Professional Documents
Culture Documents
American Revolutionary War Vs Vietnam's
American Revolutionary War Vs Vietnam's
AIR WARo
No. M-M'~C86-049
Lfl
IN~ COFLI1CT
VIETNAM WAR
THE
AND
REVOLUTION
~PARALLELS
1%
THE AM~ERICAN
DTIC
By
MAR I 11987
ID
A"L
A13tVopCE BASE,
LLW
jM lLO
HIMIIB
DISCLAIMER NOTICE
THIS DOCUMENT IS BEST QUALITY
PRACTICABLE. THE COPY FURNISHED
TO DTIC CONTAINED A SIGNIFICANT
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'
PARALLELS IN CONFLICT
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND THE VIETNAM WAR
by
Robert P. Daly, II
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF
Research Advisor:
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAP rEF
.
.. .. . ....
DISCLAIMER-ABSTAINER..............
...
. .. .. . ....
.
.
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ABSTRACT.......................
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH..................
IINTRODUCTION..........................................
ii
.. .. .....
. ..
......
Policy....................
STRATEGIES
The American Revolution..........
...
The Vietnam War..................
TV
.. ....
.. .. .. .....
CONCLUSION.....................
..
.
. .
...
.. .. .. .....
APPENDIX:
REFERENCES...................
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. .. .. . ...
...
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Accesion For
NTIS CRAMt
DTIC TAB
Unariows:ced
B.............
v
Di-.,t: lb ifion i
Availailihty Codies
Dist
Avail ardlor
Special
the author
ant
be reproduced
in
whole or
in Part
Alabama.
.,a
:1
without
Air
Fore
TITLE:
AUTHOR:
Robert P.
-Research
United
Dalv, II,
Lieutenant Colonel,
USAF
ant
American Revolution
and the
Vietnam War
respectively.
and
wh,
an _
)merican leaders failed to appreciate the true nature :f the -=nflicts. did not
establish clear or
reasonable national
:e-
wars, military
commanders should
situation
lJ~a
i:
revolutionar,,
will support
!N
faced with
limi-
a decisive
mil:-
3IOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
Lieutenant
II.
US Air Force
(B.S..
Academy, M.S.,
had
He has served
Air-
as
an
School.
action
graduate of
4NV
His
was at
officer in
the
Office
College by seminar.
1986.
Lt Cal
Daly
and
of
the
Lei!atie
I= a
disting-
completed Ai:-
Dalv is
graduate
CONFLICTS IN PARALLEL
THE VIETNAM WAR AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
A recent speaker at
advise
College said:
it
was a
"Before
"bad war"
vou
and that,
in retrospect,
being
the United
"
wa-
Chiefs of Staff.
ement of national
are bv no means
writers and
Uni-
histo -
how Americans
view
the role
of
American
the United
come
times but,
our history.
in a broad
Vietnam
Century Superpower
tativelv inferior
too.
had its
force. Like
own "bad
aberration
war."
was not an
in
that war.
ar
and nualiBritain.
the revolutionar:es
A comoarative
Iar.
Both British
lish
clear
tantly,
or
and American
reasonable national
in the
absence of
force.
These
fatal
flaws
both
and,
most
the use
Impor-
of
natior
limited
strategy to defeat.
each
the
estat-
failed to
objectives. each
predicated on
doomed
to appreciate
objectives;
clear national
military strategy
Pursued
leaders failed
nature of
true
the
that the
War reveals
Vietnam
and
Revoltution
the American
of
analysis
Rare.,
that
This
2'
brief
review of
years ago
ould not
Vietnam
the popular
Vietn.am was
be foreseen."
War did
In
'something new.
the realm
ostensbilv usher
in
States,
a nation and
States
the role of
tions.
armed
conflict,
"new ideas."
to some old
people spawned
as
a nation
military force
is
in
But
by revolution.
the
these
themes which
the role of
-ceives
little
oresentations
that
Indeed.
our very
Britain's
attention.
force
So
the
own
War of
United
defeat
in
struggling
in
dealing
the
shoulc
of
the War of
11RI
remembered
the
Indeoendence.
revolution-
interest
re-
here."
ionored. c_
reasons
and
numerous
one soeaker
Indeoendenc_ is totally
States
revci!L-
durino the
much
comore-
with
and strategy,
a topic
to
modern
By contrast,
little that.
on military history
Darked
had
military
still
dealing with
College.
-iaos
some
somethina that
understood.
The United
hend
of
notion
for
the true
Great
soCia'
-at!-re
of
-ealities
o-f k.ietnam.
-he Amneri can Revolution should
t on a
4orcq will
most
combatants
whose commitment
71'1eer
i kely,
In
a war
of+
the use of
prove unsuccessful
to
they are
4-orce of will.
nerser'.ere
:1
thes
the conflict,
limited militarv
wh en
the cause is
conven-
d e aIi n c
so strong
vith
thiat.
n.
attrition.
In
the
words of
of-
Be-Fore
two con-flicts,
the
understood--what
and
kind of wars
indeed a
civil
revolution.
military strateaies_
-Fundamental nat-ure
war.
o-f the
as *a civil
wars
"revoluti on"
ns
mL
_st
since
Americans
S'C
L,
_Agression
or
as
an
orchestrated
American=-.
fought
or
TCli-
"unconv.entional"o
-and Orosc, te
were thev?
the
is that
"whv'
t!. e
t
tne
,4ar
NJas fcoht,
whereas
auLer i I11 a.
-FOLI[Cht.
the terms
"unconventional.
