Nietzsche's bermensch is not ber Alles

JACOB GOLOMB

I. The "free spirit par excellence" is distinct from "we free spirits"
One of the most detailed portraits of "the free spirit par excellence" is provided in
section 347 of The Gay Science. Nietzsche speaks there in categorical terms and emphasizes
the total "freedom of the will" which allows "the spirit [to] take leave of all faith and every
wish for certainty." He stresses the capacity of this spirit for "dancing even near abysses,"
namely for being able to be genuinely creative even in times of cultural and intellectual crisis,
when no rational criteria are valid anymore, and when there is no metaphysical or
transcendental guarantee for any truth or world-view. In the same section, another essential
characteristic of the free spirit par excellence is depicted: its "power of self-determination,"
which successfully resists any external foci for its personal identity. In Nietzsche's words, it
manifests complete freedom from "a god, prince, class, physician, father confessor, dogma, or
party conscience." Such spirits spontaneously create their own personal authenticity by
employing the aesthetic model for self-creation spontaneous creation of their own selves as
the artists create their unique masterpieces. One's heritage or the ethos into which one was
born should not determine one's identity and authenticity.1
Now let us introduce Nietzsche's important distinction between the "free spirit par
excellence," and the more human, and hence more attainable, figure of "we free spirits."

PhaenEx 1, no.1 (spring/summer 2006): 55-72

2006 Jacob Golomb

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Nietzsche clearly distinguishes between those who belong to the category of "wir freien
Geister " (Kritische 62; vol. 5, sec. 44) and the unique and genuine "free spirits par
excellence." There is a qualitative leap from the first type to the second, not merely a
quantitative difference of being more free in more fields of life and thought. These "very free
spirits ... will not be merely free spirits but something more, higher, greater, and thoroughly
different" (Beyond sec. 44). In contradistinction to those few sublime figures, "we spirits" are
just "their heralds and precursors."2
But the main difference between both types is not that the first are just the "heralds" of
the second; rather it lies in the dependence of "we free spirits" on culture and society. Even if
Nietzsche strove to overcome most of the "modern ideas" and ideologies that prevailed in his
time, he admits that "even we seekers after knowledge today, we godless anti-metaphysicians
still take our fire, too, from the flame lit by a faith that is thousands of years old, that Christian
faith which was also the faith of Plato, that God is the truth, that truth is divine" (Science sec.
344). And even if Nietzsche did his utmost to overcome his cultural-philosophical heritage, he
needed it as the object of his overcoming. Thus, he was dialectically dependent upon this very
heritage.
In Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, Nietzsche suggests that the highly
developed spiritual and intellectual component of power may weaken even the most superior
personality. Individuals who are genuinely free and independent are unlikely to adhere to any
rigid and inflexible set of norms: the values they possess are constantly open to examination
and susceptible to being "overcome." Their freedom from any given tradition induces a kind
of vulnerability, and they are susceptible to manipulation and exploitation:

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Compared with him who has tradition on his side and requires no reasons for his
actions, the free spirit is always weak, especially in actions; for he is aware of too
many motives and points of view and therefore possesses an uncertain and
unpracticed hand. What means are there of nonetheless rendering him relatively
strong? How does the strong spirit come into being? (Human vol. 1, sec. 230).
The problem may be recast as that of turning purely spiritual power into a concrete historical
force: is it possible to preserve the spirit of Hamlet in the body of Faust? Nietzsche's solution
focuses on the social fabric, which is woven with religious and moral dogmas, and which
produces a psychological pattern of guilt, asceticism, ressentiment, and bad conscience. All of
them are responsible for the corruption of spiritual power and cultural achievements. And
Nietzsche wanted to weaken, or in his words to "freeze" these destructive manifestations of
human psyche in order to pave the way for genuine freedom, personal authenticity and
positive, mature and creative spiritual power.3 However, by emphasizing these elements,
Nietzsche admits that there can be no absolute autonomy; even the most powerful are not
impervious to the influence of the environment with which they interact. The revaluation of
prevalent cultural norms is essential to the evolution of the psychology of the bermensch
because even the arena of the "authentic legislator" is penetrated by environmental values and
forces. Hence it becomes clear that the bermensch type is essentially different from that of
the "free spirit par excellence." The latter, namely the absolutely autonomous will to power, is
therefore no more than a regulative ideal one that provides the model for approximation, but
which can in principle never be fully realized in human society.
It follows that Nietzsche, dependent upon the tradition he strove to overcome and
conscious of his dependence, could not honestly regard himself as a "free spirit par
excellence," i.e., as absolutely independent of any historical and cultural context which hovers,

