II Reason, truth and science

II.1. Formal and material truths, deduction and induction

True statements (or, simply, truth) might be divided into two separate categories:
(1) true because of the facts (i. e. "my hair is dark", "the Spanish Civil War started in
1936") and (2) true because of reasoning (i. e. "A + B = B + A", "no civilian is an active
soldier").

II.1.1. Material truth

A statement that is true because of the facts is called an empirical or material
truth, that is, true because of experience (the word empirical means having to do with
experience), because of its content (its material, the information within it). But
because an empirical truth can be known only by looking at the facts of the world, a
statement such as There are no trees on the Doctor Maran High School courtyard
might be false, that is, contingent (a contingent truth if it is true; a contingent
falsehood if it is false). Thus, the statement that there are no trees on the Doctor
Maran High School courtyard happens to be false, but it is contingently so. We can
imagine what it would be like otherwise; if someone were to cut down the remaining
trees, then the statement would become true, but only contingently true because there
might someday once again be trees on the courtyard. As a general rule in philosophy,
all empirical statements are, if true, only contingently true.
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) spoke of synthetic truths because in order to
formulate them we extract a propriety from experience to combine it (make a synthesis)
with a given concept as in "every blackboard [concept] is flat [propriety]" (which I
know from experience). A synthetic sentence then is a proposition whose predicate
concept is not contained in its subject concept but related. The problem of such truths is
that my knowledge is provisional, its contrary is not impossible, that's why it's only
knowledgeable a posteriori ("from the later", "afterwards"), that is, dependent on
experience, issuing from some empirical content. (TBQ)

II.1.2. Formal truth

Truths of reason are called formal or necessary truths for they could not
possibly be false, a statement that is true because of reason is necessarily true.
Necessary is here the opposite of contingent: we can always imagine what it would be
for a contingent truth not to be true (or a contingent falsehood not to be false); but
cannot even make sense out of the suggestion that a necessary truth might not be true
(or that a necessary falsehood might not be false). Formal truths are true in any
possible world, 2 + 2 = 4 is a necessary truth, in that we cannot imagine (no matter
how imaginative we happen to be) what circumstances might make that statement false.
And the necessary falsehood 1 + 1 = 1 cannot be imagined to be true under any
circumstances. Necessary truths can be said to be true, accordingly, prior to experience,
or (in Latin) a priori. (It is important to note again that a priori does not mean before
in the sense of temporally before any experience, but independently of any
experience). (TBQ)
Immanuel Kant spoke of analytic truths because only conceptual analysis is
needed to prove them true: "Every triangle has more than two sides and less than four"
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is necessarily true given the meaning of the concept "triangle", a propriety (having three
sides, three being more than two and less than four) included in the definition of the
concept is made explicit (is analysed, literally "broke up", separated). An analytic
sentence then is a a proposition whose predicate concept is contained in its subject
concept. The problem of such truths is that they are somewhat empty, statements such as
"A=A" provide no new information.
Normally we can differentiate three kinds of analytic propositions:
Definitions: "A bachelor is unmarried."
Axioms and theorems: "Only one straight line crosses two different
points in a plane."
Logical truths (tautologies): "Either the Universe is infinite or it isn't."

II.1.3. Arguments
We will dedicate the next unit to deductive argumentation, so we will just note in
those lines that a deductive argument is a reasoning in which the conclusion necessarily
follows the premises (so if the premises are true the conclusion is true). A deduction is
an inference in which the conclusion is of no greater generality than the premises, there
is a reductive process from a general or entire set or domain to a particular instance or
portion: "All philosophy teachers are methodical, therefore the philosophy teacher
writing those lines is methodical." Deduction is absolutely reliable provided the initial
generalization is reliable, because deduction just makes explicit some knowledge
included in the starting premise(s). Deductive arguments are explanatory, not extensive,
they do not offer new factual knowledge, and only in this sense deduction is to be said
to proceed "from generality to particularity", because part of the whole information
present in the premises is extracted within the conclusion.
Concerning inductive arguments we already mentioned in the previous unit some
of its main characteristics, but now it's time to develop the different varieties of
induction. Inductive arguments are not merely explanatory, if they're sound their
conclusion contains more information than the premises, so the truth of the premises
does not guarantee the truth of the conclusion. An induction is an inference in which
the conclusion amplifies the range of the premises, and therefore in which the truth of
the premises makes the conclusion only probable. The rules of formal logic specify the
form of different valid deductions, the validity of inductions relies on its contents, not
its form, so all inductive arguments (sound and unsound) share this form:
A1
A2
.
.
An
---B

