IEEE ICC 2014 - Cognitive Radio and Networks Symposium

Fuzzy C-Means Clustering based Secure Fusion

Strategy in Collaborative Spectrum Sensing
Lei Li and Chunxiao Chigan
Department of Electrical & Computer Engineering
University of Massachusetts Lowell, Lowell, MA 01854
Email: {Lei_Li@student.uml.edu, Tricia_Chigan@uml.edu}

reports from multiple SUs are then combined to make final

sensing decision at the fusion center, which is called fusion
operation. However, this may incur vulnerabilities to many
severe attacks, among which the intelligent Spectrum Sensing
Data Falsification (SSDF) attack [5] is considered in this paper.
The intelligent SSDF attacker may flip its local sensing results
with a probability which is called flip rate, and send false
sensing reports to the fusion center.
Existing approaches countering against intelligent SSDF
attacks can be categorized as reputation based schemes [6][7]
and statistic based schemes [8][9]. Reputation based schemes
detect the attackers based on SUs reputation values, which are
calculated by comparing SUs sensing reports with the
reference sensing information. The reference sensing
information is thus assumed to be always correct. This
assumption, however, might be easily violated in some
scenarios [6] [7]. In statistic based schemes, attackers are
distinguished by comparing statistic characteristics of sensing
reports received at the fusion center with theoretical ones. The
attackers flip rates are assumed to be identical and fixed.
Nevertheless, the scenario of independent varying flip rates for
attackers is highly feasible, such as in the form of Sybil attack
[10] (refer to section II.B). Besides, most existing algorithms
adopt the hard decision concept wherein the attackers are
identified first and their sensing reports are ignored in the
fusion operation. Therefore, the hard decision [11] does not
use enough sensing information even if the attackers sensing
reports are genuine. From information theory perspective, this
may lead performance degradation.
In this paper, we aim to design a general solution to protect
against intelligent SSDF attack with independent varying flip
rates regardless the ratio of attackers to the total number of SUs.
We assume the period that the primary user stays at one certain
state (active or idle) is far greater than the sensing period.
Hence, the probability that the honest SUs sensing reports
received within two consecutive sensing periods are identical
should be close to 1. In contrast, the probability for malicious
users may be farther away from 1 depending on their flip rates.
Furthermore, soft decision, which makes use of genuine
sensing information from all SUs (including attackers), is
applied in this work to reduce the spectrum sensing error rate
(average of false alarm rate and miss detection rate). We adopt

AbstractCollaborative spectrum sensing in Cognitive Radio

Networks is vulnerable to Spectrum Sensing Data Falsification
(SSDF) attack. Many existing SSDF attack defending algorithms
need the assistance of reference sensing devices with high
spectrum sensing performance, which are difficult and costly to
be implemented in reality. Most of other existing approaches are
based on statistic characteristics of sensing information. These
approaches assume there is a small fraction of malicious users,
and the flip rates of malicious users are fixed and identical.
However, some effective attacks such as Sybil attack can be easily
launched with which large number of different malicious
identities can be generated. To solve these problems, we propose
a Fuzzy C-Means clustering based secure fusion strategy.
Simulations show this secure fusion strategy outperforms the
traditional reputation based approach, at almost any malicious
user ratio and varying attack flip rate.
Index TermsCognitive Radio Network, SSDF, Fuzzy CMeans Clustering, Sybil Attack, Collaborative Spectrum Sensing

I.

