterionof the existence,that is, the validity of a legal rule, is, then, its
incorporationintothe writtenlaw ofthe state. We do not repeatherewhat
and
we have said elsewhereof the scientificvalue of this juridic monism,16
consideronlythe resultsofits beingapplied to the rulesofinternationallaw.
This criterionfor the validity of legal rules means, if transferredto the
internationalfield,that the only valid rules of internationallaw are those
whichare revealed by the decisionsof courtsand internationaltreatiesduly
ratifiedand not formallyrevoked. Yet this concept is at once confronted
with two problemsfor which the positivist doctrineof internationallaw
has no solution. On the one hand, all rulesembodiedin writtendocuments
are not valid internationallaw, and, on the otherhand, thereare valid rules
of internationallaw other than the rules embodied in writtendocuments.
The positivistformulaas applied to internationallaw is at once too narrow
and too broad."7

15For criticism
Law
law,see especially,Beckett," International
ofpost-warinternational
thisJOURNAL,
in England," Law Quarterly
Rev.,Vol. 55 (1939),pp. 261,262,266;Borchard,
Vol. 27 (1933),p. 518,Vol. 28 (1934),p. 108; Hill,ibid.,Vol. 23 (1929),p. 617; JohnBassett
Law and SomeCurrentIllusions
Moore,ibid.,Vol.27 (1933),p. 607; thesame,International
Vol. 11 (1933),see
(New York,1924); the same,"An Appeal to Reason,"ForeignAffairs,
Law," ColumbiaLaw Rev.,Vol.
especiallypp. 548,585; thesame,"Post-WarInternational
27 (1927),see especiallyp. 412.
16 See Morgenthau,
La Rgalitg
desNormes,
p. 106etseq.;cf.also,theratheranalyticalthan
criticalremarksby Edwin D. Dickinson,Hague Recueil,Vol. 40 (1932), pp. 337, 344;
ibid.,Vol. 30 (1929),p. 276.
Siotto-Pintor,
ibid.,Vol. 41 (1932),pp. 265,266; Verdross,
17 To the following
discussion,see Morgenthau,"Positivismemal compriset thgorie
rgalistedu Droitinternational,"
MglangesAltamira(Madrid,1936), p. 3 et seq.; see also,
"Der Rechtspositivismus
Archiv
fueroeffentliches
Recht,
Affolter,
in derRechtsuissenschaft,"
Vol. 12 (1896/97),pp. 40, 41.

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The science of internationallaw has not developed a criterionto distinguish, in an objective way, between seeminglyand actuallyvalid rules of
internationallaw. "One can assertthat nine-tenthsof the traditionaldoctrinesof internationallaw are not actual internationallaw," said Professor
GeorgeJellinekas farback as 1905.18 Declared ProfessorOppenheima few
years later:
It is also indispensablethat the science should freeitselffromthe
tyrannyofphrases. As thingsare,thereis scarcelya doctrineofthelaw
ofnationswhichis whollyfreefromthetyrannyofphrases. . . . Anyone
who is in touch withthe applicationof internationallaw in diplomatic
practicehears fromstatesmeneveryday the complaintthat books put
forthfancifuldoctrinesinsteadoftheactual rulesoflaw. Now it is often
notdifficult
to pushtheirrelevantto one sideand to extractwhatis legally
discourse. But thereare entire
essentialfromthewasteofphrase-ridden
areas in whichthe tyrannyofphrasesso turnsthe head that ruleswhich
absolutelynever were rules of law are representedas such.19
"On no subject of human interest,except theology,"said JohnChipman
Gray at about the same time, "has there been so much loose writingand
nebulous speculationsas on internationallaw." 20
If these statementswere true in the firstdecade of the century,the
developmentof the post-WorldWar science of internationallaw has only
added to their significance. The Covenant of the League of Nations, for
instance,is a duly ratifieddocumentwhich has never been repealed. But
has it everbeen valid internationallaw as a whole? If not,whichprovisions
never had the quality of valid legal rules,and which ones lost this quality
in the course of the gradual collapse of the institutionof Geneva? No
treatise of the law of nations offersany general criterionto answer these
questions,nor do the concreteanswers given with referenceto the actual
validityof Article16 of the Covenant reveal any such underlyingobjective
criterion. The absolute denial of any validity,the assertionof a so-called
"de facto revision,"and the defenseof full validity,are advanced side by
side.21 Similarproblemsarise withrespectto the Briand-KelloggPact and
the Peace Treaties of 1919, as well as to otherpolitical treaties,such as the
Pact of the Little Entente, alliance treaties, the concepts of aggression,
independence,intervention,government,and so forth.22They are em18 System
dersubjektiven
Rechte(Tuebingen,1905),p. 321; see also the even
oeffentlichen
criticism
Staatsvertraege,
p. 8.
stronger
by Bergbohm,
19The FutureofInternational
Law (Oxford,1921;firstin German,1911),pp. 58, 59; see
also, The ScienceofIntemationalLaw, pp. 315,334.
20 Natureand Sourcesofthe Law (New York,1927;first
edition,1909),p. 127.
21 Cf., for instance,Schwarzenberger,
in The New Commonwealth
Quarterly,Vol. 3
(1937/38),pp. 263, 360 et seq.; ibid.,Vol. 4 (1938/39),p. 60 etseq.;foran excellentstateVol. 33 (1939),p. 33.
mentoftheproblem,
see Kunz,id.,p. 131,and thisJOURNAL,
-' An excellent
ofthisproblemis to be foundin Baty,
to theunderstanding
contribution
Vol. 33 (1939),p. 653 etseq.,and "The
"The TrendofInternational
Law," thisJOURNAL,
AbuseofTerms,"ibid.,Vol. 30 (1936),p. 377.

POSITIVISM,

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bodied in writtendocumentswhichwereduly ratifiedand neverinvalidated.

Have theyever been valid law fromthe beginning,and what has become of
themin the years of theirviolation? Are theystillvalid? If theyare not,
of
what destroyedtheirvalidity? These are questionswhichtheinterpreter
domesticstatutes,subjectto a rationalprocessofvalidationand invalidation,
is not likelyto be asked, and hence the positivistdoctrineof international
law, followingthe patternof domesticpositivism,has nothingwithwhichto
answer them.23
The basic assumption of juridic positivism,that its exclusive subjectmatteris the writtenlaw of the state, leads legal sciencenot only to the inclusion of alleged legal rules whichno longerhave or never have had legal
validity,but also to the exclusionof undoubtedlyvalid rules of law. Positivist jurisprudence,starting with the axiom of "legal self-sufficiency,"
separatesthelaw fromthe othernormativespheres,that is, ethicsand mores,
on the one hand, and fromthe social sphere, comprehendingthe psychological, political, and economic fields,on the other hand. By doing so,
positivismseversthe actual relationsbetweenthe law and the otherbranches
of the normativeand social sphere. It proceedson the assumptionthat the
law, as it reallyis, can be understoodwithoutthe normativeand social context in whichit actually stands.24 From the applicationof this assumption
to internationallaw thereresultsa threefolddelimitationof legal research,
contraryto the exigenciesofthe reality,and hencea threefoldmisconception
of what internationallaw reallyis.
1. The normativesphere,comprehendingthe totalityof rules governing
a given society,is one whole withregardto the basic preceptsit contains.25
23 This absenceof any scientific
law is
testforthe validityof the rulesof international
oftheinterrepresentatives
intowhichsomeoftheforemost
fortheperplexity
responsible
Scelle,whohadfounded
a whole
nationallawofGenevahavefalleninrecentyears. Professor
law upon "internationalsolidarity,""international
systemof "positive" international
and like "social facts,"in 1937arrivesat theconclusionthatthereis no such
federalism,"
law at all. "I1 n'y a plus en Europede droitdes gens,"he writesin
thingas international
theJournaldesNations(No. 1665,Feb. 28 and March1, 1937). "Il n'ya plusdes trait6s."
Zimmern("The Declineof Interna"The conclusionseemsunescapable,"says Professor
Affairs,
Vol. 17 (1938),p. 12), "that positiveinternational
tionalStandards,"International
law,so called,hasno claimto thenameoflaw." (See also thesame,The LeagueofNations
and the Rule of Law 1918-1935(London,1936),p. 94.) Thesescholars,whonevercared
ofthevalidityofa ruleoflaw,nowfallfrom
forsuch"abstract"problemsas thecriterion
international
oneerrorintotheother. First,theyacceptedtheassumedvalidityofpost-war
law withoutquestion;now,sinceit is obviousthatthemainbulkofthisso-calledinternawith
thisproductoftheirimagination
tionallaw neverhasbeenvalidlaw at all,theyidentify
law,whichtodayis as validas it has everbeen,and
the mainbulkofpre-warinternational
law simplydoesnotexist!
declarethatinternational
24 "Can we even understand
Englishlaw withoutgoingbeyondthe actual rulesthemPolitica,Vol. 4
paper, "WhitherJurisprudence,"
selves?" asks Paton in his interesting
(1939),p. 16.
25 To thefollowing
Law,"
in International
see Pound,"The PartofPhilosophy
discussion,
Congresssof Philosophy(New York,1927),p. 374 et
of the 6thInternational
Proceedings