"1revolution-ary.
"and
The manner of
connotate "how"
"
prosecution
0LLr
'conven t ionalI."
"
of
the
the Vietnam
war waE-
War
Ie a d s
one to believe that the United States approached the war orimarilv as a
the
"Ie
technical
social
enterprise and
and political
origins o-E
been
a social
ZIM0iY an
unconventional
or
oolitical
he
erment
its
and not
-Acaression b
support;
dJirect or indirect.
Revolution
All
a~nd
lmnsMust
be oresent:
1)
elites:
political
cross section of
American
of
war.
hamd
to be sucsfl
widesoread
and
war
always
(2:151
is redistribution of
;revolution
and a civil
conventional
A~ re'/olution is a orocess.
aoal
North Vietnam.
its
the conflict.
to
2)
and,
7-) external
these
support.
+actors were
whether
it
cresent dlri.nC
With
strateimies
this
in
mind
of Great
a
be
the
we zar
Eqritain, and
War College.
of many
the Fabyani:
z asses S mili
1ta:ry/ strateov
Jiscreet
'arce
variables.
(sree
structure.
2)
doctrine.
7)
Model
in conflict
In the curriclum
is offered
Ao oen di1x
isi
1)
by
as a trameworl
msotan
o1
s ~h t
'2
threat.
4)
1,
tech-
nol ogy
5)
targetr-.'.
its leadership.
6.
()These
oclic..
This research
Will
paoer
States d~lri na
-rMuL
t I :1nc
' ~f
'3OCIETh
A me r can
The
Pevo'
_
~a11v
-AU
eo'
te
C!us_1
E c
tbe~n
g n
o-f+i c Ial1
some
:-t arted
( 4: 1 1- 12
t at
nmterd
zonor
fie~~::
ith
15::
&2
I r
1a7
rM
_aI)
:olMnMsS
The9is
Nlorth
nomic.
and
' z,l
t o
reliliouLS freedoms.
at the time
~merican society
th
1e
century..
13th
and
orn
the French
in
17!S
power had
Britain'
and
r,
?cOnomi c
hA.',e
a t tr 1bUt e d t ne r-
U CZSS E~
fo.r chnan,-
-as no EUr.:oean
al
T.ertF
sic
the
The
atEr
SCMSCt
_
or
me r .an
n
e Le
EI-''1-,
Lwr-,'1
EPr' ti
LJ?r5
the : e4"e-at
Emo'.r _.
Poman
=ame +,-,-,:
--
=-
r-noved wenaith
War.
anl Mrioso:t'
weal tn
were
h-and.
the status-anut.
maintainima
thei r zocial
=_oc
the ct
looked
Americans_
of
Much =f
mobl1e
The British.
-:n .( n c 9d
rernalne
cclonies
~he s eedsa:)
ec:-
vwa:t
'=ocietv.
ri-id
interestz were in
=tower
Altho~toh thle
LEPIDERHIc
AND
althouch
i ar ims, at
~h=e,./wi 1 1
0evolUt Icn
Mass-Achusetts.
Le,.ingtan.
rI a1d.
a.nd
1 t -krv =t -a tatev
ni
vni
Use the
Revol uti on
e,, oh t var1 ab I e - a n -
t~ h
e~te
2 _c i et'~s
that
nizina
s-i;,vri'
militarv strategy by
into a
intecrated
Then
and
*n
_ss.
r,
an
4I
3 -lrtwjt-
-'-'-
:e
Ls
c~ -"
2:a
lv
economic.
This
the
real
reason
was
a demand
important
to all
for
distinction,
classes of
self-governmenn.
is
the reason
colonial
why
society:
American colonies
civilian
though
American
throughout
:ietv
of
the will
the
the war,
of
7,000 miles
dedicated to
had
expressed
the
it
for the
victory
was
by many
legitimacy
at
British
war
British
in
of
British
society never
army for
accepted
fielded a
fully unite
of
the use of
rL'e
by one of
leaders. or
Z
the
torce
(4:97-!52)
over
Parliament's
an
fully
never
consequence
Parliament
sc-
the traditional
society to
predictable
thought
mercenaries and
and therefore
Al-
individualisti-
their homes.
any cost.
assemblage
the conflict.
the highly
could, however,
to rely on
away.
The failure of
war
thus mirroring
responsibility
the
leaders throughout
other hand,
a gifted
the colonies,
methods of
war
and military
over
the
in
support
C.
the disaffectin
force to
en+or:s_
colonists.
the opposition
Burke:
leaders
This
tc
progressed and
Parliament
increasingly found
escalated in
intensity, the
itself in heated
English
ever or owino need for men and material to fight the war.
British
appreciated
the British
-Failure to
appreciate
colonial
Ujnited
in the American
nurtured for
colonies. the
a long meri od of
(105?
to 19-75)
rev.olution. and
-an
d
has been
As
in Asia. Vietnam
seeds of social
was
French.
were viewed
enemv in
Communist
: M411-t
American involvement
rea-lly, bean
by the
armed
ztruc-
I M th =
retreat of
insurgents
1-
as merely
1-.4-.
the
the
war which
been
only. a continu.ation of an
=ivil
American forces,
unrest had
c:entury.
c=urrent
the
history of violence
gle.
asoirati.ons.
has a long
Vietnam
Like
Amer'-ca
a new social
order.
prime inaredient
in th-e
Mobili~ation
of
indigenouS Communist
distribution
of wealth and
and political
- ormerly had
Their primary
legacies of
dominated Indochina.
goal
removal
was the
re-
of the rulin.
the
strongly attacked
Communist Vietnamese
forces.
for the
,-jestern
world
is not
It
"hcw
strongly"
The
the cause.
