Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Torts Reviewer (Gianna - Ranx.tina - Gi.sam - Katz.alex - Emjo.didy)
Torts Reviewer (Gianna - Ranx.tina - Gi.sam - Katz.alex - Emjo.didy)
not defined in the NCC nor in any Philippine Law BUT many
scattered provisions on tortuous acts
usually defines as: (1) what it is not; (2) remedies granted; (3)
social/public policy protected
Why not use the concept of tort? It is too broad vis a vis culpa
aquiliana.
very sloppy definition but its the only case that defines Tort
Why SC gave definition of Tort? They had to determine the liability of
the officers (Naguiat) for the tortious act.
Is it part of the ratio of the case? NO. Obiter. They already found CFTI
liable under the Labor Code so SC did not need to establish liability
through tort
VINZON-CHATO v FORTUNE
FACTS: Vinzons-Chato, in her capacity as Commisioner of the Internal
Revenue, imposed a 55% ad valorem tax on Fortune. The latter sue for
damages based on Article 32 for alleged violation of its constitutional
right against deprivation of property without due process of law and
the right to equal proetection of law. SC found for Fortune.
The Court defined tort in this case as a wrong, a tortious act
which has been defined as the commission or omission of an act by
one, without right, whereby another receives some injury, directly or
indirectly, in person, property or reputation. Presence of good motive,
or rather, the absence of an evil motive, does not render lawful an act
which is otherwise an invasion of another's legal right.; that is, liability
in tort is not precluded by the fact that defendant acted without evil
intent.
NOTES:
Definition is too broad. It may cover criminal acts, but not all
criminal acts give rise to damages.
a legal wrong that causes harm for which the violator is subject
to civil liability
punishable by law
According to this case, culpa aquiliana may include acts or
omissions punishable by law. The overlap does not destroy the
distinction between crimes and QD, it just gives the injured
party a choice of whether to sue based on culpa criminal
(where employers are only subsidiarily liable) or culpa
aquiliana (where employers are primarily liable).
ELCANO v HILL
FACTS: In criminal case where Reginald Hill was charged with the
killing of Agapito Elcano, the former was acquitted for lack of intent to
kill, coupled with mistake. The deceaseds parents thereafter sued
Reginald and his father for damages. CFI dismissed the civil cases on
the ground of res judicata.
ISSUE: WON the civil action for damages is barred by Hills acquittal in
the crim case. NO.
HELD: Hills acquittal in the crim case has not extinguished his liability
for QD, hence the acquittal is not a bar to the instant civil action.
Art. 2176 where it refers to fault or negligence, covers not only acts
not punishable by law but also acts criminal in character, whether
intentional and voluntary or negligent.
NOTES:
PEOPLE v BALLESTEROS
FACTS: Ballesteros et al were convicted of murder. They were ordered
to pay actual, compensatory, and moral damages to the heirs of the
deceased.
ISSUE: WON damages were correctly awarded. YES
HELD: Damages may be defined as the pecuniary compensation,
recompense, or satisfaction for an injury sustained, or as otherwise
expressed, the pecuniary consequences which the law imposes for the
breach of some duty or the violation of some right.
Actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in satisfaction
of, or in recompense for, loss or injury sustained. The party claiming
such must present the best evidence available such as receipts.
Moral damages may be invoked when the complainant has
experienced mental anguish, serious anxiety, physical suffering, moral
shock and so forth, and had furthermore shown that these were the
proximate result of the offenders wrongful act or omission.
CUSTODIO v CA
FACTS: Custodio et al built an adobe fence making the passageway to
Mabasas apartment narrower. Mabasa filed a civil action for the grant
of easement of right of way against them. CA, aside from granting right
of way, awarded damages to Mabasa.
ISSUE: WON award of damages was proper. NO
HELD: In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no
legal injury. Custodio et als act of constructing a fence within their lot
is a valid exercise of their right as owners.
(4) potential conflicts between justice and policy outlook and legal
process outlook
(5) distribution of loss the cost of loss suffered by plaintiff is not
simply transferred to the defendant but is distributed through the
defendant to a large number of individuals
(6) redress of social grievances tort law a popular mechanism
that permits ordinary people to put authority on trial
(7) a mixed system tort law a mixed set of functions
CLASSES OF TORTS: Property torts and Personal torts
II. CONCEPT OF QUASI-DELICT
A. Elements
Art. 2176, NCC
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of
this Chapter.
PNR v BRUNTY
FACTS: The car carrying Rhoda Brunty, her host Juan Garcia and driver
Rodolfo Mercelita collided with a PNR train. The collision killed Brunty.
The mother of the deceased and Garcia sued PNR for damages. RTC
and CA awarded damages.
ISSUE: WON the award was proper.
HELD: YES. In order to sustain a claim based on QD, the following
requisites must concur:
1. damage to the plaintiff
2. negligence, by act or omission, of which defendant, or some
person for whose acts he must respond (vicarious liability) was guilty
3. connection of cause and effect between such negligence
and damage
BPI v LIFETIME
Facts: Alice Laurel, an agent of Lifetime Marketing was able to defraud
the company by depositing amounts to Lifetime's account with
different BPI branches and then requesting to reverse the deposits
after the deposit slips have been machine-validated. She would then
present these slips to Lifetime which granted her certain privileges or
prizes based on the deposits she supposedly made. The fraudulent
acts were done because of the alleged negligence of BPI tellers in not
retriving the deposit slips. Lifetime sued BPI for damages. RTC and CA
awarded damages to Lifetime.
SC: Elements of QD
1. fault or negligence of the defendant, or some person for
whose acts he must respond
Sir: This is a poorly crafted decision. The SC did not even cite
the basis for the elements.
Quasi-delict
private concern
CC repairs the damage by
indemnification
include all acts in which "any kind
of fault or negligence intervenes."
solidary liability of employer
defense is that accused observed
due diligence of a good father of a
family
ANDAMO v CA
FACTS: The Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette caused the
construction of waterpaths and contrivances in its compound. This
allegedly caused flooding and damage to the adjacent lot, property of
the Andamo spouses. The Andamos filed a criminal case for
destruction by means of inundation, and later also filed a civil action
for damages against respondent corporation. The civil case was
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, as the crim case was field ahead of it.
ISSUE: WON the dismissal of the civil case was proper.
HELD: NO. The civil action was based on QD and may proceed
independently of the criminal case. All the elements of QD are present
in the complaint, to wit:
(1) damages suffered by the plaintiff;
Art. 2178. The provisions of articles 1172 to 1174 are also applicable to
a quasi-delict.
NOTES: Negligence for BoC and QD are defined in the same way as
provided by Art 2178.Therefore, if you sue for negligence, you can
base the action on quasi-delict, delict, or contract.
DOCTRINE: QD and BoC are concentric, and QDs are broader. Plaintiff
with a pre-existing contractual relation may still sue for QD so long as
had there been a no contract, there is still a quasi-delict.
NOTES: SC held there was a contract of carriage even if Cangco did
not pay for a ticket. Also, Sir took note of the 4 main differences of QD
and BoC in this case:
1.
liability
of
defendant employer
2.
defendant
employers defense
3.
vinculum
(legal tie)
juris
4. what a plaintiff
needs to prove
NOTES:
Under QD
Presumptive liability
Under BoC
Direct and immediate
Rebut
presumption
through proof of the
exercise of due care
in
selection
and
supervision
Created
by
the
wrongful or negligent
act/omission itself
Defendants fault or
negligence
Prove performance of
contract or contributory
negligence
Independent the breach
of the duty assumed by
the parties
The contract and its
nonperformance.
The
negligence need not be
proven
1. moral damages
2. defendant carriers
defense
3.
what
plaintiff
needs to prove
Under QD
Anywhere there are
physical injuries (Art
2219[2])
Proof of due diligence
in
selection
and
supervision
Carriers
fault
or
negligence
Under BoC
Recoverable
only
if
passenger dies or there
is malice or bad faith
(proof of due diligence
not available)
Injury to passenger. No
need to prove it was
carriers
Fault
NOTES:
Does not say that when there is a contract, you cant sue for
QD.
FAR EAST v CA
FACTS: Plaintiff Luna got a Far East credit card which was dishonored
at a despedida party due to a hotlist policy compelled by the loss of
the complementary card. He sues for damages. RTC awarded him
moral and exemplary damages.
HELD: Complaint is based on contract because without the contract,
the act or omission complained of cannot by itself be an actionable
tort. Moral damages were deleted because negligence in failing to give
personal notice to Luna is not gross as to amount to malice or bad
faith. Exemplary damages were deleted because
DOCTRINE: The test to determine whether QD can be deemed to
underlie the BoC s where, without a pre-existing contract between 2
parties, an act or omission can nonetheless amount to an actionable
tort by itself.
NOTES:
prudent
iii. must make allowance for the risk apparent to the act for his
capacity to meet it and for the circumstances under which he must act
3. Special Cases
a. Children
TAYLOR vs. MANILA RAILROAD (1910)
Taylor (15), son of mechanical engineer, mature than the average boy
his age and having considerable aptitude and training in mechanics
went to the power plant in a small island in Pasig river. Together with a
boy (12) they walked around the plant to and gathered brass
fulminating caps where the plant dumps them together with cinders
and ashes from furnaces. The caps are used for exploding charges of
dynamite and they have explosive power on their own. They opened a
cap and lighted it with a match. The cap exploded and Taylor lost an
eye.
HELD: In Torpedo cases, records discloses that the plaintiffs (in whose
favor judgment have been affirmed) were of such tender years that
they were held not to have the capacity to understand the nature or
character of the explosive instruments which fell into their hands. In
this case, Taylor knew of the explosive character of the caps and yet
he willingly, recklessly and knowingly produced the explosion.
DOCTRINE: The care and caution required of a child is according to his
maturity and capacity only, and this is to be determined in each case
by the circumstances of the case.
JARCO MARKETING vs. CA (1999)
It has been in existence for 15 years. Its structure was safe and wellbalanced.
Zhieneth (6) was pinned by the bulk of the department stores giftwrapping counter/structure, brought to the hospital and died after 14
days. When she was rushed to the hospital the girl told the doctor that
she didnt even touch the counter. The department store contended
that it was the childs own act of climbing into the structure that was
the proximate cause of the fall of the counter.
HELD: Jarco was negligent because the unstable condition of the
counter is known to them (prior to the accident) but they didnt do
anything about it. Since negligence may be a felony and a quasi-delict
and required discernment as a condition of liability, either criminal or
civil, a child under 9 years of age is, by analogy, conclusively
presumed to be incapable of negligence; and that the presumption of
lack of discernment or incapacity for negligence in the case of a child
over 9 but under 15 years of age is rebuttable, under our law. The rule,
therefore, is that the child under 9 years of age must be conclusively
presumed incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
DOCTRINE: A child under 9 years of age must be conclusively
presumed incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
YLARDE vs. AQUINO (1988)
b. Experts/ Professionals
CULION ICE vs. PHILIPPINE MOTORS (1930)
Culion wanted to get his motor schooner repaired, he went to
PMC. Quest, PMCs manager decided to oversee the repairs.
Apparently, the tube connecting the carburetor and the fuel tank
was not well-fitted, such that the fuel mixture leaked and
dripped down to the engine compartment. Quest attention was
called on this but he took it lightly. When the engine was started,
there was a backfire and burned the boat.
HELD: Ordinarily, a backfire from an engine would not be
followed by any disaster, but here the leak along the pipeline
and the flooding of the carburetor created a dangerous situation,
which a prudent mechanic, versed in repairs of boat engines,
would have taken precaution to avoid. When a person holds
himself out as being competent to do things requiring
professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails
to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the
particular work which he attempts to do. Quest is experienced in
fixing car and tractor engines, but not that of boats. A person
skilled in dealing with boats would have been sufficiently warned
by the circumstances to cause him to take precaution against the
danger. Quest did not use the skill that would have been
exhibited by one ordinarily expert in repairing gasoline engine on
boats.
DOCTRINE: When a person holds himself out as being
competent to do things requiring professional skill, he will be
held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill
of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts
to do.
US vs. PINEDA
If the victims had been human beings instead of horses, the damage
and loss would have been irreparable.
Santos bought medicine with prescription from Pineda (pharmacist) to
give to his sick horses. He was sold barium chlorate(poisonous)
instead of potassium chlorate which poisoned and killed 2 horses.