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Althoughtheremay be in a given societyparticularlegal rules which contradictparticularethicalrulesor mores,and viceversa,the main bulk of basic
ideals to be realized,of ends to be achieved,and of intereststo be protected,
is generallythe same in the different
branchesof a given normativeorder.
Law, ethics, and moressupport each other in the pursuit of these aims.
Legal rules referto ethicsand moresforthe determinationof theirmeaning
and viceversa.26 The guidinginfluence,however,as to the ideals, ends, and
intereststo be pursued by the norms under which a given society lives,
emanatesfromthe ethicalsphere. Fromit law and moresreceivethe fundamental distinctionsbetweenthe good and the bad, the ends to be advanced
and the ends to be opposed, the intereststo be protectedand the interests
to be repudiated. At the base of any legal systemtherelies a body of principles which incorporatethe guiding ideas of justice and order to be expounded by the rulesoflaw. The intelligibility
of any legal systemdepends
upon the recognitionofsuch a set offundamentalprincipleswhichconstitute
the ethical substance of the legal system,and shed theirilluminatinglight
upon each particularrule of law.
This recognitionis relativelyeasy to performin the domesticfield,where
the constitutioncodifiesthe main bulk of those fundamentalprinciples,and
a highlyintegratedpublic opinionprovidessupplementarymoral guidance.
The task is muchmoredifficult
withrespectto internationallaw. Here there
is no body of such principlesseparate fromthe ordinaryrulesof law. Some
of those principlesmay be only partlyexpressedin these rules; othersmay
not be expressedat all, and hence have to be detected, in a dangerously
uncertainprocedure,in the generalmoralideas underlyingthe international
law of a certaintime, a certaincivilization,or even a certainnation. Yet
the successfulsearch for these principlesis as essential for the scientific
understandingof internationallaw as of any legal system.
Legal positivismis unable to grantthis recognition;forat its basis there
is the hostilityto all mattersmetaphysical,that is, those which cannot be
ascertained by actual observation. Since non-legal rules have generally
enteredthe horizonof the positivistjurist as metaphysicalrules of natural
law, the positivistis inclinedto identifynatural law and ethicsas such, and
to repudiateboth as metaphysics. However, to exclude a prioria certain
subject-matterfromscientificresearchby callingit metaphysical,instead of
impartiallyexaminingactual experience,is to blindoneselfto a preconceived
idea originating,not in experience,but in mere reasoning,and thus to do
violenceto the facts. Hence, the positivistconceptofthe normativesphere
seq.; Bentwich,The ReligiousFoundationsof Internationalism
(London,1933),especially
"International
p. 262 etseq.;Zimmern,
Law and Social Consciousness,"
Transactions
ofthe
thebrilliant
GrotiusSociety,Vol. 20 (1934),p. 25 etseq.;cf.,particularly,
paperby Schwar"The Rule of Law and the Disintegration
of the International
zenberger,
Society,"this
JOURNAL, Vol. 33 (1939),p. 56.
26We have dealtwiththisproblemin La RMalitW
desNormes,
p. 155.

POSITIVISM,

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269

itself reveals a metaphysicalattitude, a kind of negative metaphysics

which plainly contradictsthe very assumptionsof a positivescience.27
Yet positivismhas never been quite able to live up to its legalisticand
anti-metaphysicalassumptions. The verynature of its subject-matterhas
compelledit time and again to violate its own assumptionsand make use of
fundamentalprinciplesnot revealedby " positive" law. In orderto give at
least apparent satisfactionto these assumptions,positivismdares to make
use of such principlesonly under the disguise of positivistconcepts, and
thereforedevelops a fictitiousmethod which tries by pseudo-logicalarguments to derive from "positive," that is, written,rules of international
law somethingthat those rulesdo not contain. The interminableand quite
sterile discussionson the foundationof the bindingforceof international
law are evidence of this word-juggling,since this is a problem which, as
definedin the positivistterms of mutual consent and the like, is contradictoryin itself,and hence insoluble withinthe frameworkof positivism.
The foundationofthe bindingforceof " positive" law can logicallybe found,
not in this "positive" law itself,but only outside it.28 Anotherexample is
the problem of sovereigntyas definedand solved by positivism. Here
again a fundamentalprinciplewhich,by its verynature,cannot be derived
from"positive" law, but fromwhich"positive" law itselfratherderivesits
meaning,is to be dealt with as if it were a rule of "positive" international
law. It is forthese helplessattemptsto conciliateits legalisticassumptions
with actual juridic experiencethat the positivistdoctrineof international
law is bound to misrepresentthe realityof internationallaw and to fail to
do justice to its actual content.29
2. The preceptsof internationallaw need not onlyto be interpretedin the
lightof the ideals and ethico-legalprincipleswhichare at theirbasis. They
need also to be seen withinthe sociologicalcontextof economic interests,
social tensions,and aspirationsforpower,whichare the motivatingforcesin
the internationalfield,and whichgive rise to the factual situationsforming
the raw materialforregulationby internationallaw.30 The correctnessof
27For thispoint,see Liard,La Sciencepositive
etla m6taphysique
(4thed., Paris,1898),
of
pp. 38, 57, 72. See also Ruggiero,loc. cit.,p. 261: "Not onlythe extremedifficulty
but
positiveand notexceedingthelimitsofexperience
itselfon a levelstrictly
maintaining
haveoftencausedpositivism
withmateriality,
objectivity
also thetendency. . . to identify
in contradiction
to its ownprethatis, intometaphysics,
to rangeoverintomaterialism,
of"positivismendingin disregard
ofpositive
legalphenomenon
mises." As to thespecific
in ModernTheoriesofLaw (London,1933),pp. 132,133;andMorgenlaw,"see Lauterpacht,
mal Compris,
pp. 3, 4.
thau,Positivisme
28 Strupp,Hague Recueil,
Vol. 47 (1934),p. 298; Brierly,The Law of Nations(London,
1936),p. 45.
29 Brierly,The Shortcomings
of InternationalLaw, p. 4 et seq.; Morgenthau,"The
of Kansas City Law Rev., Vol. VII (1939), p. 110;
Problemof Neutrality,"University
Wild,loc.cit.,p. 478 etseq.
of the
30 For thispoint,see Brierly,
op. cit.,pp. 5, 16; KennethColegrove,Proceedings
s6rieC,
ofTeachersofInternational
Law, p. 97; Ray,AnnalesSociologiques,
5thConference

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this postulate forthe interpretationof municipallaw is today self-evident.