United
hope
could not
States
to
in
nM=till
of violence,
Communist
Vietnamese forces.
which was
frequently displayed
By contrast,
American
and was
by
the
-ocietv.. was
far removed
from
like
their
British counterparts
nearly
7',ID,
e =er=
has
appears to have taken place of the importance of Southeast Asia to American security interests, of the correctness of the
dire predictions regarding the cunsequences
of the loss of the area, of the probability
of success in the military struggle. or o
the costs of winning the war in Indochina. (6:60T)
As
in
the American
Revolution when
British societ\
failed t-
tv
became less
ers
terests
in
and
less
States
war escalated,
American society
demanc
in
the Vietnam
issues.
etc)
which culminated
Great Britain.
imperceptibly
situation"
from which
not appear
to be any
Over a span
-:verreaction
to
mation. and
The
United
a total
It
is
the
critical
also by
a
often
striking
majority
of
Britain
similaritv
four
adminis-
of
information.
of
and,
in
and
of
an entancling
nor
in
that
full'
an'i =eviar
but rather.
misin.:r-
(7:!47'
-tL.,drc'i
_trC-
the case of
tnetaT..
comorehend
the fee!:nc-
the Vietnamese
Poo,(.1ati0r..
the culture
made
i-
presidents,"
investigate
mistake
Great
coloni-
US toward
ignorant
Culture
understanding
but
to
of
,1.2.
based on miSLnderstancing.
lac.:
and
of
ulation was
is
failure
lac.. of
States,
States
Politics
aspirations
This
involvement
princiols
in the
for intervention,
American
United
seemingl:,, small
in some cases,
country's
a:imost
pulled the
the part of
intrigue on
Truman,
"master plan
in
misadventures
political
escalation of
representation
:aliCtlations
reasons for
i0
it began to
in-
goverr-
rebellion against
and
security
publically defied
involvement
the gradual
tion,
er
national
lead-
eventu-
retrospect.
!n
ous
as oalitical
authority.
ment
al
the war
to
supportive of
American socie-
of
-ionificant degree
of
the inaigenouSo:-
b', not
onl
the Peolutin.
both
Great
Britain
the
'!7it_:e
-4c
'
an_
t .
would
substantial
those
that
large share of
be borne by
indigenous
effort
support
colonists
and
forces. Great
in
remaining loyal
the
the burden of
the
Britain
conduct of
to the
crown,
South Vietnamese
force capable of
ever,
States failed
of
the United
the
South
Vietnamese
expected
the war
and
+rom
the United
not only to
the
also to
defending South
es-
field a
Vietnam.
How-
people which
resulted
in
disastrou=
consequences:
.
.
the non-Communist Vietnamese were
never able to achieve ideological cohesion, organizational discipline, or political legitimacy. They were never able tc
overcome their differences so as to project one unified policy that would be able
to win the support of the peasantry. Given
this, America's hopes for success in
Vietnam were probably doomed from the beginning. (7:149)
In
British
ety.
a similar
failed
fashion,
to understand
the British
during
in men
flies
with a hammer."
the desire to
troops)
to rely
on
in
thus
American
20C). years
socilater.
and
their numerical
was like
(4:97) While
trving
conou.=ring;
use Loyalist
for occupation
Vietnam
mese
in
to hit a swarm of
led to
and Americans
pualitative superiority
This
the
forces
(or South
freeing regular
both wars,
regular
forces
forces were
Vietnafor a+never
i t*
it.
af
.oyalist
low
able
sustain effective offensive operations and USUally! only temporar-After capture preferring the relE-
the coastal
British defeats
tect
little confidence
British
to
for
their
inflict the
Course of
safety and
and
,rc,-
recrimination=-.
in the
ultimate defeat
the
announced to the
1-oalist
on the
'neutral"
Wit-
_Abilit~v o--
the
colonists.
-Arld never
the
tecamea
rebel
held villages-and
South
Cong guerillas.
es sen tia1
territory.
in
Vietnamese
cite
to fiahtina
the-,.
critic
scainst
gavernment
aca-,'
Communis m
As e arl1
Staff warnec:
civiliakn
... that Without a stable
government in control and without A Willingness by the k.ietnamese themselves to
resist communism. 'no -Amount of ex"ternal
pressure and assis-tance can long delay complete 'Cmmunist victor.
in South Vi etnazm. ' (:'
Another
ao
nlumerous critics
and commitment
inaredient
after
"neutral."
initiative
of
wrote:
t he cardinal mistake made In,, the
United States concerned nat our asseszment of our snemies , but of oUr allies.
and soeci-Ficallv,. the nature of thie -variouz
ai4.
of South
and solidify
military. South
American
force.
Vietnamese
the legitimacy of
Vietnamese forces,
Revolution, were
casualties.
this background
in
the
a credible militar'.
aenerals. +earful
in areas where
of discord.
in the Fabyanic
to
of
the VC wer
(6:702)
is against
leadership
the Loyalists
for "Cautious
It
like
little
never considered
not uncommon
It was
governments did
Model tc
British societ.
The ne>-t twc
be discussed are
'
lariatles
4-orce StrUct'-ure
4-,-1
doctrine.