HELD: The profession of pharmacy is one demanding care and skill.
The responsibility to use care has been variously qualified as
ordinary care, care of a specially high degree, the highest
degree of care known to practical men, which is the highest
practicable degree of prudence, thoughtfulness, vigilance, and the
most exact and reliable safeguards consistent with the reasonable
conduct of business, in order that human life may not constantly
be exposed to danger flowing from the substitution of deadly
poison for harmless medicine. The care required must be
commensurate with the danger involved, and the skill employed
must correspond with the superior knowledge of the business
which the law demands. The question of negligence or ignorance is
with the standard practice, with the same level of care that any
reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the
same circumstances. Assuming that there was in fact a misdiagnosis,
the same would have been rectified if Ramolete followed the order to
return for a check-up. She omitted the diligence required by the
circumstances which could have avoided the injury. The omission in
not returning for a follow-up evaluation played a substantial part in
bringing about her injury. Had she returned, Cayao-Lasam could have
conducted the proper medical tests and procedure necessary to
determine her health condition and applied the corresponding
treatment which could have prevented the rupture of her uterus.
DOCTRINE: Medical malpractice is a particular form of negligence
which consists in the failure of a physician or surgeon to apply use at
least the same level of care that any reasonably competent doctor
would use to treat a condition under the same circumstances. As to
this aspect of medical malpractice, the determination of the
reasonable level of care and the breach thereof, expert testimony is
essential. Further, inasmuch as the causes of the injuries involved in
malpractice actions are determinable only in the light of scientific
knowledge, it has been recognized that expert testimony is usually
necessary to support the conclusion as to causation.
All told, doctors are protected by a special rule of law. They are not
guarantors of care. They are not insurers against mishaps or unusual
consequences specially so if the patient herself did not exercise the
proper diligence required to avoid the injury.
LUCAS vs. TUANO (2009)
Lucas had a sore eye and used maxitrol (steroid based) for it. He then
consulted Dr. Tuano (opthal) on October 1988. He was prescribed a
different medicine. The sore eyes was cured but the eye developed
EKC (a viral infection) and he was told to use maxitrol. EKC tapered
down and Lucas was told gradually reduce the dosage of maxitrol
otherwise EKC might recur. His EKC recurred and he was told to
resume the orig dosage of maxitrol. Blephamide (also steroid based)
was used when maxitrol is unavailable. Lucas discovered that
prolonged used of maxitrol is dangerous to the eyes (may develop
glaucoma). He told Tuano about it but the doctor just brushed it aside.
By December his right eye was blind and he was told to stop the use of
maxitrol and was prescribed different medicines. Tuano referred Lucas
to another Doctor for the treatment of glaucoma and Tuano treated
him according to the advice of that doctor. Lucas consulted Dr. Aquino
on his own initiative and was told that his condition needs lifetime med
and follow ups. Lucas underwent two operations (1990 and 1991) of
laser trabeculoplasty. He said that what he had is steroid-induced
glaucoma and sued Tuano. Tuano says that Lucas glaucoma is not
steroid induced for if it were, it would disappear with the discontinue of
the use of maxitrol.
and adequate facilities and equipment; (2) the selection and retention
of competent physicians; (3) the overseeing or supervision of all
persons who practice medicine within its walls; and (4) the formulation,
adoption and enforcement of adequate rules and policies that ensure
quality care for its patients.
e. intoxication
f. insanity
Art. 2182. If the minor or insane person causing damage has no
parents or guardian, the minor or insane person shall be answerable
with his own property in an action against him where a guardian ad litem
shall be appointed. (n)
B. Degrees of Negligence
Art. 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the
defendant acted with gross negligence.
AMEDO vs. RIO (1954)
Filomeno Manguit, a seaman, jumped overboard from his ship into the
water to retrieve a 2-peso bill that was blown by the breeze to the sea.
He drowned.
HELD: He failed to exercise even the slightest care and diligence,
that he displayed a reckless disregard of the safety of his person, that
he could not have been but conscious of the probable consequences
of his carelessness and that he was indifferent, or worse, to the
danger of his injury. There is more reason to hold that his death was
caused by his notorious negligence. If while he was working, his bill
merely fell from his pocket, and as he picked it up from the floor
something accidentally fell upon him and injured him, he would surely
be entitled to compensation, his act being obviously innocent. Jumping
into the sea, however, is entirely different, the danger which it entails
being clear, potent and obvious.
DOCTRINE: Notorious negligence has been held to be tantamount to
gross negligence, which is want of even slight care and
diligence. By gross negligence is meant 'such entire want of care as
to raise a presumption that the person in fault is conscious of the
probable consequences of carelessness, and is indifferent, or worse, to
the danger of injury to person or property of others.' .The negligence
must amount to a reckless disregard of the safety of person or
property.
NOTE: What determines if an act if negligent is the danger of an act
(apparent and imminent). The nature of the act of jumping into the sea
involves danger per se.
MARINDUQUE IRON MINES v WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
(1954)
NOTES:
Might also have something to do with the nature of the
procedure the act or omission is not dangerous per se
SANGCO (10-12)
The amount of care demanded by the standard of reasonable conduct
must be proportionate to the apparent risk.
DEGREES OF NEGLIGENCE:
SLIGHT NEGLIGENCE - an absence of that degree of vigilance which
persons of extraordinary prudence and foresight are accustomed to
use. (failure to exercise care)
GROSS NEGLIGENCE described as failure to exercise even that care
which a careless person would use. There is no generally accepted
meaning, but the probability is that it signifies more than ordinary
inadvertence or inattention, but less than conscious indifference to
consequences. (extreme departure from the ordinary standard of care)
WILFUL, WANTON, AND RECKLESS quasi-intent, lying between
intent to do harm and the mere reasonable risk of harm to another.
They apply to conduct which is still merely negligent but which is so far
from a proper state of mind that it is treated in many respects as if it
were intended (actor has intentionally done an act of unreasonable
character in disregard of a risk known to him or so obvious that he
must be taken to have been aware of it, and so great as to make it
highly probably that harm would follow).
There is often NO CLEAR DISTINCTION between the above and
gross, and the two have tended to merge and take on the same
meaning as an AGGRAVATED form of negligence, differing in QUALITY
rather than in DEGREE from ordinary lack of care.
C. Proof of Negligence
1. Burden of Proof
RULE 131: BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS
BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS
Sec. 1. Burden of proof in civil cases. - Each party must prove his own
affirmative allegations. Evidence need not be given in support of a
negative allegation except when such negative allegation is an
essential part of the statement of the right or title on which the cause
of action or defense is founded, nor even in such case when the
allegation is a denial of the existence of a document the custody of
which belongs to the opposite party. The burden of proof lies on the
party who would be defeated if no evidence were given on either side.
Sec. 2. Burden of proof in criminal cases.
violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two
months.
If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of Article 2180
are applicable.
Art. 2185
Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person
driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap,
he was violating any traffic regulation.
Art. 2188
There is prima facie presumption of negligence on the part of the
defendant if the death or injury results from his possession of
dangerous weapons or substances, such as firearms and poison,
except when the possession or use thereof is indispensable in his
occupation or business.
Art. 1734
Common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or
deterioration of the goods, unless the same is due to any of the
following causes only:
(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or
calamity;
(2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;
(3) Act of omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
(4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the
containers;
(5) Order or act of competent public authority.
Art. 1735
In all cases other than those mentioned in Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the
preceding article, if the goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated,
common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary
diligence as required in Article 1733.
NOTES:
Art 2184 CC (Driver)
disputable presumption:
o 2x w/in the next preceeding 2 mos: guilty of reckless
driving / violation of traffic rules
if the owner is not in the car, does the disputable presumption
apply?
o n/a when the owner is not in the car / common carrier
Art 2185 CC
Art 2188
common carriers
1734 EXCEPTION: subject to defense of EXTRAORDINARY
DILIGENCE; treated as exception to presumptions
Rebuttable
o Will not ordinarily have happened
o PROVE/SHOW (Burden of Proof)
cause was the failure of the driver of the parked truck to install an
early warning device. IAC concluded that under the doctrine, the
plaintiff was negligent. The question is whether the doctrine was
applicable.
HELD: Res ipsa loquitor (the thing speaks for itself) Where the thing
which causes the injury is shown to be under the management of the
defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things
does not happen if those who have he management use proper care, it
affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the
defendant, that the accident arose from want of care. It is not rule of
substantive law but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural
convenience. It can be involved when and only when, under the
circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily
available. It cannot be availed of when the plaintiff has knowledge and
testifies or presents evidence as to the specific act of negligence which
is the cause of injury complained of or where there is direct evidence
as to the precise cause of the accident and all the facts and
circumstances attendant to the occurrence appear. The absence of
want of care of the driver has been established by clear and convincing
evidence. The doctrine does not apply.
RULE: Res ipsa can be invoked when and only when, under the
circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily
available.
NOTES:
RIL applicable:
No expert testimony
from ordinary want of care. All the requisites are present in this case.
(1) The entire proceedings of the caesarian were under the exclusive
control of Dr. Batiquin.
(2) The patient underwent no other operation which could habe caused
the offending piece of rubber to appear in her uterus, it stands to
reason that it could habe only been a by-product of the caesarian
section.
RULE: Res ipsa Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be
under the management of the Defendant, and the accident is such as
in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the
management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the
absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose
from want of ordinary care.
NOTES:
Theoretical basis for RIL: The proof should come from the
defendant (RIL is the bridge which allows the plaintiff to
reach the defendant).
RIL applies
theoretical basis:
o proof is in exclusive control of defendant
o bridge that connects plaintiff to the proof
Prof. Casis thinks that it is the victims fault for falling off the
platform.
Due care defense comes into play only after the
circumstances for the application of the doctrine has
been established.
COLLEGE ASSURANCE v BELFRANLT
FACTS: Belfranlt leased several unit of a building to CAP and
comprehensive annuity Plans
and Pension Corporation (CAPP).
However, as fire occurred which destroyed portions of the building
including the units they leased. An investigation report found out that
the origin of the fire was from CAPs storeroom due to an overheated
coffee percolator.
ISSUE: WON RIL applies.
HELD: YES.
The requisites of RIL are present
a.
* The son could have sued stepbrother of his father for building
the house so close to the wire*
BERNARDO v LEGASPI
(If both negligent cannot recover from each other)
FACTS: CFI dismissed the complaint filed in an action to recover
damages for injuries sustained by plaintiffs automobile by reason of
defendants negligence in causing a collision. Court also dismissed a
cross-complaint filed by the defendant, praying for damages on the
ground that the injuries sustained by his automobile, and those to the
plaintiffs car were caused by plaintiffs own negligence.
HELD: Court found that both plaintiff and defendant were negligent in
handling their automobile so both cannot recover. Where plaintiff in a
negligence action by his own carelessness contributes to the principal
occurrence as one of the determining causes thereof, he cannot
recover.
RULE: When the negligence of both the plaintiff and the defendant is
the proximate cause of the accident, they cannot recover from each
other.
NOTES:
Cause/Condition
2. Contributory Negligence
NPC v HEIRS OFCASIONAN
FACTS: Noble and his co-pocket miner, Melchor Jimenez, were at
Dalicno. They cut two bamboo poles for their pocket mining. One was
18 to 19 feet long and the other was 14 feet long. Each man carried
one pole horizontally on his shoulder. As Noble was going uphill and
turning left on a curve, the tip of the bamboo pole he was carrying
touched one of the dangling high tension wires. Melchor, who was
walking behind him, narrated that he heard a buzzing sound when
the tip of Nobles pole touched the wire for only about one or two
seconds. Thereafter, he saw Noble fall to the ground. Melchor rushed
to Noble and shook him but the latter was already dead. Their coworkers heard Melchors shout for help and together they brought the
body of Noble to their camp.
ISSUE: WON there was contributory negligence on the part of the
victim?
HELD: Yes
Negligence is the failure to observe, for the protection of the
interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution, and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other
person suffers injury. On the other hand, contributory negligence is
conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause
to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard which he
is required to conform for his own protection.
NOTES:
No contributory negligence
NPC v MERALCO
o SIR agrees more with NPC = contributory negligence
damages;
50%
no
PROPORTIONAL
DAMAGES
=
Relaxation of Draconian
o Comparative Negligence and
Contributory Negligence if
defendant contributed more,
plaintiff allowed to recover
3. Fortuitous Event
Art. 1174, NCC
Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is
otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the
obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be
responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which,
though foreseen, were inevitable.
