Austria, France, and the Venetian Question, 1861-66

Author(s): Nancy Nichols Barker

Source: The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Jun., 1964), pp. 145-154
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1874636
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AUSTRIA, FRANCE, AND THE VENETIAN

QUESTION, 1861-66
NANCY

IN

THE

NICHOLS

years between the Italian War

of 1859 and the Austro-Prussian War

of 1866 the Venetian question was
the major issue between Austria and
France. A study of this problem contrasts vividly the rigidity of Austrian
policy, wedded to traditional dynastic
principles, with the vacillations and opportunism of the Second Empire. To a
remarkable extent, the Venetian question determined the shape of diplomatic
events in the 1860's and had incalculable
effects upon the fortunes of both countries. It was rather like the small jewel
on which swings the massive door of a
vault.
When Napoleon III abruptly terminated the Italian War leaving Venetia
still in Austrian possession, he broke his
pledge to free Italy from the Alps to the
Adriatic. "The spector of Venetia wanders in the halls of the Tuileries," noted
Count Nigra, Italian minister in Paris.'
It proved to be a lively ghost which
appeared frequently to torment the emperor and provoke him to elaborate
schemes to induce Austria to yield in
peace what he had not wrested from her
in war. Not only his Buonaparte heritage, his carbonari beginnings, and his
desire to destroy the treaties of 1815
caused the emperor to aid the Italians.
In the Venetian question he felt that
his honor was involved.2 Late in 1859
1 Nigra to Ricasoli, Paris, Jan. 26, 1862, B.
Ricasoli, Lettere e documenti del Barone Bettino
Ricasoli (Florence, 1891), VI, 333.
2 Metternich to Rechberg, Paris, Sept. 1, 1862,

BARKER

and 1860, virtually obsessed with the

problem, he promoted a series of solutions only more astonishing in their variety than in their number. An exchange
of Venetia for Egypt was several times
mentioned.3 The sale of Venetia for cash
with Venice to be a free city,4 and the
exchange of Venice for Candia, principal
port of Crete,5 were suggested. Early in
1861 Edouard Thouvenel, the French
foreign minister, hinted broadly that
Austria should take advantage of the
disturbances in Bosnia and Herzegovina
and prepare to profit by the imminent
demise of the Turkish "sick man."6
To these suggestions the Austrian government turned a deaf ear. Referring to
the Cretan proposal, Prince Metternich,
the Austrian ambassador in Paris, wrote
contemptuously: "if we accepted such a
bad joke, we would merit tomorrow
being offered Mesopotamia in exchange
for Trieste." 7 With a not unjustified
feeling of bitterness against the emperor,
Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Vienna, Political
Archives, IX, France (hereafter cited as HHSA),
no. 50 A-C, secret.
3 Metternich to Rechberg, Compiegne, Nov. 9,
1859, ibid., private.
4 Ibid., Paris, Dec. 13, 1860.
5 Ibid., Feb. 21, 1861.
6 Ibid., Mar. 12, 1861.
7 Ibid., Feb. 21, 1861. The limits of this study
do not permit discussion of responsibility for
policy-making in Austria. Most of the important
decisions were probably made by the emperor
(Chester W. Clark, Franz Joseph and Bismarck.
The diplomacy of Austria before the war of 1866
[Cambridge, 1934], p. 497), but since they were
carried out by his ministers, they are simply
considered here as acts of the Austrian government.

145

146

NANCY NICHOLS BARKER

Count Rechberg, the Austrian foreign

minister, formulated a policy of no concessions on Venetia.
Affairs were in this state when, to the
great disappointment of Austria, Napoleon in June 1861 extended diplomatic
recognition to the newly formed Kingdom of Italy. However, in so doing, the
emperor did not publicly indorse the
principle of Italian unity, nor did he
really clarify his intentions for the future
form of the peninsula. Despite this act,
his policies remained ambiguous. French
troops in Rome still protected the temporal power of the pope. Although Napoleon had recognized Naples and Sicily
to be within the realm of King Victor
Emmanuel, he was suspected of secretly
favoring a Muratist movement;8 and his
wife, the Empress Eugenie, was a strong
partisan of Bourbon restoration.9
At the very time France granted diplomatic recognition to Italy, the subtle
mind of her imperial master was contemplating a plan which would in fact
destroy Italian unity but would give
Venetia to a truncated state. The idea
was to divide the Italian peninsula into
three parts-a proposal which became
the basis of negotiations until late in
1863 when Austria definitively turned
away from the French alliance. Although
8 In September 1860 Napoleon denied supporting Prince Murat (Moniteur, Sept. 1). But Metternich was convinced that the emperor, without
openly aiding the Muratist movement, still intended to enthrone his relative in Naples (Metternich to Rechberg, Paris, Dec. 9, 1860, HHSA,
no. 90F; see also Cowley to Lord John Russell,
Paris, June 14, 1860, Public Record Office, London [hereafter cited as PRO], Cowley papers, FO
519/227).
9 Metternich to Rechberg, Paris, Dec. 21, 1860,
HHSA, private. Eugenie wrote a letter of encouragement to the Queen of Naples early in
1861 during the siege (Gramont to Thouvenel,
Rome, Feb. 12, 1861, Minist&re des Affaires
ttrang&res, Paris, Papiers Thouvenel, X, 30-33,
private).