FORCE STRUCTURE AND DOCTRINE
At
of
to the
farmers.. tradesmen.
individual
standing
colonies.
and
sailors whose
The
colonists had
co:m-
allegiences wers
no need
+zr
-A
:ti
seen duty in
ex cesti
of
the Seven
1C
*100X
a British officer
Year's War.
war progressed.
comfort
tative mismatch:
... the native American is an effemi-
nate thing.
ver
Iia
lir-
snd
.ng
:nr
Mar'
I-1a 1-
patient of war.
vagabonds, the
human species.
During
.
.
a set of upstart
dregs and scorn of the
(4:1277
the course of
the war.
the need
for
equal
the exigencies of
to
a regular army
saying that
modern war,
match
ruinous."
for
the
regular
were
colonial
army
of
could only be
colonial
to defeat
it must
forces
under
prove
were
Il-
never
the rules of
!Eth
i,:C,000 reuIars.
hy
in
a decisive engagement.
the British
forces
won by such
how to make
it
an
happen
never
perienced
able to adapt
in
looked
engagement,
"as
he
SUCCe=sfullv
Howe.
Ze
The
to the
was unable tc
the enemy
(4:91)
to engage the
Although General
in America. realized
as
forces?
Commander
clearly
as well
British forces
recognized
Washington
is attempted
(9:177) However,
General
British
militrw
conditions they
ee-
North America:
disregarded
warfare on
Samoa
in
traditional
the tactical
the North
American
and
doctrine. British
stratelc
continent,
and
realiti-_
relied
to:-
:omman,,df 'and
.-
hea,iI
on support from
numbers.
appreciable
Both
major
failure in British
tain
offensive operations
also be
attributed
of
failed to materialize
British
reluctance of
to
to sus-
to the
ir.
commanders
tc
in
the war,
the offensive
in
from
commitment
lack
of
believed that
its
the British
the belief
for
early in
army
the war
As
an
compelled
at
one
to t.a4e
army would
crumble
example, the
Sr.t.sh
reenlistment
the American
and supply.
the American
membership up
that
never felt
time.
as
the bull.
in
of
December
on the part
nz
gain strength,
confidence, and experience, and most likely was the result Q+ th--,
British underestimating the enemy's capabilities.
The British experience in doctrinal deficiency was
by
the American
later.
repeated
The American
eqi_.uipped
14
War
II.
American
jungle
war against
trained
in
highly motivated,
the art of
counterparts,
realities of
revolutionary
indigenous
fight a
Communist
warfare. Like
their
forces
British
not support
the
the war:
the
mise is
Harry
in
G.
Summers,
Context,
summarizes
in
that
IK,
prior to World
War
to force him to
timate doctrinal
tional
sue for
surrender.
This
two
the Chinese
fundamental
fined
the
to
in
restraints
war,.through
peacetime
between
power
cold war
1962,
II
and
war,
to
than
war
15
fncuse
enemy's forces
changed this
of
war.
so
ul-
could not
military
in
Kcrea
introdce,_
in concert
that
ac-
would
war can
limited war
was
te
rede-
general
between
limited
the
two,
faced
first,
struggle
and
the
doctrine which
war,"
means rather
limited
of
The
Summers' pre-
in Vietnam:
a "spectrum of
dilemma
In
its
Strategy:
Vietnam. Colonel
changes to
1962 doctrinal
On
doctrinal
simply forcing
intervention.
limit the
the
his book
destruction
objective to
in
war ranged
The
nations with
frcm cold
former
the
"neither distinct
or
t-
being
dividng
line
absolute.''
The similarity
art
sitated
concept
detail.
in
superpower
the traditional
prosecution of
of
The degree of
its
national
needs to be
military force
National
variable.
objectives.
policy
explored
national
neces-
polic,.
It
in
a nation chooses
consequence of
together form
coupled
and
"limited means."
is a direct
Model
when
the period
force that
limited
a conflict
Fabyanic
wars of
is this
greater
to empcy
policv--anothe-
and national
"how" a nation
strategy
achieves
national
In
the
in
army trained
had a regular
tary doctrine,
the
of
doctrines
and American
British
and
structures
force
limited use
of
!rom
force evolve?
POLICY
National
policies and
The
pendent
and
the attainment
policy, however,
the combatants
is
American
retrospect,
of
a review
of
objectives
of
are
objectives.
the national
intertwined
Be-ore
dis-
obiectives
=4
in order.
colonists clearly wanted
confederation
conduct
national
of
the
of
the
16
was
yet to
Americans
in
an
the enact
colonies although
the government
the policies
to establish
be
indeform
determined.
1775 were
In
rather
-~~~~~
fragile and
separatists.
a policy of
British
However,
Clearly then,
tus
War
self-determination and
forces from
North
America
in
the minds of
it
----
the
collectivel,
subscribe to
independence with
e.xpulsion of
as their
primary
objective.
concept
sta-
1763:
As late as June 11. 1779, the King remarked to Lord North that he should
think it the greatest instance among
the many he had met with of ingratitude
and injustice if it could be supposed
that any man in his dominions 'more
ardently desired the restoration of
peace and solid happiness in every part
of this Empire' than he did. 'There is
no personal sacrifi:e I could not readily yield for so desirable an object.'
But, at the same time, no desire to get
out of the present difficulties would
incline him to enter 'into what I look
upon as the destruction of the Empire.'
However,
while the
British
with
objective was
the American
(4:24)
relatively
situation
was very
in dispute.
Whereas the government and its supporters
found the issue in supremacy of Parliament-or rather, the colonial rejection of parliamentary supremacy--the opposition found the
issue
in colonial resistance to discrete
measures taken by the metropolis since
176: and, above all, to measures of tanation.
