CITY OF MANILA, HON. ALFREDO S.

LIM as the Mayor of the City of

Manila, HON. JOSELITO L. ATIENZA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of
the City of Manila et al (councilors) vs. HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO,
JR., as Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila and MALATE TOURIST
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION.
FACTS
The City Council of Manila enacted on March 9, 1993 and approved
on March 30, 1993 an ordinance entitled: AN ORDINANCE
PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES
PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT,
SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA,
PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES.
It prohibited establishments such as bars, karaoke bars, motels and
hotels from operating in the Malate District which was notoriously
viewed as a red light district harboring thrill seekers. This was
expressly provided under Section 1 of the ordinance:

SECTION 1. Any provision of existing laws and ordinances

to the contrary notwithstanding, no person, partnership,
corporation or entity shall, in the Ermita-Malate
area bounded by Teodoro M. Kalaw Sr. Street in the North,
Taft Avenue in the East, Vito Cruz Street in the South and
Roxas Boulevard in the West, pursuant to P.D. 499 be
allowed or authorized to contract and engage in, any
business providing certain forms of amusement,
entertainment, services and facilities where women are
used as tools in entertainment and which tend to disturb
the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely
affect the social and moral welfare of the
community, such as but not limited to:

1. Sauna Parlors
4. Beerhouses
7. Super Clubs
10. Dance Halls

2. Massage Parlors 3. Karaoke Bars

5. Night Clubs
6. Day Clubs
8. Discotheques
9. Cabarets
11. Motels
12. Inns

Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation

(MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels,
motels, hostels and lodging houses. It built and opened Victoria
Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly
accredited with the Department of Tourism as a hotel. MTDC prayed
that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among
its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and
unconstitutional.
One of the reasons raised by MTDC on why the ordinance was
invalid and unconstitutional is that the Ordinance constitutes a
denial of equal protection under the law as no reasonable basis
exists for prohibiting the operation of motels and inns, but not
pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar
establishments, and for prohibiting said business in the ErmitaMalate area but not outside of this area.
Petitioners asserted that the Ordinance is valid because it was
enacted in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the
community in conjunction with its police power. Petitioners also
maintained that the Ordinance is not unconstitutional because it did
not infringe the equal protection clause and cannot be denounced

as class legislation as there existed substantial and real differences

between the Ermita-Malate area and other places in the City of
Manila.
On 28 June 1993, Judge Laguio issued an ex-parte temporary
restraining order against the enforcement of the Ordinance. And on
16 July 1993, he granted the writ of preliminary injunction prayed
for by MTDC. The ordinance was declared null and void.
Petitioners made an appeal on the grounds that (1) It erred in
concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra vires, or otherwise,
unfair, unreasonable and oppressive exercise of police power and
that (2) it erred in declaring the Ordinance void and
unconstitutional.
However, respondents reiterate that the questioned Ordinance is
not a valid exercise of police power; that it is violative of due process
and is violative of the equal protection clause.
ISSUE
Whether or not Ordinance 7783 violates the due process clause and
the equal protection clause
RULING
The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the lower court did
not err in declaring the Ordinance, as it did, ultra vires and therefore
null and void.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of
decisions has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only
be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to
enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by
law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its
police power, an enactment of the City Council acting as agent of
Congress. This delegated police power is found in Section 16 of the
LGC, known as the general welfare clause.
The inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of the
exercise of such delegated power.
A. The Ordinance contravenes the Constitution (DUE PROCESS)
The enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of
delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general
laws.
The police power granted to LGUs must always be exercised with
utmost observance of the rights of the people to due process and
equal protection of the law. Due process requires the intrinsic
validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his
life, liberty and property.

Requisites for the valid exercise of Police Power are not met.
To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale
for the enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it from the
imputation of constitutional infirmity, (1) not only must it appear
that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those
of a particular class, require an interference with private rights, but
(2) the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. It must be evident that no other alternative for the
accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can
work. A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of
the police measure and the means employed for its
accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public
interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property
will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure
shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights as
a violation of the due process clause.
The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and
protection of the social and moral values of the community.
Granting for the sake of argument that the objectives of the
Ordinance are within the scope of the City Councils police powers,
the means employed for the accomplishment thereof were
unreasonable and unduly oppressive.
The worthy aim of fostering public morals and the eradication of the
communitys social ills can be achieved through means less
restrictive of private rights; it can be attained by reasonable
restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. The closing down
and transfer of businesses or their conversion into businesses
allowed under the Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the
accomplishment of its purposes. Otherwise stated, the prohibition
of the enumerated establishments will not per se protect and
promote the social and moral welfare of the community; it will not
in itself eradicate the alluded social ills of prostitution, adultery,
fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila.
The enumerated establishments are lawful pursuits which are not
per se offensive to the moral welfare of the community. While a
motel may be used as a venue for immoral sexual activity, it
cannot for that reason alone be punished. It cannot be classified as
a house of ill-repute or as a nuisance per se on a mere likelihood or
a naked assumption.
If the City of Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution,
fornication and other social ills, it can instead impose reasonable
regulations such as daily inspections of the establishments for any
violation of the conditions of their licenses or permits; it may
exercise its authority to suspend or revoke their licenses for these
violations; and it may even impose increased license fees. In other
words, there are other means to reasonably accomplish the
desired end.
The City Council instead should regulate human conduct that occurs
inside the establishments, but not to the detriment of liberty and
privacy which are covenants, premiums and blessings of democracy.
In the instant case, there is a clear invasion of personal or property
rights, personal in the case of those individuals desirous of owning,
operating and patronizing those motels and property in terms of the
investments made and the salaries to be paid to those therein
employed.