the theme had variations, it always called

for Austrian cession of Venetia to a
northern Italian kingdom. In the south
would be the Kingdom of the Two
Sicilies 0 and between them the papal
states. In addition, France usually promised vaguely to support Austria in finding territorial compensation elsewhere.
The real enticement was the destruction
of Italian unity and French adherence
to conservative principles in Rome and
Naples.
Napoleon chose to express these ideas
to Metternich in the same month in
which he had recognized Italy. The ambassador, concerned over the emperor's
intentions in Italy, asked:
"Do you want Italian unity?"
"No."
"Do you want a confederation?"
"Yes."
"Without the pope?"
"No.,'
His real desire, Napoleon volunteered,
was an Italy in three parts-a northern
state including Venetia, a papal state
with a lay government, and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.
"Oh, if you would come and say to me,"
added His Majesty, "that as of today you
were ready to arrangewith me in this sense,
it would be quickly done. You would make
your conditions, you would impose on me
what you wished, you would tell me: Here
is what I want in the east-reinstate the
Holy Father and the King of Naples by
arms [sic], well, I would promise all, and we
would make a fine secret alliance."11
Rechberg did not seriously consider
entering into such adventures. The AusL0 Presumably under a Bourbon restoration,
although the former Grand Duke of Tuscany, a
relative of Emperor Franz Joseph, was later considered (Clarendon to Cowley, Foreign Office,
May 16, 1866, PRO FO 519/180, private).
11 Metternich to Rechberg, Paris, June 30,
1861, HHSA, private.

AUSTRIA, FRANCE, AND THE VENETIAN QUESTION, 1861-66

trian foreign minister had little faith in

the emperor. Moreover, the Austrian
government thought that the quid pro
quo for the sacrifice of Venetia-the
destruction of Italian unity-was of no
value. The Italian kingdom, built on
intrigue and revolutionary flotsam, would
destroy itself. Time and the natural
course of events would take care of it.
Only after its disappearance would Austria be willing to arrange with France
on the future form of the peninsula.12
Even though the recently unified Italy
did not obligingly vanish, Rechberg's
position remained virtually unchanged
when, in 1962, Napoleon renewed his
overtures of the preceding years. Garibaldi's move on Rome and check at
Aspromonte late in August caused Franco-Italian negotiations to break down
on the Roman question.13 The emperor,
unable to make terms which would allow him to evacuate Rome, inclined toward Austria and the conservative alliance. His offer was based on a tripartite
Italy and French help to Austria in
securing compensation for the loss of
Venetia "wherever you want it." 14 Again
Austria doubted the sincerity of French
intentions and refused. Metternich and
Rechberg still suspected the emperor of
being devoted to the cause of revolution.15 However, it is difficult to avoid
the conclusion that Rechberg would not
have relaxed his hold on Venetia even
if he had received convincing proof of
Napoleon's good faith. As Metternich
later admitted, "military pride" was not
12 Rechberg to Metternich, Vienna, July 29,
1861, ibid., no. 9, secret.
13 Lynn M. Case, Franco-Italian relations 18601865, the Roman question and the convention
of September (Philadelphia, 1932), p. 226.
14 The words of the empress, who spoke for
her husband (Metternich to Rechberg, Sept. 1,
1862, HHSA, no. 5OA-C, secret).
15 Ibid., Sept. 4, 1862, private.