INTRODUCTION

With the increasing demands of wireless network systems

for future anytime and anywhere pervasive communications,
the scarcity and underutilization of spectrum resources will
become a bottleneck and thus a crucial problem to be fully
addressed. A cognitive radio network (CRN) [1] is an
intelligent wireless network system whose subscribers
(secondary users) are allowed to opportunistically access the
spectrum bands that have been assigned to, but unoccupied by
licensed users (primary users). The secondary users (SUs) are
required to evacuate the spectrum bands when the primary
users (PUs) become active. This necessitates the CRN being
aware of surrounding environment continuously, which is
called spectrum sensing [2]. Spectrum sensing is thus a
determine factor of the overall performance of coexisting
CRNs and licensed wireless networks.
Cooperative spectrum sensing, which is recommended in
IEEE 802.22 standard [3], shows great potential to improve the
performance of spectrum sensing [4]. With cooperative
spectrum sensing, in the infrastructure based networks, SUs
send local sensing results to fusion center periodically. Sensing
This material is based on work supported by the National Science Foundation
under Grant No. CNS-1252643.



978-1-4799-2003-7/14/$31.00 2014 IEEE

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IEEE ICC 2014 - Cognitive Radio and Networks Symposium

network as the dominant primary network for CRNs.

According to [16], the TV receiver (rather than transmitter) is
the one should be protected. Therefore, it is reasonable to
assume the period that the primary user (e.g., TV set) stays at a
certain state (usually few hours) is larger than the sensing
period (some milliseconds). This motivates us to adopt the
probability that the sensing reports received within two
consecutive sensing periods are identical to generate weights
indicating the authenticity of SUs sensing reports. We call this
probability as joint sensing probability.

the Fuzzy C-Means (FCM) Clustering algorithm [12] to softly

cluster the probabilities for all SUs in order to generate the
weights for each SUs sensing report. The final sensing result
is calculated by comparing the summation of all weighted
sensing reports with threshold in the fusion center.
The contributions of this paper are: 1) we propose a FCMClustering based secure fusion strategy. Our approach does not
need any reference sensing information. 2) Our approach
adopts the concept of soft clustering using FCM Clustering
algorithm and makes use of information from all users to
improve the overall spectrum sensing performance. 3) Unlike
existing schemes, our approach protects against attacking
scenarios with almost any attacker ratio (percentage of attacker
in the total number of SUs) and any attackers flip rate (e.g.,
with 90% attacker ratio and 80% attackers flip rate, the overall
sensing error rate of our scheme is less than 10%; referred to
figure 5). Hence, the FCM-Clustering based secure fusion
strategy is suitable for hostile environment wherein the
flexibility of dealing with varying attack scenarios is desired.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: section 2
introduces the system model. The FCM Clustering based
secure fusion strategy is presented in section 3. The analysis of
parameter optimization is given in section 4. Numerical results
and analysis are shown in section 5. Section 6 provides the
conclusion of this work.

B. Attack Model
We adopt Sybil attack [10] as our attack model in this paper
since it can be easily launched by relay nodes in CRNs [17].
For intelligent SSDF with Sybil attack, a single attacker may
forge a large number of SUs with different flip rates in a
sensing period. Each SUs flip rate is assumed to be a
uniformly distributed random variable. The flip rates of SUs
are assumed to be i.i.d. The SUs forged by a Sybil attacker is
called malicious users in this paper. We consider the scenarios
with almost any malicious user ratio, which is the percentage
of forged malicious users in the total number of SUs.
III. FUZZY C-MEANS CLUSTERING BASED SECURE FUSION
STRATEGY
In this section, we propose a FCM Clustering based secure
fusion strategy for cooperative spectrum sensing to solve
problems concerned in our attack model. 

II. SYSTEM MODEL

In this section, we briefly introduce the system model of
CRNs and the attack model that will be used in this paper.

A. Background and Notations

The joint sensing probability mentioned in section II.A can
be expressed as   where indicates the
SUs sensing report received at the fusion center in the
sensing period. is the probability that the SUs sensing
reports received at the fusion center in the and
sensing periods are identical. For an honest user, its joint
sensing probability can be expressed as:

A. CRN Background and System Model

We consider the infrastructure based CRNs in this paper,
which is shown in figure 1a. Figure 1b illustrates an example of
time slots assignment for SUs. In each time slot, SUs sense the
usage status of a particular spectrum channel in the sensing
period and send local sensing results to the fusion center. The
fusion center makes the final decision about the channel status
based on all received reports and then sends its decision results
to SUs. If the channel is idle, SUs may start to transmit data in
the transmission period over this channel. Otherwise SUs need
switch to and sense the availability of another channel in the
next sensing period.






