Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
March 23, 1929
In re LUIS B. TAGORDA,
Duran & Lim for respondent.
Attorney-General Jaranilla and Provincial Fiscal Jose for the Government.
MALCOLM, J.:
The respondent, Luis B. Tagorda, a practising attorney and a member of the provincial board of Isabela, admits that
previous to the last general elections he made use of a card written in Spanish and Ilocano, which, in translation, reads
as follows:
LUIS B. TAGORDA
Attorney
Notary Public
CANDIDATE FOR THIRD MEMBER
Province of Isabela
(NOTE. As notary public, he can execute for you a deed of sale for the purchase of land as required by the cadastral
office; can renew lost documents of your animals; can make your application and final requisites for your homestead;
and can execute any kind of affidavit. As a lawyer, he can help you collect your loans although long overdue, as well as
any complaint for or against you. Come or write to him in his town, Echague, Isabela. He offers free consultation, and
is willing to help and serve the poor.)
The respondent further admits that he is the author of a letter addressed to a lieutenant of barrio in his home
municipality written in Ilocano, which letter, in translation, reads as follows:
ECHAGUE, ISABELA, September 18, 1928
MY DEAR LIEUTENANT: I would like to inform you of the approaching date for our induction into office as member of the
Provincial Board, that is on the 16th of next month. Before my induction into office I should be very glad to hear your
suggestions or recommendations for the good of the province in general and for your barrio in particular. You can come
to my house at any time here in Echague, to submit to me any kind of suggestion or recommendation as you may
desire.
I also inform you that despite my membership in the Board I will have my residence here in Echague. I will attend the
session of the Board of Ilagan, but will come back home on the following day here in Echague to live and serve with
you as a lawyer and notary public. Despite my election as member of the Provincial Board, I will exercise my legal
profession as a lawyer and notary public. In case you cannot see me at home on any week day, I assure you that you
can always find me there on every Sunday. I also inform you that I will receive any work regarding preparations of
documents of contract of sales and affidavits to be sworn to before me as notary public even on Sundays.
I would like you all to be informed of this matter for the reason that some people are in the belief that my residence as
member of the Board will be in Ilagan and that I would then be disqualified to exercise my profession as lawyer and as
notary public. Such is not the case and I would make it clear that I am free to exercise my profession as formerly and
that I will have my residence here in Echague.
I would request you kind favor to transmit this information to your barrio people in any of your meetings or social
gatherings so that they may be informed of my desire to live and to serve with you in my capacity as lawyer and
notary public. If the people in your locality have not as yet contracted the services of other lawyers in connection with
the registration of their land titles, I would be willing to handle the work in court and would charge only three pesos for
every registration.
Yours respectfully,
(Sgd.) LUIS TAGORDA
Attorney
Notary Public.
The facts being conceded, it is next in order to write down the applicable legal provisions. Section 21 of the Code of
Civil Procedure as originally conceived related to disbarments of members of the bar. In 1919 at the instigation of the
Philippine Bar Association, said codal section was amended by Act No. 2828 by adding at the end thereof the following:
"The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice."
The statute as amended conforms in principle to the Canons of Professionals Ethics adopted by the American Bar
Association in 1908 and by the Philippine Bar Association in 1917. Canons 27 and 28 of the Code of Ethics provide:
27. ADVERTISING, DIRECT OR INDIRECT. The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young
lawyer, and especially with his brother lawyers, is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional
capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced, but must be the outcome of character and conduct. The
publication or circulation of ordinary simple business cards, being a matter of personal taste or local custom, and
sometimes of convenience, is not per se improper. But solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements, or by
personal communications or interview not warranted by personal relations, is unprofessional. It is equally
unprofessional to procure business by indirection through touters of any kind, whether allied real estate firms or trust