147

the least of the reasons for Austrian refusals.'6

The Venetian question became critical
in 1863 when the Polish revolt gave
Napoleon another opportunity to approach Austria on the subject while
seeking her co-operation against Russia.
In an ambitious plan to remake the map
of Europe on a large scale, he proposed
an Austro-French alliance which would
have involved war with both Prussia
and Russia and destroyed the unification
of Italy. Napoleon told Metternich:
In case events in Poland force you to
evacuate Galicia, I offer you exclusive preponderance in the East and material compensation to be designated by yourself....
If the definitive settlement of the Italian
question (King of Naples, Pope, and Piedmont) should require the surrender of
Venetia, I would support your attempts at
preponderancein Germany.17
Here was a new variation on the familiar theme. Austria was to cede Venetia
in return for the destruction of Italian
unity and for compensation in Germany
(Silesia), and she was to assign Galicia
to a reconstructed Poland for compensation in the Balkans (probably the Danubian principalities). The Austrian government seriously considered this proposal and called Metternich to Vienna
for consultation.
Of course, the negotiations foundered
owing to Austria's understandable reluctance to give up either Venetia or
Galicia. The cession of Venetia could
never be admitted as favorable to Austria's interests, wrote Rechberg, and
could be contemplated only after comIbid., Feb. 28, 1864, no. 2MA.
Metternich to Rechberg, Mar. 5, 1863, Hermann Oncken, Die Rheinpolitik Kaiser Napoleons III. von 1863 bis zu 1870 und der Ursprung
des Krieges von 1870-1871 (Stuttgart, 1926), I, no.
4, very secret, p. 11.
16

17

148

NANCY NICHOLS BARKER

pensation had been won in Germany

and in the Balkans. Destruction of Italian unity was again considered an entirely insufficient reward for Austrian
sacrifices.18
When Metternich returned to Paris
from Vienna, Napoleon gave Austria another, and as it turned out, a last chance
"to kill Italian unity with one blow."
Austria, said Napoleon, should tell King
Victor Emmanuel: "We give you Venetia
on the condition that you return to the
pope the provinces you have taken from
him, and to the King of Naples his kingdom." On the other hand, the emperor
continued, if Austria were not willing to
give up Venetia, France would no longer
"put so much value" on the division of
the peninsula.19 Nothing could have
been plainer. Napoleon had no intention of further opposing Italian unification unless Austria sacrificed Venetia.
The negotiations were prolonged
through most of 1863. As the months
passed, the strain on Austro-French relations caused by the alliance which
never materialized began to tell. By November 5, 1863, the Austrian refusal of
Napoleon's surprise invitation to a congress merely put an end to negotiations
which for months had served little purpose. Austria turned away from France
and toward Prussia. Napoleon, humiliated and angry, retreated into isolation.
Austria was no doubt justified in her
refusal to make large territorial sacrifices
before entering into an alliance with
France. But in so doing, she lost an opportunity to destroy Italian unity with
French help-an opportunity she sought
1i Rechberg to Metternich, Vienna, Feb. 27,
1863, HHSA, no. 3, and his secret and personal
instructions for Metternich, Mar. 21, 1863, ibid.,
varia.
19 Metternich to Rechberg, Paris, March 29,
1863, ibid., no. 12B.

in vain to recover three years later. As

it turned out, Italy was the only country
to profit from the abortive negotiations.
Napoleon never again offered to divide
the peninsula into three parts as a quid
pro quto for Venetia.
After the diplomatic failures of 1863
Napoleon adopted a passive attitude not
untinged with hostility toward Austria.
Suspicious of a secret guarantee of Venetia, he disliked the Austrian understanding with Prussia. In February 1864 Metternich received the cold comfort of an
assurance from the emperor that France
would be neutral in case of an Italian
attack on Austria. But the ambassador
distrusted Austria's "new friends" and
feared a Franco-Prussian secret entente.20
Strong advocate of friendship with
France, he seemed already to sense that
the alliance spurned in 1863 might be
unrevivable in time of future need.
In May Eug?ene Rouher, minister of
state, expressed in the French senate the
hope of the government that the "great
movement of assimilation" in Italy
would continue. Metternich noted that
this was the first public declaration of
its kind in France.21 It boded little good
for Austria's future in Venetia.
Meanwhile Italy stepped up its campaign to obtain Venetia through diplomacy. In February a mission headed by
Count Pasolini, former foreign minister,
proposed a quadruple alliance of Austria, England, France, and Italy on the
basis of the Austrian exchange of Venetia
for the Danubian principalities.22 In
May came an offer to marry Prince
H-umbert of Savoy to an Austrian archduchess. Then Austria should sell Vene20 Ibid., Feb. 28, 1864, no. 79A, and May 14,
1864, private.
21 Ibid., May 14, 1864, IX, 78.
22 Ibid., Feb. 28, 1864, no. 79A.

