The Problem of Boredom: an Exposition of

Rotation of Crops in Kierkegaards Either/Or

Ken Geter
Kierkegaard Independent Study
June 21, 2010

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What is boredom? It is something with which we are all familiar, but to define the
experience precisely presents difficulty. It pervades our individual existence, and many contend
with it on a constant basis. Many lives pass in a state of perpetual boredom. What is boredom?
Is it merely a lack of interest? Is it merely passive apathy, or is it something active? Is boredom
thrust upon us by our external circumstances, or is it created internally? Is boredom a choice that
we make in our given circumstances? Is it something under our power to control? Is it merely a
mood? In Either/Or, Kierkegaard addresses some of these questions. In the Rotation of Crops
section, he makes rather strong claims about boredom such as all people are boring, and
boredom is the root of all evil (285).
In Either/Or, Kierkegaard is writing under the pseudonym Victor Eremita, who claims to
be reporting on papers of an esthete who he calls A and a judge named William who Victor
calls B. This kind of double-layered pseudonymity may seem to hide the real Kierkegaard, but
I believe that even in the tongue-in-cheek writing style of the the esthete A, Kierkegaards stance
occasionally shines through. I will be focusing on As papers in Part I of Either/Or entitled
Rotation of Crops: A Venture in a Theory of Social Prudence. For the purposes of this paper I
will be ignoring the larger project of the two parts of Either/Or that compares the strengths and
weaknesses of living in the aesthetic and ethical spheres, I will also be largely ignoring the
social prudence theory of this particular section of Either/Or. I will concentrate on As protophenomenological analysis of boredom that I believe stands on its own merits. The main points
of As analysis I will follow are 1) boredom as a powerful moving force 2) the pervasiveness of
boredom in human existence and history; 3) the distinction between boredom and idleness; 4) the
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requirement of change as prescribed by his rotation of crops method and how all such change is a
relation between recollecting and forgetting; and 5) the role arbitrariness in this change.
A begins the Rotation of Crops section with the assertion of the basic principle that all
people are boring. (285). Boredom is a moving force, a repelling, negative force. It has to the
highest degree the repelling force always required in the negative, which is actually the principle
of motion, and this force is infinitely repulsive. A continues describing boredom as an
powerful force of great power, if we are to realize this power at its maximum, we arrive at a
unsettling conclusion: a person needs to only to ponder how corrupting boredom is for people
if he wants to press the speed of the motion to the highest point, almost with danger to the
locomotive, he needs only to say to himself: Boredom is the root of all evil. As purpose will
be to show how to overcome the driving force of boredom. Why does A place so much emphasis
on boredom as a moving force? It is as if he is explaining boredom as an Aristotelean causa
efficiens that moves an individual to action (or perhaps inaction). A ends the opening paragraph
wondering why boredom is such a potent force: [I]t is very curious that boredom, which itself
has such a calm an sedate nature, can have such a capacity to initiate motion. The insidious
nature of boredom is that its great force goes largely unrecognized.
This force of boredom has been present since the dawn of time. A recounts this history:
The gods were bored; therefore they created human beings. Adam was bored because he was
alone; therefore Eve was created Adam and Eve were bored together; then Adam and Eve and
Cain and Able were bored en famille. After that, the population of the world increased and the
nations were bored en masse (286). The tower of Babel was a terrible demonstration of how
boredom had gained the upper hand. Thus A posits boredom as a historical condition of our
existence, not only as individuals, but as a species.
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In continuing with his thesis that all people are boring, A makes a rather humorous yet
brilliant observation about bores: How remarkable it is that those who do not bore themselves
generally bore others; those, however, who bore themselves entertain others (288). Which then
is the greater evil: to be bored, or to bore others? The former condition is preferred, as A says,
the superior ones, are those who bore themselves (289). This brings into question the
relationship between being boring and being bored: in some instances (see footnote below about
busy workers) A equates the two, as if being boring also means being bored, or that being bored
makes one boring to others. However his statement above would contradict that, since those
who bore themselves entertain others and vice versa. Another problem arises from his
observation: once one has conquered boredom and is able to entertain oneself, then that person
becomes a bore to others!
