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Discourse in the shadows: Discursive construction and the Northern Ireland

Assembly
John Wilson and Karyn Stapleton
Discourse Society 2012 23: 69
DOI: 10.1177/0957926511419930
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Article
Discourse in the
shadows:Discursive
construction and the
Northern Ireland Assembly1
Discourse & Society

23(1) 6992
The Author(s) 2012
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DOI: 10.1177/0957926511419930
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John Wilson and Karyn Stapleton

University of Ulster at Jordanstown, Northern Ireland
Abstract
Parliamentary discourse (PD) is shaped by pre-defined rules, which may be strategically transgressed
to achieve political goals. Here, we examine a relatively unique form of PD, the discourse of the
Shadow Assembly, which was tasked with establishing the procedures of the new Northern Ireland
Assembly (1998). Using a discursive constructionist perspective, which emphasizes the intersection
between social theory and sociolinguistics, we examine how Members of the Assembly vie to
discursively establish the fundamental parameters of political behaviour within the Assembly. These
included address terms, speaking rights and, indeed, which language members should speak. Hence,
we have a rare opportunity to examine how discursive construction mediates the future forms of
interactional limits and constraints. In particular, we consider PD in a context where the rules
are not pre-established and there is, moreover, a strong history of socio-political conflict. We also
consider the role of culture in shaping and constituting PD.
Keywords
construction, Northern Ireland, parliamentary discourse, rules, Shadow Assembly, social theory,
transgressions
Introduction
In the general field of political language, it is not surprising that a specific importance
has been given to the study of parliamentary discourse (Bayley, 2004; Chilton, 2004;
Chilton and Schffner, 2002; Ilie, 2010a; Wodak and Van Dijk, 2000). This is, of course,
Corresponding author:
John Wilson, School of Communication, University of Ulster at Jordanstown, Newtownabbey, Co. Antrim
BT37 0SR, Northern Ireland.
Email: j.wilson@ulster.ac.uk
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Discourse & Society 23(1)
one of the most obvious and central examples of political language in action, which has
been viewed as a specific sub-genre of political language (Chilton, 2004) and as a discourse model in its own right (Bayley, 2004). It is also widely recognized that language
plays a constructionist role in the very constitution of parliaments themselves (see
Chilton, 2004; Ilie, 2010a). Hence, the parliamentary context itself is constituted and
enacted through sets of discourse structures, practices and routines. A particular feature
of such discourse is the extent to which it is shaped by pre-defined rules and constraints,
such as orders of discussion, time limits on talk, legal protections on certain language
usage, reference constraints relating to oneself and others, and so on. Equally of interest,
here, is the extent to which these boundaries can be negotiated and transgressed within
the limits of acceptable or legitimate parliamentary behaviour (see De Ayala, 2001; Ilie,
2004, 2010b).
In this article, we consider how a discursive constructionist perspective may provide
insight into a relatively unique form of parliamentary discourse, the discourse employed
at the outset of a new legislative Assembly in Northern Ireland. Specifically, we discuss
the Shadow debates, named after the Shadow Assembly, which initiated the new
Northern Ireland Assembly (NIA) and was tasked with establishing the procedures and
parameters of the political institutions. Here, we view discursive interaction as both
forming and being formed by social contexts and the social roles played out in such
contexts. As such, we operate at the intersection of social theory and sociolinguistics
(see, for example, Heller [1995, 2001], who views sociolinguistics as a form of social
theory; Berger and Luckmann, 1967; Bourdieu, 1994, 1998; Wilson, 2001; Wilson and
Stapleton, 2007). Much social interaction within society functions through institutionalized patterns of behaviour, including sociolinguistic/discursive behaviours, which are the
outcome of interactional routines exemplifying specific social contexts and institutions.
This should not be misunderstood as being deterministic, however; with Bourdieu
(1998), we see societal and hence sociolinguistic patterns and routines as being susceptible to challenge and change (as we have argued elsewhere, for example in the case of
the sociolinguistic role of habitus and policing change in Northern Ireland; see Wilson
and Stapleton, 2007).
In the database for this study, we see an example of this as members of the newly
formed NIA vie to discursively establish the fundamental discourse parameters of
political behaviour within the Assembly. This included such things as which parties are
called, who speaks when and for how long, and indeed in which language they speak.
This analysis is relatively unique, then, in that it is not often within Western Europe
that one has the chance to view initial debates about such issues; for most European
parliaments, these are already well-established (Bayley, 2004; Chilton, 2004), having
been set up, in some cases, a number of centuries ago. Here, however, with the establishment of the NIA, we have one of those rare windows of opportunity to see how
discursive construction mediates the future forms of interactional limits and constraints.
While this makes the database particularly interesting, it also creates an inbuilt potential limitation. Although there are several further Shadow debates in our corpus, the fact
is that following the initial debate, these other debates become controlled and set by what
has been grounded in the initial debate. That is, the discursive parameters have been
established for Assembly discourse and parties, and members move on to concentrate on
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Wilson and Stapleton
core political issues, health, security, the economy, etc., rather than on how such core
issues should be introduced, at what time, by whom, for how long, and so on. While there
is much that is interesting in these other debates, consideration of the basic grounding
rules is not generally repeated for further comparison, since these have been discursively
agreed. It is not that there are not opportunities for challenge or disagreement on various
issues on the procedures of the Assembly, but even such challenges would be in terms of
the initially agreed parameters set in the first debate. For example, the issue of which
language one should use arises in other places, but only in terms of the initially agreed
parameters discussed in the first debate (see later), that is that members are free to use
any language of their own choice.
The potential limitations of looking at only the initial Shadow debate are therefore
natural and ecologically necessary, and hence, we would argue, not necessarily limitations at all, but rather a reflection of a rare and potentially unique sociolinguistic and
political context.
At this point, we would also note that the parliamentary language found in the Shadow
debates is contextually unique in other ways. For example, Sinn Fein, one of the major
parties in the Assembly, had been for many years an advocate for the destruction of the
Northern Ireland (NI) state, the withdrawal of NI from the UK and the unification of NI
with the Republic of Ireland. In turn, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), a strong
supporter of both NI and Britain, did not want Sinn Fein in any new NI Assembly and
had long campaigned against Sinn Feins involvement in even the democratic process.
Moreover, because of the nature and structure of the NIA, all parties are effectively in
government together, that is there is no Opposition as in other parliaments and, hence, all
decisions must be arrived at in a consociational way (see The socio-political context
later). In the Shadow debates, then, we have an Assembly of antagonistic bedfellows,
thrown together against a backdrop of a long history of civil and ethnic strife, and tasked
with agreeing methods and processes for a new parliamentary way forward.
The present article focuses on the starting point of this process, the point at which the
parliamentary rules and procedures are being negotiated and constructed. As noted
above, this analysis provides a rare opportunity to examine how such practices become
established and, moreover, how they set the parameters of future institutional interaction.
Clearly, the Shadow Assembly is not operating in a vacuum and, to this extent, certain of
the rules (and categories of rules) draw upon existing parliamentary models (most notably Westminster). However, the content of these rules and of the emergent parliamentary
discourse framework is here being constructed in real time and within the institutional
context which it will later define and constitute. Hence, through our analysis, we aim to
(a) provide insights into the construction of parliamentary discourse and procedures,
with a particular focus on the way in which the very lack of agreed procedure provides
grounds for contestation and conflict; and (b) examine within a social (discursive)
constructionist framework the way in which such construction processes shape future
patterns of behaviour and institutional contexts.
In the remainder of the article, we will, first, briefly discuss some of the structures and
features of parliamentary discourse as found in established political institutions. This
provides the backdrop for our own study in which the discourse processes of the NIA are
being negotiated and defined. In light of our own analysis, we are particularly interested
72
here in the role of rules, boundaries and transgressions in defining and patrolling what
is legitimate parliamentary behaviour, as well as the role of culture in shaping and
constituting the parliamentary context. Next, we will highlight the political context of
the establishment and operation of the NIA. This is not only for descriptive reasons, but
also serves as a socio-political resource for understanding the discursive dimensions of
the debates themselves (see Van Dijk, 2005). Thus, it will serve as a backdrop for
understanding the discursive techniques and processes adopted in the Shadow debates,
and will assist us in understanding the interaction of discursive construction and
contextual processes in the construction of political meaning. Following this, we will
analyse and discuss the Shadow debates under a number of thematic headings. The
article concludes with a consideration of our analysis in relation both to the study of
parliamentary discourse and to the political context more generally.
Parliamentary discourse
As noted above, parliamentary discourse has, in recent years, been the focus of sustained
empirical analysis, and has given rise to a number of book-length discussions. Most
analysts view parliamentary discourse as a sub-genre of political discourse (e.g. Chilton,
2004; Rasiah, 2010) and/or as a discourse model in its own right (Bayley, 2004). There
has also been a focus on parliamentary institutions as communities of practice, wherein
members must learn to engage in accepted discourse practices in order to constitute
themselves as parliamentarians (see Harris, 2001; Shaw, 2000). Language is integral to
the nature and business of parliament, comprising its key activities, and making manifest
political power and ideology (see Bayley, 2004; Chilton, 2004; Ilie, 2010a).
Bayley (2004) identifies three key characteristics of parliamentary discourse: (1) it
reflects the culture and history of the political system in which it is located; (2) it is ritualized and rule-bound (see further below); and (3) it is fundamentally adversarial (2004:
21), being based on a conflict between opposing parties and ideologies most notably,
between Government and the Opposition. Bayley further makes the point that although
parliamentary discourse is essentially a series of monologues, which are intertextually
and contratextually interwoven (2004: 24), the nature of the discourse is dialogic and
genuine dialogues do occur, albeit within the constraints of parliamentary regulations.
All three of Bayleys points can be seen as relevant to the present study. The sociopolitical and historical backdrop of NI is ever-present in the workings of the NIA and this
leads to a particular type of adversarial discourse, based here not on the standard notion
of Government versus Opposition, but, as we shall see, on interparty wrangling and,
most crucially, on the traditional fault lines of Unionism versus Nationalism (despite the
fact that all of these parties are ostensibly in government together). Of particular interest
are the issues of ritual and rule-boundedness, since it was these very issues which occupied the Shadow Assembly and which provide the focus of our analysis.
As noted, the data discussed in this article are distinctive in that they provide an
insight into how parliaments and parliamentary discourse become constituted and
legitimated in real time. Central to this process is the creation of the rules of acceptable
parliamentary behaviour, particularly as they pertain to interactional and linguistic
choices. In most other parliaments, these rules are already well established. As outlined
73
by Ilie (2010a: 880), (t)the gradual ritualisation of parliamentary proceedings has been
marked by an increasing regularisation of the collective behaviour and individual roles
of Members of Parliament (MPs), on the one hand, and by institutionalised form and
structure of their verbal interaction, on the other.
The parliamentary discourse genre is regulated in part by the prescriptive rule book of
Erskine May, first published in 1844 and continually reproduced in new editions and
derivative handbooks (see May, 1989). The book sets out guidelines for the form, channel
and content of parliamentary proceedings, including debates, questions and speeches. To
this extent, it can be seen to define the rules, norms and practices that constitute acceptable
parliamentary language, which, in turn, is tied to notions of rationality and politeness
(see Chilton, 2004; De Ayala, 2001; Ilie, 2004). Indeed, Ilie (2010b) notes that, rather
than being purely regulative (as in non-institutional interaction), the rules of parliamentary interaction are constitutive and therefore integrated with the discourse itself.
However, the rules and norms of parliamentary discourse are frequently breached;
hence, the existence of these rules does not prevent their being broken (Chilton, 2004:
95). In fact, in many cases, parliamentary rules are purposefully and strategically manipulated in order to achieve political goals, as demonstrated in analyses of, for example,
parliamentary insults (Ilie 2004, 2010b); parliamentary questions and evasions (Chilton,
2004; Rasiah, 2010); and parliamentary interruptions (Bevitori, 2004). In a study specifically concerned with Erskine Mays rules, De Ayala (2001) shows how the existence of
these rules and associated politeness strategies actually provides a space for adversarial,
or face-threatening, acts (FTAs), in that the latter are formed as part of a regulated, and
therefore clean, confrontation. This gives rise, according to De Ayala, to a specific form
of parliamentary institutionalized hypocrisy (2001: 150). Similarly, Ilie (2004) shows
how certain forms of boundary transgression, namely types of parliamentary rudeness or
insult, have, over time, acquired an acknowledged legitimacy [in] ritualised confrontational encounters (Ilie, 2004: 52). Hence, parliamentary rules are routinely subject to
negotiation, infringement and direct manipulation; and it is often in these moments of
transgression that the normative workings of parliament are most clearly revealed.
Moreover, as noted by Bayley (2004: 16), because of the very existence of parliamentary
rules, in moments of tension, the procedures themselves may be the cause of conflict
and the object of discussion (emphasis added).
In the present article, we are centrally concerned with the way in which the rules,
procedures, form and content of parliamentary discourse are negotiated in the early days
of the Northern Ireland Assembly. Hence, in relation to the features just described, we
are interested to observe both how these become established and the effects of their
absence on parliamentary process and interaction. In this way, we also aim to provide an
in situ perspective on the role of discourse in establishing the form and constraints of
institutional processes and interactions.
The socio-political context