AUSTRIA, FRANCE, AND THE VENETIAN QUESTION, 1861-66

tia to Italy for a large sum of cash.

"Inadmissible," was the reaction of Rechberg.23

In the fall of 1864, after signing the

September Convention with France guaranteeing French evacuation of Rome
after a delay of two years, Italy tried to
link Austrian diplomatic recognition
with the cession of Venetia. But the
position of the two countries was so far
apart as to exclude any possibility of
agreement. The Austrian foreign minister would scarcely consider recognition
of Italy in return for a guarantee of
Venetia. General La Marmora, the Italian premier and foreign minister, would
not accept recognition unless Venetia
came with it.24 Offers of money were renewed and again rejected.
A diplomatic impasse had been
reached. Napoleon realized the futility
of efforts to extract Venetia from Austria
without war. Likewise, he had given up
the idea of destroying Italian unity for
Austria's benefit. The September Convention signed with Italy implied acceptance of the status quo. France had
now no desire to "bring back former
times" in the peninsula. The emperor
told Metternich: "I wish Italy to keep
what she has, neither more nor less."25
The Austrian position had become
even more inflexible. On October 27,
1864, Rechberg resigned. His successor
as foreign minister, Count Mensdorff,
expressed his line of policy uncompromisingly.
23 Rechberg to Metternich, Vienna, May 13,
1864, ibid., no. 4.
24 Mensdorff to Metternich, Nov. 30, 1864,
ibid., IX, 80; and La Marmora to Nigra, Turin,
Nov. 22, 1864, Alphonse La Marmora, Un peu
plus de lumiere sur les evenements politiques et
militaires de l'annee 1866, trans. Niox and Descoubes (Paris, 1874), p. 50.
25 Metternich to Mensdorff, Nov. 29, 1864,
HHSA, IX, 79, essential points of a confidential
conversation.

149

That which is called the Venetian question must . . . be excluded.

The

imperial

government would not in any case admit

that this question be raised in connection
with Rome, and any project of entente
would be condemned in advance to failure
if it were to rest on a combination tending
to change the situation of Venetia.26
By the end of 1864 it was clear that if
Napoleon's conscience were ever to be
relieved of its Venetian burden more
than diplomacy would be required.
Although the threat of war between
Austria and Prussia over the disposition
of Schleswig and Holstein was close at
hand, Mensdorff made no attempt to
draw France toward Austria. He showed
an optimism amounting almost to euphoria. When Metternich expressed conmight do
cern over what Napoleon
should Austria be engaged in a twofront war, the minister replied blandly:
"I do not believe affairs in Germany will
take a turn which would encourage an
attempt against our Italian possessions
and oblige us to seek a point of support
in France."27 Although well aware of
Prussian overtures in Turin and fearful
of an outbreak of war in which Austria
would fight alone against Prussia and
Italy, Mensdorff remained inflexible on
to
Venetia. He instructed Metternich
maintain the good will of Napoleon
and to induce him (but without offering
any inducements) to keep the Italians
neutral in the case of an Austrian war
with Prussia.28 Only in the event that
Vienna's negotiations with Prussia broke
down entirely was Metternich to stand
by to handle any "overtures" which Austria "might" then make.29
This apparently reckless insouciance
26 Mensdorff to Metternich, Vienna, Nov. 11,
1864, HHSA, no. 2.
27 Ibid., May 10, 1865, private.
28 Ibid., July 29, 1865, telegram.
29 Ibid., Aug. 11, 1865, private.