companies advertising to secure the drawing of deeds or wills or offering retainers in exchange for executorships or
trusteeships to be influenced by the lawyer. Indirect advertisement for business by furnishing or inspiring newspaper
comments concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the
lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation, defy the traditions and lower the tone of our high calling, and are
intolerable.
28. STIRRING UP LITIGATION, DIRECTLY OR THROUGH AGENTS. It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice
to bring a lawsuit, except in rare cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust make it his duty to do so. Stirring up
strife and litigation is not only unprofessional, but it is indictable at common law. It is disreputable to hunt up defects in
titles or other causes of action and inform thereof in order to the employed to bring suit, or to breed litigation by
seeking out those with claims for personal injuries or those having any other grounds of action in order to secure them
as clients, or to employ agents or runners for like purposes, or to pay or reward directly or indirectly, those who bring
or influence the bringing of such cases to his office, or to remunerate policemen, court or prison officials, physicians,
hospital attaches or others who may succeed, under the guise of giving disinterested friendly advice, in influencing the
criminal, the sick and the injured, the ignorant or others, to seek his professional services. A duty to the public and to
the profession devolves upon every member of the bar having knowledge of such practices upon the part of any
practitioner immediately to inform thereof to the end that the offender may be disbarred.
Common barratry consisting of frequently stirring up suits and quarrels between individuals was a crime at the
common law, and one of the penalties for this offense when committed by an attorney was disbarment. Statutes
intended to reach the same evil have been provided in a number of jurisdictions usually at the instance of the bar
itself, and have been upheld as constitutional. The reason behind statutes of this type is not difficult to discover. The
law is a profession and not a business. The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or through others
for to do so would be unprofessional. (State vs. Rossman [1909], 53 Wash., 1; 17 Ann. Cas., 625; People vs. Mac Cabe
[1893], 19 L. R. A., 231; 2 R. C. L., 1097.)
It becomes our duty to condemn in no uncertain terms the ugly practice of solicitation of cases by lawyers. It is
destructive of the honor of a great profession. It lowers the standards of that profession. It works against the
confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar. It results in needless litigation and in incenting
to strife otherwise peacefully inclined citizens.
The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment or suspension. That should be distinctly
understood.
Giving application of the law and the Canons of Ethics to the admitted facts, the respondent stands convicted of
having solicited cases in defiance of the law and those canons. Accordingly, the only remaining duty of the court is to
fix upon the action which should here be taken. The provincial fiscal of Isabela, with whom joined the representative of
the Attorney-General in the oral presentation of the case, suggests that the respondent be only reprimanded. We think
that our action should go further than this if only to reflect our attitude toward cases of this character of which
unfortunately the respondent's is only one. The commission of offenses of this nature would amply justify permanent
elimination from the bar. But as mitigating, circumstances working in favor of the respondent there are, first, his
intimation that he was unaware of the impropriety of his acts, second, his youth and inexperience at the bar, and,
third, his promise not to commit a similar mistake in the future. A modest period of suspension would seem to fit the
case of the erring attorney. But it should be distinctly understood that this result is reached in view of the
considerations which have influenced the court to the relatively lenient in this particular instance and should,
therefore, not be taken as indicating that future convictions of practice of this kind will not be dealt with by
disbarment.
In view of all the circumstances of this case, the judgment of the court is that the respondent Luis B. Tagorda be and is
hereby suspended from the practice as an attorney-at-law for the period of one month from April 1, 1929,
Street, Johns, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., reserves his vote.
Separate Opinions
OSTRAND, J., dissenting:
I dissent. Under the circumstances of the case a reprimand would have been sufficient punishment.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. L-1117

March 20, 1944

THE DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, complainant,

vs.
ESTANISLAO R. BAYOT, respondent.
Office of the Solicitor General De la Costa and Solicitor Feria for complainant.
Francisco Claravall for respondent.
OZAETA, J.:
The respondent, who is an attorney-at-law, is charged with malpractice for having published an advertisement in the
Sunday Tribune of June 13, 1943, which reads as follows:
Marriage
license promptly secured thru our assistance & the annoyance of delay or publicity avoided if desired, and marriage
arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any matter free for the poor. Everything confidential.
Legal assistance service
12 Escolta, Manila, Room, 105
Tel. 2-41-60.
Appearing in his own behalf, respondent at first denied having published the said advertisement; but subsequently,
thru his attorney, he admitted having caused its publication and prayed for "the indulgence and mercy" of the Court,
promising "not to repeat such professional misconduct in the future and to abide himself to the strict ethical rules of
the law profession." In further mitigation he alleged that the said advertisement was published only once in the Tribune
and that he never had any case at law by reason thereof.
Upon that plea the case was submitted to the Court for decision.
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics of his
profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among
other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant
advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops
to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public. As a member of
the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of
Jehovah. "The most worth and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . is the establishment of a
well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome
of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)
In In re Tagorda, 53 Phil., the respondent attorney was suspended from the practice of law for the period of one month
for advertising his services and soliciting work from the public by writing circular letters. That case, however, was more
serious than this because there the solicitations were repeatedly made and were more elaborate and insistent.
Considering his plea for leniency and his promise not to repeat the misconduct, the Court is of the opinion and so
decided that the respondent should be, as he hereby is, reprimanded.
Yulo, C.J., Moran, Horrilleno, Paras and Bocobo, JJ., concur.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