Boredom is not idleness. A is careful to make this distinction. Idleness is not the root of
all evil as the maxim idle hands are the devils workshop suggests. Idleness is in fact, a good
thing, providing boredom can be overcome. Idleness is by no means a root of evil; on the
contrary, it is truly a divine life, if one is not bored (289). The superior ones noted above do
not fear being idle, but rather fear boredom: the noble nature does not fear such things
[idleness] but does indeed fear being bored. Idleness is not an evil but is the true good, and
having a sense for this distinguishes one as truly human: everyone who lacks a sense for it
thereby shows that he has not raised himself to the human level. Here it is important to keep in
mind that for A, the human level is exemplified by the aesthetic life, a life that cultivates the
senses and desires. This sense that idleness is not the root of evil is the realization that idleness
is trivial and is easily overcome. Idleness is quickly cured by work. However, work does not
cure boredom. In fact, work exacerbates boredom. Busy workers are the most boring of all:
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those whirring insects with their bustling buzzing, are the most boring1 of all (290). A sets up
idleness and work as a dialectical pairing. He wants to find something, like work, to pair with
boredom that will be the cure for boredom. He believes the analogue to work in this pairing is
amusement. Boredom is is annulled only by amusing oneself ergo, one ought to amuse
oneself (290). However, amusing oneself is easier said than done.
As we saw earlier, A believes boredom to be an infinitely repulsive force, of nearly
unstoppable momentum. For the most part, we have seen the character of the esthete, A, to be
rather flippant, sarcastic, and comic. At certain points, however, he takes on a more serious
nature, and perhaps it is at these moments that Kierkegaard himself comes to the surface, as we
possibly see here: [b]oredom rests upon the nothing that interlaces existence; its dizziness is
infinite, like that which comes through looking down into a bottomless abyss (291). This
description of boredom mirrors another central Kierkegaardian theme, namely, anxiety. His
description of boredom sounds remarkably like the description of anxiety given in his later work
Concept of Anxiety: Anxiety may be compared with dizziness. He whose eye happens to look
down into the yawning abyss becomes dizzy anxiety is the dizziness of freedom (CA, 61).
Boredom is facing the abyss of the nothing while anxiety faces the abyss of freedom. While it
is beyond our scope to compare boredom with Kierkegaards concept of anxiety, by giving such
a description of boredom, Kierkegaard is pointing to its central role in human existence.
Boredom is something like anxiety, in that it too faces a dizzying abyss. Overcoming boredom,
however A may seem to trivialize it, is serious business for Kierkegaard.
How then, can amusement conquer the nothing that boredom rests upon? What is
necessary for amusement? Change is key: All who are bored cry out for change (291). As
1 Here is an instance where A seems to equate being boring with being bored. Perhaps this is a translation issue.

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method of rotation of crops will provide the change that is needed. He does not want his
method to be confused with the vulgar notion of crop rotation, however. In its common usage,
as the method used by farmers, it consists in continually changing the soil, but seeing the
analogy in this only allows for change in the extensive dimension (291). What is this extensive
dimension? The extensive dimension is the spatio-temporal external world in which the
individual lives. The intensive dimension is the individuals internal, subjective, mental
dimension. A gives examples of extensive change as going abroad because one is bored with
their native land, or eating on silver instead of using the usual boring porcelain. A believes one
eventually runs out of ways to change the external environment: [t]his method cancels itself and
is the spurious infinity (292). A spurious infinity, as the translators note, is Hegelian jargon
denoting a false infinity, the Notion of infinity of in the understanding, a finitized infinite
(643-4, fn. 20).
A proposes a variation on the common notion of crop rotation that allows for (infinite?)
change in the intensive dimension: The method I propose does not consist in changing the soil
but, like proper crop rotation, consists in changing the method of cultivation and the kinds of
crops (292). In this variation, the soil, which corresponds to the extensive dimension, remains
unchanged. The method of cultivation and the crops correspond to the intensive dimension.
As model can be constructed as soil + cultivation method = crops. The soil remains constant.
