MLTC CATRAM Market Study Container Terminals West and Central Africa

Final report
MLTC/CATRAM
Market study on container terminals

in West and Central Africa
Final report 23/01/2013
Market study on container terminals in West and Central Africa
Contents
Glossary ................................................................................................................................... 3
Study summary and recommendations .................................................................................... 9
PHASE 1 CURRENT STATUS ........................................................................................... 13
1. Maritime and port analysis........................................................................................... 13
1.1.
Maritime services ................................................................................................. 13
1.2.
Types of vessels................................................................................................... 32
1.3.
Shipowners strategies ......................................................................................... 59
2. Infrastructures, traffic and organisation ....................................................................... 64

2.1.
Ports in detail........................................................................................................ 64
2.2.
Freight handlers strategies ................................................................................ 115
PHASE 2 PORT REQUIREMENTS .................................................................................. 118

1. Evolution in maritime container traffic........................................................................ 118
2. Consequences for port infrastructures ...................................................................... 123
This study was financed by the Agence Franaise de Dveloppement.

AFD is not responsible in any way for its contents.
Final report MLTC/CATRAM 23/01/13
Glossary
Maritime agent
See consignee below.
Alliance
Agreement made between shipowners on the principal global routes for

sharing of resources, notably vessels, and coordination of maritime services.
We talk of global alliances when shipowners collaborate on at least the three
large East-West routes.
Port authority
Organisation delegated to managing port facilities and the ports public

equipment. Port facilities may be granted to private concerns. The port
authority is in charge of sovereign functions and in some cases certain
shipping services (piloting, mooring, towing etc.).
BAF
Bunker Adjustment Factor: a tax compensating for variations in fuel prices

(maritime transport).
B/L
Bill of lading: a negotiable contract for the carriage and ownership of goods
transported by sea, clearly stating the nature of the goods, their packaging, net
weight, gross weight, volumes if required, declared value, the sender and the
recipient. These details are attached to the cargo manifest.
BOT
Build, Operate, Transfer: using the BOT concession approach is designed to

allow private companies to conduct infrastructure projects that would have
been carried out and managed by public institutions or public sector
companies. The private company has a concession to finance, build and
manage the operation of the project during the concession period. At the end
of the concession period the project returns to the Government.
Cabotage
Short-distance maritime transport, national or international, which takes place

along the coastline or between islands (for example, along the coast of the Gulf
of Guinea: Nigeria-Cameroon-Gabon-Sao Tome).
It concerns vessels navigating in defined areas, in principle limited to one
country. Cabotage is different from long-distance navigation or navigation
restricted to an area close to the home port.
CAF
Currency Adjustment Factor: a tax compensating for fluctuations in exchange

rates, for example freight in dollars (maritime transport).
Car-Carrier
A vessel specialised in car transport (new or used). It also extends to PCC

(Pure Car Carrier) or PCTC (Pure Car and Truck Carrier).
Carrier Haulage
In contrast to Merchant Haulage: control of the land transport pre or postdelivery by the shipowner and not the consignee or his nominated haulage
contractor.
CWA
Central and West Africa
Liner conference
A group of shipowners serving the same lines, having reached agreements

between themselves on tariffs, traffic and organising routes, in order to control
competition. As of October 2008, Europe repealed the antitrust exemption
granted to liner conferences. They are illegal for all maritime traffic to and from
ports in the European Community.
Consignee
Also known as a Shipping agent. The representative of the shipowner in the

port who deals with the formalities concerning the vessels call in port and
makes the various declarations (particularly vessel, crew, loaded/unloaded
goods, waste, dangerous goods)
Consortium
The pooling of vessels by shipowners on a maritime route. An integrated

consortium (now inexistent) meant a system whereby shipowners shared
resources, but also costs and revenues.
Conventional
This refers to freight or traffic which does not use containerisation and
therefore requires traditional handling techniques. Conventional vessels
transport goods which are neither containerised nor capable of being
rolled/driven.
Detention
This refers to the length of time a container is detained by a shipper outside of

the port. The shipowner has the right to invoice a shipper for penalty charges
for any detention beyond the time stated in the contract.
Port charges
Taxation levied on the vessel or goods at a port to recover the cost of the use
of the port infrastructure. These charges may be applicable to the vessel (paid
by the owner) or goods (paid by the shipper).
TEU
Twenty Feet Equivalent Units for defining the container capacity of a vessel
(also of storage capacity on land, etc.).
Feedering
The organisation of feeder lines (feederisation). A service provided by the

feeders. The collection and redistribution of goods. The transhipment between
large vessels (mother ships) calling at a limited number of ports, and smaller
vessels (feeders) that carry the goods to smaller ports which owners do not
serve with a direct line.
Charter
A vessel rented out by its owner. In parallel with this, chartering is to hire a
vessel.
Gateway Port
A port in which the majority of the traffic either originates in or is destined for
the hinterland (this is the case for all historical ports).
Hub
A large port where a significant share of the traffic is destined for transhipment.
Hub and spokes
Literally as it sounds. One means of conducting transhipment (interlining being

the other). It is a system for collecting and distributing containers to and from
ports generating small volumes limited or hindered by infrastructure which
does not allow them to receive large ocean-going vessels. It uses smaller
collection-distribution vessels (feeders) through transhipment in a large port
(hub).
ICD
Inland Container Depot, a term used principally to designate an intermodal

platform, but can also be applied to simple storage facilities outside the port (at
Tema for example).
Interlining/Relay
The mapping of major shipping lines and transhipment of containers between

ocean-going vessels of various shipping lines to serve a maximum number of
pairs of ports (origin and destination) while minimising the number of times
ships of the various lines have to call into port. In the case of parallel lines, we
use interlining, and relay when connections are radial (intersection of west/east
and north/south lines for example).
Tonnage
The registered volume of the vessel used for calculating the taxes applicable to
it, as well as insurance premiums. The unit of measurement is the tonne, equal
to 2,831 m3 (a British measure of 100 cubic feet).
Gross tonnage: the interior volume of a vessel plus the volume of enclosed
space on deck (minus the volume of the double hull and some spaces above
the upper deck and the volume of various equipment which is found on a ship:
kitchens, auxiliary machinery etc.).
Net tonnage: Gross tonnage, minus machinery space, cabins, staff and crew
offices, fuel tanks etc. Anything that does not have a direct commercial
function.
Regular line
(As opposed to tramping or sailing on demand): a service provided by a

shipping company's vessels sailing at regular intervals between specified ports.
Shipping services are organised according to a fixed itinerary, the ports served
are identified with a set frequency of service. The shipper (industrial or
commercial) wishing to use these lines reaches an agreement on transport
conditions with the shipowner.
Liners terms
The provision by liner conferences of tariffs for maritime transport.
Manifest
An on-board document detailing the cargo loaded and unloaded in each port
and its nature, to which the corresponding bills of lading are attached providing
detailed information.
Handling
Designates the loading and unloading of a ship, and operations in storage

yards and despatch areas.
In African ports a distinction is made between on-board handling (loading and
unloading of ships), a service paid for by shipowners, and quayside freight
handling (movement of goods between the dock and storage yards and
despatch areas), for which the freight handler will charge the forwarding agent.
Freight handler
The handling operator who loads and unloads ships, deals with storage (in the
case of containers) and delivers to transporters (or vice versa).
Tidal range
The difference in sea level between low and high tide.
Merchant Haulage
In contrast to Carrier Haulage: control of the land transport pre or post-delivery

by the shipper or his nominated haulage contractor.
Nautical mile
International unit of measure which is 1,850m and corresponds to the length of

one minute of arc of latitude along any meridian.
Mother ship
Long-distance ocean-going vessel, travels on the mother lines making few

stops and links with smaller vessels for transhipment, see Feeder.
Multipurpose
vessel
As the name suggests, a multipurpose ship.
Knot
A unit of speed (1 nautical mile per hour or 1,852m/h)
IMO
International Maritime Organisation. Created by a UN convention in Geneva on

17 March 1948, one of its main tasks is to develop legislation relating to safety
at sea.
Equipment
We distinguish between quay equipment (cranes or gantries) and yard

equipment (straddle carriers, reach-stackers, RTG and RMG as well as port
tractors and Tugmasters providing traction)
Over-Panamax (or
Post-Panamax)
1. Describes a vessel with a width that prevents it using the Panama

Canal (more than 32.3m wide).
2. 2. Describes handling equipment suitable for over-Panamax vessels.
Panamax
A vessel whose width allows it to use the Panama Canal (a width of not more
than 32.3m), or handling equipment capable of dealing with vessels up to
Panamax width.
Yard
Open ground for stocking containers awaiting loading or delivery.
Keel
clearance
Minimum depth which must be left below the vessel. This can be up to one
metre, for safety reasons of course, but also to ensure good water flow
beneath the ship. It varies in accordance with local nautical conditions and the
associated risks.
Pool
Agreement between shipowners, members of a liner conference, that results in

the pooling and sharing, according to agreed quotas, of transportation
equipment and/or cargo and/or operating results.
Deadweight
The difference between the weight of a completely loaded vessel and the
weight of the empty or nearly empty vessel. It is the maximum loading capacity
allowed by international safety regulations.
Reach-stacker
Handling equipment for storage yards allowing containers to be stacked up to

four high, but requiring fairly large aisles between the rows, resulting in a
relatively low storage density. Reserved for handling low volumes.
RMG
Rail Mounted Gantry, a yard gantry operating on rails. Devices capable of

storing containers extremely densely (up to eight containers high and 12

containers wide). However, their poor flexibility has led to RTGs often being
preferred (see below).
Rolltainer
Self loadingTrailer, for containers of 20 or 40. It is an equipment considerably

more expensive to purchase and to use than a simple flat trailer. In demand
among shippers in French overseas territories who wish to retain the container
in their establishments for some time to overcome limited storage capacity.
Route
Direction followed by a vessel.
RTG
Rubber Tyred Gantry, a yard gantry on wheels. Allows for very high density
storage of containers, in blocks of around six wide and up to four or five in
height. Ensures good capacity in ports with only limited ground space. More
efficient in terms of density than reach-stackers or even straddle carriers and
more flexible than RMGs (see above).
Shift
In a port, the standard working hours of a handling team is usually called a

shift. Conventionally, a shift has a duration of between six and eight hours in
French ports.
Slot
Refers to the storage position on a cellular container vessel.
Slow steaming
Navigation at reduced speed to save fuel. Its a procedure progressively

introduced by shipowners and now becoming generalised to cope with very
high fuel prices which are difficult to pass on to customers. Consumption grows
geometrically with speed, and the savings that can be achieved by slowing
from 24 knots to 16, for example, are considerable. Some services may drop to
12 knots (super slow steaming).
Bunkering
Operation providing the fuel necessary for the operation of the ship. Supply of
fuel for boilers or engines in a vessel.
Automatic
spreader
Automatic tool linked to a mobile crane or gantry which grips the container. The
spreader seizes the container via the corner pieces located at the four upper
extremities of the container.
Surcharges
Various supplements in addition to tariffs (freight rates). Some are always

applied, such as those arising from the nature of the packaging or certain port
fees or special taxes levied in the countries served. Others are exceptional
because they depend on current conditions: currency fluctuations, fuel prices,
port congestion etc.
Demurrage
Penalty imposed under a charter agreement by a shipowner to the charterer (in

the case of a charter which has exceeded the contractual duration of the trip).
Also used, for example, where a penalty is charged by a handler to the shipper
via an agent when goods have been left for longer than the contractually
agreed free storage time in the yard.
User taxes
Charges levied on users of superstructures (yards, warehouses, gangways

etc.) or equipment (cranes, silos etc.).
THC
Terminal Handling Charge. Fee set by the liner conferences or by shipowners

and paid under handling by a shipper (via an agent) to the shipowner who pays
the handler for all services, both on-board and quayside. It is nearly universal
in container transport, with the notable exception of Africa and French
overseas territories.
Draught
The vertical distance between the waterline and the keel or lowest point of the
ship.
Tramping
Maritime service available on demand, in other words the vessel is chartered

for a particular voyage or period of time. This type of service is used for the
transportation of oil, iron ore, coal and grain. It is the opposite of a regular
service.
Forwarding agent
Works in the port to provide customs clearance of the goods, pays for all the
maritime and port services required for the goods on behalf of the shipper and
in due course re-invoices for these fees. In Europe, most freight forwarders are
also logistics organisers (organising on behalf of the shipper the entire logistics
chain, including land transport).
VLCS/ULCS
Very Large Container Ship or Ultra-Large Container Ship. VLCSs are vessels
with a size of between 7,500 and 10,000 TEU and ULCSs are vessels with a
size of above 10,000 TEU.
Study summary and recommendations

Main findings
Maritime services in West and Central Africa
Nearly three million containers were transported in West Africa in 2011. This is a remarkable
figure for the region but it, however, needs to be put into perspective, as some 500 million
TEUs were exchanged worldwide. Nevertheless, the growth rate in volume terms illustrates
the dynamism of Africa and its potential.
It is for this reason that most of the world's leading container shipping companies have a
presence on the West African coast (Maersk, CMA-CGM, MSC etc.), sometimes with
different strategies.
The development of container traffic has long been hampered by the unreliability of port
operations, but infrastructure improvements, changes in the governance of terminals - the
introduction of port concessions - and the arrival or strengthening of world leaders in port
handling have contributed to recent developments. Many port projects have emerged in the
recent past: the problem and the challenge now rest on the correspondence between the
strategies of shipping companies and the relevance of developments and port projects.
Which transhipment hubs in CWA?
This is a fundamental issue. It appears difficult to determine which port could play the role of
a continental transhipment hub and if there is a real need for one in this area. The presence
of large, very competitive transhipment hubs in the north of the continent - Algeciras, Tangier
Med and Las Palmas - and in the south - the South African ports- means any possible hubs
would have to be both well located geographically, in other words towards the centre of the
region, and be competitive in terms of costs, with the risk of creating a slow return on
investment.
Logic would dictate that a pairing equivalent to Algeciras/Tangier built in the south of the
continent, reinforced by the importance of markets in Angola, DRC and Cameroon, would
allow these countries to develop efficient ports and create the possibility of services on the
Asia-Latin America east coast routes etc.
It is difficult to understand the proposed MSC project in Lom, even though it is part of
MSCs overall strategy based on transhipments. It should be noted, however, that the Lom
project does have some significant strengths: excellent draught, relatively low capital cost
and low-cost labour. It should also be noted that the strategy of transhipment ports in the
south is already used by shipowners through ports in South Africa and Pointe-Noire.
For the majority of shipowners interviewed, Walvis Bay is too close to the ports of South
Africa to be a major transhipment hub and its weak hinterland is a clear handicap.
Geographically, it is Pointe-Noire that receives the most votes.
Moreover, there are few or no exchange systems between vessels of intercontinental lines
(mother ship to mother ship relay/interlining) in place in West African ports. This is due to
several reasons:
Major operators have sufficient services to reach directly all the major ports of the
region with differentiated services at very short intervals. For secondary ports they
use radial feedering (hub and spokes).
Relay operations are outside the range, mainly in the major hubs of the north
(Algeciras, Tangier Med and Las Palmas). As we noted earlier, all Maersk CWA
container services dealing with traffic from Europe and with part of the flow from
Asia, are transhipping at Algeciras and Tangier Med. Delmas has even got two
services at Tangier Med.
In fact, the logic of exchanges between lines implies that they are carried out in
ports on the major intersections between east-west and north-south flows, which
is not the case for any port in CWA.
Geographical constraints, shipowners strategies and the evolution of the size of vessels
have resulted in the establishment of regional hubs and secondary services which make it
possible to have a cascade of services to all coastal ports depending on their nautical
capacity and commercial importance.
Risks linked to the volatility of transhipment traffic
The traffic passing through gateway ports is a function of the traffic flow generated by the
hinterland of the port in question and can be considered captive to a certain extent, provided
the port remains commercially and operationally competitive vis--vis competing ports whose
hinterlands may overlap1.
In cases where multiple ports are in competition, a judgement is ultimately made by the
shipper based on several criteria: cost and quality of passage through the port, cost and
duration of inland transport, maritime transit time, etc.
In contrast, transhipment traffic is controlled by the maritime operator who chooses to serve
a port directly or via a transhipment hub based on commercial and operational criteria:
volume of traffic under consideration, vessel size and capacity of the final destination port,
competition etc.
Transhipment costs are, therefore, the responsibility of the shipowner who considers them an
operational cost and constantly seeks to minimise them. This has an impact on a large
number of parameters: changes in the size or type of vessels operated, changes in the type
of service etc.
Shipowners can very quickly move large volumes of traffic from one hub to another based on
their current strategy and the commercial attractiveness of the various hubs.
Some transhipment ports have seen their traffic gradually fall as new competitors, better
placed geographically or economically, came on the market. This is the case, for example, of
Gioia Tauro, built in 1995 and whose traffic peaked in 2004 at 3.26m TEU before falling
every year, reaching 2.35m TEU in 2011. Over the same period, its closest competitor,
Marsaxlokk (Malta) saw traffic increase from 1.4 to 2.4m TEU. Similarly, Singapore has seen
its position as a major (if not hegemonic) South-East Asian hub challenged by the
1
While acknowledging that competition between ports in West and Central Africa is severely limited by the distances
involved and the poor quality of road and rail infrastructure when available.
10