The dashed line means here that the connection between the premises and the
conclusion is just probable, and there are many different ways in which the premises
would make the conclusion probable: there might be a causal relation between the
premises (cause: "the bullet hit her brain") and the conclusion (effect: "she died"), a
correlation (a variation in a series of values corresponds to a variation in another series
of values: statistically high unemployment rates are correlated to higher rates of
property crimes) or an analogy (the similarity between two different cases make us

transfer the results obtained in one case to the second one: an optical device as complex
as a camera has been designed, therefore an optical device as complex as the human eye
must have been designed too). Arguments based on analogies are the weaker kind of
inductive arguments, and very often correlations are established seeking to discover a
causal relation (for instance, in the case of lung cancer, was first noticed a correlation
between smoking and lung cancer: lung cancer was more frequent among smokers, but
it could have turned out to be a coincidence; nevertheless subsequently a causal
connection between both circumstances was scientifically established).

II.2. The scientific method and the problem of demarcation

II.2.1. Classes of sciences
Let's take a look to the following statements:
a) (a - b)2 = a2 - 2ab + b2
b) Amnesia can be caused by a traumatic event
c) The Anschluss was tolerated by the Allies hoping that Hitler's imperialism would be
thus satisfied
d) Any object, wholy or partially immersed in a fluid, is buoyed up by a force equal to
the weight of the fluid displaced by the object.
e) The atomic number of Potassium is 19

All those sentences have something in common: all of them are true.
Nevertheless their contents, their references, are very different. A first distinction can be
made between "a)" and the rest of the statements: "a)" does not refer to facts, it says
nothing about the actual World, it has no factual content. On the other side, "b)", "c)",
"d)" and "e)" give us information about events, about something going on in the World.
Those statements belong to empirical sciences (psychology, history, physics and
chemistry respectively) whereas the first one belongs to a formal science (mathematics).
Empirical sciences are those of which sentences refer to facts (empirical
propositions), affirm or deny something about what actually happens in the World. The
truth of the statements of empirical sciences depends on its comparison with reality,
with experience, so material truth and inductive reasoning are typical of empirical
science.
Formal sciences are those of which sentences do not refer to facts (formal
propositions) but to other sentences. The truth of the statements of formal sciences
depends on the absence of contradiction between the sentences of the system. The truth
of the statements of formal sciences depends on its connection with the rest of the
statements of the system, independently of experience, so formal truth and deductive
reasoning are typical of formal science.
Within empirical sciences we can draw a new distinction: "b" and "c" refer to
human behavior whereas "d" and "e" refer to natural facts. Empirical sciences must then
be subdivided into natural sciences and social or human sciences. Social sciences
share the objectivity, precision and methodology of natural sciences, but they resist
mathematization and have difficulties in predicting future facts, as their object of study,
human beings, is quite unpredictable.
We can see the different kinds of science with a table:
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Formal sciences don't deal with facts and events from reality, but with relations between
symbols. They have no empirical content nor are they based on observation.
Natural They deal with
Empirical sciences deal with reality, with the facts. They nature
have empirical content issued from observation and
experience.
Social They deal with
society and humanity.

Logic
Mathematics
Physics
Chemistry
Biology...
Sociology
History
Psychology...