HELD: SC said that there are specific acts of negligence on the part of
the respondents. Jeep was running at a very fast speed and was
overloaded. In this case, the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected
occurrence was not independent of human will. It was caused either
through the negligence of the driver or because of the mechanical
defects in the tire.
NOTES:
NOTES:
SOUTHEASTERN COLLEGE v CA
FACTS: During a typhoon, schools roof was partly ripped off and
blown away, landing on and destroying portions of the roofing of
respondents house.
A team of engineers conducted an ocular
inspection and found that the causes may have been the U-shaped
formation of the building and the improper anchorage of the trusses to
the roof beams.
HELD: Court found that other than the report submitted by the
engineers, no investigation was conducted to determine the real cause
of the incident. Respondents did not even show that the plans, specs
and design of the school building were defective. On the other hand,
city building official testified that the school obtained both building
permit and certificate of occupancy; same official gave go signal for
repairs of damage of typhoon and subsequently authorized the use of
the entire 4th floor of the building; annual maintenance inspection and
repair of the school building was regularly undertaken; and that no
complaints have been lodged in the past. Therefore, petitioner has not
been shown negligent or at fault regarding the construction and
maintenance of the school building. Typhoon was the proximate cause.
CASO FORTUITO event which takes place by accident and
could not have been reasonably foreseen, it is an unexpected
event or act of God which could neither be foreseen nor
resisted.
2 GENERAL CAUSES:
1. By nature- earthquakes, storms, floods, etc.
2. By the act of man- armed invasion, attack by bandits, governmental
prohibition, etc.
NOTES:
flying roof is FE
*they could have used RIL*: might have done better? But there
is evidence of diligence.
SICAM v JORGE
FACTS: Lulu Jorge pawned her jewelry with Agencia de R.C. Sicam, a
pawnshop in Paraaque, in October 1987 to secure a loan in the
amount of P59,500.00. On October 19, 1987, armed men entered the
pawnshop and took away whatever cash and jewelry were found in the
vault. On the same day, Sicam notified Jorge of the robbery incident
and that consequently all here jewelry is gone. Jorge did not believe
him.
ISSUE: WON the robbery is a fortuituous event which can absolve
Sicam from liabilty.
HELD: NO
- Fortuitous events by definition are extraordinary events
not foreseeable or avoidable. It is therefore, not enough
that the event should not have been foreseen or
anticipated, as is commonly believed but it must be one
impossible to foresee or to avoid. The mere difficulty to
foresee the happening is not impossibility to foresee the
same. 22
- The burden of proving that the loss was due to a fortuitous event
rests on him who invokes it. And, in order for a fortuitous event to
exempt one from liability, it is necessary that one has committed
no negligence or misconduct that may have occasioned the loss.
Robbery per se, just like carnapping, is not a fortuitous
event. It does not foreclose the possibility of negligence on
the part of herein petitioners
NOTES:
ILOCOS NORTE v CA
FACTS: After a 2-day typhoon, Isabel went out of her house to check
on her grocery store. She waded in waist-deep flood and got
electrocuted. According to the NPC Engr, there were no INELCO
linemen who were going around.
HELD: Court said that contrary to petitioners claim, the maxim
violenti non fit injuria does not apply here. Isabel should not be
punished for exercising her right to protect her property from the
floods by imputing upon her the unfavorable presumption that she
assumed the risk of personal in injury. A person is excused from the
force of the rule, that when he voluntarily assents to a known danger,
he must abide by the consequence, if an emergency is found to exist,
or if the life or property of another is in peril or when he seeks to
rescue his endangered property.
NOTES:
gasoline began to leak and escape from the gasoline tank, spreading
over the bus and the ground under it, and that the lighted torch set it
on fire.
ISSUE: What was the proximate cause of the accident?
HELD: The overturning of the bus, and not the fire that burned the
bus, is the proximate cause. The coming of the men with the torch
was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of
the bus, the trapping of the passengers and the call for outside help.
NOTES:
Definition #1 of proximate cause according to Bataclan v.
Medina:
Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not
have occurred.
The house is the condition which made the injury possible but
not the cuase
SIR: as a question of policy, this is a good ruling
o People lost their homes
o If Meralco was nto liable, the owners would have ran
after Rodrigueza who also lost his house
MANILA ELECTRIC v REMONQUILLO
FACTS: Efren Magno repaired the media agua below Pealozas 3storey house. In the course of the repair, the end of the iron sheet he
was holding came into contact with an uninsulated electric wire of
Manila Electric, causing his death by electrocution. The distance from
the electric wire to the media agua was only 2 feet, in violation of
the regulation of the City of Manila requiring 3 feet.
ISSUE: What was the cause and condition of the accident?
HELD: The cause was Magnos own negligence. The condition was the
too close proximity of the media agua, or rather, its edge, to the
electrical wire of the company by reason of the violation of the original
permit given by the city and the subsequent approval of said illegal
construction of media agua.
3. Efficient Intervening cause
NOTES:
FACTS: On October 23, 1980, Urbano hacked Javier in his right palm.
Javier was brought to a doctor who issued a certificate stating the
incapacitation is from 7-9 days. On November 5, Javier was seen
catching fish in dirty shallow irrigation canals after a typhoon. ON
November 14, he died of tetanus.
ISSUE: WON there was efficient intervening cause YES.
HELD: The death must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence
of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. The medical findings,
in the case at bar, show that the infection of the wound by the tetanus
was an effacing intervening cause later or between the time Javier was
wounded to the time of death.
NOTES: The court adopted the Bataclan definition of proximate cause.
There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause
and its subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary
precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause
of Javiers death with which Urbano had nothing to do.
Citing Manila Electric v. Remoquillo: A prior and remote cause
cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did
nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the
occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there
intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury
a distinct, successive, unrelated and efficient cause of the
injury, even though such injury would not have happened
except but for such condition or occasion.
What could have been the IC now becomes the remote cause
TEAGUE v FERNANDEZ
FACTS: A vocational school for hair and beauty culture had only one
stairway, in violation of an ordinance requiring 2 stairways. A fire broke
out in a nearby store and the students panicked and caused a
stampede. Four students died.
ISSUE: WON there was an independent intervening cause NO.
HELD: the violation of a stature or ordinance is not rendered remote
as the cause of an injury by the intervention of another agency if the
occurrence of the accident, in the manner in which it happened, was
the very thing which the stature or ordinance was intended to prevent.
In the present case, the violation was a continuing violation in that the
ordinance was a measure of safety designed to prevent the specific
situation of undue crowding in case of evacuation.
NOTE: The PC of the deaths is the overcrowding brought about by the
violation. However, the court did not specifically identify the violation
itself as the PC.
on the opposite lane. A Philippine Rabbit Bus from the opposite lane
bumped the rear portion of the jeep. Three passengers of the jeep died
as a result.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the bus driver was negligent. It applied
the substantial factor test: It is a rule under this test that if the
actors conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the
harm to another, the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor
should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner in
which it occurred does not prevent him from being liable.
ISSUE: Who is liable?-Jeep.
HELD: The Supreme Court was not convinced by the application of the
substantial factor test. Even though the bus was driving at 80-90 kph,
it was still within the speed limit allowed in highways. The bus driver
had little time to react and had no options available: it could not
swerve to the right (western shoulder was narrow and had tall grasses;
already near the canal) or to the left (it would have it the jeep headon).
NOTE: The substantial factor test contains no element of
foreseeability.
Prof. Casis thinks that this case should not be cited for the
substantial factor test because the SC did not apply the
test; only the CA did.
Elements:
o Both parties must be negligent
o Appreciable interval of time
o When it is impossible to determine whose fault or
negligence should be attributed to the incident
The doctrine also cannot be extended into the field of joint tortfeasors
as a test whether one of them should be liable to the injured person.
So, the doctrine cannot apply in this case because this is NOT a suit
between owners and drivers but a suit brought by the heirs of the
deceased passengers against both owners and drivers of the colliding
vehicles
- did not apply LCCD
NOTES:
Does the last clear chance doctrine still stand? Yes, because it
was still used in later cases
o HOWEVER, Phoenix says that purpose behind
contributory negligence no longer exists therefore
A2179 which is irreconcilable with LCC
o But in subsequent cases, the SC stil used LCC
cargo truck was staying on his lane because the line in the road
was wrongly painted
case filed by heirs of the driver of the jeep who died as a result of
the collision
RATIO:
- The truck driver was not negligent and so cannot be held liable.
Furthermore, the doctrine of Last Clear Chance also cannot apply
because there is no negligence of the other party
- Even assuming that the truck driver was negligent, the doctrine of
Last Clear Chance would still absolve him from any actionable
responsibility for the accident because both drivers had full view of
each others vehicle.
The truck stopped 30 m away from the jeep and so by this time, the
jeep should have stopped or swerved
Jeep driver had the last clear chance to avoid the accident
Chance
CANLAS v CA
Doctrine can [was]
apply
in
commercial
FACTS:
2 parcels of land owned by Canlas were sold to Manosca
Manosca issued 2 check that bounced
Manosca was then granted a loan by Asian Savings Bank with the 2
parcels of land as security
2 impostors used who introduced themselves as the spouses Canlas
mortgage was foreclosed
Canlas wrote to Asian Savings Bank regarding the mortgage of
Manosca of the 2 properties without their consent
Canlas filed this case for annulment of the deed of real estate
mortgage against ASB
RATIO:
ASB was negligent in not exerting more effort to verify the identity of
the sps Canlas
The Bank should have required additional proof of the true identity of
the impostor aside from their residence certificate
Applied the doctrine of Last Clear Chance which states that:
Where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one
is appreciable later in a point of time that that of the other, or
where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence
brought about the occurrence of the incident, the one who had the
FACTS:
RATIO:
The last clear chance doctrine may only be applied when the
negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of the other,
or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or
negligence caused the loss, the one who had the last clear
opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so, is chargeable
with the loss.
NOTES:
Angala instituted an action for damages alleging that his pickup was slowing down to about five to ten kph and was making
a left turn preparatory to turning south when it was bumped
from behind by the crewcab which was running at around 60 to
70 kph.
The facts are ambivalent enough that Angala could have been
declared as the party at fault. Proximate cause is where the
court exercises the greatest latitude. So if facts are similar to a
case that was already decided, cite the case!
SANGCO, (pp. 74-81)
The Doctrine of Last Clear Chance
Facts required:
o
That the plaintiff was in a position of danger and by his
own negligence became unable to escape from such position
by the use of ordinary care, either because it became
physically impossible for him to do so or because he was
totally unaware of the danger.
o
The defendant knew that the plaintiff was in a position
of danger and further knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care
should have known that the plaintiff was unable to escape
therefrom
o
That thereafter the defendant had the last clear chance
to avoid the accident by the exercise of ordinary care but failed
to exercise such last clear chance and the accident occurred as
a proximate result of such failure
Many courts take the view that the doctrine of last clear
chance is not available to defendant. LCC can only be invoked in
favor of the person injured, since it implies contributory negligence
on his part, and is, generally speaking, only operative in those
cases where, notwithstanding the injured persons want of care,
another person wantonly, or with knowledge of the perilous
situation of the person injured carelessly or recklessly injured him.
The doctrine embraces successive acts of negligence: primary
negligence on the part of the defendant then contributory
negligence on the part of the plaintiff which creates a situation of
inextricable peril to him and then becomes passive or static
followed by the subsequent negligence of the defendant in failing
to avoid injury to the plaintiff.
Although the defendant may not invoke the doctrine, it does
not preclude him from proving that the plaintiff had the last clear
opportunity to avert the injury complained of and thus establish
that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence which
proximately caused the accident and consequently bars plaintiffs
recovery.
Between the defendants, the doctrine cannot be extended into
the field of joint tortfeasors as a test of whether only one of them
should be held liable to the injured person by reason of his
discovery of the latters peril and it cannot be invoked as between
defendants concurrently negligent.
LCC applies in a suit between the owners and drivers of
colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands
responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations.
Plaintiff
WON
applied the
LCCD
YES
Bustamante
Picart v Smith
Passengers
Picart (one of the
parties
who
caused
the
collision)
NO
Yes
Bustamante v CA
Passengers of the
No
Why?
