ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. vs.

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003.

FACTS:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by Representative Felix
William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of
legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the
Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable
violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed
by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and was referred to the
House Committee. The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment
complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in
substance. To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in
accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. Four months and three weeks since the
filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on
Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the
House by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House
Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of
Representatives.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.
with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.
2. Whether the resolution thereof is a political question has resulted in a political crisis.

HELD:
1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and
referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of
Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner,
another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of
the Constitution. In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President
Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2,
2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint
filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on
October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings
against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.
2.From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial
power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this
creature called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that
Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political questions." From this clarification it is
gathered that there are two species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which
"are not truly political questions." Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for

respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly political in nature.
Civil Liberties Union vs Executive Secretary
In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 which allowed members of the
Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition
to their primary positions subject to limitations set therein. The Civil Liberties Union (CLU) assailed this EO averring
that such law is unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is being challenged by CLU on the principal
submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the Constitution which provides:
Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not,
unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall
not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be
financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or
any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, the only exceptions against
holding any other office or employment in Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (i) The
Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary
of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.
HELD: No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, VicePresident, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure multiple offices or
employment in the government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as above clarified
with respect to posts held without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as
required by the primary functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as
examples during the debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down for all appointive officials should be
considered as mere personal opinions which cannot override the constitutions manifest intent and the peoples
understanding thereof.
In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution,
EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries
or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than 2 positions in the
government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in
direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing
so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
Miriam Defensor- Santiago vs. COMELEC G.R No. 127325 March 19, 1997
FACTS:
On December 6, 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative, filed with
the COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative"
citing Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Acting on the petition, the COMELEC set the case for hearing and
directed Delfin to have the petition published. After the hearing the arguments between petitioners and opposing
parties, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their "memoranda and/or
oppositions/memoranda" within five days. On December 18, 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander
Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a special civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 raising the following
arguments, among others:

1.) That the Constitution can only be amended by peoples initiative if there is an enabling law passed by Congress,
to which no such law has yet been passed; and
2.) That R.A. 6735 does not suffice as an enabling law on peoples initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other
modes of initiative.
ISSUE:
WON R.A. No. 6735 sufficient to enable amendment of the Constitution by peoples initiative.
WON RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and if so WON the Act as
worded adequately covers such initiative.
WON COMELEC Res. No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the constitution is valid,
considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative?
WON the lifting of term limits of elective national and local official, as proposed in the draft petition would
constitute a revision of , or an amendment of the constitution.
WON the COMELEC can take cognizance of or has jurisdiction over the petition.
WON it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when there is a pending case before the
COMELEC.
HELD:
NO. R.A. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
Under the said law, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not
accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through
the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions." The use of the
clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed" denotes that R.A. No.
6735 excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
Also, while the law provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum and for Local Initiative and
Referendum, no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This means that the main thrust of the law is
initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If R.A. No. 6735 were intended to fully provide for the
implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor,
considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to
directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local
laws.
While R.A. No. 6735 specially detailed the process in implementing initiative and referendum on national and local
laws, it intentionally did not do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is hereby declared void and orders the respondent to forthwith dismiss the Delfin
Petition . TRO issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent.
WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED.
Gonzales vs COMELEC G.R. No. L-28196 21 SCRA 774 November 9, 1967
Petitioner: Ramon A. Gonzalez / Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA)
Respondent: Commission on Elections (COMELEC)