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as it were, above the contemporary manifestations of social ethos and modes of thought.
Nietzsche clearly perceives himself to belong solely to the category of "we spirits." What this
means is that Nietzsche delineated an essential distinction between the human free spirits like
himself and a few others, and the ideal free spirit, which he calls the "free spirit par
excellence." Moreover, "we free spirits" are not equal to the spirit of the bermensch who, like
the free spirit par excellence, personifies the qualitative jump from being a humanely free spirit
to manifesting it in an bermenschlich way.
The type "we free spirits" thus indicates a humanely possible stage on the way to
becoming the bermensch but in no way can its members attain the highest status of the free
spirit par excellence. This Nietzschean intuition is also expressed in the grammatically plural
"we," in contradistinction to the singular "spirit par excellence." Let us remind ourselves in this
context that Thus Spoke Zarathustra is subtitled: A Book for all and None. Everybody can
aspire to belong, like Nietzsche, to the distinguished elite group of "we spirits" but no one can
reach the exalted and most sublime status of the "free spirit par excellence."

II. The bermensch is not the free spirit par excellence

Nietzsche claims that even the bermensch depends on society, which should draw
upon all its resources in order to cultivate him. Hence his statement that man is the bridge
between the ape and the bermensch, and his admission regarding the ideal of the
bermensch, which
has hitherto been a mere dream [of which] as yet history does not offer us any
certain examples. Nevertheless history might one day give birth to such people too
once a great many favorable preconditions have been created and determined (Science
sec. 288).

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One cannot find in Nietzsche's writings a similar statement about the possibility that in the
future people who manifest the patterns of the "free spirit par excellence" will emerge.
The free spirit par excellence does not need society for its cultivation and sustenance. It
emerges spontaneously by the power of its mental resources and by sheer luck. It resembles
the Spinozistic causa sui and hence it is this figure, rather than the figure of the bermensch,
that must emerge after the "death of God." After pronouncing that "God is dead," it is to this
ideal that Nietzsche refers when he exclaims: "Is not the greatness of this deed too great for
us? Must we ourselves not become gods simply to appear worthy of it?" (Science 125). The
essential difference between the bermensch and the "free spirit par excellence" is clear in
Nietzsche's view that a society of the bermenschen is not impossible, but a viable social
nexus consisting solely of free spirits par excellence is impossible.
In On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche embarked upon the genealogical inquiry to
examine whether the emphasis upon the immanence, autarchy and extreme individuality of
authentically powerful persons is compatible with a social context. The genealogical account
shows that the moral patterns of positive power were occasionally manifested within this or
that social and historical context, though not always in their most perfect or distinct forms. It
also shows that factors external to these patterns (like Christianity) were responsible for their
disappearance. Nietzsche's affirmation of society as the necessary condition for the
materialization of positive power emphasizes his extreme individualism. And since Nietzsche
affirms "a community" (e.g., second essay of Genealogy, sec. 9), and does not seek to destroy
it, he had to explain how the bermenschlich patterns of behavior or the morality of positive
power are possible within a social context. He analyses the nature of the interaction among the

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members of society and maintains that genuine justice is possible only within a social fabric
composed of equally powerful members:
Justice ... is the good will among parties of approximately equal power to come to
terms with one another, to reach an `understanding' by means of a settlement and to
compel parties of lesser power to reach a settlement among themselves (sec. 8).
Nietzsche argues that the powerful individual is characterized by egoism. This emphasis on the
egoism of genuine mental power, however, does not prevent Nietzsche from continuing to
describe the moral and social network of powerful individuals who would willingly and freely
enter the restrictive social framework. In Beyond Good and Evil (sec. 264), for example,
Nietzsche declares that recognition of the value and freedom of others originates in egoism.
Only an individual who freely expresses an abundance of positive power and a firm selfhood
is able to grant similar rights and freedoms to all those who are recognized by him as equals.
He or she is not afraid that this might diminish or destroy his or her own power. It is
self-affirmation and the confidence in one's power and virtues that enables the affirmation of
"others" and their uniqueness. In Nietzsche's eyes, human egoism and the emphasis on
selfhood do not contradict the moral order; they actually create the ideal conditions for its
proper functioning.
At this point a question arises: why do the powerful need a society at all? Is it not the
case that the need of others indicates weakness and insufficiency? In answer, one may point
out that the powerful person is not identical with an omnipotent and absolutely perfect God,
capable of functioning fully and freely apart from his creation. There is no upper limit to
power and there is no optimum for absolute autarchy and self-sufficiency. Moreover, cultural
enterprises require the association and collaboration of various creative powers, each