Nobody wouldevertryto interpretsocial legislationwithoutreferenceto the
conflictingsocial intereststo be evaluated and the social relations to be
settled. Nobody would ever endeavor to grasp the legal meaning of economiclegislationwithoutmakingeconomicinterestsand conflictspart ofthe
reasoning. Even wherethe referenceto the underlyingeconomicand social
forcesand relationsis not always explicit,as in the fieldof contracts,the
sociologicalcontextis neverthelessalways referredto by implication. It is
onlybecause ofthehighlytypicalcharacterofthefactualsituationsand their
social and economic significance,with which everybodyis familiar, and
which are completelyand adequately expressedin the legal rules,that the
merereference
to thoselegal rulesimpliesthe considerationof the social and
economicfactorswhichare at theirbasis.
It was, historically,the most disastrous error of positivism to misunderstand completelythis implicit referenceto the sociological context
whicheverylegal rule contains. This errorcan be traced back to the tradition of the pandectists,who had in the Roman law the classical model of a
highlytypifiedlegal systemwhich expressedwith perfectappropriateness
the fundamentalinterestsand relationshipswhichcan arise fromthe social
activitiesof men. So perfectlywas this sociologicalcontextrepresentedin
the abstractionsofthe Roman law, that the pandectistswereonlytoo prone
to forgetits very existenceand to deal with those abstractionsas with independent logical entities. So did the positivists,both in the municipal
and internationalfields.3' This methodologicalerror was of minor importancewherethe legal conceptsweretrue abstractionsfromthe interests
and relationswhichtheyweresupposed to regulate. When,however,those
legal rules were applied to interestsand relationsto which some of them
referredonly partly,othersnot at all, that methodologicalerrorwas bound
to have a disastrousinfluenceupon the scientificvalue of positivistjurisprudence. In the domesticfield,it became instrumentalin distortingthe
legal reality and originatingthat positivist conceptualismwith which a
decadentlegal scienceattemptedto adapt the old legal rulesto new economic
and social needs, but at the same time maintainedthe fictitiousassumption
that the writtenlaw already contained,logically,all the rules necessaryfor
the solutionofthosenew problems. Thus the juridicalpseudo-logicbecame
the artificialmakeshiftby whicha stationarylaw could be reconciledwitha
movingsocial reality.
In the internationalfield,the methodologicalerrorof neglectingthe socioNo. 3, p. 14 etseq.;cf.especially,theexcellentremarks
by Friedman,ModernLaw Review,
Vol. 2 (1938),p. 194;andreview,
ibid.,p. 81.
81For the influence
of Romanlaw upon intemational
law, see Pound,loc. cit.,pp. 376,
377; Lauterpacht,PrivateLaw Sources,p. 23 et seq.; Alvarez,NouvelleConception
des
ttudesjuridiques,p. 47 etseq.

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logical contextofinternationallaw led to even worseconsequences.32 In the

domesticfield,the correspondencebetween legal concepts and sociological
contextwas at least a temporaryfact, and withinthis limitthe negligence
of the sociologicalcontextand the assumptionof the "self-sufficiency"
of
the writtenlaw could be justified. In the most importantbranches of
internationallaw this correspondencehas never, and could never, have
existed. The sociologicalrelationshipsunderlyingthose branchesof international law are characterizedby theirindividual,non-typicalnature.33 A
politicalsituationin the internationalfieldis not likelyto repeatitself,since
the varietyoffactorsof whichit is composedmakes foran indefinitenumber
of possible combinations. Hence only a strictlyindividualizedrule of law
willbe adequate to it. Internationallaw providespartlyforsuchindividualized rules by restricting
the application of a rule to one individual case and
leavingtheregulationofsimilarfuturecases to newlegislativeefforts. Peace
treatiesare instancesof such individualizedrules of internationallaw. In
part, however,internationallaw does maintain the form of the general,
typical rule of law and depends on the interpretationof the rule to provide
the flexiblemeaningwhichthe ever-changingsociologicalcontextrequires.
All political treaties which are intent upon establishingpermanentrights
and dutiesbetweenthe contractingpartiesare of this kind. The same generallyand typicallywordedtext may imply quite different
rules,according
to the politicalfunctionwhichit is supposed to fulfill.34Thus one is able,
for instance, to distinguishthree differentperiods in the historyof the
Treaties of Locarno.35 Those three periods are characterizedby three
significantchanges in the normativecontent of the rules, resultingfrom
changesin the political context,althoughthe wordingof the rulesremained
unchanged. The Covenant of the League of Nations, as a whole,as well as
particularprovisions,forinstance,Article16,have been submittedto similar
modificationsas a result of factual sociological developmentsand not of
legislativechanges.36
The same phenomenonoccursnot only in temporarysuccession,but also
Law, pp. 72,73.
ofTeachersofInternational
ofthe2ndConference
Reeves,Proceedings
is clearlyrecognizedby Brierly,Hague Recueil,
This highdegreeof individualization
ibid.,Vol. 46, p. 265.
Vol. 58, p. 16; Ray, ibid.,Vol. 48, p. 699; Schindler,
has beenexcellently
withregardto municipalsociallegislation
34 The same phenomenon
that
describedby Frankfurter,
loc. cit.,pp. 369, 370: "It is nowclearlyenoughrecognized
by thefactsrelevant
each case presentsa distinctissue;thateach case mustbe determined
to it; that we are dealing,in truth,not witha questionof law but the applicationof an
changingand growingvarietyof economicand social
undisputedformulato a constantly
notonlyofthegeneral
consideration,
callsfora newand distinct
facts. Each case,therefore,
in questionand the
factsof industrybut the specificfactsin regardto the employment
whichcalledforthespecificstatute."
specificexigencies
" TheoriedesSanctionsinternationales,"
Revuede DroitInt. et de Leg.
3 See Morgenthau,
Comp.,Vol. 16 (1935),p. 832.
36See Morgenthau,
of Neutralityin Europe," Am. Pol. Sci. Rev.,
"The Resurrection
Vol. 33 (1939),p. 473.
32

33

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sociologicalconditions. The identical

undercontemporaneousyet different
text of an arbitrationtreatyor non-aggressionpact may have quite different
legal meanings,accordingto the politicalsituationexistingbetweendifferent
contractingparties.37 Even one and the same legal rule, as, for instance,
interpretationswith reArticle16 of the Covenant, lends itselfto different
political conditions.38
spect to states livingunder different
The positivistdoctrineof internationallaw has completelyignoredthis
particular relationshipbetween the rules of internationallaw and their
sociological context. Positivism transplanted schematically the highly
refinedpositivistmethodof formalistand conceptualistinterpretationinto
the domain of internationallaw. This method developed under, and was
justifiedby, the specificdomestic conditions of a temporarilystabilized
society where there was approximatelyno tension between law and sociologicalcontextbut almost completerationalizationand representationof
the sociologicalcontextwithinthe conceptsof positivelaw. Schematically
nature,this method
applied to a law and a societyof a distinctlydifferent
was bound to produceentirelyinadequate results. Wherethe experienceof
internationallaw showedthat an individualsituationrequiredan individual
interpretationof the legal rule,the positivistmethod could not fail to disregardall individual aspects of the factual situation and concentrateupon
the generalwordingof the legal rule which,by virtueof its logical self-sufficiency,was supposedto containall elementsnecessaryforits understanding;
and to thisthe referenceto the sociologicalcontextcould contributenothing.
An arbitrationtreatywhichsubmittedall conflictsbetweenthe contracting
parties to internationaltribunalswas a legal documentthat revealed its
legal significancethroughits text, i.e., another step towards the establishment of an internationalorder based upon respect forlaw. Whetherthe
treaty was concluded between Switzerland and Uruguay, or Denmark,
Sweden,and Norway,or Great Britainand France, or Germanyand Poland
in 1925, 1935, or 1939-these were "political" considerationsirrelevantly
lyingbeyond the scope of positivistinterpretation.39
3. The positivistdoctrine,by recognizingas internationallaw only the
rules enforcedby states, excludes fromthe domain of internationallaw all
rules whose validity cannot be traced to the writtendocumentsof states.
On the otherhand, the positivistdoctrinecannot deny that such rules,like
most rules of general internationallaw, actually exist. Confrontedwith
the embarrassingdilemmaof violatingits own etatistassumptionsor of dis37Leresche,"La Crisedu Droitdes Gens,"Rev.int.Franqaisedu Droitdes Gens,Vol. 6
(1938),p. 303.
38 See the excellent
seit
Staatsvertraege
criticism
by Barandon,Das Systemderpolitischen
Vol. 4), p. 1.
1918 (Handbuchdes Voelkerrechts,
politicalcirtreatiesconcludedunderdifferent
39 See author'sanalysisof arbitration
its Natureand its Limits (in German,1929),
in International
Jurisdiction,
cumstances,
p. 131 etseq.