The NIA was established as part of two interrelated processes: constitutional devolution
within the UK, and the political peace process in Northern Ireland. From the outset, the
Assembly, established under the Belfast Agreement of 1998, reflected the dual aims of
74
constitutional reform and conflict resolution (Carmichael, 1999; Horowitz, 2002; Tonge,
2005). After approximately 30 years of conflict (known as the Troubles), the Assembly
was welcomed as a unique opportunity for inclusive political dialogue and mutual
understanding (see Horowitz, 2002).
On its establishment, the NIA was given full legislative authority for transferred
matters, including education, health, regional development, agriculture, trade and
investment, culture, arts and leisure, and transport. Other issues, known as reserved matters and excepted matters, continued to be dealt with by Westminster.2 The Assembly
met for the first time on 1 July 1998, but existed only in shadow form until 2 December
1999, when legislative powers were transferred from Westminster (see The present
study: Creating parliamentary discourse, below). It is unicameral and comprises 108
elected Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs), the vast majority of whom
represent a designated Unionist or Nationalist party. The main unionist parties are the
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), while the two
largest nationalist parties are the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) and Sinn
Fein (SF). There are also some MLAs from the centre-ground (or cross-community)
Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (APNI). Initially (and at the time of our analysis),
there were also MLAs from smaller sub-formations of unionism and from another
centre-ground party, the Northern Ireland Womens Coalition (NIWC). However, in
subsequent elections, these smaller parties were squeezed out by the main voting blocs
of unionism and nationalism.3
As conceived under the Belfast Agreement, the notions of power-sharing and crosscommunity support are central to the NIA, and this has resulted in a number of distinctive features. For example, as noted earlier, under consociational principles, all of the
main parties share in Government, with no provision for an Opposition. Two key mechanisms were put in place to facilitate power-sharing: the dHondt system, through
which ministerial portfolios are distributed on the basis of party strength; and the
requirement that all major decisions taken by the Assembly must receive cross-community support from a majority of MLAs representing each community (MLAs must designate themselves unionist or nationalist prior to casting their votes). The Speaker is
the Presiding Officer and he or she must also be elected on a cross-community basis.
Despite this emphasis on dialogue and consociationalism, the Assembly has never
operated smoothly; on the contrary, it has been beset by repeated conflicts and suspensions, the most recent of which ended in 2007. Moreover, while it has operated
continuously from 2007, unionists and nationalists (and indeed different sub-groupings
of unionism/nationalism) continue to disagree over many issues. This, together with
the operation of mutual vetoes, has increasingly led to an impression of political
deadlock and stalemate. In our discussion below, we will consider the current NIA in
light of the present analysis.
The present study: Creating parliamentary discourse