FIRST DIVISION
PEDRO L. LINSANGAN,
Complainant,
- versus ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO,
Respondent.
September 4, 2009

A.C. No. 6672

x-----------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:

This is a complaint for disbarment[1] filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office
against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional services.
Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his clients[2] to transfer
legal representation. Respondent promised them financial assistance[3] and expeditious collection on their claims.[4] To
induce them to hire his services, he persistently called them and sent them text messages.
To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit[5] of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to
prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant and utilize respondents services instead, in exchange
for a loan of P50,000. Complainant also attached respondents calling card:[6]
Front
NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
LAW OFFFICE
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
Fe Marie L. Labiano
Paralegal
1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01
6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar
Fax: (632) 362-7821
Grace Park, Caloocan City
Cel.: (0926) 2701719

Tel: 362-7820

Back
SERVICES OFFERED:
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE
TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD.
(emphasis supplied)
Hence, this complaint.
Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulation of the said calling card.
[7]
The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.[8]
Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report and recommendation,[9] found that respondent
had encroached on the professional practice of complainant, violating Rule 8.02[10] and other canons[11] of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule against soliciting cases for gain, personally or through
paid agents or brokers as stated in Section 27, Rule 138[12] of the Rules of Court. Hence, the CBD recommended that
respondent be reprimanded with a stern warning that any repetition would merit a heavier penalty.
We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondent but we modify the recommended penalty.

The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by respondent into complainants professional practice in
violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the means employed by respondent in furtherance of the said misconduct themselves
constituted distinct violations of ethical rules.
Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the manner by which a lawyers services
are to be made known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides:
CANON 3 - A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND
OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and not a business; lawyers should
not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares.[13] To allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to
commercialize the practice of law, degrade the profession in the publics estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render
that high character of service to which every member of the bar is called.[14]
Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:
RULE 2.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT DO OR PERMIT TO BE DONE ANY ACT DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO SOLICIT LEGAL BUSINESS.
Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers.[15] Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment.[16]
Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides:
RULE 1.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT, FOR ANY CORRUPT MOTIVE OR INTEREST, ENCOURAGE ANY SUIT OR PROCEEDING OR
DELAY ANY MANS CAUSE.

This rule proscribes ambulance chasing (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by an attorney, personally or
through an agent in order to gain employment)[17] as a measure to protect the community from barratry and champerty.[18]
Complainant presented substantial evidence[19] (consisting of the sworn statements of the very same persons coaxed
by Labiano and referred to respondents office) to prove that respondent indeed solicited legal business as well as profited
from referrals suits.
Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later admitted it during the mandatory hearing.
Through Labianos actions, respondents law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer representation
on the strength of Labianos word that respondent could produce a more favorable result.
Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the
CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
With regard to respondents violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that a lawyer should not steal another
lawyers client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good result or reduced fees for his services.
[20] Again the Court notes that respondent never denied having these seafarers in his client list nor receiving benefits from
Labianos referrals. Furthermore, he never denied Labianos connection to his office.[21] Respondent committed an
unethical, predatory overstep into anothers legal practice. He cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.
Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers, respondent violated Rule 16.04:
Rule 16.04 A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the clients interests are fully protected by the
nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of
justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, when in the interest of justice, he has to
advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographers fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or
premium for surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the client.
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyers independence of mind so that the free exercise of his judgment may not be
adversely affected.[22] It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the case he is handling as well as his entire devotion and
fidelity to the clients cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client in connection with the clients case, the lawyer in effect
acquires an interest in the subject matter of the case or an additional stake in its outcome.[23] Either of these circumstances
may lead the lawyer to consider his own recovery rather than that of his client, or to accept a settlement which may take care
of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the clients cause.[24]
As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice[25] which calls for the exercise of the Courts
disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes warrants serious sanctions for initiating contact with a prospective
client for the purpose of obtaining employment.[26] Thus, in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to protect the public from
the Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the nobility of the legal profession.
Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the prohibition on lending money to clients), the
sanction recommended by the IBP, a mere reprimand, is a wimpy slap on the wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly
incommensurate to its findings.
A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A lawyers best advertisement is a wellmerited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his character and conduct.[27] For this reason,
lawyers are only allowed to announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple professional cards.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