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regardingan obvious part of legal experience,the positivist doctrinehas

taken refugein a concept which has become a veritable panacea for its
theoreticaltroubles. We are referringto the concept of customarylaw,
whichhas servedforthe traditionaldoctrineof internationallaw as a kind
of collectivedesignationfor all the rules of internationallaw the originof
which cannot directlybe traced to writtensources. The insurmountable
theoreticaldifficulties
of explainingthe existenceof a so-called customary
law have been pointed out elsewhere,40
and this is no place to resume the
discussion. It is sufficient
to state that the reconciliationwhichthe positivist doctrineis able to establishbetweenits monist,legalisticassumptions
and the existenceof a so-called customarylaw, is merelyapparent. In
orderto save these assumptionsas well as those facts,it resortsto a series
of fictions,like tacit consent,recognition,judicial admission,and so forth,
which indirectlyendeavor to attributethe existenceof the so-called customaryrulesofinternationallaw to the legislativewill of states.
PREFACE

TO A FUNCTIONAL

THEORY

OF INTERNATIONAL

LAW

The fundamentalweakness of the positivistdoctrineof internationallaw

lies in its inadequacy to internationallaw as it reallyis. Unfaithfulto its
own assumptions,it containsat the same timemoreand less than the actual
rulesofinternationallaw, whichit furthermore
submitsto subjectiveevaluation in the lightof ethicaland politicalprinciplesof assumedlyuniversal,yet
doubtful,validity. A trulyscientifictheoryofinternationallaw mustavoid
thesemistakesin orderto come closerto the reality. It seemsto be a logical
choice to call such a theoryby the name of realist. There are, however,
two objectionsto this choice. On the one hand, the increasingdisrepute
of the traditionaldoctrineof internationallaw has led no few practitioners
of this doctrineto demonstratetheirclosenessto the realityof international
law by callingthemselves"realists." 41 This misuse has deprivedthe term
of its distinctivecharacterin the internationalfield. On the other hand,
realismhas become a collectivedesignationforseveral tendenciesin modern
jurisprudence,all aiming at replacing,by differentmeans, the fictitious
legalismoftraditionaljurisprudencewitha conceptionnearerto the realities
of the law. All these tendencieshave this in common:They do not regard
the legal rules as definitelydeterminedby their legislative or judicial
formulation,but search forthe psychological,social, political and economic
forceswhich determinethe actual contentand workingof legal rules and
40 La R&UlitM
desNormes,p. 89 etseq.; forcriticism
ofthe doctrineof customary
internationallaw, see also,Brierly,Hague Recueil,Vol. 58, p. 29; Ray, ibid.,Vol. 48, pp. 697,698.
41See, forinstance,Kaufmann,Hague Recueil,Vol. 54 (1935),pp. 319,320; Scelle,ibid.,
Vol. 46 (1933), p. 691; Verdross,ibid.,Vol. 30 (1929), p. 277; Le Fur, in Revuede Droit
International,
Vol. 17 (1936),p. 7-authors whohave certainly
not verymuchin common
besidestheclaimofbeing"realists." Cf.also,Lundstedtwho,accordingto Pound,loc.cit.,
p. 145,qualifiesPound,Kelsen,and Duguitas "realists"!

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which,in turn,are determinedby them. In otherwords,theirscientificgoal

is to formulateuniformfunctionalrelationshipsbetween those forcesand
the legal rules. Hence, "realist" jurisprudenceis, in truth, "functional"
jurisprudence.42
The legacy whichpositivismhas left to the science of internationallaw
consistsin the task of comprehending
the internationallaw of a giventime
as standingin a dual functionalrelationshipwith the social forcesof this
time. On the one hand, internationallaw is the functionof the civilization
in whichit originates,that is, of the regulativeideas laid down in the ethics
and moresof this civilization,of the political, economic and generalsocial
forcesprevailingin it, and, finally,ofthe specificpsychologicalfactorsmanifestingthemselvesin the individuals determiningit. On the other hand,
internationallaw is a social mechanismworkingtowardscertainends within
this same civilizationwhich,in turn,as far as determinedby it, becomes a
functionof this same internationallaw. By systematizingthe rules of a
giveninternationallaw underthe viewpointof this dual functionalrelationship betweenrules and social forces,the functionaltheorywill arrive at a
real scientificunderstandingof the materialelementof the legal rules which
positivismeven at its best was able to describeand systematizeonly according to superficiallegalisticviewpoints.43
Six importantconsequencesfora functionaltheoryof internationallaw
of a sociologicalnature,
42Althoughthe doctrinedevelopedin the textis undoubtedly
throughthe inwe wouldratherpreferto avoid the term;forsociologicaljurisprudence,
is associatedwiththe idea of "social engineering,"
fluenceof Professor
Pound'swritings,
legal science,a verypremature
whichis, fromthe standpointof the contemporaneous
proposition;
see,infraVI under.
of functionaljurisprudence,
as understoodin this paper, have been
43 The principles
by Llewellyn,"Legal Traditionand Social Science Method-a
admirablyformulated
1931);
Realist'sCritic,"Essays on Researchin the Social Sciences(BrookingsInstitution,
and "Some Realismabout Realism," Harvard Law Rev., Vol. 44 (1930/31),p. 1236 et
describedby Pound,
is excellently
frompositivismto functionalism
seq. The transition
ibid.,Vol. 51 (1937/38),pp. 446,447: "The determining
"FiftyYears of Jurisprudence,"
and thedirectionwas sociology,
study
leadingto functional
impetuscamefrompositivism
ofthe
in thelightofall the socialsciences,and tendsto consideration
oflegal institutions
ofthelegal materials
ratherthanexclusiveconsideration
legal orderas a socialinstitution
thatorder." See also, Hudson,CornellLaw Rev.,
withwhichtribunals
workin upholding
developedalsoby P. Alex,Du Droit
Vol. 10,p. 434. The functional
viewpoint
is excellently
et du Positivisme
(Paris,1876),see especiallypp. 12 etseq.,26 etseq.,39, 118. Thiswork,
ofa well-understood
positivism
today,endeavorsto applytheprinciples
completely
forgotten
of juridicposithe subsequentaberrations
to jurisprudence,
and thusputsby implication
articleby FelixS. Cohen,"The Problems
tivismin therightlight. See also,thepenetrating
ModernLaw Review,Vol. 1 (1937/38),p. 5; and Malinowof FunctionalJurisprudence,"
ski, "The Group and the Individualin FunctionalAnalysis,"Am. Jour.of Sociology,
Vol. 44 (1938/39),p. 951: "I wouldlike to add thatthe scienceof modernjurisprudence
in treatinglegal phenomenawithinthe context
could becomeinspiredby anthropology
of social life and in conjunctionwith othernormsof conduct." For the philosophical
background,see Kallen, "Functionalism,"Encyclopediaof the Social Sciences,Vol. 6,
p. 523.