.
. . Throughout the almost continuoUs dispute on American policy that
raged in the Commons and 1ords from the
beginning of 1774 to the spring of 1775.
it is this difference in understanding
that overshadows all other points at controversy. . . . This affinity of historians for the political opposition in Parliament rests, of course, upon far more
than simply the latter's insistence that
the dispute might have been settled with-
17
clear.
the
much
out war.
(5:384-385)
Unable to agree,
. . . the record of the North ministery
was clearly open to the charge that its
American policy was marked by inconsistency and sheer inadvertence . . . and
was one not only of compromise, but of
compromise that had been neither well
conceived nor consistently pursued. (5:391)
British policies
stemmed
should be made.
alienate
to
the protection of
(4:51)
This
:onstlt
plagued
is by no means a dead
withdrawal
issue.
*Schlesinger.
Jr.
%18
the
said in 19T:
11
To-
and
British commanders.
the British
achieve.
appeasing
What.
firm and
them further,
more difficult
the
were alternately
desired or intended.
Appro ,imately
Vietnam
i-
(7: 147 )
a poll
t--A[ en
of
US Arm%..,-'
a
and uncertain,
and 91 percenit
of
them felt
fUtt~re conflic-s:
in fact, the United States did pUr=Lte defined objectives in Indochina; the trOLttie
was that it kept changing its man-nd as to
what they were.
From first
to last there=
was consistent agreement only/ about wh~at
our objective w.as not: we were not fighting
to make South Vietnam into a=n American colony .
Unfortunately, that as exaz-ctl%,' what a great
man>' people thought we were doing.
S:'
agreement
Whal1e
on
specific
is
ob jec tives
M-A'.V
broad objective of
be
conntainment
a d15cussaon
M~ImTI
L
on Amera4::kr
American
doma.noe
tilon.
mnust
theory'
And
if
leadership was
frst
one
espouised
the
Cy
in
military
sion.
in
the
by/ Using
military
(11:71)
The
'e
polt-
The- '::nm:ra'-e
Revolu~tion.
United StaIte=
obeca..
the
po:I
Communa1 St po--wer
wq-Ii7-g
IP1P
te
-
wh-c
the expansi on cf
contaanment'
ecta .o,
that ob ,ecz~e
1
a political
the American
cb
t:: the
-ad M a7Sr'Z
the region,
,,.jar
utse of
consequLence cf
British
dilemma
defanately weddedi
BCUrce
toi- ra5 ,
z-4:
the
thr2:s
an
-1 -1=,
g't
_7
the policy of
flexible response
the
through a policy of
re-
solve to keep South Vietnam free of Communist domination by gradually escalating the
the threat.
ular
of conflict
as necessary to
counter
policy of
expected
level
response
flexible
and
"gradualism,"
but
also
was
the war,
fabric of
South
military's ultimate
Vietnam while
simultaneou.si'.
objective was
not the
"destruction of
the
but rather.
War
between fie
are remarkable.
Both
American Revolution
British and
and
the
American forces
trines
doc-
11212
x
that general
war
would
never
lead
to an
amiable settlement
and
The dilemma
Vietnam was
complicated,
from
perhaps more
the perceived
realities of
"sufficient" force
EARLY
IN
THE WAR.
but
world
were
government
variables in
addressed:
the threat
and
Britain
Would
threat of
immediate
was twofold.
signal
First.
to other
Great
would have
the
if
nonetheless.
Drevented
in
4ro T
of
ars.,t',
orQCLtuce(
f'awe:
sch
the Fab.,ani-
the
colcnial
crce.
hi-
Ioce-
rebellion
revolution was
the
adverse
in the world
was
Great
the colonies
impact
at
tz
3r=t
Empire that
the deoarture of
a severe
Britain's prestige
in
TARGETRv
members of
States
targetry.
THREAT AND
The
the use of
ser,'
originati,.
center
policies
brings
two
politics
effectively
precluded
last
a dilemma
Flawed
oni,
would
leniency
on trade.
Britain
f-rm
tie
Fcremcst.
staie:
the British
other
failed
colonies might
of
Parliament's
What
the United
to
be
contain
"containment."
power
threat
did
States
196@s.
containment
and preservation
the potential
Like
of
colonial
t'er
tne_
had tei
cooiti
owr
tc
the Emoirs.
Britain.
21
_i!
of
LiLe
the British
fall.of
Great
re-sl>:_-r
ollow S-UIt.
inclined to
l05(s and
c.itizen
this
South
was
.'it
Ic=_
4-m
prestige
in the
world
perhaps
States
States,
as leader
of
the
the main
in
world
the free
choice
that
,/4orld. It
was necessary
is
monolithic Communism
conclude
threatened
and,
by
conscious
international
and
champion
that
in
the perceived
in
the free
of
a broad
context.
expansion ot
was contrary to
of
was
control.
In
June
1P56.
then
in
Vietnam"
"America's stake
sentiments of
:1ared
that
a broad
Senator
in a
spectrum of
John
F.
speech
political
region. Most
:etnam
represents
and
prestige
important,
a test of
however,
opinion.
that
the
K*.ennedy de-
ground
is
outlined
expressed
the
tion.
Kennedy
which
on behalf
to ensure
the British
like
intervene?
"saving face"
probably fair to
Vietnam
South
leadership make
American
the extremes of
between
of
United
the United
a duty to
intervention
secLrity and
the
and did
that the
Did
reason
for
democracy
Kenned.'
said
in Asia:
if
it falls victim to any one of the
perils that threaten its existence...
then the United States, with some justification will be held responsible; and
Cur prestige in Asia will sink to a new
I ow.
