Recent Brittle Fractures in Steel Bridges

and Preventative Mitigation Strategies

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Topic Area III Fatigue

Robert J. Connor1
John W. Fisher2
William J. Wright3

Keywords: Fracture, Fatigue, Bridge Failure, Forensic Investigation

Abstract
Brittle fracture results in unplanned loss of service, very costly repairs, concern regarding the future
safety of the structure, and potentially loss of life. These types of failures are most critical when there is no
evidence of fatigue cracking leading up to the fracture. Hence, the failure occurs without warning and the details
are essentially non-inspectable. In these cases, it appears desirable to take a proactive approach and introduce
preventative retrofits to reduce the potential for future crack development. These efforts will help ensure that the
likelihood of unexpected fractures is minimized.
This paper examines the behavior of two bridge structures in which brittle fractures have developed in
recent times, discusses the causes of the failures, and offers suggestions preventative mitigation techniques. In
situations where considerable uncertainty exists in the prediction of accumulated damage or in the ability to
reliably inspect critical details, preemptive retrofit strategies appear to be highly desirable.
1

Research Engineer ATLSS Engineering Research Center, Lehigh University, Bethlehem Pennsylvania, 18015, USA, Email:
rjc3@lehigh.edu

Professor Emeritus of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Lehigh University, Bethlehem Pennsylvania, 18015, USA,
Email: jwf2@lehigh.edu

Research Engineer FHWA Turner Fairbanks Research Center, 6300 Georgetown Pike, McLean, VA 22101, Email:
Bill.Wright@fhwa.dot.gov

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Introduction
Compared to fatigue cracking, the number of fractures in highway bridges has been relatively small over the past
40 years. However, brittle fracture results in unplanned loss of service, very costly repairs, concern regarding the
future safety of the structure, and potentially loss of life. These types of failures are most critical when there is no
evidence of fatigue cracking leading up to the fracture. Hence, the failure occurs without warning and the details
are essentially non-inspectable.
Field instrumentation and in-service monitoring is a very useful tool in estimating the remaining fatigue life in a
bridge. However, for the fracture limit-state, many details are very difficult to inspect and instrumentation cannot
provide the needed information to make a sufficient evaluation. In these cases, it appears desirable to take a
proactive approach and introduce preventative retrofits to reduce the potential for future crack development.
These efforts will help ensure that the likelihood of unexpected fractures is minimized.
This paper examines the behavior of two bridge structures in which brittle fractures have developed in recent
times, discusses the causes of the failures, and offers suggestions preventative mitigation techniques. In situations
where considerable uncertainty exists in the prediction of accumulated damage or in the ability to reliably inspect
critical details, preemptive retrofit strategies appear to be highly desirable.
Case Study 3 1 US 422 Bridge
The US 422 bridge over Schuylkill River is a six span two-girder steel structure, designed and built in 1965. The
bridge was originally built as a pin and hanger bridge but was retrofit in the early 1990s to remove the pin and
hangers. Full moment connections were installed by splicing a complete section of girder into the area where the
pin and hanger details were located. The concrete deck is supported by a stringer/floorbeam system and was
designed as noncomposite with the steel members. A lateral bracing system is located near the bottom flanges
and is connected to the web and floorbeam connection plate by a gusset plate.
On May 20, 2003, a fracture was found during a routine inspection on one of the two girders supporting the
eastbound lanes in the positive moment region of an interior span, as shown in Figures 1 and 2. Based on criteria
developed by FHWA and Lehigh University, the bridge had been identified as being susceptible to constraint
induced fracture (CIF). Retrofit plans to mitigate the condition had been developed. Ironically, the bridge was
scheduled to be rehabilitated within a matter of months when the fracture occurred.
The fracture initiated at the intersecting welds connecting the web, gusset plate, and transverse connection plate
approximately three inches above the bottom flange. The fracture propagated upward above the gusset plate
through the web about six inches and arrested at some discontinuities within the web plate. The fracture also
propagated downward and completely severed the bottom flange. Immediately after the crack was found, all
traffic was diverted off of the eastbound structure and weight restrictions were placed on the twin westbound
structure. The eastbound bridge remained closed to all traffic until a full bolted splice was installed and other
retrofits already planned were in place. The complete forensic investigation is fully reported in reference [1].
Examination of Fracture on Site
The day after the fracture, an inspection of the failed girder was made using an under bridge inspection unit
placed on the westbound bridge. The inspection revealed that the fracture surface was still clean and rust free,
indicating that it had recently occurred. In order to prevent the fracture from reinitiating and traveling further up
the web, a two inch diameter core was taken in the web (see Figure 3). This was done to effectively blunt the
crack tip and allow it to be removed for inspection.
Examination of Fracture in the Laboratory
A portion of the girder was removed and sent to Lehigh Universitys ATLSS Engineering Research Center for
examination. The region removed from the plate girder is shown in Figure 3 and consisted of the entire portion of
the web and flange that fractured. Portions of the fractured lateral gusset plate were also attached to the specimen.