>
E

Wh

W
^

Wh

^h

^h

^h

K
^
^
^h
^
E

^
^
^
E
^h

Fig. 1a CRNs architecture

 ^ d



^

^ d

 ^ d


where and indicates the spectrum is unoccupied and

occupied respectively. Thus, the honest SUs joint sensing
probability can be calculated by:

^ d



^ d ^ d

(1)

&
^h

Wh


Wh


^

Fig. 1b Time slot for SUs

According to the FCC regulation, SUs in CRNs are allowed

to opportunistically access to TV bands while avoiding its
interference to TV users [13]. IEEE 802.22 is the first CRN
standard, whose users are allowed to access to TV bands [3].
Some other communication networks such as WiMAX and
LTE have also added cognitive radio functions in their revised
standard [14][15], wherein the TV network is considered as
primary network. Hence, it is rational to consider the TV

(2)

Where and are false alarm rate and miss detection rate
of local spectrum sensing algorithm for each honest SU. The
malicious users joint sensing probability can be calculated by:



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IEEE ICC 2014 - Cognitive Radio and Networks Symposium

IV. ANALYSIS OF PARAMETER OPTIMIZATION

In this section, we will derive the expression of false alarm

rate and miss detection rate of FCM clustering based fusion
strategy respectively, which are the functions of the threshold.

(3)

TABLE I
FCM CLUSTERING BASED SECURE FUSION STRATEGY

where
and are false alarm rate and miss detection rate
of local spectrum sensing algorithm for each individual
malicious SU. is the malicious users flip rate.
Figure 2 shows typical joint sensing probability values of
honest and malicious users. The blue circles which closer to 1
are joint sensing probabilities for honest SUs. This is because
the honest users send correct sensing results, which is a
constant state value in a longer period relative to the sensing
period, with a high probability. The joint sensing probabilities
for malicious users distribute between 0.5 and 1 depends on
their flip rates. More properties of malicious users joint
sensing probability will be introduced in section IV.

Step 1: Parameter setting

Step 2: Calculation of Joint Sensing Probabilities
Step 3: FCM clustering:
For loop index to , do
For cluster, do
For sensing node, do





For cluster, do
For sensing node, do

0.55

0.6

0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
Joint Sensing Probability Values

0.85

0.9

End for
End for

Malicious Users
Honest Users

0.5

if ,

0.95

go to step 3
End if
Step
5:  


Fig. 2 Joint sensing probability values

B. Fuzzy-C Means Clustering based Secure Fusion Strategy

The detailed description of FCM clustering based secure
fusion strategy is described as following. The SUs joint
sensing probability in the sensing period can be calculated
by dividing by . represents the number of times
that the SUs sensing reports received at the fusion center
in two consecutive sensing periods are identical till the
sensing period.
At each sensing period, all SUs joint sensing probabilities
are taken as the input of the FCM clustering algorithm. The
FCM clustering algorithm is initialized with following
parameters:  is the number of clusters, which
implies the honest and the malicious user clusters; is the
center point of these two clusters; is acceptable error; is
fuzzy level; and represents the maximum iteration number.
The membership degrees of each sensing nodes are calculated
through FCM clustering algorithm.
Finally, these membership degrees are used as weights of
SUs sensing reports by the fusion center to make the final
decision on the spectrum usage status. The spectrum is

considered as occupied if

, where
indicates the total number of sensing reports received at the
fusion center, and is the membership degree of the
SU belonging to the honest node cluster calculated in the
sensing period. is the threshold which will be optimized in
section IV. Otherwise, the spectrum usage is considered as
unoccupied. The procedure of FCM clustering based secure
fusion strategy in the sensing period is described in table 1.
It is obvious that the threshold has impact on the
performance of the fusion strategy such as false alarm rate,
miss detection rate. Hence, the fusion center needs to optimize
the threshold in order to improve the performance of the
fusion strategy.