lawyers name;
name of the law firm with which he is connected;
address;
telephone number and
special branch of law practiced.[28]

Labianos calling card contained the phrase with financial assistance. The phrase was clearly used to entice clients (who
already had representation) to change counsels with a promise of loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to
lure clients away from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their financial distress and emotional vulnerability.
This crass commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and deserved no place in the legal profession. However, in the
absence of substantial evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is not prepared to rule that respondent was personally and
directly responsible for the printing and distribution of Labianos calling cards.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of one year effective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of
the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the
Philippines, and be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator to be circulated
to all courts.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

January 9, 1973
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
On December 1, 1972, the Commission on Bar Integration 1 submitted its Report dated November 30, 1972, with the
"earnest recommendation" on the basis of the said Report and the proceedings had in Administrative Case No. 526
2 of the Court, and "consistently with the views and counsel received from its [the Commission's] Board of Consultants,
as well as the overwhelming nationwide sentiment of the Philippine Bench and Bar" that "this Honorable Court
ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar as soon as possible through the adoption and promulgation of an
appropriate Court Rule."
The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to order the integration of the Philippine Bar, after due
hearing, giving recognition as far as possible and practicable to existing provincial and other local Bar associations. On
August 16, 1962, arguments in favor of as well as in opposition to the petition were orally expounded before the Court.
Written oppositions were admitted, 3 and all parties were thereafter granted leave to file written memoranda. 4
Since then, the Court has closely observed and followed significant developments relative to the matter of the
integration of the Bar in this jurisdiction.
In 1970, convinced from preliminary surveys that there had grown a strong nationwide sentiment in favor of Bar
integration, the Court created the Commission on Bar Integration for the purpose of ascertaining the advisability of
unifying the Philippine Bar.
In September, 1971, Congress passed House Bill No. 3277 entitled "An Act Providing for the Integration of the
Philippine Bar, and Appropriating Funds Therefor." The measure was signed by President Ferdinand E. Marcos on
September 17, 1971 and took effect on the same day as Rep. Act 6397. This law provides as follows:
SECTION 1.
Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect
the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal
profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more
effectively.
SEC. 2. The sum of five hundred thousand pesos is hereby appropriated, out of any funds in the National Treasury not
otherwise appropriated, to carry out the purposes of this Act. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the same
purpose shall be included in the annual appropriations for the Supreme Court.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

The Report of the Commission abounds with argument on the constitutionality of Bar integration and contains all
necessary factual data bearing on the advisability (practicability and necessity) of Bar integration. Also embodied
therein are the views, opinions, sentiments, comments and observations of the rank and file of the Philippine lawyer
population relative to Bar integration, as well as a proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission and
presented to them by that body in a national Bar plebiscite. There is thus sufficient basis as well as ample material
upon which the Court may decide whether or not to integrate the Philippine Bar at this time.
The following are the pertinent issues:
(1)

Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine Bar?

(2)

Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional?

(3)

Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this time?