The locus of change occurs in the cultivation method, which produces different crops. Being
only allowed to change the cultivation method is a limiting factor, but this limitation is viewed as
positive: Here at once is the principle of limitation, the sole saving principle in the world. The
more a person limits himself the more resourceful he becomes. By restricting extensive
possibility, one becomes more intensively directed: Here is the extreme boundary of that
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principle that seeks relief not through extensity but through intensity. A provides examples of
successful intensity: the prisoner who is amused solely by watching the movements of a spider, a
child in school entertained by trapping a fly, or allowing oneself to be entertained by the
monotonous dripping from the roof (292).
As analysis of the change required by amusement now becomes specifically focused on
the mental phenomena of recollecting and forgetting: The more resourceful one can be in
changing the method of cultivation, the better, but every particular change still falls under the
universal rule of the relation between recollecting and forgetting (292). Forgetting has
traditionally been associated with the negative, as a way of suppressing the unpleasant: To
forget this is the desire of all people, and when they encounter something unpleasant, they
always say: If only I could forget! (293). The need to forget the unpleasant arises because we
tend to give too much meaning to unpleasant events. We shouldnt attribute undue significance
to any event, pleasant or unpleasant: Thus nil admirari [marvel at nothing] is the proper wisdom
of life. No part of life ought to have so much meaning for a person that he cannot forget it any
moment he wants to; on the other hand, every single part of life ought to have so much meaning
for a person that he can remember it at any moment. Thus there is a balance between forgetting
and remembering. No event should have an overpowering memory, yet no event should be
completely forgotten.
This balance is apparent in the ability to remember poetically: The more poetically
one remembers, the more easily one forgets, for to remember poetically is actually only an
expression of forgetting. When I remember poetically, my experience has already undergone the
change of having lost everything painful (293). Remembering poetically is a selective form of
recollecting, where the painful is forgotten or pushed out. Remembering poetically is only
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possible if one is wary of all-out enjoyment: if one continually takes the utmost that enjoyment
can give, one will be unable to recollect or forget. In this case, recollection becomes
involuntary, one loses the ability to willfully recollect or forget anything. Thus, A prescribes a
technique for preventing one from being carried away by powerful experiences: if a person
notices that enjoyment or a part of life is carrying him away to forcefully, he stops for a moment
and recollects [f]rom the beginning, one curbs the enjoyment and does not hoist full sail for
any decision; one indulges with a certain mistrust (293). When an experience threatens to
become too powerful, one pauses to recollect. One stops to remember the value of controlled
recollection. One stops to view the relative importance or unimportance of the event at hand.
One essentially pauses to view the self ecstatically. A believes this ability to pause itself brings a
kind of of enjoyment, and at its maximum, enables the person complete control over their
existence: It is a singular feeling when in the midst of enjoyment one looks at it in order to
recollect it. When an individual has perfected himself in the art of forgetting and the art of
recollecting in this way, he is then able to play shuttlecock with all existence (293-4).
Forgetting and recollection thus have a reciprocal and interdependent relationship. A posits that
forgetting and recollection are identical: Forgetting is the scissors with which one snips away
what cannot be used, but, please note, under the maximal supervision of recollection. In this
way, forgetting and recollecting are identical, and the artistically achieved identity is the
Archimedean point with which one lifts the whole world (295). This kind of control over
forgetting and recollection allows ultimate control: one plays badminton with existence and has
the leverage to lift the whole world.
This kind of control may seem unrealistic. A claims that this art of recollecting and
forgetting precludes one from being able to have much of a social life. A recommends that one
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guard against friendship, never get married, or take an official post (295-8). This is As theory
of social prudence which Kierkegaard appears to be setting up as impracticable.
A continues in the vein of the need for mental control in his brief discussion of moods: it
is essential to have control over ones moods. To have them under control in the sense that one
can produce them at will is an impossibility [j]ust as an experienced sailor always scans the
sea and detects a squall far in advance, so one should always detect a mood a little in advance
(299). Moods cannot be controlled; they can only be detected and recognized in advance. It is
curious A believes this, when he has just posited an art of controlling recollection and
forgetting as entirely possible. Why do we have the mental powers to control recollecting and
forgetting, but not moods?