Just as parliamentary discourse is shaped by broader cultural and social frameworks
(Bayley, 2004; Chilton, 2004; Chilton and Schffner, 2002; Ilie, 2004; Shaw, 2000), it
can also provide revealing insights into the socio-political context of which it is a part.
75
Given that the NIA is a new venture, will it provide the opportunity for a new form of
political language suited to the changing times, or the imposing of an old style on new
formats? The reality is, of course, that while the NIA is a new venture, its politics and its
structures start from standard and available parliamentary models (Westminster and
other regional parliaments). Hence, as noted earlier, the members participating in the
Shadow debates were negotiating a set of already (broadly) defined practices and
expectations. The outworking of these negotiations is of particular interest when set
within the socio-political context of conflict and conflict resolution, which characterized
the NIA. In examining the Shadow debates, we want to demonstrate a number of characteristics which reveal the particular problems faced by the NIA and how these reflected
the external and internal socio-cultural limits of debate at that time (and, to some extent,
still do so today).
It is worth noting the fact, given this context, and as mentioned briefly above, that
one of the major parties in the Assembly, namely the DUP, was fundamentally opposed
to working with SF until all IRA weapons were destroyed and the IRA disbanded. To
the DUP (and to many unionists) at this time, to enter the NIA was to enter directly into
government with terrorists. Hence, it can be read that one party to the Assembly did not
want the Assembly to exist in either shadow or actual form. This is but one factor which
makes the NIA significantly different from most other parliaments.4 It is also one that,
once again, can only be assessed initially in the first Shadow debate, since once the
DUP take part, they have by this very action discursively co-constructed the Assembly
and taken part in a debate with Sinn Fein.
The Shadow Assembly was established for the purpose of organisation, without
legislative or executive powers, to resolve its standing orders and working practices and
make preparations for the effective functioning of the Assembly and associated
implementation bodies.5 This was seen as a necessary phase preceding full devolution,
since the delegation of appropriate powers was dependent upon members working out
and agreeing appropriate parliamentary procedures and the ground rules of behaviour for
what would be the actual Assembly. The behaviours displayed at this shadow time are
significant, then, in that they set the tone for future processes. As a form of parliamentary
discourse, they also provide very real insights into how parliaments, and indeed parliamentarians, become constituted as entities through the discourses and practices that they
employ.
Analysis: The Shadow debates

As noted earlier, our analysis is drawn from the initial Shadow debate of 1 July 1998;
here, NIA members, under the control of a Shadow Speaker, made their first attempts to
move forward Assembly organization and Assembly rules. The official agenda of this
debate ran as follows: Assembly: Preliminary Matters; Roll of Members; Presiding
Officer and Deputy; First Minister (Designate) and Deputy; Committee on Standing
Orders; Assembly Members Names; First Minister (Designate) and Deputy: Proposals;
Committee to Advise the Presiding Officer; Orange Institution Parade (Drumcree). From
an initial thematic analysis of these sections, we have identified discussions related to
three key areas, which form the basis of our analysis. These are: Party Designation,
76
Table 1.Themes and debate location

Theme
Extracts
Section of debate
Party designation
Parliamentary processes
Parliamentary language
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Roll of Members
Roll of Members
First Minister (Designate) and Deputy
Committee on Standing Orders
Roll of Members
Parliamentary Processes and the Language of Parliament. The extracts selected below
are not intended to give an exhaustive treatment of these topics, but rather to highlight
their occurrence and negotiation within the debate. For the most part, the extracts that we
have selected for analysis are discussed in the order in which they occur in the Official
Report of the debate, that is we follow the lines of the discussion as it develops within
the text. However, on a couple of occasions, we have drawn together extracts from different parts of the text in order to facilitate a fuller consideration of particular themes,
as identified in the initial analysis. The specific location of extracts within the debate is
given in Table 1.
In the analysis which follows, we draw on a range of discursive and broadly sociolinguistic tools to explain the operation of discussion and debate in relation to the key
definitional issues, as outlined above.
Party designation:Who are we?