commissioning in early 2000 (less than 50km away from the port of Singapore!) of the port of
Tanjung Pelepas in Malaysia. Thanks in particular to the transfer of Maersks transhipment
activities, the latter has grown rapidly in strength and handled 7.5m TEU in 2011,
representing 25% of the volumes handled by Singapore.
Transhipment flows therefore exhibit intrinsic volatility which is difficult to regulate. However,
this volatility is a function of the investments made by shipowners in transhipment port
terminals and in the terms of the concession contracts made with the port authorities: indeed,
the more an owner has invested in the long term in a terminal and the more punitive the
contract in cases of non-compliance with the agreed volumes of transhipments, the less
likely an owner is to rapidly change its maritime services in response to the offers of
competing ports in the region.
Any new port or port development in West and Central Africa whose business model is solely
or largely based on transhipment traffic is vulnerable. Especially when large competitors
already exist or are being developed at both ends of the region, and the shipping companies
serving CWA do not seem for the most part to have incorporated regional transhipment in
their future strategy.
Investments
The risk of overcapacity cannot be ignored and in particular for projects such as Lom,
Abidjan and Dakar, which is why the involvement of port operators and shipping companies
in various projects seems to be necessary to perpetuate the investment.
In Africa, as in other parts of the world, terminal operators (much more so than shipowners in
the African region) agree to invest in infrastructure. This is particularly the case in Dakar
(Dubai Port World has built a third berth), in Lom both for Bollor (third quay) and for
TIL/MSC (LICT), Pointe-Noire and Cotonou (Benin Terminal) for Bollor, etc.
It should be noted, though, that in all the cases cited these investments relate to operational
infrastructure (dredging and quays). In absolute terms, the investments concerned are
therefore not huge. In the case of LICT in Lom, TIL/MSC have taken much less of a risk
because they were able to sell for a good price half of their share to China Merchants, as
well as having the contributions and loans from lenders.
The need for profitability results in tailored concession periods and, no doubt, in some cases
in relatively high tariffs. But experience also shows that the existence of high tariffs is not
only the result of significant investments made by a concessionaire but mainly the result of
insufficiently careful governance.
Currently, we are now seeing more ambitious projects such as the BOTs on greenfield sites
in Nigeria, proposed by some quite powerful consortia bringing together multiple specialised
partners as in the case of Badagry and Lekki. While investments seem high, the expected
growth of the various activities in these future ports can easily allow us to anticipate strong
profitability provided the duration of the concessions is sufficient. A case study on the subject
is provided by that of the BOT in Shanghai where the activity grew by two million TEU per
year.
A terminal dedicated solely to transhipment could be viable if a shipping company agreed to
bear the full costs. If we believe the statements of MSC, this would be the case in Lom. This
11

seems, however, to be contradicted by the emergence of China Merchants Holdings
International, which is obviously seeking a return which can only be found in import-export or
transit traffic.
Port environments
The port system in the countries of West and Central Africa displays numerous
heterogeneities, not only in the quality and suitability of its infrastructure and equipment, but
also in their institutional and regulatory environments and land-based logistics.
The performance of some ports such as Tema, for example, suffers significantly for these
reasons, combining the negative impacts of restrictive and obsolete regulation, an
inadequate institutional framework and severe saturation of its land access. This port is far
from alone in experiencing this type of problem. Although progress has been made over the
past 10 years in this area, much remains to be done and careful attention must be paid to it
in the future.
Principal recommendations
1. Continue the policy of improving infrastructure and port facilities
2. Create institutional reforms where they are needed (Ghana, Angola etc.) and
encourage the modernisation of port regulations
3. Encourage and be involved in the establishment of real one stop shop systems
corresponding to the common standards of the different ports
4. Contribute to the improvement of port hinterlands (roads, land-based platforms
positioned at strategic points in the hinterland etc.)
5. Avoid monopolistic situations in a port as part of a policy to reduce port passage
costs (if received volumes are sufficient)
6. Generalise port concessions and involve port operators and shipowners in
investment for sustaining infrastructure
7. Support projects that focus on domestic traffic
8. Be involved in the improvement of serving landlocked countries
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PHASE 1 CURRENT STATUS
1. Maritime and port analysis

1.1. Maritime services
The maritime container services serving ports in West and Central Africa were identified
using the Alphaliner database.
They are divided into several categories:
Local feeder or cabotage services; in other words services serving several ports on the
West African coast departing from a port in West Africa,
Feeder services departing from a transhipment hub and destined for ports on the West
African coast,
Direct lines serving West Africa departing from northern and southern Europe and the
Mediterranean,
Direct lines serving West Africa departing from Asia,
Direct lines serving West Africa and arriving from North and South America.
For each of these categories, we have distinguished those maritime services operating only
cellular vessels (cc) and other maritime services operating the following types of vessels:
Multipurpose (mp), Roll-on, Roll-off or Ro-Ro (ro), Reefer (ref), Barge Carriers (bg).
Key indicators for the services (source Alphaliner)
13

The containerised maritime service offer for West Africa currently comprises 84 services.
Nearly 60% (50 services) are considered direct services and 40% (34 services) as feedering
services.
The services considered as direct services are those serving the ports of the West African
coast from: North and South America, Asia, northern and southern Europe, and the
Mediterranean. Services are considered to be feeders if they operate as local feeders
departing from a port in West Africa, or if they are lines out of a transhipment hub such as
Las Palmas, Algeciras and Tangier Med with destinations on the West African coast.
Concerning the current vessel offer, it should be noted that a total of 392 ships operate on
the lines serving West Africa. Nearly 71% (280 vessels) are containerships that vary from
ships with a capacity of between 1,000 and 2,000 TEU to ships with a capacity of 3,000 to
5,999 TEU. The rest of the fleet (29%) is mainly composed of Multipurpose and Ro-Ro
vessels, and the share of Reefers is relatively low.
Around 30 different shipowners are currently serving the ports of West Africa. Most of them
operate independently; however, others exploit some lines in the form of partnerships. The
three main global shipowners, namely Maersk Line, MSC and CMA-CGM, unsurprisingly,
dominate, notably for vessels coming out of Europe and Asia.
A total of 38 ports from 21 countries between Mauritania and Namibia are involved in the
maritime services included in our study. The ports most visited are those of Abidjan and
Pointe-Noire, followed to a lesser degree by the ports of Lagos, Tema and Dakar. These are
the ports that have the most favourable conditions for receiving vessels (nautical access,
draught, quay length etc.).
14

Local feeder services
Source: Alphaliner
In total, 16 services are dedicated to regional feedering between ports on the coast of West Africa. Almost half (seven) are from Pointe-Noire.
This is particularly the case for the services operated by Niledutch, Maersk Line and PIL, whereas MSC operates its three services from the port
of San Pedro. To a lesser extent, Abidjan, Luanda, Douala, Cotonou, Walvis Bay and Durban each have a regional feeder service. The current
maritime offer means 24 ports are serviced in West Africa.
15

Container services in detail
Seven services out of 16 use specialised containerships with a capacity varying from 300 to 1,900 TEU. The other services (nine in total) are
not full container but operate multipurpose vessels offering capacities varying between 300 and 1,300 TEU.
Niledutch and Maersk Line/Safmarine are the operators with the largest presence in the market, both in terms of the capacity on offer and in
frequency of services. To a lesser extent, we find MSC and Delmas. The operators PIL, Camship and OACL have the smallest presence in the
market.
It should be noted that the shipowners on the intercontinental routes use their own feeder services in coastal West and Central Africa to such an
extent that there is no independent local offer. In addition, there is no cooperation between operators in respect of these feeder services, except
within the same groups (for example, Maersk and Safmarine). However, slots can be rented on feeder services to third party operators.
Source: Alphaliner
16
Source: Alphaliner
Summary of services
Source: Alphaliner
17

Northern Europe West Africa services
Source: Alphaliner
With 18 services, the direct route from northern Europe to West Africa is one of the sectors with the most shipping lines. Taken together, they
represent a total of 102 ports of call serving 31 different ports. It should be noted that the majority of services coming out of the northern range
ports in Europe are from the port of Antwerp (60%).
18

Services in detail
Five services use only containerships, with capacities ranging from 1,600 to 2,500 TEU.
The other services (13 in total), operate mainly Ro-Ro ships - this is particularly the case for
the services offered by Grimaldi - and multipurpose vessels. A service using reefer ships and
another using barge carriers are also present in this market.
The total capacity on the northern Europe to West Africa route is in the region of 118,000
TEU.
Source: Alphaliner
Concerning the capacity available for full container services, Delmas (CMA-CGM) is the
maritime operator with the largest presence in the northern Europe-West Africa market with
38% of the total capacity. It is closely followed by MSC (29%) and, to a lesser extent, by the
MOL, Hapag Lloyd, Zim partnership (18%) and finally the Dutch shipowner NileDutch (15%).
Market share of shipowners
19
Source: Alphaliner
On services other than full container, Grimaldi has the largest presence. It operates five
services from northern Europe with a fleet of 21 Ro-Ro vessels. The Italian operator is the
only one to use this type of ship. BOCS, EuroAfrica, UAFL and Safmarine also offer services
from Europe, using multipurpose vessels.
Summary of services
Source: Alphaliner
20

Southern Europe/Mediterranean West Africa services
Source: Alphaliner
The route between West Africa and ports in southern Europe and the Mediterranean offers a total of 11 direct services. Taken together, they
represent a total of 52 ports of call, serving 23 different ports.
From the Mediterranean, services leave the ports of Valencia in Spain, Fos and Port-Vendres in France and La Spezia, Salerno and Naples in
Italy. Other services from southern Europe are exclusively from Portugal, notably the ports of Lisbon and Leixoes.
21

Services in detail
Nearly 70% of the services between southern Europe and the Mediterranean to West Africa
use containerships, with the remaining 30% using Ro-Ro and reefer vessels.
The capacity of containerships varies between 1,100 and 2,600 TEU.
In total, 34 containerships are used on these routes, making it the third largest market in
terms of the number of cellular vessels used.
Source: Alphaliner
With an offer comprising vessels with capacities of between 2,500 and 3,000 TEU, MSC is
the operator with the largest share of the southern Europe/Mediterranean to West Africa
market segment. It is followed by Delmas (CMA-CGM) and to a lesser extent by the
partnership of Zim/COSCO, Lin Lines, Marguisa and Portline.
22
Source: Alphaliner
Operators Grimaldi, Messina and AEL complete the maritime offer on the southern
Europe/Mediterranean to West Africa route. Grimaldi and Messina operate two and three RoRo vessels respectively, while AEL operates four reefer vessels.
Summary of services
Source: Alphaliner
23

Hub services West Africa
Source: Alphaliner
Routes to ports on the West African coast from transhipment hubs comprise a total of 18 services, the majority of them offered by Maersk Line,
the worlds largest shipowner. In total, they represent a total of 47 ports of call in West Africa, serving 22 different ports.
In order of importance, Algeciras (Spain), Tangier Med (Morocco) and Las Palmas (Canary Islands) are the three transhipment hubs involved in
services to West Africa.
24

Services in detail
All the services leaving the transhipment hubs use containerships. Capacities vary between
1,100 and 3,600 TEU. It should also be noted that vessels with a larger capacity, of between
3,000 and 5,099 TEU, are present.
The average weekly capacity of services from hubs to West Africa is around 1,747 TEU for a
total weekly capacity of 31,450 TEU for all services.
Source: Alphaliner
Maersk Line and its subsidiary Safmarine have, by far and away, the largest presence in
services to West African ports from a transhipment hub (64%). They offer at least 11
container services from Tangier Med and Algeciras. In total, the offer comprises 53
containerships with a weekly capacity of 20,169 TEU.
MSC is the second largest operator of services from a hub, with 12% of the total available
capacity. Departing from Las Palmas, MSC offers three services with a weekly capacity of
around 3,800 TEU. It is closely followed by the partnership formed by shipowners UASC,
Hanjin and Evergreen which, since 2010, have offered a service from Algeciras with the
particularity of being operated by three containerships with capacities of between 2,000 and
6,000 TEU.
On a smaller scale (9%), CMA-CGM offers, through its subsidiary Delmas, two weekly
services from the port of Algeciras for a capacity of about 2,800 TEU. Finally, the partnership
of MOL, Hapag Lloyd and ZIM provides one weekly service from Algeciras with a capacity of
1,532 TEU.
25

Summary of services
Source: Alphaliner
26

Asia West Africa services
Source : Alphaliner
The maritime container route between West Africa and Asia offers 15 direct services. In total, these represent 59 port calls into 19 ports.
The services currently in place from Asia come in large part from China - 75% of the total direct services - and notably from the ports of Tianjin
and Shanghai. China is followed by India, which has 13% of the services. Finally, Malaysia and South Korea offer one service each.
27

Services in detail
Some 80% of the services departing from Asia are operated using containerships, with the
remaining 20% using multipurpose vessels.
The capacity of the container ships in service on the Asia to West Africa route varies
between 1,000 and 4,500 TEU. Not surprisingly given this type of ship, services to West
Africa are limited to a small number of ports with adequate navigational capacities, such as
Abidjan, Tema, Lom, Lagos, Pointe-Noire and Luanda.
The average weekly capacity for this market segment is in the region of 2,472 TEU, with a
total weekly capacity of 29,662 TEU for all services.
In total, of the 130 vessels operating on these routes, 119 are containerships making it, by
far, the largest market in terms of the number of containerships used.
Source: Alphaliner
Maersk Line and CMA-CGM have the largest presence on the Asia to West Africa route, with
respectively 31% and 29% of the total capacity available, including one service operated
jointly. CMA-CGM has three services of its own compared to two for Maersk Line, which
operates larger capacity vessels at a lower frequency.
With 18% of the total capacity, PIL is the third largest operator on the Asia to West Africa
route. It has three services giving a weekly capacity of 5,372 TEU.
NileDutch, the partnership of CSCL, K Line, Hapag Lloyd and NYK and the partnership of
GSL and Evergreen complete the maritime container offer for Asia to West Africa with
respectively 8%, 7% and 7% of the total capacity.
28

Source: Alphaliner
For services other than full container, we find PIL, Maersk Line and Cosco, each of which
runs multipurpose vessels.
Summary of services
Source: Alphaliner
29

North and South America West Africa services
Source: Alphaliner
On the routes from North and South America to West Africa there are six direct services. In total, these represent 32 port calls, serving 17 ports.
Of the six services identified, two depart from, or are destined for, South America and four, North America. In South America, the ports of
Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro and Santos are served by two services and in North America, the ports of Jacksonville-Savannah and Houston
figure in the majority of services.
With vessels offering a total capacity of 25,200 TEU, the route between the Americas and West Africa has the lowest capacity of the market
segments we have studied.
30

Container services in detail
Only one service of the six offered operates container vessels. The five other services are
composed of multipurpose and Ro-Ro vessels.
The capacity of the containerships varies between 1,700 and 1,900 TEU. It should be noted
that out of a total of 28 vessels operating on these routes, only five are containerships.
Source: Alphaliner
Delmas (CMA-CGM) and NileDutch are the only shipowners to offer containerships from
South America.
Maersk Line and UAL operate respectively two and eight multipurpose vessels, departing
from the ports of Houston and Savannah.
Grimaldi and Nordana Line complete the current offer, operating respectively 11 and two RoRo vessels.
Source: Alphaliner
31
1.2. Types of vessels

Analysis of the available fleet
The containership fleet is not as well segmented as the bulk carrier fleet. Nevertheless, we
can see the classic differentiation of Panamax ships (with a capacity of between 3,000 and
5,099 TEU) as is found in many maritime markets. Generally, a definitive commercial
equilibrium has yet to be established for container vessels.
The table below provides an initial overview of how the current containership fleet is
distributed. This is a recent fleet which has seen an almost continuous growth in its number
of units. The most striking feature, however, is the use of ever larger ships.
Distribution of the containership fleet by age of vessels
Source: BRS
32

Fleet availability according to draught and length
Source BRS: October 2012
The scatter graph above shows both the current and future fleet of containerships2.
Unsurprisingly, there is a positive correlation between vessel size and the draught required
for a port call.
The high and low limits take into account both the maximum draught registered in the ports
of West Africa (namely the ports of Cotonou, Lagos (Apapa Terminal) and San Pedro which
have a draught of 13.5m) and, on the other hand, the minimum draught, which is found in the
port of Douala with 7m. The average draught of all ports in West Africa is 11.3m (blue line).
Thus, if we take into account only the draught of the ship, we can see that accepting ships
with a capacity of less than 2,000 TEU, and part of the fleet with a capacity of between 2,000
and 3,000 TEU, is not a problem for most of the African ports included in this report.
Note on the scatter graphs: Each point on the graph represents one or several ships. Ships
are often constructed as part of a more or less long series. Ships in the same series, sister
ships, have identical characteristics but appear as only one point on the graph, leading to a
bias against the largest series. Some of these series may be relatively large since the same
design developed by a shipyard may be offered to a number of shipowners. For example,
132 ships were built from theCV1100 Plus design, in many different European and Chinese
The orderbook has been taken into account where the information was available in this case for 536 ships on order.
33

shipyards. These graphs are nevertheless relevant visuals and the bias is corrected by the
figures.
Analysis of the available fleet by port