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contributing its distinct capacities to the common enterprise. To make the social manifestation
of power possible, any creation, even the most individual, needs the social fabric and the
mutual exchange of ideas and concepts. There is no power without creation and form giving,
and there is no creation without society. Hence there is no power without society, and its
essential manifestations are impossible if there is a complete severance from the social
context.4
Furthermore, since absolute power never actually "exists," and since there is no
creation ex nihilo, persons possessing positive powers, namely "we free spirits" (and this
includes, by extrapolation, the bermenschen) need each other, and need society and culture
as the vital working framework within which they create. Obviously society itself also requires
moral patterns that organize and consolidate it. Nietzsche, then, is not a negating "nihilist" who
wishes to overthrow society and go beyond its limits. The "Antichrist" within him does not
turn him into an anarchist, nor does it make him immoral. This is especially due to his
anthropological concept of "Macht."5
Because of the unattainable ideality of the "free spirit par excellence," Nietzsche
dwells more on the figure of the bermensch. However, he believes that it is necessary to
introduce the first type as well because in this way he provides the upper limit, which, though
unattainable by humans, may endow with some degree of viable credibility his other more
attainable ideals: those of the Overman and the authentically powerful person. And thus the
ideal of "the free spirit par excellence" is used to give his readers the sense that the other
ideals, which are less lofty, are indeed within their reach. The genuinely powerful persons and
the bermensch become realizable and the readers' sense of their viability is aroused by

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specific descriptions of their modes, especially those that portray the feasible patterns of "we
free spirits."
Nietzsche's descriptions of the antithesis to "we free spirits" in Beyond Good and
Evil indicate that these "falsely so-called 'free spirits'" are "eloquent and prolific";
"scribbling slaves of the democratic taste and its 'modern ideas,'" they seek "the universal
green-pasture happiness of the herd, with security, lack of danger, comfort, and easier life
for everyone." They most often exhibit their worry for "equality of rights" and sympathy for
all that suffers" (sec. 44). The fact that Nietzsche provides antitheses to "we free spirits"
and to the figure of the bermensch (in the figure of "the last man," e.g., in "Zarathustra's
Prologue," Zarathustra sec. 5), but does not find it necessary to do so in respect of the "free
spirit par excellence," is yet more evidence of the latter's essentially unique nature.

III. Negative versus positive power patterns

To clarify the exact standing of the category of "we free spirits" within Nietzschean
anthropological philosophy I will now present in a nutshell his distinction between two
basic patterns of persons one deriving from the existence of positive power and another from
its absence:
There are recipes for the feeling of power (Gefhle der Macht), firstly for those who
can control themselves and who are thereby accustomed to a feeling of power; [and
secondly] for those in whom precisely this is lacking (Daybreak sec. 65, my italics).
Consequently, he describes two distinct psychological types who manifest their respective
kinds of power in everyday patterns of life and intellectual activity. This (at first)
anthropological principle and its two diametrically opposed manifestations are the ground for

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his evaluations of human beings. Thus Nietzsche posits two basic patterns of moral behavior:
one deriving from the existence of positive power and another from its absence (allied with the
will to achieve it). The will to attain power always lies beneath the surface of all the spiritual
expressions of humanity.
We should note, however, that his distinction between negative and positive powers is
abstract and pictures consolidated ideal types of the various power vectors within the single
individual (Beyond sec. 260). Humanity does not possess a pattern of either positive or
negative power par excellence, as if one of these were a definite and permanent
socio-economic condition or achievement. The two vectors of power and their opposing
manner of operation constitute alternating sentiments and different types of pathos in
permanent conflict and fluctuation within "a single soul" and character (sec. 260). Thus any
morality and any society necessarily manifest both the negative aspects of repression and
violence as well as the positive dimensions of sublimation and creativity. Every individual
living within the social and moral framework is necessarily a slave, repressing a part (or most)
of his or her drives; yet he or she is also a master, creating values and sublimating power.
Eventually, Nietzsche identifies power with life and growth and with one's ability to
overcome the weakest elements of one's personality. Negative power is symptomatic of a
weak personality, lacking in power but incessantly attempting to obtain it (Daybreak sec. 65).
Disguised cruelty and its perverse pleasure are called upon only to reinforce an unstable
character. Negative power does not express itself spontaneously, but derivatively: it is
fundamentally deficient and defective, striving to encourage and fortify itself by enjoyment
obtained from abuse and cruelty.