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The two-inch core, previously mentioned was also included for examination. Figure 4 shows the general
appearance of the crack surface.
A light corrosion layer was evident over most of the surface from exposure to the weather prior to removal.
However, the fractured portion of the girder remained on the bridge for several weeks prior to removal.
Nevertheless, no evidence of heavy corrosion resulting from long-term exposure was seen anywhere on the crack
surface which precluded the existence of an earlier crack in the gusset-vertical stiffener weld or girder web.
Chevron marks on the web fracture surface clearly pointed to the weld intersection of the lateral gusset plate and
the vertical stiffener as the origin of the girder fracture (see Figures 4 & 5). The brittle fracture propagated into
the bottom flange via the longitudinal web-to-flange fillet welds and also propagated upward in the web until it
arrested about nine inches from the bottom flange.
The origin of the brittle fracture in the fillet weld connecting the gusset plate to the vertical stiffener connection
plate appeared to be in the vicinity of the weld intersection (within 1 inch) of the web. However, the exact point
of origin was less clear since the weld quality was poor and multiple initiations occurred along the weld before
arresting in the gusset plate beyond the vertical stiffener. The cause of the poor weld quality appeared to be due to
excessive root opening between the gusset and the vertical stiffener from poor fit-up. It is apparent in the detailed
view of the web fracture origin shown in Figure 5 that the gusset-vertical stiffener weld crack and web crack were
offset about inch and not continuous. As a result, this required a separate but near simultaneous brittle fracture
initiation in each element.
Figure 5 shows a detailed view of the crack surface at the lateral gusset/vertical stiffener weld intersection after
cleaning corrosion and debris from the surface. A shear lip at the termination of the gusset-vertical stiffener weld
crack was also apparent and consistent with the two separate fractures noted above. It is also clear from
convergence of chevron marks that the origin of the web fracture was located in the weld metal at the corner
intersection of the gusset-web weld and the gusset-vertical stiffener weld. Incomplete fusion and entrapped slag
were also evident at the weld root and toe that is not uncommon at welds intersecting at corners.
SEM Examination of Fracture Origin
The web fracture origin region was examined microscopically with a scanning electron microscope (SEM) to
identify the presence and source of an initiating defect at the onset of crack instability. Other than several submillimeter sized weld porosity defects no evidence of an initial fabrication defect was observed in this region.
There was also no evidence of fatigue crack development in this region from surface or internal discontinuities
present. The only fracture mechanism observed in this area was cleavage fracture as shown in higher
magnification images in Figure 6.
The absence of evidence of stable crack growth at the fracture origin is similar to the Hoan Bridge girder fractures
at similar details [2]. In this case fracture was attributed to constraint induced fracture (CIF) from high levels of
tri-axial constraint at the crack-like geometrical condition at the weld intersection of the gusset plate and vertical
stiffener elevating stresses well beyond the yield point in this region and stress intensities exceeding the fracture
toughness of the web material. Although direct evidence of defect sharpening by cyclic stresses was also not
observed in this case, it was concluded that this had likely occurred at the microscopic level prior to the fracture.
The similarity of the detail and absence of stable crack extension in the current fracture is suggestive of a similar
fracture mechanism.
Material Properties
Chemical Composition
A chemical analysis of the flange, web, and lateral gusset plate was performed to verify the steel grade of each
plate material. The results of the analyses indicated that all three plate materials conformed to the chemical
requirements of ASTM A36 steel. The carbon, manganese, and residual element (P, S) content were typical of
this grade of steel.