The nautical capacities taken into account in these graphs concern the following ports:
Note on these graphs: For better clarity, the categories of vessels that can be
accommodated entirely in a port have been removed from the graphics. This also applies to
classes of ships which cannot be accommodated.
In the case of the port of Abidjan, for example, we deliberately removed from the graph
Feeder vessels (those with a capacity of less than 1,000 TEU) and vessels with a capacity
greater than 6,000 TEU. In fact, all Feeders ships can be accommodated in the port of
Abidjan while no vessel of more than 6,000 TEU is eligible. Therefore, only vessels with a
capacity of between 1,000 and 6,000 TEU are included in the graph. This principle has been
applied for all the ports studied.
Moreover, when the limit relating to the quay length (red line) no longer appears in a graph,
this means that the quay of the port in question is sufficiently long to accommodate all the
ships in the active fleet.
The draught indicated for each port presented in the study corresponds to the permitted
draught.
34

Eligible fleet for Dakar container terminal
The nautical conditions3 in the port of Dakar allow it to accommodate a very significant
proportion of containerships with a capacity of between 3,000 and 5,099 TEU, and a small
proportion of vessels with a capacity of between 5,100 and 7,999 TEU. The quay is long
enough for all vessels in the active fleet. In comparison with other ports, Dakar is one of the
ports on the coast of West Africa with the best nautical conditions.
The current nautical conditions for the port of Dakar are a draught limited to 13m and a quay length of 660m.
35

Eligible fleet for Banjul container terminal
The nautical conditions4 for the port of Banjul, notably in terms of draught, remain restrictive
for a proportion of ships between 1,000 and 1,099 TEU. The draught prevents it hosting
ships with a capacity greater than 2,000 TEU. On the other hand, the length of the quay
(300m) is sufficient for the fleet of containerships with a capacity of less than 5,099 TEU, and
a significant proportion of ships with a capacity of between 5,100 and 7,999 TEU.
The current nautical conditions for the port of Banjul are a draught limited to 10m and a quay length of 300m.
36

Eligible fleet for Conakry container terminal
The limiting factors for the port of Conakry are similar to those for the port of Banjul. Indeed,
nautical conditions5, particularly in terms of draught, remain restrictive for a limited portion of
vessels with a capacity of between 1,000 and 1,099 TEU. In addition, the draught (with some
exceptions) prevents it accommodating ships with a capacity of more than 2,000 TEU. The
quay (270m) is, however, sufficient for the fleet of containerships with a capacity of less than
2,999 TEU, and a significant proportion of vessels with capacities between 3,000 and 7,999
TEU.
The current nautical conditions for the port of Conakry are a draught limited to 10.5m and a quay length of 270m.
37

Eligible fleet for Freetown container terminal
The nautical conditions6 for the port of Freetown allow it to accommodate a significant
proportion of the Feeder fleet (ships with a capacity of between 0 and 999 TEU), and a
limited proportion of ships with capacities of between 1,000 and 1,999 TEU. The length of the
quay (722m), on the other hand, is sufficient for all the active fleet.
The current nautical conditions for the port of Freetown are a draught limited to 9.5m and a quay length of 722m.
38

Eligible fleet for Monrovia container terminal
The nautical conditions7 for the port of Monrovia allow it to accommodate a very significant
proportion of the fleet with a capacity of between 1,000 and 1,999 TEU, and a limited
proportion of ships with a capacity between 2,000 and 2,999 TEU. However, the length of the
quay is sufficient for all the active fleet.
The current nautical conditions for the port of Freetown are a draught limited to 11m and a quay length of 600m.
39

Eligible fleet for San Pedro container terminal
The nautical conditions8 for the port of San Pedro, notably in terms of draught, prohibit a
proportion of ships with capacities of between 5,100 and 7,999 TEU. In addition, the draught
prevents it accommodating ships with a capacity greater than 8,000 TEU. The quay (325m),
however, is sufficient (with some exceptions) for the entire fleet of containerships with a
capacity of less than 8,000 TEU.
The current nautical conditions for the port of San Pedro are a draught limited to 13.5m and a quay length of 325m.
40

Eligible fleet for Abidjan container terminal
The nautical conditions9 for the port of Abidjan allow it to receive a significant proportion of
containerships with a capacity of between 1,000 and 1,999 TEU. However, the draught of
11.5m limits access to much of the fleet between 2,000 and 3,000 TEU. Beyond 3,000 TEU,
the draught is insufficient. The quay length, though, makes it possible to receive a large
proportion of vessels between 3,000 and 5,099 TEU.
The Abidjan terminal container has a total quay length of 1000m, broken down into several berths. However, the Vidri
Canal prevents access to vessels with a length exceeding 250m. The draught is 12.5m.
41

Eligible fleet for Takoradi container terminal
The nautical conditions10 for the port of Takoradi remain restrictive for a significant proportion
of vessels between 1,000 and 1,099 TEU, particularly in terms of draught. Under 9m, the
entire Feeder fleet (with some exceptions) can access the port.
10
The current conditions for the port of Takoradi are a draught limited to 9m and a quay length of 190m.
42

Eligible fleet for Tema container port
The current nautical conditions11 for the port of Tema allow it to receive a very significant
proportion of vessels with a capacity of less than 3,000 TEU, but are relatively restrictive for
vessels with a capacity between 3,000 and 5,099 TEU and above. The quay length is
sufficient for all the active fleet.
11
The current nautical conditions for the port of Tema are a draught limited to 11.5 m and a quay length of 660m.
43

Eligible fleet for Lom container terminal
The nautical conditions12 for the port of Lom allow it to receive a large proportion of vessels
with a capacity of between 1,000 and 1,999 TEU, and some vessels with a capacity of less
than 3,000 TEU. The quay length is adequate for the entire active fleet.
12
The current nautical conditions for the port of Lom are a draught limited to 11m and a quay length of 430m.
44

Eligible fleet for Cotonou container terminal
The nautical conditions13 for the port of Cotonou allow it to receive a significant proportion of
the fleet of vessels with a capacity of between 3,000 and 5,099 TEU, and a proportion of
vessels with a capacity below 7,999 TEU. The quay length is sufficient for the entire active
fleet.
13
The current nautical conditions for the port of Cotonou are a draught limited to 13.5m and a quay length of 540m.
45

Eligible fleet for Lagos container terminals
Apapa container terminal (port of Lagos)
The nautical conditions14 for the Apapa container terminal in the port of Lagos allow it to
receive a significant proportion of vessels with capacities ranging from 3,000 to 5,099 TEU,
and a limited proportion of vessels with a capacity of between 6,000 and 8,000 TEU. The
quay length is sufficient for all vessels in the active fleet. Like the port of Dakar, the Apapa
container terminal has nautical conditions which are particularly advantageous when
compared to other ports on the West African coast.
14
The current nautical conditions for the Apapa container terminal are a draught limited to 13.5m and a quay length of 500m.
46

Tin-can Island container terminal (port of Lagos)
The nautical conditions15 for the Tin-Can Island container terminal in the port of Lagos allow it
to receive a significant proportion of the fleet with capacities of between 1,000 and 1,999
TEU, and a limited proportion of vessels with capacities of between 2,000 and 2,999 TEU,
but in terms of draught it remains restrictive for vessels with higher capacities. The quay
length is sufficient for the entire active fleet.
15
The current nautical conditions for the Tin-Can Island container terminal are a draught limited to 11.5m and a quay length
of 770m.
47

Eligible fleet for Douala container terminal
The current nautical conditions16 for the port of Douala allow it to receive a very limited
proportion of containerships. In fact, the particularly restrictive draught in this port (7m), limits
access to a significant proportion of Feeder vessels (0 to 999 TEU) and above. However,
the quay length is sufficient for the entire active fleet.
16
The current nautical conditions for the port of Douala are a draught limited to 7m and a quay length of 660m.
48

Eligible fleet for Libreville container terminal
The current nautical conditions17 for the port of Libreville allow it to host a significant
proportion of vessels with capacities of between 1,000 and 1,999 TEU, and a limited
proportion of vessels with capacities of between 2,000 and 2,999 TEU, but in terms of
draught it remains restrictive for vessels with higher capacities. The quay length is sufficient
for the entire active fleet.
17
The current nautical conditions for the port of Libreville are a draught limited to 11m and a quay length of 475m.
49

Eligible fleet for Pointe-Noire container terminal
The nautical conditions18 for the port of Pointe-Noire allow it to receive a significant
proportion of the fleet of vessels with capacities of between 3,000 and 5,099 TEU, and a
limited share of vessels with capacities of between 6,000 and 7,999 TEU. However, the
draught restricts access for vessels with capacities of more than 8,000 TEU. The quay length
is sufficient for the entire active fleet.
18
The current nautical conditions for the port of Pointe-Noire are a draught limited to 13m and a quay length of 800m.
50

Eligible fleet for Luanda container terminal
The nautical conditions19 for the port of Luanda allow it to receive a significant proportion of
vessels with capacities of between 1,000 and 1,999 TEU, and a limited proportion of vessels
with capacities of between 2,000 and 2,999 TEU. However, the draught restricts access for
vessels with higher capacities. The quay length is sufficient for the entire active fleet.
19
The current nautical conditions for the port of Luanda are a draught limited to 11m and a quay length of 550m.
51

Eligible fleet for Lobito container terminal
The advantageous nautical conditions20 for the port of Lobito allow it to receive a significant
proportion of the fleet of vessels with capacities of between 2,000 and 2,999 TEU, and a
limited proportion of ships with capacities of between 3,000 and 5,099 TEU. However, the
draught restricts access for vessels with higher capacities. The quay length is sufficient for
the entire active fleet.
20
The current nautical conditions for the port of Lobito are a draught limited to 12m and a quay length of 550m.
52

Eligible fleet for Walvis Bay container terminal
The nautical conditions21 for the port of Walvis Bay allow it to receive a significant proportion
of the fleet of vessels with capacities of between 1,000 and 1,999 TEU, and a limited
proportion of ships with capacities of between 2,000 and 2,999 TEU. However, the draught
restricts access for vessels with higher capacities. The quay is sufficient for the entire active
fleet.
21
The current nautical conditions for the port of Walvis Bay are a draught limited to 11.5m and a draught of 550m.
53

Analysis of the size of the containership fleet
The graph above, which shows the width of container vessels in relation to their capacities,
demonstrates quite clearly a fleet divided in two by the criteria for access to the Panama
Canal. Under 32.3m wide, we find ships with capacities ranging between 0 and 1,999 TEU,
and some ships with capacities between 2,000 and 2,999 TEU. The width of these vessels is
mixed. Conversely, beyond the Panamax limits, larger ships have relatively standardised
widths, corresponding to a row containing a specific number of containers (an important
criterion for handling equipment).
We can therefore see that vessels with a capacity of between 1,000 and 1,999 TEU for the
most part have a width suitable for rows of 12 containers (41% of the fleet). These are mainly
vessels with a capacity of around 1,600 TEU. In the other segments, 64% of vessels with
capacities of between 2,000 and 2,999 TEU have a width which accommodates rows of 13
containers (average capacity: 2,500 TEU), while the fleet of Panamax ships (between 3,000
and 5,099 TEU) is composed mainly of vessels which can accommodate rows of 14
containers (average capacity: 3,800 TEU).
54
Evolution of the fleet
The evolution of the containership fleet, both in quantitative terms (number of vessels) and
qualitative terms (vessel size) is an important feature of container transport. It is difficult to
predict today whether the growth in the size of ships will continue or if it has reached its
maximum. However, considering the many changes that have taken place over the past two
decades, as well as the arrival of the new CMA-CGM container vessels with a capacity of
16,000 TEU, it would appear that the first option is the most likely.
The worlds containership fleet has experienced particularly strong growth in capacity since
1995, growing at an average annual rate of 11% (while the increase was only 8% per year
between 1985 and 1995). This trend was also accompanied by successive technological
leaps in terms of vessel size and motorisation. However, while capacity has long been
increasing, is has not done so uniformly over time.
Between 1995 and 1999, the world containership fleet grew strongly, in line with
the mass introduction of over-Panamax vessels (more than 4,500 TEU).
2000 to 2001 saw a lull due to a period of consortia reorganisation and mergers.
2000 to 2003 was a period of recovery, notably with the launch of 8,000 TEU
vessels. This was followed by a slight decrease over the next two years even
though the orderbooks were full.
2006 to 2007 was a successful year. Deliveries of vessels continued at a high rate
compared to 2005, particularly for over-Panamax vessels and for ships with
capacities between 300 and 1,500 TEU and 1,500 to 3,000 TEU (+69.3%). Not
only were these deliveries large in number but they also displayed a concentration
at both ends of the size spectrum with the increasing capacity of the larger ships
creating new needs for feeder services, generating traffic that benefitted the hub
ports.
2008 was the first year of the downturn, driven by the financial crisis, and 2009
was a year of crisis management. The brutality of the downturn, following a long
period of euphoria in maritime transport, took owners and operators by surprise,
forcing them to urgently review their development strategies. In addition to the
short-term measures - deferrals of deliveries of chartered vessels and mothballing
of ships - operators had to review their order levels, which in 2008 represented
60% of the fleet and risked creating massive over-tonnage.
2010 was marked by a sharp upturn. The increase in recorded volumes
throughout the year enabled operators to increase the capacity available and
therefore bring many ships back into service.
In 2011, operators adapted their fleets to match the volumes to be transported:
the relative stability of volumes led operators to bring online a capacity roughly
equivalent to that available in 2010 on the major East-West routes, which helped
to ensure a correct level of vessel usage despite many new ships coming into
service.
55
Evolution of the containership fleet over the period 1995 2013
In October 2012, the cellular fleet comprised 5,020 ships with a capacity of approximately
16.2m TEU. For the record, as of 1 January 2000, the fleet consisted of 2,615 vessels with a
capacity of 4.5m TEU. The fleet has therefore doubled in size and more than tripled in
capacity in just over a decade. These impressive figures illustrate the significant
development of containerised transport thanks to the globalisation of trade and the everincreasing role of China in this process.
Because of deferrals, only 163 ships with a total capacity of 1,055,591 TEU (an average of
6,500 TEU per ship) were delivered between January and October 2012 (for comparison, in
the same period in the successful year of 2008, 349 ships had already been delivered).
Shipowners have used all the means at their disposal to negotiate with the shipyards to delay
the deliveries of ships they have ordered. They also tried to negotiate cancellations or the
conversion to bulk carriers or oil tankers of the ships ordered in previous years for delivery in
2013 and 2014 and whose construction was less advanced.
Alongside these quantitative measures, operators have also conducted qualitative reviews of
their fleets, focusing on their larger and more modern ships in the redesign of their East-West
services, in particular on vessels of more than 10,000 TEU which were ordered in large
numbers in 2007 and 2008 (it should also be noted that these vessels can only be used on
routes between Asia and Europe) and transferring smaller vessels onto North-South
services, these moves being designed to streamline and focus services on the principal
routes.
56

We can also identify a growing gap between vessels with a capacity of between 5,100 and
7,999 TEU and vessels with a capacity greater than 8,000 TEU. For comparison purposes,
we note that while their respective share of the total number of deliveries was still equal in
2008 (at around 10%), it had increased to 27% for ships between 5,100 and 7,999 TEU and
40% for vessels of more than 8,000 TEU. A growing trend which is also a result of a reduced
overall offer.
Another striking feature is that only 163 ships of less than 5,000 TEU are currently on order
(October 2012), compared to no less than 373 vessels of more than 5,000 TEU. The
significant fact is that this orderbook is very unbalanced in favour of vessels of more than
5,000 TEU, which represent around 75% of capacity (see graph below).
The influx of large vessels has a direct impact on the structure of the market. The rapid
growth in the fleet of vessels of more than 9,000 TEU led to an acceleration of the
concentration of services, in particular on routes from the Far East to northern Europe. These
vessels can achieve economies of scale and reduce the cost per cell, particularly when fuel
prices are high.
57
Between January and October 2012, 128 ships with a total capacity of around 240,000 TEU
were scrapped (within the same period in 2008, only 41,400 TEU of capacity was scrapped).
Therefore, since 2009 a watershed year - the average age of containerships sent for
disposal has been decreasing. Moreover, one of the characteristics of containerships is their
longevity and, demand having been virtually constant since their launch, the level of ships
scrapped is traditionally very low, representing only a small percentage of the arrival of new
vessels.
58
1.3. Shipowners strategies