A resolution of these issues requires, at the outset, a statement of the meaning of Bar integration. It will suffice, for
this purpose, to adopt the concept given by the Commission on Bar Integration on pages 3 to 5 of its Report, thus:
Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer population of the Philippines. This
requires membership and financial support (in reasonable amount) of every attorney as conditions sine qua non to the
practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
The term "Bar" refers to the collectivity of all persons whose names appear in the Roll of Attorneys. An Integrated Bar
(or Unified Bar) perforce must include all lawyers.
Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity with power to do so: the State. Bar integration,
therefore, signifies the setting up by Government authority of a national organization of the legal profession based on
the recognition of the lawyer as an officer of the court.
Designed to improve the position of the Bar as an instrumentality of justice and the Rule of Law, integration fosters
cohesion among lawyers, and ensures, through their own organized action and participation, the promotion of the
objectives of the legal profession, pursuant to the principle of maximum Bar autonomy with minimum supervision and
regulation by the Supreme Court.
The purposes of an integrated Bar, in general, are:
(1)

Assist in the administration of justice;

(2)
Foster and maintain on the part of its members high ideals of integrity, learning, professional competence,
public service and conduct;
(3)

Safeguard the professional interests of its members;

(4)

Cultivate among its members a spirit of cordiality and brotherhood;

(5)
Provide a forum for the discussion of law, jurisprudence, law reform, pleading, practice and procedure, and the
relations of the Bar to the Bench and to the public, and publish information relating thereto;
(6)

Encourage and foster legal education;

(7)
Promote a continuing program of legal research in substantive and adjective law, and make reports and
recommendations thereon; and
(8)

Enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility effectively.

Integration of the Bar will, among other things, make it possible for the legal profession to:
(1)

Render more effective assistance in maintaining the Rule of Law;

(2)

Protect lawyers and litigants against the abuse of tyrannical judges and prosecuting officers;

(3)
Discharge, fully and properly, its responsibility in the disciplining and/or removal of incompetent and unworthy
judges and prosecuting officers;
(4)
Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own forum, from the assaults that
politics and self-interest may level at it, and assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality and independence;
(5)

Have an effective voice in the selection of judges and prosecuting officers;

(6)
Prevent the unauthorized practice of law, and break up any monopoly of local practice maintained through
influence or position;
(7)

Establish welfare funds for families of disabled and deceased lawyers;

(8)
Provide placement services, and establish legal aid offices and set up lawyer reference services throughout the
country so that the poor may not lack competent legal service;
(9)

Distribute educational and informational materials that are difficult to obtain in many of our provinces;

(10)
Devise and maintain a program of continuing legal education for practising attorneys in order to elevate the
standards of the profession throughout the country;

(11)

Enforce rigid ethical standards, and promulgate minimum fees schedules;

(12)

Create law centers and establish law libraries for legal research;

(13)
Conduct campaigns to educate the people on their legal rights and obligations, on the importance of
preventive legal advice, and on the functions and duties of the Filipino lawyer; and
(14)
Generate and maintain pervasive and meaningful country-wide involvement of the lawyer population in the
solution of the multifarious problems that afflict the nation.
Anent the first issue, the Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of its power, under
Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,
and the admission to the practice of law." Indeed, the power to integrate is an inherent part of the Court's
constitutional authority over the Bar. In providing that "the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the
integration of the Philippine Bar," Republic Act 6397 neither confers a new power nor restricts the Court's inherent
power, but is a mere legislative declaration that the integration of the Bar will promote public interest or, more
specifically, will "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar
to discharge its public responsibility more effectively."
Resolution of the second issue whether the unification of the Bar would be constitutional hinges on the effects of
Bar integration on the lawyer's constitutional rights of freedom of association and freedom of speech, and on the
nature of the dues exacted from him.
The Court approvingly quotes the following pertinent discussion made by the Commission on Bar Integration pages 44
to 49 of its Report:
Constitutionality of Bar Integration
Judicial Pronouncements.
In all cases where the validity of Bar integration measures has been put in issue, the Courts have upheld their
constitutionality.
The judicial pronouncements support this reasoning:
Courts have inherent power to supervise and regulate the practice of law.
The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege; a privilege, moreover, clothed with public interest, because
a lawyer owes duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation;
and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State, the administration of justice, as an officer of the
court.
Because the practice of law is privilege clothed with public interest, it is far and just that the exercise of that
privilege be regulated to assure compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.
These public responsibilities can best be discharged through collective action; but there can be no collective action
without an organized body; no organized body can operate effectively without incurring expenses; therefore, it is fair
and just that all attorneys be required to contribute to the support of such organized body; and, given existing Bar
conditions, the most efficient means of doing so is by integrating the Bar through a rule of court that requires all
lawyers to pay annual dues to the Integrated Bar.
1.