FACTS: This case is composed of consolidated cases filed separately by Petitioner Gonzalez and PHILCONSA
assailing for the declaration of nullity of RA. No. 4913 and R.B.H. No. 1 and 3. On March 16, 1967, the Senate and
the House of Representatives passed the following resolutions (Resolution of Both Houses/R.B.H.):
1. R.B.H No. 1: Proposes that Sec 5, Art VI of Constitution be amended so as to increase the membership of the
House of Representatives from a maximum of 120 in accordance with the present Constitution, to a maximum of
180, to be apportioned among several provinces and that each province shall have at least one (1) member.
2. R.B.H. No. 2: Calls for a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution, which will be composed of two
(2) elective delegates from each representative district, to be "elected in the general elections to be held on the
second Tuesday of November 1971.
3. R.B.H. No. 3: Proposes that Sec 16, Art VI of the Constitution be amended so as to authorize Senators and
Members of the House of Representatives to become delegates to the aforementioned constitutional convention,
without the need to forfeit their respective seats in Congress.
Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which became RA No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the
Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people at
the general elections on November 14, 1967. This act fixes the date and manner of elevtion for the proposed
amendments to be voted upon by the people, and appropriates funds for said election.
Petitioners assail the validity/constitutionality of RA No. 4913 and for the prohibition with preliminary injunction to
restrain COMELEC from implementing or complying with the said law. PHILCONSA also assails R.B.H No. 1 and 3.
ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not RA No. 4913 is unconstitutional.
2.) Whether or not the issue involves a political question.
HELD:
1.) Pursuant to Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, SC held that there is nothing in this provision that states that
the election referred to is special, different from the general election. The Congress deemed it best to submit the
amendments for ratification in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. It does not negate its authority
to submit proposed amendments for ratification in general elections. Petition is therefore DENIED.
2.) SC also noted that the issue is a political question because it attacks the wisdom of the action taken by Congress
and not the authority to take it. A political question is not subject to review by the Court.
Tanada vs Cuenco
After the 1955 national elections, the membership in the Senate was overwhelmingly occupied by the Nacionalista
Party. The lone opposition senator was Lorenzo Taada who belonged to the Citizens Party. Diosdado Macapagal
on the other hand was a senatorial candidate who lost the bid but was contesting it before the Senate Electoral
Tribunal (SET). But prior to a decision the SET would have to choose its members. It is provided that the SET should
be composed of 9 members comprised of the following: 3 justices of the Supreme Court, 3 senators from the
majority party and 3 senators from the minority party. But since there is only one minority senator the other two
SET members supposed to come from the minority were filled in by the NP. Taada assailed this process before
the Supreme Court. So did Macapagal because he deemed that if the SET would be dominated by NP senators
then he, as a member of the Liberalista Party will not have any chance in his election contest. Senator Mariano
Cuenco et al (members of the NP) averred that the Supreme Court cannot take cognizance of the issue because it
is a political question. Cuenco argued that the power to choose the members of the SET is vested in the Senate
alone and the remedy for Taada and Macapagal was not to raise the issue before judicial courts but rather to
leave it before the bar of public opinion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question.

HELD: No. The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled that the issue is a justiciable question. The term Political
Question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which
full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
In this case, the issue at bar is not a political question. The Supreme Court is not being asked by Taada to decide
upon the official acts of Senate. The issue being raised by Taada was whether or not the elections of the 5 NP
members to the SET are valid which is a judicial question. Note that the SET is a separate and independent body
from the Senate which does not perform legislative acts.
But how should the gridlock be resolved?
The nomination of the last two members (who would fill in the supposed seat of the minority members) must not
come from the majority party. In this case, the Chairman of the SET, apparently already appointed members that
would fill in the minority seats (even though those will come from the majority party). This is still valid provided
the majority members of the SET (referring to those legally sitting) concurred with the Chairman. Besides, the SET
may set its own rules in situations like this provided such rules comply with the Constitution.
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS GR 122156, 3 February 1997
WHETHER OR NOT THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS ARE SELF-EXECUTING
FACTS:
The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine
Government under Proclamation 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of
the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only
two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the
MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its
hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of
petitioner. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution
of the necessary contracts, the Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong
Berhad in a letter to GSIS dated 28 September 1995. Manila Prince Hotel sent a managers check to the GSIS in a
subsequent letter, but which GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has
disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by GSIS and
consummated with Renong Berhad, Manila Prince Hotel came to the Court on prohibition and mandamus.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-executing.
RULING:
A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually
not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of
supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants
may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and
extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be
determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is
referred to the legislature for action. In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact
legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a
provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of

