433

reader may not be entirely convinced by the overall thesis, there is much to learn and
to ponder in this ne monograph.
ANDREW SMITH
andrew.smith@ucd.ie

University College Dublin

PLOTINUS ON SELF
R ( P. ) Plotinus on Self. The Philosophy of the We. Pp. xii +287.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Cased, 50, US$95.
ISBN: 978-0-521-86729-0.
doi:10.1017/S0009840X09000493

While the title of this book reects a general tendency in recent scholarship (with an
increasing number of studies being devoted to ancient conceptions of the self ), it
conveys a somewhat partial picture of its content: R.s investigation in fact covers the
whole of Plotinus philosophy, from physics to metaphysics, ethics and epistemology.
The concept of the self thus serves as a unifying perspective for a much broader
investigation, which provides one of the best available outlines of Plotinus thought.
) plays a crucial role in Plotinus philosophy (see VI.4
The concept of we (
[22], 14.16, where he poses the reexive question who are we?). The choice of the
plural we over the singular I while no doubt inuenced by Plato, Alc. I, 128e is
conceptually signicant: for Plotinus, as for most ancient philosophers, each
consciousness ideally grasps the same reality; we share objects and the normative
telos of human existence (see p. 5). Plotinus conception of the self/we is thus an
integral part of his overall conception of reality: The story about the self in Plotinus
philosophy is based on three necessary starting points: the centrality of metaphysics,
some kind of dualistic framework [] and the insights of the late Platonic dialogues,
especially the Timaeus (p. 24). R. argues that metaphysics represents the core of
Plotinus philosophy and that his notion of the self is connected to a set of
systematic ontological assumptions. Plotinus reality is grounded on a dualism
between eternal entities and temporal particulars (whose status R. compares to that
of the four-dimensional worms of contemporary Perdurantism: persisting
particulars are extended processes, p. 53). The theory of the self reects such a
dualism and its overall causal scheme. Plotinus is then drawn to develop a theory of
two selves: on the one hand, the self residing in the composite; on the other hand, the
primary, pure and rational self. Human individuals are treated as composites not just
of soul and body, but of two dierent causal systems (p. 91), which R. sets out to
elucidate in detail. We, as embodied and temporal individuals, are connected with
the causal structure of participation associated with the forming soul (
: see V.3 [49], 9.45), which determines bodily shapes and formations but also,
quite possibly, many dispositions and psychological characteristics (R. provides an
in-depth analysis of the causal role played by the soul and logoi in Plotinus theory of
participation at p. 63.). The forming soul may well be identical to the soul of the All
(though R. herself qualies such an equation with a prudent question mark at p. 89).
The individual rational soul, the ideal self, comes to reside in the shaped body and is
connected with a dierent causal system, that of the eternal, non-discursive Intellect.
R. elucidates the connections and interactions of the dual self in all its activities, from
the lower psychical functions to non-discursive thought and union with the One;
furthermore, she discusses the ethical consequences of Plotinus theory. No complete
The Classical Review vol. 59 no. 2 The Classical Association 2009; all rights reserved

434

separation exists between the empirical and the ideal self: as R. convincingly shows,
the ideal self rather acts as a normative ideal in the constitution of the everyday self
(see pp. 126, 191). This point, however, raises several problems, which R. discusses
with remarkable clarity: if the human mind were correctly to identify itself with the
ideal level, it would change into a completely dierent kind of being (on the ethical
consequences of this proposition see pp. 213.: Action and Other Peoples: the Self as
a Citizen of Two Communities). One of the most interesting sections of the book
focusses on the relation between the Intellect and discursive thought. R. (pp. 126.)
rejects those interpretations which equate non-discursive thought with an intuition
that shares very little, if anything, with discursive thought (p. 128). Plotinus actually
relates both kinds of knowledge to multiplicity and systematic interconnections; the
dierence between discursive and non-discursive thought must then be seen to lie in
the kind of interconnections that subsist in their respective multiplicities (see, at
pp. 135., R.s discussion of sameness and dierence). R. compares Plotinus
distinction between the One and the Intellect with Socrates dream in Platos
Theaetetus (Tht. 201e .): thought and knowledge, both intellectual and discursive,
require multiplicity; no knowledge can be had of what is absolutely simple.
Complexity is thus a necessary requirement for intelligibility and truth.
R. occasionally tends to over-emphasise Plotinus systematic consistency. For
example, she fails to note the tension between Plotinus treatment of completing
qualities in II.6 [17], 2.20. and his account of sensible substances as conjunctions of
qualities in VI.3 [44], 8.30, though Plotinus himself seems to present the two
approaches as conceptually distinct at VI.2 [43], 14.14. Furthermore, R. stresses the
importance of Plotinus qualied reception of Stoicism, but tends somewhat to
neglect the Aristotelian/Peripatetic background of enneadic theories and arguments:
for example, R.s discussion of Plotinus sensible particulars does not adequately
emphasise the signicance of his criticism of Aristotles essentialism (VI.1 [42], 13; 3
[44], 410); Plotinus interesting theory of the numerical identity of intelligible
substances (as opposed to sensible particulars and their inherent qualities: see IV.3
[27], 8.22.; VI.4 [22], 1.23.) is not set against its Aristotelian background (see
Ch. Tornaus commentary Plotin. Enneaden VI 45 [223]. Ein Kommentar [Stuttgart
and Leipzig, 1998], pp. 30 and 320); the discussion of physical motion in VI.1 [42],
15. is neglected. One may also object to R.s silence regarding the impact of Middle
Platonism on Plotinus (see p. 19), given that Plotinus original philosophical stance is
better appreciated in the light of the previous exegesis of Plato. These, however, are
only minor aws: this is an admirable book essential for anyone seriously interested in
Plotinus philosophy.
University of Roma Tre, Rome

RICCARDO CHIARADONNA
rchiaradonna@uniroma3.it

NEOPLATONISM
A ( P. ) La Lutte pour lorthodoxie dans le platonsime
tardif du Numnius Damascius. (Lne dor 25.) Pp. 276, ills. Paris:
Les Belles Lettres, 2006. Paper, 25. ISBN: 978-2-251-42028-8.
doi:10.1017/S0009840X0900050X

Among the many writings on later Neoplatonic philosophy, the works by A. occupy
an elevated position, and this book, like all her others, displays such originality, depth
The Classical Review vol. 59 no. 2 The Classical Association 2009; all rights reserved