One of the first things to be decided in the Assembly was the registration and designation
of each party. This was a basic issue, as votes in the Assembly would be presented in
terms of MLAs party and community designations. This would, in almost any other
place, be a seemingly straightforward process. However, as indicated above, although
years of conflict and struggle in NI have tended to polarize communities between unionism and nationalism, there are also sub-formations of these groupings, as well as centrist
parties such as the Alliance Party or the Womens Coalition and a number of independent
politicians. Hence, naming, as has been known in sociolinguistics for some time (see
Wardhaugh, 2010), is more than individual or group designation, but a social act which
may indicate a range of social factors from age and gender to politeness and solidarity.
In terms of allocating political designation in the NIA, it was agreed by the government
that there would only be three possibilities: Unionist, Nationalist and Other. Hence, the
Standing Orders of the Assembly provided by the government offered little flexibility.
This led to some interesting discussions. Consider the following:
77

Extract 1 (1 July 1998)
Mr P. Robinson (DUP)
On a point of order, Mr Initial Presiding Officer. Those whose designations were not clear
included the two representatives of the Northern Ireland Womens Coalition. They seemed to
be in some sort of political drag as other Unionist/Nationalist. If they have now satisfied you
with regard to their designation, can you satisfy us by telling us what that designation is?
The Initial Presiding Officer
They have changed their designation to Inclusive other, the words Unionist and Nationalist
having been deleted.
The Womens Coalition (NIWC) was formed in 1996 as a cross-community political

party, strongly opposed to sectarianism. In light of this, it would be assumed that party
had chosen inclusive other in an attempt not only to avoid any association with tribal
politics, but to highlight their inclusiveness as a positive dimension of their policy and
existence. The use of the term political drag by Peter Robinson is metaphorical and
implies some form of political and/or gendered disguise. However, although drag is
normally associated with men dressing in womens clothing (the term drag queen being
associated with such activity), the slang usage of the term allows for either sex dressing
in the clothes of the other sex. With the descriptive marker political, we have a set of
interrelated interpretations. First, Mr Robinson is clearly being pejorative in suggesting
that the NIWC MLAs are trying to disguise themselves. He is indirectly highlighting and
alluding to the male-dominated environment of most parliaments, and to the very fact that
the NIWC is formed as a party for women. In such a context of exclusion, to rename
themselves would be to move away from such exclusion, that is being inclusive would
be contradictory without including men. Unless, that is, they dress up (in drag) as men or
as something politically other than they are. Hence, paradoxically, the name Womens
Coalition acts to negate inclusivity, since it indicates a single gender agenda. While the
group may espouse an ideology of inclusivity, their name clashes with this; consequently, for Mr Robinson, they are confused as to who they are and what they represent.
A second issue relates to the fact that many mainstream politicians did not take the
NIWC as seriously as other core parties; the NIWC were seen in some ways as a gimmick. In such a context, again, any attempt at re-designation could be seen as trying to
join the mainstream, which is, as noted, not only male-dominated, but seen only as either
Unionist or Nationalist.
Consider now a further comment on this issue.
Mr C. Wilson (Ind. Unionist)
On a point of order, Mr Initial Presiding Officer. It is quite clear from initial Standing Order
3(1) that Members should designate their identity as Nationalist, Unionist or Other. I
understand that the two Womens Coalition Members have breached that. Indeed, I understand
from an interview on television that the Alliance Party Members have described themselves as
Centre. Surely those who claim to have assisted in putting together these Standing Orders and
this Agreement should abide by the rules and stop playing games with this Assembly.
78
Here, along with Mr Robinsons more facetious comments, we get to the heart of the
matter. The criticism is about bringing these other groups into line with the rules. But it
is also more than this; it is about power and control (Van Dijk, 2008), about who the main
political players are (see Butler, 1990; Foucault, 1975). Only those who dont really
know who they are would be messing about with re-designation; and such groups are
also those who dont really know how politics works, even when they have been given a
chance to help define the rules. But, equally, what does the term other actually mean?
Its definition is in terms not of itself, but as implied against something else. In this case,
it says what you are not nationalist or unionist but not what you are. Hence the efforts
of the Womens Coalition (and the Alliance Party) seem perfectly understandable, in that
they seek to have an identity which belongs to them, one that reflects their beliefs and
political views. This notwithstanding, the problem is that there is no system for designation of subset of Other, as is made clear by the Initial Presiding Officer (IPO) in his
response to Mr Wilson:
Initial Presiding Officer (1 July 1998)
I have taken legal advice on a number of issues, including this one because the designations
must be very clear and I have to be satisfied about them. The precise wording can be flexible,
but the designation must be absolutely clear. The officials and I have checked through this, and
with regard to the Womens Coalition and the Alliance Party I am very clear that the only
possible interpretation of their designation is Other. I can go through the designations of other
Members if the Assembly wishes, but they are clear to me.
Here again, we see a rejection of any attempt to step outside the rules. In this case, the
Alliance Party are also brought into the debate, by virtue of their attempts to use the term
centre to reflect their middle of the road position. In the scheme of things, such a discussion about minor amendments to designation may seem odd, since it is hard to know
what damage is being done either way. On the other hand, given the various shades of
unionism and of nationalism, the Assembly might end up with a plethora of designations.
In the end, therefore, the seemingly procrustean constraint of only three options may not
be so illogical. However, it is worth noting that the rules on naming parties may also be
being used to indicate where the centre of power is in the Assembly; that is, with those
traditional unionist parties who are the majority and who stand against Sinn Fein. Other
minor parties are not only not of interest, but not really worthy of naming.
When considering party designation, of course, there is also the important issue of
what each party actually is, and whom/what it represents, as perceived from the different
vantage points of unionism and nationalism. This is most clearly evident in the case of
Sinn Fein, who retained full links with the IRA, and were thus seen by many unionists as
terrorists in government (see Extracts 35 below). However, it is also an issue for nationalist/
republican perceptions of unionists, and what they stand for (as exemplified in Extract 6).
Mr S. Wilson (DUP)
I hope that before the vote Mr Trimble will make clear where he stands on the issue of sitting
in government with the representatives of IRA/Sinn Fein
79

Then there are the weasel words of the leader of IRA/Sinn Fein
IRA/Sinn Fein Members talk about taking steps into a new future. They tell us to think of the
people the very people they have been shooting and bombing for 30 years
Mr N. Dodds (DUP)
It was very interesting to hear a representative of IRA/Sinn Fein chastising Mr McCartney and
others about the equality agenda and the Irish language
Through hand-written pledges on a series of issues prisoners, decommissioning and
Government positions for IRA/Sinn Fein
We in the Democratic Unionist Party are in this House not because we are afraid of anything or
anybody but because we were elected in substantial numbers by the people of Northern Ireland.
We made it clear that we would never negotiate with IRA/Sinn Fein
Mr P. Robinson (DUP)
Ms de Brn has said that she considers todays proceedings a step in the right direction. I do not
think that any Unionist is unclear about the direction in which Sinn Fein/IRA want to take this
province.
We have selected Extracts 35 to demonstrate a specific linguistic device by which DUP

MLAs designate a connection between Sinn Fein and the IRA, that is the explicit verbal
linking of Sinn Fein/IRA and IRA/Sinn Fein. Given that Sinn Fein are simultaneously
content to be described as the political wing of the IRA, but, on many occasions, at pains
to point out that they are separate from, and unable to speak for, the IRA, the alternating
usage of this construction by unionist politicians is particularly interesting. Sinn Fein
used as the title of the party is unmarked, while both Sinn Fein/IRA and IRA/Sinn Fein
are marked to designate a link between the two parts: Sinn Fein and IRA. Now, in one
sense, each alternative Sinn Fein/IRA or IRA/Sinn Fein would seem to be semantically equivalent. In this case, is the use of IRA/Sinn Fein as opposed to Sinn/Fein IRA
purely individual and idiosyncratic? Are those designations purely random?
In terms of reference, Frege noted some time ago the distinction between two terms
having the same referent but having different modes of presentation (Frege, 1892/1980;
see also, more recently, Fiengo and May, 2006). The classic example is that of morning
star versus evening star. Both have the same referent, namely the planet Venus, but they
have different modes of presentation. Consequently, while (a), (b) and (c) are tautologies,
(d), (e) and (f) present communicated information:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
The morning star is the morning star

