IV-C People No. 3 Loss and Reacquisition of Citizenship (R.A. No.

9225)

Nestor A. Jacot vs Rogen T. Dal and Commission on Elections G.R. No. 179848 November 27, 2008

FACTS:
Petitioner Nestor A. Jacot was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who became a naturalized citizen of the
US on 13 December 1989. Petitioner sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No.
9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act. He filed a request for the
administration of his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines with the Philippine Consulate General
(PCG) of Los Angeles, California. The Los Angeles PCG issued on 19 June 2006 an Order of Approval of
petitioners request, and on the same day, petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines before Vice Consul Edward C. Yulo. On 27 September 2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued
Identification Certificate No. 06-12019 recognizing petitioner as a citizen of the Philippines. Six months after,
on 26 March 2007, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Position of Vice-Mayor of the
Municipality of Catarman, Camiguin. On 2 May 2007, respondent Rogen T. Dal filed a Petition for
Disqualification before the COMELEC Provincial Office in Camiguin against petitioner, arguing that the latter
failed to renounce his US citizenship as required under Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225. Petitioner
garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Vice Mayor during the 4 May 2007 National and Local
Elections.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is disqualified from running as a candidate in the 14 May 2007 local elections for his
failure to make a personal and sworn renunciation of his US citizenship.
HELD:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Resolution dated 28 September 2007 of the COMELEC en
banc in SPA No. 07-361, affirming the Resolution dated 12 June 2007 of the COMELEC Second Division, is
AFFIRMED. Petitioner is DISQUALIFIED to run for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin in the
14 May 2007 National and Local Elections, and if proclaimed, cannot assume the Office of Vice-Mayor of said
municipality by virtue of such disqualification. Costs against petitioner.
**** Republic Act No. 9225 - "Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003" Section 5. Civil and Political
Rights and Liabilities. (1)Those who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil
and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines and the following conditions: (2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the
filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
The intent of the legislators was not only for Filipinos reacquiring or retaining their Philippine citizenship under
Republic Act No. 9225 to take their oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, but also to explicitly
renounce their foreign citizenship if they wish to run for elective posts in the Philippines. To qualify as a
candidate in Philippine elections, Filipinos must only have one citizenship, namely, Philippine citizenship.
****He avers that he executed an act of renunciation of his US citizenship on 7 February 2007, separate from the
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines he took before the Los Angeles PCG and his filing of his
Certificate of Candidacy, thereby changing his theory of the case during the appeal. He attributes the delay in the
presentation of the affidavit to his former counsel, Atty. Marciano Aparte, who allegedly advised him that said
piece of evidence was unnecessary but who, nevertheless, made him execute an identical document entitled
Oath of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States and Renunciation of Any and All Foreign Citizenship on
27 June 2007 after he had already filed his Certificate of Candidacy. ***He submitted the document as evidence
too late. He should have done it during the trial via COMELEC.