II.2.2. Methods in science

Science uses primarily deduction: within an axiomatic system for the formal
sciences and as link between hypothesis and its consequences within the empirical
sciences.
The axiomatic methodology.
An axiomatic system contains fundamentally two kinds of statements: axioms
and theorems. Axioms (or postulates) are primitive unproved statements, admitted
because they're evident, that is, because its falsity seems untenable. Theorems are
statements logically derived from axioms or prior (already proved) theorems, proved
deductively. Also symbols, operators, rules and precise and strict definitions are
necessary. The language SL is part of an axiomatic system.
The first axiomatic system was Euclides' Elements of geometry written circa
300 BCE. It includes:
- 23 definitions (such as "a point is that which has no part" or "an obtuse angle is
an angle which is greater than a right angle") some of which use terms previously
defined,
- 10 axioms (5 called "postulates" such as "all right angles equal one another"
and 5 called "common notions" such as "the whole is greater than the part"),
- 48 propositions (such as "straight lines parallel to the same straight line are also
parallel to one another ") which play the role of first theorems directly derived from the
definitions and axioms.
With just those elements the whole system of classical geometry can be proved
deductively (but, as we will see, the fifth postulate is problematic).
The hypothetical-deductive method.
Induction is a basic procedure within empirical sciences, but those sciences have
developed a hybrid method combining experience and deduction.
The first step in natural sciences is observation. The observation of an event
lacking explanation leads to the definition of a problem. Let "a cylindrical trunk floats"
be the observed fact, hence our problem "why do trunks float?".
The next step is to formulate a hypothesis (y) which explains x. A hypothesis is
a temporal assumption, that is, a solution to the problem, an explanation that we accept
provisionally in order to confirm its consequences. The hypothesis should be rigorous
(well formulated, without ambiguities or contradictions), neutral and verifiable (it really
explains x and is provable by experience). Let "trunks float because they're cylindrical"
be our hypothesis.
The third step is the deduction of the consequences from the hypothesis, that is,
establishing the necessary connection between the hypothesis and the expected
consequences: provided the hypothesis ("trunks float because they're cylindrical") is

true, then this consequence ("any cylindrical object floats") must follow (this is the
deductive moment of the procedure). Its the time to make a general prediction to be
tested experimentally.
Finally the consequences of the hypothesis have to be verified through an
experiment. That is, we have to check if any cylindrical object would float (which, of
course, is not the case). An experiment is not mere observation (like in the first step)
but a designed proof which specifically deals with the hypothesis and might be a
significant test for it. The scientist has to control the whole process of production of the
event and isolate the variable he's checking, if possible, through artificial circumstances
which warrant that no other variable but the truth of the hypothesis might explain the
result of the experiment. In our example, throwing a cylindrical stone into a bucket full
of water would be an acceptable experiment to prove our hypothesis.
If after the experiment the consequences of the hypothesis are not met, then the
hypothesis is refuted and a new hypothesis has to be formulated. If, on the contrary, the
consequences of the hypothesis are obtained within the experiment, then the hypothesis
is corroborated and is admitted as a valid explanation for the problem raised by
observation.
An example of the hypothetical-deductive method is the discovery of Neptune. Before 1846
only seven planets were thought to exist in the solar system, with Uranus being the most distant
one. However, it had been known for decades that the orbit of Uranus did not seem to match the
predictions of Newton's theory of gravitation. So, a French mathematician named Urbain Le
Verrier hypothesised an additional planet just beyond Uranus giving rise to the anomalous orbit. To
test his hypothesis, Le Verrier observed that if his hypothesis were true, then this would imply that
the new planet had to have a particular precise location, which Le Verrier was able to calculate.
When astronomers looked to see if there was anything there, Neptune was found and thereby
corroborated Newton's theory of gravitation.