Freedom of Association.

To compel a lawyer to be a member of an integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate (or
the corollary right not to associate).
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a
member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. All that integration actually does is to provide an official
national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a
member.
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings
of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The body compulsion to which he
is subjected is the payment of annual dues.
Otherwise stated, membership in the Unified Bar imposes only the duty to pay dues in reasonable amount. The issue
therefore, is a question of compelled financial support of group activities, not involuntary membership in any other
aspect.
The greater part of Unified Bar activities serves the function of elevating the educational and ethical standards of the
Bar to the end of improving the quality of the legal service available to the people. The Supreme Court, in order to
further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional services, may require that the cost of
improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the
lawyers.
Assuming that Bar integration does compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified
as an exercise of the police power of the State. The legal profession has long been regarded as a proper subject of
legislative regulation and control. Moreover, the inherent power of the Supreme Court to regulate the Bar includes the
authority to integrate the Bar.
2.

Regulatory Fee.

For the Court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the Court levies a tax.
A membership fee in the Integrated Bar is an exaction for regulation, while the purpose of a tax is revenue. If the Court
has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation, it may impose a membership fee for
that purpose. It would not be possible to push through an Integrated Bar program without means to defray the
concomitant expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily includes the power to impose such an exaction.
The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the Bar is that the regulation does not impose an
unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted by the integration of the Bar far outweighs the inconsequential
inconvenience to a member that might result from his required payment of annual dues.
3.

Freedom of Speech.

A lawyer is free, as he has always been, to voice his views on any subject in any manner he wishes, even though such
views be opposed to positions taken by the Unified Bar.
For the Integrated Bar to use a member's due to promote measures to which said member is opposed, would not
nullify or adversely affect his freedom of speech.
Since a State may constitutionally condition the right to practice law upon membership in the Integrated Bar, it is
difficult to understand why it should become unconstitutional for the Bar to use the member's dues to fulfill the very
purposes for which it was established.
The objection would make every Governmental exaction the material of a "free speech" issue. Even the income tax
would be suspect. The objection would carry us to lengths that have never been dreamed of. The conscientious
objector, if his liberties were to be thus extended, might refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance of war or of any
other end condemned by his conscience as irreligious or immoral. The right of private judgment has never yet been
exalted above the powers and the compulsion of the agencies of Government.
4.

Fair to All Lawyers.