150

NANCY NICHOLS BARKER

may perhaps have been the result of

Mensdorff's determination not to allow
matters to come to war in 1865. Faced
with financial and other internal problems, the Austrian government yielded
to Prussian demands and negotiated a
compromise on the duchies at Gastein in
August. Furthermore, Metternich had
been successful in extracting at least a
qualified promise of French neutrality.
Napoleon, then in Algeria, wrote Eugenie that he would not depart from
strict neutrality "for less than serious
events."30 Italy would make war at her
own risk. The emperor's position never
became entirely clear during the short
crisis. He deliberately absented himself
from Paris and let Eugenie and Drouyn
de Lhuys, the French foreign minister
since late in 1862, talk with Metternich.
Even so, Mensdorff had gotten more cooperation from Napoleon in 1865 than
he was to obtain a year later.
Austria's narrow escape from war on
two fronts and the continuation of friction with Prussia did not for some time
persuade Mensdorff of the necessity of
coming to an understanding with France
30 Metternich to Mensdorff, Paris, Aug. 12,
1865, ibid., no. 48, telegram. On August 5 Napoleon had instructed Eug6nie to tell Metternich
"that whatever happens" he would maintain a
"strict neutrality" (ibid., IX, 81, telegram). However, since Foreign Minister Drouyn de Lhuys
told Nigra that the emperor would not permit
Austria to retake lost territory in Italy (Nigra
to La Marmora, Aug. 13, 1865; La Marmora, pp.
57-58), the qualified expression of neutrality of
August 12 seems closer to Napoleon's true intentions. For details on the attitudes of the emperor, Drouyn de Lhuys, and Eugenie, see Goltz
to Bismarck, Aug. 11, 1865, Oncken, I, no. 21,
51-55; Drouyn de Lhuys to Benedetti, May 3,
Gramont to Drouyn de Lhuys, Aug. 8, and
Drouyn de Lhuys to Mosbourg, Aug. 15, 1865,
Les origines diplomatiques de la guerre de 18701871; recueil de documents publie' par le ministre des affaires etrangeres (Paris, 1910-27), VI,
no. 1380, 199-203, no. 1484, 388-89, and no. 1494,
pp. 407-9.

or Italy. The policy of no concession

remained in force and caused Austria
to reject another Italian offer to buy
Venetia in the fall of 1865.31 The euphoria of the former spring seemed to
return, aided and abetted by France.
Napoleon and Drouyn de Lhuys led
Metternich to believe, during his stay
at Compi'egne with the court in December 1865, that Austria could count at
least on French neutrality in case of war
with Italy.32
Officially, Austrian policy showed no
change even in the spring of 1866.
Mensdorff apparently took French neutrality for granted and even expected
Napoleon to restrain the Italians in the
event of an Austro-Prussian war. Should
the Italians prove so misguided as to
threaten war, Austria would offer them
no inducement to remain neutral. He
wrote:
We do not misappreciate the alarming
nature of this perspective [alliance of Prussia with Italy], but we will brave it rather
than submit voluntarily to a humiliation
whose consequenceswould weaken our position in Germanyand Europe as much as a
disastrouswar.33
Secretly, however, the Austrian government early in 1866 decided to make
some arrangement on Venetia in order
to avoid a war on two fronts. As Mensdorff later explained, there was a difference between Austria's official policy
which would not even admit the existence of a Venetian question, and the
"confidential overtures" which the government would be willing to make in
certain circumstances.34 As early as Jan31 Mensdorff to Mulinen, Vienna, Oct. 25,
1865, HHSA, IX, 80; La Marmora, pp. 65-70.
32 Metternich to Mensdorff, Dec. 2, 1865, ibid.,
no. 49.
33 Mensdorff to Metternich, Mar. 1, 1866, ibid.,
IX, 84.
34Bloomfield to Clarendon, Vienna, May 24,
1866, PRO FO 356/22, telegram; Mensdorff to

AUSTRIA, FRANCE, AND THE VENETIAN QUESTION, 1861-66

151

uary 1866 Metternich had hinted to the

Italian minister in Paris that Austria
might sacrifice Venetia after compensation had been won elsewhere.35 On May
1 a courier left Vienna bearing a definite offer.36
It is not precisely clear what advantages Austria expected to gain by yielding on Venetia. Many of the records of
the secret projects and conversations of
the spring have disappeared. For example, the important despatch containing the Austrian offer to cede Venetia
and the answering counterproposals are
not in the Austrian or French archives.
Their contents must be inferred from
Mensdorff's reply to the French, from
the correspondence between Nigra and
La Marmora, and from the letters of
other diplomats on the scene. It can be
stated with certainty, however, that the
proposal required Italy to receive Venetia from France, not directly from Austria, and only after Austria had won
compensation from Prussia.37 The available evidence establishes that Austria
also laid down certain conditions regarding central and southern Italy,
among them a guarantee of the temporal power and the enlargement of the
papal states by the return of territory
taken from the pope in the past.38 Mens-

dorif seems to have gone so far as to

stipulate the restoration of the Kingdom
of the Two Sicilies and even the duchies
in central Italy.39 When Lord Clarendon, British foreign minister, heard of
the Austrian scheme, he labeled it "the
worst form of replatrage . . . [which]
would not last six months.40 Drouyn de
Lhuys and the empress, realizing the
impossibility of obtaining Napoleon's
consent to a return to the Treaty of
Zurich, as the Austrian demands nearly
implied, hoped to satisfy Emperor Francis Joseph by giving Naples and Sicily
to the Grand Duke of Tuscany and allowing central Italy to remain under
Victor Emmanuel. Lord Cowley, British
ambassador in Paris and an informed
observer of the negotiations, wrote:

