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Foreign Relations, 19691976, Volume II

234. Draft Memorandum From Wayne Smith and Andrew

Marshall of the National Security Council Staff to the
Presidents Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Kissinger)1
Washington, July 30, 1971.
SUBJECT
Intelligence Reorganization: More Limited Options

If you do not want to recommend the reorganization and other

measures the NSC/OMB study produced, there are more limited
changes that would be useful and that would likely be supported by
the PFIAB, OMB, and DCI. They are likely to produce little savings, at
least originally, and reduce the chances for any major reforms in the
operation of the intelligence community for the foreseeable future.
A minimal package would include:
(1) Net Assessment Group in the White House to review the intelligence communitys output.
Headed by a Senior Member of the NSC staff reporting directly
to you.
Total of 35 people.
Charter to encompass review of NIEs, Presidents Quarterly Report on Strategic Forces, CIA studies, DIA studies, intelligence communitys input required by NSSMs and other directives.
(2) Measures to enhance the authority and capability of the DCI
to plan and guide the national intelligence program.
Presidential directive spelling out changes in DCI responsibilities and objectives of changed community arrangements.
Delegation of day-to-day operations of CIA so that DCI can concentrate upon national programs.
Increased staff supporting DCI in this role as manager of
community.
DCI to prepare and present to OMB and President consolidated
national intelligence program and budget. CIA and DOD to supply all
information on their programs to allow this.
Revision of NSCID 1 to make USIB advisory body and change
structure to set up two major committees. One, essentially the current
USIB, to assist DCI in producing substantive national intelligence. The
other, a resources committee, to assist DCI in coordination of resource

1
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files,
Box 332, Intelligence Reorganization, Vol. I. Top Secret; Byeman. Kissinger initiated the
memorandum.

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programs. This to be perhaps a combination of NIRB and Ex Com. Possible revision of other NSCIDs to clarify missions of major elements of
community.
Further development of focal point in DOD for control of intelligence resources. Perhaps assignment to one of the two Deputy Secretaries of Defense as a main responsibility and ASD/I reporting to
him, creating point of contact for DCI.
(3) Measures to improve guidance to DCI and community on intelligence product.
Set up NSC subcommittee chaired by the Presidents Assistant
for National Security Affairs to review national intelligence product
and give guidance to DCI and community.
Your participation on subcommittee to be staffed by Net Assessment Group.
The strategy would be to task the DCI more clearly with management of community and enhance his status and management capabilities, leaving to him the job of working out the many problems of
overlap and inefficiency in use of resources and improving the quality
of the product. Some thought should be given to steps to be taken later
in the process. Extensive revision of NSCIDs is one example. Another
is to look beyond Helms retirement and to do what can be done to get
another John McCone, with strong management abilities, as the next
DCI.
Implementation
You will take a good month or so for preparation in appropriate
Presidential directive, drafting version of NSCID 1, etc. Plan needs to
be made for working with DCI and other community elements. Also
preferable not to present as a major reorganization, but as another step
toward better management of the community. This limited change may
not work. There are many sources of inefficiency and duplication it
stands little chance of touching. By itself, it will not do much to improve the product since it will not insure the needed increase in resources devoted to production and to the development of improved
intelligence analysis methods.2

2
According to Haldemans diary, the President expressed the following views on
intelligence during a July 23 budget meeting. On a general basis, the P said never has
a country spent more for less defense than does America. Then he got to intelligence,
said weve got to take the same approach there. The CIA tells me nothing I dont read
three days earlier in the New York Times. Intelligence is a sacred cow. Weve done nothing since weve been here about it. The CIA isnt worth a damn. We have to get out the
symbolism; so a 25 percent cut across-the-board, get rid of the disloyal types. He told
Henry to take a full month to do it, that it couldnt be done by Shultz or Weinberger. It
must be in terms of strategy, not in terms of budget. (The Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia
Edition, July 25, 1971)