It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for

the achievement of its purposes, the governmental interference
itself, infringes on the constitutional guarantees of a persons
fundamental right to liberty and property.
Modality employed is unlawful taking
It is an ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property
that it can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond
regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property
without just compensation. It is intrusive and violative of the private
property rights of individuals.
There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A
possessory taking occurs when the government confiscates or
physically occupies property. A regulatory taking occurs when the
governments regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable
use of the property.
What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that
government regulation is a taking if it leaves no reasonable
economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with
reasonable expectations for use. When the owner of real property
has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in
the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property
economically idle, he has suffered a taking.
The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the prohibited
establishments three (3) months from its approval within which to
wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside of
the Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of
business allowable within the area. The directive to wind up
business operations amounts to a closure of the establishment, a
permanent deprivation of property, and is practically confiscatory.
Unless the owner converts his establishment to accommodate an
allowed business, the structure which housed the previous
business will be left empty and gathering dust. It is apparent that the
Ordinance leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property
in a manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for use.
The second and third options to transfer to any place outside of the
Ermita-Malate area or to convert into allowed businesses are
confiscatory as well. The penalty of permanent closure in cases of
subsequent violations found in Section 4 of the Ordinance is also
equivalent to a taking of private property.
Petitioners cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as a zoning
ordinance. A zoning ordinance, although a valid exercise of police
power, which limits a wholesome property to a use which can not
reasonably be made of it constitutes the taking of such property
without just compensation. Private property which is not noxious
nor intended for noxious purposes may not, by zoning, be destroyed
without compensation. Such principle finds no support in the
principles of justice as we know them. The police powers of local
government units which have always received broad and liberal
interpretation cannot be stretched to cover this particular taking.
Further, The Ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary and
unrestricted power to close down establishments. Ordinances such
as this, which make possible abuses in its execution, depending
upon no conditions or qualifications whatsoever other than the
unregulated arbitrary will of the city authorities as the touchstone
by which its validity is to be tested, are unreasonable and invalid.
The Ordinance should have established a rule by which its impartial
enforcement could be secured. Similarly, the Ordinance does not
specify the standards to ascertain which establishments tend to

disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely

affect the social and moral welfare of the community.
The cited case supports the nullification of the Ordinance for lack of
comprehensible standards to guide the law enforcers in carrying out
its provisions.
Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated
establishments without infringing the due process clause. These
lawful establishments may be regulated, but not prevented from
carrying on their business.
B. The Ordinance violates Equal Protection Clause
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not
be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and
unjustly discriminate against others. The guarantee means that no
person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of
laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in like
circumstances. The equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the
protection of equal laws. It limits governmental discrimination. The
equal protection clause extends to artificial persons but only insofar
as their property is concerned.
Legislative bodies are allowed to classify the subjects of legislation. If
the classification is reasonable, the law may operate only on some
and not all of the people without violating the equal protection
clause. The classification must, as an indispensable requisite, not be
arbitrary. To be valid, it must conform to the following
requirements:
1) It must be based on substantial distinctions.
2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law.
3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only.
4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.

C. The Ordinance is repugnant to general laws; it is ultra vires.

The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code (Sec 458) as the latter
merely empowers local government units to regulate, and not
prohibit, the establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof.
With respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns,
pension houses, lodging houses, and other similar establishments,
the only power of the City Council to legislate relative thereto is to
regulate them to promote the general welfare. The Code still
withholds from cities the power to suppress and prohibit altogether
the establishment, operation and maintenance of such
establishments.
It is well to point out that petitioners also cannot seek cover under
the general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances
without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se,
or one which affects the immediate safety of persons and property
and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity.
It can not be said that motels are injurious to the rights of property,
health or comfort of the community. It is a legitimate business. If it
be a nuisance per accidens it may be so proven in a hearing
conducted for that purpose. A motel is not per se a nuisance
warranting its summary abatement without judicial intervention.
Not only does the Ordinance contravene the Code, it likewise runs
counter to the provisions of P.D. 499. As correctly argued by MTDC,
the statute had already converted the residential Ermita-Malate
area into a commercial area. The decree allowed the establishment
and operation of all kinds of commercial establishments except
warehouse or open storage depot, dump or yard, motor repair shop,
gasoline service station, light industry with any machinery or funeral
establishment. The rule is that for an ordinance to be valid and to
have force and effect, it must not only be within the powers of the
council to enact but the same must not be in conflict with or
repugnant to the general law.
Conclusion

In the Courts view, there are no substantial distinctions between

motels, inns, pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar
establishments. By definition, all are commercial establishments
providing lodging and usually meals and other services for the
public. No reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not
pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar
establishments. The classification in the instant case is invalid as
similar subjects are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred
and obligations imposed. It is arbitrary as it does not rest on
substantial distinctions bearing a just and fair relation to the
purpose of the Ordinance.
The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business
and operation of motels in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside
of this area. A noxious establishment does not become any less
noxious if located outside the area.

All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and

property rights and impairs personal privileges. It is constitutionally
infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is discriminatory and
unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and
explicit that abuses may attend the enforcement of its sanctions.
And not to be forgotten, the City Council under the Code had no
power to enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires, null and
void.
The Ordinance seeks to promote morality but fails to address the
core issues of morality. Try as the Ordinance may to shape
morality, it should not foster the illusion that it can make a moral
man out of it because immorality is not a thing, a building or
establishment; it is in the hearts of men.
Petition Denied.

The standard where women are used as tools for entertainment is

also discriminatory as prostitution one of the hinted ills the
Ordinance aims to banish is not a profession exclusive to women.
Both men and women have an equal propensity to engage in
prostitution. Thus, the discrimination is invalid.