VICTOR ORQUIOLA and HONORATA ORQUIOLA, petitioners,

vs. TANDANG SORA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

against them because to do so would amount to deprivation of property

without due process of law.

- This petition for review seeks the reversal of the decision of the Court of
Appeals which dismissed the petition to prohibit the issuing of a writ of
demolition against petitioners, and the sheriff from implementing an alias
writ of execution.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. It held that as buyers and
successors-in-interest of Lising, petitioners were considered privies who
derived their rights from Lising by virtue of the sale and could be reached by
the execution order
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition.

The facts are as follows:

- Ledesma was the registered owner of a lot in Tandang Sora, QC. The parcel
of land was adjacent to certain portions of registered in the name of Piedad
Estates and other portions to Herminigilda Pedro.
- On October 29, 1964, Herminigilda sold her lot to Lising who then
registered both lots and Lot 707-C in the name of M.B. Lising Realty and
subdivided them into smaller lots
- Certain portions of the subdivided lots were sold to third persons including
herein petitioners, spouses Victor and Honorata Orquiola. Other portions
were registered in the name of the heirs of Pedro, heirs of Lising, and other
third persons.
- In 1969, Ledesma filed a complaint Pedro and Lising for allegedly
encroaching upon Lot 689. During the pendency of the action, Tandang
Sora Development Corporation replaced Ledesma as plaintiff by virtue of
an assignment made by Ledesma in favor of said corporation. Trial
continued for three decades.
- On August 21, 1991, the trial court finally adjudged defendants Pedro and
Lising jointly and severally liable for encroaching on plaintiffs land and
ordered them:
(a) to remove all construction, including barbed wires and fences, illegally
constructed by defendants on plaintiffs property at defendants expense;
(b) to replace the removed concrete monuments removed by defendants, at
their own expense;
As a result, in February 1998, the Deputy Sheriff directed petitioners
(Orquiola spouses) to remove the house they constructed on the land they
were occupying and issued a writ of demolition
However, despite the service of the said writ to all the defendants and the
present occupants of the subject property, they failed to comply therewith
Petitioners filed with the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for a
restraining order and preliminary injunction to stop the demolition
Petitioners alleged that they bought the subject parcel of land in good faith and
for value, hence, they were parties in interest. Since they were not impleaded,
the writ of demolition issued in connection therewith cannot be enforced

ISSUES: (1) whether the alias writ of execution may be enforced against
petitioners; and (2) whether petitioners were innocent purchasers for value and
builders in good faith.
HELD
On the first issue, petitioners claim that the alias writ of execution cannot be
enforced against them. Where a case like the present one involves a sale of a
parcel of land under the Torrens system1, the applicable rule is that a person
dealing with the registered property need not go beyond the certificate of title;
he can rely solely on the title and he is charged with notice only of such
burdens and claims as are annotated on the title. It is our view here that the
petitioners, spouses Victor and Honorata Orquiola, are fully entitled to the
legal protection of their lot by the Torrens system.
Coming now to the second issue, were petitioners purchasers in good faith and
for value? A buyer in good faith is one who buys the property of another
without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in such
property. He is a buyer for value if he pays a full and fair price at the time of
the purchase or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other
person in the property. The sale to petitioners was made before Ledesma
claimed the lot. Petitioners could reasonably rely on Mariano Lisings
Certificate of Title which at the time of purchase was still free from any third
party claim. Hence, considering the circumstances of this case, we conclude
that petitioners acquired the land subject of this dispute in good faith and for
value.

Torrens title is generally conclusive evidence of ownership of the land referred

to therein, and a strong presumption exists that a Torrens title was regularly issued
and valid. A Torrens title is incontrovertible against any informacion possessoria,
or other title existing prior to the issuance thereof not annotated on the Torrens
title. Moreover, persons dealing with property covered by a Torrens certificate of
title are not required to go beyond what appears on its face.