General considerations
Operational choices of containership operators
Overall, there are strong similarities in the operational decisions taken by the main operators
of ships running on regular lines across the worlds oceans:
Almost total containerisation;

Increasingly large ships;
Growing tendency to serve secondary ports by fleets of feeders;
Streamlining of flows, by ensuring higher volumes of goods are transported on the
major maritime routes, and are distributed via transhipment platforms often by a
limited number of operators.
Other modes of transport using roll-on/roll-off or conventional, are not heretical or

contradictory methods. They are economically justified by the continued significant volumes
of goods which remain difficult or impossible to containerise and by the strategies of certain
niche market operators.
Specific problems in containerised transport
As with any merchant shipping, inactivity and the return (or repositioning) of empty
containers are costs which must be controlled to keep them at a minimum.
On any given line, the problem of 20 containers is different from that of 40 containers (as it
is for each type of special container), one or the other may occur in the other direction, with
neither inconvenience compensating for the other.
Having said this, for container traffic as for other forms of shipping, the case is economically
simple; in a competitive market, one must produce a unit cost of transportation as low as
possible by acting, primarily, on vessels and containers:
The type of vessel used (speed, consumption, payload, port productivity, ships
gear if necessary);
The size of the vessel, in order to maximise economies of scale. This is limited by
the need to optimise the loading of the ship for the complete rotation. In other
words, the size of the vessel must be adapted to the market share of the operator.
Finally, the container fleet (purchase or rental, maintenance and repair, transport
of empties and rebalancing between areas with surpluses and areas with deficits).
The best kind of containerised transport involves the transhipment of goods. As a result,
networking, in other words the connection of the various regular services of an operator
(with or without partners), makes it possible to capture volumes made larger as increasing
numbers of ports and their hinterlands across the globe are connected. The very concept of
globalisation as we talk about it today would not have been possible without the changes
brought about by the maritime industry in containerisation making trade around the world
faster, cheaper and more efficient.
59

In other words, today's globalisation is in proportion with the fluidity which containerisation
makes possible: containers can be transhipped from one vessel to another several times with
no damage to the goods, between any two ports, and shipyards now have the ability to
deliver more than 200 containerships per year, including more than 50 of 10,000 TEU, for a
total capacity of nearly 1.5 million TEU. The largest containerships will soon be able to carry
18,000 TEU with a deadweight of 200,000 tonnes. This fluidity is also due to the productivity
of the terminals, equipped with modern gantries adapted to the constant growth in the
number of containerships, as well as to the computerisation of data transferred between all
the stakeholders. Loading a 10,000 TEU containership today does not require the same
effort as that needed 30 years ago to load a 1,000 TEU multipurpose vessel.
As far as the strategy of the shipowners is concerned they seem to have only one guiding
principle; to have as little as possible and to set nothing in stone. All that counts is the ability
to adapt, along with operational and commercial opportunism as far as this capital intensive
activity allows them.
In order to have as accurate a vision as possible of the operational choices made by
shipowners in West Africa when faced with the existing constraints, interviews were
conducted with owners selected according to their representation in the market and for the
original nature of their approach, to provide the widest possible panorama of the strategies
used.
To this end, interviews were conducted with the following shipowners:
Maersk/Safmarine, CMA-CGM/Delmas and MSC, which are the three major

players in the CWA market and also the three largest shipowners in the world for
in container transport.
NileDutch, which is a shipowner specialised in serving the CWA market and
whose development in this market is particularly marked.
Grimaldi, a specialist in Ro-Ro transport and the leader in this form of transport in
the CWA market .
Hapag Lloyd, the worlds sixth largest shipowner and a new entrant in the CWA
market.
The shipowners and operators met during these interviews account for more than 80%
of the capacity in service between CWA and the other regions of the world.
The interviews were designed to highlight the strategies implemented by shipowners in the
West African market. To this end, the following topics were discussed with the different
representatives of the companies:
The services offered

The size of ships
Transhipment strategies
Shipping companies selection criteria for ports
Their views on the African ports they serve
Future developments
60

Summary of interviews and comments on shipowners strategies
Shipowners strategies
First of all it should be noted that all the global carriers are present in the CWA market, which
was not the case 15 years ago. Then we must place the CWA strategy of these shipowners
within the context of their overall strategy: the concentration of liner operators at the global
level has a direct impact on the maritime services present in CWA. The absorption of
Safmarine by Maersk and of Delmas by CMA-CGM has contributed to strengthening the
weight of these players in the CWA market and changed the type of shipping services they
perform through synergies established between their different lines.
Shipowners strategies for serving CWA derive directly from their position in the market and
we can therefore distinguish two clear trends:
- Global shipowners seek to maximise the benefits linked to their global market coverage by
connecting their different lines through their major hubs. They can take advantage of
economies of scale by increasing the size of their vessels while providing a very large
network of destinations. The only drawback of this strategy may be the loss of a certain
specialised expertise in CWA, which is no longer considered to be a destination like any
other.
It is Maersk Line which has taken this approach the furthest, removing all its direct services
to CWA from Europe and replacing them with services centred on Tangier/Algeciras and
connected to the major East-West services (Europe/Asia in particular), thereby rationalising
the use of capacity on its ships and benefitting from the reduced operating costs of its giant
vessels (14,000 TEU and, soon, 18,000 TEU) serving on the Europe/Asia routes. The
services of CMA-CGM-Delmas have partially adopted the same configuration, also from
Tangier and Algeciras. As for MSC, the company is currently reviewing the organisation of its
lines to better serve West Africa, particularly from Asia.
- Operators specialising in CWA favour direct services to African ports from northern
Europe, the Mediterranean and Asia, and stress the quality and speed of their services as
well as their personalised response to customers needs.
Types of ships used
A particularity of CWA services is the need in many ports to use vessels built specifically for
these routes: ships must be geared, have a reduced draught (less than 12.5m) and a length
limited to less than 250m. This entails ships from about 4,000 TEU upwards being overPanamax in size (to compensate for shallow draught and length limitations, vessels must be
wider than the standard) and cannot exceed 4,500 TEU. These technical particularities of the
vessels result in higher construction costs and represent an operational constraint to
shipping companies because of the difficulty of finding compatible ships on the charter
market (which also limits market entry for new players).
In addition, the fact that vessels are geared slows down operations when handling is being
conducted in modern terminals with container gantries.
Those ports or terminals which have no limitations on draught, or which seek to resolve
these problems in order to accommodate vessels of standard sizes, have a significant
61

competitive advantage, which can only increase as the growth in traffic makes the use of
larger vessels necessary.
Many maritime services still use conventional vessels in this market, but these will disappear
and be replaced by containerships as an increasing range of goods are containerised. This
will mean that the growth rate in container traffic will be higher than the overall growth rate for
volumes.
Ro-Ro vessels, which were once a very common feature in CWA because of their ability to
operate with the minimum of port infrastructure, are tending to disappear both because of
specialisation and improvement in infrastructure, but also due to the disappearance of the
traffic in used vehicles (imports of which are now prohibited in many African countries) that
were the staple of their shipments. Indeed, new vehicles, which are now mostly imported, are
generally transported on specialised vessels (Pure Car & Truck Carriers) and not on Ro-Ro
ships. In addition, while the traffic in used vehicles came mainly from Europe, the route on
which Ro-Ro ships operated, the flows of new vehicles originate from countries or areas that
are not served by these vessels: Japan Korea, Turkey, Brazil, Egypt, South Africa, and
Nigeria, for example.
Only the Grimaldi company continues to base its strategy on Ro-Ro ships, though CMACGM/Delmas have on order in Korea a series of Ro-Ro ships destined for the northern
Europe to CWA route (however, the date for putting these ships into service has been
postponed several times).
Operational problems
All the shipowners interviewed stressed the importance of taking operational aspects into
consideration in their decision-making, while very little reference was made to commercial
issues. The problems or handicaps to be overcome in the ports of CWA are mainly the
following:
- Implementation of fixed berthing windows: This is a fundamental element in the regularity of
a maritime service and in optimising the management of a terminal. This procedure is in
place on all terminals hosting East/West services. The increasing size of the vessels serving
CWA makes it more and more essential for optimising the utilisation of terminals and ship
turnaround. The specialisation of terminals between container traffic and conventional traffic
and Ro-Ro ships has already been a significant step forward and opens the way for
establishing fixed berthing windows at all ports.
- Increasing and maintaining draught: Shipowners are very keen on this point: it appears that
a draught of 12.5m is currently an acceptable minimum and an ideal draught should reach
14.5m in the future. This not only poses the problem of the initial costs of dredging to reach
this depth, but also the problem of maintenance costs due to the geographical specificities of
many African ports.
- Implementation of effective EDI systems: African ports lag behind in this area which is
extremely harmful to the fluidity of their port operations because the specificities of traffic in
CWA require precise computerised management: a large imbalance of container flows in
both type (40'/20') and number (export/import) which means sending back empty containers
in large numbers, endemic overloading in terminals requiring rapid evacuation of containers
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and storage solutions outside the port area, and servicing of landlocked countries which
requires the creation of single-window systems and the exchange of data between
administrative and operational personnel.
- Improvements to handling equipment: As was noted above, maintaining geared ships on
almost all container services on the one hand reflects the lack of quayside handling
equipment at some ports and on the other reflects shipowners mistrust of the quality and
reliability of the services provided. This is mainly due to the persistence (frequency) of power
cuts in many countries and the concern that the maintenance of quayside handling
equipment is minimal.
- Management of empty containers: As highlighted above, the problem of empty containers is
structural as exports from CWA cannot balance imports, whether it be between Europe and
CWA or, more explicitly, between Asia and CWA. This problem is exacerbated by imports
being overwhelmingly in 40' containers, better suited for light goods, while exports are mainly
in 20' containers, which are easier to optimise with heavy goods such as raw materials. The
sorting, storage and rapid redirection of empty containers is fundamental to the efficiency
and economy of marine services in CWA.
On most of these issues, a clear competitive advantage emerges for those terminals licensed
and operated by major handling groups (such as APMT and Dubai Ports) which are
considered by shipowners to be better managed and more productive than public terminals.
Services to landlocked territories
The organisation of services to landlocked territories by shipping companies is hampered by
political instability in the countries on the coastline. Uncertainties about the sustainability of a
service in any given port does not allow the setting up of regular services, such as those
established in Europe through freight corridors, to be implemented in CWA. The
consequences of events in the Ivory Coast (2006 and 2011) are relevant in this regard: the
port of Abidjan was virtually abandoned by most maritime services and they returned only
gradually. During this period, trading with Mali and Burkina Faso had to be conducted using
other routes (i.e. Dakar and Lom).
Currently, no shipping company appears to have a firmly established system for serving
landlocked countries and some shipowners even refuse to serve them as they are unable to
ensure control of their freight traffic.
With the development of consumerism and increasing exports from countries in CWA, a
better logistic network in the extended hinterland area offers a significant reservoir for
growth.
To take into account these potential flows, a number of measures would seem to be
indispensable: the implementation of single-window systems, improved EDI in ports, the
establishment of dry ports, safer and better road conditions, the consolidation of reliable rail
links and combating insecurity and abnormal practices (legal or quasi-legal taxes).
63
2. Infrastructures, traffic and organisation

2.1. Ports in detail
The purpose of this section is to provide the most exhaustive possible overview of the
characteristics of ports in West Africa taking into account nautical conditions, infrastructure
and equipment. The ports of Dakar, Abidjan, Lom and Tema have been extensively studied
and summary factsheets are offered for other ports. A special focus on the strategy of
handlers is offered at the end of this section.
It is important to note that the draughts defined in this section should be interpreted as the
permissible draught for vessels under full loads.
Moreover, the productivity of quayside handling is expressed in gross flows (either by gantry
or by ship).
An analysis of tariffs has been compiled and is available at the end of this section.
2.1.1. Dakar, Abidjan, Tema, Lom
Port of Dakar
Traffic
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Containerised traffic has grown by an average of 6% per year since the terminals were
allocated to DP World. However, it should be borne in mind that volumes have not reached
their 2007 level. The ratio of full/empty containers has changed in favour of full containers,
mainly due to the recuperation of traffic from Mali which has allowed containers for export to
be filled.
Transit traffic destined for landlocked countries is growing rapidly, having more than doubled
since 2009. This can be explained by the unstable political situation in the Ivory Coast, which
has enabled Senegal to capture a large share of Mali traffic.
The DP World terminal is the only one able to accommodate containerships. However, in
2011, 17% of containers were handled in other terminals. This situation is explained by the
fact that shipowners such as Grimaldi (pier 2) and Messina transport their containers on RoRo ships and unload them in their terminals.
In terms of consignment, agents for the three principal shipowners deal with the majority of
containers.
Nautical conditions
The port is suitably sheltered and well protected from bad weather, which usually comes
from the north/north-west. Tornadoes are very rare and relatively weak.
Port access for merchant shipping is safe and easy, and the docking of ships is rapid. Dakar
is one of the easiest ports on the Atlantic coast of Africa, served by good pilots and an
efficient tug service. Uncertainty about the port of the future project means we cannot
address this issue specifically. However, an eastward extension should give this new port a
situation that is as equally sheltered as the current one.
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Infrastructure/superstructure
DP World (one of the worlds leading port operators) was awarded the concession for the
port of Dakar in 2008 for a period of 25 years. DP World has a relatively small presence in
Africa (Algiers, Djen-Djen, Sokhna, Maputo, Djibouti, bulk terminals in South Africa etc.).
Before the granting of the concession to DP World, three operators shared handling
operations: Bollor, APMT and Getma. The handover of the terminal was made in a tense
atmosphere which had an impact on operations and volumes during the first six months.
As with previous ports, containers do not stay in the DP World terminal and are processed at
inland terminals for operational reasons (transfer of risk, a safety valve etc.). The ratio of
surface area to length of quay is average at 500m/ml. Inland terminals have relatively limited
surface areas of less than 2ha. Operations in these terminals would need to be standardised
(location of containers, stacking, safety etc.) to improve efficiency but loading and unloading
of containers by road hauliers complicates the organisation.
Road transport is congested around the port of Dakar and the road infrastructure towards
Mali has deteriorated, despite recent work, due to overloaded trucks (>40 tonnes). Rail
transport is inefficient and requires investment from the two countries. Mali is reluctant to
invest in rail because of lobbying from Malian hauliers and the importance of this sector to
the countrys economy. The maintenance and operation of this system should be split.
66
Source: PAD
67
The container terminal in the northern zone has two concrete block wall berths with a draught
of 11.6m (positions 62 and 63) representing a length of 425m. It has three distinct areas: CT
1 is the yard alongside the quayside, CT 2 is found in a second zone and CT 3 is reserved
for empty containers. Work has just been completed on infilling the basin between the CT
and pier 8 (more than eight hectares of reclaimed land and 300m of quay).
DP World has invested heavily to provide the terminal with quality facilities. The terminal
organisation (operations, ISPS, ISO 14002 etc.) nearly meets international standards. The
draught is decent (comparable with the other ports in the region). The facilities are modern
and meet the needs in terms of volumes. The theoretical maximum capacity of the terminal is
estimated at 800,000 TEU.
The distribution of positions for empty containers is made according to the free pool system.
Shipowners believe that the introduction of fixed arrival windows is a significant step forward
and reduces harbour waiting times. Docking times for a ship have fallen from 12 hours to
seven hours in three years. Truck service time is less than 30 minutes.
Productivity is constantly increasing, standing now at 35 containers per vessel per hour (1.5
gantries on average).
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Projects
The port du futur (port of the Future) is a project that was negotiated between the port of
Dakar and DP World during the award of the concession for the port (under the chairmanship
of Mr Wade). It provides for 1,150m of quays with a draught of 15m. Some 90% of its activity
will come from transhipments.
Feasibility studies for the project will be launched once a cap of 412,500 TEU handled is
exceeded.
The objective is to capture transhipment traffic from the lines between Asia and the
Americas. The investment has been calculated at 300 million and the capacity of the new
terminal would be 1.5m TEU. Some shipowners believe the proximity of Dakar to the hubs of
Tangiers and Algeciras is highly disadvantageous for transhipment in Dakar.
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Analysis and summary
The DP World terminal is known for its operational qualities and the streamlined way in which
it functions. Land transport still needs to be improved. Currently, the port du futur project
appears to be disproportionate to the needs of the Senegalese economy and the potentiality
for transhipment in the region.
SWOT analysis for the port of Dakar
Strengths
Efficiency of port operations

Quality of facilities
Fixed arrival windows
Weaknesses
GDP growth in Senegal is rather low in comparison with neighbouring countries

Rail service - lacks frequency and reliability, precarious financial health of the
stakeholders
Port handling costs
Opportunities
Capture of traffic destined for Mali
Threats
Monopoly of the port handling of containers