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Mechanical Properties
The tensile and Charpy-v-notch (CVN) properties of the plate materials were measured to determine their strength
and fracture toughness properties. The web and flange plate conformed to the strength requirements of ASTM
A36 providing average yield points of 38 ksi and 35 ksi, and average tensile strengths of 62 ksi and 76 ksi,
respectively. Although specimens were not tested from the gusset plate the composition indicated it was grade 36
steel and was assumed to possess strength consistent with this grade. Although only the flange satisfied the
current AASHTO Zone 2 fracture critical toughness requirement for Grade 36 steel of 25 ft-lbs @ 40 F, the web
and gusset plate were marginal. It is important to note that these requirements were not in place when the bridge
was fabricated.
Conclusions Case Study #1
The material properties of the web, flange, and gusset plates were found to conform to ASTM A36 steel. The
fracture toughness of the flange plate elements satisfied or exceeded the current AASHTO Zone 2 fracture
critical toughness requirements for this grade of steel. The web and gusset plate were marginal.
Fractographic examination indicated that brittle fracture developed at two separate locations at the lateral
gusset connection detail nearly simultaneously. A brittle fracture of the gusset plate vertical stiffener fillet
weld and a brittle fracture of the web developed at the intersection of the gusset plate and vertical stiffener
weld.
A fracture mechanics analysis of the crack-like conditions existing at both fracture origins indicated that the
gusset plate fillet weld likely fractured under an unusual loading at moderately low ambient temperatures
(50F) and imparted a dynamic load to the crack-like condition at the intersection of the gusset plate and
vertical stiffener which exceeded the dynamic fracture resistance of the web plate material at that temperature.
Case Study #2 - Hoan Bridge Failure
On December 13, 2000, cracks were detected in all three girders of the south approach span o the Hoan Bridge
adjacent to the tied arch spans. Two of the three girders had full depth fractures, as illustrated in Figure 7. The
span had sagged about a meter, leaving the span near collapse and the entire roadway was closed to traffic. On
December 28, 2000, the critically damaged section of the northbound road north of the field splice adjacent to
Pier 3S, was removed by explosive demolition. Figure 8 shows the dropped end span girders that fell about 30 m
onto a gravel pile. The southbound roadway was reopened to two-way traffic on February 27, 2001, with weight
and speed restrictions after short term retrofit measures. A more comprehensive discussion of the forensic
investigation can be found in references 2 and 3.
Design Details and Material Properties
The three span continuous plate girder bridge, had three hybrid girders that were 3.2 m deep. The 12.5 mm web
plates were A36 steel with a yield stress of 270 MPa. The girder flange plates were A588 grade 50W steel. The
center girder flange plates were 76 mm thick with a yield stress of 353 MPa. Outside girder flanges were 57 mm
thick. Girder F was observed to have a yield stress of 362 MPa and Girder D had a yield stress of 322 MPa.
The original structure was designed as a noncomposite system. The calculated dead load stress in the girder web
at the lateral gusset plate was about 105 MPa. Although designed without composite action between the steel
girders and the concrete slab, strain measurements verified that full composite action from friction was present
between the girder and the deck for all live load conditions. The lateral K-bracing system was connected to the
girder web plates with the shelf or gusset plates using a bolted connection.
The 19 mm lateral gusset plates were slotted to fit around the transverse connection plates. These plates had a 13
mm beveled partial penetration weld joint between the girder web and the gusset plate. Figure 9 shows a view of
a typical gusset plate fitted around the transverse connection plate. One side of the slot is in contact with the
transverse connection plate creating a crack-like geometry. High strength bolts provided a connection between
the gusset plate and the transverse connection plate.