POSITIVISM,

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can be drawnfromthisrecognition
of the functional
relationship
between
socialforcesand international
law.44
I. A functional
theory
ofinternational
lawhastostartwiththerecognition
ofthe particularly
intimatenatureof thisrelationship.45
In the domestic
field,legalrulescan be imposedby thegroupwhichholdsthemonopolyof
organized
physicalforce,
thatis,theofficials
ofthestate. The international
sphereis characterized
by theabsenceofsucha group. International
law
owesits existence
to identicalor complementary
interests
ofstates,backed
by poweras a last resort,or,wheresuchidenticalinterests
do notexist,to
a merebalanceofpowerwhichprevents
a statefrombreaking
theserulesof
international
law. Wherethereis neithercommunity
of interestsnor
balanceofpower,thereis no international
law. Whereasdomestic
law may
originatein the arbitrarywill of the rule-making
agenciesof the state,
international
law is usuallythe resultofobjectivesocialforces. When,in
theinternational
field,an arbitrary
rule-making
powertriesto imposerules
norby a balanceof power,these
supportedneitherby commoninterests
rulesneverbecomevalid law, or gainonlyephemeralexistenceand scant
andthe
oftherulesembodiedintheTreatyofVersailles
thehistory
efficacy;
CovenantoftheLeagueofNationsis a striking
exampleofthis.
It is also dueto thisintimaterelationship
betweensocialforcesand legal
rulesthatin theinternational
fieldfundamental
changesofthesocialforces
and,hence,ofthelegalrules,followeach otherat frequent
intervalsand in
an abrupt,oftenviolent,manner. In the domesticfieldthe regulative
socialforcedominating
all othersis the state. It has developednot only
an overwhelming
of
powerapparatus,but also highlyrefined
mechanisms
andjudicialreadjustment,
whichlead thesocialforcesintocertain
legislative
channelswithoutdisrupting
the legal and social continuity.Here, the
stateselectsin authoritative
decisionsthesocialforcesto be recognized
by
the law. It decidesto whatextentthe existinglegal rulesshall yieldto
changing
conditions,
to whatextenttheyshallresistthem,andin whatways
theyshalltrytotransform
them. In theinternational
fieldtheauthoritative
decisionis replacedby the freeinterplayof politicaland militaryforces.
Thismakesa gradualreadjustment
ofthelaw to changing
socialconditions
difficult.Anyfundamental
extremely
changeofthesocialforcesunderlying
a systemof international
benefilaw of necessityinducesthe prospective
ciariesofthechangetotryto bringabouta corresponding
changeofthelegal
ofthelegalstatusquo willresistanychangeof
rules,whereasthebeneficiaries
the
the old order. Here a competitive
contestforpowerwill determine
44These consequences
can be statedwithinthelimitsof thispaperonlyin verygeneral
terms,and otherconsequences
maybe revealedthrough
applicationoftheprinciples
developed in the textto specialproblems;see theenumeration
ofpossiblefurther
consequences,
in Positivisme
p. 20.
mal compris,
45This relationship
is clearlyrecognized
by Huber,op. cit.,p. 9 etseq.; Schindler,
loc.cit.,
p. 237 etseq.;see also,La R6alit6desNormes,
pp. 139,140,215.

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victorioussocial forces,and the change of the existinglegal order will be

decided,not througha legal procedureprovidedforby thissame legal order,
but througha conflagrationof conflictingsocial forceswhich challengethe
legal orderas a whole.46
Wheresuch a conflictbetweensocial forcesand the rulesof law exists,the
characterand functionof the whole legal order undergoa transformation.
We have proposed to call this relationshipby the name of "tension," and
have dealt withits legal consequenceselsewhere.47
II. This recognitionof the peculiarrelationshipbetweensocial forcesand
rulesofinternationallaw providesthe clue forrestating,in functionalterms,
the doctrineof the validityof internationallaw.48 A rule of international
law does not, as positivismwas prone to believe, receive its validity from
its enactment into a legal instrument,as, for instance, an international
treaty. There are rules of internationallaw whichare valid, althoughnot
enacted in such legal instruments,and there are rules of internationallaw
which are not valid, although enacted in such instruments. Enactment,
is no objective criterionforthe alleged validityof a rule of intertherefore,
national law. A rule, be it legal, moral,or conventional,is valid when its
violationis likelyto be followedby an unfavorablereaction,that is, a sanction against its violator. An alleged rule, the violation of which is not
followedby such a sanction,is a mereidea, a wish,a suggestion,but not a
valid rule. An alleged rule of internationallaw, against the violation of
whichno state reacts,and is likelyto react,is proved,by this very absence
ofprobablereaction,not to be a valid ruleofinternationallaw. The gradual
invalidationof the territorialprovisionsof the Treaty of Versailles,and of
mostarticlesofthe Covenant ofthe League ofNations,by violationand noninterventionof sanctionsagainst these violations,are experimentalproofof
the correctnessof this concept of validity.49
How, then,are we to know beforehandwhen such sanctionsare likely to
intervenein behalfofa violatednorm,and whennot,and, hence,how are we
46 Thisproblem,
whichrefers
to thevalidityofinternational
law and its dynamicaspects,
shouldbe clearlydistinguished
fromtheproblemdiscussedsupra,underpar. 2. Therewe
had to do withthe questionas to how in the international
fieldthe particularcharacteristicsof the socialcontextare represented
in thematerialconceptsofthelegalrules.
47 On thetheory
ofintemational
"tensions,"see Morgenthau,
International
Jurisdiction,
p. 59 etseq.; and La Notiondu "Politique,"p. 37 etseq. This theoryhas beenthoroughly
discussedby Ray,Annalessociologiques,
s6rieC, No. 1 (1935),p. 163etseq.
48 As to theproblem
ofthe validityofinternational
La R6alit6des
law,see Morgenthau,
Normes,pp. 28 etseq.,212 etseq. Professor
An Introduction
Timasheff,
to theSociologyof
Law (Cambridge,
1939),p. 271,callsthetheorydevelopedtherean "artificialconstruction."
However,it seemsto us thattheartificiality
ofthistheoryis onlythe reflex
ofthe artificial
characterofinternational
law itself;as to thistheoryofvalidityin general,see hisremarks,
ibid.,pp. 142,166,299,300. The psychological
mechanism
underlying
thevalidityofinternationallaw is welldescribedby Baty in thisJOURNAL,Vol. 33 (1939),p. 653.
49 For the relationship
betweensanctionsand validity,see also, " Th6oriedes Sanctions
Internationales,"
loc.cit.,pp. 474 etseq.,809 etseq.