Bar integration is not unfair to lawyers already practising because although the requirement to pay annual dues is a
new regulation, it will give the members of the Bar a new system which they hitherto have not had and through which,
by proper work, they will receive benefits they have not heretofore enjoyed, and discharge their public responsibilities
in a more effective manner than they have been able to do in the past. Because the requirement to pay dues is a valid
exercise of regulatory power by the Court, because it will apply equally to all lawyers, young and old, at the time Bar
integration takes effect, and because it is a new regulation in exchange for new benefits, it is not retroactive, it is not
unequal, it is not unfair.
To resolve the third and final issue whether the Court should ordain the integration of the Bar at this time requires
a careful overview of the practicability and necessity as well as the advantages and disadvantages of Bar integration.
In many other jurisdictions, notably in England, Canada and the United States, Bar integration has yielded the
following benefits: (1) improved discipline among the members of the Bar; (2) greater influence and ascendancy of the
Bar; (3) better and more meaningful participation of the individual lawyer in the activities of the Integrated Bar; (4)
greater Bar facilities and services; (5) elimination of unauthorized practice; (6) avoidance of costly membership
campaigns; (7) establishment of an official status for the Bar; (8) more cohesive profession; and (9) better and more
effective discharge by the Bar of its obligations and responsibilities to its members, to the courts, and to the public. No
less than these salutary consequences are envisioned and in fact expected from the unification of the Philippine Bar.
Upon the other hand, it has been variously argued that in the event of integration, Government authority will dominate
the Bar; local Bar associations will be weakened; cliquism will be the inevitable result; effective lobbying will not be
possible; the Bar will become an impersonal Bar; and politics will intrude into its affairs.
It is noteworthy, however, that these and other evils prophesied by opponents of Bar integration have failed to
materialize in over fifty years of Bar integration experience in England, Canada and the United States. In all the
jurisdictions where the Integrated Bar has been tried, none of the abuses or evils feared has arisen; on the other hand,
it has restored public confidence in the Bar, enlarged professional consciousness, energized the Bar's responsibilities
to the public, and vastly improved the administration of justice.
How do the Filipino lawyers themselves regard Bar integration? The official statistics compiled by the Commission on
Bar integration show that in the national poll recently conducted by the Commission in the matter of the integration of
the Philippine Bar, of a total of 15,090 lawyers from all over the archipelago who have turned in their individual
responses, 14,555 (or 96.45 per cent) voted in favor of Bar integration, while only 378 (or 2.51 per cent) voted against
it, and 157 (or 1.04 per cent) are non-commital. In addition, a total of eighty (80) local Bar association and lawyers'
groups all over the Philippines have submitted resolutions and other expressions of unqualified endorsement and/or
support for Bar integration, while not a single local Bar association or lawyers' group has expressed opposed position
thereto. Finally, of the 13,802 individual lawyers who cast their plebiscite ballots on the proposed integration Court
Rule drafted by the Commission, 12,855 (or 93.14 per cent) voted in favor thereof, 662 (or 4.80 per cent) vote against
it, and 285 (or 2.06 per cent) are non-committal. 5 All these clearly indicate an overwhelming nationwide demand for
Bar integration at this time.
The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in Adm. Case No.
526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the
Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is "perfectly constitutional and legally
unobjectionable," within the context of contemporary conditions in the Philippines, has become an imperative means
to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its
public responsibility fully and effectively.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13 of Article VIII of the Constitution, hereby
ordains the integration of the Bar of the Philippines in accordance with the attached COURT RULE, effective on January
16, 1973.

Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castillo, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ.,
concur.
Footnotes
1
Created by Supreme Court Resolution of October 5, 1970 "for the purpose of ascertaining the advisability of
the integration of the Bar in this jurisdiction," the Commission is composed of Supreme Court Associate Justice Fred
Ruiz Castro (Chairman), Senator Jose J. Roy, retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Conrado V. Sanchez, Supreme
Court Associate Justice (then Court of Appeals Presiding Justice) Salvador V. Esguerra, U. P. Law Center Director
Crisolito Pascual, Ex-Senator Tecla San Andres Ziga, and San Beda Law Dean and Constitutional Convention Delegate
Feliciano Jover Ledesma (Members).
2
Filed on July 11, 1962 (by a Committee composed of Jose W. Diokno, Roman Ozaeta, Jose P. Carag, Eugenio
Villanueva, Jr. and Leo A. Panuncialman), the petition represented the unanimous consensus of 53 Bar Associations
(from all over the Philippines) reached in convention at the Far Eastern University Auditorium in Manila on June 23,
1962.
3
Written oppositions were submitted by Attys. Cesar Fajardo and Vicente L. Arcega, the Camarines Norte
Lawyers League, Atty. Fructuoso S. Villarin, the Camarines Sur Bar Association and the Manila Bar Association.
4
The Petitioners and the Negros Occidental Bar Association submitted memoranda in favor of Bar integration,
while the Manila Bar Association submitted a memoranda opposing Bar integration.
5

All figures are as of January 8, 1973.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 1928

August 3, 1978

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP Administrative Case No. MDD1)
RESOLUTION

CASTRO, C.J.:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.
On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors unanimously adopted
Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty.
Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for
"stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice.
On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the Court for
consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which reads:
.... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall promptly inquire into the cause
or causes of the continued delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including a
recommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys.
Notice of the action taken shall be sent by registered mail to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter
concerned.
On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter adverted to above; he
submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due from him.