Feasibility and use of the port du futur project
The proximity of Dakar toTangiers risks limiting transhipment volumes for the port du
futur project
70
Port of Abidjan
Traffic
Container traffic in the port of Abidjan was hit hard by the political crisis of 2011 as there was
virtually no activity in the port over a period of three months. The AAP expects traffic in 2012
to rise sharply, returning to pre-crisis levels of more than 600,000 TEU. Approximately
150,000 containers are sent by feeder services to secondary ports. CMA-CGM accounts for
80% of transhipment activities in the port of Abidjan.
Based on fundamental economic and demographic indicators there is strong potential for
economic development and growth in traffic. Political stability will be a significant issue in the
coming years. The target set by the AAP for 2012 is a growth rate of 15% for overall traffic
and 20% for transhipment traffic.
Transit traffic destined for Mali and Burkina Faso has suffered greatly since 2006 and the
port received no traffic for several months in 2011. The ports of Dakar, Lom and Tema, in
particular, took advantage of this situation to serve the landlocked countries. Stakeholders in
the Abidjan port are confident about the ability of the port to recapture this traffic in the
coming months. Nevertheless, problems remain on the routes crossing the north of the
country and could delay the return of volumes destined for the landlocked countries (notably
Mali) from Abidjan.
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Nautical conditions
The increase in the size of vessels using the port of Abidjan is now more-or-less capped by
the limits imposed by the Vridi Canal. These limits define Africamax and make it difficult to
envisage the use of ships much larger than those currently used by the major operators.
Apart from the canals dimensions, the currents make entry for larger vessels increasingly
difficult. There are two kinds of currents. One is related to the tides and its effects are felt
longitudinally in the canal, determining the windows of opportunity available for ship
manoeuvres according to tide times. The other is the Gulf of Guinea current (one knot on
average), which generally bears east and complicates the entry of ships into the canal by
generating a lateral element during its evolution. Concerning weather conditions, it is mainly
heavy rains which can interfere with ship movements.
Infrastructure/superstructure
The container terminal operator is SETV, a joint venture between Bollor (60%) and APMT
(40%). The terminal extends over 34 hectares. SETV manages quayside container handling
and then transfers responsibility to stevedoring companies. The access roads require
upgrading, in particular access to the container terminal and to routes serving inland
terminals. The storage of containers on the premises of other companies allows SETV to free
up space and concentrate on port handling activities.
SITARAIL is the rail subsidiary of Bollor and APMT. It connects Abidjan with Burkina Faso.
A project extending the connection to Niger is envisaged. Between two and three trains per
week link Abidjan to Ouagadougou.
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The container terminal (Abidjan terminal/SETV) consists of five berths. The draught is 11.5m
with a maximum of 12.5m for positions 23, 24 and 25.
The theoretical maximum capacity of the port is estimated at 1.3m TEU (with optimised
facilities). Given the current state of the equipment (October 2012), the capacity is 675,000
TEU. The four gantries date respectively from 1986 (two), 1999 and 2009. Two new gantries
are due to be delivered in June 2013. The new gantries will be able to reach a width of 38m.
The terminal is spread over 34 hectares which gives a ratio of 358m/ml, a figure well below
international standards (which are around 500m/ml), but we have to bear in mind the
importance of the terminals beyond the main port area which are managed by port operators
and relieve SETV of the responsibility of storing a large proportion of containers.
The modernisation of yard equipment began in 2006 and RTGs have been gradually
introduced. The new quays were opened in early October and are equipped with rails.
Bollor Africa Logistics has invested 82m in the terminal. In 2014, the group expects to
receive six new yard gantries.
The average productivity of the gantries is 17 containers per hour, but this varies greatly
between gantries. For example, the P4 gantry has an average productivity of 21.5 containers
per hour and the arrival of two new gantries in 2013 is expected to raise overall productivity
to more than 20 containers per hour.
The current level of productivity is acceptable considering the overall port conditions, but falls
far short of standards in Europe or Asia.
The average gross productivity per ship is 33 containers per hour with a maximum of 43.2
containers/per hour for P4. For SETV, the fact that Maersk vessels are geared complicates
loading and unloading and affects productivity.
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Projects
The port of Abidjan has begun the tendering process for the award of the second container
terminal. Technical bids had to be filed before 19/11/12 for assignment of the terminal in
February 2013.
Four groups responded to this call for tenders:
SIVOM, Necotrans, ICTSI, CMA-CGM

PSA Singapore, Marsa
Bollor, Bouygues, Maersk
MSC
The PAA attaches great importance to the presence of a shipowner in the group to
guarantee traffic to the new terminal.
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The characteristics of the project (detailed in the table above) should allow it to handle 1.5m
TEU and be put into service in 2017. The starting costs should be around 15% and the PAA
will fund the basic infrastructure.
Source PAA plan for the CT2 project

The project for terminals on Boulay Island is an ambitious one for the distant future that
would take advantage of the space available on the island to develop a greenfield portindustrial complex with new bridges connecting the island to the mainland.
The Vridi Canal is clearly one of the limiting factors in projects for developing the port of
Abidjan. The entrance to the canal was deliberately restricted to create a venturi effect,
allowing sediment to be evacuated and reducing the need for dredging. However, this
solution is now a constraint, particularly in terms of vessel length as ships more than 250m
long cannot enter the canal. A widening of the entrance to the canal and a deepening of the
channel are therefore required to support the port of Abidjan projects. Nevertheless, there
remains uncertainty about the timing and funding of this work.
Analysis and summary
Operators and users share a common view on the potential for developing volumes in
Abidjan. They will closely follow the concession granting process for the second terminal.
The award of the terminal to a new operator will create beneficial competition in terms of
tariffs. However, uncertainties remain on the financing of the work connected to this project.
Abidjan could play a coherent role as a regional transhipment port provided that its
infrastructure is upgraded.
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SWOT analysis for the port of Abidjan

Strengths
Operation of the container terminal

Service to landlocked countries by rail and road
Weaknesses
Limited draught and vessel length in the Vridi Canal

Congestion on port access roads
Cost of port handling and stevedore services
Obsolescence of some equipment
Discrepancy between pre-booking and final loading list
Opportunities
Potential for traffic related to domestic consumption, genuine hinterland

Political stabilisation is underway which should allow the return of some traffic taken
by Tema and Lom
Launch of the tender process for CT2
Possible complementarity with the port of San Pedro in terms of the type of traffic and
the management of port congestion
Threats
Uncertainty about the ability of Abidjan to capture transhipment traffic

Risk of not recuperating all of the pre-crisis traffic
Availability of funding, notably for the Vridi Canal
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Port of Tema
Economic environment
With a population of 23 million people, Ghana is a country which is richer than many of its
West African neighbours. It is the worlds leading cocoa producer and benefits from mineral
wealth (especially gold and, more recently, oil). The rate of GDP growth is remarkably high
and this growth is expected to continue at a high level over the coming years.
Ghana is currently enjoying an economic boom, in part because of the discovery of oil
offshore, but more generally because the country offers a reassuring prospect for foreign
investors because of its democratic maturity and sound business climate, especially when
compared to that of many neighbouring countries. Ghana is attractive to foreign investors as
witnessed by air traffic which has literally exploded, growing by 250% over the course of
three years and attracting 38 airlines to Accra.
Traffic
Traffic in the port of Tema really took off in 2011; a trend confirmed by results in 2012 and
growth looks set to continue in the years to come.
Tema port container traffic in TEU
77

Nautical conditions
Nautical conditions are ideal and very rarely affected by the weather (rain, fog).
Infrastructure
Although the port of Tema is not very old (it dates back to 1962), its design is poorly adapted
to container traffic: limited draught and, above all, a drastic lack of space.
The current port of Tema is formed of the parts marked in yellow on the map below. Those
parts marked in white are extensions that were considered and subsequently abandoned.
The ports in Ghana (Tema and Takoradi) are entrusted to a national port authority, the
Ghana Ports and Harbours Authority (GPHA). The GPHA sets the general framework for port
activities, regulates the operations (safety, security etc.), builds and maintains infrastructure
and sets rates for all services, both within and outside the port (Inland Container Depots
(ICD)) offered by it, or by public or private companies.
Map of the port of Tema
The GPHA is not a landlord because it is either indirectly involved in handling (through local
handlers which it in turn manages) or directly through an ICD (Golden Jubilee).
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The satellite image shown above, which dates back to March 2011, shows the entire current
port: the container terminal, its storage area and further back, outside the port, the three
ICDs, where 50% of imported full containers are sent after landing.
We can also see that berths 4 to 12 are lined with warehouses and offer only very limited
space.
The image above provides a clear view of the container terminal (only the quay facing the
seawall is licensed to the operator MPS) and its storage area, completely separate to the
quay because of the lack of space on the jetty where the containers are unloaded.
Infrastructure
Containerterminal
Operator
Lengthofconcession
Terminalsize(surfacearea)
Inlandterminals
Roadaccess
Railaccess
Lengthofquay
Draught
STS
Mobilecranes
Reachstackers
RTG
Others
Theoreticalcapacity
Productivity
Tema
MeridianPortServices
(Bollor35%,APMT35%,GPHA30%)
20yearsfrom2004
Approx.10ha
3ICDsbeyondtheport
Yes,onlyoneandcongested
No
Berths1and2,575mlinonego
11.50m
3
3
>10
4
500000TEU
35mvt/hship
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The port comprises berths numbered 1 to 12.
Berths 1 and 2 constitute the quay of the container terminal, measuring 575m in
length and offering a draught of around 11.5m. The concession for this quay was
granted to Meridian Port Services in 2004 for a period of 20 years.
On the other side of the quay, berths 3 and 4 offer lower draughts (10m for berth 3
and 8.8m for berth 4).
On the main quay, berths 6 to 12 offer a draught of 8m, apart from berth 5, which
offers 8.7m.
Berths 1 and 2 are managed under concession by Meridian Port Services (MPS). These are
the only berths in the port to have quayside equipment.
The other berths, numbers 3 to 12, are assigned in turn to local handlers, of which there are
seven or eight. They operate on geared ships, with very low productivity levels.
The operator MPS (30% GPHA, 35% Bollor, 35% APMT) has held a 20-year concession for
the container terminal since 2004.
The equipment available in the container terminal comprises the following:
Three ZPMC quay gantries capable of lifting 40 tonnes with twinlift capacity and
capable of operating across rows of 15 containers.
Three mobile Gottwald cranes with more-or-less the same capacity: twinlift and 15
rows.
Four RTGs for managing the yard, and a number of reach-stackers.
The container terminal is currently saturated, not only on the quays, but also in the yard and
on the access routes.
Berths 1 and 2 are occupied practically 100% of the time22 if we discount the delay required
for one vessel to leave the port and another ship to replace it on the quay, a delay which can
extend to four or five hours (in fact, it is not possible for two ships to pass each other at the
entrance to the port).
However, queuing theory dictates that if the number of equivalent berths is limited to two,
then an occupancy rate of 35% should not be exceeded to maintain waiting times at a level
lower than 10% of the time taken to service ships. Clearly, waiting times here for vessels are
much longer than that. According to converging sources, the average waiting time for access
to the container port is now estimated at about 2.2 days, but in the recent past it has
extended to six days.
Admittedly, ships do not arrive in a completely random manner as berthing windows have
been introduced by MPS. Not all the shipping companies and all services have benefitted
from this introduction, but the most important services do have it at their disposal. However, it
cant solve all the problems. Delayed ships can lose their place in the queue. Above all, the
22
On the increase: according to the Halcrow report, the utilisation rates of berths 1 and 2 were 75% and 73% respectively.
They were then by far the most used berths in the port, the other berths had utilisation rates of 60% for berth 3, around 50%
for berths 4-10, and 20-30% for the last two berths.
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schedule can be disrupted by any number of incidents, including cuts in the electricity supply
affecting the port after a gas pipeline was put out of action by a ships anchor.
Ships that cannot be handled at the MPS terminal have the choice between a long wait and
opting for the GPHA quays, where the handlers are less skilled, there are no quayside
cranes and productivity is very low. However, MPS handles more than 80% of the container
traffic in the port23, which is no mean feat given the operational conditions. The productivity
achieved on the MPS quay is considered to be amongst the best in West Africa, with an
average of 35 quay movements per hour (22 movements per hour and per gantry, 12
movements per hour and per mobile crane).
Port operation
It cannot be said that the port of Tema has a container terminal as its facilities were designed
for conventional traffic.
Behind berths 1 and 2, there is very little space and this space must also be used for work on
berths 3 and 4 and the removal of the corresponding goods.
The container yard is therefore situated away from the quay and requires extra handling
which then translates into additional costs.
The yard currently operates with a mixture of reach-stackers and RTGs. Its cramped size
makes it essential to change to full RTG operations. The four current RTGs span six rows of
containers plus a truck lane and can pass a container over five.
But even with the densest possible use of the yard, the area available may not be sufficient.
This is why half of the imported containers (full) are invited to leave the port for storage in
one of the three ICDs (Inland Container Depots) established next to the port.
Here again, this transfer generates extra costs compared to short-term storage in the
container terminal.
The facilities at the port of Tema are unsuited to container traffic but, for the moment,
stopgap solutions still allow the port to meet the increase in traffic. However, it is easy to
foresee that these methods will reach their limits in the next few years.
23
Increasing: the Halcrow report noted in 2007 that berths 1 and 2 were operating on 327,000 TEU out of 495,000 TEU,
while berths 3-5 handled 74,000 TEU and berths 6-12 94,000 TEU.
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SWOT analysis for the port of Tema
Strengths
The existence of a critical mass of import-export traffic

Advantages vis--vis transit traffic to Burkina Faso in terms of the distance to
Ouagadougou
Weaknesses
Archaic port regulation and control (originally designed for a service port)
Insufficient draught available
Lack of space behind the quays in the container terminal, and a general lack of space
available in the port
Lack of equipment on the conventional quays and poor maintenance of the available
equipment (not including MPS)
Congestion on access roads
Private investment is discouraged by unreliable profitability: the GPHA fixes the rates
of private operators, sometimes in Cedi (which falls in value without any change in
the tariffs)
Procedures are too cumbersome, costing time and money
No rail service
Too many licences granted to operators and freight forwarders, who are too
numerous and incompetent
General lack of resources and a climate which is averse to open competition
Opportunities
The Ghanaian economy has entered a phase of sustainable growth

Industrial diversification is possible into the oil and gas industry
Landlocked countries are seeking to secure their supplies by diversifying routes
Threats
All ports want to become regional hubs

Some of the neighbouring ports have greater opportunities to develop their
infrastructure at a limited cost
Threats to maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea
Poor cooperation between the city and the port
Underdeveloped logistics sector, insufficient competence
82

Ship
owners
5
2
1
4
3
4
3
2
Opinion
Trafficpotential
Nauticalconditions
Infrastructure
Equipment
Maritimeservices
Roadtransport
Operationalquality
Tariffs
Adaptability/flexibility
Agents
5
2
1
4
3
2
3
2
Portoperators
5
2
0
4
4
3
4
4
1
Public
stakeholders
5
3
2
4
4
4
3
3
3
Projects
The master plan conceived by engineering consultants Halcrow, completed in 2010,

identified three scenarios (see figures on following page):
Direct call shipping services (now already obsolete)

Global hub
Regional hub, likely to give the port of Tema the status of a regional hub and
generating transhipment traffic
For the two scenarios National Gateway (satisfying national needs) and Regional Hub
(additional transhipment streams), the traffic forecasts are as follows:
HALCROW TRAFFIC FORECASTS (IN KTEU)
National Gateway
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
Optimistic
934
1,051
1,177
1,310
1,449
1,592
1,740
1,889
2,038
2,185
2,328
2,465
2,593
2,728
2,870
3,019
3,176
Neutral Pessimistic Optimistic

820
728
1,064
900
782
1,169
985
836
1,278
1,072
892
1,390
1,160
947
1,505
1,250
1,002
1,622
1,340
1,056
1,738
1,429
1,109
1,854
1,517
1,160
1,968
1,602
1,209
2,078
1,683
1,254
2,183
1,759
1,297
2,282
1,830
1,336
2,374
1,903
1,376
2,469
1,979
1,417
2,567
2,058
1,460
2,670
2,141
1,504
2,776
Regional Hub
Neutral Pessimistic
1,177
972
1,319
1,050
1,470
1,129
1,628
1,210
1,796
1,292
1,964
1,373
2,138
1,454
2,314
1,534
2,489
1,611
2,661
1,685
2,829
1,755
2,988
1,820
3,137
1,880
3,294
1,942
3,458
2,006
3,631
2,072
3,812
2,140
83
The underlying growth rates are given in the table below:
UNDERLYING GROWTH RATES IN THE HALCROW FORECASTS