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The tendency of certain individuals to excel at all costs, moved by what Nietzsche
calls the "drive to distinction," (Daybreak sec. 3) also belongs to this negative pattern. The
ambitious, competitive personality lacks the "feeling" of genuine power and firm selfhood, and
struggles to attain them through overpowering its rival. By contrast, one who possesses
positive power needs neither the approbation of his or her surroundings, nor the medals and
decorations culture often offers. This personality does not require various satisfactions
stemming from abusive domination to intensify his or her "feeling of power," for satisfaction is
intrinsic to his or her sense of self.
From all this it follows that the type "we free spirits" is virtually synonymous with the
person of positive power patterns. But we should bear in mind also that the highest type of the
positive power patterns, the individual who mainly (but not solely) consists of the positive
power vectors, like the bermensch, operates in society. Thus he or she necessarily requires
the repressive mechanism and continuous self-overcoming. In contrast, the "free spirit par
excellence," a-social in its nature, consists of positive power alone. Hence this type has
nothing negative in its character (as the bermensch has). It is clearly a theoretical
construction of Nietzsche's typology, a construction that purports, among other things, to
depict the ultimate, unattainable, and sublime limit of humanity's highest ideal. Clearly,
Nietzsche introduced this ideal figure in order to highlight its difference from "we free spirits"
i.e., persons endowed with some measure of positive powers and in order to avoid any
pretensions of some narcissistic readers to regard themselves as bermenschen. By
introducing the image of the free spirit par excellence Nietzsche wished not to be
"misunderstood and mistaken for something else" (Beyond sec. 44). He wished not to be

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misunderstood as a kind of bermensch but solely as a "free spirit" together with Goethe and
a few others.
We are now in a position to delineate Nietzsche's main typology and its inner
hierarchy. First, at the bottom of Nietzsche's scale of moral evaluations there are our "humanall-too-human" basic drives, natural inclinations, psychological handicaps and many common
petty traits. Then, there are the negative power patterns of the mentality of the slaves, which
were mainly (but not only) predominant in early Christianity with its ascetic manifestations.
Opposite these creatively sterile, inferior people, of which the majority of the Judeo-Christian
Culture consists, were those few who manifested the positive power patterns of the masters
who knew how to sublimate their physical strength (Kraft) into Macht, i.e., into a spiritual
superiority of masters and genuine creators. This category is actually synonymous with what
Nietzsche called "we free spirits." On the penultimate step of the human pyramid stands the
bermensch, who is dependent on society for its emergence and cultivation. Finally at the
very top, aloof and sublime, in an a-social vacuum hovers the ideal figure of the "the free
spirit par excellence" which is essentially different from the bermensch; one can actually
refer to it as to the positive power par excellence.

IV. The explicit non-viability of the "free spirit par excellence"

Significantly, Nietzsche himself has several reservations about the existential
viability of his highest ideal, the "free spirit par excellence." There exists a record of
Nietzsche's conversations in the winter of 1883/84 with Joseph Paneth a Jewish scientist
from Austria who was also a friend of Freud.6 Nietzsche and Paneth discussed the

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possibility of the "regeneration" and the revival of the Jewish people in Palestine.
Nietzsche was not happy at all regarding the prospect of Jews estranging themselves from
their Jewish history by becoming completely assimilated within the European nations,
since such "free spirits detached from anything are dangerous and destructive" (FrsterNietzsche 575, my translation). Nietzsche added that one should not ignore the "impact of
nationality" and, according to Paneth, he was "quite disappointed that I did not wish to hear
anything about the restoration of a Palestinian state" (575, my translation). And since
Nietzsche speaks here about a "spirit" detached from anything whatsoever, clearly he is
thinking about the more ideal type of the "free spirit," namely the free spirit par excellence.
Let us not forget that Nietzsche hardly ever promoted any ideal of nationality in his
writings and reacted to the idea of a totalitarian modern state as to "the coldest of all cold
monsters."7 He was against nationalism (of the Bismarckian kind) and tried to promote a
supra-national culturally united Europe. Hence it follows that in his warning to Paneth he
had in mind the whole cultural-historical context of a people, not solely the Jewish one.8
In any case, Nietzsche admits here that the "free spirits par excellence" are more
than not communicative; they are also "dangerous and destructive." Destructive toward
themselves i.e., self-destructive and crucially they are dangerous to others. He admits
here that "free spirits par excellence" cannot establish a viable society and cannot enter into
meaningful interactions with other people, especially with types of their own kind. Hence,
once again, we reach the conclusion that a society that consists mainly or entirely of "free
spirits par excellence" cannot be a viable one.