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Charpy V-Notch tests were carried out on the girder web and flange plates at the fracture locations by the TurnerFairbank Highway Research Laboratory. Full transition curves were developed to define the variation in material
toughness with temperature. The testing revealed that all three web locations satisfied the AASHTO requirements
for Zone 2 fracture critical applications where the lowest anticipated service temperature is -34 C.

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The CVN test results were used to develop dynamic and bridge loading rate estimates of fracture toughness, K,
based on the correlation equation [4] KId =

0.64 E (CVN ) , where KId is the dynamic fracture toughness

MPa m , CVN is the Charpy energy in J, and E the elastic modulus MPa. The bridge loading rate was estimated
from the temperature shift Ts = 0.75 (119 0.12 Fy) C. These results indicate that the crack initiation resistance
of the web plates would be on the upper shelf at the service temperatures encountered at the Hoan Bridge. The
dynamic toughness is in the lower transition region, providing limited resistance to dynamic crack propagation.
Similar tests on the flange plates yielded test results and fracture toughness estimates. The fracture toughness of
the flange plates was also obtained using 2 in. thick compact tension tests on Girders D and E at -34 C and 21 C
at static and intermediate load rates. Only the low temperature tests on the 3 in. thick Girder E flange plate
provided valid KIC values for true plain strain conditions. Nonetheless, all of the test results provided reasonable
agreement between the compact tension test results and the KIC transition curves calculated from the CVN data.
The results suggest that the estimated dynamic fracture toughness of the 57 mm flange plates from Girders D and

m at 23 C, the probable temperature at failure. For the 76 mm Girder E flange plate,

the estimated dynamic toughness was only 27.5 MPa m .
F was about 66 MPa

Fractographic Examination
Selected areas of the fractures in Girders D, E, and F at P.P. 28 were examined both visually and microscopically
using a scanning electron microscope (SEM) to characterize the fractures and gain additional information about
the fracture mechanism(s). Examination focused primarily at the fracture origin areas in the girder web at the
shelf plate weld terminating adjacent to the vertical connection plate in each of the girders. Similar areas in other
girders where cracks were also found were also examined.
In general, all of the fracture surfaces examined were covered with a layer of corrosion of varying thickness
resulting from exposure to the weather and salt prior to removal from the structure. Evidence of abraded areas on
some crack surfaces, which occurred during demolition of the span, was also observed. Prior to examining, the
as-received fractures were documented photographically. Areas for detailed examination were extracted by sawcutting followed by ultrasonic cleaning in Alconox detergent to remove as much of the corrosion product as
possible. Removal of the corrosion layer to examine the underlying fracture surface was moderately successful,
however, the tenacity of the corrosion product in some areas, often at fracture origin areas, frequently prevented
microscopic information from being obtained in these areas.
The fracture origin in Girder E had been traced to the girder web at the lateral bracing connection where the shelf
plate partial penetration weld joint to the web terminated adjacent to the vertical connection plate. The opposing
side of the web fracture with the vertical connection plate still attached is shown in Figure 10. Cleavage chevron
marks on the web fracture surface were observed to point from both directions to the shelf plate weld termination
thus confirming this area to be the fracture origin. The web fracture origin at the weld termination is shown in
Figure 10 and clearly shows a fan-shaped cleavage chevron pattern emanating from the vicinity of the weld root
lack of fusion. A similar radial cleavage chevron pattern at the shelf plate weld termination was also observed on
both sides of the fracture coinciding with a origin point in the vicinity of the weld root lack-of-fusion.
Visual examination of the fracture origin area of both sides of the fracture showed no indication of a base metal or
weld defect in this area. Microscopic examination with the SEM (see Figure 11) showed the presence of cleavage