National Gateway
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
2027
2028
Regional Hub
Optimistic Neutral Pessimistic Optimistic Neutral Pessimistic
1.13
1.10
1.07
1.10
1.12
1.08
1.12
1.09
1.07
1.09
1.11
1.08
1.11
1.09
1.07
1.09
1.11
1.07
1.11
1.08
1.06
1.08
1.10
1.07
1.10
1.08
1.06
1.08
1.09
1.06
1.09
1.07
1.05
1.07
1.09
1.06
1.09
1.07
1.05
1.07
1.08
1.06
1.08
1.06
1.05
1.06
1.08
1.05
1.07
1.06
1.04
1.06
1.07
1.05
1.07
1.05
1.04
1.05
1.06
1.04
1.06
1.05
1.03
1.05
1.06
1.04
1.05
1.04
1.03
1.04
1.05
1.03
1.05
1.04
1.03
1.04
1.05
1.03
1.05
1.04
1.03
1.04
1.05
1.03
1.05
1.04
1.03
1.04
1.05
1.03
1.05
1.04
1.03
1.04
1.05
1.03
The growth rates applied in the long term are particularly high.
The Regional Hub scenario is not a real possibility as the neighbouring port of Lom has set
its sights on this role. It has better natural conditions and a development project already
underway and scheduled for completion in late 2013 or early 2014 which will provide MSC
with the transhipment facilities they want. The port of Abidjan is also in the running with its
proposed second container terminal, but this project is not as advanced.
Furthermore, it appears unlikely that many shipowners would consider mass transhipment in
a port in the Gulf of Guinea when the broad range of the other strategic options available for
serving West Africa is taken into consideration.
Nevertheless, these traffic forecasts have been used as the basis for a very ambitious
expansion project for the port of Tema, which would provide it with a capacity of 4m TEU.
84

THE THREE SCENARIOS IN THE MASTER PLAN
85

PORT EXTENSION PROJECT
The image above shows the project in relation to the existing port.
The Halcrow master plan therefore leads to an extremely ambitious expansion of the port,
both in terms of new structures (a new 6km seawall, more than 4km of new quays, 250ha of
land reclaimed from the sea, draughts of 14 to 17m...) and in terms of cost, which has been
estimated at nearly US$3bn!
86

Project
Name
Characteristics
Objectives
Managementsystem
Completiondate
Progress
Operator
Conditions
Funding
Tema
>4kmofquays,>250halandreclaimedfromthesea
ExpansionoftheportofTema
Concessionsawardedformultipleterminals
Masterplan
US$3billiononlyforinfrastructure
The project plans the building of:

Four container terminals, including one for transhipments
Two terminals for fruit and food products
One Ro-Ro terminal
One cruise passenger terminal
One terminal for goods in transit
This disproportionate project seems totally inappropriate:
Because it does not respond to the urgent nature of the current situation
Because the scale of its ambition makes financing unlikely and as a consequence it
could delay much needed practical improvements designed to quickly improve the
situation
Because it will further concentrate flows at a point which is already very congested
(despite the proposed direct road access to the port, shown below)
87

Institutional and regulatory environment
The extension outlined in the master plan will not reach fruition, not least because it is too
expensive and will not find funding. Even if the scheme could be achieved in phases, there
are prohibitive costs involved before any quay construction can take place (principally the
building of the new seawall).
The port of Tema, with its rocky seabed and its position enclosed by the city, does not
present any great advantages for expansion when compared to Lom which has more
obvious benefits.
Nevertheless, it is clear that the situation cannot continue for much longer and an emergency
plan will have to be put into action.
MPS plans to do its part by ordering new equipment in order to increase the capacity of its
facilities from 750,000 to one million TEU through improved operational productivity:
Two quay gantries similar to those currently used but with a lifting force of 65 tonnes
(making it possible to conduct twinlifting of full containers)
One additional mobile crane
Eight new RTGs for the container yard, four of which will replace older models
currently in use.
The GPHA plans to build an ore quay near berths 11 and 12 offering several new berths,
which could offer some relief for berths 5 to 10.
But the need is clearly felt for at least one additional berth in the short term for container
traffic. This berth could be located, for example, on the other side of the jetty (berth 3, which
has greater draught). This berth could be assigned to MPS or, alternatively, two berths could
be put out to concession to an operator selected through a competitive bidding process.
More fundamentally, the following needs to be urgently considered:
The possibilities of deepening by at least 1m those berths used for container freight to
see if economically reasonable solutions can be found
It is also necessary to move towards granting concessions on other berths, including
those dedicated to handling conventional and bulk traffic, in order to obtain a sharp
increase in productivity through motivated concessionaires possessing the required
expertise and investing in mobile cranes wherever their use is possible
If it should become obvious that some berths are not suitable for the use of mobile
cranes, ways to make this possible and realistic in terms of investment need to be
studied.
88

Medium and long-term analysis
In the medium term, it is necessary to think about how to open up the port and the ICDs. A
road (three lanes each way) providing direct port access from the Accra-Tema motorway is
undoubtedly an essential part of achieving this.
The truck park planned for Kpong, some eight to 10km from the port, could also contribute to
improving traffic flow.
It is also essential to conduct a review of port procedures, identify bottlenecks and remedy
them to improve the fluidity of port activities. This will certainly include examining and
introducing a single window system, that is as a Port Community System, but also the
modernisation of customs procedures with a view to conducting random checks based on
risk criteria, thereby reducing the need to pass through the scanner or for physical
inspections.
In the long term long, other ICDs (or more likely one or more logistics platforms offering
diversified services) should be considered. Locating them at a certain distance from the port,
between Accra and Tema, would disperse the flow and reduce the concentration of flows on
a confined site. Ideally, this platform or platforms would be sited along the path of the rail line
linking Tema and Accra, allowing containers to be carried by rail to the platform. Clearly, the
railway, which currently carries a limited number of passengers, would have to be adapted to
carry heavier trains.
Again in the long term, a major port expansion needs to be investigated and built. The only
question that needs to be asked, however, is whether this expansion should adjoin the
existing port, with the risk of greatly increasing congestion on local roads, or whether a more
favourable (and perhaps less expensive to develop on a technical level) site should found, in
accordance with the blueprint for the national road network. Clearly, Accra is an area of great
economic importance, making it unrealistic to locate a future port too far away.
89

Port of Lom
Economic situation
Togo has experienced a period

of dynamic economic activity,
but there is currently a risk of
the
country
repeating
its
previous mistakes, and falling
back into debt. Togo has not yet
reached an agreement with the
IMF, which is blocking financial
backers.
Traffic
Overalltraffic(MT)
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Allactivities
5.35
6.18
7.28
7.32
8.00
Containertraffic(TEU)
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Total
215,892
237,313
275,277
354,480
339,853
350,000
57,560
55,736
59,653
52,648
55,221
61,300
ImportstoTogo
ExportsfromTogo
81,872
98,873
142,298
166,916
157,476
162,754
137,860
140,476
172,938
172,267
200,850
163,754
Empty
58,488
62,609
78,893
97,537
85,281
59,936
Transit
56,916
59,766
27,394
50,240
73,434
77,090
Transhipment
19,544
22,938
45,932
84,676
53,722
87,872
Full
Container traffic in the port of Lom has steadily increased, reaching approximately 350,000
TEUs in 2011, just as the ports overall traffic has increased too, reaching 8m tonnes in 2010.
90

Nautical conditions
The nautical conditions are ideal and the port is very rarely affected by the weather (rain,
fog).
Infrastructure
The table below shows the current situation in the Lom container terminal, which has two
berths located on either side of a narrow jetty, as well as container storage situated off the
quay and behind Bollors planned extension, which would add a third quay.
Containerterminal
Operator
Lengthofconcession
Quaydetails
Quayequipment
Terminalsize(surfacearea)
Yardequipment
Inlandterminals
Roadaccess
Railaccess
Lengthofquay
Draught
STS
Mobilecranes
Reachstackers
RTG
Others
Theoreticalcapacity
Productivity
Lom
BollorAfricaLogistics
2010/35years
500mat11m(for230ml):12m(for200ml)
4mobilecranes(Panamax)plus2onorder
12ha
19reachstackers(TOS=Oscar)
No
Yes
No
430mintwosections
230mat11mand200mat12m
0
4+2tocome
20
0
Tractorsandtrailers
350,000TEU
32MVT/h,1000MVTin48hours
Cumulatively, the existing facilities are handicapping operations. Container storage is limited
and situated away from the quay, and the quay itself is divided into two sections which
significantly reduces operational flexibility. The quay limits the length of the vessels which
can be received.
Jetty 2 and its quays are likely to be deepened to 13m, but first of all it will be necessary to
check the stability of the quay walls.
The future third quay will give the whole terminal greater coherence, providing almost double
the length of quays available and providing container storage behind. Storage density can be
increased through the use of RTGs.
91

Cargo services
Customs services are not computerised. This means that customs formalities have to be
done manually, and many steps have to be followed as the papers are transferred between
the different officials.
Port users are waiting for the implementation of the planned single window system. The Web
Cargo software does not work.
A transit time of four to five days is considered efficient. Beyond this, financial penalties in the
form of demurrage may apply.
The detention period is limited to 10 days for the return of containers which contain goods
destined for Togo. Most shipowners have aligned themselves with this figure. For goods
destined for the hinterland, the detention period is at least 21 days and can be negotiated up
to 30 days.
The free demurrage period in the terminal is 25 days for goods for the hinterland and four
days for Togo. The penalties for exceeding these limits are 3,150 FCFA for countries in the
hinterland and 3,717 FCFA for Togo (subject to VAT).
SWOT analysis for the port of Lom
Strengths
The port offers broad expansion possibilities, there is land available for expansion
and possibilities for construction behind the port (car park etc.)
The port can easily achieve the water depths necessary for large container ships
(complementary with the implementation of the two projects mentioned)
A welcoming, stable port offering flexibility in procedures (including transhipment)
when compared to Benin (too much political influence in the port of Cotonou)
The introduction of berthing windows, which have considerably reduced ship
waiting times
Very good productivity : currently close to 35 movements per hour/ship, one of the
best in Africa
No congestion in the port
Free port: ability to import, add value added tax and re-export without paying
customs duties
Weaknesses
The existing container terminal facilities are not rational, the yard is at some
distance which implies additional handling
Less commercial flexibility since Getma is no longer licensed to handle containers
Port roads are in a very poor state
Speed at which imported goods are cleared: four to five days minimum
Inefficient banking system
Opportunities
92
Easy communication between Togo and neighbouring countries: same currency,

same language etc.
The port opens the way to good quality links for services to Burkina Faso and
Niger, unencumbered by a multitude of informal tolls
In the future the port could also offer services to the hinterland of Ghana
(infrastructure undersized to meet growth in flows) and Nigeria (Nigerian ports can
suffer from congestion)
New competition in the container sector (Bollors terminal and the MSC/China
Merchants terminal) could lead to a more competitive offer
Renovation of the Lom-Blita railway?
Third quay and MSC dock
Threats
State of the roads: the Aledjo fault etc.

Piracy (principally concerning oil tankers24)
Projects
Two projects in particular are expected to be completed within the next 18 months:
Quay 3
MSC transhipment dock
The master plan also provides for the lengthening of quay 2 (the container terminal) but for
the moment this has been put on hold.
Extension of the Bollor terminal: quay 3
This comprises an extension of the quay by 450m with a draught of 15m (a big
improvement). This quay will be equipped with four gantries allowing them to operate on
vessels with at least 17 rows of containers. An expansion (30ha) and rationalisation of the
yard located behind the quay is included, with the introduction of 24 RTGs.
Project
Name
Characteristics
Objectives
Managementsystem
Completiondate
Progress
Operator
Conditions
Funding
Lom
Quay3
450mlofquayat15m,4STSandupto24RTG
IncreasethecapacityoftheterminaloperatedbyBollorAfricaLogistics
IncludedintheBollorconcession
Endof2013/beginningof2014
0
BAL
BAL300billionFCFA,457m
24
Oil tankers have been boarded by pirates, towed off the coast of Nigeria and their cargoes transhipped into a pirate oil
tanker!
93

This project provides an additional capacity of about 500,000 TEUs per year and improves
the coherence of the facilities dedicated to container traffic. It requires the dredging of two
million tonnes of material (the channel today offers a draught of 14m). The new quay and
facilities promise increased productivity in dealing with larger vessels.
MSC transhipment dock
Project
Name
Lom
LCT(LomContainerTerminal)
Shortterm, one quay of 400m (longer term 1050m at 16/17m // surface
Characteristics
area53ha).Secondquaypossiblelater.Capacity>2mTEU
Objectives
TranshipmentfacilityAsia===>CWA/CentralAfrica/EasternLatinAmerica
Managementsystem ConcessionofMSC+ChinaMerchantsInternationalHoldings?
Completiondate
Endof2013/beginningof2014
Progress
Sandtrapconstructed
Operator
MSC/CMHI?
Conditions
Funding
ConsortiumofMSC/BOAD/IFC/Proparco400m
According to its promoters, the LCT will work almost exclusively on transhipment loads. It is
clear that MSC does not have the same strategy as other shipowners, but it is nevertheless
possible to question the strategy implemented, given the following elements:
MSC has a smaller market share in the African ports compared to the market
leaders, Maersk Line and CMA-CGM, and even if its share of the European market
is substantial, its market share in Asia is weak.
With regards to Africa, MSC has numerous ports which could be used for
transhipment: it is a participant in Tangier Med, it is the only user in the port of
Sines, it has a terminal in the port of Valencia, it has a port concession in San
Pedro very close to Lom and, above all, it has a large terminal in Las Palmas
(Canary Islands). But rational and economically sound organisation of
94
transhipments requires a strong focus on a hub: dispersion is counterproductive

and between Las Palmas, San Pedro and Lom, there will be at least one hub too
many.
Achieving critical mass to supply a new hub in Lom by splitting traffic from Asia for
various destinations in Africa and the eastern coast of Latin America will be difficult
for MSC. It would be much more coherent to achieve this by splitting traffic from
both Europe and Asia (which raises the question of multiple hubs).
On the other hand, MSC could search for a partnership, for example with CMACGM (since they have forged important links, notably a joint service between the
north of the continent and Asia). Critical mass could thus be achieved to ensure
optimal use of a hub and a network of feeders.
Lom, though situated far from the East-West route, could therefore be a superior
hub, offering good draught, quality in the future LCT terminal, low labour costs etc.
But the entry of China Merchants on the scene remains very difficult to understand.
China Merchants has acquired a 50% stake in LCT for the sum of 150m. It is not
envisioned that CMHI will be involved in transhipment but it will need to ensure
good returns and manage its investment. Therefore it seems inevitable that we will
see intra-port competition on import-export and transit traffic.
The Lom projects would seem to be leading to a significant overcapacity. This could
possibly be welcome as it could temporarily relieve the pressure on the facilities in the port of
Tema, providing imports via Lom for destinations in Ghana.
MSC presents the LCT as a pure transhipment port. Such a port is a cost centre for the
shipowner who uses it and does not generate any direct profits from it: it only makes savings
on the use of the shipowners fleet possible. The entry of CMHI in the project means there
will also be a port activity directly generating profits and therefore the import/export and
transit facilities will compete with those of Bollor.
95

2.1.2. Other ports
Conakry
96

Freetown
97

Monrovia
98

San Pedro
99

Takoradi
100

Cotonou
101

Lagos
102

Lagos (continued)
103

Douala
104

Libreville (Owendo)
105

Pointe-Noire
106

Luanda
107

Lobito
108

Walvis Bay
109

Walvis Bay (continued)
The port of Walvis Bay has initiated studies for a new container terminal. The studies from
Inros Lackner and Nathan Associates have highlighted the changes that need to be made in
response to traffic evolution and also the various possibilities for the characteristics of the
terminal.
Following the first phase of work, the characteristics of the terminal will be as follows:
Length of quay: 530m for receiving two container ships of 2,500 TEU
Storage area: 450m x 530m
Turning circle: 700m in diameter
Vertical depth at quay: 16.3m (translates to an admissible draught of around 15.5m)
The terminal's capacity will increase from 260,000 TEU per year to more than 500,000 TEU
and operations should begin in early 2014.
This project will require substantial dredging.
110

2.1.3. Analysis of tariffs
Cost calculations were made on the basis of an average ship and its characteristics (these
are shown in the table below).
We also had to make many other hypotheses such as the length of the stay of the vessel in
the port (24 hours), the number of containers loaded and unloaded at each port of call, on
the weight of the goods in the container (for ports imposing taxes on the weight of
containerised goods) and even determining the average import and export tax when the tax
is applied according to the nature of the goods.
Plausible hypotheses have been used, but some of them are, of course, questionable. This
should not be a major concern since the objective is to compare orders of magnitude.
Indeed, it is clear that the tariffs obtained do not necessarily reflect the prices actually paid,
particularly for on-board cargo handling.
Typical boat used:
Name
Deliverydate
Shippingline
Areaofcoverage
Constructiondate
Onboardcranes
NominalcapacityTEU
Capacityathomogeneous14t
Reeferplugs
Deadweight
Draught(summer)
Overalllength
Width
Grosstonnage
Nettonnage
Speed
Constructor
Mainengine
Classification
Bowthruster
IMOnumber
Owner/Manager
Operator
VT
AenneRickmers
27/01/2010
WEDDEL
DELMASATLANTICCWA
1998
3X45T
2,210
1,750
300
30724
11
195.29
30.2
26,131
10,106
21.3
China
ShipBuilding
CorporationTaiwan
MANBW7S70MC
GL
1,200
9152753
RICKMERSLINIEGMBH&CIE
KG
CMACGM
64875,338
111