Metternich, Vienna, May 16, 1866, HHSA, IX,

84, telegram; Gramont to Drouyn de Lhuys,
Vienna, May 22, 1866, Origines, IX, no. 2418,
Pp. 232-234.
35 Nigra to La Marmora, Paris, Jan. 19, 1866;
La Marmora, p. 83.
36 Mensdorff to Metternich,
April 29, 1866,
HHSA, IX, 82, telegram.
37 Nigra to La Marmora, Paris, May 5, 1866,
telegram; La Marmora, pp. 215-16; Metternich
to Mensdorff, Paris, May 5, 1866, HHSA, no. 69,
telegram.
38 Metternich
to Mensdorff, Paris, May 29,
1866, HHSA, no. 29B, confidential. The Austrian
demand for an Italian guarantee of Rome was
not mentioned by La Marmora as a part of these

early negotiations in May. But it clearly was a

part of the original package. In another despatch
of May 29, ibid., no. 29A-c, Metternich worded
the Austrian offer as follows: "If France restrains Italy, and if Austria conquers in Germany
a territory whose importance appears to her
sufficient compensation for Venetia, Austria
would cede this province to France on certain
conditions concerning the definitive reconstitution of Italy." (Italics mine.)
39 Metternich to Mensdorff, Paris, May 29,
1866, ibid., no. 29B, confidential.
40 Clarendon to Cowley, Foreign Office, May
9,1866, PRO FO 519/180, private.
41 Cowley to Clarendon, Paris, May 15, 1866,
ibid., 232.

I can not doubt from all that has come

to my knowledge in different ways but that
the wish . . . in high quarters, particularly
with the Empress,is the partition of Italy
into three. . . . Now when one knows what
a point of honor the Emperor [Francis
Joseph] has always made of providing for
the Duke of Tuscany, it may be upon the
cards that he would think himself justified
in honor in giving up Venetia if the throne
of Naples were to be secured to his uncle
or cousin-whichever he is. Perhapshe might
be satisfied with Sicily. That Drouyn has
some scheme which he is keeping back I
am certain.41

152

NANCY NICHOLS BARKER

Without any doubt, although the exact

terms of the Austrian proposal are still
unknown, they called for a revival of
one of the plans, formerly spurned by
Vienna, to destroy Italian unity as partial compensation for Venetia.
Meanwhile, Prussia and Italy had
signed a treaty of alliance on April 8,
1866 which promised Venetia to Italy
if war broke out within three months.
The existence of this treaty changed
the situation very little. It had been
almost a bluff to begin with on Italy's
part to force Austria's hand.42 When
Nigra first heard of Austria's offer in
May to cede Venetia, he wired eagerly
to La Marmora: "please maintain absolute secrecy and reflect deeply, for the
thing is worth the trouble."43 The Italian minister answered:

followed delaying tactics.45 Nigra was

obviously panicky at the idea of fighting Austria even with the help of Prussia. If France too would join forces
against Austria, he favored a war, but
failing her aid he preferred a peaceful
settlement, even if it meant making some
concessions.4?
For over a month Austria and Italy
dickered while the French emperor
served as an indecisive intermediary.
Napoleon hoped the Italians could come
to an agreement with Austria and would
stay neutral in the war, but he now
refused to allow Austria to undo his
work of 1859 and would not force Italy
to accept the Grand Duke of Tuscany
or otherwise