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to say, in an objective,scientificway, whichnormsare valid and whichare

not? The considerationof the functionalfactorwill give the answer.
1. The commonestand simplesttest forthe validityof an alleged rule of
internationallaw is this: State A has, in the past, requestedState B to performcertainactions corresponding
to the rule,whereasState B, in turn,has
requested State A to performcertainactions correspondingto the same or
another rule. Where these identical or complementaryinterestsin the
mutual observance of these rules did not sufficeto guarantee the actual
observance,both states were willingto enforcecompliancewith the rule by
protest,reprisal,or militaryaction. Wheretherewas, in the past, a recognized identicalor complementaryinterestin a certainaction on the part of
two or morestates,togetherwiththe willingnessto enforcethisaction,there
existsthe likelihoodthat the same sanctionsforthe sake ofthe same interests
will also be performedin the future. Respect forthe status of diplomatic
representativeshas been, in the past, an interestrecognizedand guaranteed
withsanctionsby all states; therefore,
the forecastis justifiedthat the states
will followthe same course of action in the future.
The enactmentof rules correspondingto such interestsin international
treatiesmay indicatethe permanentnatureof those interests,but this is an
assumptionwhichneeds supportfromthe factsand whichcan be disproved
by them. Anotherindicationof the permanenceof such interestsis their
sublimation into moral principles,which pretend universal validity and
endeavor to give certaininterestsof exceptionalimportancea justification
superiorto that which they could derive fromthe law.
2. The situation,however,is not always so simple. Three possible situations presentthemselvesfor-examination. It can be that:
(a) Identicalor complementary
interestssurvivethe willingnessto enforce
the actions correspondingto them. The provisions of the Treaties of
Locarno were the functionof identical and complementaryinterestsof the
contractingparties. When Germanyviolated these treatiesby remilitarizing the Rhineland, the interestsof the signatoriesin the demilitarization
survived their willingnessto enforce an attitude correspondingto their
interests,and thus the respective rules of international law lost their
validity.
(b) The willingnessto enforcecertainactions correspondingto identical
or complementaryinterestssurvivesthe intereststhemselves. The provisions of the Treaty of Versailles establishingthe German-Polishfrontier
fromthe outset did not correspondto the interestof both states. These
provisionswere observedfora period of twentyyears because thereexisted
a balance of power between both nations and theirrespectiveallies, which
preventedeitherof themfromviolatingthe law.
(c) The interestsand the willingnessto enforcethe actions corresponding
to them disappear altogether. In this categorybelong the French-Russian
and German-Italianmilitaryalliances, the Pact of the Little Entente, the

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politicalprovisionsofthe Covenant ofthe League of Nations, and numerous

provisionsof the Peace Treaties of 1919.
What does the analysis of these cases show withregardto the validityof
internationallaw? In the cases (a) and (c) the rules of internationallaw
become invalid accordingto the functionalconcept of validity because no
longer does there exist a likelihood of sanctions being performed,should
those rules be violated. In case (b) the validityof the rules depends upon
a balance ofpower,whichmay be stable fora certaintime,and thensuddenly
become unstable,but whichin our time is of a ratherpermanentlyunstable
and precariousnature. All cases have this in common, that they make
forecastsas to the likelihoodof sanctionsextremelyuncertain. The enactment of the rules in internationaltreatiesis here of no avail, and, as contemporaneousexamples have amply shown, is rather misleading. Their
withmoralprinciplesis scarcelymoreilluminatingbecause ofthe
conformity
of ascertainingthe exact moral natureof such principles.
aforesaiddifficulty
Where the functionalrelationshipsbetween sociologicalforcesand international law is in a state of transitionfrom(1) to one of the situationsunder
(2) the developmentmay as well stop at an intermediatepoint between
(1), on the one hand, and (2 a) and (c), on the other; proceed to (2 b); or,
finally,come to an end at (2 a) or (c). Here, the validityof the respective
rules of internationallaw is, so to speak, in suspense, and may be as well
maintained or destroyed. With respectto such rules the science of international law becomesa systemofguesses,enjoyinga greateror lesserchance
of being proved true accordingto the factual developmentof the functional
relationshipbetweenthe social forcesand the rules of internationallaw.50
III. It followsfromthis analysis that thereexist two obviouslydifferent
types of internationallaw, one founded upon the permanentand stable
interests,the other based upon the temporaryand fluctuatinginterestsof
is not only of fundamentalimportanceforthe
states.5" This differentiation
understandingof the validityof internationallaw; it leads to yet more farreachingconsequencesas to the subject-matter,the methods,and the scientificcharacterof the scienceof internationallaw. One mighteven say that
sciencesofinternationallaw which
it leads to the recognitionof two different
deal with different
subject-matters,and apply, or rather ought to apply,
methodsof researchand systematization.
different
The main bulk ofthe conceptsand principlesofinternationallaw has been
derivedfrommunicipalcivil law. These conceptsand principleshave been
1881),p. 34, makes,in conInternational
Law Digest,Vol. 2 (Washington,
60 Wharton,
betweennecessary,
distinction
nectionwithJonesv.Walker,2 Paine 688,a veryinteresting
thatis, politicalvalidity.
thatis, juridic,and voluntary,
1 The classicalconceptofjus necessarium
pp.
mal compris,
Positivisme
(see Morgenthau,
rules(loc.cit.,p. 45
and extraterritorial
betweenterritorial
16, 17) and Huber'sdistinction
See also, Starke,"Monismand
et seq.) referto relatedbut notidenticaldifferentiations.
Law," BritishYear Book of InternationalLaw,
Dualism in the Theoryof International
Vol. 17 (1936),p. 78 etseq.

POSITIVISM,

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279

stability
developed withina legal systemcharacterizedby the extraordinary
of the interestsunderlyingit. Hence its application is, of necessity,restrictedto legal systemsbased upon equally stable interests. In the international fieldsuch stable interestsexist,forinstance,withrespectto diplomatic
privileges,territorialjurisdiction,extradition,wide fieldsof maritimelaw,
arbitral procedure,and so forth. This is the classical fieldof traditional
internationallaw as it has graduallydevelopedin the practiceof states since
the sixteenthcentury. We propose to call these rules non-politicalinternational law, originatingin the permanentinterestsof states to put their
normal relationsupon a stable basis by providingfor predictableand enforceableconductwith respectto these relations.
But thereis anothertype of internationallaw whichexpresses,in termsof
rightsand duties,temporaryinterestsevergivento change. In thiscategory
belong politicalagreements,especiallytreatiesof alliance and theirmodern
substitutes,which,underthe legalisticdisguiseoftreatiesof generalarbitrafrequentlypursueaims at least preparatory
tion,consultation,or friendship,
to close political ties. The traditionalscience of internationallaw treats
both types of internationallaw alike, applying to both the concepts and
methods developed in municipal civil law.52 By doing so, it cannot but
draw a completelydistorted picture of those rules which belong in the
categoryofpoliticalinternationallaw. Undersuch treatment,theirvalidity
established,whereasit is actuallyalways precarious;the
appears to be firmly
interestswhich they are supposed to serve appear to be permanentand
definite,whereas they are actually exposed to continuouschange and are
more or less uncertain;and consequently,the rightsand duties established
by themappear to be clearlydetermined,whereasthey are subject actually
to the most contradictoryinterpretations.
This writerknows of only one monographdealing with political international law as an independentsubject-matterrequiringconceptsand methods
of its own: Rafael Erich's Alliancesand Alliance Treaties.53 He is aware of
only a fewreferencesclearlystatingthe functionalrelationshipbetweenthe
political rules of internationallaw and the underlyingsocial factors:Judge
Manley 0. Hudson remarksthat "if internationallaw is to be built on solid
foundations,it is no more possible to ignorethe political and social phases
of the prevailinginternationalorder than it is possible to ignore similar
phases of the prevailingnational orderin the buildingof municipallaw"; 4
52 This problem
is clearlyseenby Whitehead," AlnAppealto Reason,"AtlanticMonthly
policy,arisesfromtheimmediate
(March,1939),p. 311: "Obligation,in Europeanforeign
situationand fromdutyto thefuture. Formallaw can referonlyto situationssufficiently
centurysoughtthe
stable." See also, Hudson,loc. cit.,p. 435: "Where the nineteenth
vindicationofnaturalrights,it mustbe ourtaskto ascertainand evaluateinterests."
1907.
63In German,Helsingfors,
54ThePermanentCourtof InternationalJustice(New York, 1934), p. 567; see also
Law, p. 40,
ofTeachersofInternational
ofthe2ndConference
p. 552etseq.,and Proceedings
withFenwick,ibid.,p. 69,and thisJOURNAL, Vol. 33 (1939),p. 107,agreeing. In thesame

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a similarremarkin theHarvardResearchin International