Regarding the loading/unloading mix, we have judged that the ship unloads 50 full 20
containers and 50 full 40 containers, and reloads 20 full 20 containers and 80 empty 40
containers.
Regarding the weight of the containers, we have judged the unloading weight to be 15
tonnes, whether it be full 20 or 40 containers and the reloading weight to be 20 tonnes.
Port dues
Port services and port dues for ship
DAKAR
BANJUL
CONAKRY
FREETOWN
MONROVIA
ABIDJAN1
ABIDJAN2
SANPEDRO
TAKORADI
TEMA
LOME
COTONOU
TINCAN
LAGOS
PORTHARCOURT
DOUALA
BATA
MALABO
LIBREVILLE
PORTGENTIL
POINTENOIRE
LUANDA
WALVISBAY
Total
Median
Average
Tugfees
Pilotfees
Mooring
fees
2,729
2,822
341
1,005
555
122
7,974
2,779
128
0
0
0
17,987
4,996
600
2,592
4,237
700
2,592
4,237
700
2,592
2,729
910
2,262
889
291
2,262
889
291
2,850
940
183
3,570
1,683
468
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2,823
5,538
573
5,076
1,296
1,693
9,911
2,085
183
4,024
7,222
543
4,383
4,856
543
6,313
1,416
0
4,205
1,626
0
1,513
1,549
0
89,650
63,510
12,612
2,592
1,549
291
3,091
2,190
435
Source: Shipowner
Portdues
6,510
22,218
0
20,284
4,336
4,476
2,952
744
2,571
0
0
2,342
27,841
19,963
26,660
9,951
4,741
4,302
16,517
7,231
2,850
7,878
0
321,428
4,406
11,480
Total
12,402
23,900
0
20,284
27,919
12,005
10,480
0
6,012
8,063
27,841
19,963
26,660
18,884
14,231
19,797
28,306
17,012
10,579
13,709
454,973
13,056
16,249
The cost of the tug service for the same vessel varies between 250 (Cape Verde) and
18,000 (Monrovia). Most ports range between 2,000 and 3,000. There is a trend for the
southern ports in this survey to be more expensive than others.
The cost of pilotage varies widely, ranging from the hundreds of Euros (Cape Verde, Banjul,
Bissau, Takoradi, Tema, Lom, Boma and Soyo, i.e. small ports), through to the 1,000 to
2,000 range (Cotonou, Bata, Pointe-Noire and Luanda), the 2,000 to 3,000 range (Dakar,
112

Conakry, San Pedro and Malabo), the 4,000 to 5,000 range (Monrovia, Abidjan and PortGentil) and more than 5,000 (Douala, Libreville and Matadi, partly justified by the need to
navigate the river).
Mooring fees seem to be particularly onerous (more than 1,000) in Bata, Matadi and Soyo.
Port dues for ships are particularly difficult to interpret if you do not know the port dues paid
on merchandise. In an increasing number of ports in the world, port dues on goods are
tending to disappear because of a tariff structure oriented towards the real cost (in a port, the
ship is at the origin of major costs, including basic infrastructure and operational costs, while
the merchandise uses only the road network in the port). However, ports in many developing
countries remain traditionally attached to indirect tariffs via dues on goods.
The sums revealed show a huge variation, from San Pedro (744) to Matadi (106,607!).
After Matadi, the most expensive ports top 20,000 (Banjul, Freetown and Nigeria). The
majority of ports charge between 4,000 and 7,000. The cheapest ports (less than 3,000)
are notably the ports in Ghana, Cotonou and Pointe-Noire.
Port dues on goods
Entering
Leaving
Noportduesongoods
Port dues on goods are more homogenous, with two relatively cheap ports (Tema and
Cotonou), two ports situated in the middle (Dakar and Douala), one port 50% more
expensive (Pointe-Noire) and, finally, one very expensive port (Walvis Bay).
113

On-board handling
Onboardhandling
The table above details the rates (not necessarily the same as the price paid) for 20 and 40
containers entering (E) or leaving (S) the port either full (P) or empty (V). These figures do
not reveal a very great difference between the ports. Douala seems relatively less expensive
than the others, especially for full 40 containers.
Quayside handling
Quaysidehandling
20'
Dakar
EP
EV
40'
SP
SV
EP
EV
SP
SV
Lom
129.59
3.05
53.36
3.05
144.84
6.10
83.85
6.10
Tema
57.56
56.10
50.14
41.00
94.69
83.00
78.84
62.50
114.35
0.00
114.35
0.00
189.05
0.00
189.05
0.00
Lagos
Douala
PointeNoire
RDC
367.50
61.50
526.00
61.50
367.50
123.00
526.00
123.00
Libreville
160.00
20.00
160.00
20.00
240.00
40.00
240.00
40.00
Abidjan
Cotonou
Walvis
The rates for quayside handling show greater differences. The port of Tema appears to be
relatively inexpensive, while ports in the DRC are extremely expensive. The balance
between on-board and quayside handling established by the concessionaire does not
sufficiently explain these differences. However, the local port environment as well as
competitive pressures do.
114
2.2. Freight handlers strategies

Changes in container processing facilities
Container terminals in sub-Saharan Africa have changed greatly over the past decade. We
can note two significant changes:
As a general rule, terminals had no quayside equipment until the early 2000s, with
the exception of very large ports that were already equipped with gantries
Most terminals were not, in fact, terminals, but quays used by several handlers
From the early 2000s, we have seen the introduction and then general use of quayside
equipment, mainly mobile cranes. We have also seen the introduction of terminal
concessions, making it possible for operators to increase their investments.
Productivity has therefore increased dramatically, from around 12 movements per hour per
ship up to 30 to 40 movements per hour. As a result, the capacity of facilities has also
increased significantly.
In the early 2000s, the facilities dedicated to containers in the port of Dakar were saturated.
There were containers everywhere in the port as there was no available space left either in
the dedicated facilities or in the two berths. Two handlers shared the facilities at this time,
each with its own yard (managed using reach-stackers) and their own mobile cranes. After
the arrival of DP WORLD and the creation of a third berth, the landscape changed
completely. The terminal is now handled by a single operator, with a unified yard operating
with RTGs, a quay equipped with gantries and mobile cranes and offering more than enough
capacity to meet demand25.
Concessions have progressively become the norm in the main ports, with a recent
acceleration of this trend. The corollary has been the elimination of the secondary operators
offering handling services or their relegation to conventional handling activities: first Progosa
and then Getma have been sidelined from the handling of containers. It is clear that in most
ports there is no room for two terminals.
If it is not possible to exclude an operator, the best option is an alliance to prevent new
operators from seizing the opportunity to enter the market.
Handling companies in West Africa
Two companies dominate container handling in West Africa, and have done so for a long
time: Bollor Africa Logistics and APM Terminals (APMT).
Currently, other companies have only marginal involvement: DP WORLD (Dakar), China
Merchants (Lagos and soon in Lom) and Portek/Mitsui (port authority in Gabon).
Bollor follows a vertical integration model, possessing in West and Central Africa:
25
Plantations and factories,
Making expensive investment unlikely.
115
Railways,
Freight forwarders (for example, SDV, SCAC, SAGA etc.),
Handling facilities.
For a time, it was also a shipowner (Delmas-Vieljeux) despite the conflict of interest, but this
interest has been sold to CMA-CGM, with which it maintains close, but not exclusive,
contacts.
Bollor is a company whose international presence is largely confined to Africa in general.
Conversely, APM Terminals has a global footprint: it is present on all continents as are its
major rivals HPH, PSA, DP WORLD and, to a lesser degree, ICTSI.
APMT is a subsidiary of the AP Meller group, which also controls Maersk Line. The
involvement of Maersk/APMT in handling in Africa is longstanding, dating back to the
beginnings of ship ownership in the mid 1980s. However, a major change has occurred since
then: at the time, the African handling parts of the group had just one client - Maersk Line with the objective of ensuring ships in the group enjoyed a good quality service.
Today, APMT is increasingly, in Africa (and elsewhere), a multi-client handling company
seeking to expand its market share and provide a good return for its shareholders.
Handling groups concessions
Ports
Dateof
concession
Operator
Length
Remarks
Dakar
DPWORLD
2008
25
Conakry
Bollor
April2011
25
Freetown
Bollor
February2011
25
Monrovia
APMT
Endof2010
SanPedro
MSC
2011
Abidjan
Bollor(60%),APMT(40%)
2004
30
Takoradi
Tema(MPS)
APMT(35%),Bollor(35%)GPHA(30%)
2007
20
Lom
Bollor
2010
35
LCT(MSC/CMHI)
Cotonou
Bollor(SMTC,including35%GETMA)
2010
APMT(Coman)
SOBEMAP
Nocontainers
LagosApapa
APMT
2006
20
45%ofmarket
LagosTinCan(TICT) Bollor(55%),ChinaMerchants(45%)
June2006
20
35%ofmarket
Onne
WACTAPMT
Douala
Bollor(50%),APMT(50%)
Libreville
25
Oil&gas
Tocome(2014)
Newterminal
2004
15
STCGmajorityBollor+Getma
2008
25
PointeNoire
Bollor(40%),APMT(40%),Socotrans
2009
27
Luanda
Sogester(State50%,APMT50%)
November2007
20
Unicargas(State)
Lobito
State
WalvisBay
State
116
We can see then that the move towards awarding concessions is relatively recent, the oldest
concessions dating back to 2004.
Today, the principal African terminals operate on concessions and the granting of these
concessions, sometimes questionable in form26, has made it possible to change handling
conditions through investments and the putting in place of modern systems of organisation.
APMT and Bollor now dominate the scene with more than 80% of the market without, to
date, suffering any real competition (with the notable exception of Dakar) and have gained
this position due to their incomparable knowledge of the countries involved, their governance
and their economies, which has been gained through their longstanding presence in these
highly specific markets.
To date, the only breakthrough of a global operator has happened in Dakar where the
container terminal is run by Dubai Port World. Equally symptomatic is the fact that the only
global operator engaged in the four consortia bidding for the second container terminal at
Abidjan is PSA in association with Marsa Morocco.
We also note that China Merchants Holdings International (CMHI) is present in Nigeria (TinCan) replacing ZIM as Bollors partner and now also has a 50% stake in the LCT project in
Lom. CMHI says it will continue to invest in developing countries with high growth rates.
Africa is, in fact, a continent experiencing growth in a world where growth has sharply
declined. Other handling operators may well show an interest in this market in the future
despite the manifest difficulties in gaining entry.
Opportunities still exist in the south of the covered region (terminals mainly or wholly
managed by public entities in Angola and Namibia) and others may also appear in the form
of new greenfield ports or terminals such as the future terminal in Lekki, Nigeria, promoted by
Singapores Tolaram group, which already has a presence in Africa, but not as an investor in
ports and handling facilities.
Shipowners may wish to enter the handling market too, but probably only in cases where the
stakes for transhipment are high, as evidenced by the MSC projects in Lom, the second
container terminal in Abidjan, and the CMA-CGM project in Equatorial Guinea, even though
the latter may not happen.
26
Some operations were acquired as much by pressure at the highest level as by the technical and financial excellence of the
bids.
117
PHASE 2 PORT REQUIREMENTS

The objective of this phase is to determine, in a theoretical manner, the requirements in
terms of port infrastructure in West Africa. For this, two distinct sub-phases are suggested.
The first provides details of the evolution in traffic, while the second compares these
projections to the capacity of projects already approved, resulting in a table summarising the
risk of over/under-capacity.
1. Evolution in maritime container traffic

The objective of this section is to offer an evolution of port traffic based on two macroeconomic indicators:
GDP
Demographics
This evolution is then compared to port projects to determine those areas where there is a
risk of over-capacity or under-capacity.
The table below demonstrates how we arrive at these projections.
N.B.: In the following pages, the abbreviation AAGR is used for average annual growth rate.
118

GDP
The hypotheses on GDP growth are drawn from the Dynamar study, which itself is based on
forecasts from the IMF and WTO. Historical changes in GDP make it possible to produce an
elasticity coefficient for container traffic. GDP projections concern the period 2011-2015,
which we have extended until 2020. Given global economic instability and the geopolitical
risk inherent in the African continent, it seems unlikely that data on a timescale longer than
this would be reliable.
It is important to note that these growth rates are high when compared to world growth rates.
They range from 3% for Chad to 11% for Sierra Leone. Our calculations took into account
the AAGR for the period and not the gross annual figures in order to reduce cyclical effects.
119

Demographics
The population data is based on a study by the United Nations, and a 2005 study entitled
The Demography of Sub-Saharan Africa from the 1950s to the 2000s. It is interesting to see
that in general the projected rates of population growth over the period 2010-2020 are lower
than the period 2005-2010, which will affect the domestic consumption of the countries being
studied.
120

Elasticity
As described earlier, the objective of this section is to determine how container traffic evolves
as a function of GDP and population in order to then be able to use projections for GDP and
population as a basis for predicting traffic trajectories.
The growth rates for container traffic are consistent with the rates observed over the period
2006-2010. PIDA (Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa) predicts an increase
in trade of 6.7% per year to 2020.
However, we were faced with two problems:
The volumes taken into account include both domestic traffic and transhipment traffic,
which distorts the analysis, but the available data was not precise enough to
distinguish between the two types of traffic.
Some evolutions were overestimated due to specific cyclical factors or due to the
entry into service of new port capacity which boosted traffic. We have therefore built
in a weighting coefficient to avoid extreme values and to put cyclical effects into
perspective.
121

Traffic projections
122
2. Consequences for port infrastructures

Capacity of principal port projects
Dakar
2011 traffic=400,000 TEU
Concession DP WORLD ==>
2032
Current terminal
Designation
Phase 1 extension
Port of the Future
500m
500,000 TEU
2020
Final extension
Port of the Future
500m
500,000 TEU
2025
Quay length
660m
Surface
area
18ha
Capacity
Year
600,000 TEU
The Dakar container terminal is far from being saturated, with a fairly slow growth in traffic. In
principle, the concessionaire is committed to investing in an external extension programme
beyond the current port, which will require protection works. It should be noted, however, that
there are alternatives which would allow container capacity to be developed inside the
current port, making it possible to put back the introduction of the Port du Futur27
infrastructure. In any event, the port of Dakar should be able to meet the demand for
increases in the medium term without requiring more infrastructure resources.
Conakry
Current terminal
270m
Surface
area
8ha
Phase 1 extension
338m
12ha
300,000 TEU
2013
Final extension
300m
300,000 TEU
2025?
Concession BAL ==> 2036
Designation
Quay length
Capacity
160,000 TEU
Year
Long term
The concession for the Conakry terminal was recently (2011) taken over from Getma by
Bollor. The concessionaire is committed to making significant investments to increase the
capacity of the terminal. This effort is underway with the extension of the quay (+338m) and
an increase in yard area. Eventually, the quay will be increased to 900m in length.
Freetown
Concession BAL ==> 2030
Designation
Current terminal
Quay length
722m
Surface
area
Capacity
Year
>300,000 TEU*
Extension
* depending on reinforcements in equipment
27
The latter has the major disadvantage of requiring costly protection works before the first metre of quay can come into
service.
123

Bollor Africa Logistics was awarded the concession for the container terminal. The quay is
722m long, but with a draught of only 9.5 m. It is currently served by two mobile cranes.
Given the low level of current traffic, no capacity problems are to be expected in the medium
term.
Monrovia
Designation
Quay length
Current terminal
Surface
area
600m
Capacity
Year
75,000 TEU*
Phase 1 extension
Final extension
Long term
* Plus conventional traffic

APM Terminals was granted the concession for the container terminal in Monrovia in 2010
for a period of 25 years. Through the introduction of the necessary equipment, the terminal
should not suffer from a lack of capacity in the medium term.
San Pedro
Designation
Quay length
Current terminal
210m
New terminal
700m
Surface
area
Capacity
20ha
500,000 TEU
Year
120,000 TEU
2017+
MSC was awarded the concession for the container terminal in 2010 in order to cater for
transhipment traffic. This occupies almost half of the only quay in the port, which is now
saturated not only because of the many halts by MSC ships, but also by those of other
shipping lines (Maersk, CMA-CGM etc.) and conventional vessels on long stopovers.
Depending on the season (for example, conventional rice imports during the cocoa season),
this can result in long delays for some vessels.
There is a project to construct a new container terminal with a capacity of 500,000 TEU, but
this will not be available before 2017-2018.
Abidjan
Current terminal
Vridi Container Terminal
Quay
length
1000m
Extension
Second terminal
1500m
Designation
Surface
area
31ha
1,100,000 TEU*
35ha
1,500,000 TEU
Capacity
Year
2018+
Long term (Isle of Boulay)