The evening star is the evening star
Venus is Venus
The morning star is the evening star
80
(e) The morning star is Venus

(f) The evening star is Venus
In the case of IRA and Sinn Fein, even if these terms did refer to exactly the same referent in all respects, that referent can be presented in two different modes of presentation,
namely IRA and Sinn Fein. Hence IRA/Sinn Fein removes any referential ambiguity as
to how certain members of the Assembly are viewed by others in terms of their referential designation. Such members are sociolinguistically marking the IRA and Sinn Fein as
equivalent, and in doing this they highlight what Moscovici (2000: 45) refers to as the
genealogy of naming. They are placing the term within a specific cultural matrix of
unionist understanding, that is, the IRA as terrorists.
Now many members of Sinn Fein insisted that there was a distinction between Sinn
Fein and the IRA, making clear in some cases that they did not speak for the IRA and
were not members of the IRA. There may be a link here between what Habermas (2000)
refers to as being true and being-held-to-be-true. The first is similar to the formal
semantic view, whereas the second is linked to discursive justifiability. In this second
case, where one has reasons to believe Sinn Fein and the IRA are the same for all intents
and purposes, then one can designate them as equivalent in terms of what is believed to
be true, where such belief is justifiably expressed and forms the basis for what Habermas
calls the cooperative search for truth.
In an idealized world of communication, this seems fine, but in the case of the NIA,
the DUP members do not believe that Sinn Fein have a right to be in the Chamber, nor,
therefore, to take part in rational argumentation. Consequently, using IRA/Sinn Fein and
Sinn Fein/IRA signals a breach in argumentation options, a talking about Sinn Fein/
IRA rather than talking with Sinn Fein/IRA. This latter point applies whether it is IRA/
Sinn Fein or Sinn Fein/IRA, so does the order of the conflation matter? It is difficult to
decide the issue one way or the other, although the structural alternatives need not be
without implied consequences. It has been argued by critical linguists (see Fairclough,
1995; Kress and Hodge, 1979) that linguistic selections carry ideological loading. For
example, in the case of active/passive sentences such as (a) and (b), below, it is suggested
that (b) places the affected Patient in the subject position, thereby reducing the central
role of the Agent, that is the person or persons who actually carried out the act.
(a) The IRA shot the policeman.
(b) The policeman was shot by the IRA.
Now consider the IRA/Sinn Fein versus Sinn Fein/IRA distinction. These are clearly not
examples of the active/passive construction, but a similar point may apply. Specifically,
it could be suggested that in IRA/Sinn Fein, not only is IRA given prominence, but
further its prior positioning may be an effort to map issues to the world, that is in saying
that the IRA comes first. If this is a possible analysis, then those wishing to express their
most vehement rejection of Sinn Fein would adopt IRA/Sinn Fein, and in the examples
above all those who do this are members of the DUP. The argument only proceeds so far
however, since Peter Robinson is also a member of the DUP. Nevertheless, unless there
81
is a party line that only the term IRA/Sinn Fein is employed, it would give some individual freedom of selection. Further, it is interesting to note that no one outside the DUP
has employed such a designation. As a result, what we seem to have is a type of scale
(Sinn Fein Sinn Fein/IRA IRA/Sinn Fein) which moves from the neutral to the
increasingly more negative associational frame of IRA/Sinn Fein.
This point is evidenced, in a later debate, by at least one MLA attempting to attack
the DUP usage of IRA/Sinn Fein and Sinn Fein/IRA by posing the following question
to the Speaker: If terms like Sinn Fein/IRA are to be used, may other Members feel
free to use terms like DUP/LVF? (Mr J Kelly, 14 September 1998). Here, Mr Kelly
is turning the tables on the DUP by linking them directly with the Loyalist Volunteer
Force, an outlawed Protestant terrorist grouping. Given that the DUP have never been
linked to any terrorist grouping, the incongruity of this statement may be taken as an
attempt to analogously decouple Sinn Fein from the IRA at least for the purposes of
debate in the Chamber.
Returning to the way in which Sinn Fein are being referenced, from the perspective
of nationalist voters and politicians, there is an important issue at stake here. Under the
framework of the Belfast Agreement, the Sinn Fein Representatives are in the Assembly
because they were elected; they are there, consequently, as a political right, and the
concept of political rights is central to nationalist and republican political discourse.
This is encompassed in the following example from Martin McGuinness, which also
reflects the issue of political perceptions, that is who we (you) are.
Mr M. McGuinness (SF)
Dia dhaoibh a chairde Having listened to the contributions of the United Kingdom
Unionist Party and the Democratic Unionist Party, people will perhaps have a better
understanding of the position that we have adopted for this election. It is a very good day for
us to be here together as the elected representatives of all the people of this part of the island.
It is particularly important to us to meet people like Mr Cedric Wilson, who for years stood
in splendid isolation at the front of Parliament Buildings waving a placard as we moved back
and forth attempting to negotiate on behalf of the people who had given us political
responsibility Mr McCartney laughed and smirked as someone on this side of the House
spoke Irish. What he said suggested that he is very concerned about equality and justice. I
certainly hope that he is. However, he looked very intently at the Members behind
Mr Trimble, as if to intimidate them.
Mr R McCartney (UKUP)
The Member should not talk about intimidation.
Mr M McGuinness (SF)
I hope that he will not manage to intimidate anybody in this Chamber. He certainly will not
intimidate the representatives of Sinn Fein, for we are here on the back of a very substantial
electoral mandate. We are here on behalf of people who have been discriminated against since
the foundation of the Northern state. We are here on behalf of people who want an end to
inequality, discrimination, domination and injustice
82
Here Mr McGuinnesss claim for the importance of individual and social rights is
implicitly and explicitly linked to the notion that, in the past, nationalists were denied
such rights by unionists. He also attributes such denial to present unionist MLAs such as
Mr Cedric Wilson and Mr Robert McCartney. In fact, he draws an explicit contrast
between people like Mr Cedric Wilson standing in splendid isolation waving a
placard and Sinn Fein, who are presented as working on behalf of their electorate to
achieve these same political and social rights. In this context, he presents (present-day)
unionist politicians as attempting to obstruct basic human rights; and moreover as
threatening, or intimidating, those who try to achieve them. The latter point is
challenged by Mr Robert McCartney, of the UK Unionist Party, who refers implicitly to
Mr McGuinnesss links with the IRA. However, Mr McGuinness counters this challenge
by returning to the notion that it is, in fact, unionists who are attempting to intimidate
other Assembly members (i.e. nationalists/republicans). He then reiterates the claim that
Sinn Fein members are representing those who have traditionally been denied rights;
for this reason, he states, they refuse to be intimidated by unionist politicians. This
exchange, then, is built around a positioning and (re)positioning of nationalists and
unionists, with each side casting the other as agents of intimidation both inside and
outside the political arena.
We can see in these debates that a core principle of parliamentary interaction remains
under challenge, that is not only recognition of the various parties in the Assembly, but
recognition of their electoral right to be in the Assembly.
Parliamentary processes: What do we do?