Smith had a
clear
opportunity
to avoid the
accident
No
Smith
had
clear
opportunity
to avoid the
accident
No negligent
Phoenix v IAC
Philippine Bank of
Commerce v CA
Glan v IAC
Pantranco v Baesa
Phoenix (one of
the parties who
caused
the
collision)
RMC (one of the
parties
who
caused
the
accident)
No
No
Yes
No
Ong v Metropolitan
Parents of
deceased
the
No
Anuran v Buno
Heirs
of
the
passengers
of
jeep
(with
contract)
Canals (one of the
parties
who
caused
the
incident) for the
annulment of the
deed
No
Canlas v CA
Yes
plaintiff
because the
plaintiff in the
case are the
passengers of
the bus who
are asking for
damages
Doctrine was
not
carried
over to the
CC
Just to know
if PBC was
negligent but
damages
were divided
40-60
Truck driver
(other party
in
the
collision) was
not negligent
There was no
opportunity
to avoid the
accident and
driver
was
not aware of
the peril
Defendant
was
not
negligent
There
was
contractual
relation
Defendant
bank had the
last
clear
chance
to
prevent
the
fraud
Note:
there
was
no
contractual
relation
between
Canlas
and
Consolidated Bank
v CA
No
Engada v CA
Inured
party
(owner
of
the
Tamaraw)
No
PNR v BRUNTY
Brunty (mother of
passenger
who
died)
No
Lapanday (driver
of one of the cars
involved in the
accident)
Yes
LAPANDAY
ANGALA
the bank
Liability
of
bank
arose
from
culpa
contractual
and
so
doctrine
cannot
be
applied
There was no
clear chance
in
avoiding
the accident
because
it
was
an
emergency
situation
Last
clear
chance
was
inapplicable
because
PNRs
negligence
was already
established
as
the
proximate
cause
Last
clear
chance
was
applied
because both
parties were
found to be
negligent.
Decision was
based
on
circumstance
s of incident
NOTES:
There can be more than one tortfeasor and they are called
JOINT TORTFEASORS
Are you suppose to sue all of them? NO because you can get
relief from one of them.
Do they have to act in concert? NO, as long as they all
contributed to the act.
WORCESTER v OCAMPO
February 27, 1912
FACTS: Dean Worcester filed an action to recover damages resulting
from an alleged libelous publication against Martin Ocampo, Teodoro
M. Kalaw, Lope K. Santos, Fidel A. Reyes, Faustino Aguilar, et al, as the
owners, directors, writers, editors and administrators of the daily
newspaper El Renacimiento (Spanish version) and Muling
Pagsilang (tagalong version). Worcester alleged that the defendants
have been maliciously persecuting and attacking him in the
newspapers for a long time and they published an editorial entitled
Birds of Prey with the malicious intent of injuring Worcester, both as
This rule applies even if the owner of the vehicle was present
at the time of the accident, unless THE NEGLIGENT ACTS OF THE DRIVER ARE
CONTINUED
OWNER
A REASONABLE
The court however may make findings as to which of the alleged joint
tortfeasors are liable and which are not, even if they are charged
jointly and severally.
When will the owner be liable?- An owner who sits in his vehicle,
and permits his driver to continue in a violation of the law by the
performance of his negligent acts, after he had A REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY TO
OBSERVE THEM AND TO DIRECT THAT THE DRIVER CEASE THEREFROM, BECOMES HIMSELF
RESPONSIBLE FOR SUCH ACTS.
When will the owner be NOT liable?-if the driver by a sudden act of
negligence, and without the owner having reasonable opportunity to
prevent the act or its continuance, injures a person or violates the
criminal law, the owner of the vehicle, present therein at the time the
act was committed, is not responsible, etiher civilly or criminally,
therefor.
NOTES:
The Case defines a joint totfeasor which is taken from the point
of view of the actor.
CHAPMAN v UNDERWOOD
March 28, 1914
FACTS: J.H. Chapman was trying to board a San Marcelino car
trough the rear platform when he was struck by Mr. James
Underwoords automobile, which was at that time driven by his
chauffer.
Underwoods driver was guilty of negligence because he was
passing an oncoming car upon the wrong side when he ran over
Chapman. Chapman, was not obliged for his own protection to observe
whether a car was coming upon him from where he was because
according to the law, no automobile or other vehicle coming from his
left should pass upon his side of the car.
TC: In favor of Underwood
ISSUE: WON Underwood is responsible for the negligence of his driver.
HELD: No. TC affirmed. The interval between unlawful act and the
accident was so small as not to be sufficient to charge Underwood with
the negligence of the driver.
The driver does not fall within the list of persons in Art. 1903 (now
2180) for whose acts Underwood would be responsible.
RULE: Underwood is not liable for his drivers act even if he was inside
the car at the time of the accident (unless he let the negligence
continue for a long time without correcting it) because the driver is not
listed in 1903 (now 2180) as one of the persons whose acts Underwood
would be responsible for.
NOTES:
There is no one standard of care for owners who are riding with
their drivers since there are different reasons why hired the
driver in the first place
VICARIOUS LIABILITY: found in Article 2180 (but use the term
tortfeasors instead of one
-a tortfeasor would be liable not only for his own acts or omissions but
also for those of persons for whom he is responsible
Take note of difference between NCC and FC:
under the NCC: the father, and in cases of his death or incapacity,
the mother, will be responsible for the damages caused by their
minor children who live in their company
under the FC: parents and other persons exercising parental
authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused
Family Code
Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the
individual, entity or institution engaged in child are shall have special
parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while under
their supervision, instruction or custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities
whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or
institution. (349a)
Art. 219. Those given the authority and responsibility under the
preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages
caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor. The
parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute
parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable.
A child above fifteen (15) but below eighteen (18) years of age shall
likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an
intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in
which case such child will be subjected to the appropriate proceedings
in accordance with this Act.
Laws applicable
o Civil Code,2180
Age of emancipation: 18
Are the parents still liable for if above 18 but below 21? Yes.
Legal basis: PD 603
1. Parents (see table after cases)
EXCONDE v CAPUNO
June 29, 1957
FACTS: Dante Capuno, 15 years old, a student of the Balintawak
Elementary School, was instructed by the city schools supervisor to
attend a parade in honor of Rizal in San Pablo City. From the school,
the students boarded a jeep, and when it started to run, Dante took
hold of the wheel, while the driver sat on his left side (remember that
the steering wheel is at the LEFT side). The jeep turned turtle and 2
passengers died.
Delfin Capuno, the father, was not with Dante at the time of the
accident, nor did he know that Dante was going to attend a parade. He
only found out after the accident when Dante told him about it.
Criminal case:
TC: Dante was convicted for Double homicide through reckless
imprudence.
CA: affirmed
Civil case: against Delfin and Dante Capuno (reserved by Sabina
Exconde, mother of one of the deceased):
TC: Convicted ONLY Dante to pay the damages.
CA: certified to SC
ISSUE: WON Delfin Capuno can be held civilly liable, jointly and
severally with his son for damages.
HELD: Yes. TC Modified. Delfin and Dante are jointly and severally
liable for the damages.
Art. 19031 applies: The obligation imposed by the next preceding
articles is enforceable not only for personal acts and omissions, but
also for those persons for whom another is responsible.
The father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
liable for any damages caused by the minor children who live with
them.
Xxx
Finally, teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any
damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under
their custody.
1. School is NOT liable
Art. 1903 (now 2180) about teachers applies only to institutions of
arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution.
Balintawak Elementary School
is an academic institution, hence
neither the teacher nor the head can be held liable.
Even if Dante was on the jeep pursuant to the city school
supervisors instruction, neither the head of the school nor the city
schools supervisor could be held liable because Dante was not a
student of an institution of arts and trades.
2. Delfin, as the father IS liable. He failed to prove that he
exercised all the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent the
damage.
The civil liability which the law impose upon the father, or the
mother as the case may be is a necessary consequence of the parental
authority they exercise over them. This parental authority imposes
12180 now: The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children
who live in their company.
Xxx
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and
students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
ELCANO v HILL
FACTS: Reginald Hill was a married minor living and getting
subsistence from his father, co-defendant Marvin. He killed Agapito
Elcano, son of petitioners, for which he was criminally prosecuted.
However, he was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal
because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake." Subsequently,
petitioners filed a civil action for recovery of damages against
defendants, which the latter countered by a motion to dismiss.
ISSUE: W/N there is a cause of action against Reginalds father, Marvin
HELD: Marvin Hill is vicariously liable. However, since Reginald has
come of age, as a matter of equity, the formers liability is now merely
subsidiary.
Under Art. 2180, the father and in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children
who live in their company. Applied in this case, Reginald, although
married, was living with his father and getting subsistence from him at
the time of the killing. The joint and solidary liability of parents with
their offending children is in view of the parental obligation to
supervise minor children in order to prevent damage to third persons
NOTES:
-
LIBI v IAC
September 18, 1992
FACTS: Julie and Wendell were sweethearts for 2 years when Julie
broke it off due to Wendells sadistic and irresponsible nature. A month
after their break-up, Julie and Wendell died each from a single gunshot
wound traced to the gun licensed in the name of Cresencio Libi, the
father of Wendell. There were 2 versions of the story:
Libis: another man shot the 2
Gotiong: Wendell shot Julie and then committed suicide.
The Gotiongs (julies parents) fiuled for damages against the Livis
under Art. 2180.
TC: dismissed for insufficiency of evidence
IAC: Set aside TC and found the Libis subsidiarily liable.
ISSUE: WON Art. 2180 was correctly applied to hold the Libis liable.
The Libis were grossly negligent from preventing Wendell from having
access to the key to the safety deposit box where the gun was stored.
Diligence required is that of instruction and supervision of the kid.
BUT, liability is not subsidiary, it is PRIMARY
Rule on parents liability is correct but characterization of their nature
must be given a second look (coz SC held in some cases that the
liability of parents is subsidiary).
If the liability of the parents for crimes or QDs of their minor
children is subsidiary, then they can neither invoke nor be absolved of
civil liability on the defense that they acted with the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent damages.
But if the liability is direct and primary, the diligence would
constitute a valid and substantial defense.
Hence, the liability of parents for QDs of their minor kids as
contemplated in 2180 is PRIMARY and not subsidiary.
In fact, applying 2194 (solidary liability of join tortfeasors) the parent is
also solidarily liable with the child.
The liability of parents for felonies is likewise PRIMARY & not
subsidiary. Art. 101, RPC says so.
For both QDs and crimes, the parents primarily respond for such
damages is buttressed by the corresponding provisions in both the
RPC and CC that the minor transgressor shall be answerable or shall
respond with his own property only in the absence or in case of the
insolvency of the parents. Arts. 21822, CC and 1013, RPC support this.
RULES:
2 Art. 2182. If the minor or insane person causing damage has no parents or guardian, the minor or insane person shall be answerable with
his own property in an action against him where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed. (n)
xxx
Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his authority, legal guardianship or control, or if such
person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor shall respond with their own property, excepting property exempt from execution, in
accordance with the civil law.
TAMARGO v CA
June 3, 1992
FACTS: Adelberto Bundoc, 10 years old, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an
air rifle, causing injuries which resulted in her death. Adelbertos
natural parents for damages. Adelberto was living with his natural
parents at the time of the accident but a petition for his adoption has
already been filed by the Rapisura spouses. This petition was granted
after the shooting of Jennifer.
The Tamargos filed:
The Bundocs claimed that the Rapisuras should be held liable instead,
that they are indispensable parties because parental authority had
already shifter to them the moment the successful petition for
adoption was filed.
TC: dismissed the complaint. The Bundocs are not indispensable
parties to the action.
CA: dismissed petition. Tamargos lost their right to appeal.
ISSUE: Who are the indispensable parties? The Bundocs or the
Rapisuras?
HELD: The natural parents, the Bundocs, are the indispensable
parties. CA reversed and set aside, complaint reinstated and case
remanded.
When Adelberto shot Jennifer, parental authority was still lodged in the
Bundocs, his natural parents. Hence, they who had actual custody of
Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.
Ratio:
The act of Adelberto gave rise to a cause of action on QD, under 2176
against him. On the other hand, the law imposes civil liability upon the
father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any
damages that may be caused by a minor child who lives with them.
The principle of parental liability is a species of what is frequently
designated as vicarious liability, or the doctrine of imputed
negligence, where a person is not only liable for the torts committed
by himself, but also for torts committed by others with whom he has a
certain relationship and for whom he is responsible.