2oth
Great
(.5:6 QQ 11
Britain
and
insurgencies to be a threat
the
United
States
to their dominance
in
considered
the world
-.
the
arena
and that
the
case of
was
or
not
become
a bastion
might
of
States
fact
Asia
has
perhaps the
paranoia. Again.,
threats
the national
we
that
security
history
interests
the nation.
The last
variable
be targetry. What
were the
in the early
scrted
colonial
no match
"modern"
the
draw
for
British
guerilla
regulars.
mentioned. General
in
declined
and
stall
to one of
a major
Washington
and
militias were
the first
conflict.
enter
the myths
not
off
win
time
The aims
for
France would
upon
the British
the colonial
gravity,
aimed at keeping
colonial
to fight
ution.
the Revolution,
as previuously
of
will
to harrassment tactics
balance since,
the
stages of
to be discussed
targets, or centers
of
national
perceived
was
the United
the threat
indicate that in
gross
in
indicate that
guilty of
parallel
Britain and
of
the war--that
years ago,
history would
"was
As noted previously,
it contrived?"
insur-
the
if
would be served
interests
national
their
with-
British will
of
the war.
of
the
a determined provinicial
arm-in-arm
in
the struggle
"standard patriotic
to overcome tyranny."
it
der
is not
the command
in the
colonial
jective
during
of
General
offensive operations
never
that
able to
Washington
However,
imposed on
(12:211)
appeal.
unfortunate-
the regular
the real
army
of
un-
gravity
British military
ob-
British
were clearly a
stood
tial
to the
American
survival
British
army in
of
long
their
forces,
they
were
and occupied
of
the
sanctity of
their
"home" and
essen-
the continent.
Conse-
in New England
once
they
population
guerillas
1777. unable to
engagement,
decided
their
the
earlier
detail
thereby
close with
British
to embark
engage.
under
In
addition,
increasing
British
the colonial
the
the
general
itself
frustration.
armv for
command of
Gneral
a decisive
Burgoyne
indirect
left
elusive to
into bands of
and
under-
seaports were
the seaports
most
although, as
from
forces on
way
and Canadian
the
er
While
In
myth-
be discussed
in
from
great-
later.
Similar
to the British
in
24
military
experienced
in
many of
that they
vity.
two
the
military
military
undertook
Vietnam.
troop
by
first
1967,
successes,
States began
involvement
seriously
just a guerilla
Like the
States
of
consider
with
in
the
initial
the war
that
stages of
key to defeating
the conclusion
unacceptable due
in
to
that
its
direct
1-*;
after
the
the United
as being
Once
regular
United States
than
limited
conclusion.
the region.
recognized
the American
the
To
more
do so was
Great Britain
25
we see
and
United
cf
after
army was
never
the
the
the
reall',!
offensive opera-
in order
provoking ever
again,
the
British who
that more
to the risk of
into South
American Revolution,
the rebellion,
to a successful
Cong
increased
began
forces,
against
States esca-
men
States
the
American
the Viet
the conflict
a guerilla war
the
conflict
16,000
and
facod
progressed.
American
Unlike
war
to defeat
inserted
not unitl
conflict. However.
accepted
an effort
gra-
war.
British
was faced
to
war., the
the United
It was
of
insurgency campaign
the North.
direct
in the
War
guerillas and
had
strength
focus to
than
using special
and,
Viet Cong
a classic counter
directly
the
army. Early
lated
forces:
the Vietnam
to bring
the
deemed politicall.,
greater
a oarallel
the United
levels
of
between
the
States
failed to
engage the
during
which,
rebel
the
centers of
early years,
gravity--the
regular
with a
were preoccupied
armies--and
guerilla wa-
This
light of
the assessment
concludes
this
assessment,
the Fabyanic
of
strategies
military
the
Model.
of
In
Great
in Arms:
the vara-
which existed
tire
it became
increasingly clear
to the
British military,
were necessary if
a militar'y
victor,
was to be achieved.
It
.6
,happ
'"
'1
I"
..
.......
duct
of
and
of
the
war.
The
British military
In
ulace,
view of
long
indirect
strategy could
was a
not
strategy that,
win the
given
to
war.
the state
defeat.
lines of
supply,
lack
of
support
at
pop-
home, etc..
the
In
addition, the
commanders
destroy
timent
hindered
the enemy.
of
extreme caution
aggressive
This latter
exhibited by
operations
condition,
necessary
and
British
to seek
the prevailing
General
and
sen-
Howe:
caution
is not surprising
that
on
the part
the turning
of
point of
which was
tion
from their
strategv. This
from
their
that
plagued
the
Saratoga
initial
the inability
thrusts
However,
John
for
indirect
illustrates
military
campaign,
of
and
strategy
British
into rebel
The idea
General
deterrent
this
forces
the dual
in
to
British
the
war
je'.a-
a mar-ed
departure
strateg'n
dilemma
operation was
the British
the
classic
mount and
sustain
example
As
of
offensive
territory.
the
Burgoyne
campaign
and,
as the analysis
of
in
was
the
theory, was
brainchild
basicall,
297
has
of
soumd
shown,
Major
plan.
given
British
force
doctrine.
structure.
policy,
society.
se*era
etc..
insurmountable obstacles existed which prevented the British military from conducting
against
an
and sustaining
indigenous rebel
(approximately
from
the
North
'!banv.
New
Colonel
St.
Hessians.
two
York.
