July Decisions

Previous enclave strategy lasted only a month

Joint Chiefs of Staff believed the situation in Vietnam had deteriorated too much, that substantial
forces needed to be sent
o Westmoreland requested 150,000 troops be sent
o McNamara requested 100,000 troops and the call up of 236,000 reserve troops
Believed delaying action would leave the US with the option to leave, or suddenly
expand forces
LBJ decided to ignore both, seeking to stave off defeat in the short run, while offering a good
chance of a settlement in the future
In late July, LBJ became visibly upset with the inability of the South Vietnamese to progress and
improve, and the refusal of the North Vietnamese of any talks
Realising the cost of an NLF victory was too high, LBJ continued with the idea of gradual build-up
of forces
o Aimed to keep build-up quiet, so it wouldnt appear that the US was becoming very
invested
Didnt want to attract attention of USSR and US public
At the decisions, LBJ showed greater awareness than his advisors ever did, expressing doubt over
the true effectiveness of US troops, and how fragile the public support was
The decisions were the stage for George Ball, the only powerful politician with open opposition to
the war, a platform to show his opinions
o He believed that the US should cut their losses in Vietnam and focus on maintaining
European and NATO alliances
o He realised that an increase in troops was no guarantee, and more troops meant it would
become harder to leave
Ball was ignored because he did not offer sharp, consistent and easily followed advice, and that his
recommendation of leaving Vietnam was not as easy as he made it out to be
Belief was that if LBJ took Balls advice, he would have to change all his lieutenants and advisors
who had exaggerated national pride and belief in Americas ability
Clark Clifford offered some opposition, claiming that China and the USSR wouldnt allow Vietnam
to stop fighting, and so doubted that the US could outlast them, but eventually joined LBJs side
Economist John Kenneth Galbraith took issue with LBJ suggesting the future of mankind lay in
Vietnam, telling the President that he would be taking all of the blame if it failed
All opposition failed because it would need the President and his advisors to think again, but they
were all fixed and blind to the idea of US supremacy.
The Wise Men panel said that any fraction of the US aims would be a defeat, that a neutral
government would be a failure
Eventually, it was agreed that an additional 100,000 troops to the already 90,000 would be a good
balance of success n Vietnam without alerting too many people to the advance
President said that he regretted that we were embroiled in Vietnam. But we are there
McNamaras idea of calling up reserves was dismissed as it needed to appear that it was simply a
continuation of policy, rather than a new program altogether
Congressional leaders were informed on July 27, met with all-around support
o Mike Mansfield offered some opposition, claiming a victory wouldnt really achieve
anything
LBJ stressed his Great Society to distract people from his controversial increase in Vietnam
When Henry Fowler argued that the war was causing prices to rise, putting a strain on the
economy, the White House warned him to be quiet