Thus, parental liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the
duties and responsibilities of parentstheir parental authoritywhich
includes the instructing, controlling and disciplining of the child.
The basis for the doctrine of vicarious liability was explained in
Cangco v. Manila Raildroad:
With respect to extra contractual obligations arising from
negligence, whether of act or omission, the legislature has elected to
limit such liability to cases in which the person upon whom such an
obligation is imposed is morally culpable, or on the contrary, for
Salen and
Salbanera
vs. Balce
(son above
15 but below
18 killed 18
yr old)
Fuellas vs.
Cadano
(stole pencil
and had the
nerve to be
mad by
breaking
classmates
arm!)
Guitierrez
vs.
Guitierrez
(bus
collision,
family except
pa in the car
driven by
minor)
RodriguezLuna vs.
IAC
(go-cart vs.
Toyota)
Action
for
Civil
action for
damages
(father
and son
impleaded
)
Criminal
case with
civil
liability
arising
from it
Criminal
action vs.
Rico for
Serious
Physical
Injuries
Civil
action vs
Agapito
(the
father)
only
Civil
action vs.
Manuel
Guitierrez
(the
father)
only (+
bus driver
and
owner)
Civil
action vs.
pa and
son
Who held
liable
TC: only son
liable
SC: Pa and son
jointly and
severally liable
-not the school
because not a
school of arts
and trades
SC: Father
liable
subsidiarily
-child above 15,
below 18
SC: Pa liable
SC: Pa made
primarily liable
for the injury
caused by son
(son already of
Tamargo
vs. CA
(adopted
child still
with parents
at time of
incident)
Civil
action vs.
parents
Criminal
complaint
Civil
complaint
vs. Natural
parents of
child
age, said to be
insolvent but in
Madrid!)
SC: Libis are
primarily and
directly liable
SC: Bundocs
(natural
parents) are
indispensable
parties
-the adopting
parents had no
actual custody
yet
ends of justice
Art 221, FC; Art 2180,
NCC; Art 101, RPC
Why primarily liable:
1. If liability of the
parents for crimes or
QDs of their minor
children is subsidiary,
then they can neither
invoke nor be absolved
of civil liability on the
defense that they acted
with the diligence of a
good father of a family to
prevent damages.
2. The liability of parents
for felonies is likewise
Primary and not
subsidiary under A101 of
RPC: minor only liable if
parents are insolvent
(A101 par3)
Art. 2176, parental
authority coupled with
presumed parental
dereliction in the
discharge of duties
accompanying such
authority, doctrine of
vicarious liability as
explained in CANGCO VS.
MANILA RAILROAD
*IMPORTANT: PARENTS
MUST HAVE ACTUAL OR
PHYSICAL CUSTODY OVER THE
MINOR TO BE HELD LIABLE
Elcano v
Hill
(married
child who
still lives
with
parents at
time of
incident
Civil
action for
damages
against
the father
2. Guardians
Family Code
Art. 216. In default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian, the
following person shall exercise substitute parental authority over the
child in the order indicated:
(1)The surviving grandparent, as provided in Art. 2144;
(2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of age, unless
unfit or disqualified; and
(3) The child's actual custodian, over twenty-one years of age, unless
unfit or disqualified.
Whenever the appointment or a judicial guardian over the property of
the child becomes necessary, the same order of preference shall be
observed. (349a, 351a, 354a)
All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be
governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. (n)
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not
only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in
their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or
incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their
company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are
likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the
service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees
and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks,
even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special
agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to
whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided
in Article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades
shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students
or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
Art. 219. Those given the authority and responsibility under the
preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages
caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor. The
parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute
parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable.
MERCADO v CA, et al
May 30, 1960
FACTS: Augusto, 9 years old, lent his pitogo to Benedicto who lent it
to Renato. When Augusto tried to retrieve his pitogo, Manuel Jr,
thinking it was Benedictos, interfered and told Augusto not to get it
from Renato as Renato was better at putting the chain into the holes of
the pitogo. Augusto resented this remark and aggressively poushed
him. A fight ensued and Augusto wounded Manuel Jr. on the right
cheek with a piece of razor.
CA
LONG
AS
THEY
REMAIN
IN
THEIR
CUSTODY-
CONTEMPLATES A SITUATION WHERE THE PUPIL LIVES AND BOARDS WITH THE TEACHER,
SUCH THAT THE CONTROL DIRECTION AND INFLUENCE ON THE PUPIL SUPERSEDES THOSE OF
THE PARENTS.
RULE:
1. exconde v. capuno doctrine7: academic institutions not included in
Art. 2180
2. exconde v. capuno doctrine: responsibility passes from parents to
teachers or heads of ONLY institutions of arts and trades
3. Lourdes is not liable because they dont retain custody
(custody=living with the teachers or heads) of their pupils.
4. Ciriaco Mercado is not responsible even under Art. 2180 par. 2probably because Manuel Jr. did not die nor was he incapacitated.
5. No moral damages because cases in Art. 2219 were not shown to
exist.
6. Augusto was only 9 and was not shown to act with discernment
7. Even if there was a QD on Augustos part, the proximate cause of
the injury was Manuel Jrs own act of interference.
DOCTRINE: what Art. 2180 means by custody
PALISOC v BRILLANTES
October 4, 1971
FACTS: Dominador Palisoc, 16 years old and Virgilio Daffon, of age,
were classmates at the Manila Technical Institute. During recess, while
working on a machine, Daffon made a remark that Palisoc was like a
foreman because he was merely watching them. Irked, Palisoc bitchslapped Daffon. In retaliation, Daffon gave Palisoc a strong flat blow on
the face, followed by fist blows on the stomach. Palisoc tried to retreat,
but Daffon followed him. They exchanged fist blows until Palsioc
stumbled on an engine block which caused him to fall face downward.
He fainted and never regained consciousness. The autopsy report said
he died of broken ribs and hemorrhage on the brain caused probably
by strong fist blows.
TC: Daffon liable for QD under 2176.
Absolved the following because 2180 is not applicable: It applied
Mercado v. CAs definition of custody
1. Brillantes-member of the board of directors of MTI
2. Valenton, president of MTI
6Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
5 The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in
their company.
7 Although later cases say this is a mere obiter because the issue was won the father had civil liability
NOTHING
(MEMORIZE)
IN THE LAW REQUIRES THAT FOR SUCH LIABILITY TO ATTACH, THE PUPIL-
Concurring: Reyes
Concurs with majority but dissents with the dissent. Makalintals
interpretation not in accord with the law.
1.
Only the guardians and parents are exempt once the child
reaches majority
2.
The authority and custodial supervision (of the teachers and
heads) over the pupil exists regardless of the pupils age.
RULE:
1. Mercado doctrine abandoned/overturned
2. Wants to overturn Exconde (to include academic institutions
in the scope of 2180) but has no chance because MTI is anonacademic institution.
3. Definition of custody= the protective and supervisory custody
that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils
There is no substantial distinction between an academic and a nonacademic school insofar as torts committed by their students are
concerned. The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the
students under his control and supervision, whatever the nature of the
school he is teaching.
(MEMORIZE
LONG
AS
STANDARD):
IT
CAN
BE
CUSTODY
SHOWN
THAT
STUDENT
IS
IN
THE
SCHOOL
PREMISES
AS
IN
9 This disparity no longer exist in view of the increase in enrollment. But thats a task for the legislature.
SALVOSA v. IAC
October 5, 1988
FACTS: Jimmy Abon, was a student of the BCF and an employee of
AFP (as an armorer for the BCF-ROTC unit) with work premises inside
the BCF. Abon shot Napoleon Castro, a commerce student of BCF with
an unlicensed gun from the ROTC armory, at the BCF parking lot at
around 8pm. He was convicted of Homicide. Napoleons heirs (Castros)
sued for damages impleading Abon, The ROTC Commandant, B.
Salvosa-president and chairman of BCF board, J. Salvosa-the EVP of
BCF, the dean and BCF.
TC: Solidary liability of Abon, B. Salvosa and BCF
Absolved other defendants
IAC: Affirmed but modified award
ISSUE: WON Salvosa and BCF can be held solidarily liable with Abon
for damages under 2180.
HELD: No. Abon was not in the custody of BCF at the time of the
incident. IAC Reversed in so far as it holds Salvosa and BCF solidarily
liable with Abon.
1. Rationale for liability
Reiterated Palisoc: The rationale of the liability of school heads and
teachers is that they stand to a certain extent, as to their pupils and
students, in loco parentis, and are called upon to exercise
reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child.
2. Abon was not in the custody of BCF when he shot
Napoleon
DEFINITION
OF
CUSTODY THAT THE SCHOOL AND ITS HEADS AND TEACHERS EXERCISE OVER THE PUPILS
AND STUDENTS FOR AS LONG AS THEY ARE AT ATTENDANCE IN THE SCHOOL, INCLUDING
RECESS TIME.
Qualifying custody
CONCEPT
REMAINS
WITHIN THE CALL OF HIS MENTOR AND IS NOT PERMITTED TO LEAVE THE SCHOOL PREMISES OR THE
AREA WITHIN WHICH THE SCHOOL ACTIVITY IS CONDUCTED.
INCLUDE DISMISSAL.
for
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity
or institution. (349a)
Art. 219. Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for
TC: 1. St. Marys is liable for damages under 218 & 21910, FC
2. The Daniels were held subsidiarily liable in the event of St. Marys
insolvency.
10 Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child are shall have special
damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute
parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable.
The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised the
proper diligence required under the particular circumstances.
parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody.
All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on quasidelicts. (n)
For damages
caused by
Liability
FC
A218: school, its
administrators and
teachers, or the individual,
entity or institution
engaged in child
have special parental
authority and responsibility
to all authorized activities
whether inside or
outside the premises of
the school, entity or
institution
Minor child while under
their supervision,
instruction or custody
A219: unemancipated
minor
Principally and solidarily
liable schools
Subsidiarily liable parents,
judicial guardians, persons
exercising substitute
parental authority
NCC
A2180, par7: teachers or
heads of establishments
of arts and trades
*In St. Francis Case,
activity should be inside
school premises
HELD: YES. The action is an action for damages for QD under Art 2176
and 2180. The Court has considered the liability of a registered owner
of a public service vehicle for damages arising from tortuous acts of
the driver as primary, direct and joint and several or solidary with the
driver (Art 2194)11. The employers only recourse is to recover what it
has paid from the employee who committed the fault or negligence
(Art 2181)12.
HELD: No.
1. Balingit is not the manager contemplated in 2180
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are
likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the
service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions.
The terms employers and
establishment or enterprise DOES
THE
TERM MANAGER
WHICH
IS
NOT
(DEPENDIENTE)
(DIRECTOR
EQUAL
TO
IN
SPANISH
MANAGER
owners
OF
and
CORPORATION
WHO
managers
IS
ALSO
AN
of
an
EMPLOYEE
OF THE CORPORATION .
NOTES:
The truck hit a minor, Marvin C Jayme, who was crossing the highway
who died. Complaint for damages was filed. Apostol and Simbulan (the
registered owner and possessor) claimed that Lozano took pick up
truck without consent. Mayor Miguel, Lozano ( passenger and driver),
and the Municipality of Korondal said that Marvins sudden sprint was
impossible to avoid. Miguel also said he wasnt in the car at the time.
ISSUES:
WON Miguel as an employer should be solidarily liable with the driver
Lozano?
WON Municipality of Korondal as employer is liable?
HELD/RULES:
To sustain claims against employers for the acts of their employees
under Art 2180, the following requisites must be established:
(1) That the employee was chosen by the employer personally or
through another; (2) That the service to be rendered in accordance
with orders which the employer has the authority to give at all times;
(3) That the illicit act of the employee was on the occasion or by
reason of the functions entrusted to him
(4) injurious or tortuous act was committed at the time the employee
was performing his functions
AN EM-ER relationship must first be established by plaintiff through the
ff: (1) the employer's power of selection; (2) payment of wages or
other remuneration; (3) the employer's right to control the method of
doing the work; and (4) the employer's right of suspension or dismissal
APPLICATION:
(1) NO, Mayor Miguel was neither Lozano's employer nor the
vehicle's registered owner. There existed no causal
relationship between him and Lozano or the vehicle used that
will make him accountable for Marvin's death. Mayor Miguel
was a mere passenger at the time of the accident. Drivers
duty is not one that may be delegated to others.