II.2.3. The demarcation of science

The problem of demarcation of science is the problem of the definition of
science, of the distinction of its essential characteristics and the formulation of specific
criteria to distinguish true scientific knowledge from merely apparent scientific
knowledge, science from pseudo-science (astrology, quiromancy, futurology...).
The final end of scientific proofs is to formulate laws and integrate them into
theories so, a primary feature of science would be the inclusion of laws and theories.
Normally a law is a single statement whereas theories are sets of statements, more
general and with a higher range. For this reason laws are deductible from theories
(Kepler's laws of movement are a particular case of Newton's general theory of
universal gravitation, and can be deduced from it). Laws contain previously well
defined terms which refer to something observable or defined operationally thereby
fixing regularities and making precise predictions.
The inclusion of well defined terms, that is, a rigorous language would be
another important feature of science. Every concept is defined with precision and has
an univocal reference (just one possible meaning or interpretation).
Also, science is systematic and coherent, its concepts, laws and theories are to
be connected hierarchically (establishing clearly what is primary from what is derived,
with no gaps in between) and without contradiction.
Finally, the crucial aspect of science is that scientific statements are empirically
verifiable: if experience could not prove whether a statement is true or false, then it's
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not scientific (the statement needs to be provable, not necessarily proved, a false
statement can nevertheless be scientific provided it is testable).
But some pseudo-sciences emulate the language of science, astrology counts
with concepts, laws and theories which are apparently coherent but, are those really
scientific? What makes a theory to be truly scientific and not a fancy science looking
substitute?
The problem of the demarcation of science was philosopher's Karl Popper
(1902-1994) main concern. Before Popper (what is called the "received view" of
science) verification of scientific statements was understood as a form of induction
which justifies or confirms hypothesis. But according to Popper's critical rationalism,
the scientific method is not inductive: science does not try to confirm hypothesis, but it
nevertheless learns through experience with a scientific method of trial and error, of
conjectures and refutations [see Karl Popper's Science as falsification] in which
hypothesis just may survive provisionally but not be verified. Therefore the scientific
method is a method of verifying hypothesis, but through verification science
doesn't pretend to justify or confirm its hypothesis, but to refute them. In some way
science works deductively and just uses modus tollens: logic can only refute hypothesis,
never confirm them, "we never know, we can just conjecture".
An instance of falsification of a scientific conjecture is the other side of the discovery of
Neptune: the falsification of the existence of Vulcan. Under the influence of the success of the
discovery of Neptune, Le Verrier tried to explain the observed anomalies in the orbit of Mercury
with the hypothesis of another new planet, this time between Mercury and the Sun: Vulcan. Apart
from a certain number of reports which proved themselves non reliable, the planet was never
found and the anomalies of Mercury's orbit were ultimately explained by Albert Einstein's theory
of general relativity.

What is, then, the final criterion of demarcation of science: the falsifiability of
its laws and theories. A theory should be considered scientific if and only if it is
falsifiable: "statements or systems of statements, in order to be ranked as scientific,
must be capable of conflicting with possible, or conceivable observations". The laws
and theories of pseudoscience can not be falsified, there's no crucial experiment
which would make them false because:
a) their laws and theories are ambiguous so it's impossible to design a
test which would clearly prove them false or,
b) their predictions are so general that almost everything would count as
a confirmation of them, they are so vague that they are irrefutable or,
c) they use ad hoc hypothesis to confirm the theory after it has been
falsified to render it immune to falsification.

II.3. Brief history of scientific worldviews

Worldview stands for the German word Weltanschauung (also in use in
English among philosophers), coined by the philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey (18331911) and composed of Welt ('world') and Anschauung ('view' or 'outlook'). A
comprehensive world view or worldview refers to a wide world perception, to the
basic framework of ideas and values forming a global description through which
an individual, group or culture watches and interprets the world and interacts
with it. It is therefore the fundamental cognitive orientation or basic point of view of
an individual or society including scientific, philosophical, and moral principles.

In philosophy of science, scientific worldviews are usually referred to as

paradigms which, in the most basic sense of the word, are frameworks containing
all of the commonly accepted views about a subject, a structure of what direction
research should take and how it should be performed. The philosopher Thomas S.
Kuhn (1922-1996) was the first to use the term for science, suggesting that scientific
research does not progress towards truths, but is subject to dogma and clinging to old
theories (as we will study in V.4). A paradigm dictates:
What is studied and researched.
The type of questions that are asked.
The exact structure and nature of the questions.
How the results of any research are interpreted.
Within the western history of science there have been three main worldviews:
the Aristotelian-Ptolemaic paradigm, the Newtonian paradigm and the Einsteinian
paradigm.