IV-C People No. 3 Loss and Reacquisition of Citizenship (R.A. No. 8171)
CIRILO R. VALLES vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ROSALIND YBASCO LOPEZ
G.R. No. 137000. August 9, 2000
FACTS:
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the
spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an
Australian. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines.
On June 27, 1952, she was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino citizen, at the Malate Catholic Church in Manila.
Since then, she has continuously participated in the electoral process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as
well. She served as Provincial Board Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao Oriental. In 1992, she
ran for and was elected governor of Davao Oriental. Her election was contested by her opponent, Gil Taojo, Jr., in
a petition for quo warranto, docketed as EPC No. 92-54, alleging as ground therefore her alleged Australian
citizenship. Her citizenship was again questioned during the 1995 and 1998 local elections with the COMELEC
ruling in her favour.
The Commission on Elections ruled that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is a Filipino citizen and
therefore, qualified to run for a public office because (1) her father, Telesforo Ybasco, is a Filipino citizen, and
by virtue of the principle of jus sanguinis she was a Filipino citizen under the 1987 Philippine Constitution; (2) she
was married to a Filipino, thereby making her also a Filipino citizen ipso jure under Section 4 of
Commonwealth Act 473; (3) and that, she renounced her Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992 before
the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and her Australian passport was accordingly
cancelled as certified to by the Australian Embassy in Manila; and (4) furthermore, there are the COMELEC
Resolutions in EPC No. 92-54 and SPA Case No. 95-066, declaring her a Filipino citizen duly qualified to
run for the elective position of Davao Oriental governor.
Petitioner, on the other hand, maintains that the private respondent is an Australian citizen, placing reliance on
the admitted facts that: a) In 1988, private respondent registered herself with the Bureau of Immigration as an
Australian national and was issued Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. 404695 dated September 19,
1988; b) On even date, she applied for the issuance of an Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR), and c) She
was issued Australian Passport No. H700888 on March 3, 1988.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is a Filipino and qualified to run for governor; and if she is, Whether or not she
renounced her citizenship by applying for ACR and ICR and being issued an Australian passport.
HELD:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the COMELEC Resolutions, dated July 17, 1998 and
January 15, 1999, respectively, in SPA No. 98-336 AFFIRMED. Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is
hereby adjudged qualified to run for governor of Davao Oriental. No pronouncement as to costs. SO
ORDERED.
**** Respondent is a Filipino. In 1934, the controlling laws of the Philippines were the Philippine Bill of July 1,
1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916 (Jones Law). Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of
the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein, including their children, are
considered Philippine citizens. Respondent's father was therefore a Filipino, and consequently, her. Respondent
did not lose her citizenship. Renunciation of citizenship must be express. Applying for ACR, ICR, and Australian
passport are not enough to renounce citizenship. They are merely acts of assertion of her Australian citizenship
before she effectively renounced the same. The filing of a certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce
foreign citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification as a dual citizen. This is so because in the
certificate of candidacy, one declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen and that he/she will support and
defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain faith and allegiance thereto. Such declaration,
which is under oath, operates as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship. Therefore, when the
herein private respondent filed her certificate of candidacy in 1992, such fact alone terminated her
Australian citizenship.

IV-D Sovereignty b. When is a suit against the state

China National Machinery & Equipment Corp. Group (CNMEG) vs Hon. Cesar D. Santamaria
G.R. No. 185572 February 7, 2012
FACTS:
In September 2002, CNMEG entered into a MOU with Northrail for the conduct of a feasibility study
on a possible railway line from Manila to San Fernando, La Union or known as the Northrail Project.
In August 2003, the EXIM Bank and the Department of Finance (DOF) entered into a MOU, wherein
China agreed to extend Preferential Buyers Credit to the Philippine government to finance the Northrail Project.
The Chinese government designated EXIM Bank as the lender, while the Philippine government named the DOF
as the borrower. Under the August 30 MOU, EXIM Bank agreed to extend an amount not exceeding
US$400,000,000 in favor of the DOF, payable in 20 years, with a 5-year grace period, and at the rate of 3% per
annum.
In October 2003, Ambassador Wang wrote the DOF of CNMEGs designation as the Prime Contractor for
the Northrail Project.
On December 30, 2003, Northrail and CNMEG executed a Contract of Agreement for the Construction of
Section 1, Phase 1 of the North Luzon Railway System from Caloocan to Malolos on a turnkey basis. The
contract price for the Northrail Project was pegged at US$421,050,000.
On February 26, 2004, the Philippine government and EXIM Bank entered into a counterpart financial
agreement Buyer Credit Loan Agreement No. BLA 04055, where EXIM Bank agreed to extend Preferential
Buyers Credit in the amount of US$400M in favor of RP to finance the construction of Phase I of the Northrail
Project.
On February 13, 2006, respondent taxpayers filed in the Makati RTC a complaint for annulment of
contract and injunction against CNMEG, the Office of the Executive Secretary, the DOF, the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM), the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA), and Northrail before the
RTC. Respondents alleged that the Contract Agreement and the Loan Agreement were void for being
contrary to (a) the Constitution; (b) Republic Act No.9184 (R.A. No. 9184), otherwise known as the Government
Procurement Reform Act; (c)Presidential Decree No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code;
and(d) Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code.
The RTC set the case for hearing on the issuance of injunctive reliefs, prompting CNMEG to file an
Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of this order. Before the RTC could rule on this, CNMEG filed a motion to
dismiss the case arguing the RTC did not have jurisdiction over it.
On May 15, 2007, the RTC issued an omnibus order denying CNMEGs motion to dismiss
eventually prompting CNMEG to elevate case to the CA. (GR No. 185572, China National Machinery &
Equipment Corp. Group v. Judge Santamaria, February 7, 2012)
ISSUE:
Whether or not CNMEG is entitled to immunity precluding it from being sued before a local court. Whether or
not the Contract Agreement is an executive agreement, such that it cannot be questioned by or before a local
court.
HELD:
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. Petitioner China National Machinery & Equipment Corp.
(Group) is not entitled to immunity from suit, and the Contract Agreement is not an executive agreement.
CNMEGs prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction is DENIED for being moot and
academic. This case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 145, for further
proceedings as regards the validity of the contracts subject of Civil Case No. 06-203. No pronouncement on
costs of suit. SO ORDERED.