(2) YES, municipality is the employer but it cannot be sued.
Municipality of Korondal is the employer since an employeremployee relationship still exists even if the employee was
loaned by the employer to another person or entity because
control over the employee subsists
However, the municipality cannot be sued because it is an
agency of the State engaged in governmental functions and,
hence, immune from suit. A municipality may only be liable if it
can be shown that they were acting in proprietary capacity.
NOTES:
SALUDAGA v FEU
April 2008
FACTS: Petitioner Joseph Saludaga was a sophomore law student of
respondent Far Eastern University (FEU) when he was shot by
Alejandro Rosete (Rosete), one of the security guards on duty at the
school premises.
Saludaga filed a complaint for damages against FEU on the ground
that they breached their obligation to provide students with a safe and
secure environment and an atmosphere conducive to learning. FEU, in
turn, filed a Third-Party Complaint against Galaxy Development and
Management Corporation, the agency contracted by respondent FEU
5th paragraph
Employers, in general, WON
engaged in a business or industry
Encompasses negligent acts of
employees as long
as they were acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks
Whats the rule if we combine 2180 (4) and (5) as regards the
liability of employer for the acts or omissions of employees?
Requisites to hold the employer liable for torts under 2180:
1. ER-EE relationship
2. Employee must be acting within the scope of his
assigned task
FILAMER v IAC
FACTS: Funtecha is a part-time janitor and scholar of Filamer. Having
a drivers license, he requested Masa, driver and son of school
president, to let him drive them home where Funtecha also lives. Masa
yielded and on the way they hit a pedestrian, Kapunan, because
Funtecha swerved right to avoid a fast-moving truck. It appears that
Agustin Masa, school president, knew of the license.
ISSUE: WON Filamer is liable
HELD: YES. The clause within the scope of their by assigned
tasks for the purpose of raising the presumption of liability of an
employer includes any act done by the employee, in furtherance of the
interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the
time of the infliction of the injury. It is applicable even if the employee
derives some benefit from the act. In this case, Funtecha drove the
jeep not for his enjoyment but for the service of Filamer. The fact that
he was not the school driver is insignificant. Besides, Filamer did not
exercise the diligence of a good father of the family.
Presumptive liability of employer (when employee is driving a
company vehicle) is determined by answering
The question Does the servant at the time of the accident performing
any act in furtherance of his masters business?
Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules implementing the Labor Code,
provides guidelines on the exclusion of working scholars from the
employment coverage as far as compliance with the substantive labor
provisions on working conditions, rest periods, and wages, is
concerned. It is merely a guide to the enforcement of the substantive
law on labor. The Court, thus, makes the distinction and so holds that
Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules is not the decisive law in a civil
suit for damages instituted by an injured person during a vehicular
accident against a working student of a school and against the school
itself. Hence, the reliance on the implementing rule on labor to
disregard the primary liability of an employer under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code is misplaced.
Supervision includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations
for the guidance of its employees and the issuance of proper
instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons with
whom the employer has relations through his employees.
NOTES:
NOTES:
not liable simply because of company car but because of bonus
pater familias standard in 2180 did not prove diligence and
under 2nd instance discussed in Castilex
juris tantum presumption (rebuttable) vs. juris et jure
(conclusive)
HELD: YES. The Court held that it was already declared at no ER-EE
relationship exists at the RTC and CA level and to this, Agana did not
appeal. Hence, said ruling is final. However, PSI is held liable for
corporate negligence and not under 2180. Yet, the Court also said that
this case is pro hac vice or on a case to case basis. Consequently,
the ruling in this case cannot be applied to other cases. Still in the end,
the Court (making things worse), declared that PSI is solidarily liable
with Dr. Ampil. This declaration of liability has an unknown basis
because 2180, which provides for solidary liability, not longer applies.
HELD: YES. The Court found that del Rosario took an exam for delivery
man, not as truck driver. Furthermore, he used a Galant for the test
and not a truck. There were also no tests on motor skills, etc, and no
NBI and police clearances asked for. Mercury Drug also did not provide
for a backup driver for long trips. Also, at the time of the collision, del
Rosario had no license but Mercury Drug neither did suspended nor
reprimanded him for this.
NOTES:
6. State
-not liable for acts of its officers, agents and employees (unless special
agent; and except when state acts as a juridical person capable of
acquiring rights and contracting obligations)
MERRIT v GOVERNMENT
FACTS: Plaintiff Merritt suffered severe injuries as his motorcycle
collided with a PGH ambulance due to the
negligence of the latters vehicles driver. The Government passed an
Act authorizing Merritt to sue
the Government.
ISSUE: WON the State is liable for damages
HELD: NO. Though the State waived its immunity from suit, it did not
concede liability to Merritt. The State is not liable for torts, except
when it acts through a special agent. In this case, the driver is not a
special agent within the contemplation of the law. Although the
accident was caused by a government employee, the State did not
undertake to guarantee to third persons the acts of all its employees
for that would subject the State to countless suits, which is subversive
to public interest. The State is not responsible for the damages
suffered by private individuals in consequence of the acts performed
by its employees pertaining to their office because neither fault nor
negligence can be presumed on the part of the State in the
organization of branches of public service and appointment of its
agents.
MEMORIZE:
Short version: A special agent is one who receives a definite and fixed
order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if
he is a special official.
Long version: A special agent is one duly empowered by a definite
order or commission to perform some act or charged with some
definite purpose which gives rise to the claim, and not where the claim
is based o n acts or omissions imputable to a public official charged
with some administrative or technical office who can be held to the
proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of civil
responsibility.
NOTES:
In this case the chauffeur still was acting within his duty as a
driver when he hit Merritt
There must be another law to hold the state liable and in this
case, it is 1903 (2180)
5.Freedom of suffrage
6.The right against deprivation of property without due process of law
7.The right to just compensation when property is taken for public use
8.The right to equal protection of the laws
9.The right to be secure in ones person, house, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures
10. The liberty of abode and of changing the same
11. The right to privacy of communication and correspondence
12. The right to become a member of associations and societies for
purposes not contrary to law
13. The right to take part in a peaceable assembly and petition the
government for redress of grievances
14. The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form
15. The right of the accused against excessive bail
16. The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation against
him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face
to face, to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witnesses on is behalf;
17. Freedom form being compelled to be a witness against ones self,
or from being forced to confess his guilt, or from being induced by
a promise of immunity or reward to make such confession, except
when the person confessing becomes a State witness.
18. Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment,
unless the same is imposed or inflicted in accordance with a
statute which has not been judicially declared unconstitutional;
19. Freedom of access to the courts
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the
defendants act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved
party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil
action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted) and
may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may
also be adjudicated. The responsibility herein set forth is not
demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a
violation of the Penal code or any other penal statute.
MHP GARMENTS v CA
FACTS: MHP was awarded the exclusive franchise to sell and
distribute official uniforms and supplies of the Boy Scouts of the
Philippines. They were informed that Cruz, Lugatiman and Gonzales
were selling BSP uniforms without authority. They sought the aid of the
Philippine Constabulary. Constabulary men and De Guzman,
representative of MHP, went to the stalls, seized the goods and caused
a commotion, all without warrant.
ISSUE: WON MHP and De Guzman may be held liable
HELD: NO. The Court distinguished the two duties of a public official:
1) its duty to the public; and 2) its duty to a private individual. The
Court held that public officers that are liable under Art 32 are only
those whose duty is directed to a private individual (in essence, only
notary publics). The Court was in effect saying that there must first be
a determination of the constitutionality of the issuance to determine if
there was a violation of the constitutional rights of Fortune.
NOTES:
Sir would take the case to not overturn the doctrine on bad
faith
SANGCO 228-233
According to Sir, the point of this case is that one may file a
criminal complaint and a civil one in one court and both could
proceed independently of each other.
Criminal case and civil case (for the same act) may proceed
independently of each other
1. Defamation
MVRS v ISLAMIC
FACTS: This is a class suit instituted by the respondent on behalf of all
Muslims who were allegedly defamed by an article of the petitioner
which said that Muslims in Mindanao do not eat pigs and all other
animals because these are sacred to them and are worshiped like
Gods.
ISSUE: WON MVRS may be held liable
HELD: NO.
1) THE BASIC CONCEPT OF DEFAMATION AND ITS ELEMENTS-Defamation, which includes libel and slander, means the offense of
injuring a persons character, fame or reputation through false and
malicious statements. It is that which tends to injure reputation or to
diminish the esteem, respect, good will or confidence in the plaintiff or
to excite derogatory feelings or opinions about the plaintiff.
Words which are merely insulting or offensive are not actionable. There
must be a presence of allegations as to special damages suffered by
the plaintiff.
(2) SIZE OF THE GROUP SUBJECT OF THE DEFAMATIONWhere the
defamation is alleged to have been directed at a group or class, it is
essential that the statement must be so sweeping or all-embracing as
to apply to every individual in that group o class. Each reputation is
personal in character to every person. Together, the Muslims do not
have a single common reputation that will give them a common or
general interest in the subject matter of he controversy.
Puno, J.If the defamatory statements were directed at a small,
restricted group of persons, they applied to any member of the group,
and an individual member could maintain an action for defamation.
When the defamatory language was used toward a small group or
class, including every member, it has been held that the defamatory
language referred to each member so that each could maintain an
action. If the defamatory words are used broadly in respect of a large
class or group of persons, and there is nothing that points, or by proper
colloquium or innuendo can be made to apply, to a particular member
of the class or group, no member has a right of action for libel or
slander.
NOTES:
HELD: YES. The acquittal was based on the ground that the reckless
imprudence or criminal negligence charged did not exist and the
collision was pure accident. Criminal negligence is no one of the crimes
mentioned in article 33, hence no separate civil action may be brought
on the basis of the same article.
NOTES:
CORPUS v PAJE
FACTS: Victory Liner bus driven by Paje collided with a jeep driven by
Marcia. Marcia died and 2 other were seriously injured. An information
for homicide and double serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence was filed against Paje. Heirs of Maria reserved the right to
file a civil action separately and later did.
ISSUE: WON the acquittal of Paje in the criminal case bars the civil
action
Case Title
(Year)
Facts
Issue(s)/Hel
d
Ratio
Doctrine
Was the
award of
damages
against
Marcelo was
proper? NO
(2) Marcelo and Norma pleaded selfdefense which was not given credence
"Physical injuries" as
contemplated in CC33
includes homicide committed
in the consummated,
attempted or frustrated
degrees.
Dulay v. Court of
Appeals (1995)
Will the
independent
civil action
against
Superguard
prosper? YES
Facts
(1) Commercial Air Lines (CALI)
purchased supplies from the Shell Co. of
the P.I. ever since the former began
operations.
Issue(s)/Hel
d
(1) Did Shell
Philippines
betray the
trust of CALI?
YES
Ratio
Shell's transfer of its
aforementioned credit would have
been justified only if Mr. Fitzgerald
(of Shell) had declined to take
part in the Working Committee
Doctrine
CC19's provision, while it may
only be a mere declaration of
principle, such is implemeted by
CC21. A moral wrong or injury,
even if it does not constitute a
Globe Mackay v.
Court of Appeals
(1989)
(2) By reason
of this
betrayal, is
Shell
Philippines
liable to
answer for
damages?
YES
Was there an
abuse of
rights by
Hendry? YES
Was there an
abuse of
rights or
malicious
prosecution?
NEITHER
Amonoy v.
Gutierrez (2001)
Is Amonoy
liable for
damages to
the
Gutierrezes?
YES
Barons Marketing
v. Court of
Appeals (1998)
Can an
educational
institution
may be held
liable for
damages for
misleading a
student into
believing that
the latter had
satisfied all
the
requirements
for
graduation
when such is
not the case?
YES
(1) Was there
an abuse of
rights here
by Phelps?
NO
(2) Is Barons
liable to pay
interest and
attorney's
fees? YES
Is Diaz
entitled to
damages
under CC19,
20, 21 and
2217? NO
Wassmer v. Velez
(1964)
Is Velez liable
for the cost
of wedding
preparations
by Wassmer?
YES
Tanjanco v.
Santos (1966)
Does CC21
apply here?
NO
Does CC21
apply here?
YES
Pe v. Pe (1962)
Can the
defendant be
held liable
under CC21?
YES
Que v.
