Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Solution EVA
Solution EVA
($000s)
R&D Expense
Amortization Period
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
1995
10673
1996
12487
1997
14610
1998
17094
1999
20000
2135
2135
2497
2135
2497
2922
2135
2497
2922
3419
2135
2497
2922
3419
4000
2135
4632
7554
10973
14973
2497
2922
3419
4000
7800
20638
10673
23160
37770
54864
74864
113864
2135
6767
14321
25293
40266
60904
8538
16393
23449
29571
34598
52960
Advertising Adjustments
($000s)
Adv Expense
Amortization Period
11
13
14
13
14
15
14
15
17
38
113
73
42
158
114
45
208
160
40
44
48
2000
39000
NOPAT
($000s)
NOPAT
Net Income before Tax
R&D Expense
R&D Adjustment
Adv Expense
Adv Adjustment
Goodwill Amortization
Net Operating Profit Before Taxes
Income Tax Payments
NOPAT
1999
2000
20000
20000
-14973
45
-42
2500
27531
-7875
19656
51000
39000
-20638
50
-45
2500
71866
-18725
53141
1999
110000
34598
44
7500
152142
-16736
2000
135000
52960
48
10000
198008
-21781
2920
31361
EVA
CAPITAL
Net Operating Assets
Capitalized R&D
Capitalize Adv
Accumulated Goodwill Amortization
Capital
Capital Charge
EVA
Solution 2:
Solution 3:
EVA forces balance sheet accountability and helps manage EVA drivers, increasing firm value. But,
determining EVA is tough. EVA is good for measuring business performance but not so good at
measuring compensation.
The major reasons for this are:
1. The point of a good performance measure is to measure based on the Managers
Controllables. The EVA structure at Vyaderm does not do so. For example, a Regional
Divisional Presidents bonus was a function of Global Business and Regional Business
(weighted 50% and 50% respectively). Regional business would be in her control but the
business in that geography would not and her bonus should ideally reflect that lack of
control.
2. This system holds the manager responsible for extraneous Uncontrollables as well. What
happened with the North American Dermatology Division was a one-time only deal that had
nothing to do with the performance of its managers. There is no need to reward them to
such an extent and set a precedent.
3. EVA is backward looking. It focuses on past performance rather than what managers are
doing to create future shareholder value.
4. The constant up and downs of bonus banks will have a negative emotional impact on staff
morale especially if they can do nothing to control it personally. This system does not take
into account this aspect of human psychology. Also, if the EVA Bank Balance has been
negative for a couple of years, it will be really difficult to get to a positive zone and could
actually de-motivate managers, leading to employee turnover.
5. EVA does not provide good line of sight. In the traditional compensation system, managers
have a good line of sight of the performance measure. For example, A sales manager needs
to boost period sales, an operating manager needs to cut down on fixed and variable costs
etc. With the EVA structure this direct line of sight is lost and is replaced by EVA targets set
at executive level. Translating EVA targets to day-to-day objectives could be difficult at lower
echelons of management.
6. Contrary to claims, the current EVA structure does not provide managers an incentive to
perform above par because a significant portion of their bonus comes from Uncontrollables.
Their utility curve will result in a point where their bonus is maximized vis--vis their effort
and they will stick to this level. This is because additional effort will have such a small effect
on total bonus (because of the Uncontrollables) that the cost of that effort will not be met.