the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right.
The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a selfexecuting constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation.
The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not
necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of
the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in
harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more available. Subsequent
legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully
enforceable. As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a
different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the
people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has
evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is
necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are
self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the
legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. In fine,
Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is
complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From
its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation.
Occena vs. Commission on Elections
[GR 56350, 2 April 1981]
Facts: The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings against the validity of three Batasang Pambansa
Resolutions proposing constitutional amendments, goes further than merely assailing their alleged constitutional
infirmity. Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of the Philippine Bar and former delegates to the
1971 Constitutional Convention that framed the present Constitution, are suing as taxpayers. The rather
unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law, the
Javellana ruling to the contrary notwithstanding.
Issue: Whether the 1973 Constitution was valid, and in force and effect when the Batasang Pambansa resolutions
and the present petitions were promulgated and filed, respectively.
Held: It is much too late in the day to deny the force and applicability of the 1973 Constitution. In the dispositive
portion of Javellana v. The Executive Secretary, dismissing petitions for prohibition and mandamus to declare
invalid its ratification, this Court stated that it did so by a vote of six to four. It then concluded: "This being the vote
of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect."
Such a statement served a useful purpose. It could even be said that there was a need for it. It served to clear the
atmosphere. It made manifest that as of 17 January 1973, the present Constitution came into force and effect.
With such a pronouncement by the Supreme Court and with the recognition of the cardinal postulate that what
the Supreme Court says is not only entitled to respect but must also be obeyed, a factor for instability was
removed. Thereafter, as a matter of law, all doubts were resolved. The 1973 Constitution is the fundamental law. It
is as simple as that. What cannot be too strongly stressed is that the function of judicial review has both a positive
and a negative aspect. As was so convincingly demonstrated by Professors Black and Murphy, the Supreme Court
can check as well as legitimate. In declaring what the law is, it may not only nullify the acts of coordinate branches
but may also sustain their validity. In the latter case, there is an affirmation that what was done cannot be
stigmatized as constitutionally deficient. The mere dismissal of a suit of this character suffices. That is the meaning
of the concluding statement in Javellana. Since then, this Court has invariably applied the present Constitution. The
latest case in point is People v. Sola, promulgated barely two weeks ago. During the first year alone of the
effectivity of the present Constitution, at least ten cases may be cited.
IMBONG VS COMELEC G.R. No. L-32432; G.R. No. L-32443; September 11, 1970 Ponente: Makasiar, J.
FACTS:

Manuel Imbong and Raul Gonzales, filing separate cases and both interested in running as candidates for delegates
to the Constitutional Convention, question the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6132, claiming that it prejudices their
rights as such candidates. On March 16, 1967, the Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, passed Res. No. 2
which called for a Constitutional Convention which shall have two delegates from each representative district. On
June 17, 1969, the Congress passed Resolution No. 4 amending Resolution No. 2 by providing that the convention
shall be composed of 320 delegates with at least two delegates from each representative district. On August 24,
1970, the Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted R.A. 6132, implementing Res Nos. 2 and 4 and expressly
repealing R.A 4914 which previously implemented Res. No. 2. Gonzales assails the validity of Sections 2, 4, 5, and
par. 1 of 8(a), and the entire law, while Imbong questions the constitutionality of par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) of said R.A.
6132.
ISSUES:
1.
Does the Congress have the right to call for a constitutional convention and set the parameters of such
convention?
2. Are the provisions of R.A. 6132 constitutional?
HELD:
1. The Congress has authority to call a constitutional convention as the constituent assembly. The Congress also
has the authority to enact implementing details, contained in Res. Nos. 2 and 4 and R.A. 6132, since such details
are within the competence of the Congress in exercise of its legislative power.
2. The provisions are constitutional. Sec. 4 of R.A. 6132 is merely in application with Sec. 2 of Art. XII of the
Constitution and does not constitute a denial of due process or equal protection of the law. Sec. 2 also merely
obeyed the intent of the Congress in Res. Nos. 2 and 4 regarding the apportionment of delegates. The challenged
disqualification of an elected delegate from running for any public office in Sec. 5 is a valid limitation as it is
reasonable and not arbitrary. Lastly, par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) which is both contested by the petitioners is still valid as the
restriction contained in the section is so narrow that basic constitutional rights remain substantially intact and
inviolate thus the limitation is a valid infringement of the constitutional guarantees invoked by the petitioners.
Ex Parte Milligan
1865
Location: Military Commission at United States Court House in Indianapolis
Facts of the Case
Lambden P. Milligan was sentenced to death by a military commission in Indiana during the Civil War; he had
engaged in acts of disloyalty. Milligan sought release through habeas corpus from a federal court.
Question
Does a civil court have jurisdiction over a military tribunal?
Davis, speaking for the Court, held that trials of civilians by presidentially created military commissions are
unconstitutional. Martial law cannot exist where the civil courts are operating.
The Supreme Court decided that the suspension of habeas corpus was lawful, but military tribunals did not apply
to citizens in states that had upheld the authority of the Constitution and where civilian courts were still operating.