Law revealsthe
same author;5 and,finally,
Professors
Jessup56 and Wild57 urgethefunctional approach. There seems to be only one judicial opinionclearly
pointing
to thepracticalconsequences
ofthisrelationship:
JudgeAnzilotti's
dissentingopinionin the Austro-German
CustomsUnion Case.58 It remainsfora functional
theoryofinternational
law to developsystematically
as well
conceptsand methodscapableof conveying
thelegalcharacteristics,
as the functional
on politicalfactors,of politicalinternational
dependence
law.
notonlybetween
IV. As wehaveseen,thereexistfunctional
relationships
the law and thenon-normative
socialforces,but also betweenthelaw and
theotherbranchesofthenormative
sphere,thatis, ethicsand mores. The
latterarethreefold
withregardto thevalidityandthecontentoftherulesof
law.
As has beenshownelsewhere,59
the validityof any legal systemreposes
upona fundamental
normwhichitselfcannotbe ofa legalnature,butbelongs
of necessity
to the domainof ethicsand mores. Thus,the validityof the
legalsystemoftheUnitedStatesreposes,on theone hand,uponan ethical
rule enjoiningupon the President,the membersof Congressand of the
SupremeCourtto obeythe Constitution,
and,on theotherhand,uponthe
moreskeepingalive amongthe citizensthe respectforthe Constitution.
is lacking,thevalidityof
Whenoneortheotheroftheseethicalfoundations
the Constitution
and ofthelegalsystemfoundeduponit is in a precarious
state. Whenall are lacking,the Constitution,
and withit the wholelegal
haveceasedto existas a livinglegalordereventhoughtheymaynot
system,
have beenformally
invalidated.
Not onlydoesthevalidityofthelegalsystemas a wholereposeuponethics
in
and mores,butthevalidityofindividual
legalrulesalso standsfrequently
a particular
functional
relationship
withethicsand mores. It can be that
thevalidityofoneandthesameprecept,
forinstance," Thoushallnotkill,"
directionpointsthe remarkby McNair,Hague Recueil,Vol. 43 (1933),pp. 251 and 252:
" Nous appartenons
A l'ecolede ces juristesqui pensentque la sciencedu droitinternational
a besoin aujourd'huides mat6riauxA mettreen oeuvre plus que des theses et des
monographies."
66 Researchin International
Law undertheAuspicesoftheFacultyoftheHarvardLaw
School,thisJOURNAL, Supp., Vol. 29 (1935),p. 953; see also pp. 937,938, 947.
Law, p. 134 etseq.
56 Proceedings
ofthe 3rdConference
ofTeachersofInternational
57 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev., loc. cit.
of the majoritydecisionfromthe functional
standpoint,see
68 As to the defectiveness
CustomsRegime,"AmericanBar
Hudson, "The WorldCourt and the Austro-German
AssociationJournal,
Vol. 17 (1931),p. 793:" In ournationalcourts,a refusalto takeaccount
of the socialand politicalconditions
to whichlaw mustbe applied,has producedsomeof
courtmightsimilarly
the sharpestcriticismof our legal systems.. . . An international
builda law in disregard
ofthepoliticalfactorswhichconditionitsapplication,but it would
almostcertainly
lack boththeappearanceand the substanceofreality."
59 La Rgalit6
desNormes,
pp. 76 etseq.,174 etseq.,216 etseq.

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281

reposesupon the likelihoodthat againstits violationtherewill be performed

sanctions pertainingto the domains of ethics and mores,as well as to the
realmofthe law. Many provisionsofthe Constitution,ofciviland criminal
are at the same timelegal rules,
law, belongto this category,and, therefore,
ethical rules,and rulesof the mores. It is obvious that this double or triple
guarantyhas an importantbearingupon the observance and validity of a
given precept. When such a multipleguarantyexists,that is, when ethics,
mores and law co6perateto realize a certainorderof things,thereis a much
greaterlikelihoodthat this orderwill be realized than when the law alone
strivesforthis goal.60
It has already been pointed out that legal rules receive their precepts
partly from ethics and mores. The meaning of these precepts requires
explanationin the lightof these otherrules fromwhichit is derived. The
Constitutionitself,forinstance,does not reveal what "due processof law"
or "freedomof contract" is; it is only by referenceto the ethics and mores
of a certainperiod of constitutionalhistorythat the meaningof these constitutionalconceptscan be determined.
The recognition,with regard to internationallaw, of these three fundamental relationships,here hinted at rather than actually explained, calls
for the discussionof a series of problemswhich the traditionalscience of
internationallaw does not even care to pose. What is, for instance, the
empiricalnatureof the dual relationshipbetweeninternationallaw, on the
one hand, and ethics and moreson the other? Are there ethics and mores
of a trulyinternationalnature,or do we call by the name of "international,"
ethicsand moresthe preceptsof whichhave been developedunderthe determininginfluenceof the individual states and are applied to international
affairsin the interestof these states? Which rules of internationallaw
belong,at the same time,to ethicsand mores,and so have a greaterchance of
being observed? The meaning of which rules of internationallaw can be
only determinedby referenceto ethicsand mores,and to what kind of ethics
and moresdo these rules refer?61
V. It followsfromthe precedingdiscussionsthat no branchof the traditional scienceofinternationallaw is morein need ofreformthan the doctrine
of interpretation. The traditionaldoctrinehas limitedits effortsto transferringschematicallythe time-honoredcommonand Roman law principles
of interpretationto the internationalfield. It has discussed the problem
whetherthe wordingof a treatyor the intentionsof the partiesshall be the
main source of interpretation;it has gone deeply into the question whether
preparatorymaterials may be used for purposes of interpretation;and it
60 To this"cumulative"relationship,
discussion
see ibid.,p. 185etseq. To thefollowing
to
ibid.,p. 155 etseq.; and the remarksreferring
explanations,
see the generaltheoretical
op. cit.,pp. 62, 83, 84, 272,324.
themby Timasheff,
(supra,notes4, 25)
papers by Friedmanand Schwarzenberger
61 The aforementioned
in thisdirection.
beginning
are a promising

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has advanced a great varietyof so-called "rules of construction." Yet it

has completelyoverlookedthe fact that, due to the peculiar relationship
between social forcesand rules of internationallaw, the problemof interpretationin the internationalfieldshowsunique aspects forwhichthe traditional civil law techniqueof interpretationis utterlyinadequate.
When in the domesticfieldthe meaningof a contractis ascertainedby the
usual means ofinterpretation,
the interpretative
job is done. It is generally
not too difficult
to performthe same task with regardto an international
treaty;but thenthe real problemof interpretation
just begins. A contract
of civil law generallyuses standardized language whose legal meaning is
definite,or at least can be ascertainedaccordingto objective, universally
recognizedcharacteristics. An internationaltreatyis not necessarilyof the
same nature. Its real meaningmay be disguisedwith diplomaticlanguage
so that its wordingis indicativeonlyof what it does not mean. Undersuch
circumstances,it is only fromthe social contextthat this treatywill receive
its meaning. The political situation of the parties, and their intentions
withrespectto this situation,have to be ascertainedfromthe viewpointof
the subject-matterofthe treatyin question,forthe timeofthe conclusionof
the treatyas well as forthe time of the interpretation;for,as we have seen,
the legal meaningofan internationaltreatyis eversubject to change. From
this analysisone may thenconclude,in a laboriousand always highlyuncertain manner,what mightbe the probable objective of the treaty and the
legal meaningof the particularstipulationsservingthis purpose.
What, for instance, does the term "independence" in an international
treatymean? Its meaningmay coincidewiththe accepted meaningof the
term,it may be somewhatdifferent,
it may be the exact opposite,or it may
have no legal meaningat all. The rules of constructionwill be of no avail
with respectto this problem. It is only fromthe backgroundof the social
contextand of the functionthe treatyis supposed to fulfillwithinit, that a
scientificinterpretationcan hope, at least withincertainlimits,to receivea
satisfactoryanswer. The answer will, for instance, vary according to
whetherthe state to whichthe term applies is a colonial, semi-colonial,or
non-colonialcountry;whetherthe treatyis concluded between two states
of equal or different
political power; whetheror not in the last alternative,
the morepowerfulstate has imperialisticintentionswithrespectto the other
party; whetherthe treatyis of a bilateralnature,pursuinga specificpolitical
aim, or is supportedby the consensusofa greatnumberof statesforthe sake
of a generalpurpose commonto all of them.
VI. To fulfillits task,thefunctionaltheoryofinternationallaw has to take
another step beyond positivism. It was the assumptionof the positivist
concept of science to be more scientificthan any previous approach to an
understandingofthings. Positivistsciencewas supposed to be freefromall
metaphysicalelements,not asking how thingsought to be and what their
"real"yessence mightbe, but seekingonly uniformrelationsbetweenthings