Then we show the optimum threshold accordingly.

A. Derivation of Theoretical Performance
In our derivation, we have following assumptions: (1) the
primary user has the equal probability to be present and absent
which means ; (2) the malicious users flip
rates follow uniform distribution in the range of , i.e.,

where indicates the malicious users index; (3)

the individual (sensing) false alarm rate and (sensing) miss
detection rate for malicious and honest users are identical i.e.

.
1) Derivation of False Alarm Rate

and
indicate the malicious and honest users
Let
joint sensing probability in the sensing period respectively.
According to equation (3), the joint sensing probability for
malicious user is:

(4)

Consider the case that the primary user is absent which is

represented by . Since , the malicious users
joint sensing probability is a random variable (denoted as
),

whose conditional density function can be expressed as

following:



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(5)

IEEE ICC 2014 - Cognitive Radio and Networks Symposium

where


and indicates
the malicious users ratio.
According to equation (4), the range of joint sensing

probability for the malicious user is . The flip
rates for the honest users are 0, so the honest users joint
sensing probability value is . The probability mass function
is:

For the malicious users, the conditional probability that

individual sensing report of user is 1 under the condition that

primary user is absent is

. Thus we get the conditional probability

as a random variable which is uniformly distributed in the

range of

. So we have

. According to the analysis above, we have:

(6)

The conditional variance of fusion result is calculated by the

summation of variance value of honest users fusion reports
and that of malicious ones. The variance for the honest users
can be expressed as:

According to the derivation above, the joint sensing

.
probability value for the malicious user is greater than

Furthermore, from equation (5), the probability of malicious

users joint sensing probability values which are close to 0.5 is
much higher than that of values far from 0.5. For simplicity of
derivation, we let the optimized center point value in FCM
clustering algorithm for malicious users cluster be 0.5, i.e.
. It is also reasonable to let the optimized center point
value for honest users cluster be equal to, i.e.  ,
since the joint sensing probabilities of honest users are identical,
and equal to. Based on the analysis above, the conditional
density function of membership degree is:

where

For the malicious users, we have:


(7)


The conditional density function for malicious user is described

in equation (7) when
.
According to the analysis above, the false alarm rate is:

 

(9)

where and
.
2) Derivation of Miss Detection Rate
In order to derive the miss detection rate, the primary user
is assumed to be present which is indicated by . Adopting
the same concept as shown in derivation of false alarm rate, the
conditional density function of malicious users joint sensing
probability is:

(8)

where and are the numbers of

malicious and honest users;

and are the
malicious and the honest users membership degree
belonging to honest sensing report cluster.
According to the probability theory principles, the fusion result
is a random variable which follows Gaussian distribution.
The conditional expectation of fusion result under the
condition that primary user is absent can be calculated as
follows:

  

The final step in FCM clustering based fusion strategy is

combining weighted individual sensing reports from secondary
users (including both honest and malicious users) which can be
expressed as:

  
 

 


Where
And

The honest users joint sensing probability is:

.
where


The conditional density function of membership degree is
exactly identical with equation (7). The conditional expectation
and variance of fusion result under the condition that the
primary user is present can be expressed as:

As we mentioned before, the center point value was set as

honest users joint sensing probability. Therefore, the
membership degrees for honest users are 1. Then we have:

 





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IEEE ICC 2014 - Cognitive Radio and Networks Symposium




where

So, the miss detection rate is:

  

0.06
0.04
0.02

(10)