The final question now is: could we consider petitioners builders in good
faith? On this score, we find that petitioners are indeed builders in good faith.
A builder in good faith is one who builds with the belief that the land he is
building on is his, and is ignorant of any defect or flaw in his title. As earlier
discussed, petitioner spouses acquired the land in question without knowledge
of any defect in the title of Lising. Shortly afterwards, they built their
conjugal home on said land. It was only in 1998, when the sheriff of Quezon
City tried to execute the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-12918, that they had
notice of private respondents adverse claim. The institution of Civil Case
No. Q-12918 cannot serve as notice of such adverse claim to petitioners since
they were not impleaded therein as parties.
As builders in good faith and innocent purchasers for value, petitioners have
rights over the subject property and hence they are proper parties in interest in
any case thereon. Consequently, private respondents should have impleaded
them in Civil Case No. Q-12918. Since they failed to do so, petitioners cannot
be reached by the decision in said case. In our view, the spouses Victor and
Honorata Orquiola have valid and meritorious cause to resist the demolition of
their house on their own titled lot, which is tantamount to a deprivation of
property without due process of law.

GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE

REGION, represented by the Philippine Department of
Justice, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO
MUOZ, Respondents.
This case discusses whether the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of
Rights extends to a prospective extradite in an extradition2 proceeding.
On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British
Crown Colony of Hong Kong signed an "Agreement for the Surrender of
Accused and Convicted Persons." It took effect on June 20, 1997.
2

Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition
Law) defines "extradition" as "the removal of an accused from the Philippines
with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the
requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal
investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him
under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government."

The Petitioner is the Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative

Region, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice
The Respondents are Judge Felix Olalia and Juan Antonio Muoz
FACTS
Private respondent Muoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with
three (3) counts of the offense of "accepting an advantage as agent," in
violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201
of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to
defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. Warrants of arrest
were issued against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of seven (7) to
fourteen (14) years for each charge.
On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department
of Justice a request for the provisional arrest of private respondent. The
RTC issued an Order of Arrest against private respondent. That same day, the
NBI agents arrested and detained him.
Private respondent filed a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner.
After hearing, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for
bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases
and that private respondent is a high "flight risk." Judge Bernardo, Jr.
inhibited himself from further hearing the case, it was then raffled off to
Branch 8 presided by respondent judge. Private respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail and this was
granted by respondent judge.
Petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was denied
by respondent judge. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision
in the Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee.
HELD:
No. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise
behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary detention" is the
possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. This is based on the assumption
that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice. Given the foregoing, the
prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she
is not a flight risk and should be granted bail.
Accordingly, although the time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda
demands that the Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition

Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region it
does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the
Philippines should diminish a potential extraditees rights to life, liberty, and
due process guaranteed by the Constitution. More so, where these rights are
guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by international
conventions, particularly the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to
which the Philippines is a party.
Ratio:
The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations,
committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the
worth and dignity of every person. Clearly, the right of a prospective
extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of
the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for
the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the
presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to
it that the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired.
Extradition is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the
potential extraditee. Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely
administrative in character. Its object is to prevent the escape of a person
accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from
which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment. It does not necessarily
mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should
diminish a potential extraditees rights to life, liberty, and due process.
More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but
also by international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We
should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail,
provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented
evidence to show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should
be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be
granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the
trial court to determine whether private respondent is entitled to bail on the
basis of "clear and convincing evidence." If not, the trial court should order
the cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate detention; and thereafter,
conduct the extradition proceedings with dispatch.

HUDGEN vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

FACTS
Butler Shoe Co. warehouse workers went on strike and decided to picket the
nine retail locations in Atlanta. One of those stores was located within the
North DeKalb Shopping Center, owned by the Petitioner, Hudgens
(Petitioner). When striking members of respondent union picketed in front of
their employer's leased store located in petitioner's shopping center, the
shopping center's general manager threatened them with arrest for criminal
trespass if they did not depart, and they left. The union then filed unfair labor
practice charges against petitioner, alleging that the threat constituted
interference with rights protected by the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA). The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), concluding that the
NLRA had been violated, issued a cease and desist order against petitioner,
and the Court of Appeals enforced the order. Petitioner and respondent union
contend that the respective rights and liabilities of the parties are to be decided
under the criteria of the NLRA alone, whereas the NLRB contends that such
rights and liabilities must be measured under a First Amendment3 standard.
Hudgens argued that the Bill of Rights only applies to governmental actions,
and this was private property (aka the State Action Doctrine). NLRB looked
to Amalgamated Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza,
Inc. (391 U.S. 308 (1968)) and argued that that when a private entity is open
to the public, or performing a governmental function, they are bound by
the Public Function Exception.
ISSUE: WON a private shopping mall prohibit picketing of its tenants by
members of the public
HELD
A private shopping mall is not the functional equivalent of a town and,
therefore, not a state actor subject to the requirements of the First Amendment
of the United States Constitution
The majority overrules the holding of Logan Valley and reasserts the holding
of Lloyd. A mall may look like and function as a small town would, yet it
does not have all of the attributes of a town. So, it is not restricted by the