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fracture as close to the fracture origin as could be discerned. Corrosion product not removed during cleaning of
the surfaces obscured some areas at the origin, however, no indication of stable crack growth processes such as
fatigue or ductile tearing was observed in corrosion free areas within 1 mm of the origin. Without the presence of
a macroscopic defect cleavage likely initiated from a microscopic discontinuity, which may have sharpened by
fatigue over time. Fracture initiation from a microscopic defect is not inconsistent with the high triaxial stress
state believed to exist in this area.
The fracture origin in Girder D traced back to the same location as in Girder E. The section of Girder D
containing the crack origin at the shelf plate weld joint termination is shown in Figure 12. The opposing crack
surfaces at the fracture origin removed from the corner of the shelf plate and from the web along the vertical
connection plate as for Girder E. One distinct cleavage fracture origins occurring in offset planes resulting in a
stepped appearance of the fracture. One origin appeared to be in the shelf plate weld near the weld root although
a well defined original as determined by cleavage chevron markings were not as clear as in Girder E. The other
origin was clearly traceable to the shelf plate weld toe area. In both cases no visual indication of an initiating
defect was observed in the origin areas. A weld metal gas pore about 1 mm in diameter was observed in one of
the origin areas, however, it is not certain if this defect was associated with the cleavage initiation.
The fracture origin in Girder F as well as two other web cracks that were detected at other lateral bracing
connections in other spans of the structure provided identical results when examined.
The crack arrest in the bottom flange region of Girder D was examined to determine the location of crack arrest
and characterize the fracture mechanism. The web crack clearly propagated through both web-flange fillet welds
and arrested in the fine grain heat affected zone of the weld.
Conclusions
All three girder web fractures initiated from the crack-like geometric condition that resulted from the
intersecting shelf or gusset plate and transverse connection plate welded connections with intersecting and
overlapping welds.
The existing geometric configuration caused extreme high levels of constraint and stress to develop in the
web plate gap.
Brittle fractures (cleavage) were found to develop at every web crack examined without any detectable fatigue
crack extension or ductile tearing at the crack origin.
Once the web fractured, it was found that the bottom flange plates of Girders E-28 and F-28 were not capable
of arresting the propagating crack.
All of the flange and web steels were found to have mechanical tensile properties and Charpy V-Notch
toughness that satisfied the AASHTO requirements at the time the structure was built. The Charpy V-Notch
toughness was also found to satisfy current (2001) requirements for Zone II.
The web plates were found to have sufficient toughness to tolerate through plate thickness cracks under
normal conditions without the high constrain conditions that were imposed on the girder web plate by the
shelf plate welds and the intersecting transverse connection plate welds.
The nature of the web crack development results in a detail that is not inspectable. The small critical crack
size cannot be detected.

Identifying Details Susceptible to CIF

The most common details susceptible to CIF are located at intersection of gusset plates and transverse connection
plates (stiffeners). In addition, intersections between vertical stiffeners and longitudinal stiffeners can also present
a problem. A recently completed in-depth finite element study conducted at Lehigh University, has confirmed
that gaps greater than inch sufficiently reduce the triaxial stress condition within the gap to acceptable levels.
Figure 13 is an example of the detailed finite element model developed to analyze this complex connection.