* Through reinforcement of equipment as and when needed to meet demand
The Abidjan container terminal has changed profoundly over recent years through major
investments in equipment (renewal of quayside gantries and the transformation of yard
management from using reach-stackers to a management system which is now almost fully
124

RTG). These investments must continue; reinforcements to the equipment could help to
increase the terminal capacity to 1.1m TEU if needed.
Nevertheless, a project for a second container terminal has been launched by the State and
the PAA in order to introduce competition and develop transhipment traffic. This project
involves a broadening and deepening of the Vridi Canal and channel to provide the terminal
with a draft of 16m. This project is currently at the consultation stage, with four groups
interested, three of which include shipowners.
Tema
Designation
Current terminal
Phase 1 extension
Quay
length
660m
Surface
area
10ha
Capacity
Year
600,000 TEU*
Unrealistic projects
2020+
Final extension
Long term
The current terminal in Tema, comprising only two berths, deals with 80% of the ports
container traffic. It is saturated as is the entire system, including the three ICDs.
The capacity of the system could be increased marginally by adding to the equipment
available and increasing the space available at the ICDs, through improving shared computer
systems and strengthening scanning equipment in order to streamline the processing of
containers. It is also possible to relieve the pressure on the terminal quays by adding a berth
and equipping the other quays with mobile cranes with a view to increasing productivity for
the treatment of goods other than container traffic.
But currently there is no viable solution for the medium and long term. The master plan for
the port has resulted in an unrealistic project for a new port constructed outside and backing
onto the current port. The cost for this has been estimated at $3bn and it would have the
effect of concentrating flows and substantially increasing the level of congestion, which is
already at a critical level.
Lom
Designation
Current terminal
Quay
length
430m
Surface
area
Capacity
Year
350,000 TEU
Phase 1 extension
Third quay
450m
500,000 TEU
2013-2014
Phase 2 extension
LCT phase 1
400m
500,000 TEU
2013-2014
Phase 2 extension
LCT completion quay 1
600m
750,000 TEU
2020?
Long term
Quay LCT vis--vis?
1000m
1,250,000 TEU
2030
The current terminal, under concession to Bollor Africa Logistics, has two berths either side
of a jetty with extremely limited capacity. The space available behind the quay for the
container yard is thoroughly inadequate to cope with the storage needs, so many containers
125

are subject to further transport to an area behind the future third quay. The latter should
come into service in early 2014 and will offer 450m of quay with a draught of 15m. It will bring
a very large increase in capacity thanks to powerful equipment (four quayside gantries and a
yard operating with RTGs). While import-export and transit demand will largely be covered by
this development, another project is also planned for Lom, with the putting into service of
the first phase also due in early 2014. This is the LCT dock, initiated by MSC, which has
recently gone into partnership with China Merchants. Officially, the goal of this project is to
partially cover the transhipment needs of ship owner MSC. In the long term, this dock has the
potential to offer two quays of more than 1,000m each, with a draught of 16-17m.
Cotonou
Designation
Current terminal
Extension phase
Long term
Benin Terminal
Quay
length
600m
Surface
area
540m
20ha
Capacity
Year
250,000 TEU
540,000 TEU
Second port Sm-Kpodji
2013
2025
The Benin Terminal is expected to come into service in the port of Cotonou in early 2013,
offering 540m of quay with a draught of 13m, while the channel should be deepened to 15m
over the next two years.
Beyond this, the port cannot be extended (because of its proximity to the city, to the French
Embassy and the Presidential residence) and beyond the commissioning of the new
container terminal south of the dock, further port development will require a new site.
In the long term, we know of the proposed second port in Benin, located at Seme-Kpodji,
20km from Cotonou in the direction of Nigeria.
Lagos
Nigeria's ports are expecting to have to deal with 10m TEU in 30 years time and 2m TEU by
2018, compared to 1.2m TEU today. Faced with such a prospect, ambitious greenfield ports
will need to be envisaged. Most of the demand will continue to be concentrated in the region
of Lagos.
2011 traffic=1,100,000 TEU
Apapa terminal
Quay
length
1050m
Surface
area
55ha
850,000 TEU
Tin-Can terminal
770m
24ha
400,000 TEU
Designation
Capacity
Year
Extension 1 (can be phased)
Badagry (Phase 1)
3,000,000 TEU
2016+
Extension 2 (can be phased)
Lekki (Phase 1)
2,000,000 TEU
2016+
This justifies the two projects planned, one at Lekki and a second, more recent, project at
Badagry.
126

The first (Lekki) is being promoted by a Singapore operator (Tolaram) in partnership with
ICTSI as the operator, and the second (Badagry) has been launched by a consortium
including, notably, APMT and TIL (MSC group). In both cases, they are large greenfield
projects near Lagos (Lekki is 65km to the east of the city and Badagry is 20km to the west)
and both projects comprise multiple activities (oil, dry bulk, industrial zones etc.).
Douala/Kribi
2011 traffic= 340,000 TEU
Designation
Current Douala terminal
Kribi extension phase 1
Multipurpose quay
Quay
length
700m
Surface
area
Capacity
Year
500,000 TEU
700m
400,000 TEU
2015?
Kribi final extension

Long term
The port of Douala is handicapped by its access channel and the difficulty of keeping it
dredged. Use of the port is prohibited to vessels with a medium and large draught.
There are no extension projects planned for this site.
In contrast, the first step in the construction of a greenfield port at Kribi is well advanced. At
its launch, it was a very ambitious project with many specialised terminals to be put out to
concessions. Today, the first step is underway with the Chinese company CHEC entrusted
with building the general port, including a multipurpose terminal offering 600m of quay.
Libreville/Owendo
Current terminal
Quay
length
475m
Phase 1 extension
150m
Designation
Surface
area
15ha
Capacity
Year
120,000 TEU
2014?
Long term
The port is congested with an average wait of four days per ship. A large part of the problem
is down to very slow handling, which is performed exclusively with on-board equipment. The
first improvement will come with the arrival of two mobile cranes, a process which is
underway. The port authority also plans to increase the length of quay available in the
container terminal, with the addition of one berth.
Pointe-Noire
Current terminal
Congo Terminal
Quay
length
800m
Phase 1 extension
Congo Terminal
700m
Designation
Surface
area
31ha
450,000 TEU
36ha
750,000 TEU
Capacity
Year
2030+
Long term
127

Since the concession was awarded to Bollor Africa Logistics and its partners in 2010 for a
period of 27 years, significant investments have been made in order to create a real
container terminal with specialised and expanded quays and yard storage, and providing the
terminal with quayside equipment (mobile cranes and then quayside gantries) and yard
equipment (a move to RTGs). At the end of the concession, there should be some 1,500m of
quay with a draught of 15m, providing a capacity of 1.2 million TEU.
Luanda
Current terminal
Sogester
Quay
length
542m
Multipurpose terminal
Unicargas
536m
Barra do Dande
800m
Designation
Surface
area
14ha
330,000 TEU
18ha
200,000 TEU
Capacity
Year
Extension?
Long term
800,000 TEU
The port of Luanda has two main facilities for dealing with container traffic: the Sogester
terminal (a joint venture between APMT and a local operator) and the multipurpose
Unicargas terminal.
Following the boom in traffic in recent years, these facilities are now saturated. There is a
greenfield project 50km north of Luanda at Barra do Dande, but we know nothing concrete
about the progress of this project.
Walvis Bay
Designation
Quay
length
Surface
area
Current terminal
Capacity
Year
300,000 TEU
Phase 1 extension
480m
24ha
350,000 TEU
Final extension
2,400m
120ha
1,750,000 TEU
2015
2025?
Long term
The infrastructure of the port of Walvis Bay is still quite underdeveloped and lacks
specialised facilities.
There are long-term plans for extension, which could be achieved in phases. Specifically this
concerns a jetty, reclaimed from the sea, of some 2.4km in length and with a depth of 500m.
128
129

Summary of port needs and the risks of over or under-capacity
Dakar
The current terminal still has spare capacity and can support several years of growth
provided transhipment traffic does not grow too quickly (which seems likely). We can
understand why the concessionaire would not be over keen to invest in the Port du Futur
project when we take into account the sums of money involved and the indivisible nature of
this kind of project. Perhaps it would be better to develop the terminal inside the port,
transferring facilities for bulk liquids and solids, currently situated in the south-east of the
terminal, outside the terminal (bulk vessels do not require the same stability as
containerships). This would provide the possibility of doubling the capacity of the container
terminal.
The construction of the Port du Futur would certainly lead to the existing terminal facilities
being reallocated to meet other needs. The new container terminal, which could be built in
phases, would have the advantage of offering more extensive storage facilities and quays
with greater draught.
In either case, we cannot see any real risk of over-capacity in Dakar.
Conakry
The investments which are currently planned satisfactorily meet demand in the medium to
long term.
Abidjan
Abidjan is one of ports with potential over-capacity problems. Provided it further strengthens
the equipment at its disposal, the current terminal can provide a total capacity of about 1.1m
TEU. It can satisfy the needs of the Ivory Coast and the overland corridors it serves for
another 10 years. The proposed second terminal will have a capacity at least equal to and
probably greater than the current terminal. It will also offer greater draught, in the region of
16m, and with these conditions could be attractive for transhipment, without actually being
able to generate very large volumes of transhipment traffic.
Ultimately, if the second terminal is completed, there will certainly be strong intra-port
competition (except in the case of an allocation of the concession to a group including
Bollor). The competition will centre on attracting import-export and transit traffic rather than
transhipment volumes. Depending on whether the terminal is completed in one block or in
phases, over-capacity will be more or less severe. The advantage of the project lies in the
much improved draught, but serious questions remain about its sustainability given the
maintenance costs for these depths.
Tema
Tema certainly has the greatest risk of under-capacity handicapping the countrys economy.
Under-capacity is already blatant and is not limited to the port: access to the port is also
below the capacity required. It is possible for the container terminal operator to gain a
marginal improvement in capacity by adding to the available equipment and, if possible,
gaining another berth, on condition that, in parallel, the authority also strengthens the storage
130

capacity outside the port (ICDs). The situation can continue in this way for a few more years
but in an impaired fashion.
Beyond the medium term, the master plan project for the port is not credible because it is
both too ambitious and has a total price tag of $3bn. This type of project cannot respond
quickly to medium-term need. This is especially so as the port authority needs to be changed
so that its role is redefined as one of landlord and not, as is now the case, a stakeholder in all
projects and associated with all the ports. It is also urgent to introduce a cargo community
system worthy of the name to facilitate flows as much as possible in the port and ICDs.
Moreover, it is probably not advisable to create a second port on the same site as the first
since inextricable congestion already exists around the port of Tema.
There is an urgent need to produce a viable project authorising the installation of a real
container terminal, with sufficient storage space, and which is capable of providing a
minimum capacity of 2 million TEU once finished (construction in phases). Failure to do this
places the countrys economy at risk of serious repercussions due to the obsolescence of its
port facilities and their under-capacity.
Lom
In Lom, Bollors third quay project alone would have been sufficient to cope with the
expected traffic in the medium to long term. The second project, the MSC/China Holdings
dock, has a completely different potential and may well not be limited to transhipment traffic.
It seems inevitable that there will be competition between the new arrivals and Bollor. The
level of over-capacity will depend on both the phasing of the project and the ability of MSC
and its potential partners to make the site a real and efficient transhipment hub. At the
moment there are more questions than answers. However, it is not unreasonable to think
that a large capacity in Lom could also help meet the needs of Ghana until a viable solution
can be found to their port capacity needs.
Cotonou
Benin Terminal, the first real container terminal in the port of Cotonou, will become
operational in early 2013 and offer sufficient capacity to meet the medium to long-term needs
of the country and the overland corridors it serves. It will also constitute the first genuine
container terminal port.
Lagos
Currently, Nigeria does not have an international trade commensurate with its population:
container traffic is less than double that of Ghana, while its population is six times greater.
The existing facilities, especially Apapa and Tin-Can, meet demand as best they can, but
their capacity reserves are reduced. The time has come for Nigeria to invest in new port
sites, with the prospect of container traffic climbing to 2-3 million TEU in 2018 and 10 million
TEU in 2040.
Two projects have been presented and are underway:
- Lekki, promoted by ICTSI with Tolaram
131

- Badagry, promoted by APMT and TIL
Both projects are ambitious, with a broad range of terminals and an industrial and logistics
free zone. The reported coming into service deadlines (2015 and 2016) appear consistent
with the ports needs. But there are still uncertainties about the characteristics of these
greenfield projects and the phasing of the putting into service of the terminals.
Pointe-Noire
The development of the Pointe-Noire terminal due to be conducted by Bollor Africa
Logistics and its partners should be able to meet medium and long-term needs. The phasing
of these works can be adjusted to meet changing needs. Transhipment traffic is likely to
fluctuate or decrease if other ports targeting this market are constructed in the region
(Equatorial Guinea etc.). The capacity made available will serve the needs of transit traffic,
which is expected to grow strongly in the long term (DRC, CAR, Chad etc.).
Luanda
Despite the award of a first concession, the strong growth in recent years has led to serious
problems of congestion and port capacity in Angola. There is, however, a greenfield project
for a site in Barro do Dande, 50km from Luanda, but no specific information is available.
Walvis Bay
According to studies by Inros Lackner and Nathan Associates, the terminal should provide a
capacity of 500,000 TEU by 2014, which seems over and above the needs of the Namibian
hinterland and the corridors served.
132

Table summarising the risks of over-capacity
The table below summarises the conclusions drawn from the analyses of port projects and
prospective traffic. The table details for 2015 and 2020 the risk of over-capacity (or undercapacity) according to the projects that we felt realistic and likely to enter into service in the
time frames mentioned.
The caption at the bottom of the table explains the colour code
133

MLTC CATRAM Market Study Container Terminals West and Central Africa

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Final report

Market study on container terminals

Market study on container terminals in West and Central Africa

Maritime services ................................................................................................. 13

Shipowners strategies ......................................................................................... 59

2. Infrastructures, traffic and organisation ....................................................................... 64

Freight handlers strategies ................................................................................ 115

PHASE 2 PORT REQUIREMENTS .................................................................................. 118

This study was financed by the Agence Franaise de Dveloppement.

Final report MLTC/CATRAM 23/01/13

Market study on container terminals in West and Central Africa

See consignee below.

Agreement made between shipowners on the principal global routes for

Organisation delegated to managing port facilities and the ports public

Bunker Adjustment Factor: a tax compensating for variations in fuel prices

Build, Operate, Transfer: using the BOT concession approach is designed to

Short-distance maritime transport, national or international, which takes place

Currency Adjustment Factor: a tax compensating for fluctuations in exchange

A vessel specialised in car transport (new or used). It also extends to PCC

Central and West Africa

Final report MLTC/CATRAM 23/01/13

Market study on container terminals in West and Central Africa

A group of shipowners serving the same lines, having reached agreements

Also known as a Shipping agent. The representative of the shipowner in the

The pooling of vessels by shipowners on a maritime route. An integrated

This refers to the length of time a container is detained by a shipper outside of

The organisation of feeder lines (feederisation). A service provided by the

Hub and spokes

Literally as it sounds. One means of conducting transhipment (interlining being

Final report MLTC/CATRAM 23/01/13

Market study on container terminals in West and Central Africa

Inland Container Depot, a term used principally to designate an intermodal

The mapping of major shipping lines and transhipment of containers between

(As opposed to tramping or sailing on demand): a service provided by a

The provision by liner conferences of tariffs for maritime transport.

Designates the loading and unloading of a ship, and operations in storage

The difference in sea level between low and high tide.

Final report MLTC/CATRAM 23/01/13

Market study on container terminals in West and Central Africa

In contrast to Carrier Haulage: control of the land transport pre or post-delivery

International unit of measure which is 1,850m and corresponds to the length of

Long-distance ocean-going vessel, travels on the mother lines making few

As the name suggests, a multipurpose ship.

A unit of speed (1 nautical mile per hour or 1,852m/h)

International Maritime Organisation. Created by a UN convention in Geneva on

We distinguish between quay equipment (cranes or gantries) and yard

1. Describes a vessel with a width that prevents it using the Panama

Open ground for stocking containers awaiting loading or delivery.

Agreement between shipowners, members of a liner conference, that results in

Handling equipment for storage yards allowing containers to be stacked up to

Rail Mounted Gantry, a yard gantry operating on rails. Devices capable of

Final report MLTC/CATRAM 23/01/13

Market study on container terminals in West and Central Africa

Self loadingTrailer, for containers of 20 or 40. It is an equipment considerably

Direction followed by a vessel.

In a port, the standard working hours of a handling team is usually called a

Refers to the storage position on a cellular container vessel.

Navigation at reduced speed to save fuel. Its a procedure progressively

Various supplements in addition to tariffs (freight rates). Some are always

Penalty imposed under a charter agreement by a shipowner to the charterer (in

Charges levied on users of superstructures (yards, warehouses, gangways

Final report MLTC/CATRAM 23/01/13

Market study on container terminals in West and Central Africa