POSITIVISM, FUNCTIONALISM, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

283

in experience."Je ne proposerien,je ne supposerien,j'expose,"

verifiable
was Comte'sdevice. But just as Comteendedin the metaphysics
of his
"religionofhumanity,"
so juridicpositivism
wasnotsatisfied
withknowing
whatthe law actuallywas and how it worked. It was onlytoo eagerto
remodelthe worldof the law afteridealisticassumptions
whoseuniversal
authorstookforgranted. This tendency,
validitytherespective
variously
branchesofmunicipallaw,is uppermost
in theposistrongin thedifferent
ofinternational
law. The scienceofinternational
tivistdoctrine
law,completelyabsorbedby practicalproblems
as to whattherulesofinternational
law shouldbe, is payingalmostno attentionto the psychological
and sotheactionsofmenin theinternational
ciologicallawsgoverning
sphere,nor
to the possiblelegal rulesgrowingout of such actions. Who woulddare
embarkuponsuchresearchwouldbe called"impractical,"and the results
of his studies,if evermentioned
at all, wouldbe qualifiedas "worthless."
Grandioselegalisticschemespurporting
to solvethe ills of the worldhave
replacedthelessspectacular,
searchfortheactuallawsand the
painstaking
facts underlying
them. This presumptuous
enterprisehas contributed
nothing
to thebetterment
ofinternational
letalonetheknowledge
relations,
of whattheseinternational
relationsactuallyare. It has onlyshownthe
utterfutility
of all attemptsto reform
humanconditions
on the basis of
idealisticassumptions
withoutknowingthe laws underwhichtheseconditionsstand. As WilliamGrahamSumnerput it:
In thisview,theworstvicein politicaldiscussions
is thatdogmatism
whichtakesits standon "greatprinciples"or assumptions,
insteadof
ofthingsas theyare and humannastandingon an exactexamination
tureas it is. . . The socialsciencesare,as yet,thestronghold
ofall
thispernicious
and nowheredoesit do moreharmthanin
dogmatism;
politics. The wholemethodofabstractspeculationon politicaltopics
is vicious. It is popularbecauseit is easy;it is easierto imaginea new
worldthanto learnto knowthisone; it is easierto embarkon speculationsbasedon a fewbroadassumptions
thanit is to studythehistory
of
statesand institutions;
it is easierto catchup a populardogmathanit
is to analyzeit to see whether
it is trueor not. All thisleads to confusion,to the admissionof phrasesand platitudes,to muchdisputing
but littlegainin theprosperity
ofnations.62
"The eagerness
forpremature
practicalapplication. . . ," to expressthe
samethought
in thewordsofVilfredo
Pareto,"is everobstructing
theprogressofscience,alongwitha maniaforpreaching
to peopleas to whatthey
oughtto do-an exceedingly
bootlessoccupation-insteadof findingout
whattheyactuallydo." 63
Why,then,is it thatthe fieldwherethe socialsciencesare able to work
is muchnarrower
successfully
thanthe corresponding
fieldof the natural
62 "Democracy and ResponsibleGovernment,"
in The Challengeof Facts and Other
Essays (New Haven, 1914),pp. 245,246.
63 The Mind and Society,Vol. 1 (New York,1935),p. 185.

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sciences? It is againSumnerwhoknowsan answerto thisquestion. "The

reasonis becausetheelements
ofanysortofproblemwhichwe do notknow
so farsurpassin numberand importance
thosewhichwe do knowthatour
solutionshave fargreaterchanceto be wrongthanto be right."64 Thus,
theproblemwhichthescienceofinternational
lawhas to solveis clearlyset.
The naturalscienceshad to discoverthelawsgoverning
naturebeforethey
couldhopeto dominate
thenaturalforces,
to preventthedangersemanating
fromthem,and to use themforhumanaims. In thesameway,thesocial
sciencescannothopeto masterthesocialforcesunlesstheyknowthelaws
whichgovernthesocialrelationsofmen. In thenaturalsciences,thediscoveryof the infinitesimal
calculusby Newtonand Leibnizwas boundto
precedemanymoderntechnicalinventions.The millennialattemptsat
the airplanecould not succeedas long as Carnothad not
constructing
establishedhis purelytheoretical
on thermodynamics.
propositions
Were
it not forthe theoretical
efforts
of Faraday,who himselfdid not invent
ofpracticalvalue,therewouldnot be todayany ofthe multiple
anything
forpracticalpurposes. Had not Maxwelland Hertz,
uses of electricity
withoutanypracticalobjective,carriedout certain"abstruseand remote"
in thefieldofmagnetism
calculations
and electricity,
Marconicouldnever
have inventedwirelessand theradio.65
The scienceofinternational
law,as wellas thesocialsciencesin general,
are stillawaitingtheirNewton,theirLeibniz,theirFaraday,theirCarnot,
theirMaxwell,and theirHertz. To expectthecontemporaneous
lawyerto
be an "engineer"or "technician"ofthelaw meansto expectEdisonbefore
Faraday,WrightbeforeCarnot,MarconibeforeMaxwelland Hertz. And
a futileexpectation.The greattaskwhichlies beforethe
thisis certainly
socialsciencesis topreparetheworkofthelatterso thattheformer
canbuild
uponit. By joiningthemin thisendeavorthefunctional
theoryofinternationallaw willnot onlyfulfill
thetaskofany scientific
thatis,
doctrine,
to knowwhatis and whyit is; it willalso preparethegroundforsatisfying
thegreaterethicaland politicaldesireto improveinternational
relations
by
meansofthelaw."8
64

"SpeculativeLegislation,"op. cit.,p. 219.

65 For therelationship
betweentheoryand practicein thenaturalsciences,see Meyerson,

La D6duction
(Paris,1925),p. 333 etseq.; IdentitM
etRMatitd
(Paris,1926),pp. 36,
relativiste
37; Du Cheminement
dela Pens6e,Vol. 1 (Paris,1931),p. 3 etseq.;Flexner,"The Usefulness
of UselessKnowledge,"Harpers(October,1939),p. 544.
66 A highly
oftheproblem,
illuminating
discussion
onlyhintedat in thetext,is to be found
in ProfessorHankin'spaper, "Social Scienceand Social Action,"AmericanSociological
Positivismin SoRev., Vol. 4 (1939),p. 1; see also, Professor
Lundberg,"Contemporary
ciology,"ibid.,p. 52 etseq. The problemis statedwithintuitive
insightby LincolnSteffens
in hisletterofJune18,1919,to Laura Suggett(The LettersofLincolnSteffens
(New York,
1938),Vol. 1,p. 472),picturing
WilsoninParis:" He is righteous. Ifonlyhewereintelligent,
scientific!But theunmoral,
intellectual
to produce.
scientific,
typeis forthenextgeneration
Our partis to use the transition
periodto raisethequestions,pointawayfromall persons
and individualguiltto thephysicaland economicenemiesof Man."