Part of the work of the Shadow Assembly was to find appropriate mechanisms and
procedures for carrying out parliamentary business. In Extracts 7 and 8, we see examples of confusion about what these procedures are/should be. It is notable that these
situations are commonly used as an opportunity for political point scoring, either
between particular parties/individuals or between nationalism and unionism more
generally.
Mr Adams (SF)
On a point of order, Mr Initial Presiding Officer. In the interests of good manners and good
relationships
Several Members
Stand up.
Mr Adams (SF)
Sorry: I thought I was standing up. I am certainly standing up for the rights of the people who
sent me here.
Should not each party be referred to by its given title? I undertake to describe the United
Kingdom Unionists as the United Kingdom Unionists, the Democratic Unionist Party as the
Democratic Unionist Party, and so on, and my party should be referred to as Sinn Fein.
83

It is clear that a number of issues relating to Standing Orders will have to be addressed. We need
a Committee to decide, for instance, how Members should be described and how they should
address each other. It would be invidious for me, as Initial Presiding Officer, to rule on issues
which go beyond the current Standing Orders.
In this extract, Mr Gerry Adams, the leader of Sinn Fein, takes issue with the way in
which many of the Unionist members link SF with the IRA when referring to the party
(see earlier). His opening in the interests of good manners and good relationships is
interrupted by a number of MLAs who highlight the fact that he is not following parliamentary procedure, that is he is not standing up to address the IPO. However, Mr Adams
deliberately misinterprets the phrase stand up (literally meaning to get to ones feet),
taking instead its metaphorical meaning to stand up (for), meaning to defend or to
speak on behalf of. He claims that he is, in fact, standing up in this metaphorical sense,
therefore countering criticism of his breach of protocol and also underlining what he sees
as a central aspect of SFs political identity. Following Mr Adams point about his partys
title, the IPO states that forms of address have not, in fact, been agreed upon by the
(Shadow) Assembly. Until this is done, then, members are presumably free to refer to
one another in any way they please. This is an explicit example of our point above about
the significance of the initial Shadow debate, in that here we see again the centrality of
reference and naming at this phase, and indeed, the way it is being discursively manipulated for political gain.
In Extract 8, we see another example of procedural confusion and political disagreement
on the back of this, as members argue about the desirable composition of a proposed
Committee on Standing Orders.
Rev. Dr Ian Paisley (DUP)
Mr Durkan seems to think that Nationalists and Republicans are badly done by. It is not so.
Nationalists as a whole have 42 Assembly Members and will have seven on the Committee,
whereas 48 Unionists will have only seven.
Mr Hume (SDLP)
Remember the Progressive Unionist Party.
I am talking about the two largest Unionist parties, which have more than one representative on
the Committee.
Nationalists are always telling us that they are badly done by. Forty-two Nationalists have the
same Committee representation as 48 Unionists, yet they are arguing
Mr Hume (SDLP)
The answer to Dr Paisleys question about the Social Democratic and Labour Party is that we
can count. There are 108 Members in the Assembly, 18 of whom will be on the Committee.
That works out at one Committee representative for every six Members the most democratic
arrangement.
84
Mr P Robinson (DUP)
A party with fewer than six Members will have two
Mr Hume (SDLP)
Hold on a minute.
You already subtracted three.
Mr Hume (SDLP)
The three parties that are represented entirely accurately are the Alliance Party (one
representative for six Members), Sinn Fein (three for 18) and the Social Democratic and Labour
Party (four for 24).
Let us look at the Unionist parties representation. The United Kingdom Unionist Party is overrepresented, as is the Progressive Unionist Party. Together, the Unionist parties are well
represented
This extract clearly demonstrates both the NIAs lack of agreed protocol and members
confusion as they attempt to negotiate this (contested) protocol. However, it is also clear
that the general confusion is exacerbated by members attempts to ensure the maximum
representation, not necessarily for their respective parties (although that is important
too), but rather for their own political side, that is unionism or nationalism. This reflects
a zero-sum approach to political interaction from both nationalists and unionists. This
approach is, in turn, facilitated and perpetuated by the lack of agreement on parliamentary protocol, which appears to be treated as a space in which either unionists or
nationalists could negotiate a potentially better deal for their own side.
Part of the problem here is that minority parties of perhaps only one or two members
will of necessity have statistical overrepresentation if the Assembly Committees are to
work. Here the issue of number is not only an issue of mathematical distribution, but
once again of control and power for the largest groupings. Of course, within a power
sharing arrangement, everyone who is elected has to have their position. However, if
one doesnt believe in compulsory power sharing, or is at least not supportive of it, one
may use numbers to reflect social arguments for the potential unfairness of such power
sharing by indicating its impact on political representation inside the Assembly. That
is, number is made political. It is to be interpreted only within a standard majority
rule principle of democracy, which is of course a challenge to the very basis of the
consociational nature of the Assembly structure itself.
Parliamentary language: What do we speak?