Intermediate
Appellate Court
(1989)
Was Que
guilty of
malicious
prosecution?
NO
Drilon v. Court of
Appeals (2001)
Magbanua v.
Junsay (2007)
Are damages
properly
awarded
against
Grand Union?
YES
Carpio v.
Valmonte (2004)
Are Carpio's
imputations
against
Valmonte
damna
absque
injuriaethat
would bar
Valmonte's
recovery for
damages?
NO
Quisaba v. Sta.
Ines-Melale
Veneer and
Plywood (1974)
Is Quisaba's
complaint
based on an
employeremployee
relationship
which brings
his case
under the
coverage of
the
jurisdiction of
the NLRC?
NO
Is Garcia
liable for
damages?
YES
Is St. Louis
Realty liable
for damages?
YES
Gregorio v. Court
of Appeals (2009)
Is Gregorio's
complaint
based on
quasi-delict
or malicious
prosecution?
Quasi-delict
Test: when the conditions provided in the law exist, you are
already liable
".
CC26.
A. Possessor of animals
Art. 2183, NCC
The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is
responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may
escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the
damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the
person who has suffered damage.
VESTIL v IAC
FACTS:
-The Dingcongs rented a house and established Central Hotel. Kanaan,
et.al. rented the ground floor of house where they established the
American Bazaar. Echeverria rented room in the hotel.
-One night, Echevarria, carelessly left the faucet open when retiring to
bed, causing the water to run off and spill to the ground, wetting the
articles and merchandise of the Kanaan's "American Bazaar" in the
ground floor. Kanaans filed complaint for damages against Echevarria
and Dingcongs.
HELD: The obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not
based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the
possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. It is based on
natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who
possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer for
the damage which such animal may cause.
- While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house, which
was still part of Vicente Miranda's estate, there is no doubt that she
and her husband were its possessors at the time of the incident in
question.
- It does not matter that the dog was tame and was merely provoked
by the child into biting her. The law does not speak only of vicious
animals but covers even tame ones as long as they cause injury. As for
the alleged provocation, the petitioners forget that Theness was only
three years old at the time she was attacked and can hardly be faulted
for whatever she might have done to the animal.
HELD:
-Echevarria is liable for being the one who directly, by his negligence in
leaving open the faucet, caused the water to spill to the ground and
wet the articles and merchandise of the plaintiffs.
-Dingcong, being a co-tenant and manager of the hotel, with complete
possession of the house, must also be responsible for the damages
caused. He failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the
family to prevent these damages, despite his power and authority to
cause the repair of the pipes.
NOTES:
NOTES:
NOTES:
NOTES:
ALARCON v. ALARCON
Facts:
School teacher hired two people to dig a well on his land. One died
while being lowered into the dug hole because of an obnoxious odor
and hot air that caused asphyxia.
Held:
Teacher is not liable because 1711 applies only to owners of
enterprises and other employers operating businesses or engaged in a
particular industry or trade which requires the contracting of laborers
services. 1711 excludes purely casual employees and for acts
performed not for the purposes of occupation or business of the
employer.
NOTES:
Who are they liable to? Anyone who consumed goods (even if
goods were stolen)
market
Can RES IPSA LOQUITUR apply? Only if the defect in the items
is of such nature and character that do not change.
COCA-COLA v CA
FACTS: Geronimo sold food and softdrinks in a school canteen. A
group of parents complained that fibrous materials were found in the
softdrink bottles bought by their children. Upon inspection by the
DOH, the bottles were found to be adulterated. The sales of Geronimo
drastically dropped and she was forced to close shop. She brought an
action for damages against Coca-cola and the trial court ruled that the
complaint was based on a contract, not quasi-delict and should have
been filed within 6 months from the delivery of the softdrinks.
Geronimo argues that her case is based on quasi-delict and should
prescribe in 4 years.
HELD: The Court sided with Geronimo. The vendees remedies against
a vendor with respect to the warranties against hidden defects or
encumbrances upon the thing sold are not limited to those prescribed
in A1567. The vendee may also ask for the annulment of the contract
upon proof of error or fraud in which case the ordinary rule on
obligations shall be applicable.
NOTES:
What if the person who consumed the goods did not buy them
but stole them? The manufacturer/processor may still be held
liable.
II SANGCO (p. 714-734)
Product Liability
1.
Governing law: Art. 2187, NCC
is given, where the situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict
liability for unfortunate consequences attending their use, merely
because he has undertaken to supply the public with apparently
reasonable risk.
Liability for negligence in food products.
If it falls under A2187, can you still sue for breach of contract?
Sangco says, yes.
E. Interference with contractual relations
Art. 1314 Any third person who induces another to violate his
contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party.
GILCHRIST v CUDDY
FACTS: Cuddy was the owner of the film Zigomar. Gilchrist was the
owner of a theatre in Iloilo. They entered into a contract whereby
Cuddy leased to Gilchrist the Zigomar for exhibition in his theatre for
a week for P125.
-Days before the delivery date, Cuddy returned the money already
paid by Gilchrist so that he can lease the film to Espejo and Zaldarriaga
instead and receive P350 for the film for the same period.
-Gilchrist filed a case for specific performance against Cuddy, Espejo
and Zaldarriaga. He also prayed for damages against Espejo and
Zaldarriaga for interfering with the contract between Gilchrist and
Cuddy.
ISSUE: WON Espejo and Zaldarriaga are liable for interfering with the
contract between Gilchrist and Cuddy, they not knowing at the time
the identity of the parties
HELD: YES, Appellants have the legal liability for interfering with the
contract and causing its breach. This liability arises from unlawful acts
and not from contractual obligations to induce Cuddy to violate his
contract with Gilchrist.
-ART 1902 CC provides that a person who, by act or omission causes
damage to another when there is fault or negligence, shall be obliged
to pay for the damage done. There is nothing in this article which
requires as a condition precedent to the liability of the tortfeasor that
he must know the identity of a person to whom he causes damage. No
such knowledge is required in order that the injured party may recover
for the damages suffered.
NOTES:
SO PING BUN v CA
FACTS: Tek Hua Trading originally entered into a lease agreement
with DC Chuan covering stalls in Binondo. The contracts were initially
for 1 year but were continued on month to month basis upon
expiration of the 1 yr. Tek Hua was dissolved, original members of Tek
Hua formed Tek Hua Enterprises (THE) with Manuel Tiong as one of the
incorporators. However, the stalls were occupied by the grandson (So
Ping Bun) of one of the original incorporators of Tek Hua under
business name Trendsetter Marketing.
-new lease contracts with increase in rent were sent to THE, although
not signed.
-THE through Tiong asked So Ping Bun to vacate the stalls so THE
would be able to go back to business BUT instead, SO PING BUN
SECURED A NEW LEASE AGEEMENT WITH DC CHUAN.
ISSUE: WON So Ping Bun was guilty of tortuous interference of
contract
HELD: Yes. A duty which the law on torts is concerned with is respect
for the property of others, and a cause of action ex delicto may be
predicated upon an unlawful interference by one party of the
enjoyment of the other of his private property. In the case at bar,
petitioner, Trendsetter asked DC Chuan to execute lease contracts in
its favor, and as a result petitioner deprived respondent of the latters
property right.
- Damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from injury, and
damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the
damage suffered.
- One becomes liable in an action for damages for a nontrespassory
invasion of anothers interest in the private use and enjoyment of asset
if: a) the other has property rights and privileges with respect to the
use or enjoyment interfered with; b) the invasion is substantial; c) the
defendants conduct is a legal cause of the invasion; d) the invasion is
either intentional and unreasonable or unintentional and actionable
under the general negligence rules.
- elements of tort interference:
a) existence of a valid contract
b) knowledge on the part of the third party of its existence
c) interference of the third party is without legal justification or
excuse
- Since there were existing lease contracts between Tek Hua and DC
Chuan, Tek Hua in fact had property rights over the leased stalls. The
LAGON v. CA
FACTS: there was a contract of lease between Sepi and Lapuz where
latter is to construct commercial buildings, sublease it and pay the
lease via his collection. However, while said lease was in force, Sepi
sold the land to Lagon. Lapuz sued Lagon for interfering with his
leasehold rights.
HELD: Lagon is not liable. Elements of tortuous interference are
absent. Lagon had no knowledge of the renewed lease because the
owners did not tell him and the title had no indication of lease. There
was no inducement on the part of Lagon because the heirs sold in on
their own volition. There was also no malice because it was merely for
the advancement of Lagons financial interests, thus precluding
recovery of damages.
AQUINO, (pp. 795-801)
Interference with contracts:
Can last clear chance apply? Wasnt it Guilatcos fault that she
was negligent in alighting a tricycle? No because it is under
strict liability.
Sir said it is wise to apply this to the case of PLDT and the
accident mound case (DACARA)
Art. 2205 provides for the kinds of AD which the plaintiff may
recover
Art. 2200. Indemnification for damages shall comprehend not only the
value of the loss suffered, but also that of the profits which the obligee
failed to obtain.
AS
OTHERWISE
EXPRESSED,
THE
PECUNIARY
CONSEQUENCES WHICH THE LAW IMPOSES FOR THE BREACH OF SOME DUTY OR THE VIOLATION OF
SOME RIGHT.
For actual damages, the party making claim must present best
evidence (original documents).
II. Kinds of Damages
A. Actual or compensatory
Art. 2216. No proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral,
nominal, temperate, liquidated or exemplary damages, may be
adjudicated. The assessment of such damages, except liquidated ones,
is left to the discretion of the court, according to the circumstances of
each case.
Art. 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled
to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by
him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual
or compensatory damages.
1. Kinds
PNOC v. CA
FACTS: The M/V Ma. Efigenia XV, owned by respondent Ma. Efigenia
Fishing Corp. collided with the vessel Petroparcel which at the time
was owned by the Luzon Stevedoring Co. The Board of Marine Inquiry
rendered a decision finding the Petroparcel at fault and thus the
respondent filed an action for damages against Luzon Stevedoring and
the Petroparcels captain. During the pendency of the case, petitioner
PNOC acquired the Petroparcel and was substituted in place of Luzon
Stevedoring in the complaint.
HELD: ACTUAL OR COMPENSATORY
OF, OR IN RECOMPENSE FOR LOSS OR
THEY
OF NATURAL JUSTICE AND ARE DESIGNED TO REPAIR THE WRONG THAT HAS BEEN DONE,
TO COMPENSATE FOR THE INJURY INFLICTED AND NOT TO IMPOSE A PENALTY.
Art. 2201 lays down the distinction between good faith and bad
faith (in bad faithwhatever damage happens)
Forseeability:
3. Certainty
-possible that the exact value (peso) is not known.
PNOC v. CA
FACTS: Collision of 2 vessels
Certainty: to enable an injured party to recover AD or CD, he is
required to prove the actual amount of loss with reasonable degree
of certainty premised upon competent proof and on the best
evidence available.
Burden of Proof: on the party who would be defeated if no evidence
would be presented on either side.
Evidence Required: He must establish his evidence by
PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE, which means that the evidence, as
a whole, adduced by one side is superior to that of the other.
Damages are not presumed: damages cannot be presumed and
courts, in making an award must point out specific facts that could
afford a basis for measuring whatever CD or AD are borne.
NOTES:
NOTES:
SCAR, ESPECIALLY ONE ON THE FACE OF A WOMAN, RESULTING FROM THE INFLICTION OF INJURY
UPON HER, IS A VIOLATION OF BODILY INTEGRITY, GIVING RISE TO A LEGITIMATE CLAIM FOR
RESTORATION TO HER CONDITION ANTE.
NOTES:
This case is always cited to support that plastic surgery can
be the subject of AD.
Civil Indemnity for Death is normally P75k and for Rape, P50k
PEOPLE v. ASTROLOGO
HELD: Civil indemnity due to a crime (rape) is in the nature of actual
damages and is mandatorily granted to upon proving of the fact of the
crime. It is granted without any need of proof other than the
commission of the crime.
NOTES:
AS regards the gen rule and exception, sir said it can be BOTH
Why may one recover attorneys fees under those listed?
person is forced to protect his interest and for at least double
judicial costs, the person must have done something really
bad AND be liable for a greater degree
Why ED only? Why not for other damages as well?
What is the rationale for the enumeration? A person is free to
litigate. (Except 2208)
PHILAMGEN filed a notice of appeal but the same was not given due
course because it was supposedly filed out of time. The trial court
thereafter issued a writ of execution.