Leger
they met
the Hudson
England
Albany.
from
General
command
New
of
Hudson
to
be
mixed
by strikina
Rivers.
taks
met bv Lieutenant
force
-f
Brt
s'
all
York.
rest
colonial
led by
This
of
opposition
General
campaign
in their matr
the colonies.
On
then sever
the
the campaign
Up
Net.
drive south
ginning.
to
Ticonderoga.
(1 ':_'7'A-'_55)
key
part
Canadians, and
This
Burgoyne was
a British force
from the
However.
then
and
Anglo-Germar.
and,
from Montreal
the Richilieu
in
Tories, and
to lead a strong
men)
At Albany.
forces would
Rs
6,500
along
ooeration-
army.
bold offensive
Indians
provision of
tions and in at
Sritish:
1)
of
-lan
the
to
supplement
least
one
only approximately
2)
the
transplanted Englishman
society
and was
to
travel
favor
with
one of
with
the regular
fell
11100 Tories
idea of
was
the reasons
the war.
heavy
thousands
far
aspect unaxpectdlv
against
lost
for
I-
was
(some
400
e,cecta-
aalnst
Indians
immoral
English
18
+,_)rc-,
Indians to
using
in addition.
artillery
worked
considered
that
British
short of
and
Tris=.
Cf
societ.
Burgoyne was
artiller
NAM
b,
4-!. ,e
were
fight
Encli-h
eer.
deterri2ed
mie,-:
and
all
all
the traditional
One final
a-rmv.
trappings of
an eighteenth
cent r1u
Informati, n
Burgoyne
forces
Albany.
would
available
for the
home.
in
Julv 17'
-ampaign
sp2Trt
of declining_
left Montreal
can,
sv
administration rested.
North's
The march
cruci atl,ngl v
South through
slow due to
the mountains of
cessful
New York
Sritish
that
Burgoyn,-
Howe'
the war.
camoaign of
in the face
General
diarecarded b
most imoortant
was casually
ava1-
as.--
zarrie-
t_.- tn..
Burgo'vne was
Although
ensured
The
detailed account
It
is
of General
an
Burgovne
march
south
1M
which
clearly
tu.re in
America
of the citizen
The
=-c,!fier.
t:) amaso-ICnjal
20
. .... ~~~~
....
"''i
'
..
- " .....
,
':
"'"M
MM
~_ _
"@'
forces
were
October
14.
supply,
of
Saratoga.
two
he
General
defeat
primary
eqLUip
British
for
':new would
reasons:
,.,ears of
Both
Although
with France
these
well
full
York
the British
France
that
a trained
objectives were
to
final
achieved
the
forces
British
were crucial
With
in
the
vict
at!e
were
after
on
,-ar
f'irst
-
arreml
m.,
the
the resources.
men.
and
_olonia
cause by
the French. a
combined force oz
.nd
regulars
defeated
British
French
Yorktown
in
c'evoluton.
Cut
England. General
in
the
concluded
the
from their
the American
initially,' adopted
Model
situation
Revolution.
very
Ameri,-a'
=-bac!
lashincton.
VIETNAM WA
the Fabyanic
the same
.-attl-
lines =f
analysis of
at
c-lonz.,
casualties
THE
The
the
essentially
and
1791
faced with
+l-.
shio
and
-ide
the
the colonial
Laced
and
at Saratoga.
v'ictory
.u
cause for
engage
into
the
roo_
village
b,
the colonial
aaainst
thev knew
the New
capability to
bro~ught
O,
reasonable
it
.ictories
men.
17. 000
with nc
to
battle which,
and
to
near
Sufficlent
the Americans.
the war.
and
surrendered
gave the
the decisive
and an alliance
war.
it
army of
numerous
to score
4. 000)
from
have to occur.
of
the side
swel l
Burgoyne
at
re.ular
to
of
able
that
Vietnam that
ConseQuentlv.
much the
o0
in
shows
*he
the
American
Llnited
_ -i.=
leader-
a=
in
the war
deterrent
that this
escalating
more
the
(prior to
expansionism in
and
indirect
strategy was
level
of
direct strategy
1964),
strategy. When
it
became
the United
(although limited)
States
failing, and
conflict,
the United
States adopted
designed to bring
North
than
To
be sure,
the
earlier,
two years.
creasingly
special
more
its efforts
increased
16.00C)
troops had
to
material
on
of
United
to South Vietnam.
like
grad!0A=,
19S4.
and
ii
the Unte-d
the British
strategy.
air
In-
States
of
In
aggression.
intensified
the
first
and
the end
increased requirement
of
1964,
the
By
in-
role to that of
an
the
changed their
strategy was
the end
the
Communist
rears
200
commitment.
increasing
dramatically
more *~mp1e;
British
its military
defeating
been deployed
By
deal
and successful,
change of
like the
units. As
its military
ever
the Revolution,
tions.
forces
aggressive
ually
this
to
politically
as little use of
to focus
response
was
advisors and
States
War
surgency with
began
the Vietnam
Incumbent
for
mon
1n
in
and
ground opera-
American military
had
2l,
troops in-country.
The change to
the
bombing of
achieve
a more
targets
an unconditional
direct
in
offensive strategy,
the North,
surrender,
nor
was undertalen
the total
principally
neither
destruction
to
of
the enemy's
bring
war fighting
the Communists
this gradual
ed
the American
the North
rather was
battle of
years
1968
significant
was a
the American
tc
later.
sides culminat-
tasted
nonetheless., Tet
Vietnamese against
Tet.
desicned
table. Four
military never
But,
but
to the negotiating
escalation of
in the dramatic
field.