IV-D Sovereignty b. When is a suit against the state

China National Machinery & Equipment Corp. Group (CNMEG) vs Hon. Cesar D. Santamaria
G.R. No. 185572 February 7, 2012
Discussion of the Ruling:
****The Court stressed that the Contract Agreement was not concluded between the government of the
Philippines and China but between Northrail and CNMEG, which is neither a government nor a government
agency of China but a corporation duly organized and created under the laws of the Peoples Republic of China.
Since the Contract Agreement explicitly provides that Philippine Law shall be applicable, the parties have
effectively conceded that their rights and obligations thereunder are not governed by international lawIt
is therefore clear from the foregoing reasons that the Contract Agreement does not partake of the nature of an
executive agreement. It is merely an ordinary commercial contract that can be questioned before the local
courts, the Court held.
The Court further ruled that CNMEG engaged in a propriety activity hence was not covered
immunity. The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between CNMEG and Northrail shows
sought the construction of the Luzon Railways as a proprietary or commercial venture in
course of its business. Clearly, it was CNMEG that initiated the undertaking, and not
government, ruled the Court.

by sovereign
that CNMEG
the ordinary
the Chinese

The Court further held that based on the MOU, the Loan Agreement, and the letter of Chinese Ambassador to the
Philippines Wang Chungui stating CNMEG and not the Chinese government initiated the Northrail Project, it was
clear that the Northrail Project was a purely commercial transaction.
The Court held that even assuming arguendo that CNMEG performs governmental functions, such claim does not
automatically vest it with immunity. Following the Courts ruling in Deutshe Gesellschaft Fr Technische
Zusammernarbeit v. CA, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, CNMEG is to be presumed as a governmentowned and-controlled corporation without an original charter. As a result, it has the capacity to sue and be sued
under Section 36 of the Corporation Code. In this connection, the Court noted CNMEG failed to present a
certification from the Department of Foreign Affairs that it is entitled to sovereign or diplomatic immunity.
The Court also held that an agreement to submit any dispute to arbitration may be construed as an implicit
waiver of immunity from suit. Under the contract agreement, CNMEG and Northrail, if any dispute arises, are
bound to submit the matter to the HKIAC for arbitration.
******When is a suit is against the State? Regardless of who is named as the defendant, when it produces
adverse consequences to the public treasury in terms of disbursement of public funds and loss of government
property. It cannot prosper unless the State has given its consent.

IV-D Sovereignty c2 Consent to be sued Implied Consent

United States of America vs Hon. Eliodoro B. Guinto G.R. No. 76607 February 26, 1990
FACTS:
These are cases that have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of state immunity. The
United States of America was not impleaded in the case at bar but has moved to dismiss on the ground
that they are in effect suits against it to which it has not consented.
1.

USA vs GUINTO (GR No. 76607)

The private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force in Clark Air Base in connection
with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services in the said base, which was won by Dizon.
The respondents wanted to cancel the award because they claimed that Dizon had included in his bid an area not
included in the invitation to bid, and also, to conduct a rebidding.
2.