II.3.1. Aristotelian organicism

To fully understand the Aristotelian worldview it is necessary to bear in mind
that in ancient Greece modern experimental science remained unknown, and philosophy
and science were conflated (that's why Aristotle theories concerning the Earth and other
planets are deeply connected to his teleological philosophy and metaphysics). But to be
fair the Aristotelian worldview succeeds in giving a coherent and accurate description of
the phenomena known back then. In fact it was so successful that it remained in force
over almost two thousand years, until the scientific revolution.
In Aristotle's model, universe can be compared to an enormous living being
formed by countless beings which try to reach their own ends. For Aristotle it is only
possible to understand the universe if we understand the final cause all the things
pursue. According to the Aristotelian worldview the universe is geocentric, limited
in space, eternal in time, heterogeneous and teleological.
The Aristotelian worldview is said to be teleological (from telos = cause)
because within it all that exists pursues its own end. All the things, non animated objects
included, tend to reach their natural purpose. Also Aristotle, as most of his
contemporaries, thought that the universe was geocentric: the Earth is the centre of the
cosmos and the Moon, the Sun, the planets and even the stars turn around it. the
movement of the celestial bodies is explained through a system of moving spheres to
which the different Moon, the different planets and the stars are linked. The last sphere
contains the stars, and beyond this sphere there's nothing, no even empty space, the
universe has a limit, it is finite. On the other hand the universe has always existed
(because ex nihilo nihil fit, "out of nothing nothing comes") so it is eternal. Finally, the
Aristotelian universe is heterogeneous because it is divided in two different regions.
underneath the Moon's sphere is the sublunary region (including Earth), subject to
changes, to generation and corruption. It is an imperfect region formed by the four
elements (fire, air, water and earth). Each element has its natural place to where it
approaches spontaneously. Above the Moon's sphere is the superlunary region, formed
by the celestial bodies which, for Aristotle, are divine and therefore move only in circles
(the more perfect existing figure). This region is perfect, with no changes, so the
celestial bodies are immutable and eternal.
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II.3.2. Newton's mechanistic universe

The birth of experimental
science in the XVIIth century lead to a
crucial change in European thought.
The works of Copernicus, Kepler,
Galileo and Newton, as well as the
discoveries issued from the use of
telescopes, proved Aristotle wrong and
made it possible to develop a new
vision of the cosmos. According to this
new worldview the universe was
heliocentric, unlimited in the space
but finite in time, homogeneous and
determinist.
With the telescope, scientists
discovered regions of the universe very
distant from Earth, which lead them to
believe that it had no spatial limits. On
the other hand, they thought that the
universe wasn't eternal, since it had
been created ex nihilo by God.
With the discovery of the law of gravity Newton found the cause of the
trajectory of the planets which applied to the whole universe. Newton's universe was
therefore homogeneous, ruled by the same laws everywhere and with no final cause
driving the changes in natural objects. Against the teleological view of Aristotle, in
classical physics nature is formed by inert matter subject to mathematical laws.
Classical physics assume that nature is regular and ordered, mathematical
formulae allow for calculating the position of the planets and stars with great precision
because many properties remain constant and never change, as described by the
principles of conservation of energy and mass. The classical physics worldview
therefore is mechanistic (everything happens by means of direct interaction of forces)
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and deterministic (everything is predictable as long as the antecedent causes are

known).

II.3.3. Einsteinian relativism

The Newtonian paradigm felt
into a crisis at the beginning of the
XXth
century,
when
several
experiments showed some results
inconsistent with the predictions of
classical physics. New perspectives
were adopted and lead to the
development of the theory of relativity
and quantum mechanics.
Classical physics had always
presumed the existence of absolute time
and space, but Einstein defended that
the speed of light had the same value for
any observer, which meant that both
space and time were relative, and
therefore we could only refer to space
and time in relation with a certain
viewer.
Also, the theory of relativity indicates that mass and energy are two
manifestations of the same reality, and they can transform one into the other.

A second revolution in physics took place also in the beginning of the XXth
century. Quantum mechanics appeared when scientists were urged to revise a basic
idea of classical physics: matter and energy are continous. Energy, in fact, is not
continous, but can be exchanged in the form of packets of energy or quanta. Also, the
new paradigm stablished that particles function also as waves, subatomic particles
have a dual character: corpuscular and undulatory. Finally, quantum mechanics
stablish that it is impossible to know with certainty both the position and the speed of a
particle as stated in the principle of uncertainty (or indeterminacy). The consequence
is that it impossible to calculate the trajectory of an electro, but just the probability of
finding it at a certain point at a certain time. This introduces the notion of chance in our
interpretation of reality, partially dismissing the mechanicist and determinist worldview.
Robert C. Solomon & Kathleen M. Higgins. The Big Questions. A short introduction to philosophy (TBQ). Wadsworth: Wadsworth
Cengage Learning, 2006. Parts of III.1. are extracted from this work (pp. 147-152).