A brings this section of Either/Or to an end by expounding on another art, that of being
arbitrary: Arbitrariness is the whole secret. It is popularly believed that there is no art to being
arbitrary, and yet it takes profound study to be arbitrary in such a way that a person does not
himself run wild in it but himself has pleasure from it (299). What does arbitrariness entail? It
involves a rejection of the immediate object by replacement of the object with something
arbitrarily introduced. This provides a kind of accidental enjoyment: One does not enjoy the
immediate object but something else that one arbitrarily introduces. One sees at the middle of a
play; one reads the third section of a book. One thereby has enjoyment quite different from what
the author so kindly intended. One enjoys something totally accidental. This kind of enjoyment
allows life to feel unscripted and spontaneous, but taken to the extreme this practice would
make ones existence haphazard and random. For A, arbitrariness provides the necessary
amusement in conquering boredom: For many people, this method is an excellent means of
stimulation [t]he more consistently a person knows how to sustain this arbitrariness, the more
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amusing the combinations become (300). Thus, sustaining this arbitrariness and never falling
into patterns in daily life provides endless amusement, which is As prescription for curing
boredom.
Earlier, in his description of his rotation of crops method, A emphasized the importance
of change in the intensive dimension over change in the extensive dimension. He returns to that
theme, though not explicitly, at the end of this section of Either/Or: The accidental outside of
person corresponds to the arbitrariness within him. Therefore he always ought to have his eyes
open for the accidental, always ought to be expeditus [ready] if something should come up
(300). The accidental takes place in the extensive dimension, while arbitrariness occurs in the
intensive dimension. The extensive dimension can apparently affect the intensive dimension: the
more accidental the extensive, the more arbitrary the intensive. The accidental things of the
extensive dimension become material for arbitrary amusement in the intensive dimension: even
the most insignificant thing can accidentally become a rich material for amusement (300).
At the end of this section of Either/Or, A does not summarize how his rotation of crops
method cures boredom. How does amusement which requires change which in turn involves
recollecting, forgetting, and arbitrariness relate to the problem of annulling boredom? Let us
recall how A sets this up. The amusement that annuls boredom requires change. This change
cannot rely on change in the extensive dimension, that is, one cannot cure boredom merely by
changing ones external surroundings. The change must occur in the intensive, subjective
dimension. In the intensive dimension, all change occurs in the relation between recollecting and
forgetting. This relation centers on not allowing oneself to be controlled by unpleasant or even
pleasant memories. There is an art to practicing recollecting/forgetting, that once perfected,
becomes the Archimedian point of leverage in controlling intensive change and thus boredom.
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Arbitrariness is the final key point: one can make any ordinary situation stimulating by inserting
something arbitrary.
Some inconsistencies can be found in As rotation of crops method. Initially, he contends
that limitation of the extensive dimension increases resourcefulness in the intensive dimension,
however in the end with his focus on arbitrariness, he indicates that accidental change in the
extensive dimension increases arbitrariness in the intensive dimension. In the former case,
restricting external change increases internal change, in the latter, increase in external increases
internal change. Perhaps the distinction is that in the former case, the extensive change isnt
accidental, it is something planned, which doesnt encourage spontaneity in the intensive
dimension. In the latter situation, since the extensive change is accidental, the intensive change
is unexpected and surprising.
Kierkegaard, writing as Victor Eremita, who is further writing as the esthete A, seems to
be pointing at the weaknesses of living in the aesthetic realm. Some of As assertions border on
being ridiculous. At the same time however, much of As analysis of the problem of boredom is
insightful, and cannot be dismissed outright. The distinction between idleness and boredom is
quite perceptive. Overall, A is emphasizing the importance of being comfortable in ones own
skin: to be content in periods of external inactivity because one has an abundance of internal
activity. Kierkegaard appears to see some strength in this, but in Part II of Either/Or and in other
works such as Concluding Unscientific Postscript he will favor the ethical and religious positions
over the aesthetic stance taken here.

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Works Cited
Kierkegaard, Sren, Howard Vincent Hong, and Edna Hatlestad Hong. Either /or: Part I.
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton UP, 1987. Print.
Kierkegaard, Sren, Reidar Thomte, and Albert Anderson. The Concept of Anxiety: a Simple
Psychologically Orienting Deliberation on the Dogmatic Issue of Hereditary Sin. Princeton N.J:
Princeton UP, 1980. Print.

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