USA vs RODRIGO (GR No. 79470)

Genove filed a complaint for damages for his dismissal as cook in the US Air Force Recreation Center at
Camp John Hay Air Station. It had been ascertained after investigation that Genove had poured urine into the
soup stock used in cooking the vegetables served to the club customers. The club manager suspended him and
thereafter referred the case to a board of arbitrators, which unanimously found him guilty and recommended his
dismissal.
3.

USA vs CEBALLOS (GR No. 80018)

Bautista, a barracks boy in Camp O Donnell, was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by
petitioners, who were USAF officers and special agents of the Air Force Office. An information was filed against
Bautista and at the trial, petitioners testified against him. As a result of the charge, Bautista was dismissed from
his employment. He then filed for damages against petitioners claiming that it was because of the latters acts that
he lost his job.
4.

USA vs VERGARA (GR No. 80258)

A complaint for damages was filed by private respondents against petitioners (US military officers) for
injuries allegedly sustained by the former when defendants beat them up, handcuffed them and unleashed dogs
on them. The petitioners deny this and claim that respondents were arrested for theft but resisted arrest, thus
incurring the injuries.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendants were immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts done by them in
the performance of their official duties.
HELD:
WHEREFORE, after considering all the above premises, the Court hereby renders judgment as follows:
1. In G.R. No. 76607, the petition is DISMISSED and the respondent judge is directed to proceed with the
hearing and decision of Civil Case No. 4772. The temporary restraining order dated December 11, 1986, is
LIFTED.
***** In US vs GUINTO, the court finds the barbershops subject to the concessions granted by the US government to be commercial
enterprises operated by private persons.

2. In G.R. No. 79470, the petition is GRANTED and Civil Case No. 829-R(298) is DISMISSED.
***** In US vs RODRIGO, the restaurant services offered at the John Hay Air Station partake of the nature of a business enterprise undertaken
by the US government in its proprietary capacity, as they were operated for profit, as a commercial and not a governmental activity. Not even
the US government can claim such immunity because by entering into the employment contract with Genove in the discharge of its proprietary
functions, it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit. But, the court still dismissed the complaint against petitioners on the

ground that there was nothing arbitrary about the proceedings in the dismissal of Genove, as the petitioners acted quite properly in terminating
Genoves employment for his unbelievably nauseating act.

3. In G.R. No. 80018, the petition is GRANTED and Civil Case No. 115-C-87 is DISMISSED. The temporary
restraining order dated October 14, 1987, is made permanent.
***** In US vs CEBALLOS, it was clear that the petitioners were acting in the exercise of their official functions when they conducted the buybust operation and thereafter testified against the complainant. For discharging their duties as agents of the United States, they cannot be
directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued.

4. In G.R. No. 80258, the petition is DISMISSED and the respondent court is directed to proceed with the
hearing and decision of Civil Case No. 4996. The temporary restraining order dated October 27, 1987, is
LIFTED.
***** In US vs VERGARA, the contradictory factual allegations in this case need a closer study of what actually happened. The record was too
meager to indicate if the defendants were really discharging their official duties or had actually exceeded their authority when the incident
occurred. The needed inquiry must first be made by the lower court so it may assess and resolve the conflicting claims of the parties.

All without any pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

DISCUSSION:
The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is one of the generally accepted principles of
international law that were have adopted as part of the law of our land. Even without such affirmation, we would
still be bound by the generally accepted principles of international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under
this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of the states, such principles are deemed incorporated in the law of
every civilized state as a condition and consequence of its membership in the society of nations. All states are
sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. While the doctrine appears to prohibit
only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of
the states for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the
judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the
same, the suit must be regarded as against the state although it has not been formally impleaded. When
the government enters into a contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of the other
contracting party and divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied consent.
It bears stressing at this point that the aforesaid principle do not confer on the USA a blanket immunity for
all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines. Neither may the other petitioners claim that they are also
insulated from suit in this country merely because they have acted as agents of the United States in the discharge
of their official functions.
There is no question that the USA, like any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its nonsuability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity (commercial acts/jure gestionis). It is
only when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity (governmental acts/jure imperii) that no
such waiver may be implied.
*****NOTE:
1. A STATE MAY BE SAID TO HAVE DESCENDED TO THE LEVEL OF AN INDIVIDUAL AND CAN
THUS BE DEEMED TO HAVE TACITLY GIVEN ITS CONSENT TO BE SUED ONLY WHEN IT ENTERS INTO
BUSINESS CONTRACTS.
2. Jure Gestionis by right of economic or business relations, may be sued. (US vs Guinto)
Jure Imperii by right of sovereign power, in the exercise of sovereign functions. No implied consent.
(US v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487)