to destroy her own unity.47

He was, as the British foreign minister

wrote, rather "at sea" on how to "ride
his Venetian hobby."48 The first counReceived your important despatch. I terproject worked out in Paris and sent
await the courier with impatience. My first to Vienna was not well received. Mensimpressionis that it is a question of honor dorff wired back:
and loyalty not to break away from Prussia.
My first impressionproducedby the com. . .But as the treaty expires July 8, the
affair could be arranged through the con- munications brought by Count Miulinen
[Austrian charge d'affaires] is not very favgress.44
orable. The counterproject . . . would imDelay until the expiration date of the pose on us the engagement to cede Venetia
after the peace whatever it may be-which
treaty between Italy and Prussia could is inadmissible. . . . We miss likewise that
be achieved by prolonged preliminary positive promise of the future formation of
negotiation for a European congress Italy after the cession of Venetia.49
which had been suggested again by Na45 Drouyn de Lhuys to Malaret, Paris, May 15,
poleon.
1866, Origines, IX, no. 2345, 133-34. As late as
The Italian government was naturally May 27 La Marmora was still seriously considering a peaceful settlement (Malaret to Drouyn de
eager to obtain Venetia through diplo- Lhuys, Florence, May 27, 1866, ibid., no. 2463,
macy rather than war if that were pos- 277-79).
46 Nigra to La Marmora, May 17, 1866, telesible. Although La Marmora was fairly
gram; La Marmora, p. 248, and ibid., May 31,
confident of Italy's military prepared- 1866, p. 270. Bismarck was much alarmed at the
ness, he distrusted Prussia, accepted prospect of Italy's defection (Benedetti to Drouyn
gratefully the idea of a congress, and de Lhuys, Berlin, May 23, 1866, Origines, IX,
42 Nigra to La Marmora, Paris, Mar. 17, 1866;
La Marmora, p. 133.
43 May 5, 1866, telegram, ibid., pp. 215-16.
44 La Marmora to Nigra, May 5, 1866, ibid.,
p. 217.

no. 2421, 237-38).

47 Metternich to Mensdorff, Paris, May 29,
1866, HHSA, no. 29B, confidential.
48 Clarendon to Cowley, Foreign Office, May
29, 1866, PRO FO 519/180, private.
49 Italics mine. Mensdorff to Metternich, Vienna, May 8, 1866, HHSA, telegram.

AUSTRIA, FRANCE, AND THE VENETIAN QUESTION, 1861-66

Still, all hope for Italian neutrality

was not gone. The Italian government
accepted the idea of a congress. Napoleon preached moderation and patience
to La Marmora. The Austrians, who
loathed the idea of a congress where
they would have to discuss their own
mutilation, yet avoided a definitive refusal. As for the Italians, stalling for
time until the expiration of the treaty
with Prussia was still the order of the
day.50

The evidence shows that Italy did not

resign herself to war until June. But
on june 5 Nigra heard that Napoleon,
if Italy went to war and were unsuccessful in an attempt to take Venetia by
arms, would mobilize and force Austria
to give up her province. As a result of
this knowledge, Nigra wired La Marmora: "At present it seems to me the
moment has come to end the temporizations." 51 Win or lose, Italy would receive
Venetia.
Early in June Austria returned an
answer to the invitation to the congress
which was tantamount to refusal. She
demanded exclusion from the agenda of
all discussion of territorial aggrandizement for any country. Moreover, she insisted on the presence of the pope at the
congress and would admit no basis for
discussion other than the Treaty of Zurich.52

It seems strange that Austria and

Italy, both genuinely wanting to agree,
and indeed in accord on the basic prem50 D. Azeglio to La Marmora, London, May 11,
1866, telegram; La Marmora, p. 239. On May 17
Nigra told Metternich he thought a peaceful
solution still possible (Metternich to Mensdorff,
May 17, 1866, HHSA, no. 26D).
51 Nigra to La Marmora, Paris, June 5, 1866;
La Marmora, p. 299-300.
52 La Tour d'Auvergne to Drouyn de Lhuys,
London, June 4, 1866, telegram, Origines, X, no.
2563, 37-38.