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We must bear in mind that even Nietzsche was not a pure Nietzschean. His ideal
type, the a-historical "free spirit par excellence" was solely a regulative ideal. The ideal
was, among other things, a means to provide an antidote to the tendency of Germans to fill
the existential void incurred by the death of (belief in) God by embracing extreme
ideological and political substitutes (like Communism or Nationalism). By means of this
ideal he strove to fight the dangerous Hegelian and historicist tendencies prevalent in
contemporary German culture. In his essay "On the uses and disadvantages of history for
life," he did not object to the use of the past for the service of life in the present. He argued
only against a past that overpowers the present and annihilates any of its novel and vital
elements, so that, inter alia, it also destroys the future. More vitality and less historicity was
his prescription in this essay. For Nietzsche "we free spirits" are not individuals who act in
an a-historical vacuum, or a kind of existential tabula rasa without memories, identity, or
sensibilities rooted in their culture, heritage, and people. Nietzsche did not believe that one
could succeed in severing all his or her linkages with previous history.9 He only attacked
the popular illusion that it was possible to detach oneself completely from tradition, to
become a "free spirit" by rejecting one's entire past. For psychological reasons Nietzsche
did not believe that such a "liberation" was even feasible, let alone desirable. He was not at
all reluctant to oppose either the metaphysical traditions of the past or the accepted
Christian ethic. But neither did he profess to be a nihilist or seek a complete break with the
past and its values. Nor was he a radical revolutionary, freed of the restraints of tradition,
and descending into the historical arena from an a-temporal, a-historical pinnacle.
Nietzsche's commitment was to a path of self-transformation that is arduous and

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painstaking; for him the rigors of self-education and the anguish of self-conquest constitute
a process of slow and difficult evolution. He believed in a steady educational advance,
devoid of grand illusions, which only gradually leads one to new patterns of life and
thought. It goes without saying, that in any social-historical context one cannot free oneself
absolutely from one's own history, heritage and linguistic culture, and float in thin air as it
were. Hence nobody can become "a free spirit par excellence," but one may become a part of
the nexus of "we free spirits." However, what about the viability of the bermensch?

V. Is the ideal of the Overman existentially viable?

I argued that Nietzsche believed that although the lofty ideal of the "free spirit par
excellence" is not existentially viable, at least the ideal of the bermensch is. But can he
really claim that such is the case? From the fact that Nietzsche held that the bermensch
needs society for its breeding it does not follow that the Overman is able to subsist within
society. And despite my earlier claim that perhaps Nietzsche introduced the unattainable
ideal of the "free spirit par excellence" in order to place into sharp relief the viability of the
bermensch, I still would like to argue now that this so-called less lofty ideal is impossible
as well. If this is true then Nietzsche's morality suffers from a cardinal flaw: it cannot on
principle be existentially implemented and Nietzsche's 'ought' can never become a viable
'is.'
Nietzsche claimed that the bermensch is devoid of negative power factors like
Schuld (guilt feelings), 'bad conscience' and ressentiment. However, he perceives the
Overman as necessarily living in a society. But according to his own genealogical

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investigations it is precisely society which is responsible for the emergence of such

negative factors in each of its members (see especially the second essay of Genealogy
which is concerned with the genesis of "Guilt, Bad Conscience and the Like"). Hence a
pure bermensch is impossible and we can speak only of relative qualities of positive
versus negative spiritual and mental powers in each of us.

VI. Conclusion
To clarify the above I will draw an analogy with the domain of psychoanalysis. If
neurosis is, as Freud claimed, a natural outcome of repressive society, and if society is
necessarily founded upon repression, can we imagine a society where there are no
repressed i.e., neurotic people? This question remains valid even for a society in which
all neurotic individuals have successfully undergone psychoanalytic treatment. For when
they try to live in society under more or less the same conditions that caused their neurosis
in the first place, will they not regress to some degree? The same considerations are
relevant with respect to the individual whose quest for authenticity or for optimal positive
power in the form of the bermensch is supposedly finally fulfilled. Since such a
person continues to be a member of society, the processes of social conditioning and the
assault from within on one's 'pure power' will continue to exert their anti authenticating and
weakening effects. Hence the struggles to attain personal authenticity or the bermensch
status face what seems to be a paradoxical situation: these lofty ideals cannot be
materialized without society, but neither can they be lived within its framework.