A petition was filed before the IAC to compel the trial court to give due
course to the appeal. However, the petition was dismissed and so the
case was elevated to the Supreme Court. In the meantime, Dr.
Casasola died leaving his widow and several children.
After Casasolas death, Quirante filed a motion in the trial court for the
confirmation of his attorneys fees alleging that there was an oral
agreement between him and the late Dr. Casasola with regard to the
said fees and allegedly confirmed by his widow in writing.
The trial court granted the motion despite opposition thereto hence the
instant petition before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: WON the attorneys fees being claimed are the same
attorneys fees contemplated in article 2208 of the Civil Code.
HELD: No. What is being claimed here as attorneys fees is different
from attorneys fees as an item of damages provided under Article
2208 of the Civil Code, wherein the award is made in favor of the
litigant, not of his counsel, and the litigant, not his counsel, is the
judgment creditor who may enforce the judgment for attorneys fees
by execution.
DAMAGES ARE AWARDED TO ENABLE THE INJURED PARTY TO OBTAIN MEANS, DIVERSIONS
OR AMUSEMENTS THAT WILL SERVE TO ALLEVIATE THE MORAL SUFFERING HE/SHE HAS UNDERGONE,
BY REASON OF THE DEFENDANT'S CULPABLE ACTION .
ITS
SINCE
His wife might have been badly disfigured, but he had not testified
that, in consequence thereof, his right to marital consortium was
affected. Clearly, Victor (and for that matter, Lucila) had failed to
make out a case for loss of consortium, unlike the Rodriguez spouse.
The social and financial standing of Lucila cannot be considered in
awarding moral damages. The factual circumstances prior to the
accident show that no "rude and rough" reception, no "menacing
attitude," no "supercilious manner," no "abusive language and highly
scornful reference" was given her.
The social and financial standing of a claimant of moral damages may
be considered in awarding moral damages only if he or she was
subjected to contemptuous conduct despite the offender's knowledge
of his or her social and financial standing.
Be that as it may, it is still proper to award moral damages to
Petitioner Lucila for her physical sufferings, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety and wounded feelings. She sustained multiple injuries
on the scalp, limbs and ribs. She lost all her teeth. She had to
undergo several corrective operations and treatments. Despite
treatment and surgery, her chin was still numb and thick. She felt that
she has not fully recovered from her injuries. She even had to undergo
a second operation on her gums for her dentures to fit. She suffered
sleepless nights and shock as a consequence of the vehicular accident.
RULES:
When social & financial standing may be considered in
awarding MD: only if he or she was subjected to contemptuous
conduct despite the offenders knowledge of his or her social and
financial standing.
On Exemplary Damages:
-designed to permit the courts to mould behavior that has socially
deleterious consequences, and its imposition is required by public
policy to suppress the wanton acts of an offender. However, it cannot
be recovered as a matter of rightit is based entirely on the discretion
of the court.
Requirements before ED may be awarded:
1. by way of example or correction in addition to CD
2. claimant must 1st establish his right to moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages; &
3. the wrongful act must be accompanied by BF, and the
award would be allowed only if the guilty party acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner.
On Moral Damages:
NOTES:
Sir: Only refers to QD and it does not apply to delict and culpacontractual
EXPERTRAVEL AND TOURS, INC. v. CA
June 25, 1999
FACTS: Expertravel issued to respondent Ricardo Lo (Ricky Lo!
Showbiz!) four round-trip plane tickets to Hong Kong, together with
hotel accommodations and transfers for a total cost of P39, 677.20.
Alleging that Lo had failed to pay the amount due, Expertravel caused
several demands to be made. Since the demands were ignored by Lo,
Expertravel filed a complaint for recovery of the amount.
Respondent Lo answered that his account with Expertravel had already
been fully paid. The account had been remitted to Expertravel through
its then Chairperson Ma. Rocio de Vega who was theretofore
authorized to deal with the respondents clients.
The trial court found for the respondent and held that the amount
claimed by Expertravel had already been paid.
ISSUE: WON damages can be recovered by reason of a clearly
unfounded suit.
3.
a.
b.
DEFENDANT IN A CIVIL SUIT WOULD BE NO DIFFERENT FROM THE USUAL WORRY AND ANXIETY
SUFFERED BY ANYONE WHO IS HALED TO COURT, A SITUATION THAT CANNOT BY ITSELF BE A COGENT
REASON FOR THE AWARD OF MORAL DAMAGES.
If the rule were otherwise, then moral damages must every time be
awarded in favor of the prevailing defendant against an unsuccessful
plaintiff.
Nature of MD: not punitive, but are designed to compensate and
alleviate in some way the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly caused to a
person.
Amount of MD: though incapable of pecuniary estimation, must be
PROPORTIONAL TO AND IN APPROXIMATION OF THE SUFFERING INFLICTED.
*REQUISITES
1.
2.
3.
4.
OF
MD:
2219 (CASIS:
ART.
PENDING ISSUE)
4.
5.
-moral damages are not intended to enrich the plaintiff at the expense
of the defendant, the award should nonetheless be commensurate to
the suffering inflicted
-court took into consideration the traumatic amputation, physical and
occupational rehabilitation, anxiety, sleeplessness, psychological injury
etc.
-increased moral damages to 1M
LOPEZ V. PAN AMERICAN 16 SCRA 431
-moral damages are recoverable in breach of contracts where
defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith
-his prestige does not leave his office
- SEN. LOPEZ awarded 100k
o Was the Senate President, former VP of Philippines,
and was expected by well-wishers to be first to
disembark from the plane as a first class passenger
must then guard against the award of exorbitant damages; they should
exercise balanced restrained and measured objectivity to avoid
suspicion that it was due to passion, prejudice, or corruption on the
part of the trial court.
-The award of moral damages cannot be granted in favor of a
corporation because, being an artificial person and having existence
only in legal contemplation, it has no feelings, no emotions, no senses,
It cannot, therefore, experience physical suffering and mental anguish,
which call be experienced only by one having a nervous system. The
statement in People v. Manero and Mambulao Lumber Co. v. PNB that
a corporation may recover moral damages if it "has a good reputation
that is debased, resulting in social humiliation" is an obiter dictum. On
this score alone the award for damages must be set aside, since RBS is
a corporation.
-It may be reiterated that the claim of RBS against ABS-CBN is not
based on contract, quasi-contract, delict, or quasi-delict, Hence, the
claims for moral and exemplary damages can only be based on Articles
19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code.
REPUBLIC V. TUVERA G.R. NO. 148246. FEBRUARY 16, 2007
-The claimant in this case is the Republic of the Philippines, a juridical
person. We explained in Filipinas Broadcasting v. Ago Medical &
Educational Center-Bicol Christian College of Medicine (AMEC-BCCM):
-GENERAL RULE: A juridical person is generally not entitled to moral
damages because, unlike a natural person, it cannot experience
physical suffering or such sentiments as wounded feelings, serious
anxiety, mental anguish or moral shock.
-the Court's statement in Mambulao that "a corporation may have a
good reputation which, if besmirched, may also be a ground for the
award of moral damages" is an obiter dictum.
-EXCEPTION: Nevertheless, AMEC's claim for moral damages falls
under item 7 of Article 2219 of the Civil Code. This provision expressly
authorizes the recovery of moral damages in cases of libel, slander or
any other form of defamation. Article 2219(7) does not qualify whether
the plaintiff is a natural or juridical person. Therefore, a juridical
person such as a corporation can validly complain for libel or
any other form of defamation and claim for moral damages.
- GENERAL RULE: A juridical person is not entitled to moral damages
under Article 2217 of the Civil Code.
-EXCEPTION: It may avail of moral damages under the analogous cases
listed in Article 2219, such as for libel, slander or any other form of
defamation. Suffice it to say that the action at bar does not involve any
of the analogous cases under Article 2219, and indeed upon an
intelligent reading of Article 2219, it is difficult to see how the Republic
could sustain any of the injuries contemplated therein.
SPS VALENZUELA VS SPS MANO JULY 9, 2010
-person claiming moral damages must prove bad faith
-willfully done in bad faith or with ill motive
-allege and prove 2217+ bad faith
only if the injured party has shown that he is entitled to recover moral,
temperate or compensatory damages."
-4% is not a penal clause because under 2209 he is still entitled to a
legal interest which is 6% per annum
FRANCISCO V. FERRER GR. NO. 142029
- wedding cake ordered was not delivered; delivered a two layered
cake instead.
-To warrant the award of exemplary damages, "[t]he wrongful act must
be accompanied by bad faith, and an award of damages would be
allowed only if the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless
or malevolent manner."
-REQUIREMENTS OF THE AWARD OF EXEMPLARY DAMAGES: (1) they
may be imposed by way of example in addition to compensatory
damages, and only after the claimant's right to them has been
established; (2) that they can not be recovered as a matter of right,
their determination depending upon the amount of compensatory
damages that may be awarded to the claimant; (3) the act must be
accompanied by bad faith or done in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive
or malevolent manner."
- "Nominal damages are 'recoverable where a legal right is technically
violated and must be vindicated against an invasion that has produced
no actual present loss of any kind or where there has been a
breach of contract and no substantial injury or actual damages
whatsoever have been or can be shown.'"27
-Nominal damages may be awarded "to a plaintiff whose right has
been violated or invaded by the defendant, for the purpose of
vindicating or recognizing that right, not for indemnifying the plaintiff
for any loss suffered."28
GONZALES V. PEOPLE G.R. NO. 159950. FEBRUARY 12, 2007
-Gonzales set fire on a building. He was charged with arson
-no proof of actual damages by each witness; however, nominal and
temperate damages were awarded
-The assessment of nominal damages is left to the discretion of the
trial court according to the circumstances of the case.
-Generally, nominal damages by their nature are small sums fixed by
the court without regard to the extent of the harm done to the injured
party. However, it is generally held that a nominal damage is a
substantial claim, if based upon the violation of a legal right; in such a
case, the law presumes damage although actual or compensatory
damages are not proven. In truth, nominal damages are damages in
name only and not in fact, and are allowed, not as an equivalent of
wrong inflicted, but simply in recognition of the existence of a technical
injury.14
-Temperate damages may be recovered when the court finds that
some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot from the
nature of the case be proved with certainty
-only temperate damages were awarded
ratified the act of their employees and such act also shows bad faith.
Hence, Id corporation is able to pay exemplary damages.
RAMOS V. CA, SUPRA
-wrong intubation, commatose
-temperate damages were awarded on top of actual damages
- the amount of damages which should be awarded, if they are to
adequately and correctly respond to the injury caused, should be one
which compensates for pecuniary loss incurred and proved, up to the
time of trial (ACTUAL DAMAGES); and one which would meet pecuniary
loss certain to be suffered but which could not, from the nature of the
case, be made with certainty (TEMPERATE).
In other words, temperate damages can and should be
awarded on top of actual or compensatory damages in
instances where the injury is chronic and continuing. And
because of the unique nature of such cases, no incompatibility
arises when both actual and temperate damages are provided
for. The reason is that these damages cover two distinct
phases.
-As it would not be equitable and certainly not in the best interests
of the administration of justice for the victim in such cases to
constantly come before the courts and invoke their aid in seeking
adjustments to the compensatory damages previously awarded
temperate damages are appropriate. The amount given as temperate
damages, though to a certain extent speculative, should take into
account the cost of proper care.
-Value awarded for temperate damages should allow petitioners to
provide optimal care for their loved one in a facility which generally
specializes in such care. -They should not be compelled by dire
circumstances to provide substandard care at home without the aid of
professionals, for anything less would be grossly inadequate.
-Finally, by way of example, exemplary damages in the amount of
P100,000.00 are hereby awarded. Considering the length and nature of
the instant suit we are of the opinion that attorney's fees valued at
P100,000.00 are likewise proper.
PNR V. ETHEL BRUNTY, SUPRA
-car was hit by a train, Brunty died
- Respondents, however, failed to present evidence for such damages;
hence, the award of actual damages cannot be sustained. However,
as the heirs of Rhonda Brunty undeniably incurred expenses
for the wake and burial of the latter, we deem it proper to
award temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00
pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence. This is in lieu of actual
damages as it would be unfair for the victims heirs to get
nothing, despite the death of their kin, for the reason alone
that they cannot produce receipts.
REPUBLIC V. TUVERA, SUPRA
a.
b.
c.