In Extract 6 above, Mr McGuiness began his contribution in the Irish language, which
was fairly standard practice for Sinn Fein MLAs throughout NIA debates. This is, of
course, not accidental, in that Sinn Fein use Irish as a symbol of their aspiration for a
united Ireland free from British rule. It was to be the case that members of the NIA were
free to speak in whichever language they chose. However, the link between politics and
85
language is well established both in historical and contemporary terms (see e.g. Haugen,
1966; Nic Craith, 2007), and in a politically contested context such as Northern Ireland,
this inevitably gave rise to a linguistic disagreement in the Assembly (see Wilson and
Stapleton, 2003). As noted above, the Irish language has become associated with the
nationalist cause of a United Ireland, and is thus used strategically by nationalists/republicans in political (as well as other) contexts. Unionists, on the other hand, have, until
recently, communicated in such contexts exclusively in English. More latterly, Ulster
Scots (a form of Lowland Scots spoken in Ulster) has become associated with the
unionist cause (Nic Craith, 2001; Stapleton and Wilson, 2004) and therefore unionists
could, if they so wished, utilize Ulster Scots in a manner similar to the nationalist/republican use of Irish.6 Ironically, as noted earlier, the single identity associations of these
languages are actually heightened under the parity of esteem principles of the Belfast
Agreement an issue that is discussed elsewhere specifically in relation to arguments
for and against the use of languages other than English in the Assembly (Wilson and
Stapleton, 2003).
However, as demonstrated in Extract 9, the Speaker is obliged to allow the use of any
language that MLAs choose to use.
Initial Presiding Officer
I mentioned to the party Whips yesterday that I, for so long as I am in the Chair, will have no
objection to the use of Irish or any other language. However, we have no simultaneous
translation facilities at present, so it would be appropriate if, out of courtesy, Members were to
offer their own translation. Speeches will be reported in the language spoken. There will be no
translation other than that which is offered by the Member. That applies to any alternative
language, though Irish is, I expect, the one most likely to be used.
Clearly, the question of language choice in Northern Ireland raises a host of contentious sociolinguistic issues (bilingualism; ethnolectal variation; language planning and
policy) which it would be inappropriate to detail in the present article. Our main
purpose in looking at the topic of language(s) here is to consider its effect on parliamentary proceedings. As stated in Extract 9, the NIA did not, at this point, have
simultaneous translation facilities available to it. Where different languages are
employed in an Assembly of political groupings, with diverse linguistic backgrounds,
it might be expected that some translation facilities should be available, and indeed
simultaneous translation was introduced for both Ulster Scots and Irish at a later stage
of the NIA. The introduction of such facilities would not negate the contentious effects
of members choosing to speak Irish or Ulster Scots; nor would it satisfy those members
who maintain that, since all MLAs are fluent speakers of English, then the introduction
of additional languages/language facilities is superfluous, divisive and wasteful.
However, in the Shadow phase of the Assembly, the lack of simultaneous translation
proved inconvenient, and, notably, provides a further opportunity for parliamentary
challenge and disruption. We have chosen just two brief examples of this, presented in
Extracts 10 and 11 below.
86

Mr Adams (SF)
First of all, let me say that I am very pleased to be here and to see so many other people with
us. I mo theanga fin, caithfidh m a r gur l stairiil an l seo, agus le cuidi D beidh muid,
agus t muid, i mo bharil fin, ag cur r n-aidhm stairiil ar aghaidh. As seo amach, is fidir
linn [Interruption]
Let us have order for the Member speaking.
If we could understand him we might give him order.
May I have order and due respect in the Chamber, please.
As Mr Adams begins to speak Irish, we can see that this leads to an initial interruption.
This clearly causes disruption to the proceedings, and leads to a call for order from the
Initial Presiding Officer (IPO). However, the reason for the interruption is not immediately obvious. Given that proceedings are disrupted, it might be assumed that (some)
members are opposed to Mr Adams use of Irish. However, we cannot be certain
whether such opposition is on political or practical grounds, that is whether MLAs are
objecting to the Irish language per se or simply that they are unable to understand the
contribution (or both). The remark from Dr Ian Paisley, leader of the DUP (If we could
understand him we might give him order), while clearly ironic in intent, is nevertheless instructive in its own way. There would be few speakers of Irish among unionist
MLAs; hence, not only would they not understand that part of Mr Adams speech, they
would have no way of knowing whether the translations he provided were accurate or
accommodating. The choice to use a minority language (e.g. Irish or Ulster Scots) in a
context where the majority cannot understand it, but where everybody can understand
English, is clearly a political one, since for all practical purposes English is the de facto
working language of the Assembly. In a direct sense, the use of Irish here, then, is an
expression of Irish nationalism, a claim to be speaking the language of the Island of
Ireland.
In the absence of simultaneous translation, the use of a minority language also facilitates disruption to the parliamentary proceedings. In Extract 11, we can see another
example of the parliamentary language issue.
. . . Ayes and Noes are the only responses that will be noted. There is currently no provision for
noting abstentions.
Mr Shannon (DUP)
Is the Ulster Scots word nah acceptable?
87

As I said earlier, where any language other than English is used, it would be courteous to
provide a translation.
Mr Shannon
For those who do not understand, let me explain that nah is the Ulster Scots for no.
I entirely understand what you are saying, and I repeat that when any language other than
English is used, a translation should be given for the sake of other Members who may not
understand it. Otherwise it will not be noted.
Mr Adams
Is there an Ulster Scots word for yes?
Here, the absence of simultaneous translation is again a source of parliamentary asides.

Mr Jim Shannon asks whether he can use Ulster Scots in registering a no vote in the
Assembly. Because of its similarity to the English word no, the Ulster Scots nah
would obviously be understood by all MLAs. However, following the general protocol,
the IPO maintains that a translation should be provided. This then leads to a somewhat
facetious explanation of the term from Mr Shannon, after which the IPO repeats the
reasons for requesting a translation of any contributions made in a language other than
English. The very fact that Mr Shannon requested to use Ulster Scots may itself be seen
as making a political point, since, again, Mr Shannon speaks English and does not need
to communicate in Ulster Scots. This sequence also provides another opportunity for a
political aside, in the form of Mr Adams ironic enquiry as to whether there is an Ulster
Scots word for yes. In the NI context, this remark would be readily interpretable as
referring to the stereotype of the intransigent unionist (Ulster says no, etc.). Hence,
Mr Adams designates Ulster Scots as belonging to the unionist community, and also
manages to implicitly criticize the unionist politicians currently in the Assembly.
Discussion and conclusion