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or

prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the

prohibition on content-based speech review that a state actor would be under

in the same circumstances.
Under the present state of the law, the constitutional guarantee of free
expression has no part to play in a case such as this, and the pickets here did
not have a First Amendment right to enter the shopping center for the purpose
of advertising their strike against their employer. ( Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407
U.S. 551. Pp. 512-521.)
The rights and liabilities of the parties are dependent exclusively upon the
NLRA, under which it is the NLRB's task, subject to judicial review, to
resolve conflicts between 7 rights and private property rights and to seek
accommodation of such rights "with as little destruction of one as is consistent
with the maintenance of the other," NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S.
105, 112. Hence, the case is remanded so that the NLRB may reconsider the
case under the NLRA's statutory criteria alone.

Rubi vs Provincial Board of Mindoro

G.R. No. 14078, March 07, 1919

ruled that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the
police power and thus constitutional.

Facts: The provincial board, by Resolution No. 25, selected a site in the sitio of

Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas

Tigbao on Naujan Lake for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro.

corpus can, therefore, not issue.

Pursuant to the provisions of section 2145 of the revised Administrative Code, all
the Mangyans in the vicinities of the townships of Naujan and Pola and the

One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with when the

Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan and

degree of civilization of the. Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for

Rubis place in Calapan are directed to take up their habitation on the site of

their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due

Tigbao, Naujan Lake.

process of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of due process

This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of

of law and equal protection of the laws, there exists a law; the law seems to be

the Province of Mindoro. It is alleged that the Mangyanes are being illegally

reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure

deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his

prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.

companions are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro,

against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the
provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away from the reservation.

The public policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands is shaped with a view
to benefit the Filipino people as a whole. The Manguianes, in order to fulfill this
governmental policy, must be confined for a time, as we have said, for their own

Issue: Whether Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprives a person of his
liberty of abode and is therefore unconstitutional
Held: No. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of
his liberty without due process of law and does not deny to him the equal
protection of the laws, and that confinement in reservations in accordance with said
section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. The court further

good and the good of the country.

** Javier v Comelec 144 SCRA 194 (1986)

Facts: The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates

in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa in the May 1984 elections.
The former appeared to enjoy more popular support but the latter
had the advantage of being the nominee of the KBL with all its
perquisites of power. On May 13, 1984, the eve of the elections,
the bitter contest between the two came to a head when several
followers of the petitioner were ambushed and killed, allegedly by
the latter's men. Seven suspects, including respondent
Pacificador, are now facing trial for these murders. Owing to what
he
claimed
were
attempts
to railroadthe
private respondent's proclamation, the petitioner went to
theCommission on Elections to question the canvass of the
election returns. His complaints were dismissed and the
private respondent was proclaimed winner by the Second Division
of the said body. The petitioner thereupon came to this Court,
arguing that theproclamation was void because made only by a
division and not by the Commissionon Elections en banc as
required by the Constitution. Meanwhile, on the strength of his
proclamation, the private respondent took his oath as a member
of
the
Batasang
Pambansa.
Issue: Whether or Not the Second Division of the Commission on
Elections authorized to promulgate its decision of July 23, 1984,
proclaiming the private respondent the winner in the election.
Held: This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded "the
cold neutrality of an impartial judge" as the indispensable
imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement, we have
held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also
appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that
his decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than
that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated they
can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They must trust the
judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe
in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment.
Without such confidence, there would be no point in invoking his
action
for
the
justice
they
expect.
Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring

compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of

fair play. Fair play cans for equal justice. There cannot be equal
justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed to
the other party and with a judgment already made and waiting
only to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the
charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extra-judicial)
proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the parties are
supposed to make the motions and reach the denouement
according to a prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain
the ending. The judge will reach his conclusions only after all the
evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the
established facts and the pertinent law.