-60

-40

-20

20

0.04
0.02
0

60

Theoretical, = 0.2
Theoretical, = 0.4
Theoretical, = 0.6
Theoretical, = 0.8
Simulated, = 0.2
Simulated, = 0.4
Simulated, = 0.6
Simulated, = 0.8

-50

50

Threshold

Theoretical, = 0.2
Theoretical, = 0.4
Theoretical, = 0.6
Theoretical, = 0.8
Simulated, = 0.2
Simulated, = 0.4
Simulated, = 0.6
Simulated, = 0.8

0.8

False A larm
R ate

Comparison of Theoretical and Simulated

Miss Detection Rate

Comparison of Theoretical and Simulated

False Alarm Rate

40

0.06

Fig. 3a Comparison of Simulated

Fig. 3b Comparison of Simulate
and Theoretical fusion result under H0 and Theoretical fusion result under H1

B. Optimization of Threshold
According to the analysis shown above, the false alarm rate
of FCM clustering based fusion strategy is inversely
proportional to the threshold. On the contrary, the miss
detection rate is proportional to the threshold. The optimized
threshold is the value which minimizes both the false alarm
rate and miss detection rate simultaneously. So, the optimized
threshold could be expressed as follows:

-80

0.08

Threshold

.
where and

 

Theoretical, = 0.2
Theoretical, = 0.4
Theoretical, = 0.6
Theoretical, = 0.8
Simulated, = 0.2
Simulated, = 0.4
Simulated, = 0.6
Simulated, = 0.8

0.08

Comparison of Theoretical and Simulated

PDF of fusion result under H1

Comparison of Theoretical and Simulated

PDF of fusion result under H0

Probability Density
Function

Probability Density
Function

0.6
0.4

Miss Detection
Rate

 

0.2
0

-80

-60

-40

-20

20

Theoretical, = 0.2
Theoretical, = 0.4
Theoretical, = 0.6
Theoretical, = 0.8
Simulated, = 0.2
Simulated, = 0.4
Simulated, = 0.6
Simulated, = 0.8

0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
-40

40

-20

20

40

60

80

Threshold

Threshold

Fig. 3c Comparison of Simulated

and Theoretical FAR

Fig. 3d Comparison of Simulated

and Theoretical MDR

From figures 3c and 3d, it obviously implies that both the

false alarm rate and miss detection rate will increase when the
malicious user ratio goes up under a certain threshold. This
indicates the performance of FCM clustering based fusion
strategy degrades with more malicious users. Figures 3c and 3d
also depict the false alarm rate decreases with the increase of
threshold with a certain malicious user ratio, whereas, the miss
detection rate is positively proportional to the threshold. Hence,
the optimal threshold could be determined by minimizing the
false alarm rate and miss detection rate simultaneously. The
threshold optimization will be introduced in the next subsection.

(11)

V. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

In this section, we illustrate the numerical simulation
results of FCM clustering based secure fusion strategy using
MATLAB (Throughput performance of CRNs with Sybil
attacks is also simulated in NS2 [17]. Due to the page limit, it
is not presented here). In the simulation, we set the total
number of secondary users as which means the
fusion center will always receive 100 sensing reports during
each sensing period. The numbers of malicious and honest
users are determined by the malicious user ratio. We assume
the secondary users individual (sensing) false alarm rates are



[3]. Their individual (sensing) miss detection
rates are set as 
. A flip rate vector was
generated following uniform distribution in the range for
each malicious user. For the FCM clustering algorithm, we set
the maximum iteration number as 10, the accepted error
, initial cluster center point and
threshold .

B. Threshold Optimization
In this sub-section, we analyze the selection of optimum
threshold. Figures 4a and 4b depict the simulated false alarm
rate and miss detection rate of FCM clustering based fusion
strategy with malicious user ratios of 0.1 through 0.9.
Comparison of Miss Detection Rate
with Different Malicious Ratio

Comparison of False Alarm Rate

with Different Malicious Ratio

False Alarm
Rate

= 0.1

0.8

= 0.2

0.6

= 0.4

0.4

= 0.6

0.2

= 0.8

0
-100

Miss Detection
Rate

rate and miss detection rate. The solid curves in these two
figures are theoretical ones. These four figures verify that our
derived theoretical performances of FCM clustering based
fusion strategy are consistent with the simulated results.