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Nietzsche was well aware of the difficulty of trying to allow for the 'ought' of the
bermenschlich authenticity within the social 'is.' The fact is that he leaves this issue
intentionally vague in the closing sentence of Zarathustra, where Zarathustra, who
personifies the ideal of personal authenticity, leaves his "cave" in order to do what? To
return to society? It is far from clear: "thus spoke Zarathustra, and he left his cave, glowing
and strong as a morning sun that comes out of dark mountains." The explicit presence of
the "sun" implies that Zarathustra, not being able to become part of the human-social
nexus, is like the sun, which not being part of the earth, only warms it from above. Hence
Zarathustra can only inspire us to try and become authentic, to be freer than we are, to be
mentally and intellectually more powerful and creative than we are at present.

Notes
This essay is a concise version of papers presented in October to the Departments of
Philosophy of University of Toronto and Brock University. I am obliged to those who
invited me and to the many helpful comments of the attending students. A more elaborated
and extensive version of this paper is forthcoming in The Journal of Nietzsche Studies.
1

For elaboration of Nietzsche's teaching on personal authenticity, see chap. 4 in my In Search

of Authenticity and "Nietzsche on Authenticity."
2

Beyond sec. 44 and cf. sec.30: "There are books [and Nietzsche means here his own
oeuvre] that have opposite values for soul and health, depending on whether the lower soul,
the lower vitality, or the higher and more vigorous ones turn to them: in the former case,
these books are dangerous in the latter, heralds' cries that call the bravest to their
courage."
3

On Nietzsche's tactic of "freezing" (by psychologization) our motives for believing in

various ideals, rather than refuting them by logical means, see chap. 4 in my Nietzsche's
Enticing Psychology of Power.
4

For elaboration, see chap. 7 in my Nietzsche's Enticing Psychology of Power.

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Cf. my essay "How to De-Nazify Nietzsche's Philosophical Anthropology?"

The letters of Paneth were first published in a biography of Nietzsche by his sister. See
Frster-Nietzsche 474-475, 479-493.

Zarathustra, Part One, "On the New Idol." Cf. Golomb and Wistrich.

About Nietzsche's impact on Jewish and Zionist thought, see my Nietzsche and Zion.

Thus he emphatically claims: "For since we are the outcome of earlier generations, we are
also the outcome of their aberrations, passions and errors ... It is not possible wholly to free
oneself from these chains" ("History" 76).

Works Cited
Frster-Nietzsche, Elizabeth. Das Leben Friedrich Nietzsches. Vol. II. Leipzig, 1904.
Golomb, Jacob. Nietzsche and Zion. Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press, 2004.
. "How to De-Nazify Nietzsche's Philosophical Anthropology?" Nietzsche,Godfather of
Fascism? Ed. Jacob Golomb and Robert S. Wistrich. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2002. 19-46.
. In Search of Authenticity from Kierkegaard to Camus. London and New York: Routledge,
1995.
. "Nietzsche on Authenticity." Philosophy Today 34 (1990): 243-258.
. Nietzsche's Enticing Psychology of Power. Ames: Iowa State University Press and
Jerusalem: The Magnes Hebrew University Press, 1989.
Golomb, Jacob and Robert S. Wistricheds, eds. "Editors' Introduction." Nietzsche, Godfather
of Fascism? Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Kritische Studienausgabe. Ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari. 15
Vols. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1967-1988.
. Human, All Too Human. Trans. R.J. Hollingdale. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1986.
. "On the uses and disadvantages of history for life." Nietzsche's Untimely Meditations.
Trans. R. J. Hollingdale. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983. 57-123

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. Daybreak. Trans. R. J. Hollingdale. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.

. The Gay Science. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Random House, 1974.
. On the Genealogy of Morals. Trans. and ed. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Random
House,1967.
. Beyond Good and Evil. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Random House, 1966.
. Thus Spoke Zarathustra. The Portable Nietzsche. Trans. and ed. Walter Kaufmann. New
York: Viking, 1954.