IV-D Sovereignty Suability vs Liability

The Municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan vs Hon. Simeon P. Dumdum, Jr.
G.R. No. 168289 March 22, 2010
FACTS:
Respondent Emily Rose Go Ko Lim Chao, doing business as KD Surplus was contacted by
petitioner Felix V. Ople (chief executive of Hagonoy). Respondent had entered into an agreement with
petitioner municipality through Ople for the delivery of motor vehicles, which supposedly were needed to
carry out certain developmental undertakings in the municipality. However, despite having made several
deliveries (total of 21 motorcycles worth P5,820,000.00. Ople allegedly did not heed respondents claim
for payment. As of the filing of the complaint, the total obligation of petitioner had already totaled
P10,026,060.13 exclusive of penalties and damages. Thus, respondent prayed for full payment of the
said amount, with interest at not less than 2% per month, plus P500,000.00 as damages for business
losses, P500,000.00 as exemplary damages, attorneys fees of P100,000.00 and the costs of the suit. O
n February 13, 2003, the trial court issued an Order granting respondents prayer for a writ of preliminary
attachment conditioned upon the posting of a bond equivalent to the amount of the claim. On March 20,
2003, the trial court issued the Writ of Preliminary Attachment directing the sheriff to attach the estate,
real and personal properties of petitioners.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming that the action was unenforceable under the statute
of frauds. Petitioners also filed a Motion to Dissolve and/or Discharge the Writ of Preliminary Attachment
already Issued, invoking among others, immunity of the state from suit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not as a municipal corporation, the Municipality of Hagonoy is immune from suit, and that its
properties are by law exempt from execution and garnishment.
HELD:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED IN PART. The January 31, 2005 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81888 is AFFIRMED insofar as it affirmed the October 20, 2003 Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 7 denying petitioners motion to dismiss in Civil Case No.
CEB-28587. The assailed decision is REVERSED insofar as it affirmed the said trial courts denial of
petitioners motion to discharge the writ of preliminary attachment issued in that case. Accordingly, the
August 4, 2003 Writ of Preliminary Attachment issued in Civil Case No. CEB-28587 is ordered lifted.
***** The general rule spelled out in Section 3, Article XVI of the Constitution is that the state and its political
subdivisions may not be sued without their consent. Otherwise put, they are open to suit but only when they consent
to it. Consent is implied when the government enters into a business contract, as it then descends to the level of the
other contracting party; or it may be embodied in a general or special law such as that found in Book I, Title I, Chapter
2, Section 22 of the Local Government Codeof 1991, which vests local government units with certain corporate
powers - one of them is the power to sue and be sued.
Be that as it may, a difference lies between suability and liability. As held in City of Caloocan v. Allarde, where the
suability of the state is conceded and by which liability is ascertained judicially, the state is at liberty to determine for
itself whether to satisfy the judgment or not. Execution may not issue upon such judgment, because statutes waiving
non-suability do not authorize the seizure of property to satisfy judgments recovered from the action. These statutes
only convey an implication that the legislature will recognize such judgment as final and make provisions for its full
satisfaction. Thus, where consent to be sued is given by general or special law, the implication thereof is
limited only to the resultant verdict on the action before execution of the judgment. The functions and public
services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public
funds from their legitimate and specific objects. The writ of attachment in this case would only prove to be
useless and unnecessary under the premises, since the property of the municipality may not, in the event
that respondents claim is validated, be subjected to writs of execution and garnishment unless, of course,
there has been a corresponding appropriation provided by law.