In this article, we have adopted a discursive constructionist perspective on the opening
debate of the Northern Ireland (Shadow) Assembly. Such an approach operates at the
intersection of social theory and sociolinguistics (e.g. Heller, 2001; Wilson, 2001). Thus,
we are interested in the patterns of behaviour and interaction which arise from particular
social institutions and contexts, and through which these same institutions are constructed and legitimated. From this perspective, we have examined some of the linguistic
and interactional features being laid down by the newly established Assembly; and we
have considered the significance of these behavioural patterns for the constitution of the
Assembly.
A key aim of our analysis was to provide insights into how parliamentary discourse
and processes are constructed in real time. The Shadow debates can be seen as an instance
of parliamentary constitution in a context where some of the political and discourse
88
issues are still open for negotiation. Moreover, to the extent that (p)olitical discourses
and parliamentary institutions are mutually constitutive through public display of meaning negotiation, persuasion rhetoric, and power management (Ilie, 2010a: 879), the
analysis also allows for consideration of how the NIA as an institution was being socially
constituted and legitimated through discursive frameworks and patterns. Finally, the
early debates provide a lens through which we can view the NI political and peace process as it was unfolding at this time. As Van Dijk (2005: 66) has claimed, political discourse analysis should not be limited to structural features of text and talk, but also
account for their conditions and functions in the political process. Within the Shadow
debate, the interaction of political conditions and structural features seems specifically
highlighted.
Taking this further, and as already noted, the NI parliamentary context is distinctive in
a number of ways; in particular, the socio-historical context of conflict can be seen to
pervade the debates and provide the backdrop for the ongoing antagonism and pointscoring between individuals, parties and ideologies. In addition, the make-up of the NIA
itself (i.e. where all parties share power, there is no official Opposition and cross-
community support is required for all decisions) reflects the nature and purpose of the
NIA which has always been as much about peace-building as about providing local or
regional government. This point is in line with Bayleys (2004) claim that all parliaments
and parliamentary discourse reflect the socio-cultural context of which they are a part.
Further, the intrinsically adversarial nature of parliamentary discourse is based here not on
Government versus Opposition parties, as in most other parliaments, but between the two
main blocs which are ostensibly sharing the government of NI, that is nationalist and
unionist (albeit that there is also some interparty wrangling within these competing blocs).
Our analysis was centrally focused on the creation and negotiation of parliamentary
rules, specifically those surrounding party designation (Who are we?), parliamentary
processes (What do we do?) and the language of parliament (What language do we
speak?), all of which are sociolinguistic in nature since they revolve around such things
as naming and addressing, processes for speaker selection and which language should be
employed. This was revealing on at least two levels. First, the Shadow debates were
specifically about working out parliamentary process and ritual; hence they provide an
opportunity to view the way in which parliamentary rules become legitimated. Second,
in these early debates we have a situation in which the procedures were not agreed
and were, to some extent, open to negotiation and/or exploitation. In most established
parliaments, rules and rituals are pre-determined (usually by means of prescriptive rulebooks or treatises such as that of Erskine May); and within this context, as Bayley (2004),
Ilie (2010b) and others have noted, the rules may be strategically breached for political
purposes and, in certain situations, they can themselves become the focus of conflict. In
our analysis, we can observe the way in which members exploit both the lack of agreed
rules and sanctions and also the opportunity to input into the final form of these structures. This process is typically used as a further opportunity for power wrangling and the
trading of insults, primarily between unionist and nationalist parties. Hence, as the MLAs
debate what is (or should become) the acceptable form of parliamentary discourse and
behaviour, these very issues themselves provide an opportunity for a particular form of
political antagonism based on the NI political divide.
89
Therefore, throughout the debate, the members can be seen as vying to discursively
establish the parameters of political behaviour within an essentially antagonistic framework. Here, as noted, the very lack of agreed protocol engenders ongoing contestation
around classic issues of sociolinguistic power struggle and display, for example: naming, reference and address terms; individual/group speaking and participation rights;
and linguistic and identity rights/recognition (see e.g. Talbot et al., 2003). Moreover,
while antagonistic structures are characteristic of much, if not all, parliamentary discourse, we would argue that the NIA exchanges analysed here are marked out in other
specific ways: (a) a stark zero-sum approach to power and its distribution; (b) a willingness to use procedural uncertainty to delay and derail proceedings, particularly at
the expense of the other side; and (c) a clear and accepted division along the traditional dichotomy of unionism and nationalism, which implicitly underpins the debate
and the parliamentary process as a whole. In this way, the Shadow forms of discursive
construction can be seen as shaping the future forms of discourse and interactional limits within the Assembly, which, we would argue, are evident in the current functioning
of the institutions.
In light of the above, it is perhaps unsurprising that the NIA has never operated
smoothly. Its initial progress was faltering and, as noted by Bradbury and Mitchell
(2001: 257), was always threatened by interparty animosities and severe limits on the
normalization of policy-making. Its functioning was also undermined by continuing
political disagreements and by developments in wider NI society (e.g. controversies
surrounding IRA decommissioning of weapons, allegations of spying at Stormont and
disagreements over the devolution of policing and justice). Moreover, a number of writers have argued that the emphasis on cross-community agreement and parity of esteem,
enshrined in the Belfast Agreement, actually work to promote single-identity politics
and to entrench the very positions they are designed to dislodge (Brown and MacGinty,
2003; MacGinty and Darby, 2002; Stapleton and Wilson, 2010; Tonge, 2005; Wilson
and Stapleton, 2003). As a result of these ongoing conflicts and difficulties, the NIA was
suspended on four separate occasions, during which responsibility for devolved matters
was temporarily returned to the Northern Ireland Office. In the most lengthy and serious
of these, it was suspended from October 2002 until May 2007, and was reinstated only
following lengthy discussions and the St Andrews Agreement of 2006.
The reinstatement of the NIA on 7 May 2007 was hailed as a remarkable event, since
it involved the unprecedented decision of the hard-line parties DUP and Sinn Fein (by
then the largest parties in their respective communities) to share power and enter
government together. However, although the Assembly has operated continuously from
that date, unionists and nationalists continue to disagree over many issues, to operate
mutual vetoes on proposals and initiatives, and to focus on totemic issues (e.g. language
and parades), alongside the bread and butter politics that occupy most other regional
governments. To date, the DUP and Sinn Fein, which, as the two largest parties, dominate Ministerial posts, have remained largely in accord on social and political issues.
However, it might be argued that this seeming harmony restricts the scope of topics on
which political debate can occur. The common ground between the parties is fragile,
while issues such as language rights and cultural symbols (among other things) retain
strong potential for discord between the parties. Hence, as noted earlier, the NIA is
frequently seen as operating in a context of (at least partial) deadlock and stalemate.
90
We would argue that these features reflect the origins of parliamentary discourse in
the Shadow Assembly and, of course, the socio-political context of Northern Ireland.
Thus, the initial discursive patterns of blocking, derailment and power protection can be
seen to underpin the current forms and limits of parliamentary discourse. Indeed, the fact
that the fundamental inbuilt antagonism within the majority grouping must be masked to
maintain the existing structures further limits the scope of parliamentary discourse and
process, and thus further consolidates the patterns laid down in the initial debates. The
future outworking of these issues provides a fascinating arena in which to further observe
the interaction of politics and discourse as they are constituted in real time.
Notes
1. We would like to thank Cornelia Ilie (rebro University, Sweden) for her helpful comments
on an earlier version of this article.
2. One of these reserved matters, Policing and Criminal Justice, was subsequently devolved to
the NIA in April 2010.
3. The hard-line parties, namely the DUP and Sinn Fein, have made particularly large gains
in successive elections.
4. For example, although the devolved institutions of Scotland and Wales had Scottish and Welsh
nationalist members, who would have preferred independence, neither in size, representation,
nor indeed inclination were they comparable to the DUP.
5. Belfast Agreement, Strand 1, paragraph 35.
6. It should be noted that Ulster Scots is not embraced, nor even necessarily accepted, by all
unionists as a political/cultural marker (see McCall, 2002).
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John Wilson is Professor of Communication at the University of Ulster. His research

focuses on political discourse and on the construction of linguistic meaning in varieties of everyday talk, drawing mainly on the fields of Pragmatics, Discourse Analysis,
and Sociolinguistics. He has recently co-edited two books: Devolution and Identity
(with K Stapleton; Ashgate, 2006) and The Discourse of Europe (with S Millar; John
Benjamins, 2007).
Karyn Stapleton is a Senior Lecturer in Communication at the University of Ulster. Her
core research involves the application of Discourse Analysis to issues of politics, culture
and identity, particularly in the context of Northern Ireland. Recent publications include
articles on Ulster Scots, political narratives, cognitive dissonance and public apologies.

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Discourse in the shadows: Discursive construction and the Northern Ireland

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