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As a result of increasing the gap, the material in the web is permitted to yield rather than being subjected to higher
and higher stresses until the limit state becomes brittle fracture. In this study, various geometries of gusset plate
connection were evaluated for different gap lengths. The values presented in Table 1 are from one of these
studies and clearly show that a web gap size of inch is effective in reducing the stresses in the X-direction ( 1)
and in the Y-direction ( 2) by 26.2% and 36% respectively, as well as totally eliminating the stresses in the Zdirection ( 3) (through thickness). The table also indicates there is a significant decrease in the triaxiality factor
(T) to within acceptable limits.
In the presents of a inch gap, the level of constraint is reduced and brittle fracture should not occur. It is critical
to point out that the inch gap is the distance between weld toes of the components and not the actual distance
between the plates.
Other details common to other bridge types like box girders for example are also are susceptible to CIF. These
details need to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis to determine if a retrofit is needed. The same gap
limitation will likely still apply.
As part of a research project currently underway at Lehigh University, a detailed survey related to CIF was
conducted. The survey revealed that brittle fracture as a failure mode is not as well recognized or understood by
most bridge engineers. For example, in some cases, small to moderately sized cracks were observed at gusset
plates and the problem was dismissed as a fatigue issue. This conclusion was drawn although no forensic
investigations were conducted. In these cases, the corrective measures were taken to prevent future fatigue cracks
from growing into the web. Interestingly, these retrofits relied on hole drilling which also removed enough
material to decrease constraint effects (and hence triaxiality) and the stress concentration to acceptable limits. If
the holes were drilled in the web, a brittle fracture, if initiated, would enter the hole and likely be arrested.
Another interesting point revealed in the survey is that there are no standard procedures for investigating,
documenting, and archiving such failures. In summary, due to the lack of awareness of the phenomena as well as
the lack of defined procedures that should be implemented when a failure occurs has led to several cases of CIF
not being identified as such and obviously being documented at all. More importantly, it is not clear if the bridges
which have exhibited these fractures in the past were subsequently retrofit to correct the problem at the other
similar details or simply repaired and considered rogue failures.
Retrofit Strategies
Since the fracture of the Hoan Bridge in Milwaukee WI and the more recent fracture of the US 422 bridge, there
has been considerable interest in identifying effective methods to retrofit similar details. It is extremely important
to note that the failures observed in both bridges gave no warning. The details can not be inspected unless they
fracture. Hence, it is of utmost importance to identify details that may be susceptible to CIF and implement a
retrofit program. It is worth noting that the state of Pennsylvania has been very aggressive in this effort.
There are several retrofit options to prevent constraint-induced fracture in details that have been determined to be
vulnerable. Each case has to be evaluated on an individual basis. Geometry constraints, access limitations,
contractor capabilities, and long-term performance are factors that need to be considered when selecting options.
An engineer may determine that other retrofit options are the best choice for a particular case. Retrofit details and
procedures should be individually evaluated by an engineer to determine: 1) if the risk of constraint-induced
fracture is eliminated; 2) if the strength of the resulting joint is adequate to carry all applicable loads; and 3) if the
retrofit will provide adequate fatigue performance over the intended life of the structure
The problem is relatively easy to correct for most details and relies primarily on hole drilling techniques. For
gusset plate details, a preferred method is to drill holes in the gusset plate near the intersecting welds in order to
increase the gap and reduce constraint as well as the tri-axial stress condition. Difficulties arise in this retrofit
primarily due to the limited room for access at most of the details. In addition, quality control must be maintained