153

ise of the cession of Venetia, could not

arrange the question through diplomacy.
Some scholars have concluded either that
the Austrian offer failed because it came
too late, after Prussia and Italy were
bound by treaty, or that Italy really
preferred to win Venetia by arms.53
To be sure, if Austria had made her
offer before Prussia had engaged Italy,
negotiations might have been easier; but
the treaty was no great obstacle. Also,
Italy did prefer war to the kind of offer
made to her. Lord Clarendon, whose
own desire was for Italy to get Venetia,
Austria to get Silesia, and Prussia "a
licking," believed that if Austria had
required only Silesia as compensation,
an arrangement with Italy could have
been worked out.54
Thorough examination of the documents reveals that Austria's offer was
rejected not because of its tardiness or
owing to a warlike attitude on the part
of Italy but rather because Vienna insisted on coupling the cession of Venetia with the destruction of Italian unity.
Italy, persuaded of Austria's military
superiority, might have agreed to accept
Venetia after Silesia had been won. But
not even Nigra was willing to make any
concessions on Rome and the temporal
power. "Out of the question," was his
53 Denis Mack Smith, Italy, a modern history
(Ann Arbor, Mich., 1959), pp. 77-78, attributes
Italy's refusal to La Marmora's confidence in
Italian arms and to the minister's feeling of
honorable obligation to Prussia. A. J. P. Taylor,
The struggle for mastery in Europe 1848-1918
(Oxford, 1954), pp. 161-63, holds that Italy's
hands were tied for three months by the treaty
with Prussia and that she rejected the Austrian
offer because she could not get Venetia through
a plebiscite. Clark, Franz Joseph and Bismarck,
recognizes that there were some Austrian demands in the Italian peninsula (pp. 407-12) but
attributes the failure of the negotiation to the
tardiness of the offer to cede (p. 441).
54 Clarendon to Cowley, Foreign Office, May
12, 1866, PRO FO 519/180.

154

NANCY NICHOLS BARKER

reaction.55 Austria, on the other hand,

was inflexible in her resolve to wreck
Italian unification. When Lord Bloomfield, British ambassador in Vienna,
made a last effort to obtain Austria's
consent to the congress, Mensdorff told
him that Austria would cede Venetia
for adequate compensation but would
not do so "for the purpose of facilitating
the unification of Italy."-56 Napoleon
in 1866 was no longer willing to force
a policy of restoration on Italy as he
earlier had been ready to do. Mensdorff
complained bitterly over what he termed
Napoleon's lack of good faith. He told
the British ambassador:
If Austria could place the least reliance
in the EmperorNapoleon something might
be thought of to conciliate his views and
those of other countries; but his word was
good for nothing as was plainly proved in
1859 .

. .

. How has he kept his word to

the Emperor Franz Joseph, "You will alwayshave the keysof Italy"?57
Apart from the basic question of unity,
there were other advantages that Italy
could expect to derive from a warlike
solution. Even Nigra pointed out that
Austria would be as strong after the
cession of Venetia as before and very
hostile to Italy.58 La Marmora wanted to
obtain Venetia by a plebiscite, not as a
gift from France.59 The nation's selfesteem would be better served by a war.
These considerations, however, probably
could have been overcome. It was the
question of compensation which was the
55 Nigra to La Marmora, May 26, 1866, telegram; La Marmora, pp. 264-65.
56 Bloomfield
to Clarendon, Vienna, June 5,
1866, no. 327, PRO FO 356/22, most private and
confidential.
57 Ibid.
58 Nigra to La Marmora, Paris, May 5, 1866;
La Marmora, pp. 219-20.
59 La Marmora to Nigra, Florence, May 14,
1866, telegram, ibid., pp. 243-44.

real "stumbling block."e0 Austria simply

asked for too much in Italy.
In a last and really pitiful episode of
Austria's inept diplomatic preparations
for her struggle with Prussia, Mensdorff,
faced with a war on two fronts, was
forced to cede Venetia in order to avoid
a third enemy-France. Despite his insistence that Venetia should never be a
cause of war between them, Napoleon
threatened armed intervention unless
Austria promised to cede Venetia regardless of the result of the war and to renounce a policy of restoration in Italy.
Napoleon told Metternich:
I was wrong, perhaps, to let the Italian
revolution triumph. But I have done it,
and to help you, Austria, overthrowit from
top to bottom would be a ridiculous negation of a decennial policy.61
The only satisfaction Austria could obtain was Napoleon's promise that France
would not oppose spontaneous developments in Italy leading to the disruption
of its unity, and that he would not object to a "territorial gain conquered by
Austria" (Silesia) which did not upset
the balance of power.
These agreements formed the basis of
the secret convention signed on June 12.
Mensdorff had at last played his trump
card only to find that there were few
tricks worth taking left in the deck.
Venetia, once so highly priced, had been
given up with virtually no quid pro quo
except French neutrality, long taken for
granted by Austria in any case. Her
inept and disastrous diplomacy paved
the way for a two-front war and military
reverses in Germany that solved the
Venetian question with rapid finality.
UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS

Same to same, May 20, 1866, ibid., p. 251.

Metternich to Mensdorff, Paris, May 29,
1866, HHSA, no. 29B.
60
61