It observed further that during the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, citizens may be only held without
charges, not tried, and certainly not executed by military tribunals; the writ of habeas corpus is not the right itself
but merely the ability to issue orders demanding the right's enforcement.
It is important to note the political environment of the decision. Post-Civil War, under a Republican Congress, the
Court was reluctant to hand down any decision that questioned the legitimacy of military courts, especially in the
occupied South. The President's ability to suspend habeas corpus independently of Congress, a central issue, was
not addressed, probably because it was moot with respect to the case at hand. Though President Lincoln
suspended the writ nationwide on September 24, 1862, Congress ratified this action almost six months later, on
March 3, 1863, with the Habeas Corpus Suspension Act. Milligan was detained in 1864, well after Congress
formally suspended the writ. That notwithstanding, military jurisdiction had been limited.
Three types of military jurisdiction
This case was also important in clarifying the scope of military jurisdiction under the US Constitution. The justices
held that:

There are under the Constitution three kinds of military jurisdiction: one to be exercised both in peace and war;
another to be exercised in time of foreign war without the boundaries of the United States, or in time of rebellion
and civil war within states or districts occupied by rebels treated [71 U.S. 2, 142] as belligerents; and a third to be
exercised in time of invasion or insurrection within the limits of the United States, or during rebellion within the
limits of states maintaining adhesion to the National Government, when the public danger requires its exercise.
The first of these may be called jurisdiction under MILITARY LAW, and is found in acts of Congress prescribing rules
and articles of war, or otherwise providing for the government of the national forces; the second may be
distinguished as MILITARY GOVERNMENT, superseding, as far as may be deemed expedient, the local law, and
exercised by the military commander under the direction of the President, with the express or implied sanction of
Congress; while the third may be denominated MARTIAL LAW PROPER, and is called into action by Congress, or
temporarily, when the action of Congress cannot be invited, and in the case of justifying or excusing peril, by the
President, in times of insurrection or invasion, or of civil or foreign war, within districts or localities where ordinary
law no longer adequately secures public safety and private rights.
This distinction between martial law and military government was not commonly made before 1866. After the
Supreme Court's clarification in this landmark case however, it has continued to be used up to the present day.
Birkhimer describes the difference on page 1 of his opus Military Government and Martial Law (3rd edition, 1914)
by saying that
Military jurisdiction is treated in the following pages in its two branches of Military Government and Martial Law.
The former is exercised over enemy territory; the latter over loyal territory of the State enforcing it.
US Army Field Manual FM 27-10 The Law of Land Warfare, paragraph 362 states that
Military government is the form of administration by which an occupying power exercises governmental authority
over occupied territory. The necessity for such government arises from the failure or inability of the legitimate
government to exercise its functions on account of the military occupation, or the undesirability of allowing it to do
so.