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to ensure that the web plate is not nicked or gouged. After the holes are in place, the web gap area should be
ground smooth using appropriate die grinding equipment and flapper wheels to provide a smooth surface finish.
If the gusset plate or longitudinal stiffener is fillet welded to the web, care should be taken to blunt the transition.
Smooth tapering of fillet welds result in hair-thin cross sections of weld metal that can be vulnerable to fatigue
cracking. Poor quality work can result in fatigue cracking at the retrofit or other problems. Typical sketches of
effective retrofits for gusset plates and longitudinal stiffeners are shown in Figure 14.
Summary
1. It is critical to identify and address details that are susceptible to CIF to prevent similar failures on other
bridges as there is no warning to these fractures. Hence, it is of utmost importance to identify details that may
be susceptible to CIF and implement a retrofit program.
2. Standardized procedures should be developed to document, investigate and archive structural failures to
ensure problems are understood and prevent similar failures in the future.
3. A gap width of inch or greater reduces triaxiality and constraint to acceptable levels thereby allowing the
web material to yield rather than fail in brittle fracture.
4. Retrofit techniques have been developed which are economical and effective in mitigating CIF for various
types of details. These methods primarily rely on hole-drilling techniques and require superior quality control
standards be maintained to ensure other problems are not created.
Acknowledgments
This forensic investigation into the failure of the US 422 bridge was sponsored by the Pennsylvania Department
of Transportation and the ATLSS Engineering Research Center at Lehigh University. This forensic investigation
into the failure of the Hoan Bridge was sponsored by the Wisconsin Department of Transportation and the Federal
Highway Administration. The authors are indebted to Bala Sivakumar and William Edberg, Lichtenstein
Consulting Engineers for providing support during the Hoan Bridge failure investigation. Thanks are also due to
Zhan Xi and Hernando Tjiang for their assistance with material tests and modeling at the Turner-Fairbank
Research Center, FHWA. The authors are also grateful to Mr. Hussam Mahmoud, who performed the detailed
linear and non-linear finite element analysis used to develop the data related to the triaxaility factor. Dr. Eric
Kaufmann performed the fractographic analysis for both studies.
References
1. Kaufman E.J., Connor R.J., Fisher, J.W. Failure Analysis of the US 422 Girder Fracture Final Report,
ATLSS Report No. 04-21, Center for Advanced Technology for Large Structural Systems, Lehigh University,
Bethlehem PA, 18015, October 2004
2. Wright, W., Fisher, J. W., Sivakumar, B., Kaufmann, E. J., Xi, Z., Edberg, W. And Tjiang, H., Hoan Bridge
Forensic Investigation Failure Analysis Final Report, FHWA, June 2001.
3. Wright, W. J., Strock, T., Hartmann, J., Hoan Bridge Forensic Investigation - Documentation of Condition
Prior to Demolition, FHWA Research Report, March 2001.
4. Barsom, J. M. and Rolfe S. T., Fracture and Fatigue Control in Structures, 3rd Edition, ASTM Stock
Number: MNL141, ASTM, West Conshohocken, PA, Nov. 1999.

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1, (ksi)
2, (ksi)
3, (ksi)
T

Web Gap Size

Zero inches
57.2
18.9
18.3
1.48

1/4 inch
42.2
12.1
0
1.12

% Change
- 26.2
- 36.0
-100.0
-24.3

Table 1 - Effect of web gap on principal stresses and triaxiality factor

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Figure 1 Fractured girder exterior face

Web Crack

Figure 2 Fractured girder - interior face

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Core Removed at
Web Crack Tip

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Web Crack

Flange
Crack

Gusset Plate
Crack

Figure 3 Portion of girder removed for evaluation

Figure 4 - Crack surfaces with chevrons pointing back to fracture origin

at the weld intersection of the lateral gusset and vertical stiffener
Shear Lip at
Fracture Offset

Lateral
Gusset
Plate

Web

Web Fracture Origin

Figure 5 - Fracture origin at the intersection of the lateral gusset and vertical stiffener welds

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Figure 6 - SEM images of the fracture origin region and cleavage fracture
[Mag. 10.1x & 600x]

Figure 7 - Fractured girders at floorbeam 28

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Figure 8 - View after demolition of span

Figure 9 - View of lateral gusset insertion

with transverse connection plate

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Crack
Origin

Crack
Origin

Figure 10 - Girder E crack surfaces at gusset plate

- transverse connection plate intersection

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Figure 11 - SEM micrographs of crack surface at

fracture origin showing cleavage

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Crack
Origins

Figure 12 - Section of girder D with crack origin

and arrested crack in bottom flange with view of
crack surface

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Structures 2005
Structures Congress 2005

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Figure 13 - Typical finite element model use to investigate potential for CIF

2" Dia. Hole

(typical)
Web

Grind Transition
to Web

Gusset Plate

TOP VIEW
Transverse Stiffener

Longitudinal
Stiffener

Cut Back Stiffener

or

Increase Web Gap

Figure 14 Typical retrofits for gusset plates and longitudinal stiffeners to address CIF

17
Copyright ASCE 2005

Structures 2005
Structures Congress 2005