On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's comment:
on March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.
Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were required to submit
memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution.
At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show that the propriety and necessity of
the integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence conceded. The respondent, however, objects to particular
features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as the Court Rule) 1 in accordance with which the Bar of the
Philippines was integrated and to the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws (hereinabove
cited).
The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent
member's name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill of the IBP By-Laws (supra), whereas
the authority of the Court to issue the order applied for is found in Section 10 of the Court Rule, which reads:
SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment
of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such
payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of
Attorneys.
The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these words of the Court Rule:
SECTION 1.
Organization. There is hereby organized an official national body to be known as the 'Integrated Bar
of the Philippines,' composed of all persons whose names now appear or may hereafter be included in the Roll of
Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court Rule:
SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board of Governors
shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. ...
The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights
in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to
be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial
support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to
liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of
the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys,
contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an
"administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."
The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to constitutional issues that inevitably and
inextricably come up to the surface whenever attempts are made to regulate the practice of law, define the conditions
of such practice, or revoke the license granted for the exercise of the legal profession.
The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous case before the Court, entitled
"Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman
Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The Court exhaustively considered all these matters in that case in its Resolution ordaining
the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. The Court there made the unanimous
pronouncement that it was
... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and
the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar
Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is 'perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable'. ...
Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar
associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is
essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the
objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of
the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are,
therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a
reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional
ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon
proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member. 2
The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of public interest and public
welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally justifies the restrictions that integration imposes
upon the personal interests and personal convenience of individual lawyers. 3
Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been uniformly
and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession. The practice of law is
not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial
duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part
in one of the most important functions of the State the administration of justice as an officer of the court. 4 The
practice of law being clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control for the
common good, to the extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Roberts

explained, the expression "affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police
power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502).
When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 5 authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt rules of court to
effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in the exercise of the
paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively." Hence, the
Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar through its Resolution promulgated on
January 9, 1973, and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a body corporate
through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations of public
welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of pressing public necessity.
The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal liberty, property and
occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general
prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est
supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To this fundamental principle of government the rights of
individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to
prevail over authority because then society win fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an
undoubted power of the State to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some freedom.
But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in the Philippines is
the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X of the 1973
Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(5)
Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro. procedure in all courts, and the admission to the
practice of law and the integration of the Bar ...,
and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:
SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of Court to effect the
integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal
profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more
effectively.
Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and looking
solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power "to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law," it at once
becomes indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases
regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of law.
Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his exercise of the said
profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body politic to require him to
conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for the common good, even to the
extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable interference and
regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an interest in his concerns.
On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.
The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with them seriatim.
1.
The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel him to become a
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it impinges
on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a
member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. 6
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a
member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that integration actually does is to provide an official
national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is a ready a
member. 8
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings
of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he
is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in
elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion
be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the lawyers. 9
Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such
compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. 10
2.
The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule requiring payment of a
membership fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and
duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar
(Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) which power the respondent acknowledges from requiring members
of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the
profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed
to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration. 11

3.
The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to a deprivation
of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights. Whether the practice of law is a
property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here
pause to consider at length, as it clear that under the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers
granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practise law before the courts of this
country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory
measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by
payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. 12
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, 13 and as such must
bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.
4.
Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer from
its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of
lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions
and responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion. 14
In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Board of Bar Commissioners in a disbarment
proceeding was confirmed and disbarment ordered, the court, sustaining the Bar Integration Act of Kentucky, said:
"The power to regulate the conduct and qualifications of its officers does not depend upon constitutional or statutory
grounds. It is a power which is inherent in this court as a court appropriate, indeed necessary, to the proper
administration of justice ... the argument that this is an arbitrary power which the court is arrogating to itself or
accepting from the legislative likewise misconceives the nature of the duty. It has limitations no less real because they
are inherent. It is an unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a brother member of the Bar, particularly where, as here,
the facts are disputed. It is a grave responsibility, to be assumed only with a determination to uphold the Ideals and
traditions of an honorable profession and to protect the public from overreaching and fraud. The very burden of the
duty is itself a guaranty that the power will not be misused or prostituted. ..."
The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to the Court the
power to "Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice ... and the admission to the practice of law and the
integration of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a member
of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.
We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon should
be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.
Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez and
Guerrero, JJ., concur.