=apability,
however,
defeat
significant
center of
in
the
victory
for
gravit/:
wished
support
ed.
society and
to see.
Three years
segments of
In
its
the face of
declined,
later,
the
and pressure to
United
States
OLb
t,,,
1
'
ietiate
'
_pulled
of
out
Sout!-,
Vietnam.
The United
reasons for
and
Model
States had
British
during
failed
to adapt
ties
the war
of
derestimating
in
the
the Revolution.
they found
their
the
sult,
hope of
in
the analysis
conditions
strategic,
a strategy of
limit
use of
force
and
The
Fabvani c
the
b'.
the
United States
had
political
adopting
"gradualism,"
Vietnam.
of
the war.
reali-
enemy's capabilities. By
preventing
lost
encountered
Essentially. the
tc the tactical,
disdained
the
found
parallel
any
the
in the war
Communist
the
war
and.
takeover
a flexible
then,
like
as a reSouth
0
com-elled to
the
British
e'j0erience
have
mioht
the
in
Revolution,
Ameri.-an
been very
the outcome
of
the
war
different.
CONCLUS I ON
that
The
analysis
both
the British
true
nature of
the
,Itions
and
commitment,
level
American
of
was
national
While
respond
conflict
commanders
the
military
limited
resulted
from
were
And.
the
tional
command
reducing
gradually to
military
in
authorities
negotiating
of
war.
in
the British
these
The use
ng
saddled
incapable
of
limited
ob
, ,-
obect,
ob ect._s
es
military
oQeratins
for
following
the American
linited teer
national
.1
ene!,,'=_
,ConclusiCn.
<
the concept
The
armies.
military
that
...
clear
absence of
fle.-ibility.
-,
es,- aat
doctrines
to achieve..
the fact
inhibited
cl-
the
an
the rebel
resoec-
true rev,-!-
Full\. comprehend
successful
means
wars were
the
radi~lp!
which
wars
Both
the use of
unclear.
in
appreciate
Vietnam War
conflicts to a
in these wars
of
in
to
the zonventional
dictated by
which resulted
policies
objectives,
to
and
livil
the time.
failing
forced to
intensity/ of
bringing
of
failed
Revolution
revolutionary
each nation,
The military
lias
were representative
which
Model
escalated
of
the Fabyanic
wars were
Both
tivelv.
of
tear
thcuQht,
Revolution,
ar.
last parallel
a national
leadership
wars is significant--i+
facade
political vision.
In
passage was written about the American Revolution, but is ramarkable in its applicability to the Vietnam War:
To pursue approaches for peace while
using to their utmost extent the soldiers
and ships which were provided were in
reality two incompatible aims - AND IT
WAS THIS MISCONCEPTION WHICH FRUSTRATED
THE UNDOUBTED ADVANTAGES WHICH THE BRITISH
OPENED OPERATIONS AGAINST THE COLONIES,
AND HINDERED THEM IN ACTION AGAINST
THEIR SMALL, UNORGANISED ENEMY. (4:113)
The
principal
lesson to
34
deal-
ing
with
swift.
revolutionary civil
If
means to
this action
the
In
in many
tional
on
of
limited
and
use of
Volutionary civil
tary
.I.
. .
Revolution
ways.
In
wars,
both
failure can
force.
and the
be
be traced
of
In
the
the
to
political
early in
'
., i .
',
situation will
,_vn-
urcle-ar rF-
initially
future, when
cause
of
-
a !ac
conflicts.
. . . .
force must
military strategies
...
military
objectives,
the
of
derstanding
_
at.e
objectives.
remarkably similar
of
application
achieve national
wars.
cred:_at
faced
with
re-
advocate milisup-Crt
Ie-
the conflict.
'-
...
_.
. .,
M I L
VAR
I T A RY
ABLE
S T R A
T E G Y
I ONSH
RELAT
I PE
Force Structure
Pol
Doctrine
icv
ety!
I
k3_=Oc
a er hi ,
Strategy
Threat
Targetry
Technology
4-.---T i me
.Aopendi ,
!IST OF REFERENCES
1.
Clauswit:. Carl von.
University Fress, 1976.
On War.
Princetor. NJ:
Gates, John M.
"Vietnam the Debate Goes On. " Parameters
4ournal
a+ the US Arm\' War Colleae. Carlisle Barracks, r-9:
C:
1984
2.
.
Fabyanic. Dr Tom.
"Fundamentals of Military, Strategy."
Lecture.
Montgomery. Al.:
Air War College, August !
6.
Lewev, Guenter.
"The Implications of Barriers to Efficient
Defense Rolicy Making.
The Roots of the American Invocveren_
Vietnam.
American Defense Folic,, edited by Feichert
_.on F.
and Sturm. Steven R. 5th ed. Baltimore, Md: The Jonn Ho-ki+ s
University Press. 1982.
Kezirian. Richard.
American History:
Maior Controversies
R.viewd
New York. New York:
Kendall Hunt Publishng Cc..
'.
! 983.
9.
Frumkin, David and Chase, James.
"What are the Lessons
Vietnam?"
Forei. n A-fzir . Vol 6 . No. 4. Spring 1985.
9.
Prestcn. Pichard A. and Wise. Sydney F.
Men in Arms. A
Histor- of Warfare and Its Interrelatianshios with Wester4th ed. New York. New York:
Holt, Finehart.
-and
Winston.
1979,
-7
New Yort.
!0.1.
Ne
:78
foreign