= 0.3
= 0.5
= 0.7

0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2

= 0.9
-80

-60

-40

-20

Threshold

20

40

60

0
-50

=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
-30

0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
-10

10

30

50

Threshold

70

90

110

Fig. 4a Theoretical False Alarm Rate Fig. 4b Theoretical Miss Detection Rate

A. Comparison of Simulated and Theoretical Performance

In this sub-section, we compare our derivation results with
simulated ones for verification. Figures 3a and 3b show the
probability density function of fusion results in equation (8)
under different malicious user ratio. Figures 3c and 3d show
the comparison of the theoretical false alarm rate (FAR) and
miss detection rate (MDR) with the simulated ones under
various malicious user ratio respectively. In this simulation, we
set the malicious user ratio as 0.2, 0.4, 0.6 and 0.8. The dot
curves in figures 3a, 3b, 3c and 3d are the simulated false alarm

From figures 4a and 4b, the false alarm rate and miss
detection rate of FCM clustering based fusion strategy with the
same malicious user ratio are symmetrical to the threshold
equal to 0 no matter what the malicious user ratio is. Thus the
optimum threshold is 0. From theoretical perspective, since we
assume the secondary users individual false alarm rate and

miss detection rate are identical, then we have 

, and . Then equation (11) can be



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IEEE ICC 2014 - Cognitive Radio and Networks Symposium

expressed

as:

proposed FCM clustering based fusion strategy does not need

any helper device, it can be easily implemented in reality.
Simulations using MATLAB and NS2 confirm the
effectiveness of FCM clustering based fusion strategy. It shows
that FCM clustering based fusion strategy is flexible in hostile
environment since it outperforms traditional reputation based
schemes in scenarios with any attacker ratio and any attackers
flip rate.

where 

. Since the function  is odd function, the


solution of this equation is . The theoretical optimized
threshold is consistent with the simulated one.

C. Performance of FCM Clustering based Fusion Strategy

In this sub-section, we simulate the traditional reputation
based fusion strategy in [6] and compare its performance with
our proposed FCM clustering based fusion strategy. The
majority rule was used in the traditional reputation based fusion
strategy introduced in [6]. Figure 5 shows the performances
(logarithm of Spectrum sensing error rate) of fusion strategies
vs. malicious user ratios. The spectrum sensing error rate in
this figure is calculated by averaging the false alarm rate and
miss detection rate i.e. .

REFERENCES
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[2]

Comparison of Spectrum
Sensing Error Rate
10

[3]

FCM Clustering based Fusion Strategy

Spectrum Sensing
Error Rate

Traditional Reputation based Fusion Strategy

10
10
10
10
10

[4]

-2

-4

-6

[5]

-8

-10

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

Malicious Users Ratio

[6]

Fig. 5 Performance comparison of fusion strategies

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spectrum sensing error rate of FCM clustering based fusion
strategy is reduced by at least 50% compared with the
traditional reputation based strategy over all malicious user
ratios. The performance improvement is analyzed below. In [6],
the principle of reputation based fusion strategy can also be
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respectively. Consequently, the fusion result of reputation
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strategy is larger than that from traditional reputation based
strategy; however, the difference of variance between these
two strategies is much smaller than the difference of the mean
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VI. CONCLUSION
We proposed a Fuzzy C-Means clustering based secure
fusion strategy to defend against SSDF attack for collaborative
spectrum sensing in CRNs. This fusion strategy is based on
soft decision concept which makes use of genuine sensing
information from all nodes (including attackers). Since our

[16]

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